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

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PUBLIC OPINION ON CARBON PRICING AND REVENUE USES IN EAST AFRICA

Niklas Harring, Anna Nordén, Daniel Slunge

Public Opinion on Carbon Pricing and Revenue Uses in East Africa

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Foreword by EBA

The ongoing climate crisis calls for radically reduced emissions of greenhouse gases. Although low- and lower middle-income countries may have small or minimal climate footprints compared to richer countries, reductions are key also in those countries, not least since future consumption is likely to increase with increasing economic growth and population.

The most common way to reduce emissions is to decrease subsidies or increase prices on fossil fuels. However, such reforms often come at a price in the form of negative reactions and opposition from vast groups of citizens. Hence, to assess the feasibility of reduced emissions, it is important to know how the public is likely to react. Several studies of public opinion on environmental policies have been conducted in OECD countries. In African countries, however, such knowledge is rare.

The Swedish government has announced an increase in Swedish climate aid, with the primary purpose of more effectively contribute to reduced greenhouse gas emissions. Hence, the current study provides timely findings about public opinions in three East African countries. And what kind of interventions are relevant to support with development assistance?

We believe this report will be of use to staff at Swedish embassies in the East African region when deciding what policies to support, and what dialogues to pursue with national governments in the three countries. We also believe the report may inform staff within the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Sida, as it contributes to filling a knowledge gap. The study has been conducted with support from a reference group chaired by Johan Schaar, who previously served as vice chair of EBA.

The authors are solely responsible for the content of the report.

Stockholm, March 2024

Torbjörn Becker, EBA chair

Johan Schaar

Sammanfattning

Klimatförändringarna utgör en akut utmaning med djupgående konsekvenser för ekosystem, människors hälsa, livsmedelssäkerhet och ekonomisk utveckling, världen över. Därmed är en effektiv global klimatomställning ett prioriterat område i svensk utvecklingspolitik. Svenskt bistånd syftar till att bidra väsentligt till energieffektivitet och effektiv minskning av utsläpp, vilket understryker behovet av klimatåtgärder globalt.

Dagens höginkomstländer bär ett stort historiskt ansvar för klimatförändringarna. Samtidigt, för att uppfylla Parisavtalets mål, måste även låg- och medelinkomstländer undvika utsläpp av växthusgaser. Detta gäller exempelvis afrikanska länder, vars utsläpp förväntas öka i takt med att deras befolkningar och ekonomier växer. I den här rapporten analyserar vi möjligheten att införa koldioxidskatter och ta bort subventioner av fossila bränslen i Östafrika, med fokus på allmänhetens uppfattningar om dessa åtgärder. Vi använder ”koldioxidprissättning” för att omfatta båda åtgärderna, eftersom båda i praktiken innebär höjda kostnaderna för fossila bränslen och därmed minskar utsläppen.

När afrikanska länder utvecklar sina klimathandlingsplaner i enlighet med Parisavtalet är det viktigt att regeringar, biståndsgivare och andra aktörer har en god förståelse av vilket stöd det finns hos allmänheten för olika klimatpolitiska styrmedel. Det finns en snabbt växande vetenskaplig litteratur inom området, som kan hjälpa beslutsfattare att utforma klimatpolitiska styrmedel som accepteras av allmänheten, men den täcker huvudsakligen OECD-länder. Kunskapen om acceptans för klimatpolitiska styrmedel i afrikanska länder är låg. De betydande skillnaderna i inkomstnivåer, institutionell tillit och korruption mellan OECD-länder och afrikanska länder begränsar sannolikt överförbarheten av existerande forskningsresultat.

Denna studie undersöker allmänhetens stöd för koldioxidskatter och avskaffandet av subventioner på fossila bränslen i de tre östafrikanska länderna Kenya, Tanzania och Uganda. Vi fokuserar specifikt på hur allmänhetens stöd för en koldioxidskatt påverkas av att explicit ange hur skatteintäkterna används. Genom att fokusera på Östafrika, där utbredd fattigdom och omfattande korruption bidrar till lågt förtroende för politiska institutioner, bidrar studien med ny kunskap om acceptansen för klimatpolitiska styrmedel.

Forskningsfrågor:

Studien struktureras kring fyra centrala forskningsfrågor:

1. Finns det stöd hos allmänheten för koldioxidprissättning i Kenya, Tanzania och Uganda?
2. Hur påverkas allmänhetens stöd för en koldioxidskatt av explicit information om skatteintäkternas användning?
3. Vilka är preferenserna för användningen av intäkterna från en koldioxidskatt när det gäller tidsaspekter (lång/kort sikt) och varans natur (kollektiva/privata nyttigheter)?
4. Hur är institutionellt förtroende och brist på institutionellt förtroende associerat med stöd för koldioxidbeskattning och preferenser för användning av skatteintäkterna?

Studien bygger på empiriska data från två befolkningsundersökningar i Kenya, Tanzania och Uganda genomförda 2022 och 2023. Det är viktigt att notera att vårt urval inte är helt representativt för befolkningen i de tre länderna, eftersom det innehåller en relativt större andel av mer urbana och utbildade invånare. Eftersom denna del av befolkningen förmodligen har ett relativt större politiskt inflytande än andra delar av befolkningen, kan kunskap om deras acceptans och stöd för styrmedel vara särskilt relevant för beslutsfattare. Givet den bristande representativiteten bör dock resultaten tolkas med försiktighet och generaliseringar undvikas. Dessa förbehåll till trots etablerar studien en empirisk grund för framtida forskning, samt bidrar med ny kunskap om acceptans och stöd för klimatpolitiska styrmedel i Östafrika.

Resultat:

1. *Stöd för koldioxidprissättning:* Våra resultat visar ett genomsnittligt stöd på 29 % för skatter på fossila bränslen och 33 % för minskning av subventioner på fossila bränslen bland den relativt mer urbana och utbildade delen av befolkningen i Kenya, Tanzania och Uganda. Detta ligger nära vissa globala uppskattningar, såsom det 33 % genomsnittliga stödet i 23 europeiska länder (Fairbrother et al., 2019). Stödet är dock betydligt lägre än de nivåer som rapporterats av Dechezleprêtre et al. (2023), med en stödnivå på runt 55 % i höginkomstländer och 70 % i medelinkomstländer. Variation i nivå finns också bland de östafrikanska länderna, där lägst stöd finns hos befolkningen i Kenya.
2. *Information om användning av skatteintäkter och stöd för koldioxid-prissättning:* Att explicit specificera hur intäkter ska användas mer än fördubblar stödet för en skatt, eller ett avskaffande av subventioner, på fossila bränslen, jämfört med när användningen av intäkter inte görs explicit. Noterbart är att användning av skatteintäkter för utbildnings och sociala program är det som medför högst befolkningsmässigt stöd. Flera andra studier finner att användning av skatteintäkter för miljöinsatser är det som genererar mest stöd bland medborgarna. En tänkbar förklaring kan vara att den utbredda fattigdomen i de tre länderna gör att sociala frågor prioriteras högre.
3. *Preferenser för användning av intäkter från koldioxidprissättning:* Trots förekomsten av utbredd fattigdom, korruption och institutionell misstro, föredrar en betydande andel av de som deltagit i undersökningen att intäkterna från en koldioxidskatt ska användas till långsiktiga investeringar i kollektivtrafik snarare än kortsiktig finansiering. De föredrar också att intäkterna ska användas till kollektiva nyttigheter snarare än privata nyttigheter (som kontantöverföringar).

4. *Institutionellt misstroende och stöd för koldioxidprissättning:* Vi finner att en hög grad av misstroende, både mot andra medborgare och mot statliga institutioner, är associerat med lägre stöd för koldioxidprissättning. Detta resultat belyser den viktiga kopplingen mellan förtroende för politiska institutioner och stöd för hållbara och samhälleliga investeringar. Att bygga förtroende för institutioner tar tid, men de preferenser för långsiktiga investeringar och kollektiva nyttigheter som identifieras i studien över tre länder, kan hjälpa till att bygga detta förtroende.

Slutsatser för utformningen av koldioxidprissättning i Östafrika och biståndspolitik:

Flera av studiens resultat har en potentiellt viktig betydelse för utformningen av svensk biståndspolitik på klimatområdet och för utformningen av klimatpolitiska styrmedel i Östafrika.

Trots att det offentliga stödet för koldioxidprissättning i Kenya, Tanzania och Uganda är måttligt, kan det sannolikt bli högre genom explicit information om hur intäkterna från skatter eller minskade subventioner används. Resultatet att politik som kopplar samman koldioxidprissättning med social utveckling kan få ett större stöd hos allmänheten kan innebära en unik möjlighet. Om svenskt bistånd kan kombinera stöd som adresserar klimatförändringarna samtidigt som de leder till konkreta sociala förbättringar har det sannolikt större chans att blir framgångsrikt.

Slutligen visar preferenserna för långsiktiga investeringar och kollektiva varor på möjligheten för svenskt bistånd att fokusera på långsiktigt hållbara initiativ även i utmanande politiska och ekonomiska sammanhang. Här kan till exempel initiativ som investeringar i hållbar kollektivtrafik och förnybar energi ligga i linje med både allmänhetens preferenser och klimatpolitiskt effektiva prioriteringar.

Summary

Climate change poses an urgent global challenge with profound consequences for ecosystems, human health, food security, and economic development. Within this context, an accelerated global climate transition has become a key priority in Swedish development aid policy. Swedish aid aims to contribute substantially to energy efficiency and effective emission reduction, underscoring the need for climate action globally.

While high-income countries bear greater historical responsibility for greenhouse gas emissions, low- and lower middle-income countries must also transition away from fossil fuels to meet Paris Agreement targets. This includes African countries, whose emissions are expected to increase as their populations and economies grow. In this report, we assess the viability of implementing carbon taxes and ending fossil fuel subsidies in East Africa, with a focus on public perception. We use "carbon pricing" to encompass both measures, recognizing their collective impact on raising fossil fuel costs and supporting climate mitigation efforts.

As African countries develop their Nationally Determined Contributions under the Paris agreement, it is crucial that they, and development actors, understand the public support for different policy options to reduce carbon emissions. The rapidly growing scientific literature on this subject can assist decision-makers in designing climate policy reforms that are accepted by the public. However, since this literature is predominantly covering OECD countries, there is little evidence that explains public support for climate policies in African countries. The transferability of these findings to less economically developed contexts is likely limited, firstly due to lower income levels, and secondly, due to the prevailing institutional distrust, which could further complicate the implementation of public policies.

In this study we examine public support for carbon taxes and subsidy removals on fossil fuels in the three East African countries Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. We specifically focus on how public support for a carbon tax is affected by explicitly stating revenue uses and the preferences for different types of uses of the revenue generated. Exploring revenue recycling from carbon pricing is particularly intriguing in the context of East Africa, where prevalent poverty and widespread corruption contribute to institutional distrust.

Research Questions:

The study is structured around four central research questions:

1. Is there public support for carbon pricing in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda?
2. How does specifying different uses of revenue affect public support for carbon pricing?
3. What are the preferences for different aspects of revenue uses from carbon pricing, such as temporal aspects and the nature of the good?
4. How is institutional trust and distrust associated with support for carbon pricing and preferences for allocation of revenue generated from carbon pricing?

The study builds on empirical data from two population surveys in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda carried out 2022 and 2023. It is important to note that our sample is not fully representative of the population in the three countries as it contains a relatively larger share of more urban and more educated inhabitants. As this segment of the population is presumably relatively more influential in the policy process than other parts of the population, knowledge about their preferences may be particularly relevant from a policy making perspective. However, the non-comprehensive representation of the broader population and the reliance on stated preferences, susceptible to various biases, necessitate a cautious interpretation of our findings.

Despite these considerations and caveats, we believe our study not only establishes an empirical foundation for future research, but also provides essential scientific and policy insights regarding public opinions on carbon pricing and revenue uses in East Africa.

Main Findings:

1. *Public support for carbon pricing:* Our findings indicate an average support of 29% for fossil fuel taxes and 33% for fossil fuel subsidy reductions among the relatively more urban and more educated segment of the population in Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda. This aligns closely with some global figures, such as the 33% average support reported in 23 European countries (Fairbrother et al., 2019). However, it is also significantly lower than the levels reported by Dechezleprêtre et al. (2023), with a level of support of around 55% in high-income countries and 70% in middle-income countries. Variation in level also exists among the East African countries, with Kenya exhibiting the weakest public support.
2. *Revenue recycling and policy acceptance:* Explicitly specifying revenue use more than doubles support for a tax on fossil fuels or a subsidy removal compared to when revenue uses is not made explicit. Notably, allocating revenue toward educational and social programs has the most pronounced effect in increasing acceptability. A plausible explanation could be the prevalence of poverty within the three countries. In environments where poverty is more widespread, social issues may resonate more deeply with people, shaping their priorities.
3. *Preferences for the use of revenues from carbon pricing:* Despite living in countries with widespread poverty and institutional distrust where corruption may lead to bureaucratic red tape, a significant portion of the population shows support for directing carbon tax revenues towards long-term investments rather than short-term financing, and towards public goods rather than private goods (such as cash transfers), in the context of public transport.

4. *The role of institutional distrust:* Distrust, both in others and government institutions, is associated with lower level of public support for carbon pricing instruments. This underscores the important role of trust in influencing public acceptance. Recognizing the impact of institutional distrust on individual choices, the study emphasizes the important connection between trust at the institutional level and public support for sustainable and societal investments. Building trust in institutions takes time, but the preference for long-term investments in public goods, as seen in the study across three countries, could help in building this trust.

Implications for carbon pricing in East Africa and aid policy:

This report offers important insights for climate policy in East Africa and Swedish aid policy. It reveals that while public support for carbon pricing in Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda is modest, it can be enhanced through being explicit about revenue uses. The finding that linking carbon pricing with social development programs could increase public support presents a unique opportunity. Swedish aid could support policies and projects that address climate change while providing immediate, tangible community benefits, harmonizing environmental and social objectives.

Additionally, preferences towards long-term investments in public goods, even in challenging political and economic contexts, highlights the importance of focusing on sustainable infrastructure projects. For policymakers and Swedish aid, prioritizing initiatives such as sustainable public transportation and renewable energy aligns with public preferences and promotes sustainable development, although the challenges posed by corruption should not be overlooked.

1 Introduction

Climate change is one of the most urgent challenges facing humanity today with devastating consequences for ecosystems, human health, food security, and economic development. The consequences are particularly serious for low-income countries with few resources to adapt. Limiting global warming to 1.5 or 2.0 degrees[1] over pre-industrial levels require the implementation of strong policy measures that incentivises drastic reductions in green-house gas emissions (IPCC, 2023).

While the greatest historical responsibility for greenhouse gas emissions rests on the industrialized world, it is necessary that also low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) engage in the transition away from fossil fuels to reach the targets set in the Paris Agreement. This includes African countries, whose emissions are expected to increase as their populations and economies grow (IEA, 2022). An accelerated global climate transition is a key priority in Swedish development aid policy stating that Swedish aid increasingly shall contribute to energy efficiency and effective emission reduction (Swedish government, 2023).

In this report, we explore the feasibility of introducing carbon taxes and removing fossil fuel subsidies in East African countries[2], focusing on the public reception of these measures. Throughout our analysis, we employ the term "carbon pricing", acknowledging that while the removal of fossil fuel subsidies does not directly constitute

[1] According to the global stocktake which is a central outcome of COP 28, the UN Climate Change Conference in Dubai in December 2023, the global greenhouse gas emissions need to be cut by a daunting 43% by 2030, compared to 2019 levels, to limit global warming to 1.5°C (UNFCC, 2023). (https://unfccc.int/news/cop28-agreement-signals-beginning-of-the-end-of-the-fossil-fuel-era)

[2] An increasing number of countries are implementing carbon taxes and emission trading systems to curb emissions. Most existing instruments are in North American and Europe, but also a number of emerging economies and African countries are exploring carbon pricing options (World Bank, 2023).

a carbon price, both actions effectively raise the cost of fossil fuels, thereby aiding climate mitigation efforts (van den Bergh, van Beers & King, 2024).

Especially carbon taxes are widely regarded as the most efficient and cost-effective way to reduce emissions, and could be central components of the "ambitious, economy-wide emission reduction targets, covering all greenhouse gases, sectors and categories and aligned with the 1.5°C limit" which all countries are expected to include in their next round of Nationally Determined Contributions (climate action plans) (UNFCC, 2023).

Besides raising the cost of carbon-intensive activities and incentivizing behavioural change and innovation in alternatives (see e.g. Stieglitz et al., 2017), another important feature of carbon pricing instruments is their potential to generate fiscal revenue. In fact, fuel taxes have constituted a significant source of fiscal revenue in many African countries long before they were framed as climate policy instruments (Slunge and Sterner, 2009).

However, a crucial prerequisite for the implementation of carbon pricing instruments is that they are supported by the public[3]. This is not only important from a democracy perspective. Also from a more practical standpoint, the absence of public support poses a significant risk to the implementation of climate policies (Jagers et al., 2021). Initially, there is a risk of social unrest, as evidenced in nations like Nigeria, Mozambique, and Ghana, where attempts to eliminate fossil fuel subsidies have sparked unrest. Additionally, politicians, prioritizing their political longevity, are unlikely to initiate such reforms without significant public backing (Burstein, 2003; Matti, 2015). Finally, studies indicate that when policies are perceived as fair and legitimate, citizen compliance tends to increase (Tyler, 2006; Stern, 2008).

[3] In this text we will use the terms public support and public acceptance interchangeably. For a further discussion see Kysela et al., 2019.

Hence, as more countries develop their Nationally Determined Contributions under the Paris agreement, it is crucial that they, and development actors, understand the public support of different policy options. The rapidly growing scientific literature on this subject can aid decision-makers in designing climate policy reforms that are accepted by the public. However, since this literature is predominantly covering OECD countries, there is little knowledge on public support for climate policies in African countries. The transferability of these findings to less economically developed contexts may be limited due to lower income levels and prevalent institutional distrust, which could further complicate the implementation of public policies. Distrust in public institutions can influence individuals' readiness to back long-term investments and support for public goods. In situations where there is scepticism regarding the management and execution of policies, people may be reluctant to endorse or contribute to initiatives with long-term benefits. It is crucial to acknowledge this pattern in contexts plagued by high levels of institutional distrust, as it influences policy formulation and public investment strategies.

The first aim of this report is to examine public support for carbon pricing (i.e., a carbon tax or the removal of subsidies for fossil fuels) in East Africa, along with the factors influencing this support. Here we utilize data from a 2022 population survey involving participants from East Africa, including Kenya (959 respondents), Tanzania (981 respondents), and Uganda (885 respondents)[4]. Several factors influence support for carbon taxes, as discussed in previous literature (e.g., Bergquist et al., 2022), which we elaborate on in Section 3.1 of this report. However, our focus in this report is on institutional trust and distrust, which we consider relevant for the East African context, where public distrust in public institutions is understandably widespread due to political uncertainty and corruption (Dulani et al., 2023).

[4] The paper "Public acceptability of policy instruments for reducing fossil fuel consumption in East Africa" (Harring et al., 2024) contains a detailed analysis of the climate policy related data from this survey.

A key policy question is how to make carbon pricing policies more publicly acceptable. One important finding in the scientific literature is that revenue recycling or making revenues (or savings) from carbon pricing instruments explicit and specified, generally increases public support (Valencia et al., 2023). However, it is dependent on the specification of these resources. Investigations of the effects of lump-sum transfers (i.e. general transfers to all households), indicate varying results, sometimes an increase in public support (e.g., Nowlin et al., 2020) while others find no effects or even decline in support for carbon pricing policies (Fremstad, 2022; Mildenberger, 2022). However, even though there is variation between different studies and contexts, investments in climate adaptation, environmental restoration, social welfare programs as well as lowering taxes or supporting vulnerable groups in society increases public support for carbon pricing (Baranzini & Carattini, 2017; Dechezleprêtre et al., 2023; Grimsrud et al., 2020; Jagers et al., 2021; Kallbekken et al., 2011; Kotchen et al., 2017; Maestre-Andrés et al., 2017; Nowlin et al., 2020; Sælen & Kallbekken, 2011). Yet again, there is an empirical gap as most studies have been conducted in OECD countries and there are hardly any studies on low-income countries[5].

Further, exploring revenue recycling from carbon pricing is especially intriguing in the context of East Africa with prevalent poverty and widespread corruption. These factors present significant obstacles in tax collection and the implementation of both long-term investments and investments in public goods. Unfortunately, tax revenues often find alternative channels, in terms of bribes or entangled in bureaucratic red tape, thereby casting significant doubt on the successful completion of long-term projects. An illustration of this challenge in a somewhat similar context can be seen in a study conducted on small development projects in Ghana, revealing that merely one third of initiated projects were finalized (Williams, 2017).

[5] See Dechezleprêtre et al., 2023 and Harring et al., 2024 for two recent studies on public acceptability of climate policies in low- and middle-income countries.

Consequently, individuals in East Africa may exhibit reluctance in allocating resources towards endeavours with a longer time horizon.

In contexts marked by corrupt and dysfunctional political institutions, individuals tend to prioritize private goods over public goods (cf. Svallfors, 2013; Bauhr & Charron, 2020; Jacobs & Matthews, 2015). Consequently, individuals may exhibit a diminished inclination to allocate resources to long-term investments and to contribute to the financing of public goods.

In line with these research findings, **the second aim of this report** is to identify how specifying different uses of revenue affect public support for carbon pricing and the preferences for different types of uses of the revenue generated from carbon pricing. Also in this case we pay particular attention to the association between institutional distrust and the preferences for allocation of revenue generated from carbon pricing. To study these issues, we included specific questions about revenue use in the survey carried out in 2022 (see above). We also carried out an additional population survey in 2023 with participants from Kenya (852 respondents), Tanzania (921 respondents), and Uganda (904 respondents). This survey focused on how respondents in East Africa would distribute revenues from carbon pricing, particularly emphasizing the temporal aspect (long-term versus short-term) and the nature of goods (public versus private). We specifically focused on the allocation of funds towards long-term investments in the context of public transportation, as opposed to short-term ones. Additionally, we examined funding for public goods, such as public transportation, in contrast to private goods, like direct cash transfers.

The third aim of the report is to discuss implications of our findings for Swedish development policy and ultimately the design of carbon pricing policies in developing countries.

1.1 Research questions

1. Is there public support for carbon pricing in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda?
2. How does specifying different uses of revenue affect public support for carbon pricing?
3. What are the preferences for different aspects of revenue uses from carbon pricing, such as temporal aspects and the nature of the good?
4. How is institutional trust and distrust associated with support for carbon pricing and the preferences for allocation of revenue generated from carbon pricing?

The two population surveys underpinning this report were conducted in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda in 2022 and 2023 by professional survey firms using computer assisted telephone interviews. Interviews were conducted based on prior informed consent, and research permits were acquired from relevant authorities[6].

It is important to note that our sample is not fully representative of the population in Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda. Instead, it includes a relatively larger proportion of urban and more educated individuals. This outcome is expected in phone surveys in these regions, as they tend to target this segment of the population due to the extent of mobile phone coverage. As this segment of the population is presumably relatively more influential in the policy

[6] For the 2022 survey, research approval was received from the National Commission of Science, Technology and Innovation in Kenya, and the survey company possess national research permits for each of the five focal countries. For the 2023 survey, research approvals were obtained from the Tanzania Commission for Science and Technology, the Uganda Ministry of Water and Environment, and the Kenya National Commission of Science, Technology and Innovation. The Swedish Ethical Review Authority decided that an ethical permit was not needed.

process than other parts of the population, knowledge about the preferences of this part of the population may be particularly relevant from a policy making perspective. However, the non-comprehensive representation of the broader population and the reliance on stated preferences, susceptible to various biases, necessitate a cautious interpretation of our findings. For instance, more educated respondents might show more positive attitudes towards climate change policies due to higher environmental awareness, potentially leading to an overestimation of overall support. Urban respondents, benefiting differently from policies like public transportation improvements, may not represent the views of rural populations who have distinct needs, such as climate adaptation in agriculture. Additionally, potentially better access to information among our sample could further tilt preferences towards support of climate policies, not fully capturing the diverse views and needs of the entire population. Therefore, while the preferences of the urban and more educated are relevant for policy-making, especially given their potential influence, it's crucial to approach the interpretation of our findings with caution, acknowledging the limitations of our sample's representation.

Despite these considerations and caveats, we believe our study not only establishes an empirical foundation for future research, but also provides essential scientific and policy insights regarding public opinions on carbon pricing and revenue uses in East Africa.

1.2 A road map for the report

This report is structured to guide the reader through an in-depth examination of public support for carbon pricing policies (i.e., a carbon tax or fossil fuel subsidies removal), including revenue recycling and preferences for different components of revenue uses and its association with institutional distrust, in the context of Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda. We begin in Section 2 by establishing a

foundational background on existing fossil fuel taxes and other relevant instruments in these countries, setting the stage for a deeper exploration of public attitudes and policy support.

In Section 3, the journey continues with a review of existing literature, shedding light on some of the important determinants of climate policy support and the implications of revenue recycling. This section synthesizes previous academic findings and frames the subsequent analysis within a broader scholarly context.

Section 4 presents our primary research findings, exploring the levels of public support for carbon pricing in the three countries. Here, we also study how factors such as institutional trust and specific revenue uses influence public support for carbon pricing policies.

Section 5 shifts the focus to the preferences regarding the allocation of carbon pricing revenues. This section present results of preferences for long-term investments and for public goods over private ones, as well as examines how institutional distrust shapes these preferences, providing critical insights into the nuances of public opinion.

The report culminates in a concluding discussion in Section 6, where we synthesize the main findings and discuss their implications. This final section reflects on the implications for carbon pricing policy design in low- and lower middle-income countries and considers the relevance of these findings for Swedish development policy.

For an in-depth understanding of the research methodologies employed, we direct readers to the detailed discussions on the design of the 2022 survey in Harring et al. (2024), and for the 2023 survey to Appendix 3.

Overall, this report aims to provide a clear, logical progression through the complex terrain of public support for carbon pricing policy in East Africa, offering valuable insights for policymakers, scholars, and practitioners in the field.

2 Carbon pricing policies in East Africa

This section provides a brief background to the climate emission reduction targets and carbon pricing policies in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. We also give examples of social protests relating to climate policies in the three countries and provide comparative country data on economic development, poverty levels and corruption.

All three countries have submitted Nationally Determined Contributions to the UN with stated ambitions to reduce the emissions of green-house gases by 2030 with 25–35% in relation to a business-as-usual scenario of increasing emissions. For example, Kenya commits to "economy-wide emission reductions by at least 32% compared to the 2030 BAU (baseline) emissions". One of the priority areas for mitigation is a "low carbon and efficient transport system" (Govt. of Kenya, 2020). Tanzania and Uganda also identify the transport sector as one of several priority sectors for mitigation (Govt. of Tanzania, 2021; Govt. of Uganda, 2022). Hence, there will be a need to implement mitigation policies to reach the stated targets.

Table 1 presents an overview of the use of taxes on fossil fuels in the realm of transportation. All three countries employ excise duties on imported fossil fuels, with these import taxes serving as a substantial source of fiscal revenue that is not earmarked (Slunge and Sterner, 2009). Moreover, Kenya and Tanzania use road maintenance levies, earmarked for the upkeep of roads, along with other levies to finance for example energy infrastructure. Notably, there exist various additional regulations, subsidies, and taxes on vehicles, albeit not detailed in Table 1, as they do not directly address fossil fuel consumption.

Table 1: Fossil fuel related taxation in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania

	Kenya	Uganda	Tanzania
Excise duty	Introduced in 2015, revised in 2021[1]. Applicable to automotive gasoline and diesel. Rate: 0.16 USD/L of gasoline; 0.08 USD/L of diesel[1] (April 2023)	Introduced in 2014, revised in 2020[7] Applicable to gasoline, diesel, and other gas oils (e.g., kerosene) Rate: 0.39 USD/L of gasoline; 0.30 USD/L of diesel and gas oil[8] (February 2023)	Introduced in 1990[9].Applicable to imported gasoline and diesel[10]. Rate: 0.14 USD/L of premium gasoline; 0.16 USD/L of regular gasoline; 0.11 USD/L of diesel[11] (January 2023)
Road Maintenance Levy	Introduced in 1993[2]. Applicable to gasoline and diesel. Rate: 0.13 USD/L[3] (April 2021)		Introduced in 2001, revised 2021[12]. Applicable to petrol and diesel12 Rate: 0.17 USD/L[11] (January 2023)
Other levies on fossil fuels	Petroleum Development Levy (PDL) to develop distribution and testing infrastructures for oil products, introduced in 1992 (revised in 2020)[4] Petroleum Regulatory Levy (PRL) to finance		Petroleum fee to develop energy infrastructure[13]. Introduced in 2015[13] Applicable to petrol, diesel, and kerosene Rate: 0.04 USD/L[11] (January 2023)

	Kenya	Uganda	Tanzania
	sector regulation, introduced in 2014 (revised in 2018)[5] Applicable to all consumed petroleum products (e.g., gasoline, diesel). Rates: PDL: 0.04 USD/L of gasoline and diesel; 0.003 USD/L of kerosene[6] (April 2023) PRL: 0.002 USD/L of automotive gasoline, kerosene, and diesel[6] (April 2023)		

Notes: Average conversion rates (25 April 2023): 1USD = 133.56 KES (Kenyan Shilling); 1USD = 3,709.78 UGX (Uganda Shilling); 1USD = 2,308.27 TZS (Tanzanian Shilling) (Source: Oanda.com). See Appendix 1 for the sources of the table. See also Harring et al., 2024.

The implementation of some of the policies related to fossil fuels has led to public protests. For instance, in Kenya, street protests erupted in 2011 in response to the escalating fuel costs (IRIN, 2011). In 2018, oil distributors staged a strike to contest the imposition of a 16% tax on fuel (CGTN Africa, 2018). Subsequently, in 2021, motorists obstructed highways to express their discontent with soaring fuel prices (The East African, 2021). In Uganda, significant protests against elevated fuel prices were held in 2011 (The Guardian, 2011), and in July 2022, Ugandan authorities resorted to teargas and arrested over 40 individuals during a large-scale protest against

heightened fuel prices. The demonstration also spotlighted the government's refusal to reduce taxes on cooking oil and fuel (Reuters, 2022). These instances underscore the importance of considering public acceptability in the formulation and implementation of policies related to fossil fuels in East Africa.

The indicators for each country outlined in Table 2 reveal very low mean energy-related carbon emissions per capita in the region, ranging from 0.13 tCO_2 per capita in Uganda to 0.42 tCO_2 per capita in Kenya. These figures reflect the differing per capita income levels in the three countries. Notably, there exists a significant variance also in poverty rates, with 37% in Uganda, 39% in Tanzania, and only 16% of Kenya's population subsisting on less than 1.9 USD a day. Moreover, corruption poses a significant challenge, with Uganda ranked 144th and Kenya 128th out of 180 countries in Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index. Tanzania is ranked somewhat more favourably as the 87th most corrupt country. Evidently, the East African context differs substantially in various aspects from the high-income and high climate gas-emitting countries that have traditionally been the focus of studies on public climate policy attitudes.

Despite the lower emissions and consequently reduced revenues in these three low- and lower middle-income countries, carbon taxation remains a compelling policy instrument. As argued by for example Heine and Black (2019); In these settings, a carbon tax would likely target wealthier population groups, who are the primary emitters of greenhouse gases due to their higher consumption patterns and reliance on fossil fuels. A carbon tax not only ensures that the principle of 'polluter pays' is adhered to, but it also avoids placing undue financial burdens on the poorer segments of society. Furthermore, the revenues generated, even if smaller, could be strategically invested in renewable energy projects or used to fund climate adaptation efforts, which are crucial for these countries' resilience to climate change impacts. Thus, carbon taxation stands

out as a viable policy tool that aligns economic incentives with environmental sustainability goals, even in contexts with lower overall emissions.

Table 2: Selected country statistics

Indicator	Year	Units	Kenya	Uganda	Tanzania
Population	2020	Millions	53.7	41.5	59.7
GDP per capita	2021	USD/capita	2,007	858	1,135
Poverty rate	2020	% of population below 1.9$/day	16	37	39
Energy-related CO_2 emissions[1]	2019	tCO_2/capita	0.42	0.13	0.21
Degree of urbanization[2]	2020	%	28	24.9	35.2
Corruption Perception Index (Transparency International)[3]	2021	Score[4]	30	27	39
		Ranking[5]	128	144	87

Notes: [1]Includes CO_2 emissions from burning fossil fuels and cement manufacturing but excludes land use emissions. [2]Percentage of total population living in urban areas; [3]https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2021; [4]Score: 100 (very clean), 0 (highly corrupt). Sample 88 had the highest score, and sample 11 had the lowest score.; [5]Ranking among 180 countries.

Source: The table is based on Harring et al., 2024, using data from World Development Indicators, the World Bank and Transparency International.

3 From resistance to public support for carbon pricing?

3.1 Public support of climate policy instruments

There is today a substantial body of academic literature focusing on the overall public acceptance and rejection of climate policy instruments, and a diverse array of factors have been recognized as influential determinants of individuals' attitudes (Bergquist et al., 2022; Drews and van den Bergh, 2016). Nevertheless, there is a notable empirical gap, as almost all these studies are conducted in the Global North (Kallbekken, 2023). In this section, we discuss factors that have been recognized in previous research with a special focus on institutional trust and distrust and elucidate the relevance to our study in East Africa.

One reason for politicians to be hesitant to implement carbon pricing on a larger scale might be believes of lack majority support for such measures. Indeed, for instance, a survey of European countries by Fairbrother et al. (2019) found that only 33% of Europeans supported a higher tax on fossil fuels to reduce carbon emissions, and this is a common trend across almost all countries in the survey. However, Dechezleprêtre et al. (2023), find that a level of support of 55% in high-income countries and 70% in middle-income countries. Clearly, levels of support vary between contexts but also between studies indicating that support can be influenced in different ways.

Before introducing the factors explaining public support for carbon pricing that we focus on in our survey, namely, revenue uses and institutional distrust, we will account for a number of other determinants which have been discussed in previous research. A key

factor influencing individuals' attitudes is the degree to which they, or their respective social groups, are impacted by reform measures or policy instruments. This impact could be both in terms of costs, such as augmented prices on consumer goods (e.g. Jakobsson et al., 2000), and benefits, such as enhanced air or water quality.

However, self-interest alone cannot explain individuals' policy positions, also other factors at the individual level play significant roles in shaping policy attitudes. These factors can be categorized into internal, external, inter-relational elements, and policy specific beliefs; the latter referring to, for example whether a specific policy imposes constraints on individual freedoms and whether it is effective in achieving stated objectives influence levels of support (Eriksson et al., 2008). For example, individuals might express concern about the potential extinction of certain fish species and therefore support the goal of implementing a fishing or selling ban on those species. However, they may not support the associated policies due to doubts about their effectiveness. They may fear that involved actors will not comply with policies and will continue to fish or sell these species regardless.

Policy specific beliefs could also encompass considerations of fairness, where individuals may resist a policy if they perceive it disproportionately impacts the economically disadvantaged, even if they themselves are not poor. Additionally, some may argue against climate mitigation policies based on claims that other nations bear greater responsibility for greenhouse gas emissions, deeming it unfair for their own country to enact such measures (Maestre-Andrés et al., 2019). Such considerations could also be linked to *internal* factors, such an individual's ideology and hence perspectives on the roles of the state and market intervention (Dunlap et al., 2001), which in the end affect their position on climate and environmental policies.

While the role ideological positions foremost have been scrutinized by political sociologists, another internal factor; values, has mostly been scrutinized by environmental psychologists. A line of research that argues that an individuals' fundamental values, which for

example could be divided into altruistic, egoistic, or biospheric values, can be activated and through individuals' beliefs, personal norms and concerns about the environment, in the end determine their policy positions. Where altruistic, and especially biospheric values, are associated with a prioritization of environmental objectives and hence, a stronger support for environmental policies compared to egoistic values (Matti, 2015; Stern, 2008; De Groot and Steg, 2007).

Moreover, *external,* or contextual, factors play a significant role in shaping policy attitudes. These factors include the level of economic development (Franzén and Meyer, 2008), economic equality (Harring, 2014), as well as historical and cultural perspectives regarding the state's role in the economy.[7] The idea that economic development fosters shifts in values, subsequently leading to heightened support for environmental and climate policies, has been influential. However, it has also faced considerable criticism (Dunlap and York, 2008).

In recent years, several studies have emphasized the significance of the quality of government (encompassing factors such as effectiveness, fairness, impartiality, and institutional functionality). This aspect is closely intertwined with the inter-relational factor of trust at the individual level. Research has consistently shown a reluctance towards economic instruments in contexts marked by corruption (Harring, 2016; Davidovic and Harring, 2020; Davidovic et al., 2020; Fairbrother et al., 2019). Potential reasons for this pattern include concerns about the challenges of transferring funds in corrupt environments, a preference for alternative legal or punitive measures in the absence of trust in other actors, the perception that taxes necessitate greater discretion from public administrations, or the historical misuse of taxes in corrupt regimes for private rather than public interests.

[7] However, it is hard to identify contextual factors in international surveys as many of these contextual factors covariate strongly. The countries with the most well-functioning public institutions are also those that are most economically equal and who also have high levels of economic development (Harring, 2014).

Trust in institutions, such as the current government and public administration responsible for policy implementation and oversight, significantly impacts levels of policy support (Davidovic & Harring, 2020; Bergquist et al., 2020), as trust in these institutions enhances policy support, whereas distrust undermines it. For example, perceptions of self-serving or corrupt behaviour among politicians or bureaucrats affect individual attitudes. Studies on environmental policy preferences underscore the importance of this dynamic, particularly regarding economic instruments, as individuals are reluctant to risk financial losses in corrupt systems (Harring 2016).

Additionally, research has examined the correlation between trust in other actors and policy support. Some studies suggest that individuals who lack confidence in others tend to advocate for stricter regulation (Aghion et al., 2010; Harring, 2016). Conversely, trust in others' compliance with policies is deemed essential for garnering public support. Instances of tax evasion or illegitimate subsidy claims are believed to weaken public support of policies (Harring, 2016; Davidovic and Harring, 2020).

In our study, we specifically focus on the association between institutional distrust and support for carbon pricing as well as the preferences for allocation of revenue generated from carbon pricing. Recent studies highlight the significant role of institutional distrust, particularly in contexts marked by corruption. Survey experiments conducted in both Sweden and Mexico by Davidovic (2023) demonstrate that perceptions of corruption and trust impact attitudes towards climate taxes. A finding that aligns with previous survey-based studies, (Davidovic et al., 2020), indicating that distrust strongly affects individuals with environmental concerns or pro-environmental values. In simple terms, individuals informed about corruption, even if they are deeply engaged and concerned about the climate issue, tend to hold negative views on climate taxes. Hence distrust leads to hesitancy in supporting policy implementation, even when individuals strongly believe in the importance of addressing the problem targeted by the policy.

This report contributes to a small but growing body of literature that addresses public support for climate policy instruments and carbon pricing also in middle- and low-income countries, and countries with less well-functioning political institutions. In a comprehensive international study, Dechezleprêtre et al. (2023) examined attitudes toward climate policies across a range of high-income and middle-income countries worldwide (Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, South Africa, Turkey, and Ukraine). Their findings indicate that attitudes toward policy support are shaped by considerations of effectiveness, concerns about inequality, and self-interest. This involves assessing the policy's efficacy in reducing emissions, its impact on income distribution – particularly among low-income households – and the extent to which it directly affects respondents' own households. We contribute by studying carbon pricing attitudes in low- and lower middle-income countries with some of the most corrupt institutions in the world (Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda) and especially explore the role of institutional distrust.

3.2 Preferences for the use of revenues from carbon pricing

Various policy innovations have been proposed to enhance public support, such as aligning policies more closely with people's perceptions of fairness. For instance, a climate tax on fossil fuels could be paired with a substitute subsidy, mitigating adverse effects on individual consumers. Recent emphasis on revenue recycling as a solution to significantly boost public support is noteworthy.

Studies suggest that reallocating revenue or communicating the utilization of income/savings from measures like climate taxes or reduced subsidies into public goods such as environmental restoration, education or healthcare, amplifies public support (Baranzini & Carattini, 2017; Dechezleprêtre et al., 2023; Grimsrud et al., 2020; Jagers et al., 2021; Kallbekken et al., 2011; Kotchen et al., 2017; Maestre-Andrés et al., 2017; Nowlin et al., 2020;

Sælen & Kallbekken, 2011). The increase in public support is not surprising, considering respondents are reminded of the policies' potential for increased revenues/savings. Recent meta-analyses also support this notion. Valencia et al. (2023) discovered that while revenue recycling generally enhances public support, the degree of impact varies significantly depending on the design and context. Their findings indicate that the effectiveness of revenue recycling strategies is not consistent and heavily relies on specific contexts and specifications. Therefore, to effectively communicate these savings/revenues, understanding the particular context becomes imperative. In a context similar to the three countries in this report, Fremstat et al. (2022) find that communicating "rebates" might be especially effective in context in which carbon taxation is not strongly politicised.

Various studies have shed light on the intricacies of earmarking and revenue recycling, as well as their potential to garner increased public support (Fremstad, et al., 2022; Mildenberger, et al., 2022). Some studies find that lump-sum dividends distributed to all households do not appear to enhance support, (Fremstad et al., 2022; Mildenberger et al., 2022), while others find that it increases support (e.g., Nowlin et al., 2020). The impact of specifying and emphasizing the use of revenue is contingent upon an individual's political affiliation or ideology, has been shown in previous work (Jagers et al., 2021; Mildenberger et al., 2022; Nowlin et al., 2020). Furthermore, respondents' support may be influenced by political messages received from organizations or political groups, hindering their endorsement (Fremstad et al., 2022).

However, the general finding is that earmarking carbon tax revenues for environmental initiatives, such as investments in renewable energy and climate-related projects, notably amplifies public support. Conversely, when revenues are directed towards purposes unrelated to the environment, like general public finance, the increase in support is comparatively less pronounced (Baranzini & Carattini, 2017; Kotchen et al., 2017; Maestre-Andrés et al., 2017; Sælen & Kallbekken, 2011).

This observation aligns with the concept of "issue-linkage" (e.g., Sælen & Kallbekken, 2011), where individuals instinctively associate environmental tax revenues with initiatives aimed at safeguarding and enhancing environmental conditions. This mental association leads to an implicit expectation among the public that revenues generated from environmental taxes should be channelled into projects and programs aligned with environmental objectives.

Furthermore, Valencia et al. (2023) examine the geographical aspect, revealing that the impact of revenue recycling on public support varies across regions. Notably, the effect appears to be smaller (not moving attitude positions) in the global north (Europe and North America) compared to the global south (Africa, Asia and Pacific, Latin America, and the Caribbean). Thus, there seems to be a stronger potential for revenue recycling schemes to enhance support in low-income contexts.

This intriguing cross-national variation in policy support is worth further exploration, as there is significant policy potential in revenue recycling. However, there is limited research on understanding such cross-national differences in the role of revenue recycling and carbon pricing support. We think that indications of stronger effects in low- to middle-income countries, are particularly notable given the prevalent issues of corruption and limited financial capacity for resource redistribution in these nations. Moreover, it's puzzling to observe residents in vulnerable conditions willing to accept higher consumer prices (carbon pricing) for investments in public goods like environmental quality, education systems, and welfare systems. We aim to further explore this by focusing on how distrust in public institutions influences people's willingness to invest in long-term and public goods.

4 Public support for carbon pricing in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda

In order to judge the feasibility of carbon pricing in East Africa, it is crucial to understand the public opinion. We do this by conducting a phone survey with respondents from three East African countries; Kenya (959 respondents), Tanzania (981 respondents), and Uganda (885 respondents)[8].

The final sample accurately represents the population's gender distribution but has a lower proportion of young (under 30 years) and elderly (over 50 years) respondents[9]. Additionally, this sample has a higher percentage of individuals with university education and those living in urban areas compared to the general population[10] (see Appendix 3 in Harring et al. (2024) for a detailed comparison between the sample and the population). Since our sample does not entirely reflect the demographics of the population, it is important to be cautious when extending our findings to the entire East African population.

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[8] Results in this section is based Harring et al. (2024) where data was collected from adult respondents in five East African countries – Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Ethiopia, and Rwanda – regarding public opinions on various climate policy instruments. These instruments included both quantity-based regulations and price-based measures, such as a climate-motivated tax on fossil fuels and a reduction in subsidies. In this report we focus on the price-based measures and on the results from Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. The data collection was conducted by a professional survey firm based in Kenya. The company used its existing national databases of respondents involved in earlier investigations to recruit survey respondents in each of the five countries. The design of the survey, including the questionnaire, and all results are found in Harring et al. (2024).

[9] Among the respondents, 17–30% were under 30 years old and 11–14% were over 50, in contrast to the general population across all three countries, where the figures were 40–49% and 14–18% for the respective age groups.

[10] In the three countries, 33–73% of the respondents had a university education, in stark contrast to just 2–4% of the total population. Furthermore, 36–45% of the respondents lived in urban or peri-urban areas, compared to 26–37% of the total population residing in urban areas in all three countries.

The results in Figure 1 reveal that, on average, 29% supported the introduction of a fossil fuels tax, and 33% of respondents in the region were somewhat or strongly in favour of a subsidy reduction. However, significant variations in support levels were observed among the three countries. In Kenya, support for the fuel tax and subsidy reduction was considerably lower (13% and 14%, respectively) than in Uganda (40% and 43%, respectively). Moreover, a substantial majority of respondents in Kenya (77% in both cases) strongly opposed these price-based policy instruments. These results underscore the importance of considering local contexts and preferences when designing and implementing policies to reduce fossil fuel consumption in East Africa.

Figure 1: Share of respondents supporting carbon pricing



Note: Carbon pricing is an increase in the price of fossil fuels by introducing a tax or reducing subsidies. Results from 2,825 respondents in East Africa, 959 respondents in Kenya, 981 respondents in Tanzania and 885 respondents in Uganda. The figure is based on Harring et al. (2024).

4.1 Institutional trust and public support for carbon pricing

Trust (or distrust) in political institutions plays a significant role in determining how carbon pricing is received by the public (Bergqvist et al., 2022; Fairbrother et al., 2019; Davidovic et al., 2020). Our survey results highlight varying levels of support for fossil fuel taxes and subsidy reductions among more educated individuals in urban areas across the three East African countries. This variation underscores the need to understand the underlying factors that influence public opinion. In Kenya, where there is a marked opposition to price-based policy instruments, examining how distrust the institutions responsible for implementing these policies becomes even more critical. By doing that we can gain insights into the dynamics of public support and identify strategies to enhance the acceptance and effectiveness of carbon pricing in diverse socio-economic contexts within East Africa.

The levels of social and institutional trust vary substantially across these countries. In our non-representative sample (with more educated urban residents aged 30–50), trust in national government spans from 28% in Kenya to 68% in Uganda. In Kenya 73% of the respondents had some university education. This may explain their low trust in government as research has shown that more educated people are more likely to be aware of the consequences of corruption for instance (Hakverdian & Mayne, 2012). The higher level of trust in governments in Uganda, a more authoritarian state, may be explained by that individuals may feeling constrained in expressing their true level of trust (Tannenberg, 2022).

Our study (see Harring et al., 2024 for detailed results) reveals a positive correlation between the level of trust in others and in government institutions, and the support for a carbon tax. This implies that individuals who have higher trust in their fellow citizens and their government are more likely to support the implementation of a carbon tax. This relationship highlights trust as a factor in public

acceptance of environmental policies. Understanding this dynamic can be crucial for policymakers in designing and promoting climate-related initiatives, particularly in contexts where fostering public support is essential for successful implementation especially to avoid violent resistant as have been seen for instance in several countries in the region (see introduction).

4.2 Public support for carbon pricing when specifying revenue uses

Building on the knowledge of factors influencing support for carbon pricing, we turn our focus to the impact of specifying revenue uses on public support for carbon pricing, a crucial aspect influencing public support of climate policy (Baranzini & Carattini, 2017; Dechezleprêtre et al., 2023; Jagers et al., 2021; Kallbekken et al., 2011; Kotchen et al., 2017; Maestre-Andrés et al., 2017; Nowlin et al., 2020; Sælen & Kallbekken). Our comprehensive survey results explore how public support for carbon pricing in Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda shifts when the potential uses of the revenue generated are clearly communicated. These findings are invaluable for policy development, highlighting that transparent information about revenue use is potentially a cost-effective method to enhance public support.

In our survey, we informed the respondents that revenue is generated when the government imposes a tax or reduces subsidies (discounts) on fossil fuels like petrol, diesel, and kerosene. This revenue can be used in different ways. We then asked the respondents to again express their support level for a fossil fuel tax or subsidy reduction, but this time we specified four potential uses for the revenue: (i) funding better education for school children, (ii) investing in improved electricity and transport infrastructure, (iii) restoring the environment, such as cleaning polluted or littered areas, and (iv) supporting social programs for the poorest households in society. We found that respondents were much more likely to support a tax or subsidy cut when they knew how the funds would be used.

Figure 2: Share of respondents supporting carbon pricing when revenue used are specified



Note: Results from 2,825 respondents in East Africa, 959 respondents in Kenya, 981 respondents in Tanzania and 885 respondents in Uganda. The figure is based on Harring et al. (2024).

In Figure 2, our results reveal a significant positive impact on policy support when explicitly outlining the use of revenue. In instances where respondents were informed that the revenue would be directed towards education, infrastructure, environment, or social programs, support for a tax or subsidy reduction on fossil fuels increased from 29–33% (without any information) to between 67–69%, with the highest support for education and social programs at the regional level.

In summary, we observe a strong effect of explicitly detailing revenue use on public support. However, within this context of low- and lower-middle income countries, our findings indicate that investments in the environment may not be the most influential factor shaping people's attitudes. Consequently, these results need further exploration. Moreover, we contend that the literature on revenue recycling and climate policy support lacks sufficient theoretical underpinning, a topic we delve into more deeply in the following section.

5 Preferences for the use of revenues from carbon pricing

Finding a significant difference between explicitly outlining revenue usage on public support, and not making this explicit, this section explore preferences for different aspects of revenue uses from carbon pricing. An understanding for various aspects of revenue uses is instrumental in designing efficient climate policies.

Considering the context of our study – East Africa – a region grappling with significant challenges such as corruption, poverty, and visible effects of climate change, it becomes crucial to explore the citizens' willingness to allocate revenues based on the temporal aspect (long-term versus short-term) and the nature of goods (public versus private). The distinction between short-term and long-term investments can potentially influence public perception and willingness to support carbon pricing, as immediate benefits may be more appealing to some, while others may prioritize future gains. Similarly, understanding preferences for public versus private goods reveals how individuals value collective benefits versus personal advantages.

This analysis is especially pertinent in East Africa, where immediate challenges like corruption and distrust in public institutions combined with poverty and the effects of climate change might impact preferences towards short-term relief over long-term solutions, and private benefits might prioritize over the collective.

The results presented in this part of the report are derived from a phone survey conducted in 2023 with respondents from Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda. The survey included 2,677 participants (852 from Kenya, 921 from Tanzania, and 904 from Uganda), offering a reasonably representative cross-section of these populations in terms of age, gender, and education levels. However,

as commonly observed in phone surveys in this region, our sample is slightly younger[11] and more educated[12] compared to the broader population (detailed comparisons can be found in Appendix 4).

In our survey in 2022, we followed the design of several previous studies and measured preferences for revenue uses by predetermined alternatives and then looked at the impact of these explicit revenue uses on the support for carbon pricing. There are some problems with this approach. For instance, predetermined uses may capture variation in budget expenditure (ex. education, climate investment etc.), but not the full spectrum of possible alternatives. Furthermore, "closed options" do not open up for respondents to allocate money between different budget expenditures. To address these challenges and to broaden the knowledge regarding attributes in revenue uses, in our survey in 2023, we followed Gaikwad, Genovese and Tingley (2022) and let the respondents distribute the resources themselves between different budget items.

In the 2023 survey, the respondents are asked to allocate resources generated by a climate policy between three alternative uses (in percentages that need to sum to 100%). The alternatives were designed to reflect the differences between long-term versus short-term and public versus private goods. We specifically focused on allocating funds towards long-term investments in the context of public transportation, as opposed to short-term ones. Additionally, we examined funding for public goods, such as public transportation, in contrast to private goods, like direct cash transfers. See Appendix 4 for the actual wording of the questions.

[11] Among the respondents, 38–49% were under 30 years old and 13–20% were over 50, in contrast to the general population across all three countries, where the figures were 40–49% and 14–18% for the respective age groups.
[12] In the three countries, 12–18% of the respondents had higher than secondary education, in contrast to 2–18% of the total population.

5.1 Preferences for revenue uses towards long-term investments

In the face of climate change, the emphasis on long-term investments becomes increasingly important as these for instance facilitate the transition to renewable energy, resilient infrastructures, and sustainable practices, reducing future environmental impacts and associated costs.

Contrary to our preconceptions, we discovered that within these institutionally unstable contexts, respondents, on average, favour long-term investments in the context of public transportation, as opposed to short-term ones.

On average in the three countries compiled, 38% of the budget was dedicated to these long-term infrastructural investments, compared to 28% for short-term projects and 34% for direct cash transfers to households (see Figure 3). Histograms of the distributions of share allocated to each revenue use option are presented in Appendix 5 and reveal that there is substantial variation in allocations across individuals. The respondents in each of the three countries on average also allocate a higher share to the long-term option than the short-term option (Figure 4). The share allocated to long-term investments is notably higher in Uganda (44%) than in Kenya (34%) and Tanzania (36%). Another difference between the countries is that the respondents in Kenya on average allocated most resources to the private good option, while this option was the least popular in Uganda.

Figure 3: Average allocations of revenues to long-term and short-term in public transport in the three countries jointly



Note: Results from 2,677 respondents in East Africa (Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda).

Figure 4: Average allocations of revenues to long-term and short-term in public transport in three countries separately



Note: Results from 852 respondents in Kenya, 921 respondents in Tanzania and 904 respondents in Uganda.

5.2 Preferences for revenue uses towards public and private goods

In the East African context, marked by high political uncertainty and prevalent corruption, there might be a tendency for individuals to prefer private goods as these provide tangible returns that directly enhance their personal well-being over investing in public goods, whose benefits might be less immediate and more uncertain.

In our study, we further examine the preferences for the nature of the goods (public versus private goods). We structured the allocation questions to include one private good option, namely "All households receive an equal amount of cash transfers", alongside the two public goods options (long-term and short-term investments in public transport). Our analysis aggregates the responses for the public good, effectively combining the preferences for both short-term and long-term investments in public transport.

The data presents some clear patterns regarding how people prefer to allocate resources. On average, across the three countries studied, we find that 34% of funds are designated for private initiatives, specifically equal cash payments made directly to households. In contrast, a larger portion, 66%, is preferred to be used for public services, such as improving transportation infrastructure (as detailed in Figure 5).

Figure 5: Average allocations of revenues to public (public transportation) and private goods (cash transfers to households) in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda



Note: Results from 852 respondents in Kenya, 921 respondents in Tanzania and 904 respondents in Uganda.

However, when we look at each country individually, we notice significant variations in these preferences. For instance, in Kenya, there is a stronger inclination toward private allocations, with an average of 41% of funds earmarked for direct household transfers, which is the highest among the three (this is illustrated in Figure 5). In Tanzania, the preference for private allocations is slightly less, at 36%. Uganda shows the greatest support for public spending, with only 25% of funds preferred for direct cash transfers to households. These differences highlight the diverse priorities and approaches to resource allocation in each country.

5.3 Institutional distrust and preferences for the use of revenues from carbon pricing

Distrust in public institutions can significantly impact the willingness of individuals to support long-term investments and public goods. In environments where there is a lack of confidence in how institutions manage resources or execute policies, people may be hesitant to invest in or support initiatives that promise benefits in the distant future. Understanding this dynamic is crucial in regions with high levels of institutional distrust, as it shapes the approach to policy-making and public investment strategies.

Our findings indicate significant variations in institutional distrust levels across countries, with Kenya exhibiting the highest level among the three countries studied (see Figure 5). We utilize this variable, lack of trust in institutions, to further analyse its correlation with perception of current corruption and its influence on the allocation of revenue for long-term use and to public goods.

Consistent with expectations, our findings reveal a positive correlation between a lack of trust in the government and perceptions of current corruption. Additionally, our analysis reveals a positive correlation between the perception of corruption as an ingrained part of their culture and a lack of trust in the government. These results are further detailed in Appendix 6.

Figure 6: Level of distrust and trust in national governments



Note: The variable "distrust trust in national government" is coded 1 for level 0–2 and 0 for level 3–10, and trust in national government is coded 1 for level 8–10 and 0 for level 1–7, where 10 is Complete trust in the national government and 0 is No trust at all in the national government. Results from 2,634 respondents in East Africa collected in survey conducted in 2023, 846 respondents in Kenya, 903 respondents in Tanzania and 885 respondents in Uganda.

We delve deeper into how institutional trust influences preferences for long-term revenue use by conducting a regression analysis. This analysis focuses on the relationship between individuals who express a lack of trust in the government and the proportion of the budget they allocate to long-term investments in public transport. The results, detailed in Appendix 7, indicate that distrust in national government significantly reduces the allocation of funds to long-term investments, as observed across the entire sample.

However, a more nuanced picture emerges at the country level. When examining countries individually, we find that distrust in national government has no statistically significant effect on the allocation of revenue for long-term use in Tanzania. At the same time, it remains negatively significant in Kenya and Uganda, meaning that distrust in Kenya and Uganda decrease the willingness to allocate to long-term revenue use.

To further explore the impact of distrust in public institutions on different components of revenue uses, we conducted regression analyses on the correlation between lack of trust in the national government and allocation to public goods. In line with our predictions, we find that allocation to public goods decreases when individuals have stated distrust in national government (regression results are presented in Appendix 8). We also observed some variation among the three countries. The negative impact of distrust in national government is significantly related to the allocation to public transport in Kenya and Uganda, but this correlation was not statistically significant in Tanzania.

In this chapter, we have presented a first exploration of preferences for the use of revenues from carbon pricing in low- and lower middle-income countries. Our results from Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda, show that slightly more educated and urban citizens tend on average to prefer long-term investments in public transport, and public over private goods. However, these preferences are notably diminished by institutional distrust. Our findings underline the need for building institutional trust to effectively align climate initiatives with public preferences of long-term investments in public good. The broader implications of our results are further discussed in the coming, and last section of this report.

6 Concluding discussion

6.1 Discussion of main findings

In this report, we utilize two comprehensive population surveys carried out in 2022 and 2023 in Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda to explore questions related to public support for carbon pricing and revenue recycling.

When assessing the average support for carbon pricing in East Africa, caution is necessary due to the limited comparative studies and our sample's skewness (see section 3.1). Despite these limitations, our findings show an average support level of 29%. This aligns closely with some global figures, such as the 33% average support reported in 23 European countries (Fairbrother et al., 2019). However, it is also significantly lower than the levels reported by Dechezleprêtre et al. (2023), with a level of support of around 55% in high-income countries and 70% in middle-income countries. The varied support levels for carbon pricing in our three focus countries reflect the diversity observed in high- and middle-income countries, with Kenya showing the lowest support. Factors contributing to this variation may include recent political debates, discussions on taxes and climate policies, and institutional elements like corruption levels.

Notably, explicitly stating revenue use nearly doubled support for carbon pricing in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. Our study reveals that allocating revenue to social programs, rather than environmental initiatives, significantly boosts acceptability in these countries. This result might stem from the prevalence of poverty, where social issues resonate more strongly and shape people's priorities in this region. Hence, recognizing social concerns in this context can enhance climate policy support and effective implementation. However, differences between the three countries highlight the need for country-specific communication strategies about revenue recycling, considering each country's socio-economic conditions.

In contexts of widespread corruption and institutional instability, understanding the relationship between institutional trust and support for carbon pricing is vital. Our research indicates that institutional trust increase support for carbon pricing, emphasizing its role in climate policy acceptance. Despite inherent institutional distrust, governments that signal trustworthiness can foster opportunities for introducing taxes for public goods. Conversely, distrust significantly undermines public support for climate policies, a crucial consideration for policymakers. This lack of trust can lead to scepticism about the government's motives and effectiveness, potentially resulting in social unrest or even political violence. Therefore, understanding and addressing the roots of this distrust is essential for ensuring successful policy implementation and maintaining social stability.

On a positive note, an optimistic interpretation of our results suggests that even in corruption-affected countries, governments signalling trustworthiness might successfully introduce carbon pricing creating revenue for public goods, potentially starting a virtuous cycle of increasing institutional trust. Additionally, a significant portion of the respondents support long-term societal development investments, indicating a readiness to prioritize policies with enduring benefits despite challenges.

Furthermore, a majority of the sample prefer investments in public goods over private ones, showing a willingness to prioritize societal benefits over individual gains even in corruption and economically challenging contexts. This resilience and commitment to long-term, public-oriented investments highlight the potential for positive community development and change, despite systemic challenges.

This study represents an initial exploratory effort to understand public opinions on carbon pricing instruments in East Africa. While it establishes valuable correlations, it does not delve into causal relationships. Our findings align with previous studies in different contexts but highlight the need for further research, especially regarding cultural influences. Exploring the cultural context, such as

the impact of existing social safety net structures on preferences for cash payments, is crucial for a deeper understanding and more effective policy design in these regions.

6.2 Implications for the design of carbon pricing and Swedish development policy

Our research findings are significant for climate policy development in East Africa as well as for Swedish aid policy. Firstly, the observation that public support for carbon pricing in Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda is low but heightened by institutional trust suggests a strategic focus for policy makers and aid agencies. Efforts to strengthen institutional credibility and transparency could be pivotal. This approach not only promotes a supportive environment for carbon pricing policies but also aligns with broader goals of sustainable development and governance improvement. For Swedish aid, this presents an opportunity to contribute to capacity building in these areas, reinforcing both climate and developmental objectives.

Secondly, the identified preference for using carbon pricing revenues for social programs presents a unique policy-making challenge and opportunity. This preference implies that integrating carbon pricing policies with social development initiatives might lead to greater public support and effectiveness. It suggests a need for innovative policy design that harmonizes environmental sustainability with tangible social benefits. For Swedish aid, this could mean supporting policies and projects that not only address climate change but also deliver immediate and visible benefits to communities. Such an integrated approach could enhance the effectiveness of aid, ensuring it meets both the immediate needs of the population and the long-term goal of sustainable development in East Africa. On that note, it can be important to acknowledge that previous research has

pointed at the role of visibility of revenue use in order to move public opinion (Mildenberger et al., 2022). Citizens must know and understand that there is a revenue recycling initiative. Our findings also align with multi-country studies conducted by the IMF which stress the importance of complementary policies and careful sequencing and communication when governments implement carbon mitigation policies (Dabla-Norris et al., 2023; Rentschler and Baziliany, 2017).

Thirdly, the results on how survey respondents prefer to allocate revenues generated from carbon pricing, particularly in the context of public transportation, represent a positive outlook. Even within politically uncertain contexts characterized by a high level of corruption, our findings reveal that individuals generally exhibit a strong preference for long-term investments, demonstrate solidarity, and prioritize public goods over private ones. This preference underscores the importance of prioritizing projects that not only offer immediate benefits but also ensure sustainable, long-term impacts for the wider community. For policy makers and Swedish aid programs, this translates into a strategic focus on initiatives that invest in long-term public infrastructure and services, such as sustainable public transportation and renewable energy projects. These types of investments not only align with the public's preferences but also contribute to broader goals of sustainable development and environmental protection, reinforcing the effectiveness and acceptance of climate policies in the East African context.

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Appendix 1

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Appendix 2

Figure A1: Level of trust in other people and in national/central governments



Note: In contrast to Figure 6, this graph shows a significantly higher level of trust in national government in Uganda and Kenya, and slightly lower in Tanzania. Except that data were collected in different years (Figure A1 survey conducted in 2022 and Figure 6 data collected 2023), there could be several plausible explanations for the differences observed in level of trust. For instance, measuring social and institutional trust in an authoritarian state is difficult, as individuals may feel constrained in expressing their true level of trust (Tannenberg, 2022). Furthermore, the report discusses challenges such as obtaining representative samples. The variable level of trust in other people is coded 1 for level 8–10 and 0 for level 1–7 where 10 is Most people can be trusted and 1 Most people cannot be trusted. For level of trust in the national/central government the variable is coded 1 = A great deal/Quite a lot and 0 = No or very little/Little/Neither a lot nor little. Results from 2,825 respondents in East Africa, 959 respondents in Kenya, 981 respondents in Tanzania and 885 respondents in Uganda.

Appendix 3

Study design of survey conducted in 2023

Data regarding preferences for revenue uses was collected from adult respondents in Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda during July and August 2023. This was done by a survey firm using Computer Assisted Telephone Interviews (CATI). The survey was conducted in English and Swahili in Kenya and Tanzania, and in English, Swahili, and Luganda in Uganda.

Before the budget allocation question, respondents were asked about their age, gender, county of residence, educational background, and experiences with drought. They were also required to evaluate three statements concerning the government's role in society and taxation.

Following the budget allocation questions, we inquired about the respondents' trust in other people and institutions, as well as their perceptions and experiences of corruption. Lastly, to understand variations in preferences due to different levels of reliance on public transport, we included questions about the use of public transport.

Below is the questionnaire section on revenue uses.

> Kenya is currently facing a number of severe consequences of climate change, including increased occasions of drought in several parts of the country, extreme temperatures and flooding. This results in an increasing need for more resources and funding to adapt to climate change.
>
> Consider a situation where the government, in order to generate funding for adaptation to climate change, passes a climate policy that increases the prices on fossil fuels (such as petrol, diesel, gas, kerosene and coal) which generates public revenues. Such policy

is expected to generate around 70 billion Kenyan shilling per year that the government could use for climate adaptation.

How would you want the government to spend the money collected from the climate policy? We will give you 3 alternative options to allocate the revenues between. Please state for each of the 3 options what share of the revenues you would like to allocate, and make sure that all options together sum up to 100%.

Option 1: Long term investments in public busses, trains and roads:_____ %

Option 2:Short term financing for repairs of public busses, trains and roads:_____%

Option 3: All households receive an equal amount of cash transfers: _____%

Thanks! You chose that the money should be divided as follows: [INSERT % FOR OPTION 1] to long term investments in public busses, trains and roads; [INSERT % FOR OPTION 2] to short term financing for repairs of public busses, trains and roads; and [INSERT % FOR OPTION 3] to all households receive an equal amount of cash transfers. Is this correct? [IF RESPONDENT SAYS IT IS NOT CORRECT LET HER/HIM MAKE CHANGES IN ALLOCATIONS]

You now have specified how you think the money should be spent; please take some time to tell us why you made the choices you did.

Note: The order of the options was randomized. Country specific revenues to allocate were presented to respondents in each of the three countries.

Appendix 4

Comparative statistics

Table A1: Sample vs Population, for survey 2023 on preferences for revenue uses from carbon pricing in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda (percentages)

	Kenya (Population, %)	Kenya (Sample, %)	Tanzania (Population, %)	Tanzania (Sample, %)	Uganda (Population, %)	Uganda (Sample, %)
Gender						
Male	49.7	46.71	50.0	46.91	49.3	47.68
Female	50.3	53.29	50.0	53.09	50.7	52.32
Age Group						
18–29	39.7	38.26	42.7	40.83	48.8	49.00
30–39	24.7	24.77	23.1	26.38	23.4	23.01
40–49	17.5	17.37	15.9	15.64	13.5	14.71
50–59	9.9	14.32	9.1	14.12	8.3	9.73
60+	8.2	5.28	9.2	3.04	6.0	3.54
Education Level						
Primary or Below	64.0	57.39	83.3	80.39	77.3	68.58
Secondary	25.0	24.88	12.9	7 .23	18.5	17.92
Post-2ry and university (including TVET)	7.0	17.72	1.5	12.38	18.4	13.16

Note: Population data sources from population and housing surveys for each country, age sourced from: https://population.un.org/wpp/Download/Standard/Population/, 2023-04-25. Number of respondents in the survey (sample) vary slightly depending on if respondents answered all questions or not. In general, the results are based on 2,677 respondents in East Africa, 852 respondents in Kenya, 921 respondents in Tanzania and 904 respondents in Uganda.

Appendix 5

The graphs below illustrate the distribution of budget allocation by respondents among three alternative revenue options. Each option pertains to different uses of the total budget: Option 1 is for long-term investments in public buses, trains, and roads; Option 2 is for short-term financing for repairs of public buses, trains, and roads; Option 3 allows for direct cash transfers to all households. The sum of allocations across all options equals 100%.

Each bar in the graph represents the percentage of the total budget allocated to a specific revenue option, while the height of each bar indicates the percentage of respondents who chose this allocation. For example, in the graph for Option 1 (Long-term investments in public buses, trains, and roads), we can observe that approximately 14% of respondents allocated 40% of the total public budget to this option.

These graphs are presented to demonstrate that there is a significant spread in how the budget is allocated among individuals, indicating varied priorities and perspectives on fiscal policy.

Figure A2: Histograms of shares allocated to the different revenue use options for the three countries jointly




All households receive an equal amount of cash transfers
Share of responses (%)
0
5
10
15
20
0
20
40
60
80
100
Share allocated out of 100%

Appendix 6

Table A2: Regression result for corruption perceptions and social distrust on distrust in national government

	All Three Countries	Kenya	Tanzania	Uganda
Perceive the country have abundant corruption today	0.17***	0.17***	0.06***	0.14***
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.04)
Perceive corruption as part of the culture	0.10***	0.07**	0.01	0.11***
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Distrust in other people	0.14***	0.21***	0.04**	0.11***
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Higher education	0.05*	0.06	-0.04	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Age	-0.001	-0.003**	-0.001	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Male	0.04**	-0.02	0.04**	0.09***
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Household income (USD/month)	0.001	0.001***	0.001	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Live in urban area	0.01	0.01	-0.01	0.07**
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.04)
Constant	0.02	0.13**	0.05	-0.03
	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.06)
R-squared	0.122	0.153	0.030	0.073
Number of observations	2,280	797	697	786

Note: Main results regarding the correlation between corruption perception and social distrust on distrust in national government are robust to the exclusion the socio-economic variables.

Appendix 7

Table A3: Regression results for distrust in national government on revenue allocation to long-term public transport

	All Three Countries	Kenya	Tanzania	Uganda
Distrust in government	-2.51**	-2.17*	-3.42	-3.57*
	(1.05)	(1.30)	(2.94)	(1.95)
Weekly use of public transport	-1.87**	-1.03	0.83	-0.07
	(0.92)	(1.34)	(1.65)	(1.69)
Higher education	5.96***	9.17***	-2.20	6.00**
	(1.50)	(1.95)	(3.06)	(2.78)
Age	-0.04	0.01	-0.09	0.11
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Male	1.58*	2.87**	5.31***	-3.10*
	(0.86)	(1.20)	(1.38)	(1.70)
Household income (USD/month)	0.001	0.001	0.002	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Live in urban area	0.08	0.34	1.68	-1.26
	(0.97)	(1.50)	(1.46)	(1.94)
Constant	39.45***	32.08***	33.47***	43.60***
	(1.61)	(2.40)	(2.72)	(2.96)
R-squared	0.01	0.04	0.03	0.02
Number of obs.	2,344	800	740	804

Note: Standard Errors in Parentheses. Significance Levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Main results regarding the correlation between distrust in national government and long-term investments in public transport are robust to the exclusion the socio-economic variables.

Appendix 8

Table A4: Regression results for distrust in national government on public goods (public transports)

	All Three Countries	Kenya	Tanzania	Uganda
Distrust in government	-6.01***	-8.65***	-3.46	-4.35***
	(1.15)	(1.66)	(3.88)	(1.55)
Weekly use of public transport	-3.24***	-2.02	-1.58	0.97
	(1.01)	(1.71)	(2.18)	(1.34)
Higher education	4.53***	9.43***	2.84	-0.16
	(1.66)	(2.48)	(4.04)	(2.21)
Age	-0.06	0.03	-0.04	0.02
	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.06)
Male	2.21**	2.28	6.92***	-2.53*
	(0.94)	(1.54)	(1.82)	(1.35)
Household income (USD/Month)	0.001	0.001	0.001	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Live in urban area	-0.19	0.97	-1.75	1.19
	(1.06)	(1.91)	(1.93)	(1.54)
Constant	69.52***	59.83***	61.71***	75.47***
	(1.77)	(3.07)	(3.59)	(2.35)
R-squared	0.022	0.056	0.024	0.018
Number of obs.	2,344	800	740	804

Note: Standard Errors in Parentheses. Significance Levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Main results regarding the correlation between distrust in national government and public goods are robust to the exclusion the socio-economic variables.

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