

WORKING PAPER JULY 2023

**INFLUENCE IN MULTILATERAL AID ORGANIZATIONS:
A LITERATURE REVIEW**

Magnus Lundgren, Isabella Strindevall



Influence in Multilateral Aid Organizations: A Literature Review

Magnus Lundgren

Isabella Strindevall

Working Paper, July 2023

to

The Expert Group for Aid Studies (EBA)

The EBA Working Paper Series constitutes shorter overviews, surveys, mappings and analyses that have been undertaken to bring about discussion and advance knowledge of a particular topic. Working Papers are not subject to any formal approval process by the Expert Group. Just as in the EBA reports, authors are solely responsible for the content, conclusions and recommendations.

Please refer to the present report as: Lundgren, M. and Strindevall, I., *Influence in Multilateral Aid Organizations: A Literature Review*, Working Paper July 2023, The Expert Group for Aid Studies (EBA), Sweden.

This report can be downloaded free of charge at www.eba.se

Cover design by Julia Demchenko

Magnus Lundgren is Associate Professor of Political Science at University of Gothenburg, specializing in the study of international organizations and their interventions.

Isabella Strindevall is a PhD candidate in Political Science at Stockholm University and has worked as a research assistant on projects within Political Science and International Relations.

Acknowledgements

The authors express their sincere gratitude to Lisa Dellmuth, Helena Hede Skagerlind, Jonas Tallberg and Númi Östlund for their invaluable suggestions and advice. Any errors remain the responsibility of the authors.

Table of Contents

Foreword by EBA	1
Sammanfattning	2
Summary	3
List of abbreviations	4
1 Introduction	6
2 Methodology.....	8
2.1 Scope and limitations	10
3 Influence in multilateral organizations	12
3.1 Conceptualizing influence.....	12
3.2 Channels of influence.....	13
3.3 Measuring influence.....	16
4 Overview mapping	19
4.1 Methodological orientation	19
4.2 Influencing target.....	20
4.3 Influencing actor.....	21
4.4 Channels of influence.....	22
5 In-depth review	24
5.1 Financial Flows	24
5.2 Formal governance	32
5.3 Advocacy.....	40
5.4 Staffing	45
6 Conclusions	51
6.1 Principal findings	51
References.....	60
Appendix 1: Search Documentation	68
Appendix 2: Overview of reviewed studies	70

Foreword by EBA

Sweden is an important donor to the multilateral system, promoting its aid and development priorities through significant financial support to multilateral organisations such as the European Union, the United Nations and the World Bank. These organisations, and others, also represent important arenas for Swedish efforts to promote its development as well as foreign policy priorities. But does Sweden exert influence in multilateral organisations in correspondence with its financial contributions?

The authors of this report, Magnus Lundgren and Isabella Strindevall, have reviewed and summarised the findings of 76 academic and gray literature publications on influence in multilateral aid organizations. Through this work they provide a comprehensive overview of the literature on influence in multilaterals, focusing on the channels and strategies that countries use to assert influence.

A main conclusion is that influence in multilaterals stems from continuous influencing work that draws on multiple channels and utilizes a range of strategies and tools, over time. The importance of adequate financial and human resources to secure formal representation and informal preparatory and follow-up activities is also stressed. Small states can act smart by timing their efforts, prioritizing issues, and forging strategic alliances.

We hope that this report will find its audience among policymakers, academics, and practitioners who are interested in understanding the dynamics of influence in multilateral aid organizations.

EBA working papers are shorter studies that investigate a question of limited scope or that complements a regular EBA study. Working papers are not subject to a formal decision from the expert group but instead reviewed by the secretariat before publication. The authors are, as with other EBA publications, responsible for the content of the report and its conclusions.

Stockholm, July 2023

Jan Pettersson, Managing Director

Sammanfattning

Sverige är en hängiven partner i det multilaterala utvecklingssamarbetet. 2021 gick mer än hälften av Sveriges internationella utvecklingsbistånd, ungefär 30 miljarder kronor, till multilaterala organisationer i form av kärnstöd och öronmärkta bidrag. Som en betydande biståndsfinansiär har Sverige ett intresse av att påverka sina multilaterala partners verksamhet och inriktning, och försäkra sig om att de främjar Sveriges utvecklingspolitiska prioriteringar.

Den här underlagsrapporten syftar till att ge en översikt av kunskapsläget kring påverkansarbete och inflytande i multilaterala biståndsorganisationer. I rapporten sammanfattas och diskuteras 76 publikationer inom vetenskaplig och grå litteratur. Rapporten identifierar breda drag i litteraturen samt ger djupare insikter om kunskapsläget kring aktörer i påverkansarbetet, metoder för inflytande och framgångsfaktorer.

Rapporten visar att litteraturen studerat staters påverkansarbete i olika typer av multilaterala sammanhang, med viss övervikt på breda internationella organisationer som Förenta nationerna. Stater av olika storlek söker inflytande genom en mängd metoder, som kan kategoriseras i fyra huvudsakliga kanaler: finansiella medel, formell styrning, förespråkande ("Advocacy"), och personal. Finansiella medel och formell styrning erkänns som de mest nyttjade kanalerna för inflytande, men litteraturen betonar samtidigt hur det totala inflytandet bygger på arbete i flera kanaler, genom olika strategier och verktyg, över tid.

Litteraturen poängterar att de faktorer som främjar inflytande delvis beror på den kanal där påverkansarbetet bedrivs, men belyser några övergripande punkter. Bland annat bidrar tillräckliga finansiella och mänskliga resurser till att säkra en plats i formell styrning och till deltagande i förberedande och uppföljande arbete. Resurser är även betydelsefulla för nätverkande och alliansbyggande i informella sammanhang. Detta innebär dock inte att stater med färre strukturella resurser saknar påverkansutrymme. Snarare betonar litteraturen att små stater kan få inflytande genom att använda resurser strategiskt, välja rätt tillfälle för påverkansarbete, prioritera vissa policyområden och bygga strategiska allianser. På så sätt har Sverige och andra nordiska länder påverkat sina multilaterala samarbetspartners, till exempel genom att höja sina ambitioner i arbetet med jämställdhet, mänskliga rättigheter, och tillgänglighet.

Summary

Sweden is a devoted partner in multilateral development cooperation. In 2021, Sweden allocated more than half of its Official Development Assistance, around 30 billion SEK, to multilateral organizations in the form of core and earmarked funding. As a large-scale donor, Sweden has an interest in influencing the operations and agendas of its multilateral partners to ensure that they align with Swedish priorities for international development.

This report reviews and summarizes the findings of 76 academic and gray literature publications on influence in multilateral aid organizations. In doing so, it combines methods of rapid evidence assessment with traditional literature review to identify broad characteristics of the literature as well as in-depth insights on the current state of knowledge with regards to channels of influence, influencing actors, and factors shaping success.

We find that the literature has mainly focused on governments' attempts to wield influence in international, general purpose, organizations. While countries of all sizes assert influence using a combination of means, we find that they mainly leverage four principal channels: financial flows, formal governance, advocacy, and staffing. While financial flows and formal governance structures stand out as the most commonly used channels, the literature emphasizes that influence in multilaterals stems from continuous influencing work that draws on multiple channels and utilizes a range of strategies and tools, over time.

Determinants of success vary across the different influencing channels, but the literature emphasizes some recurring factors. One important factor is the structural resources of the influencing actor. Sufficient financial and human resources enable states to secure representation in formal governance and decision-making, to engage in informal preparatory and follow-up activities, and to be active on a broad range of issues across multiple organizations. However, having fewer structural resources does not necessarily equate to diminished influence, but rather, small states can be smart by timing their efforts, prioritizing issues, and forging strategic alliances. In this way, Sweden and other Nordic countries have managed to influence their multilateral partners, for example by advancing their ambitions on gender equality, human rights, and disability inclusion.

List of abbreviations

AfDB	African Development Bank
ADB	Asian Development Bank
BRIC	Brazil, Russia, India, China
DFAT	Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
EU	European Union
FAO	The Food and Agriculture Organization
HRDTF	Human Rights and Development Trust Fund
IDA	International Development Association
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IMO	International Maritime Organization
IO	International organization
MDB	Multilateral Development Bank
NDICI	the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation instrument
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NTF	Nordic Trust Fund
ODA	Official Development Assistance
SRHR	Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
WB	World Bank
WFP	World Food Programme

1 Introduction

Multilateral organizations stand at the center of contemporary efforts to promote social and economic development. They are principal venues for the formulation of comprehensive policy frameworks, such as the 2030 Agenda and the Sustainable Development Goals, and they constitute key channels for allocating development finances, implementing projects, and promoting norms and standards. The work of multilateral organizations is particularly crucial in addressing development issues that require coordinated and sustained efforts by multiple actors.

Sweden has traditionally placed multilateral organizations at the center of its development policy. In 2021, Sweden allocated approximately 30 billion SEK in Official Development Assistance (ODA), or nearly two thirds of its total aid, to multilateral organizations ([Openaid.se](https://openaid.se)). Almost 60% of this was channeled in the form of core support, i.e., financial contributions to multilateral organizations' central budgets, and the rest as earmarked funding, i.e., financial support linked to specific projects and thematic priorities (ibid). In terms of core support, Sweden remains a top donor among OECD/DAC countries (Browne et al., 2017). However, the center-right government in power since 2022 has declared an intention to shift the balance in favor of earmarked funding, which has been the international trend in recent years (Statement of Government Policy, 18 October 2022). While the World Bank and the EU are the most important individual multilateral recipients, a large portion of Swedish support is allocated to organizations within the United Nations (UN) system, such as United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, World Food Programme, United Nations Development Programme, or UN Women.

Like other large-scale donors, Sweden has an interest in influencing the agendas and operations of multilateral organizations in line with its national development cooperation priorities. The Strategy for Multilateral Development Policy, adopted in 2017, declares that Sweden's international development cooperation in multilateral organizations should be conducted to "achieve the greatest possible effect in the Government's priority areas" (Annex to government decision, UD2017/21055/FN:3). The Strategy sets out a broad register of strategies that Sweden may employ to achieve its policy objectives, including governance, advocacy, and partnerships, via both formal and informal channels.

In order to follow up on Swedish ambitions and efforts to influence its multilateral partners and their work to advance international development, better and more systematic knowledge regarding influence in multilateral aid organizations is needed. A starting point in building knowledge about influence in multilaterals, and for planning and designing evaluations of the results of Swedish influencing work, is to map and review the state of knowledge about influencing work in multilateral organizations.

To that end, this report reviews and summarizes key sources of empirical evidence on influence in multilateral organizations. It is based on the analysis and assessment of 76 academic studies and donor evaluations, selected on the basis of targeted database searches, expert suggestions, and academic references. It incorporates two levels of review. First, drawing on rapid evidence assessment methodologies, we code each of the studies along a set of key dimensions, including the studied actor, multilateral context, channel of influence, and effectiveness. By outlining the substantive and methodological contours of the influence literature in a quantitative manner, we can identify its broad characteristics and focus areas, as well as possible biases and gaps. Second, we perform an in-depth, traditional literature review, in which we identify and synthesize the current state of knowledge with regard to the nature, efficacy, and determinants of the principal channels of influence in multilateral contexts.

The remainder of the report is divided into five chapters. The second chapter explains the review methodology, describing our search protocol, inclusion criteria, and review process. The third chapter establishes some conceptual starting points, providing a definition of influence and describing the principal conceptual and methodological approaches employed in the literature. The fourth chapter provides a quantitative overview of the collected studies, mapping their substantive and methodological orientation in aggregate terms. The fifth, most substantive chapter provides an in-depth review of the collected material, summarizing and discussing the evidence as it pertains to four major channels of influence: financial flows, formal governance, advocacy, and staffing. The sixth and final chapter concludes, providing a summary of the main findings and a short discussion of research gaps and the implications of the accumulated evidence for Swedish strategic priorities on aid and development.

2 Methodology


This literature review combines methods of rapid evidence assessment (REA) (Barends, Rosseau and Briner, 2017) with elements of a systematic literature review (Knopf, 2006; Petticrew & Roberts, 2008). REA is a methodology that aims to systematically identify and select relevant studies based on explicit, pre-defined criteria, before mapping the state of research at a broad level. In this review, REA was used to provide an overview mapping of the methodological and substantive orientation of existing studies. Systematic literature reviews are methods to summarize and critically appraise a body of scientific knowledge. In this review, it was used for in-depth analysis, evaluation, and synthesis of evidence.

Relevant academic and scholarly literature was identified using two bibliographic databases, Web of Science (WoS) and EBSCO Discovery Service (EDS), one donor evaluation database, DAC Evaluation Resource Centre (DEReC), and Google Scholar. Broadly defined, academic literature consists of peer reviewed studies published in academic journals, whereas gray literature covers publications such as donor evaluations, working papers, and policy documents. Using these sources, we identified potentially relevant literature published between 1990 and February 2023 based on keyword searches (Appendix 1). For WoS and EDS, the searches used a combination of Boolean operators, truncation symbols and wildcards. Neither DEReC nor Google Scholar offers advanced search features. For this reason, our search strategy used a higher number and more specific keywords for DEReC and Google Scholar than for the other databases. After removing duplications, the initial search yielded 1,233 potentially relevant studies from WoS and EDS, and 228 publications from DEReC and Google Scholar.

The selection was then appraised and complemented in two stages (Figure 1). In the first stage, titles and abstracts or summaries from each publication were manually screened for relevance. Studies were eligible for inclusion if: i) the main object of study was influence in multilateral organizations, ii) the main actor exerting influence was a state, organization, or group of actors (e.g., interest groups), and iii) the study incorporated some form of empirical data or analysis (thereby excluding works that are entirely theoretical). The screening was not exclusively focused on organizations working in multilateral development, but rather sought to include studies that contain important insights of influence in multilateral organizations in general, and influence in multilateral aid organizations in particular.

The screening process left a sample consisting of 40 academic articles and 12 gray literature publications. In the second stage, this sample was complemented in two ways. First, the complete bibliography of the included studies was exported to an Excel-file and screened for frequently cited papers that the initial search protocol had failed to identify. Second, the selected corpus was reviewed by experts who supplemented our sample. In this way, our corpus was complemented with 18 articles, 7 gray literature publications, 7 books and 1 book chapter. In sum, 57 academic publications and 19 gray literature publications were selected for review.

Figure 1. Search and selection process



We then proceeded to code the selected literature in accordance with a pre-defined coding scheme (see Annex 2 for a condensed version). The coding scheme was designed to extract information relating to the details of the reviewed study, its methodology and thematic focus, including variables for influencing actor, channel of influence, principal target, and key findings.

2.1 Scope and limitations

This review covers scholarly and gray literature where influence in multilateral organizations is the prime focus. This focus intersects with two bodies of literature: the literature on influence, where studies of international organizations (IOs), public administration and global governance have made significant contributions, and the literature on multilateral aid, which is vast and spans multiple research fields, and only rarely discusses questions of influence. To identify the most relevant studies from these bodies of literature, we combined the use of a pre-defined search protocol with rapid assessment of a large number of abstracts, to arrive at a selection, which was subsequently supplemented by expert suggestions and frequently cited studies. While this approach has allowed us to scope a wide field within a limited time, there remains a possibility that studies relevant for the question of influence have not been captured.

One limitation is reflected in the exclusion criteria for the selected material. The review covers literature that has been published in English, between 1990 and February 2023, focusing on scientific articles and gray literature, placing emphasis on peer-reviewed articles, donor evaluations and working papers and giving less weight to other forms of publications. Influential or significant works published before this time or within an excluded format are therefore not included in this review. However, to the extent that such studies have had a lasting impact on the cumulative literature, they should be reflected in the theoretical and empirical orientation of more recent and included works. Moreover, since the review includes literature published in English, it risks missing out on relevant information published in other languages, notably Swedish. Although a few publications in Swedish have been identified and added by expert recommendations and by screening the references of included literature, there is a possibility that additional publications of particular interest to Sweden could have been included under a search protocol specifically designed to capture such insights.

Another limitation pertains to the orientation of the studied works. The review focuses on studies of influence in established multilateral organizations, awarding less attention to studies of regime formation, the process through which rules, norms, and institutions governing are established in the first place. Focusing on established organizations aligns with the orientation of the Swedish Strategy for multilateral development policy (Annex to government decision, UD2017/21055/FN:3), as well as with donor evaluations, both of which are less concerned with regime formation.

A third limitation relates to variation in terminology across research areas. While the topic of influence spans multiple research fields, our sample primarily reflects studies published within the fields of international relations, political science, development studies, development economics, and public policy. This may be a consequence of the search protocol; the included studies all discuss *influence* and its most related synonyms, such as advocacy, lobbying and impact. Our sample may reflect those research fields and traditions which rely on the included terminology, whereas other research fields, excluded in our sample, may use different phrasings.

A fourth limitation relates to the stages of the policy cycle. While the review incorporates studies of all the conventional stages of the policy cycle, from agenda-setting via policy formulation and decision-making to implementation, it places less emphasis on studies of the final stage of project implementation, especially in the field. Such studies tend to focus on operational aspects, often including a range of local implementing actors, rather than the formal and informal processes that determine influence within the organizations themselves, which is privileged in this review. Thus, this review does not cover how multilateral influencing interact with the daily work of development practitioners on the ground.

Overall, while some important topics are left outside of this review and others are dealt with very briefly, we have sought to focus the review on the studies and evaluations most relevant for questions of influence in multilateral aid organizations, in general, and for Swedish priorities, in particular.

3 Influence in multilateral organizations

This chapter sets out conceptual and methodological foundations that serve to structure the remainder of the report. These are discussed as they emerge in the reviewed literature and placed in relation to existing work in political science and international relations. The chapter begins by providing a broad definition of influence, discussing and exemplifying influence over beliefs and preferences, over behaviors, and over collective decisions. Next, it defines the main channels of influence available to states: financial flows, formal governance, advocacy, and staffing. Finally, the chapter presents the main approaches to measuring influence empirically, distinguishing between qualitative case studies, survey methods, and statistical studies.

3.1 Conceptualizing influence

Influence can be defined as the ability of one actor to shape the preferences, behaviors, or decisions of another actor in a way that aligns with its own goals and objectives (Simon, 1953; March, 1955). Broadly, one may speak of three general approaches when it comes to conceptualizing influence, all of which are reflected in the reviewed literature.

First, there are studies that focus on *influence over beliefs and preferences*. These studies emphasize how actors seek to exert influence over the ideas, values, and interests of other actors, aiming to make these align with their own perspectives. In other words, how an actor within a multilateral context gets others to think and believe in ways more similar to their own. For example, Björkdahl (2008) examines influence as the ability of actors to frame policy issues, focusing on the case of Sweden's efforts to promote norms and policies related to conflict prevention among the wider European Union (EU) membership. Similarly, Theys and Rietig (2020) investigate how Bhutan, another small state, managed to shift beliefs and preferences and introduce the notion of "happiness" as a meaningful metric in global development discourse.

Second, there are studies that focus on *influence over behaviors*, examining the ability of one actor to shape the conduct of others in ways that align with its own priorities. These studies are typically characterized by a focus on how states – often those with access to considerable resources – can shift

the behavior of other states within a multilateral organization, or the actions of the multilateral itself. For example, Schneider and Tobin (2013) examine how dominant EU countries influenced the allocation of multilateral aid, favoring affiliated states over others, while Reinsberg (2019) studies how states employ multi-bi (earmarked) aid to garner support for their campaigns to secure a seat in UN formal governance structures, effectively using aid to “buy” geopolitical influence.

Third, several studies examine *influence over collective decisions*, which may be understood as the ability of actors to shape the outcome of a decision-making process in line with its own interests and objectives. These studies typically study influence in settings where many parties, endowed with diverse interests, seek to arrive at joint decisions. Many studies conceptualize influence as preference attainment, in other words, whether an actor manages to secure an outcome favorable to their initial position (e.g., Nasra, 2011; Lundgren et al., 2022). However, there are also those that examine influence over decision-making without paying much attention to the outcomes in terms of substantive policy, such as studies of voting alignment (e.g., Dreher et al., 2008).


While most studies provide some conceptualization of influence, at least to sufficiently place them in the above categorization, there are several that do not offer clear definitions and offer but vague references to “influence” and related terms. This is particularly common for the gray literature. In some cases, influence is not the main object of study but instead appears as an indication of the effective use of financial or human resources (FPS Foreign affairs, 2021; MFA Netherlands, 2013; Santos et al., 2022). While these studies rarely provide operationalizations of influence that can help determine the comparative success of a particular strategy, there are some exceptions. For example, in their evaluation of Finland’s influence in the UN, Palenberg et al. (2020:34) make an effort at a more systematic conceptualization, defining influence as the “power or capacity to have an effect on people or things” and employing a graded scale of influence to measure and compare across several organizational contexts.

3.2 Channels of influence

Actors who seek to advance their interests within multilateral organizations may leverage a range of channels of influence, drawing on material and immaterial means. The literature emphasizes four main channels of influence in multilateral organizations: financial flows, formal governance,

advocacy, and staffing (Figure 2). Because they are recurrent in the literature and constitute principal policy levers available to governments, we have used them as the organizational principle of our in-depth review in chapter 5.

Figure 2. Channels of influence



A primary channel of influence is *financial flows*, understood as multilateral aid in the form of core and earmarked funding. Representing material resources, financial flows provide a source of incentives that can be used to exert influence, predominantly over behaviors and collective decisions. For example, funding to a multilateral organization may generate dependencies, which can be used to influence its policies or decisions.


States may also seek to exert influence via *formal governance*, flowing from the positional power that comes with certain formal roles or from bargaining power, which states may exert when participating in multilateral negotiation processes. This channel primarily relates to influence over collective decisions, but it may also incorporate influence over beliefs and preferences, for example, in a negotiation, a chair's ability to place issues on the agenda and frame them in ways amenable to joint agreement.

Another channel of influence is *advocacy*, which is centered on the promotion of ideas, values, or policy issues through strategies such as issue framing or policy entrepreneurship. Aiming to build support for a cause or issue, advocacy primarily relies on influence over beliefs and preferences, as a condition for ensuing change of behaviors and collective decisions.

Finally, states may seek to exert influence via *staffing*, whereby they use secondments or seek to place nationals or other affiliated individuals as civil servants at various levels within multilateral organizations. These individuals can then use their informal connections and decision-making authority to advance their agenda and shape the direction of the organization. The literature primarily emphasizes staffing as a channel for influence over behaviors and collective decision-making.

Using these channels of influence, actors may seek to promote their interests at each stage of the policy cycle (e.g., Jann & Wegrich, 2017). As illustrated in Figure 3, the conventional understanding of the policy cycle conceptualizes a public policy process as evolving over five temporally interconnected steps: (1) Agenda-setting, the identification of problems as relevant for policy-makers; (2) Policy formulation, the crafting of alternative policies to address the perceived problem; (3) Decision-making, the process of formally adopting a preferred policy; (4) Implementation, the efforts to execute and realize the adopted policy by allocating material and human resources; and (5) Evaluation, the assessment of whether the adopted policy achieves its intended outcomes with desired levels of effectiveness and efficiency.

Figure 3: Stages of the policy cycle



In a multilateral organization, each of these stages offers opportunities for influence. During the agenda-setting stage, influence can be exerted through the ability to shape which issues are brought to the attention of the organization. During the policy formulation stage, influence can be exercised through the ability to shape the content and scope of proposed policies, for example whether decisions should be binding or non-binding for the organization's membership. During the decision-making stage, influence can be exerted through the ability to mobilize support or block opposition to a proposed policy among the states involved in multilateral negotiations. During the implementation stage, influence can be exerted through the ability to shape how work is carried out or how compliance is monitored, for example by channeling (or blocking) funds and human resources to an organization operating in the field. Finally, during the evaluation stage, actors may seek to exert influence by shaping what is being evaluated and not, the manner of evaluation, and the specific criteria employed to gauge, for instance, effectiveness and efficiency in a given multilateral context.

3.3 Measuring influence

To understand if and how actors exert influence within multilateral organizations, scholars have developed a variety of methods. In a methodological survey, Dür (2008) distinguishes between three principal approaches to measuring influence – qualitative case studies, using surveys to assess attributed influence, and statistical evaluations of preference attainment. Broadly speaking, these three approaches to measuring influence are represented in our sample of studies.

With *qualitative case studies*, the ambition is typically to assess the nature and extent of influence on a specific policy issue or within a more limited context, but qualitative methods have also been leveraged in the service of comparative or causal research goals. In practice, a variety of qualitative research methods have been applied in the reviewed literatures, including document-based process-tracing (e.g., Schulz et al., 2017; Tallberg, 2010), discourse and content analysis (e.g., Aarva et al., 2017), and interviews (e.g., Corbett et al., 2020; Reinsberg, 2017; Mackie et al., 2022; Schoeller, 2021). There are also studies which combine more unusual methods, such as participant observation, with more common ones to investigate various aspects of influence (Monheim, 2016; Dellmuth et al., 2022).

Via systematic *surveys*, the researcher asks a larger number of respondents to assess both their own influence and that of others within a given context, such as a decision-making process, multilateral negotiation, or policy field. The goal is to arrive at an estimate of “attributed influence”, in other words, participant perceptions of influence. In our sample – and in the literature as a whole – this method is relatively rare, presumably because of its costs and the difficulty to attain a sufficient response rate (cf. Porter et al. 2004). However, there are some studies that rely, at least in part, on surveys, including Santos et al (2022), who surveyed Finnish education experts about their work and influence in multilateral organizations, the Swedish Agency for Development Evaluation (SADEV) (2009), which dispatched surveys to 65 field officials and attained a response rate of 46 percent, and Dellmuth et al. (2022) who surveyed 68 Swedish ex-secondedes and ministry staff about the use of secondments to attain influence.

The third approach to evaluate influence in multilateral organizations is to draw on quantitative analysis, using statistical methods to identify influence and its correlates. Many studies that conceptualize influence on quantitative measures focus on preference attainment, comparing numerical proxies of parties’ initial positions with collective outcomes to arrive at measures of negotiation “success” or influence (e.g., Nasra & Debaere 2016; Lundgren et al. 2022). Next to preference attainment, which focuses on the decision-making stage, another common approach is to estimate informal influence, typically by studying the statistical relationship between funding patterns of IOs and the interests of its most substantial donors. This literature largely illustrates how powerful states leverage their influence in multilateral development banks (MDBs) or UN agencies to advance their geopolitical interests, using voting alignments at the UN Security Council (UNSC) and the UN General Assembly (UNGA), and bilateral aid flows as proxies (e.g., Clark & Dolan, 2021; Copolovitch, 2010; Dreher et al., 2008; 2009; Fleck & Kilby, 2006; Kilby, 2011; Kuziemko & Werker, 2006; Lim & Vreeland, 2013; Stone, 2004; 2008). Other quantitative approaches to estimate influence include assessing the orientation of policy content and legislation (e.g., Warntjen, 2007), and proxies such as bank shares or delegation sizes (e.g., Kaya & Woo, 2022; Bertacchini, 2016).

These three approaches to measuring influence can contribute with different insights into the mechanisms of influence, its targets, and its promoting and hindering factors. As the ensuing chapter will show,

however, although the literature relies on a variety of applied methods, the findings frequently converge, also across studies using different empirical approaches. In particular, they reach similar conclusions regarding the principal channels of influence and the actors that wield them.


4 Overview mapping

Our systematic coding scheme makes it possible to map the characteristics of the reviewed studies at a broad, overview level. In the following, we provide a view of aggregate patterns regarding their principal methodology and object of study, broken down by multilateral organization, influencing actor, and channels of influence.

4.1 Methodological orientation

Figure 4 outlines the distribution of the principal methods used in the studies in our sample. As illustrated, academic studies exhibit an even distribution between qualitative (n=28) and quantitative (n=26) methods, whereas the gray literature is dominated by either qualitative studies (11) or studies employing mixed methods, i.e., combining qualitative and quantitative methods (7). It is predominantly in the mixed methods studies that we find examples of survey methods (e.g., Dellmuth et al., 2022; Mackie et al., 2022; Palenberg et al., 2015; Santos et al., 2020; SADEV, 2009). Survey methods aside, it is noteworthy that the gray literature has not incorporated quantitative methods to the same extent as the academic literature. While it may be that qualitative, case-oriented evidence is particularly informative for policy-guided evaluations, the observed gap points to a potential for methodological development in the gray literature.

Figure 4. Methodological orientation of reviewed studies



Employed methods in academic literature (n=57) and gray literature publications (n=19), respectively.

4.2 Influencing target

Table 1 provides an overview of the studied multilateral organizations, broken down by two key dimensions. First, we categorize multilateral organizations by level of governance, distinguishing between international and regional organizations. Second, we categorize organizations based on the scope of their policy mandate, distinguishing between general-purpose organizations, which are active in several policy domains, and task-specific organizations, which mainly operate in one policy field (cf. Hooghe & Marks 2010).¹ We note that the literature is relatively balanced across the main categories, but there are more studies on general-purpose Ios (n=40) than on task-specific ones (n=28) and more on international (n=42) than regional (n=21) organizations. There are fewer studies of task-specific regional organizations, possibly because there are fewer such organizations, but it nevertheless suggests the possibility that the surveyed literature – and likely the literature overall – exhibits a bias towards larger and more well-known organizations.

Table 1. Frequency of studies, by type of multilateral organization


	International Organization	Regional Organization	Multiple/other	Total
General-purpose	21	17	2	40
Task-Specific	20	3	5	28
Multiple/other	1	1	6	8
Total	42	21	13	76

Note: “multiple/other” refers to those studies that either study several organizations (such as multiple UN agencies) or where the objects of study are unspecified.

If we count the number of times a particular multilateral has been studied, the UN, the EU and the World Bank constitute more than half of our sample (Figure 5). If we disaggregate these results, the UNSC and the UNGA stand out as the UN bodies that have received the most attention (n=9 and n=4, respectively). Several studies examine multiple UN agencies, funds, or programs, especially evaluation studies commissioned by states (n=8).

¹ For example, the UN is categorized as a general-purpose international organization, the EU is categorized as a general-purpose regional organization, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank are categorized as task-specific international organizations, whereas the Asian Development Bank (ADB) is categorized as a task-specific regional organization.

Figure 5. Frequency of studies, by multilateral organization




Note: The figure considers that several publications focus on more than one multilateral organization. UN = United Nations (including vertical funds); EU = European Union; WB= the World Bank; IMF = The International Monetary Fund; AfDB = the African Development Bank; ADB = the Asian Development Bank.

4.3 Influencing actor

The vast majority of included studies has focused on influence wielded by governments (n=65). Figure 6 provides a breakdown of the studies based on the government whose influence has been examined. As evident in the figure, the most frequently studied actors are the international Group of Seven (G7) countries (n=21; out of which 12 focus on the U.S.), EU member states (n=14), and Nordic countries (n=13). The overall distribution and the clear focus on governmental influence suggests that most of the selected literature should have relevance for Swedish perspectives. While not all states are alike, especially in terms of structural power, Sweden and other states have access to a similar repertoire of influencing channels. The distribution also reflects the possibility of a regional bias, as the literature has taken a donor perspective with the lion's share of studies focusing on actors and organizations in the Global North, while very few focus on actors in the Global South.

Figure 6. Frequency of studies, by influencing government




Note: "Nordic countries" include studies where Sweden, Denmark, Norway or Finland is studied either as a single actor, or where this group of countries are the main actor of study. These includes Nordic countries that are EU member states, but these are not counted twice.

4.4 Channels of influence

If we turn our attention towards the channels of influence (Figure 7), we note that the most studied channel is formal governance ($n=38$), while financial flows constitutes a close second ($n=34$). Roughly one third of these ($n=12$) overlap, illustrating the close relationship between influencing by formal governance and by financial flows. Similarly, advocacy is mentioned as a prominent channel of influence in 28 publications, 20 of which also list decision-making as a principal channel. Finally, staffing is listed as important for influence in 31 publications, but only 8 of these have focused on staffing as the principal channel of influence. The high degree of overlap between these categories is illustrative of the literature, where many studies emphasize the mutually reinforcing relationship between different means of influence.

Figure 7. Frequency of studies, by channel of influence



Note: The same study may study several channels of influence.

Taken together, we can conclude that the literature has tended to give priority to influence wielded by G7 countries in international general-purpose organizations. The academic literature is evenly divided between qualitative and quantitative studies, while the gray literature appears to give preference to qualitative or mixed methods, for example by combining surveys, interviews and document analysis.

5 In-depth review

The literature reveals that actors have used a plethora of means to exert influence in multilateral organizations. We organize the in-depth review in accordance with the four principal channels of influence available to governments: financial flows, formal governance, advocacy, and staffing. We find that governments of all sizes utilize these channels but to varying degrees, at different stages of the policy cycle, and with variable success. In the remainder of the chapter, we summarize available evidence regarding each of these influencing channels, including a description of what they entail, the actors that wield them and with what success. Following this, we provide a brief discussion of available evidence regarding the factors that shape variation in outcomes. Given that not all studies fit neatly into one of these four channels of influence, we connect the evidence and examples to the channel that is most closely related to their subject matter.

5.1 Financial Flows

The literature suggests that governments use financial flows, including core and earmarked funding, to wield influence in multilateral contexts. In simple terms, core funding are the assessed and voluntary donor contributions to the budgets of multilateral organizations and are unrestricted in terms of their use. In 2021, Sweden ranked among the top donors of core funding to several UN agencies, including the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and the World Food Programme (WFP) (Prop. 2022/23:1). Earmarked funding (also known as multi-bi aid), instead, is voluntary funding directed towards specific purposes, such as thematic or geographic priorities. Since the early 1990s, such contributions have grown substantially.

When examining influence in relation to these principal forms of funding, the literature asks different questions. With regard to core funding, the literature has focused on examining whether its allocation is dictated by strategic donor interests or by the nature and scope of recipient organizations' substantive needs. Meanwhile, studies have addressed non-core funding in a context of shifting funding patterns, asking whether donors leverage earmarked funding to wield influence, in particular over thematic priorities and their implementation. We address each funding type under separate headlines and discuss the evidence regarding whether and for whom it may result in influence, before ending with a brief discussion of the factors that may help explain variation in outcomes.

Core funding: Asserting long-term influence

The literature has illustrated how the allocation of bilateral aid is conditioned by the strategic economic and political interests of donors, as opposed to strictly by recipient needs (c.f., Alesina & Dollar, 2000; Berthélemy, 2006; Hoeffler & Outram, 2011; Neumeyer, 2003; 2005). One of the key arguments for multilateral core funding is that it is comparatively less susceptible to state capture and distorting influence by vested interests (Gulrajani, 2016). Because core funding is not earmarked by donors but may be used where it is needed most, it is thought to promote the ability of multilaterals to execute the functions laid down in their mandates. According to this argument, core funding helps prevent undue influence within multilaterals, safeguarding impartiality in their response to substantive needs.

In support of this, Thorvaldsdottir et al. (2022) investigate donor influence on the allocation of resources through the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Using a novel dataset of state contributions and country-level expenditures, they find that country level spendings adhere to the number of refugees in countries, suggesting that UNHCR's activities are guided by the organization's main objectives – to save lives and protect the rights of refugees. However, countries that receive higher disbursements through UNHCR are also more likely to receive bilateral aid from the agency's major donors. This suggests that although donors may assert influence over the multilateral organization, aligning its work with their own bilateral priorities, such influence does not necessarily conflict with the organization's principal tasks. In contrast, Lewis (2003) notes that donor interests (tied to economic exports, political ideology, and national security) may outweigh local environmental concerns in the allocation of multilateral environmental aid via the Global Environment Facility (GEF). However, while this suggests that donor interests may play a role in the allocation of multilateral aid, Lewis' study does not demonstrate that the allocation resulted from active influencing attempts by donors.

Focusing more directly on the question of active influence, a few studies examine whether influence is an important motivation for donors when delegating funds to multilateral organizations. Greenhill and Rabinowitz (2016) examine influence as a function of representation in formal governance structures, specifically asking whether countries delegate larger sums to organizations where this would secure more influence on decision-making. Countries are here expected to provide

more core funding to agencies where they can be sure of attaining and maintaining control over delegated aid. Drawing on interviews with stakeholders in six case countries (Australia, Belgium, Brazil, France, Norway, and the United States (U.S.)), the researchers suggest that an aspiration for greater influence could be a motivation for some countries in some cases, but they find no distinct pattern in their sample. Instead, they suggest that countries contribute funds to multilaterals which already share their objectives.

Adding further weight to this conclusion, Jurgens (2017:27) finds that a key factor in the Netherlands' delegation of aid has been the "closeness of fit" of an organization's mandate with Dutch policy goals in the domain of sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR). Considering this, the Netherlands has chosen to contribute both core and non-core funding to the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and to the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS). Despite considerable differences in terms of organizational structure, both organizations are identified as key to advancing global policy on SRHR and are therefore "aligned with the priorities of the Netherlands' development agenda in SRHR" (ibid:28f). Core funding is thus argued to empower the organizations to continue to work towards their mandates, while simultaneously advancing Dutch development policy priorities. At the same time, the evaluation recognizes formal representation in the organization's boards as an important channel for Dutch influence but does not clarify if this is a key motivation when choosing their multilateral partners.

In contrast, a recent evaluation of Belgium's core funding policy points to a more explicit ambition. Adopted in 2009, the policy seeks to "deliver effective results and give Belgium a greater weight in influencing the United Nations development system" (FPS Foreign Affairs, 2021:1). As part of this strategy, Belgium has chosen to work with fewer multilateral partners, and to focus on organizations that align with Belgium's thematic and sectoral priorities. The motivation for this is to economize on limited resources (the evaluation describes Belgium as a small donor in the multilateral system), while enabling the country to forge closer relationships and maximize political influence in priority areas. The evaluation emphasizes the importance of core funding for its ability to provide access to formal governance and decision-making. In this context, the size of the contribution is said to matter, in addition to funding type:

Voluntary core funding also provides stronger opportunities – with the right follow-up – to push for certain policy and thematic priorities. In order to make a difference and have influence within the thematic windows, funding contributions would need to be of a significant level. Exerting influence in the executive boards of organizations is closely linked to the amount of financing and technical expertise that is brought in by the donor (ibid: 57).

Thus, this evaluation identifies core funding as an important channel of influence, both because it supports the multilateral partners that most effectively promote national policy priorities, and because it provides the donor with greater access to their governance structures.

Similarly, an evaluation of Finland’s influence in UN agencies stresses the importance of funding to gain a “seat at the table” (Palenberg et al., 2020:94), whilst emphasizing the reputational benefits of core funding. Although influence is not the stated goal, consistent support through core funding is argued to strengthen “general influence” in the form of a say regarding the priorities and management of Finland’s multilateral partners. The evaluation also suggests that states may enjoy greater reputational benefits if they maintain a consistent, reliable flow of core funding to multilaterals. For example, Finland continued to provide core funding to UN Women even when it ranked among poorest performing multilaterals. Sticking by its multilateral partner in challenging times, Palenberg et al argue, improved the relationship with the UN agency, which, in turn, granted influence.

The literature thus suggests that the comparative advantage of core funding lies in its potential to grant access to formal decision-making, to ensure continued work by multilaterals active in prioritized areas, and to incur reputational benefits associated with championing multilateral principles. However, while a few studies and evaluations highlight these benefits, arguing that core funding provides long-term influence, the literature provides few clear examples of or insight into the specific mechanisms through which such influence is actually asserted. The literature on “vote-buying” and informal influence, reviewed in section 5.2 below, nuances this picture by pointing to some ways in which donors with large economic resources may utilize these to shape multilateral decision-making.

Earmarked funding: Spearheading thematic issues

During the past two decades, there has been a steep increase in the use of earmarked funding to UN agencies, alongside a relative decline in core funding (Browne, 2017; Browne et al., 2017; FPS Foreign Affairs, 2021). The trend towards earmarking has been described as “à la carte multilateralism” (OECD, 2020:66) and “Trojan multilateralism” (Schnidar & Woods, 2013), suggesting a bilateralization of multilateral aid where donors strive for increasing influence over the priorities and management of multilaterals. This is coupled with the concern that earmarking could undermine the autonomy and effectiveness of multilateral organizations (Browne, 2017; Browne, Connelly & Weiss, 2017; MFA Foreign Affairs, 2021; OECD, 2020).

Some studies have examined the influence of earmarked funding, focusing on trust funds, a commonly used financial mechanism. Trust funds have their own governance structures but use multilaterals to administer and implement funds towards specific purposes. Two donor evaluations, one commissioned by Finland (Aarva et al., 2012) and one by Sweden (SADEV, 2012), find that trust funds can provide salient tools for influence. More specifically, the evaluations explore how the Nordic and Baltic countries, in coalition with Switzerland and India, have impacted the gender policies of the World Bank and the African Development Bank (AfDB) by creating trust funds, such as GENFUND established by Norway. The evaluations argue that, although there is no explicit joint Nordic strategy to promote gender equality in the multilateral development banks (MDBs) of interest, the use of multi-donor trust funds could grant certain leverage in relation to raising awareness and enhancing the operational capacity to promote certain issues, such as gender equality. To illustrate how the Nordic countries have sustained influence in this area, the World Bank Group launched a Gender Strategy in 2016, which is viewed by World Bank staff as an important example of Nordic influence (Palenberg et al., 2020, Annex 10).

While donor evaluations may have a strong interest in highlighting successful examples of influencing work, academic studies have arrived at similar conclusions. Drawing on 75 semi-structured interviews with World Bank staff and executive directors, Reinsberg (2017) finds that while earmarked funding does not directly advance donors’ geopolitical interests, it allows them to wield thematic influence at both operational and programmatic levels. He argues that trust funds are more commonly

exploited by (a group of) small and medium sized donors to influence agenda-setting and policy formulation, for example by promoting issue areas prioritized by the donors.

Reinsberg draws on the example of the Nordic Trust Fund (NTF), established by Nordic donors in 2009 to promote and integrate a human rights perspective in the World Bank, which has been examined in two donor evaluations (SADEV, 2012; Palenberg et al., 2020). After a three-year long negotiation process with a hesitant executive board, the NTF and an accompanying secretariat and grant program were established to facilitate the integration of human rights in existing and future programs at the Bank (SADEV, 2012; Palenberg et al., 2020, Annex 10). Despite growing acceptance of a human rights approach within the Bank, tangible change proved slow. To combat this, the NTF changed its name to the Human Rights and Development Trust Fund (HRDTF), following adamant negotiations by Finland, Sweden, and Norway during the 2018 Annual meetings. An evaluation of Finland's influencing work in multilateral organizations finds that following Nordic encouragement, and mostly Nordic funding, the World Bank integrated an issue highly prioritized by Nordic donors at top levels of decision-making (ibid).

Some studies argue that earmarked funding, by virtue of being reserved for specific issues, projects, or countries, can undermine the autonomy of multilaterals. In a study of vertical funds in the health domain, Browne (2017) observes that earmarked funding has indeed granted individual donors greater room to exert programmatic and operational influence in multilateral organizations. However, he points to the risk that the shift in funding patterns, in particular the increasing reliance on earmarked, conditional financing, risks eroding the independence of multilaterals and turning them into "implementing agencies for donors" (Browne, 2022:104). Browne's study implies that earmarked funding does not necessarily guarantee long-term influence in the sense of being able to shape the priorities and management or the long-term viability of a specific multilateral. Rather, it enables the promotion of a priority or the implementation of a project that would otherwise not have been prioritized.

In contrast to Browne's contention, other studies point out that earmarked funding, in combination with a strong overall support to organizations' core budgets, does not necessarily undermine the autonomy of multilaterals. For example, Palenberg et al. (2020) argue that a strategic use of earmarked funding can provide small states with an effective

influencing strategy in organizations dominated by bigger and more established donors. As they write in the case of the United Nations International Children's Fund (UNICEF):

In a situation with very limited funding to a large organization with an already solid donor base there was little or no chance for Finland to become a significant donor in comparison with others, and Finland was able to carve out a niche for itself where it had been able to contribute to significant results (p. 97).

Palenberg et al. conclude that non-core funding, in this case earmarked for UNICEF's innovation work, allowed the freedom to explore and test new ideas that UNICEF would not have had the mandates to do using core funds, while at the same time awarding Finland the opportunity to exchange and influence ideas. Hence, while granting influence for an individual donor, earmarked funding was not found to contradict or undermine multilateral principles.

Similarly, in a Dutch donor evaluation, Jurgens (2017) presents a strategy where core funding, coupled with earmarked funding, was leveraged to advance the Netherlands' work within SRHR. For example, during the period 2012–2015, the Netherlands increased its use of earmarked funding to UNFPA, despite a commitment to provide predominantly core funding to support the agency's mandate. The use of earmarked funding was channeled towards reproductive health services such as contraceptives in support of family planning. While core funding allows UNFPA to fulfil its mandate, earmarked funding to reproductive health is, arguably, important to promote SRHR. Thus, the example is illustrative both of how funding types are leveraged to achieve the greatest influence for national policy priorities and how they are used in different ways.

Factors shaping influence via financial flows

The literature reviewed in this section examines whether and how countries seek influence using core and earmarked funding. Although the evidence is not fully consistent, the literature suggests that core funding may award influence, primarily by strengthening donor reputation and institutional partnerships, supporting the viability of privileged multilaterals, and by providing access to representation in formal governance. The use of earmarked funding, instead, when used strategically, has granted states the ability to advance their developmental policy priorities, for example in the domains of gender and human rights.

When elaborating on the factors that shape influence, the literature presents mixed findings. We discuss two main factors highlighted in the literature as important in shaping variation in influence via financial flows: i) the size of the contribution, and ii) the thematic issue area within which influence is sought.

First, the literature suggests that the size of the contribution may shape the degree of influence achieved through financial flows. For example, the evaluation of Belgium's core policy framework finds that the country's comparatively small contributions have had a limited effect on influence, and that Belgium has not been "seen as a multilateral 'champion'" (MFA Foreign Affairs, 2021:36). More sizeable funding may provide more voting power and access to influence via formal governance structures. Principal donors are typically granted representation on the governing boards of multilaterals, which gives access to agenda-setting and high-level decision-making. Thus, while the use of funds may not always grant influence directly, it may complement influencing by enhanced access to formal governance. Moreover, sizeable donations award leverage to threaten withdrawals of funds, prompting multilaterals to stay on good terms with their donors, which may benefit them in terms of influence (Clark & Dolan, 2021; Reinsberg, 2017).

Thus, no study in our sample provides unambiguous evidence in support of the conclusion that larger contributions imply more expansive influence. However, there is both select case evidence and some quantitative support for this thesis, as well as for the notion that larger donors are better positioned to leverage financial flows to wield influence. However, one should note that multilateral organizations are different, for instance with regard to organizational management and funding and governance structures. Such differences should be taken into account when considering the impact of financial flows. Notably, the nominal size of core funding to one multilateral may matter significantly less than its comparative size in relation to other donations.

Second, the degree to which financial flows lead to influence may also depend on the thematic issue area that an actor seeks to influence. Much of the evidence on the impact of earmarked funding, in particular, has focused relatively narrowly on issues prioritized by smaller donors, notably Nordic countries. Finland and Sweden tell successful stories about influence in multilateral development banks (MDBs) – for instance within the gender equality and human rights issue areas – but provide little insight into encountered obstacles or resistance. Specifically, the referenced policy

priorities of gender equality and human rights may not be the most contested, and therefore “low-hanging fruit” in terms of influence. Thus, while MDBs may have advanced their work on gender equality in line with Nordic countries’ priorities and interests in the examples discussed, it remains unclear how earmarked contributions would deliver when faced with greater resistance.

5.2 Formal governance

Under this headline, we discuss studies of how governments use their participation in formal governance processes to wield influence over multilateral organizations. This involves holding formal roles in high-level organs for policy- and decision-making, such as boards of directors or interstate councils. We discuss the relevant literature in two sections. In the first section, we review the literature that examines positional power, discussing how formal positions, such as chairmanships, grant actors access to prerogatives and informational advantages that may allow them to shape the format, content, and outcome of multilateral processes. In the second, we turn to the literature on bargaining power, which has examined how states participating in multilateral negotiations may seek to exert influence to attain their preferred outcomes. In this section, we also review literature on “vote buying”, which explores how states can leverage their bargaining power and informal influence in multilateral organizations to promote their geopolitical interests. Lastly, we outline some studies that discuss how states use “forum-shopping” as a conscious strategy to advance their interests in multilateral contexts.

Positional power

The importance of positional power for asserting influence is perhaps most apparent in the role of negotiation chairs. In multilateral negotiation processes, whether they take place at ad hoc conferences or within intergovernmental organizations, the chair (also known as the president) holds the formal authority to lead and direct the negotiations as per the relevant procedural rules. While some scholars have voiced skepticism about the proposition that chairs can exert significant influence over international bargaining outcomes (cf. Moravcsik, 1999), accumulated evidence suggests that they do (Tallberg, 2004; 2010; Wartntjen, 2007; Blavoukos & Bourantonis, 2011). For example, studies have found that entrepreneurial activities of the French Presidency of the UN Climate

Change Conference (COP21) – undertaken during the agenda-setting, policy formulation, and decision-making stages – were instrumental in establishing what became the Paris Agreement on Climate Change (Dimitrov, 2016; Jepsen et al., 2021). Studies in this field typically emphasize that multilateral negotiations are characterized by several collective action problems, which present negotiation chairs with unique opportunities to steer outcomes in their preferred direction (Tallberg, 2006; Blavoukos & Bourantonis 2011; Monheim, 2016; Downie & Crump, 2017; Walker & Biedenkopf, 2020).

A considerable part of the literature on chairs is focused on the role and impact of the EU Council Presidency, which rotates among the EU membership on a six-month basis. Although it is generally acknowledged that Council Presidents must set aside their national agendas to maintain neutrality, the literature suggests that this does not necessarily imply relinquished influence. For example, SADEV (2009) finds that Swedish field officials generally perceives the rotating EU Council Presidency as an important avenue for influencing the Commission and other member states. Other studies argue that the reputation and status of the presidency may make other member states more inclined to accept policy proposals put forward by council presidents, even if those proposals align with the priorities of the member state currently at the chair (Panke, 2010).

The literature highlights several examples of such presidential influence during the agenda-setting stage in the EU. For instance, the Swedish Committee on Foreign Affairs (2007) recognizes the 2001 Swedish Presidency as important for advancing certain national priorities, such as the “Everything But Arms” scheme, which exempts least developed countries from tariffs and quotas on most exported goods to the EU. Commentating on the Finnish Presidency in the second half of 2019, Mackie et al. note that:

[...] during the six months of the Presidency when Finland played the role as a facilitator, it had to downplay its advocacy stance, but on the other hand it was in a strong position to craft the agenda and set the terms of the debate which also allows scope for advancing its own priorities in different ways (2022:37).

Björkdahl (2008) illustrates how Sweden took advantage of its Presidency during the first half of 2001 to advance EU policy on conflict prevention, a topic which had remained a key policy priority of Sweden since the early 1990s.

Other studies demonstrate that countries holding the Presidency are not only privileged in terms of agenda-setting, but that they also can leverage their positional and procedural powers in influencing during the decision-making stage. Warntjen (2007), for example, uses data on proceedings in the EU Council during a 19-year period covering 35 presidencies, to illustrate that countries that attach issue salience to environmental policy successfully influence legislative activity in the environmental field during their presidencies. Similarly, Nasra and Debrae (2010) illustrate how, in the aftermath of the financial crisis in 2008, Sweden leveraged the power of the Council Presidency to influence the adoption of a bank levy in the G20, despite powerful member states' preference for a financial transactions tax.

Although the EU Council Presidency is a clear and recurring example of how formal positions may grant influence over agenda-setting and decision-making, it is not the only one. A donor evaluation of Danish influencing work in multilaterals asserts that “participation in governing bodies is considered the core element of Danish interactions with the organizations” (MFA Denmark, 2019:16). This is consistent with other donor evaluations, which suggest that formal decision-making venues have provided crucial avenues for influence on policy formulation, for example in the gender equality domain (Aarva et al., 2012; SADEV, 2012), on disability inclusion (ODE, 2017), and on SRHR (Jurgens, 2017).

Bargaining power

We refer to bargaining power as the relative strength that an actor has in a negotiation or governance process. One cluster of studies highlight how actors assert influence in multilateral negotiations, where different bargaining tactics allow parties to steer the negotiation closer to their preferred outcomes. This literature, which focuses on the decision-making stage of the policy cycle, stresses that negotiation outcomes are shaped, in part, by the relevant decision rules, the number of parties, and the strength of different parties' positions. While the first two are contingent upon the institutional design of the relevant multilateral context, over which negotiating parties have less influence, the latter reflects their bargaining power, which states have greater prospects to impact.

In our sample of studies, the most frequently leveraged strategy to increase bargaining power is the forging of strategic alliances via coalition-building. In coalitions, states can pool their votes and resources and increase the likelihood of swaying decisions in their favor. While the ability to forge

alliances is available to states of all sizes, it stands out as a principal strategy for small states in our sample. Small states have been found to form coalitions in relation to specific issues, sometimes in collaboration with middle powers. In coalitions, small and medium-sized states have influenced negotiation outcomes in relation to the Eurozone budget (Schoeller, 2021) and Eurozone reform (Dellmuth et al., 2020) by pushing for the Nordic Directive Initiative (Arter, 2000), conflict prevention (Björkdahl, 2008) or negotiating aid allocations in the EU (Schneider & Tobin, 2013). Coalition-building is also acknowledged as a small state strategy in negotiations in the context of climate governance (Corbett et al., 2020), the International Criminal Court (ICC) (Deitelhoff & Walbott, 2012) and biological diversity (Schultz et al., 2017).

At the UN, the Nordic countries have a robust and long-standing cooperation that is consistently leveraged to advance Nordic development policy priorities, as evident on their close collaborations on issues related to gender equality, SRHR, peacebuilding, and environmental governance (Aarva et al., 2012; Tarp & Hansen, 2013; SADEV, 2012). Palenberg et al. (2020) attributes 83 percent of all influencing effects in the UN to group efforts. For the most part, such groups have been constituted by Nordic countries and like-minded states. These findings are consistent with Finnish influencing efforts in the EU, where coalitions with like-minded states are recognized as an “essential part of EU influencing mechanisms” (Mackie et al., 2022:32), underscoring the value of collaborations for effective influencing in multilateral negotiations.

To increase the likelihood of reaching an agreement, states can also turn to issue linkages, creating package deals that address the different concerns of a diverse set of actors. This means that parties engage in trading concessions on some issues in exchange for concessions on others (e.g., Haas 1980; Poast 2013). A related, but distinct, strategy is that of logrolling, where countries can facilitate collective agreement and influence over the nature of such agreements by trading support on an issue that they deem less important for another actor’s support on an issue more salient to them. In an analysis of the negotiation of the new EU Financing framework, the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation instrument (NDICI), Lundgren et al. (2022:61) find that the negotiations were characterized by such “compromises and exchanges”, suggesting that countries gained influence over some issues, while ceding ground on others. For example, they note that Nordic countries were more successful in bargaining for their preferred positions on geographic and governance issues, while having limited influence over thematic issues.

These findings are supported by Mackie et al. (2022), who, when reflecting on Finland's participation in the NDICI negotiations, conclude that the country failed in its push for a stronger climate ambition in the EU. While climate change was a stated priority for Finland, they note that "Finland failed to take a more pro-active role to push for a more ambitious target, but instead relied on other parties to improve the language on climate who then failed to do so" (ibid:49). Thus, even though Finland had preferences on the thematic issues of the NDICI negotiations, its failure to articulate them had a negative impact on its bargaining success. As empirically supported in other studies (Dellmuth et al., 2020; Lundgren et al., 2022), forming and voicing preferences during multilateral negotiations appears to increase the likelihood of steering the negotiation outcomes in one's favor.

A significant bulk of studies examine how states with ample bargaining power, for example through financial and human resources, leverage their influence in multilateral institutions to advance their geopolitical interests. Notably, these states can "buy" votes in the UNSC or the UNGA by offering a more favorable treatment by multilaterals, such as international finance institutions, where they hold significant control. In this tradition, scholars have illustrated that countries that have close economic or political ties with the U.S. tend to enjoy favorable loans or grants by multilaterals where the U.S. has significant influence, such as the World Bank (Dreher et al., 2009; Fleck & Kilby, 2006), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Stone, 2004; 2008), or UNICEF (Kuziemko & Werker, 2006).

Finally, some studies argue that states can increase their influence by strategically choosing to introduce or push for their policy preferences at the venue where it is most likely to receive support. For example, Corbett et al. (2020) illustrate how this type of venue or forum shopping was utilized by the Republic of Marshall Islands (RMI), which managed to lead a coalition of Pacific small island developing states to get the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to commit to cutting greenhouse gas emissions from global shipping by more than 50 percent. While the RMI has an impressive track record of influence in climate negotiations also in other venues, such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (cf. Jepsen et al. 2021), the IMO is a traditionally technical organization which, in this case, benefits small island states with large shipping registries and considerable expertise on the issue relative to other states. The IMO was therefore a conscious choice by the RMI-led coalition, as it was identified as a "place where they could exert influence disproportionate to their size and push forward their interests" (Corbet et al. 2020:823).

In another example, Theys and Rietig (2020:1615) highlight how Bhutan successfully promoted the idea of Gross National Happiness in different venues across the UN system because the UN “provides a platform for small states to be heard and seen”. It is generally understood that small states with limited structural resources are unable to pursue venue shopping as an influencing strategy (Deitelhoff & Walbott, 2012; Panke, 2010; Reinsberg, 2017). Yet, these examples illustrate how, under certain circumstances, small states can be successful in pushing for their policy preferences in the arenas most likely to maximize their influence.

Factors shaping influence via formal governance

To summarize, the literature in this chapter illustrates how countries have exerted influence in formal governance venues. By drawing on positional or bargaining power, states have managed to steer negotiation outcomes in line with their preferences, sometimes with surprising impact relative to their size. While positional and bargaining power has been leveraged by states of all sizes to gain influence over a variety of issues, and at several stages of the policy cycle, not all have been equally successful in their attempts. Synthesizing the findings in this chapter, four determinants of success – supported by varying amount of evidence – stand out, i) the structural resources of the influencing actor, ii) the ability to forge strategic alliances, where network capital and the composition of the coalition matter for success, iii) the actor’s reputation as an “honest broker”, and iv) institutional features, such as decision rules.

First, the effectiveness of influencing through formal governance requires sufficient structural (human and financial) resources to increase bargaining power, enable representation, and to fully exploit representation once it is secured. On a general level, such resources are recognized as important for making sure that civil servants are up to date with information, have the proper resources to facilitate coordination with coalition partners, and have stable working conditions to enable building expertise and knowledge (Jurgens, 2017; McKeown, 2009; Palenberg et al., 2020; Panke, 2010; Sadev, 2009; Santos et al., 2022). In evaluating the core funding policy of Belgium, the FPS Foreign Affairs (2021) argues that restricted human resources have impaired Belgium’s ability to participate in any strategic follow-up in several UN agencies, significantly impacting its opportunities for influence. Despite economizing with limited financial and human resources by reducing the number of multilateral partners

(ibid; Greenhill & Rabinowitz, 2016:17), the evaluation illustrates how “desk officers have to manage too many aspects of the donor–partner relationship and appear to be overstretched”.

While human resources in sheer numbers is important to ensure representation and a manageable workload, Tarp and Hansen (2013) note that small states are often more agile in their influencing strategies than large states, which are more likely to be restricted by bureaucratic inertia. Moreover, they conclude that while small states “can certainly not match larger states in manpower, they may be able to match them in [...] creating a certain degree of policy coherence and allowing for strategic synergies between the different policy interventions” (ibid:22). Thus, while effective influencing is benefitted by a sizeable workforce, more readily available to states which can afford one, small states can compensate by optimizing administrative working conditions. In support of this, Panke (2010) finds that ministries that struggle to retain staff due to unfavorable working conditions will take a damaging toll on influencing capacity in multilateral organizations. Countries that invest in human resources to develop expertise and issue-specific knowledge, instead, are more likely to be active in different stages of EU policy-making, thereby increasing the likelihood of gaining influence (see also Lundgren et al. 2022 for specific arguments about the role of expertise in Sweden’s multilateral influence).

Further supporting the notion that resources shape influence in formal governance processes, scholars have noted that powerful states with ample structural resources often enjoy greater bargaining power. This is because they are more likely to have the material and human resources to offer side payments to encourage concessions on their prioritized topics (issue linkage) or to engage in multiple organizations to find the venue most likely to generate their desired outcomes (venue shopping) (Panke, 2012; Reinsberg, 2017). As noted by Panke and Stapel (2022:4): “it is the powerful states that have the resources to actively engage across multiple arenas at the same time which is key to exert influence”. Nevertheless, the examples from our sample of studies have illustrated how small states with limited resources have been successful in exerting influence by strategically focusing on the venues most likely to benefit them. Thus, while powerful states are better positioned to engage in multiple organizations, small states can selectively engage with those institutions that will generate the greatest value for their limited resources.

Second, our sample highlights that small states have gained traction for their policy proposals by forging strategic alliances (Nasra, 2011; Schoeller et al., 2021). This success, in turn, may be attributed to their network capital – the broad and diverse relationships developed in multilateral settings – which allows them to leverage their connections and form winning alliances, thereby overcoming their structural disadvantages (Lundgren et al., 2022; Huhe et al., 2018; Nasra, 2011; Nasra & Debrae, 2016). It may also be attributed to their partnering with larger countries to increase the bargaining leverage of the coalition (Deitelhoff & Walbott, 2012).

A third factor identified in the literature as shaping influence in formal governance is reputation. Here, a reputation for being an “honest broker” is often highlighted as shaping the influence of negotiation chairs and similar roles. The concept of an honest broker is recognized in the scholarly literature as a neutral party, a state that maintains no strong geopolitical preferences or stakes (Bueger & Wivel, 2018; Moravcsik, 1999). While this notion may suggest that honest brokers must relinquish their own priorities to facilitate impartial mediation, brokering also presents opportunities to reap reputational benefits that serve as important capital, especially in informal avenues. This capital, in turn, enables brokering potential disagreements between parties. An example that illustrates the importance of reputation for brokering impasses during a multilateral process can be found in the 2015 negotiations of the Paris Agreement. As described by Odell (2021: 302), the French Presidency’s work to mediate differences during the negotiations rested not only on having access to superior information, as rationalist theories would predict, but also on France’s reputation for “leading a fair, transparent, party-driven process”.

A fourth, and final, factor in determining influence by way of formal governance processes are institutional characteristics. Drawing on a wider institutionalist literature, Panke (2012) suggests that the ability of small states to wield influence is dependent on i) the number of negotiating countries: a larger number of countries enables coalition building and the ability for knowledge and burden sharing, ii) the distribution of formal votes: a majority-based voting system where one country has one vote benefits small states, and iii) the design of the decision rule: a consensus-based decision rule that gives the participating negotiating parties the power to block decisions through the veto tends to favor small states. Thus, in certain institutional settings, the structural disadvantages that small states face carry less weight. This is especially noticeable in multilateral negotiations that operate under a consensus rule, such as

under the United Nations Framework Convention of Climate Change (UNFCCC). In these settings, small states have managed to reap surprising success in relation to their size.

5.3 Advocacy

This section outlines influencing strategies that serve to promote a particular idea, value, or policy issue, such as niche diplomacy and issue framing. Collectively, these strategies utilize informal networks, personal relationships, and norm entrepreneurship. We categorize these strategies under the term advocacy, but the literature uses no consistent term. We understand advocacy as a non-coercive – although not necessarily non-confrontative – strategy, relying primarily on social and discursive means. In this light, advocacy is typically highlighted as an avenue for small- or non-state actors who lack the material means to threaten sanctions or offer financial incentives. In the following, we first discuss the studies that illustrate how states have gained influence by prioritizing particular topics (niche diplomacy), or by making them attractive (issue framing). We then account for how informal networks and personal relationships serve as important capital for influencing in multiple channels. Finally, we summarize the factors that shape influence by advocacy.

Niche diplomacy and issue framing

Niche diplomacy entails focusing limited resources on a narrow policy area or issue where actors can make a unique contribution. By focusing on a select few topics, actors, often small states, can build supporting networks and issue-specific coalitions, granting an edge in advocating for their prioritized topics. In this way, small states have gained surprising influence in relation to their size in diverse fields, such as ocean governance and maritime security (Bueger & Wivel, 2018), climate change (Corbett et al., 2020), and global development, where they, for instance, have been effective in promoting happiness and wellbeing as leading values (Theys & Rietig, 2020). Another example of niche diplomacy is the Nordic countries' lobbying for gender equality in UN agencies (Palenberg et al., 2020), multilateral development banks (Aarva et al., 2012; SADEV, 2012), and the EU (Mackie et al., 2022). Advocating for specific thematic issues has been a pronounced strategy for Finland to gain influence in multilateral organizations, and Finland has sought to take a leading role in global campaigns for promoting gender equality, notably the “HeforShe”,

“She Decides” and “#IBelong” campaigns (Palenberg et al., 2020). This, in turn, is argued to support the country’s standing in UN agencies and yield reputational benefits important for long-term influence.

The Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade’s (DFAT) global advocacy on disability inclusion is one of the more comprehensive examples of advocacy for thematic priorities in our sample. In an evaluation commissioned by the Office of Development Effectiveness (Dunn et al., 2017), the DFAT is found to have made disability inclusion a key priority in several policy processes for global development, such as the UN World Humanitarian Summit (WHS) in 2016, where DFAT’s engagement “was crucial in bringing about a meaningful focus on inclusion” (p. 17).

The prioritization of issues not only conserves resources but also allows actors to become trusted experts in their respective niche area, which in turn may grant influence. For example, Tallberg et al. (2015) demonstrate how non-governmental organizations (NGOs) can gain influence in policy-making by offering policy expertise and information on civil society views on a particular issue, in exchange for access to policy-makers. The more expertise and information an NGO can provide, the more likely they are to gain access to policy-makers and thereby influence.

The literature also highlights issue framing as a way to gain influence. This activity refers to deliberately presenting (policy) issues in a particular light to affect how they are perceived (Nelson & Oxley, 1999). To facilitate influence, small states can frame their policy priorities so that they appear salient to greater powers, thereby improving the likelihood of them gaining traction and support (Long, 2017; Panke, 2010). A prime example is how Sweden packaged its position on conflict prevention using language that resonated with norms accepted in the EU context (Björkdahl, 2008:140). Similarly, Arter (2000) finds that Finland managed to frame the Nordic Dimension Initiative as a policy of interest and benefit to the entire EU, not just the Northern countries, which helped garner support from other member states. During the eurozone budget negotiations in 2018, the Netherlands prevailed in replacing risk-sharing and stabilization tools by framing a new reform delivery tool based on national templates as being in the interest of the greater common good (Schoeller, 2021).

States can also gain influence by framing issues to emphasize their moral urgency. In 1998, when the International Criminal Court (ICC) was established through the adoption of the Rome Statute, a coalition of small and medium sized powers joined forces with NGOs to effectively reframe

the ICC negotiations from a security-political concern to one of moral significance (Deitelhoff & Walbott, 2012). Other countries have successfully used moral framing to gain influence in international climate negotiations (Corbett et al., 2020; Theys & Rietig, 2020; Jepsen et al. 2021), and by pushing issues of national importance and salience on the EU agenda (Nasra, 2011).

As noted by Deitelhoff and Walbott (2012), referencing the moral nature of an issue makes them harder to dispute and therefore less susceptible to bargaining, which benefits smaller states with weaker bargaining power. Thus, niche diplomacy and issue framing represent two powerful tactics that are particularly effective for actors who face resource constraints. Niche diplomacy enables actors to establish themselves as experts in select policy domains, thereby cementing their positions as valuable coalition partners and positioning themselves as frontrunners in negotiations where these issues are central. On the other hand, issue framing offers a means of redefining key issues in ways that are more likely to capture the attention and support of middle and major powers, thereby increasing the likelihood of achieving desired outcomes.

Informal networks and personal relationships

While advocacy typically utilizes informal networks and forums, not all influencing through informal networks and forums can be categorized as advocacy. Rather, informal networks often work in conjunction with formal governance, although they may be less concrete and do not always leave a discernible paper trail.

A recent evaluation, however, has measured influencing effects through informal networks by analyzing meeting memos, e-mail exchanges and interviews, and estimates that informal interactions “were considered necessary to establish trust-based and effective working relationships and carry out preparatory work such as drafting joint statements which, in turn, were considered indispensable for effective influencing through the formal governance system” (Palenberg et al., 2020:64). Another evaluation contends that “it is the informal processes – the preparations of agenda-setting, alliance-building, bringing appropriate evidence to the fore etc. – that lead to desired outcomes of the formal processes” (MFA Denmark, 2019:17). In other words, these evaluations suggest that informal networks provide the necessary infrastructure to facilitate, or even enable, influence in formal governance structures.

In an evaluation of Sweden's influence in the European Commission and EU Member states, SADEV (2009:19) provides an example of the joint efforts of informal and formal governance structures. To influence the actions and representatives of the European Commission, they write, a group of like-minded donors, including Sweden, established an informal network which would meet every six weeks to sort out any disagreement within the group to present a united front before upcoming EU meetings. To appear less threatening, members would take turns in speaking out in meetings, commenting on agendas, or raising potential objections. In this way, the informal network could coordinate their agendas without garnering objections from the Commission. These experiences are also recounted at the UN level. At FAO, where Finland was argued to be proficient in influencing through formal decision-making channels, informal networks, notably the Nordic Group, were found to be essential for facilitating influencing in formal channels (Palenberg et al., 2020). Like the informal networks in the EU, the Nordic Group would get together before high-level meetings to prepare group statements and work out a common ground. Thus, "The Nordic group and related informal influencing were considered at the core of most informal influencing work at FAO, also when influencing positions of the EU" (ibid:91). Other examples of the impact of informal networks are seen in the creation of the UN Peacebuilding Commission, where Denmark and Tanzania helped steer informal consultations towards a consensus in the General Assembly (Tarp & Hansen, 2013). In the negotiation of the Paris Agreement on climate change, an informal network known as the "Cartagena Dialogue" grew to become the highly influential "High-Ambition Coalition" that left a clear imprint on the final treaty (Yamin, 2021).

Factors shaping influence via advocacy

Overall, the literature in this section illustrates how actors operate "behind the scenes" to promote a particular idea, value, or policy issue. Using advocacy strategies such as niche diplomacy and issue framing, actors, predominantly those who need to economize with sparse resources, have managed to make significant advancements in issue areas such as diversity inclusion and conflict prevention. Of crucial importance for this work, and for other influencing channels, are the connections, networks, and informal influence exerted by actors. Arguably, informal networks engaging in preparatory meetings to resolve any disagreements and to create a united front is an important strategy to maximize influence in formal governance structures, especially for actors with resource constraints.

In elaborating on factors that explain variation in success of advocacy as an influencing channel, the literature emphasizes two primary determinants: i) the reputation of the influencing actor, and ii) the nature of the issue up for debate.

First, several donor evaluations stress reputational capital as a determinant of success in multilateral influencing via advocacy and related strategies. Aarva et al., (2012:92) affirm the Nordic countries' reputation as "good doers" in multilateral development banks as a key resource in forming supporting coalitions, forging informal networks and, in turn, influencing policy formulation. In the UN, Palenberg et al. (2020) stress the role of Finland's reputation as a trusted partner in development cooperation as a key resource in multilateral influencing. They indicate that Finland's reputation as honest, credible, and unpartisan, facilitates the establishment of personal relationships and lends credibility to Finland's role as a trusted expert in particular issue areas (e.g., gender and disability inclusion). This is consistent with the findings of the evaluation of DFAT's global advocacy for disability inclusion, where consistent and sustained advocacy for disability inclusion, a supporting policy environment to back up its engagement, and funding in line with its stated priorities, earned DFAD a reputation as a credible advocate (Dunn et al., 2017). Similarly, Nasra (2011) finds that Belgium's reputation as a compliant and predictable member state lent credibility to its arguments of EU's moral obligations to stand in solidarity with the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). This was, in turn, important for Belgium's overall success in integrating the DRC in EU policy priorities.

Second, in addition to the reputation and perceptions of the influencing actor, Deitelhoff and Walbott (2012) suggest that small state influence partly depends on the nature of the issue up for debate. Issues that are regulatory in character and lend themselves to moral arguments are more likely to grant small states influence than those that do not. This may explain Belgium's influence on EU policy regarding the DRC (Nasra, 2011), and the Nordic countries' influence on gender policies in the WB and the African Development Bank (AfDB) (Aarva et al., 2012; SADEV, 2012). It may also explain why Finland, despite overall influence in multilaterals (Palenberg et al., 2010) and the EU (Mackie et al., 2022), have had such limited influence in the context of climate policy in the EU (ibid). As pointed out by Deitelhoff and Walbott (2012), although several aspects of climate change lend themselves to moral arguments, climate issues are often distributive in nature, which makes them much more susceptible to bargaining over who will get the biggest share, than engage parties in joint problem solving.

5.4 Staffing

A small cluster of studies explore influencing by staffing as a pronounced strategy. The literature typically distinguishes between secondments – sending staff from domestic ministries to multilateral organizations for a limited period – and recruiting nationals to high-level positions in the multilateral system, such as UN agencies. While the latter is often not recognized as a strategy of influence in official terms, there is a tacit understanding that it serves states to have their citizens in various positions in the multilateral system. This section first discusses the use of secondments and having nationals in the multilateral system respectively and then outlines the main factors that shape influence by staffing.

Secondments

Several states have recognized the value of using secondments for realizing national policy priorities, especially in the policy formulation and implementation stages (e.g., Dellmuth et al., 2022; MFA Denmark, 2019; Palenberg et al., 2020; Tarp & Hansen, 2013). For example, the Swedish Strategy for multilateral development policy acknowledges that Sweden’s share of nationals in the multilateral system does not match its financial contributions, and, as a way of maximizing influence, suggests that Sweden can “influence organizations and contribute to processes of change by promoting the recruitment of Swedish staff, including by working systematically on secondments” (Annex to government decision, UD2017/21055/FN:8). The recruitment of secondees typically occurs in dialogue with the recipient organization, and the duration of the placement varies from one to four years (Dellmuth et al., 2022). Secondments often target specific thematic areas and aim at strengthening the institutional capacity of the multilateral within those policy areas.

In a study of Sweden’s use of secondments, Dellmuth et al. (2022) find that, under the right circumstances, secondments can act as an effective tool for multilateral influencing. Their results build on semi-structured interviews with staff at the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs and secondees, a survey of their experiences, participant observations of an internal training course, and analysis of development policy documents. They illustrate how, in several cases, seconded staff has contributed to gaining influence for Swedish priorities, for example by advancing the work on SRHR and human rights in UNFPA. Similarly, Finnish secondees

in UN Women and UNICEF are also recognized to have facilitated influence for Finnish priorities by establishing contact points between the recipient organization and the home ministry (Palenberg et al., 2020).

However, while there are documented instances where secondees report on gaining influence for national priorities, the literature identifies a tension between serving national interests and the mandates of the recipient organization. The literature refers to an overall understanding that multilateral organizations ought to be insulated from national interests, and therefore that seconded staff should serve the interests of the recipient organization as opposed to those of their home governments. In some instances, this assumption is recognized as a hindering factor from using secondments for multilateral influencing (Dellmuth et al., 2022).

In the gray literature there appears to be a consensus that seconded staff act in line with the institution which they formally serve. An evaluation of Denmark's strategies to gain influence in multilateral settings notes that Danes "do not work for Danish interests and priorities" but rather act in accordance with their obligations towards their employer (MFA Denmark, 2019:18). Similarly, Finnish nationals in the UN supposedly "acted and behaved as employees of those organizations, in line with their responsibilities", and their loyalties are identified as laying "exclusively with the multilateral they worked for" (Palenberg et al., 2020:107).

However, working in accordance with the responsibilities and mandates of the employing multilateral does not rule out staff as a channel of influence, in particular in indirect ways. On the contrary, donor evaluations confirm that experienced staff and their associated networks constitute a crucial avenue for influence, or even "the key factor determining influence" (MFA Denmark, 2019:18). Mackie et al. (2022) also note that having Finnish nationals in different positions within the EU is an important resource for influence, due to the informal contacts and networks that they can establish. Similar arguments are recognized also in the scholarly literature. Analyzing previously classified internal assessments, McKeown (2008) points out that the U.S. government recognizes staffing as an effective yet underutilized tool for influence. Tarp and Hansen (2013) also argue that strategic secondments of Danish staff in various UN entities have contributed to Danish influence, and that despite not working for Danish interests, maintaining a network of trusted staff within the UN system provides access points that can be leveraged in support of national priorities. This illustrates that despite recognized tensions with using staff to leverage national priorities, secondments can

still have positive effects for influencing by assisting with valuable resources in other channels, such as advocating for certain priorities in formal and informal networks and by forging strategic alliances.

National actors in multilateral organizations

The tension between serving national interests and the mandate of the multilateral is not exclusive to seconded staff, but also extends to national civil servants in the multilateral system. Consequently, the scholarly literature has devoted some attention to the nationality of international civil servants.

For example, Limoncelli's (2022) account of Great Britain's attempts to assert influence in the UN during its formative years stresses staffing as a key strategy. Getting British nationals appointed to high-ranking UN positions was a conscious strategy to maintain British values and norms that dominated the predecessor organization, the League of Nations. Novosad and Werker (2019) examine the nationalities of senior officials in the UN secretariat and note that democracies that invest in diplomacy, measured by the number of foreign embassies operated by the country, are more likely to secure top positions at the UN Secretariat. This benefits the Nordic countries, which have remained overrepresented in the UN Secretariat ever since the appointment of the first ever Secretary-General (cf. Parizek & Stephen 2021). In this account, staffing is presented as a method to assume or assert control in the multilateral of employment. This nurtures the notion that staff will serve the preferences of their home governments, rather than (solely) in line with the directives of the multilateral. Novosad and Werker (2019), for example, note that senior officials in the UN tend to be loyal to their home governments, rather than to the organization that employs them. This is consistent with findings from studies on the behavioral perceptions of seconded staff, which finds that national affinity increases with seniority (Murdoch & Trondal, 2013).

In a study of the conditionality at the World Bank, Clark and Dolan (2021) finds that although U.S. allies receive preferable treatment (c.f., Dreher et al., 2009; Fleck & Kilby, 2006; Kilby, 2013), this is a result of individual decision-making at the Bank, as opposed to external pressures from the U.S. The researchers draw on interviews with World Bank staff and argue that individual bureaucrats, consciously or unconsciously, design programs that promote U.S. interests. They point out that the World Bank and the United States have historically had strong ties. The organization is based in Washington D.C., which gives government officials easy access

to World Bank staff, a significant portion of which has historically been composed of U.S. nationals. Staffing IOs with nationals could therefore award great opportunity for U.S. norms and values to permeate the organization, with knock-on effects for influencing the decision-making not only of US nationals.

Although the gray literature recognizes the value of nationals as civil servants within the multilateral system, it typically does not measure how states exploit this resource to wield influence. Instead, the scholarly literature provides more substantial insights. Notably, the principal-agent literature explores staffing as an avenue for influence via the notion of agency slack. Agency slack is the maneuvering room for the agent to act in ways to further their own interests, often against the wishes of their principal. In this tradition, Copelovitch (2010) applies a common agency framework and argues that preference heterogeneity and preference intensity among major shareholders of the IMF, acting as a collective principal, creates slack that the agent (IMF staff) can leverage for their own benefit. Utilizing an original dataset of 197 IMF loans to 47 countries over a 19-year period, Copelovitch finds that governments acting as a collective principal appear to be able to wield influence over the size of IMF loans, whereas IMF staff acting as the agent appear to influence the Fund's use of conditionality. These results suggest that states do act through IOs to promote their (collective) interests, but not always. Taking decision-making at the World Bank as a case, Lee and Woo (2022) also illustrate that when preferences among major shareholders converge, outcomes are likely to reflect the preferences of the collective principal. Under diverging preferences, in contrast, World Bank staff have greater opportunity to steer outcomes to reflect their personal priorities.

Manulak (2017) also points out that states can leverage staff at international secretariats to assert influence. By analyzing archival documents revealing the institutional design choices of UNEP during its creation in 1972, Manulak illustrates how powerful states, led by the U.S., pushed for higher degrees of formal autonomy, including opaque staffing procedures and a voluntary funding structure, to close off avenues for intergovernmental control and thereby increase channels for exerting informal influence. In contrast, states that expect to have limited informal influence will advocate for stricter staffing procedures to limit undue influence from powerful states.

Factors shaping influence via staffing

In sum, the literature highlights that states can exert influence either through seconded staff or by having national agents in multilateral organizations. Although the use of secondments may be a recognized albeit underutilized channel for influence, making it less controversial, both tactics illustrate a key tension between serving the interests of the multilateral and those of their home governments. The literature suggests a tacit understanding among donors that staff placements can be used to wield influence by maintaining access to influencing activities through a network of trusted staff, and by leveraging the expertise and networks forged during their placement. Therefore, influence also appears to increase with seniority. However, the potential of staff placements as an influencing tool in multilateral organizations is constrained by imprecise guidance and objectives, and resource limitations.

Out of all influencing strategies, strategic staffing appears to be the influencing channel that is most poorly understood, and so, there is no mature discussion on factors that enable or maximize influence. However, two factors stand out that indirectly wield influence via staffing: i) the networks and connections forged during a placement, and ii) the expertise and “know-how” of the multilateral organization. These factors are closely related, and the literature often emphasizes both as important for multilateral influencing. To build and maintain a strong network within the multilateral system is a crucial resource for building supporting coalitions, and for maximizing knowledge- and burden sharing within those networks. Relatedly, keeping a network of trusted staff within the multilateral system, even if they do not formally serve their home governments, is explained as important for building institutional knowledge (SADEV, 2009), and to help “navigate the behemoth that is the UN system” (Tarp & Hansen, 2013:21). Several studies find that although secondments in several cases have contributed to influencing effects in multilateral organizations, staffing as a channel for influence could be exploited more aggressively (Dellmuth et al., 2022; McKeown, 2009; Palenberg et al., 2020; SADEV, 2010).

Although there is a limited discussion of the factors that promote influence, the literature identifies several constraining or limiting factors. First, evaluations illustrate that conflicting or lacking instructions on influencing have had damaging effects (e.g., Dellmuth et al., 2022; SADEV, 2009). Second, the literature notes an ongoing challenge with harnessing secondees’ competences and experiences gained during a

placement, either due to lacking or poor infrastructure for doing so (Dellmuth et al., 2022), or because of “being overly cautious regarding perceived interference with multilateral employees” (Palenberg et al., 2020:108).

This articulates the friction between serving national interests and safeguarding the multilaterals’ independence, as observed in the literature. However, as suggested by Dellmuth et al. (2022), if a secondment targets the identified needs and requests by the multilateral, then leveraging the technical expertise and knowledge of the secondee to serve those needs while simultaneously serving national developmental priorities, it does not necessarily result in a conflict between serving national and multilateral interests. To facilitate influence, however, they recommend stating more explicitly Sweden’s goals and ambitions in its multilateral influencing. This would require taking a more active stance regarding the use of staffing for influence.

Other hindering factors are more practical. In evaluating the Swedish strategy for multilateral development cooperation, SADEV (2010:24f) argues that Sweden has failed to achieve its ambitions to recruit more Swedes to multilateral organizations. This failure is largely attributed to the government’s deficiency in prioritizing recruitments. For example, in 2010, only one person worked with strategic recruitments to multilateral organizations, and there appears to be divergent interpretations regarding the use of secondments for gaining influence. This is entrenched by poor instructions and lacking policy on strategic recruitments. Although this appears to have improved somewhat in recent years, insufficient human resources are still recognized as a factor hindering the use of secondments more strategically (Dellmuth et al., 2022).

In sum, these findings stress the importance of providing sufficient resources for recruiting nationals to the multilateral system, for establishing clear guidelines and routines for the recruitment and training of staff, and for harnessing the competences acquired during their placement.

6 Conclusions

This report has reviewed available evidence about influence in multilateral aid organizations, focusing on a sample of studies identified via systematic database searches, expert suggestions, and academic references. The collected material, covering 76 academic and gray literature publications focusing on both aid-specific and general-purpose organizations, was reviewed in two steps. In a first step, we analyzed the general features of the collected material, describing its aggregate orientation regarding methods, organizations, actors, and channels of influence. In a second step, we performed an in-depth review, analyzing the literature at a more granular level. The ambition here was to describe and summarize available evidence regarding the main channels of influence, the actors that wield them and with what success, together with a discussion of the factors that shape variation in outcomes. In this chapter, we summarize the principal findings before briefly discussing some key knowledge gaps and implications for policy.

6.1 Principal findings

Taken together, the literature has approached the question of influence from various theoretical perspectives and has employed both qualitative and quantitative methods. Several principal findings emerge from the reviewed literature (Box 1).

To begin with, at the most general level, there is strong and consistent evidence that actors do seek to exert influence in multilateral organizations. This highlights the importance donor countries attribute to these organizations as central venues for decision-making, norm development, and programmatic work. It, moreover, reflects actors' desire to shape multilaterals' direction and orientation in line with their own preferences. The lion's share of the literature focuses on influence by governments, a tendency that, unsurprisingly, is particularly pronounced in donor evaluations. Most studies focus on the influence of developed countries and a significant portion on powerful states, while there is less evidence regarding the influence of countries and institutions in the Global South.

Next, the reviewed evidence demonstrates that actors seek to advance their interests in a number of different ways, drawing on material and immaterial capabilities. We categorized the literature into *four principal channels of influence*: financial flows, decision-making, advocacy, and staffing.

Financial flows

- Core funding can be leveraged to influence multilateral decision-making, as it grants representation in formal governance and helps build institutional partnerships.
- Earmarked funding primarily grants influence over implementation but may also award influence over agenda-setting and policy formulation relating to thematic issues.
- The extent of influence via financial flows is likely shaped by the relative size of contributions, and the issue area over which influence is sought, but the evidence is not conclusive.

Formal governance

- Holding formal positions in multilateral governance can provide states with several forms of influence over agenda-setting, policy formulation, and decision-making.
- States can exert influence in multilateral negotiations by actively building coalitions, crafting compromises, and linking different issues into package deals.
- The extent of influence via formal governance is shaped by reputation and structural resources such as voting power, but research also suggests that experienced and knowledgeable staff can enable the strategies that shape influence in bargaining situations.

Advocacy

- By employing advocacy strategies like niche diplomacy and issue framing, states can wield influence over how problems and potential solutions are perceived, especially at the agenda-setting stage.
- In several policy areas, small states have attained noteworthy accomplishments by strategically focusing their efforts and developing specialized expertise.
- The extent of influence via advocacy is shaped by reputation, informal networks, and whether the policy issue lends itself to moral arguments.

Staffing

- Governments may also pursue influence via staffing, seeking to second or place their nationals as civil servants of multilateral organizations.

- Research remains divided whether staffing significantly promotes national priorities, especially with regard to junior officials, but having access to national staff may promote informal networks that are conducive to other types of influence.
 - What shapes the extent of influence via staffing is less researched, but studies point to the importance of clear routines for staff recruitment and training, and for harnessing the competences acquired during their placement.
- One prominent channel of influence is *financial flows*. States employ core and earmarked contributions to wield influence in several ways. The evidence suggests that core funding provides donors with greater access to formal governance, generates reputational benefits that may be leveraged for influence, and can be used to bolster the long-term ability of recipient multilaterals to deliver on donor objectives. Earmarked funding, in contrast, has typically been leveraged to wield influence over specific issues, such as gender equality and human rights. While there is considerable evidence suggesting that earmarked funding often translates into policy changes, there is a discussion of whether such funding provides influence also beyond the supported issue and whether earmarked funding may erode the autonomy of multilaterals.
 - Another channel of influence is provided to actors that are present in *formal governance* structures. Holding formal positions in multilateral governance can provide actors with levers of influence to shape the format, content, and outcomes of meetings. Considerable attention has been devoted to the influence exerted by negotiation chairs, predominantly in the context of the EU, where member states holding the rotating presidency have managed to introduce issues to the agenda and shape decision-making in their favor. Similar patterns have been found in other organizational contexts, including at FAO, but the literature on chairmanship influence remains less developed outside of the EU. Next to positional power, states may exert influence via participation in multilateral bargaining. Research suggests that states are likely to enjoy greater influence in negotiation processes if they are apt at building coalitions, identify opportunities to create package deals, or engage in creative logrolling. The literature on “vote-buying” combines political economy approaches with quantitative tools to examine how powerful states leverage their influence to shape decision-making, especially in development banks. However, it remains debated whether such influencing efforts significantly shift the targeted organization’s work.

- A third way to exercise influence is to engage in *advocacy* to raise awareness about an issue and frame it in ways that best serve one's interests. The literature has mainly examined advocacy by small states whose limited material means offer them little ability to threaten sanctions or act independently. A particular research focus has been how such actors engage in niche diplomacy and issue framing to promote thematic topics. Here, the Nordic countries' success in advocating for gender equality in multilateral contexts, including in aid organizations, serves as a prominent and frequently researched example. States may also seek to exert influence via informal networks, including personal contacts and trust-based alliances with likeminded actors. While this type of influence is less researched, some recent donor evaluations suggest that such informal networks often constitute enablers for a government's formal influence.
- Governments may also pursue influence via *staffing*, seeking to second or place their nationals as civil servants in multilateral organizations. Research has explored how states seek to secure high-level positions in IOs, predominantly in the UN system, aiming to promote their interests, values, and norms. However, it remains debated whether staff in multilateral organizations are loyal to their home country's preferences, abide by the ideal of neutrality often expected by the international civil service, or rather work for their own personal gain. While this suggests that staffing offers a less clear-cut path to direct influence for sending governments, especially for more junior placements, the literature has pointed to a number of ways in which staffing facilitates, or even is a precondition for, other types of influence. Having access to national staff within a multilateral organization provides access and information, which can help build informal networks and coalitions that can be leveraged in support of national priorities.

The literature highlights a few recurring *factors that increase the ability to assert influence* across the four channels. Most prominent are the structural resources of the influencing actor. States with ample financial and human resources have a greater opportunity to be granted representation in the boards of organizations, to participate in informal contexts, to develop several policy competencies, and to participate in multiple organizations to secure the most favorable path to promote national policy priorities. The literature also emphasizes the importance of sufficient, experienced, and knowledgeable staff, with access to up-to-date information, clear instructions on priorities and influence strategies, and routines for

communicating back to their home governments. However, while these resource-oriented conditions appear to favor powerful states, the literature highlights how small states have been surprisingly influential in relation to their size by prioritizing issues, pooling bargaining power in coalitions, and by earning an esteemed reputation as a committed multilateral partner.

Compiling evidence from heterogeneous organizational contexts raises questions of generalizability. A general question pertains to whether conclusions may be generalized across organizations with varying purposes, institutional designs, and memberships. A more specific question pertains to whether evidence generated from studies of organizations not narrowly focused on aid or development generalizes to organizations specifically focused on aid. The reviewed literature includes studies of various types of organizations. Some organizations, such as WFP and UNDP, have a more or less exclusive focus on aid and development, whereas others, such as the EU and the main UN bodies, operate in many policy areas. In comparative IO research, it is typically assumed that IOs are similar enough for general insights to be applicable across institutional contexts. This research suggests that differences in functional specialization, such as aid versus non-aid, are not a significant barrier to generalization. Our sample of studies also shows that insights from studies of aid organizations are found in studies of non-aid organizations and vice versa. However, when transferring theoretical or empirical insights from one organizational context to another, care should be taken to ensure that there exist no significant differences in variables that shape the nature and efficacy of the main channels of influence.

Knowledge gaps

Taken together, the academic and gray literatures provide important insights into the means employed by states to gain influence in multilateral organizations. In contrast, we know considerably less about certain issues, some of which deserve a mentioning here.

One poorly understood aspect is how influencing efforts are distributed across the policy process, for example if actors devote as much resources to influencing agenda-setting as decision-making and implementation, and if their efforts are equally effective across the different policy stages. While we have sought to connect evidence to the discrete stages of the policy cycle, many studies lack a clear conceptualization of the policy process and do not link their findings to any particular stage. Thus, while it is clear that

issue prioritization is effective, we often cannot say if actors should prioritize particular policy stages, where their efforts are more likely to yield the desired results.

Second, the literature's ability to determine the relative efficacy of different channels of influence remains limited. The literature illustrates that actors seek influence using a variety of methods, often emphasizing the value of combining and complementing influence asserted through different channels. Yet, there is no study in our sample that systematically maps different channels of influence, comparing their effectiveness across different multilaterals, issues, or actor groups. The implication is that our understanding of how these channels compare and the specific contextual factors that shape their efficacy is less advanced.

Third, there are very few studies of influence asserted by governments in the Global South in our sample, suggesting the possibility of a regional bias in the literature. While it is likely that the same channels of influence are employed by states in all regions of the world, albeit with different intensity due to varying resource endowments, it is possible that other and less well-understood aspects of influence would emerge if actors and institutions in and from the Global South featured more prominently in the research.

Additional lacunae exist in relation to informal influence. Although a rich literature has sought to identify informal influence by powerful states, less attention has been directed towards identifying and explaining how such influence is exerted in the daily work of multilaterals. Indeed, the literature is mixed as to whether these patterns indicate unilateral influence, or if they rather are indicative of individual bureaucrats accommodating their major shareholders. This paucity of scholarly attention may reflect difficulties in accessing data on informal influence, as indicated by McKeown's (2009) analysis of de-classified internal documents of the U.S. government, and the analysis offered by Palenberg et al. (2020), utilizing protocols from informal meetings and e-mail exchanges. These studies illustrate that internal documents may offer valuable, albeit scarce, insights on informal influence in action.

There are also possibilities for methodological advancement. In particular, quantitative text analysis constitutes a promising and under-utilized tool for studying influence in multilateral decision-making processes. Examples from existing studies on non-governmental and domestic actors can inspire the application of such methods to better understand the influence of states in multilaterals. Many of these rely on comparison of

input texts to collectively agreed outcome texts. For instance, Klüver (2009) employs quantitative text analysis to measure interest group influence by comparing policy positions with the final policy output, and Garrett and Jansa (2015) identify influence by utilizing pairwise comparison of U.S. state legislation and model legislation introduced by interest groups. As data sources expand, providing greater access to the textual traces of multilateral processes, such methods are likely to become increasingly valuable, in particular for the study of influence during the agenda-setting, policy formulation, and decision-making stages.

Finally, it is worth repeating that a literature review with a narrow focus on influence may lead to the impression that multilateral organizations are but marionets in the hands of states. We would caution against this conclusion. Other literatures, such as those on the influence of supranational actors, epistemic communities, and NGOs, suggest that states are not alone in influencing IOs. Meanwhile, the literature on IOs suggests that these organizations hold considerable independence, flowing both from their formal mandates, informal powers vested in international bureaucracies, and their organizational cultures. In other words, multilateral organizations and their activities cannot be reduced to the net vector of states' different influencing efforts, but rather reflect a wider range of factors and processes, many of which are beyond the control of individual states.

Implications for policy

Several of the reviewed studies focus on multilateral organizations that stand at the center of Sweden's Strategy for Multilateral Development Cooperation, including central actors in the UN system, such as UNDP, FAO, and UNFPA, and international finance institutions, such as the World Bank and the AfDB. The accumulated evidence presented in this review allows for preliminary discussion of a few points relating to the strategic direction and content of the Swedish strategy, and its implications for influence.

A primary strategic consideration in the Swedish strategy is "selectiveness". This emerges from the recognition that, given set resource constraints, Sweden needs to prioritize among many possible engagements in and forms of support to multilateral development cooperation. To maximize its influence, the strategy suggests, Sweden should try to focus its efforts, not spread them out too thinly. The evidence reviewed here is strongly supportive of this strategic direction. When it comes to small

states, nearly all examples of significant influence stems from decisions to allocate resources and attention very narrowly. This is evidenced in specific studies of Danish, Belgian and Finnish influencing work, which provide ample examples of the benefits of concentration of forces in the promotion of new policy ideas, such as human rights, gender equality, SRHR, and disability inclusion. While such strategies do not automatically translate into substantive influence, as the Belgian experience also illustrates, the accumulated evidence suggests that the chances to see a desired policy being implemented improve considerably with prioritization.

While the Swedish strategy is relatively vague regarding the instruments that should be employed in the pursuit of its professed goals, it identifies several influence channels that overlap with those surveyed in this review. For example, the Swedish strategy emphasizes the value of “concerted action in various groupings” and “informal dialogue” as important tools (Annex to government decision, UD2017/21055/FN:12, 7). The evidence emerging from scientific studies and donor evaluations strongly corroborate the value of formal and informal cooperation as primary conditions for effective influence, in particular for smaller states. The literature further suggests that opportunity for influence is greatest for those who organize, chair, or represent constituencies in formal and informal settings. This suggests that Sweden should take a proactive role in pursuing these prominent positions, and in organizing side events and other informal arrangements.

Similarly, the evidence lends some support to the Swedish strategy of placing emphasis on “competent staff” (ibid:12). While research suggests that secondments and senior appointments within multilateral organizations cannot be viewed as a reliable tool to promote national interests, in the sense of directly and consistently shaping policy outcomes, they provide doors to informal networks and information which are often predictive of greater influence.

In terms of funding and financial flows, the 2017 strategy places emphasis on long-term financial commitments, preferably in the form of core budget support rather than earmarked funding. The government has recently declared that it will rather seek to favor earmarked over core funding to its multilateral partners. The reviewed literature suggests that, from an influence perspective, each type of financing leads to different considerations.

With regard to long-term, core budget support, the literature suggests that it may generate reputational benefits and lead to greater influence in formal governance. At the same time, there are examples where a focus on core budget support has failed to translate into effective influence, especially in cases where donors make contributions insufficiently large to stand out in comparison to other and larger donors. With regard to earmarked funding, the reviewed literature supports the conclusion that it provides donors with more control and influence over specific issues. Many examples of strong and concrete influence can be tied to the provision of such funding and the related engagement, such as multilateral development banks' enhanced work on gender equality and human rights, where Nordic funding and advocacy are found to have made a significant impact.

While this may suggest that states seeking influence should privilege earmarked funding, a wider strategic perspective, informed by available evidence, may lead to different conclusions. First, earmarked funding may primarily lead to narrow influence, in the sense that it enables the implementation of desired policies and projects, as long as they are funded. We know considerably less about if such funding also translates into broader influence, in the sense of changing other actor's behavior and ideas in a more durable manner. Second, the literature suggests that broad-based, long-term budget support, promoted via core funding, may enable multilaterals to plan and operate with greater consistency, thereby avoiding having to adapt to the momentary and potentially politicized swings in donor priorities. Hence, to the extent that earmarked funding undermines organizational coherence and effectiveness, the influence gained from such support has to be balanced against its wider implications. If a gain in influence is traded for a decrease in the ability of the concerned organization to effectively deliver on its collectively agreed mandate, or undercuts its long-term survival, it may represent a tactical victory that sacrifices strategic, long-term advancement of national development priorities.

References

Academic literature

- Arter, D. (2000). Small state influence within the EU: The case of Finland's 'Northern Dimension Initiative'. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 38(5), 677–697.
- Bertacchini, E., Liuzza, C., Meskell, L., & Saccone, D. (2016). The politicization of UNESCO World Heritage decision making. *Public Choice*, 167, 95–129.
- Björkdahl, A. (2008). Norm advocacy: a small state strategy to influence the EU. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 15(1), 135–154.
- Browne, S. (2017). Vertical funds: new forms of multilateralism. *Global Policy*, 8, 36–45.
- Bueger, C., & Wivel, A. (2018). How do small island states maximize influence? Creole diplomacy and the smart state foreign policy of the Seychelles. *Journal of the Indian Ocean Region*, 14(2), 170–188.
- Clark, R., & Dolan, L. R. (2021). Pleasing the principal: US influence in World Bank policymaking. *American Journal of Political Science*, 65(1), 36–51.
- Copelovitch, M. S. (2010). Master or servant? Common agency and the political economy of IMF lending. *International Studies Quarterly*, 54(1), 49–77.
- Corbett, J., Ruwet, M., Xu, Y. C., & Weller, P. (2020). Climate governance, policy entrepreneurs and small states: explaining policy change at the International Maritime Organisation. *Environmental Politics*, 29(5), 825–844.
- Deitelhoff, N., & Wallbott, L. (2012). Beyond soft balancing: small states and coalition-building in the ICC and climate negotiations. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 25(3), 345–366.
- Dreher, A., Nunnenkamp, P., & Thiele, R. (2008). Does US aid buy UN general assembly votes? A disaggregated analysis. *Public choice*, 136, 139–164.
- Dreher, A., Sturm, J. E., & Vreeland, J. R. (2009). Development aid and international politics: Does membership on the UN Security Council influence World Bank decisions?. *Journal of Development Economics*, 88(1), 1–18.
- Fleck, R. K., & Kilby, C. (2006). World Bank independence: A model and statistical analysis of US influence. *Review of Development Economics*, 10(2), 224–240.

- Kaya, A., & Woo, B. (2021). China and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB): Chinese Influence Over Membership Shares?. *The Review of International Organizations*, 1–33.
- Kilby, C. (2011). Informal influence in the Asian development bank. *The Review of International Organizations*, 6, 223–257.
- Kilby, C. (2013). An empirical assessment of informal influence in the World Bank. *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 61(2), 431–464.
- Kuziemko, I., & Werker, E. (2006). How much is a seat on the Security Council worth? Foreign aid and bribery at the United Nations. *Journal of political economy*, 114(5), 905–930.
- Lee, M., & Woo, B. (2022). The Essence of Decisions in International Organizations: Two Cases of World Bank Reforms in 2010 and 2018. *The Korean Journal of International Studies*, 20(2), 243–273.
- Lewis, T. L. (2003). Environmental aid: Driven by recipient need or donor interests?. *Social Science Quarterly*, 84(1), 144–161.
- Lim, D. Y. M., & Vreeland, J. R. (2013). Regional organizations and international politics: Japanese influence over the Asian Development Bank and the UN Security Council. *World Politics*, 65(1), 34–72.
- Limoncelli, A. (2022). Remaking the International Civil Service: The Legacies of British Internationalism in the United Nations Secretariat, 1945–7. *Twentieth Century British History*.
- Manulak, M. W. (2017). Leading by design: Informal influence and international secretariats. *The Review of International Organizations*, 12, 497–522.
- McKeown, T. J. (2009). How US decision-makers assessed their control of multilateral organizations, 1957–1982. *The Review of International Organizations*, 4, 269–291.
- Monheim, K. (2016). The ‘power of process’: how negotiation management influences multilateral cooperation. *International Negotiation*, 21(3), 345–380.
- Moravcsik, A. (1999). A new statecraft? Supranational entrepreneurs and international cooperation. *International organization*, 53(2), 267–306.
- Nasra, S. (2011). Governance in EU foreign policy: exploring small state influence. *Journal of European public policy*, 18(2), 164–180.
- Nasra, S., & Debaere, P. (2016). The European Union in the G20: what role for small states?. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 29(1), 209–230.

- Novosad, P., & Werker, E. (2019). Who runs the international system? Nationality and leadership in the United Nations Secretariat. *The Review of International Organizations*, 14, 1–33.
- Panke, D. (2010). Small states in the European Union: structural disadvantages in EU policy-making and counter-strategies. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 17(6), 799–817.
- Panke, D., & Stapel, S. (2022). Towards increasing regime complexity? Why member states drive overlaps between international organisations. *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations*.
- Reinsberg, B. (2019). *Do countries use foreign aid to buy geopolitical influence? Evidence from donor campaigns for temporary UN Security Council seats* (No. 2019/4). WIDER Working Paper.
- Reinsberg, B. (2017). Trust funds as a lever of influence at international development organizations. *Global Policy*, 8, 85–95.
- Schneider, C. J., & Tobin, J. L. (2013). Interest coalitions and multilateral aid allocation in the European Union. *International Studies Quarterly*, 57(1), 103–114.
- Schoeller, M. G. (2021). Preventing the eurozone budget: Issue replacement and small state influence in EMU. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 28(11), 1727–1747.
- Schulz, T., Hufty, M., & Tschopp, M. (2017). Small and smart: the role of Switzerland in the Cartagena and Nagoya protocols negotiations. *International environmental agreements: politics, law and economics*, 17, 553–57.
- Stone, R. W. (2004). The political economy of IMF lending in Africa. *American political science review*, 98(4), 577–591.
- Stone, R. W. (2008). The scope of IMF conditionality. *International organization*, 62(4), 589–620.
- Tallberg, J. (2004). The agenda-shaping powers of the Council Presidency. In *European Union Council Presidencies* (pp. 27–46). Routledge.
- Tallberg, J. (2008). Bargaining power in the European Council. *JCMS: journal of common market studies*, 46(3), 685–708.
- Tallberg, J. (2010). The power of the chair: Formal leadership in international cooperation. *International Studies Quarterly*, 54(1), 241–265.
- Tallberg, J., Dellmuth, L. M., Agné, H., & Duit, A. (2018). NGO influence in international organizations: Information, access and exchange. *British journal of political science*, 48(1), 213–238.

- Theys, S., & Rietig, K. (2020). The influence of small states: how Bhutan succeeds in influencing global sustainability governance. *International Affairs*, 96(6), 1603–1622.
- Thorvaldsdottir, S., Patz, R., & Goetz, K. H. (2022). Mandate or donors? Explaining the UNHCR's country-level expenditures from 1967 to 2016. *Political Studies*, 70(2), 443–464.
- Warntjen, A. (2007). Steering the Union. The impact of the EU Presidency on legislative activity in the Council. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies*, 45(5), 1135–1157.

Gray literature

- Aarva P., Zukale S., Magnusson A. & Nogueira de Morais I. 2012 Evaluation of Nordic Influence in Multilateral Organizations: A Finnish Perspective. Evaluation report 2012:6. Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, Kopijyvä Oy, Jyväskylä, 106 p. ISBN 978-952-281-027-4 (printed).
- Dellmuth, L., Lundgren, M., & Tallberg, J. (2020). State Interests and Bargaining Power in the Reform of the Eurozone. Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies (Sieps).
- Dellmuth, L., Levin, P., & Svensson, N. (2022). Utvärdering av strategiska sekunderingar som del av svenskt påverkansarbete. EBA Report 2022:01, The Expert Group for Aid Studies (EBA), Sweden.
- Dunn, L., Ovington, K., & McClain-Nhlapo, C. (2017). Unfinished Business: Evaluation of Australian Advocacy for Disability-Inclusive Development. Office Of Development Effectiveness. Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.
- Greenhill, R., & Rabinowitz, G. (2016). Why do donors delegate to multilateral organisations. Overseas Development Institute.
- Jurgens, E. IOB policy review of the support to and collaboration with UNFPA and UNAIDS.
- Lundgren, M., Tallberg, J., & Pedersen, C. (2022), Member State Influence in the Negotiations on the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI), EBA Report 2022:07, The Expert Group for Aid Studies (EBA), Sweden.
- Mackie, J., Mikkolainen, P., Vaillant, C., Ulla, T., & Kontro, M. (2022). Evaluation of the Finnish development policy influencing in the European Union. Volume 1 – Main report. Commissioned by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

- Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Denmark. (2019). Evaluations study use of organisation strategies and results reporting for Danish multilateral partners.
- Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the Netherlands. (2013). Working with the World Bank. Evaluation of Dutch World Bank Policies and funding (2000–2011). IOB Evaluation.
- Palenberg, M., Katila, M., Dixon, V., Tyrrell, T., Mikkolainen, P., & Frestadius, S. (2020). Evaluation of Finnish development policy influencing activities in multilateral organisations. Volume 1 – Main report. Commissioned by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
- Santos, Í., Pekkola, E., Abebe, R., Kujala, E-N., Kivistö, J., & Ilola, H. (2022). The presence and influence of Finnish Education Sector Expertise in International Organisations. Commissioned by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
- Special Evaluation Office of the Belgian Development Cooperation/ SEO (2021), “Evaluation of the core funding policy of the international partner organisations of the Belgian Development Cooperation”, FPS Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation, Brussels.
- Swedish Agency for Development Cooperation (SADEV). (2009). Dressed for success? Evaluation of Sweden’s readiness to influence the European Commission’s and other EU member states’ actions in development cooperation at the field level.
- Swedish Agency for Development Cooperation (SADEV). (2012). Nordic influences on Gender Policies and Practices at the World Bank and the African Development Bank: A Case study.
- Tarp, M. N., & Hansen, J. O. B. (2013). Size and influence: How small states influence policy making in multilateral arenas (No. 2013: 11). DIIS Working paper.

Other references

- Alesina, A., & Dollar, D. (2000). Who gives foreign aid to whom and why?. *Journal of economic growth*, 5, 33–63.
- Annex to government decision. *Strategy for multilateral development policy*. UD2017/21055/FN.
<https://www.government.se/contentassets/671a1fc87e6547908a88dc503a4368d3/strategy-for-multilateral-development-policy-pdf>
- Barends, E., Rousseau, D. M., & Briner, R. B. (2017). *CEBMA guideline for critically appraised topics in management and organizations*. Available via: <https://cebma.org/wp-content/uploads/CEBMA-CAT-Guidelines.pdf>

- Berthélemy, J. (2006). Aid allocation: Comparing donor's behaviours. *Swedish economic policy review*, 13(2), 75.
- Blavoukos, S., & Bourantonis, D. (2011). *Chairing multilateral negotiations: The case of the United Nations*. Routledge.
- Browne, S., Connelly, N., & Weiss, T. (2017). Sweden's financing on UN Funds and programmes: Analyzing the past, looking to the future. *EBA Report 2017:11*. The Expert Group for Aid Studies (EBA), Sweden.
- Dimitrov, R. S. (2016). The Paris agreement on climate change: Behind closed doors. *Global environmental politics*, 16(3), 1–11.
- Downie, C., & Crump, L. (2017). The role of the chair in informal international organisations: Australia's Group of Twenty presidency. *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 71(6), 678–693.
- Dür, A. (2008). Measuring interest group influence in the EU: A note on methodology. *European Union Politics*, 9(4), 559–576.
- Garrett, K. N., & Jansa, J. M. (2015). Interest group influence in policy diffusion networks. *State Politics & Policy Quarterly*, 15(3), 387–417.
- Gulrajani, N. (2016). *Bilateral versus multilateral aid channels. Strategic choices for donors*. London: Overseas Development Institute (ODI).
- Haas, E. B. (1980). Why collaborate? Issue-linkage and international regimes. *World politics*, 32(3), 357–405.
- Hoeffler, A., & Outram, V. (2011). Need, merit, or self-interest – what determines the allocation of aid?. *Review of Development Economics*, 15(2), 237–250.
- Huhe, N., Naurin, D., & Thomson, R. (2018). The evolution of political networks: Evidence from the Council of the European Union. *European Union Politics*, 19(1), 25–51.
- Jann, W., & Wegrich, K. (2017). Theories of the policy cycle. In *Handbook of public policy analysis*
- Jepsen, H., Lundgren, M., Monheim, K., & Walker, H. (Eds.) (2021). *Negotiating the Paris Agreement*. Cambridge University Press.
- Klüver, H. (2009). Measuring interest group influence using quantitative text analysis. *European Union Politics*, 10(4), 535–549.
- Knopf, J. W. (2006). Doing a literature review. *PS: Political Science & Politics*, 39(1), 127–132.
- Long, T. (2017). Small states, great power? Gaining influence through intrinsic, derivative, and collective power. *International Studies Review*, 19(2), 185–205.

- March, J. G. (1955). An introduction to the theory and measurement of influence. *American Political Science Review*, 49(2), 431–451.
- Moravcsik, A. (1999). A new statecraft? Supranational entrepreneurs and international cooperation. *International Organization*, 53(2), 267–306.
- Nelson, T. E., & Oxley, Z. M. (1999). Issue framing effects on belief importance and opinion. *The journal of politics*, 61(4), 1040–1067.
- Neumayer, E. (2003). The determinants of aid allocation by regional multilateral development banks and United Nations agencies. *International Studies Quarterly*, 47(1), 101–122.
- Neumayer, E. (2005). Is the allocation of food aid free from donor interest bias?. *The Journal of Development Studies*, 41(3), 394–411.
- OECD. (2022). Multilateral Development Finance 2022. OECD Publishing. <https://doi.org/10.1787/9fea4cf2-en>
- Odell, J. (2021). Why did they finally reach agreement? In Jepsen, H., Lundgren, M., Monheim, K., & Walker, H. (Eds.) *Negotiating the Paris Agreement*. (pp. 284–313). Cambridge University Press.
- Parizek, M., & Stephen, M. D. (2021). The increasing representativeness of international organizations' secretariats: Evidence from the United Nations System, 1997–2015. *International studies quarterly*, 65(1), 197–209.
- Petticrew, M., & Roberts, H. (2008). *Systematic reviews in the social sciences: A practical guide*. John Wiley & Sons.
- Poast, P. (2013). Issue linkage and international cooperation: An empirical investigation. *Conflict management and peace science*, 30(3), 286–303.
- Porter, S. R., Whitcomb, M. E., & Weitzer, W. H. (2004). Multiple surveys of students and survey fatigue. *New directions for institutional research*, 2004(121), 63–73.
- Simon, H. A. (1953). Notes on the observation and measurement of political power. *The Journal of Politics*, 15(4), 500–516.
- Swedish Government. (2022, October 18). Statement of Government Policy [Speech by Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson, the Riksdag]. Available at: <https://www.government.se/speeches/2022/10/statement-of-government-policy/>
- Swedish National Audit Office (NAO). (2021). Swedish development aid to multilateral organisations – the government's and Sida's work. 2021/22:144.
- Tallberg, J. (2006). *Leadership and negotiation in the European Union*. Cambridge University Press.

- Vreeland, J. R., & Dreher, A. (2014). *The political economy of the United Nations Security Council: Money and influence*. Cambridge University Press.
- Hooghe, L., & Marks, G. (2010). Types of multi-level governance. In *Handbook on multi-level governance*. Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Walker, H., & Biedenkopf, K. (2020). Why do only some chairs act as successful mediators? Trust in chairs of global climate negotiations. *International Studies Quarterly*, 64(2), 440–452.
- Yamin, F. (2021). The High Ambition Coalition. In Jepsen, H., Lundgren, M., Monheim, K., & Walker, H. (Eds.) *Negotiating the Paris Agreement*. (pp. 216–244). Cambridge University Press.

Appendix 1: Search Documentation

Table A1. Search Documentation, bibliographic databases

Search terms	Web of Science	EDS
1: TS=(influenc* OR advocac* OR lobbying) AND ("multilateral organi?ation*")	61	1
2: TS=(influence* OR influencing* OR "informal governance" OR advocacy* OR lobbying*) AND TS=("multilateral aid organi?ation" OR "international organi?ation" OR "development organi?ation")	440	41
3: TS=((influence OR influencing OR impact OR persuasion OR mobili?ation) AND TS=(multilaterals OR "multilateral organi?ation" OR "international aid organi?ation" OR "international development organi?ation" OR "multilateral aid" OR "development aid"))	417	44
4: TS=("small state") AND TS=(influence OR influencing OR impact OR persuasion OR mobili?ation)	117	9
5: TS=("policy entrepreneur") AND TS=(influence OR influencing OR impact OR persuasion OR mobili?ation OR Advoc* OR lobby*)	94	9
Duplicates: 26		

Applied filters: Topic; Peer review; academic articles; English; 1990–2023.

Table A2. Search Documentation, Gray literature

Search terms	Google Scholar	DEReC
1: "influencing work" "multilateral influencing" "policy influence" "multilateral organisation" "multilateral organization"	144	97
2: "influencing plans" "influencing channels" "influencing activities" "influencing effects" "multilateral organization" "multilateral organisation" "nordic influence"	14	64
Duplicates, books or chapters:	69	

Applied filters in google scholar: 1990–2023, no filters in DEReC. Duplications cover all search results, including those from bibliographic databases.

Appendix 2: Overview of reviewed studies

Author	Theme	Method	Multilateral	Actor	Principal channels of influence					
					Financial flows	Formal governance	Bargaining	Advocacy	Staffing	Other
Arter 2000	Small State	Qualitative	EU	Government				X		
Bajpal & Chong 2019	Civil servants	Qualitative	Unspecified	Government					X	
Baxter et al. 2018	Small State; Mediation	Quantitative	Unspecified	Government			X			
Bertacchini et al. 2016	Politicization	Quantitative	UNESCO	Government			X			
Björkdahl, 2008	Small State	Qualitative	EU	Government			X	X		
Brosig & Lecki 2022	Agency	Quantitative	UNSC	Government		X				
Brown 2007	Development policy	Qualitative	Unspecified	Government	X					
Browne 2017	Vertical funds	Qualitative	GAVI; GF; WHO	Multiple	X					

Author	Theme	Method	Multilateral	Actor	Principal channels of influence					
					Financial flows	Formal governance	Bargaining	Advocacy	Staffing	Other
Bueger & Wivel 2018	Small state	Qualitative	UN	Government			X	X		
Clark & Dolan 2021	Informal influence	Mixed	WB	Non-state	X					
Copelovitch 2010	Informal influence	Quantitative	IMF	Government		X				
Corbett et al. 2020	Policy entrepreneurship	Qualitative	IMO	Multiple		X		X		
Dany 2014	NGOs; lobbying	Qualitative	WSIS	Non-state			X	X		
Deitelhoff & Walbott 2012	Small state; coalition-building	Qualitative	ICC; UNFCCC	Government			X			
Dellmuth & Tallberg 2017	NGOs; lobbying	Mixed	UN	Non-state				X		

Author	Theme	Method	Multilateral	Actor	Principal channels of influence					
					Financial flows	Formal governance	Bargaining	Advocacy	Staffing	Other
Dijkstra 2015	Informal influence; control mechanisms	Qualitative	UNMISS	Government					X	
Dreher et al. 2022	Vote-buying	Quantitative	WB, IMF	Government	X					
Dreher et al. 2009	Vote-buying	Quantitative	WB	Government	X					
Dreher & Jensen 2007	Vote-buying	Quantitative	IMF	Government	X					
Dreher et al. 2008	Vote-buying	Quantitative	UNSC	Government	X					
Fleck & Kilby 2006	Informal influence	Quantitative	WB	Government	X					
Jackson 2012	Compliance bargaining	Qualitative	WTO	Government					X	X
Kaya & Woo 2022	Informal influence	Mixed	AIB	Government	X					

Author	Theme	Method	Multilateral	Actor	Principal channels of influence					
					Financial flows	Formal governance	Bargaining	Advocacy	Staffing	Other
Kilby 2011	Informal influence	Quantitative	ADB	Government	X					
Kilby 2013	Informal influence	Quantitative	WB	Government	X					
Kleine 2018	Control mechanisms	Qualitative	EU	Government					X	
Kleine 2012	Informal influence	Qualitative	EU	Government		X	X			
Kuziemko & Werker 2006	Vote-buying	Quantitative	Multiple UN agencies	Government	X					
Lee & Woo 2022	P-A model	Qualitative	WB	Non-state					X	
Lewis, 2003	Core funding	Quantitative	GEF	Government		X				
Lim & Vreeland 2013	Vote-buying	Quantitative	ADB	Government	X					
Limoncelli 2022	International civil servants	Qualitative	UN	Government					X	

Author	Theme	Method	Multilateral	Actor	Principal channels of influence					
					Financial flows	Formal governance	Bargaining	Advocacy	Staffing	Other
Manulak 2017	Secretariat institutional design	Qualitative	UNEP	Government					X	
McKeown 2009	Informal influence	Qualitative	Multiple IFIs	Government	X				X	
McLean 2023	Trading favors	Quantitative	WB	Government	X					
Monheim 2016	Negotiation chairs	Qualitative	UNFCCC	Non-state		X				
Moravcsik 1999	Supra-national entrepreneurship	Qualitative	EU	Non-state			X			
Nasra 2011	Small state	Qualitative	EU	Government			X			
Nasra & Debaere 2016	Small state	Qualitative	EU	Government			X			
Novosad & Werker 2019	Civil servants	Quantitative	UN Secretariat	Government					X	

Author	Theme	Method	Multilateral	Actor	Principal channels of influence					
					Financial flows	Formal governance	Bargaining	Advocacy	Staffing	Other
Panke 2010	Small state	Quantitative	EU	Government			X			
Panke & Stapel 2022	Regime complexity	Quantitative	Unspecified	Government					X	
Reinsberg 2017	Trust funds	Qualitative	WB, AfDB	Government	X					
Reinsberg 2019	UNSC campaigns	Quantitative	UNSC	Government	X					
Schneider and Tobin 2021	Interest coalitions	Quantitative	EU	Government			X			
Schoeller 2021	Agenda shaping; policy entrepreneurs	Qualitative	EU	Government			X	X		
Schulz et al. 2017	Small state	Qualitative	Cartagena & Nagoya protocol	Government			X			
Stone 2008	Conditionality	Quantitative	IMF	Government	X					
Stone 2004	Conditionality	Quantitative	IMF	Government	X					

Author	Theme	Method	Multilateral	Actor	Principal channels of influence					
					Financial flows	Formal governance	Bargaining	Advocacy	Staffing	Other
Tallberg 2010	Negotiation chairs	Qualitative	EU, UN, other	Non-state		X				
Tallberg 2003	Agenda shaping	Qualitative	EU	Non-state		X	X			
Tallberg 2008	Bargaining power	Qualitative	EU	Government			X			
Tallberg et al. 2015	NGOs; information exchange	Quantitative	UN	Non-state		X				
Theys & Rietig 2020	Small state	Qualitative	UNGA	Multiple				X		
Thorvaldsdottir et al. 2021	Core funding	Quantitative	UNHCR	Government	X					
Wamtjen 2007	Environmental legislation	Quantitative	EU	Government		X	X			
Woo & Chung 2017	Vote-buying	Quantitative	UNGA	Government	X					

Author	Theme	Method	Multilateral	Actor	Principal channels of influence					
					Financial flows	Formal governance	Bargaining	Advocacy	Staffing	Other
Gray Literature										
Aarva et al. 2012	IS evaluation: GE	Qualitative	MDBs	Government	X	X				
Dellmuth et al. 2020	Bargaining power	Mixed	EU	Government			X			
FPS Foreign Affairs Belgium 2021	IS evaluation: core funding	Qualitative	Multiple UN agencies, multiple IFIs	Government	X					
Greenhill & Rabinowitz 2016	Core funding	Qualitative	Multiple MOs	Government	X					
Johnston 2005	IS evaluation; GE	Qualitative	UN	Government	X					
Jurgens 2017	IS evaluation; SRHR	Qualitative	UFPA; UNAIDS	Government	X					

Author	Theme	Method	Multilateral	Actor	Principal channels of influence					
					Financial flows	Formal governance	Bargaining	Advocacy	Staffing	Other
Lundgren et al. 2022	NDICI; Bargaining Power	Quantitative	EU	Government			X			
MFA Denmark 2009	IS evaluation; JOS	Qualitative	UNHCR	Government	X					
MFA Denmark 2019	General evaluation	Qualitative	Multiple UN Agencies	Government	X	X	X	X	X	
MFA Netherlands 2013	General evaluation	Qualitative	WB	Government	X					
Palenberg et al. 2015	General evaluation	Qualitative	Multiple UN Agencies	Government	X	X				
Palenberg et al. 2020	General evaluation	Qualitative	Multiple UN Agencies	Government	X	X	X	X	X	
Santos et al. 2022	IS evaluation: Education	Mixed	Multiple UN agencies; EU; WB	Government					X	

Author	Theme	Method	Multilateral	Actor	Principal channels of influence					
					Financial flows	Formal governance	Bargaining	Advocacy	Staffing	Other
Tarp & Hansen 2013	Small state	Qualitative	UN	Government	X	X		X	X	