



**APPENDIX**

**02**

**2023**

**MORE THAN A LABEL, LESS THAN A REVOLUTION:  
SWEDEN'S FEMINIST FOREIGN POLICY**

**APPENDIX**

Ann Towns, Elin Bjarnegård, Katarzyna Jezierska



# Appendix: More Than a Label, Less Than a Revolution: Sweden's Feminist Foreign Policy

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# 1 Interviews

## 1.1 List of interviews

### MFA

Ann Bernes	Ambassador for Gender Equality and Coordinator of Feminist Foreign Policy, 2015–2021
Sofia Calltorp	Ambassador for Gender Equality and Coordinator of Feminist Foreign Policy, 2021–2022
Ann Linde	Foreign Minister, 2019–2022
Annika Söder	State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, 2014–2019
Margot Wallström	Foreign Minister, 2014–2019

### MFA Agencies

Beatrice Arnesson	Head of Communications at National Export Credits Guarantee Board
Åsa Eldén	Senior/Lead Policy Specialist at Sida, 2014, 2015–2017
Gabriela Elroy	Head of the Gender Equality Unit at the Folke Bernadotte Academy
Anna Hallam	Director, Department for Sustainability and Development Cooperation at National Board of Trade
Ulf Hammarström	Director General at Swedac
Lena Karlsson	Senior Policy Specialist at Sida, Policy Support Unit Gender Equality

Karin Kronhöffner	Director Strategy and Communication at Swedfund
Cecilia Schartau	Senior Project Manager, Government Affairs Unit at Business Sweden
Helena Herolf	Vice President, Head of Human Resources at Business Sweden
Sven-Eric Söder	Director General at the Folke Bernadotte Academy, 2012–2022
Monika Wirkkala	Acting Director, Department for Sweden promotion at Swedish Institute

## **Colombia**

Marie Andersson de Frutos	Ambassador in Bogotá, 2011–2017
Marcelo Diaz	Attaché for Peace and Security, FBA
Catalina Hoyos	National Program Officer
Erik Norman	Embassy Counsellor, Head of Development Cooperation
Diana Puerto	Political Officer

## **Kenya**

Johan Borgstam	Ambassador in Nairobi, 2012–2017
Helge Flärd	Minister Counsellor, Deputy Head of Mission, Head of Section for Political and Trade
Andreas Giallourakis	Market Area Director Africa at Business Sweden, Trade Commissioner Kenya



Josephine Mwangi	Gender Focal Point & Senior Program Manager at Kenya Development Cooperation Section (Governance)
Hanna Carlsson	First Secretary at Kenya Development Cooperation Section (Democracy and HR)
Annika Otterstedt	Counsellor, Head of Section for Kenya Development Cooperation
Caroline Vicini	Ambassador and head of mission in Nairobi since 2020

## 1.2 Thematic interview guide

The interviews were semi-structured and were adapted to the person interviewed. The following is a thematic guide, detailing the issues covered in all interviews, rather than the exact questions posed.

- Information about the interviewee's position and duties
- The agency/embassy assignment concerning the FFP and the promotion of gender equality
- Communication/steering about FFP assignment
- Potential changes to the assignment since the launch of the FFP (2014)
- Agency/embassy implementation of the assignment
  - (a) Organization of work with gender equality and FFP
  - (b) Coordination between policy areas
  - (c) Working methods and tools used to conduct FFP
- Nature of potential changes
  - (a) More attention to gender equality and FFP
  - (b) New working methods and tools used to conduct FFP
- Main target groups of agency/embassy

- Evaluation of work with FFP
- Responsibility/accountability for work with FFP
- Working methods to implement FFP in 4 clusters: financial, capacity building, norm influence, and information dissemination.
  - (a) Clusters used in agency/embassy
  - (b) Clusters not used in agency/embassy
  - (c) How it changed over time
- Other aspects

### **1.3 Information about consent**

Informed consent was obtained from all interviewees, in email conversations before the interview and during the interview.

Similar formulation was shared with the interviewees:

The interviews will be recorded so that they can be properly transcribed. The transcriptions of the interviews will be stored on a secure server within the GenDip program at the University of Gothenburg, and other than the researchers involved in the study – Prof. Ann Towns, Dr. Elin Bjarnegård and Dr. Katarzyna Jezierska – nobody else will have access to them. The contents of the interviews may be referred to and quoted in a report published by the Expert Group for Aid Studies as well as in subsequent academic publications. The names and positions of the interviewees will be listed at the end of the publications.

## 2 Foreign policy agency study

### 2.1 List of agency documents

Business Sweden (2013a). *Redovisning av statens uppdrag Exportfrämjande.*

Business Sweden (2013b). *Redovisning av statens uppdrag Investeringsfrämjande.*

Business Sweden (2014a). *Redovisning av statens uppdrag.*

Business Sweden (2014b). *Årsredovisning.*

Business Sweden (2015a). *Redovisning av statens uppdrag.*

Business Sweden (2015b). *Årsredovisning.*

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Business Sweden (2017a). *Redovisning av statens uppdrag.*

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Business Sweden (2018b). *Årsredovisning.*

Business Sweden (2019a). *Redovisning av statens uppdrag.*

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Exportkreditnämnden (2013b). *Årsredovisning*.

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Exportkreditnämnden (2021). *Årsredovisning*.

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Folke Bernadotteakademin (2008b). *Årsredovisning*.

Folke Bernadotteakademin (2009a). *Verksambetsplan*.

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- Skr. 2015/16:114 (Regeringens skrivelse). *Strategisk exportkontroll 2015 – krigsmateriel och produkter med dubbla användningsområden*.
- Skr. 2016/17:114 (Regeringens skrivelse). *Strategisk exportkontroll 2016 – krigsmateriel och produkter med dubbla användningsområden*.
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- Skr. 2020/21:114 (Regeringens skrivelse). *Strategisk exportkontroll 2020 – krigsmateriel och produkter med dubbla användningsområden.*
- Skr. 2021/22:114 (Regeringens skrivelse). *Strategisk exportkontroll 2021 – krigsmateriel och produkter med dubbla användningsområden.*
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Swedac (2008b). *Årsredovisning*.

Swedac (2009a). *Bitar av Swedac 2009–2010*.

Swedac (2009b). *Budgetunderlag för år 2009–2011*.

Swedac (2009c). *Förordning (2009:895) med instruktion för Styrelsen för ackreditering och teknisk kontroll*.

Swedac (2009d). *Årsredovisning*.

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UD (2007c). *Förordning (2007:1224) med instruktion för Svenska institutet.*

UD (2007d). *Förordning (2007:1371) med instruktion för Sida.*

UD (2008a). *Regleringsbrev avseende Exportkreditnämnden.*

UD (2008b). *Regleringsbrev avseende Folke Bernadotteakademin.*

UD (2008c). *Regleringsbrev avseende Inspektionen för strategiska produkter.*

UD (2008d). *Regleringsbrev avseende Kommerskollegium.*

UD (2008e). *Regleringsbrev avseende Sida.*

UD (2008f). *Regleringsbrev avseende Svenska institutet.*

UD (2008h). *Regleringsbrev avseende Svedac.*

UD (2009a). *Förordning (2009:894) med instruktion för Kommerskollegium.*

UD (2009b). *Regleringsbrev avseende Exportkreditnämnden.*

UD (2009c). *Regleringsbrev avseende Folke Bernadotteakademin.*

UD (2009d). *Regleringsbrev avseende Inspektionen för strategiska produkter.*

UD (2009e). *Regleringsbrev avseende Kommerskollegium.*

UD (2009f). *Regleringsbrev avseende Sida.*

UD (2009g). *Regleringsbrev avseende Svenska institutet.*

UD (2009h). *Regleringsbrev avseende Svedac.*

UD (2010a). *Förordning (2010:1080) med instruktion för.*

UD (2010b). *Förordning (2010:1101) med instruktion för Inspektionen för strategiska produkter.*

UD (2010c). *Regleringsbrev avseende Exportkreditnämnden.*

UD (2010d). *Regleringsbrev avseende Folke Bernadotteakademin.*

UD (2010e). *Regleringsbrev avseende Inspektionen för strategiska produkter.*

UD (2010f). *Regleringsbrev avseende Kommerskollegium.*

UD (2010g). *Regleringsbrev avseende Sida.*

UD (2010h). *Regleringsbrev avseende Svenska institutet.*

UD (2010i). *Regleringsbrev avseende Swedac.*

UD (2011a). *Regleringsbrev avseende Exportkreditnämnden.*

UD (2011b). *Regleringsbrev avseende Folke Bernadotteakademin.*

UD (2011c). *Regleringsbrev avseende Inspektionen för strategiska produkter.*

UD (2011d). *Regleringsbrev avseende Kommerskollegium.*

UD (2011e). *Regleringsbrev avseende Sida.*

UD (2011f). *Regleringsbrev avseende Svenska institutet.*

UD (2011g). *Regleringsbrev avseende Swedac.*

UD (2012a). *Förordning (2012:990) med instruktion för Kommerskollegium.*

UD (2012b). *Regleringsbrev avseende Exportkreditnämnden.*

UD (2012c). *Regleringsbrev avseende Folke Bernadotteakademin.*

UD (2012d). *Regleringsbrev avseende Inspektionen för strategiska produkter.*

UD (2012e). *Regleringsbrev avseende Kommerskollegium.*

UD (2012f). *Regleringsbrev avseende Sida.*

UD (2012g). *Regleringsbrev avseende Svenska institutet.*

UD (2012h). *Regleringsbrev avseende Swedac.*

UD (2013a). *Förordning (2013:727) med instruktion för Folke Bernadotteakademin.*

UD (2013b). *Förordning (2020:767) med instruktion för Folke Bernadotteakademin.*

UD (2013c). *Regleringsbrev avseende Exportkreditnämnden.*

UD (2013d). *Regleringsbrev avseende Folke Bernadotteakademin.*

UD (2013e). *Regleringsbrev avseende Inspektionen för strategiska produkter.*

UD (2013f). *Regleringsbrev avseende Kommerskollegium.*

UD (2013g). *Regleringsbrev avseende Sida.*

UD (2013h). *Regleringsbrev avseende Svenska institutet.*

UD (2013i). *Regleringsbrev avseende Swedac.*



- UD (2013j). *Riktlinjer för Sveriges export- och investeringsråd avseende exportfrämjande.*
- UD (2013k). *Riktlinjer för Sveriges export- och investeringsråd avseende investeringsfrämjande.*
- UD (2014a). *Regleringsbrev avseende Exportkreditnämnden.*
- UD (2014b). *Regleringsbrev avseende Folke Bernadotteakademin.*
- UD (2014c). *Regleringsbrev avseende Inspektionen för strategiska produkter.*
- UD (2014d). *Regleringsbrev avseende Kommerskollegium.*
- UD (2014e). *Regleringsbrev avseende Sida.*
- UD (2014f). *Regleringsbrev avseende Svenska institutet.*
- UD (2014g). *Regleringsbrev avseende Swedac.*
- UD (2014h). *Riktlinjer för Sveriges export- och investeringsråd avseende exportfrämjande.*
- UD (2014i). *Riktlinjer för Sveriges export- och investeringsråd avseende investeringsfrämjande.*
- UD (2015a). *Förordning (2015:152) med instruktion för Svenska institutet.*
- UD (2015b). *Regleringsbrev avseende Exportkreditnämnden.*
- UD (2015c). *Regleringsbrev avseende Folke Bernadotteakademin.*
- UD (2015d). *Regleringsbrev avseende Inspektionen för strategiska produkter.*
- UD (2015e). *Regleringsbrev avseende Kommerskollegium.*
- UD (2015f). *Regleringsbrev avseende Sida.*
- UD (2015g). *Regleringsbrev avseende Svenska institutet.*
- UD (2015h). *Regleringsbrev avseende Swedac.*
- UD (2015i). *Riktlinjer för Sveriges export- och investeringsråd avseende exportfrämjande.*
- UD (2015j). *Riktlinjer för Sveriges export- och investeringsråd avseende investeringsfrämjande.*
- UD (2016a). *Regleringsbrev avseende Exportkreditnämnden.*
- UD (2016b). *Regleringsbrev avseende Folke Bernadotteakademin.*

- UD (2016c). *Regleringsbrev avseende Inspektionen för strategiska produkter.*
- UD (2016d). *Regleringsbrev avseende Kommerskollegium.*
- UD (2016e). *Regleringsbrev avseende Sida.*
- UD (2016f). *Regleringsbrev avseende Svenska institutet.*
- UD (2016g). *Regleringsbrev avseende Swedac.*
- UD (2016h). *Riktlinjer för Sveriges export- och investeringsråd avseende export- och investeringsframjande.*
- UD (2016i). *Utrikesförvaltningens handlingsplan för feministisk utrikespolitik 2015–2018 med fokusområden för år 2016.*
- UD (2017a). *Business Swedens riktlinjer.*
- UD (2017b). *Regleringsbrev avseende Exportkreditnämnden.*
- UD (2017c). *Regleringsbrev avseende Folke Bernadotteakademien.*
- UD (2017d). *Regleringsbrev avseende Inspektionen för strategiska produkter.*
- UD (2017e). *Regleringsbrev avseende Kommerskollegium.*
- UD (2017f). *Regleringsbrev avseende Sida.*
- UD (2017g). *Regleringsbrev avseende Svenska institutet.*
- UD (2017h). *Regleringsbrev avseende Swedac.*
- UD (2017i). *Utrikesförvaltningens handlingsplan för feministisk utrikespolitik 2015–2018 med fokusområden för år 2017.*
- UD (2018a). *Regleringsbrev avseende Exportkreditnämnden.*
- UD (2018b). *Regleringsbrev avseende Folke Bernadotteakademien.*
- UD (2018c). *Regleringsbrev avseende Inspektionen för strategiska produkter.*
- UD (2018d). *Regleringsbrev avseende Kommerskollegium.*
- UD (2018e). *Regleringsbrev avseende Sida.*
- UD (2018f). *Regleringsbrev avseende Svenska institutet.*
- UD (2018g). *Regleringsbrev avseende Swedac.*

- UD (2018h). *Riktlinjer för Sveriges export- och investeringsråd avseende export- och investeringsframjande.*
- UD (2018i). *Utrikesförvaltningens handlingsplan för feministisk utrikespolitik 2015–2018 med indikativa åtgärder för år 2018.*
- UD (2019a). *Regleringsbrev avseende Exportkreditnämnden.*
- UD (2019b). *Regleringsbrev avseende Folke Bernadotteakademin.*
- UD (2019c). *Regleringsbrev avseende Inspektionen för strategiska produkter.*
- UD (2019d). *Regleringsbrev avseende Kommerskollegium.*
- UD (2019e). *Regleringsbrev avseende Sida.*
- UD (2019f). *Regleringsbrev avseende Svenska institutet.*
- UD (2019g). *Regleringsbrev avseende Swedac.*
- UD (2019h). *Riktlinjer för Sveriges export- och investeringsråd avseende export- och investeringsframjande.*
- UD (2019i). *Utrikesförvaltningens handlingsplan för feministisk utrikespolitik 2019–2022 med inriktning och åtgärder för år 2019.*
- UD (2020a). *Regleringsbrev avseende Exportkreditnämnden.*
- UD (2020b). *Regleringsbrev avseende Folke Bernadotteakademin.*
- UD (2020c). *Regleringsbrev avseende Inspektionen för strategiska produkter.*
- UD (2020d). *Regleringsbrev avseende Kommerskollegium.*
- UD (2020e). *Regleringsbrev avseende Sida.*
- UD (2020f). *Regleringsbrev avseende Svenska institutet.*
- UD (2020g). *Regleringsbrev avseende Swedac.*
- UD (2020h). *Riktlinjer för Sveriges export- och investeringsråd avseende export- och investeringsframjande.*
- UD (2020i). *The Swedish Foreign Service action plan for feminist foreign policy 2019–2022, including direction and measures for 2020.*
- UD (2021a). *Förordning (2021:1252) medinstruktion för Styrelsen för ackreditering och teknisk kontroll.*

- UD (2021b). *Regleringsbrev avseende Exportkreditnämnden.*
- UD (2021c). *Regleringsbrev avseende Folke Bernadotteakademien.*
- UD (2021d). *Regleringsbrev avseende Inspektionen för strategiska produkter.*
- UD (2021e). *Regleringsbrev avseende Kommerskollegium.*
- UD (2021f). *Regleringsbrev avseende Sida.*
- UD (2021g). *Regleringsbrev avseende Svenska institutet.*
- UD (2021h). *Regleringsbrev avseende Svedac.*
- UD (2021i). *Riktlinjer för Sveriges export- och investeringsråd avseende export- och investeringsframjande.*
- UD (2021j). *Utrikesförvaltningens handlingsplan för feministisk utrikespolitik 2019–2022 med inriktning och åtgärder för år 2021.*
- UD (2022a). *Utrikesförvaltningens handlingsplan för feministisk utrikespolitik 2019–2022 med inriktning och åtgärder för år 2022.*

## 2.2 Coding Schema

- Explicit FUP-goals or gender equality goals? Reporting requirements for FUP/GE? Yes/no, which (in terms of Rs?)
- Budget: Specific resources for the goals. Yes/no, how much, for what?
- Methods specified? (classify as 1. Norm promotion 2. Capacity building 3. Economic incentives and funding 4. Gathering and disseminating facts/information)
- Target groups specified I? Yes/no (classify as 1. General public, 2. State actors, 3. Women's rights organizations, 4. Other CSOs, 5. Donors/IOs, 6. Local/tribal/community/religious leaders, 7. Business, 8. Other)
- Target groups specified II? Yes/no (classify as 1. Already working with GE, 2. Not working with GE, 3. Working against GE)
- Target groups specified III? Yes/no (classify as 1. Women, 2. Men, 3. Nonbinary/trans, 4. Sexual minorities, 5. Religious groups, 6. National/ethnic minorities or indigenous groups, 7. People in poverty, 8. People with disabilities, 9. Other)

## 3 Embassy studies

### 3.1 List of Swedish bilateral foreign missions

A current list of all Swedish foreign missions (embassies and consulates general) can be found here: <https://www.swedenabroad.se/sv/utlandsmyndigheter/>

### 3.2 Countries with which Sweden had development cooperation in 2022

Afghanistan	Ethiopia	Rwanda
Albania	Georgia	Serbia
Armenia	Guatemala	Somalia
Bangladesh	Iraq	South Sudan
Belarus	Kenya	Sudan
Bolivia	Kosovo	Syria
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Liberia	Tanzania
Burkina Faso	Mali	Türkiye
Cambodia	Moldova	Uganda
Colombia	Mozambique	Ukraine
Cuba	Myanmar	Yemen
Democratic Republic of the Congo	North Macedonia	Zambia
	Palestine	Zimbabwe
	Russia	

### 3.3 List of documents for embassy study

- Embajada de Suecia, Bogotá D.C. (2021a). Licencia Parental en Suecia.
- Embajada de Suecia, Bogotá D.C. (2021b). La Política Exterior Feminista Sueca.
- Embajada de Suecia, Bogotá D.C. (2021c). Desafiar Estereotipos de Género Para Crear Nuevas Masculinidades. *Online roundtable discussion, organized by the Swedish Embassy for the Bogotá book fair FILBo the Ferida Internacional del Libro de Bogotá*, Aug 21, 2021.
- Embajada de Suecia, Bogotá D.C. (2022a). Palabras para martes, Panel 3: Mujeres en la Agenda Internacional y Política Exterior. *Internal memo, prepared responses for Ambassador Storm's participation in the Foro M conference, convened by the vice president of Colombia*, March 8, 2022.
- Republic of Kenya (2010). *The Constitution of Kenya*.
- Republic of Kenya (2019). Sessional Paper no.2 of 2019 on National Policy on Gender and Development. [Online], Available: at <https://gender.go.ke/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Final-NPGAD-2021.pdf> [30 Nov 2022].
- Sida (2015a). *Strategirapport för Colombia 2015*.
- Sida (2015b). *Strategirapport för samarbetsstrategi med Kenya 2015*.
- Sida (2016a). *Strategirapport för Colombia 2015*.
- Sida (2016b). *Strategirapport för Sveriges utvecklingssamarbete med Kenya 2016*.
- Sida (2017a). *Strategirapport 2017 för Colombia 2016–2020*.
- Sida (2017b). *Strategirapport 2017 för Sveriges utvecklingssamarbete med Kenya 2016–2020*.
- Sida (2019a). *Fördjupad strategirapport för Sveriges strategi för Colombia 2016–2020*.
- Sida (2019b). *Fördjupad strategirapport för Sveriges utvecklingssamarbete med Kenya 2016–2020*.
- Sida (2020a). *Strategirapport församarbete med Colombia 2016–2020*.
- Sida (2020b). *Strategirapport för Sveriges utvecklingssamarbete med Kenya 2016–2020*.

Sida (2021). *Strategirapport för Colombia 2016–2021*.

Sveriges ambassad i Bogotá (2012). *Verksambetsplan*.

Sveriges ambassad i Bogotá (2013). *Verksambetsplan*.

Sveriges ambassad i Bogotá (2014). *Verksambetsplan*.

Sveriges ambassad i Bogotá (2015). *Verksambetsplan*.

Sveriges ambassad i Bogotá (2016). *Verksambetsplan*.

Sveriges ambassad i Bogotá (2017). *Verksambetsplan*.

Sveriges ambassad i Bogotá (2018). *Verksambetsplan*.

Sveriges ambassad i Bogotá (2019). *Verksambetsplan för år 2019–2022*.

Sveriges ambassad i Bogotá (2020). Gender Equality Report – Colombia 2020.  
*Report from the embassy to the Americas Department of the Swedish MFA.*

Sveriges ambassad i Nairobi (2008). *Verksambetsplan för år 2008–2010*.

Sveriges ambassad i Nairobi (2011). *Verksambetsplan*.

Sveriges ambassad i Nairobi (2012). *Verksambetsplan*.

Sveriges ambassad i Nairobi (2013). *Verksambetsplan*.

Sveriges ambassad i Nairobi (2014). *Verksambetsplan*.

Sveriges ambassad i Nairobi (2015). *Verksambetsplan*.

Sveriges ambassad i Nairobi (2016). *Verksambetsplan*.

Sveriges ambassad i Nairobi (2017). *Verksambetsplan*.

Sveriges ambassad i Nairobi (2018). *Verksambetsplan*.

Sveriges ambassad i Nairobi (2019). *Verksambetsplan*.

Sveriges ambassad i Nairobi (2020). *Verksambetsplan*.

Sveriges ambassad i Nairobi (2021). *Verksambetsplan*.



### 3.4 Survey programming

We received the assistance of the GLD team at the University of Gothenburg in the programming and sending out of the survey. The survey was programmed using SurveyToGo Studio by Dooblo which is ISO 27001 Certified (certificate attached). From Dooblo's website: *'ISO 27001 certification is an international recognition that Dooblo has invested in trustable processes and technology to guarantee that customer's data is sufficiently protected...We then went through the rigorous audit and certification process with a top ISO certification body...Working with an ISO 27001 certified solution, can help our customers secure projects that were more difficult to obtain before (government, international aid organizations, etc.)'*

**Figure A1. ISO 27001 of the SurveyToGo Studio of Dooblo Ltd.**



## 3.5 Consent and GDPR

### **EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) statement:**

Participation in this study is completely voluntary and you have the right to cancel at any time, without explanation. The answers you provide are regulated as your “study data,” in the EU/EEA under the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). They will be kept confidential and will be processed so that unauthorized persons cannot access them, in accordance with the GDPR. The answers will be stored at a secure server administered by the GenDip (Gender and Diplomacy) Program at the University of Gothenburg, available only to the researchers responsible for the study. Answers will be reported in aggregated form, including in tables and figures. When quotes are used, they will not be possible to trace back to the surveyed person. Data will be stored until all results are published. You can change or erase your answers at any time. In order to do so, or for questions, please contact Prof. Ann Towns at [ann.towns@gu.se](mailto:ann.towns@gu.se). You can also contact the Data Protection Officer of the University of Gothenburg [dataskyddsbud@gu.se](mailto:dataskyddsbud@gu.se).

Are you willing to participate in this survey?

## 3.6 Survey practices

Based on the latest version of address lists obtained from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, we first sent out an information e-mail to all ambassadors, informing them about the upcoming survey and seeking their support in encouraging participation. A primary, personal invitation was then sent out followed by three reminders to individuals who had not responded.


In keeping with standard survey practices, our analyses drop out response options of “I don’t know” or “Refuse to answer”, which were offered for every question in the survey. However, we make note of questions where non-responses are particularly high. All

multivariate analyses cluster standard errors by country in which the respondent works. Doing so accounts for inter-correlations between respondents who are working in similar settings and provides more conservative errors surrounding the estimates in our models.



In analyzing our survey, we were cognizant that embassy workers may feel pressured to answer our questions in a desirable way. Such tendencies are known as “sensitivity” or “social desirability” bias (Blair et al., 2020). In an attempt to measure potential bias in our results, we implemented a “face-saving” experiment (Morin-Chasse et al., 2017, Daoust et al., 2021). The experiment was used to test for sensitivity in a set of six questions regarding respondents’ personal assessment of their own knowledge and use of the FFP in their work. The experiment provided a short preamble to these questions that may help to legitimize admitting sensitive responses among a randomized subset of our sample. The results of the experiment suggest that sensitivity bias does not have a large influence over our findings concerning the FFP among Swedish embassy workers.

### 3.7 Additional survey-related information


Figure A2. Distribution of answers, Familiar with 3 Rs



**Figure A3. Regression Graphs FFP Knowledge (model with aid embassies only compared to model with all embassies)**



**Figure A4. Regression Graphs FFP Practices index (model with aid embassies only compared to model with all embassies)**



In this analysis, we focus on self-reported change as a result of the FFP, regardless of the previous level of reported gender equality work. We go through the variables one by one, to assess to what extent they affected the propensity of experiences of foreign policy workers to let the FFP change the way they work.

**Foreign policy area.** While we know from the previous analyses in the report that there are different levels of gender equality infrastructure currently in place in different foreign policy areas, the results of our regression analysis demonstrate that the section in which an embassy worker is based does *not* significantly affect their reports of the extent to which the FFP changed the way they work. The section variable is insignificant both in models including all embassies as well as in models including aid embassies only. This result should be seen in light of the earlier results demonstrating that aid embassies and people working in embassy development sections have more gender equality education and are more likely to report that they have Gender Focal Points. They nonetheless report having *changed* their work to the same extent as staff in other sections. The likely practical outcome is that staff in all embassy sections now do more gender equality work than prior to the FFP, but development staff continue to do even more than staff in other sections.

**Staff category.** The respondents who have replied to the survey have different types of employment. Embassy staff may be deployed from Sweden with diplomatic status, or locally employed (nationals of the country in question, but sometimes also Swedish nationals). The same regression analysis assessed whether staff category made a difference in the extent to which respondents reported that the FFP changed their gender equality work. We find that diplomatic staff are significantly *less* likely than local staff to report that the FFP has entailed more practical attention to gender equality or new methods for working towards gender equality goals, as indicated by the index *FFP Practices*. In other words, *local staff members are more likely than diplomats to report that the FFP has made a difference for how they work*. This may be because local staff, more than diplomats, perceived that the

FFP represented a new way of doing things, but it could also be because programmatically locally employed embassy staff members often work close to projects and activities on the ground. There may also be hierarchical aspects here. Keeping in mind that we are only including experienced foreign service members of staff in these analyses, it is possible that diplomatic staff will be less inclined to change what they see as institutionalized ways of working. Locally employed members of staff may be more likely to feel that they have to follow and adapt to new guidelines, such as the FFP.


**Gender.** Some of our interviewees suggested that female diplomats may have been more committed to gender equality and the FFP. Others claim that men have caught up with women on gender equality issues and that men may thus have changed more as a result of the FFP. For instance, speaking about men and gender work, one interviewee stated that “before the FFP, gender issues were not ‘theirs’” (Interview 25\_Kenya; Interview 21\_Kenya). To reiterate, this result says nothing about the general level of gender equality work of men and women embassy employees, it only says that reported *change* as a result of the FFP does not significantly differ between men and women respondents.

**Training.** We have already seen that the level of training differs between embassy type and embassy section. While respondents working at aid embassies, and in development sections in particular, are more likely to have general gender equality training, people working in other embassies and other sections are more likely to have received specific FFP-training, although at a lower level. We also know that FFP-training did affect self-reported knowledge of the FFP. But did the experience of various types of training also matter for how experienced embassy workers reported that the FFP changed their ways of working, holding all other variables constant? In models including all embassies as well as aid embassies only, *respondents who have received specific FFP training at some point are significantly more likely to report that they have changed the way they work with gender equality as a result of the introduction of the FFP.* Among all embassies,



general gender equality training also has an independent effect, which is not the case in the model estimating reported change among aid embassies only. Specific FFP training thus did not only make foreign policy workers feel they were more knowledgeable about the FFP, it also seems to have made a difference in practice.

**Figure A5. Specific methods used by those who often use Norm Promotion**



### **3.8 Partner survey note**

Just as for the larger embassy survey described above, the GLD team at the University of Gothenburg assisted with the programming and sending out of the smaller survey of partner organizations of Swedish embassies in Bogotá and Nairobi. This survey was also programmed using SurveyToGo Studio by Dooblo.

The Swedish embassies in Bogotá and Nairobi provided us with lists of their direct partners in Colombia and Kenya respectively, together with contact emails for each organization. The embassies also sent introductory emails to these organizations, to notify them about the upcoming survey and encouraging participation. An invitation to fill out the survey was then sent out, followed by one reminder to individuals who had not responded. The survey was fielded between November 7–24, 2022.

In total, we were provided with 31 contacts in Colombia and 37 contacts in Kenya. Contrary to our expectations, the embassies' partners were not Colombian and Kenyan CSOs, but primarily various UN agencies, Swedish government agencies, Swedish CSOs, Kenyan and Colombian government agencies and businesses, and only a few local CSOs. Given the low number of our original sample and, additionally, the relatively low response rate of 37% (32% for Colombia and 41% for Kenya), we ended up with 25 individual responses in total. We thus only describe open text answers in our report, without numerically summarizing the results. These “partner voices” about the FFP and the work the Swedish embassy is doing in Colombia and Kenya are presented in the main report.

## 4 Answers from the two studies: FFP implementation in Swedish foreign policy agencies and aid embassies

This study of the implementation of the Swedish Feminist Foreign Policy in bilateral work demonstrates that overall, FFP-implementation consisted of much more than simply re-labeling existing gender equality activities. However, implementation was uneven and incomplete. There was a marked increase in gender equality work among implementing foreign policy agencies and aid embassies after the FFP was launched. There was also marked variation in *how* the FFP was implemented, as well as in *how much* and even *if* it was implemented. While the message that FFP was a priority that concerned everyone was hard to miss, the same message was interpreted and prioritized differently by different actors, partly depending on their previous engagement with gender equality.

In this section of the appendix, we provide a longer summary of the answers to the report's main questions, addressing them each in turn with the help of the conducted studies.

## **4.1 What FFP directives did the Swedish government (MFA) give foreign policy agencies and aid embassies?**

The foreign policy directives from the Swedish government and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs emphasized gender equality more forcefully after 2014 and onwards than before the FFP was launched. For the foreign policy agencies, directives to implement gender equality goals were included in all appropriation directions and owner directives, with one exception: the Inspectorate of Strategic Products (ISP). ISP was never instructed through formal steering documents to perform gender analyses of arms control and Swedish arms trade nor to report on the bearing of such gender analyses on its activities. As for the embassies, even if the government/MFA does not steer embassy activities primarily through formal steering documents, its “steering signals” to embassies were powerful and clear: they were expected to step up their gender equality work. By and large, with the partial exception of development cooperation, agencies and embassies were asked to do more gender equality work without any additional funding.

Foreign policy agencies and aid embassies simultaneously had a lot of autonomy and flexibility in terms of how and to what extent they implemented the FFP agenda. Government directives to the agencies were generally abstract and open-ended. Non-development embassy work was not given any *specific* FFP- or gender related directives, with reporting requirements, from the government – this work was expected to be adapted by the embassies as they saw fit to the general “steering signals” emitted from the MFA and its political leadership.

The policy field of development cooperation received more specific and formal direction, with reporting requirements, than the other policy areas. Directives to the development agencies (Folke Bernadotte Academy, Sida and Swedfund) did not expressly

mention the FFP as such. Two of these agencies (FBA and Sida), which place staff in aid embassies, had furthermore been given directions to implement specific gender equality goals since long before the FFP was launched. However, the government saw development agencies and their gender equality work as included in its FFP. More importantly, development-related steering documents emphasized gender equality more extensively after 2014.

Although there was no budget post specifically for the FFP, additional funding earmarked for gender equality was also provided to Swedish development cooperation after 2014. While provided less resources than most other thematic strategies, the new “Strategy for Sweden’s development cooperation for global gender equality and women’s and girls’ rights 2018–2022” encompassed a total of SEK 1,000 million (MFA, 2018b). The next strategy 2022–2026 provided SEK 1,300 million (MFA, 2022b). It is not clear whether these new strategies with their resource allocation can be attributed the FFP, but some of our interviewees claim the FFP indirectly affected resource allocation by creating political pressure and expectations. The FBA is another case in point: its prominent and much noted work with gender equality has largely centered on the Women, peace and security (WPS) agenda. Its staff has increased from 80 to 200 and its budget from 250 million SEK to 420 million SEK. While it is not possible to say that the FFP alone is responsible for this increase, the fact that the WPS agenda was in line with FFP priorities facilitated the increased resource allocation.

By and large, however, most implementing actors were asked to implement the FFP within existing budget frames. Agencies and embassies were thus expected to redistribute existing resources differently and/or carry out existing activities in new ways in order to pursue FFP goals.

In many ways, the FFP asked implementing actors to do more of the same kinds of activities, not least within development. That said, the most notable change in direction for Swedish foreign policy concerns trade. Prior to 2014, Swedish trade and promotion policy

had hardly touched on gender equality at all, and none of the trade- and promotion related agencies – with the partial exception of the Swedish Institute and the National Board of Trade – had been directed in their appropriation directions to work with gender. By 2018, all of the trade- and promotion related agencies were instructed to work with gender equality, and all of them with explicit reference to the FFP.

The FFP was not the only policy that directed Swedish foreign policy actors to work with gender, as there were several developments and processes at play that prodded them towards more gender equality work (e.g. the Women, peace and security agenda, new international gender commitments, the Gender Mainstreaming in State Agencies initiative and more).

## **4.2 Did agencies and aid embassies do *more* to promote gender equality after the FFP was declared? If so, in what ways?**

The evidence in our studies of the foreign policy agencies and aid embassies clearly shows that on the whole, agencies and aid embassies stepped up their gender equality activities after the FFP was launched. All the agencies, except for the ISP, included activities to pursue gender equality or FFP goals after 2014, whereas less than half did so before 2014. What is more, except the ISP, all of the agencies engaged in *more* gender equality activities after 2014 than they did before. Even more of Swedish bilateral aid included gender equality activities during 2015–2021 than during 2009–2014.

Aid embassies also clearly worked more with gender equality issues, on the whole, after the launch of the FFP. Support structures for implementation of the FFP, such as Gender Focal Points and access to training, were sometimes already in place in aid embassies before

the FFP was launched. Typically, these early GFPs were placed in the embassies' development sections by Sida. After the FFP was declared, the MFA asked all embassies to appoint a GFP. Our survey showed that in 2022, roughly 70% of aid embassy staff reported having a GFP. At some aid embassies, such support structures were still missing or sidelined, even after eight years of FFP implementation. Our survey of staff at all Swedish embassies shows that embassy staff who had worked in foreign affairs since before the FFP reported a noticeable difference in the amount of attention they paid to gender equality. The conclusion that aid embassies changed after 2014 in the direction of more gender equality work is supported by our in-depth analyses of the operational plans, country reports and interviews with staff in the Swedish embassies in Bogotá and Nairobi.

### **4.3 Did the FFP lead Swedish agencies and embassies to pursue gender equality differently? If so, what new methods were used?**

Foreign policy agencies and aid embassy staff rely on all four of our broad categories of methods to pursue FFP goals: they provide funding, training, facts and information, and normative argumentation to support gender equality abroad. However, each agency and embassy relies more on some of these methods than others.

Embassy staff who have worked in the foreign service since before the launch of the FFP reported that they moderately changed *how* they pursued gender equality goals as a result of the FFP. However, it was not possible to systematically classify and assess in what ways the methods used by agencies and embassies changed after 2014. It turned out that the annual reports and operational plans differed too much in form, from agency to agency and embassy to embassy. These reports and plans have also changed over the years for

individual agencies, making an analysis of a single agency or embassy over time very challenging. What is more, the reports typically do not provide exhaustive lists of concrete activities – they often discuss *examples* of concrete activities to illustrate the kind of work the agencies carry out. FFP- or gender-related activities are furthermore not necessarily reported on in separate sections, adding to our difficulties in distinguishing activities to be coded. Activities may also be discussed in more general or abstract rather than concrete terms. Combined, this made a systematic comparison of gender related activities over time and across agencies virtually impossible. We consider this an important finding in itself.

Even though we were unable to systematically classify and assess whether new methods for pursuing gender equality developed with the FFP our qualified conclusion – after 26 interviews and having read thousands of document pages – is that on the whole, the FFP did not entail new methods per se. For the agencies and embassies working in development, the feminist foreign policy was not so much a new direction as it was support for developing their existing gender equality agendas further. That said, the application of existing methods to new areas, most importantly trade, required innovation and a lot of reflection. In some sense, the development of methods to pursue gender equality in and through trade may perhaps be seen as new methods?

In addition, the FFP did entail new ways to draw attention to and frame gender equality, namely through use of the terms “feminist” and “the three Rs”. Our survey showed that among aid embassy staff that worked with norm promotion, “feminism” was used by roughly 25% and “the three Rs” was used by roughly half. We believe the new framing was used more by the MFA and embassy leadership than by other foreign policy staff.



#### **4.4 In what ways, if any, did implementation differ between the three policy areas? Did the FFP perhaps entail joint action and coordination between these policy areas?**

Implementation of the FFP was not even across the three policy areas. Development cooperation stands out as the area that had the most gender equality work and support structures in place before the FFP. Staff in agencies and embassy sections devoted to development saw the FFP with its increased priority on gender equality as confirmation that the work they were already doing was important and as a call to further increase their ambitions. They thus engaged in even more gender equality work than before the FFP was launched.

The other policy areas – foreign policy and security; and trade and promotion – were engaged in much less gender equality work in 2014. Starting at lower levels, there was thus more room for change. We still found no evidence of any change in the direction of more gender equality work when it comes to the Inspectorate of Strategic Products, the agency in charge of export controls of military equipment and products that may be used both for civilian and military purposes. On the other hand, the Folke Bernadotte Academy – an agency straddling the policy areas of security and development – really increased its gender-related work after 2014. The policy area that saw most changes as a result of the FFP is probably trade and promotion, even if they never “caught up” with development.

Did the FFP entail joint action and coordination between these policy areas? Gender issues are generally understood as cross-sectional, transgressing policy areas such as security, trade, and development.

Prior to 2014, gender equality was nonetheless strongly associated with (only) one of the policy areas: development cooperation. As we discuss in chapter 8, the “feminist” label came to conceptually unify aid, trade and security under one umbrella term.

Sweden’s feminist foreign policy was indeed noted for reaching beyond development cooperation and including all foreign policy areas. According to the government: “many foreign missions testify that the policy has provided them with a platform that makes it easier to connect different tools and policy areas in more unified, powerful and systematic work and action” (Regeringens skrivelse, 2019:50). Coordination of gender equality work between different policy areas was an expressed ambition of the FFP. Again, due to the many ways in which activities are reported, it was not possible for us to trace such coordination. It is nonetheless unequivocal that the FFP was differently received and interpreted in different policy areas. And we cannot see that there were any extensive efforts to coordinate activities between the foreign policy agencies.

At the embassy level, the FFP does seem to have included an ambition to eliminate siloes. However, our study has not been able to assess to what extent this ambition was realized. The embassy survey shows that differences in the extent to which they implemented the FFP remained between embassy sections in 2022, but it does not show whether these differences had lessened over time.

Both our illustrative cases – the embassies in Bogotá and Nairobi – indicate that the FFP helped create synergies between embassy sections. However, the embassy in Bogotá had come to work in a much more integrated manner on gender than Nairobi. For instance, the Bogotá embassy created an embassy-wide gender advisory group with members from each embassy section. The interviewees all emphasized synergy effects, how much more they now collaborated across sections, and the active leadership by the ambassador on gender issues.

Interviewees in Nairobi also underscored that the FFP meant that gender was no longer solely a matter for the development section. However, the operative work was still largely divided between the different sections (Interview 23\_Kenya) and the functional dominance of development cooperation in gender equality work remained. What is more, the embassy's Gender Focal Point was appointed by Sida and located in the development section, without any mandate to coordinate gender equality efforts in other sections (Interview 25\_Kenya). The interviewed staff from other sections did not even know the embassy had a Gender Focal Point (Interview 21\_Kenya).

The FFP did entail coordination between policy areas at the embassies, in short, even if we cannot assess precisely how much. Gender equality is a cross-sectional thematic that has the potential to unify and create synergies in foreign policy. As an umbrella term, the “feminist” label thus had practical implications, helping to practically tie together trade, aid and security policies that are typically organized and practiced as separate tracks. This is not to say that Swedish aid, trade and security policy did not continue to operate largely as separate tracks. But it is clear that the FFP came to serve as a push in an integrative direction. How much of a push is beyond the scope of this report to ascertain.

## **4.5 What insights might be gleaned from the analyses about the impact of using the feminist label on foreign policy?**

Our final question concerns whether and how it matters whether gender-related foreign policy is called “feminist”. In chapter 8, we identified five functions that the feminist label had in Swedish foreign policy. First, the FFP label was used to put old wine in new bottles – many of our interviewees described using “feminism” as a new way to present existing “gender equality” activities. However,

feminist terminology never became predominant in the Swedish foreign service and foreign policy agencies. In particular, development agencies and embassy development sections continued working with “gender equality” rather than “feminist” terminology. Feminist terminology seems to have been more frequently used by political leadership and ambassadors than by other parts of the foreign service and foreign policy agencies.

To conclude that one of the functions of the FFP was to rebrand already ongoing practice is not to say that the feminist terminology was *merely* a label, however. Words matter, and the shift to FFP language served at least four additional functions in Swedish foreign policy.

A second function of the FFP was that it signalled – powerfully – the government’s greater ambitions and aspirations for re-starting the work with gender equality in foreign policy. The concept of “gender mainstreaming” had come to suffer from bureaucratized inertia, and the adoption of a new and combative concept by the political leadership helped reinvigorate a policy area that many claimed lacked momentum.

Third and relatedly, the declaration of a “feminist” foreign policy helped strengthen Swedish international leadership on gender equality issues, according to virtually all our interviewees. On the one hand, the use of the term brought about more conversations about gender equality and Swedish foreign policy. On the other, the declaration of a FFP raised the bar for Swedish action, leading to heightened expectations for more and new Swedish initiatives on gender equality.

Given the growing tide of gender-conservative forces in the past two decades, it is not surprising that the use of feminist terminology also heightened tensions with such actors. In part, the FFP was crafted as a reaction to the scaling back of women’s rights in some parts of the world. The fourth function of the feminist terminology was thus that it provoked negative reactions. Sometimes such reactions could

serve as an entry to deepened conversations. However, at other times, use of feminist terminology was counterproductive and had the opposite of the desired effect.

The fifth and final function of the new “feminist” terminology was that it helped to conceptually unify trade, aid and security policy under one umbrella term, as we discussed above.



*Expertgruppen för biståndsanalys (EBA) är en statlig kommitté som oberoende analyserar och utvärderar svenskt internationellt bistånd.*

*The Expert Group for Aid Studies (EBA) is a government committee with a mandate to independently analyse and evaluate Swedish international development aid.*