

Annex I–V: The Role of Aid in the Provision of Sexual and Reproductive Health Services

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Annex I–V to The Role of Aid in the Provision of
Sexual and Reproductive Health Services
to
The Expert Group for Aid Studies (EBA)

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Table of Contents

Annex I. Systematic review of the literature 1

Results3

Annex II. Results tables for the main FE analysis..... 15

Empirical strategy 15

Annex III. Additional results..... 41

Marginal effect of sectoral ODA on SRH services
conditional on countries baseline income classification 43

Marginal effect of sectoral ODA on SRH services
conditional on ODA/GHE category 47

Marginal effect of sectoral ODA on SRH services
conditional on sectoral ODA/total ODA category 51

Marginal effect of sectoral ODA on SRH services,
by three-year period..... 55

ODA effectiveness depending on donor type 61

Annex IV. Sensitivity analysis..... 74

Sensitivity to missing data and measurement error 75

Influence of outlying observations..... 82

FE estimation with alternative functional forms 98

Potential delayed effect..... 106

Dynamic FE model – System GMM..... 113

References..... 115

Annex V. Data and variable definitions 116

Annex I. Systematic review of the literature

A systematic review was conducted investigating the evidence of an impact of official development assistance on sexual and reproductive health (SRH) outcomes in low-and lower-middle-income countries. Consistent with the components of SRH presented in the Guttmacher-Lancet report (Starrs et al., 2018), outcomes of interest for the review included gender-based violence, maternal and infant health (incl. ante- and postnatal care), menstrual health, abortion, HIV/AIDS, other sexually transmitted diseases, reproductive cancer, family planning and female genital mutilation (FGM).

Between 25/07/2022 and 05/08/2022, 54 databases (incl. MEDLINE, CINAHL Complete, ScienceDirect, and Scopus) and 1 preprint server (arXiv) were systematically searched for English language articles assessing the impact of official development assistance (ODA) on SRH. The search strategy combined terms for the outcomes of interest, development assistance, low- and lower-middle income countries and impact evaluation. The search was restricted to articles published between 2002 and 2020. Additional grey literature was retrieved through manual keyterm or abridged searches of the WHO IRIS database, the World Bank eLibrary, UNICEF's Office of Research-Innocenti Publications, UNFPA publications, the Joint United Nations Programme on AIDS Publications Library, the Publications Office of the European Union and the preprint servers medrxiv and Lancet preprints.

To be eligible for inclusion in the review, articles had to statistically assess the impact of ODA on at least one of the specified SRH outcomes using at least one quantitative indicator. Articles were included in the review if they were experimental, quasi-experimental or observational in study design and if aid recipients matched the target

population, defined as low-and lower-middle-income countries according to the World Bank classification in 2002. Only English language articles published between 2002 and 2020 were included in the review. Studies exclusively assessing humanitarian assistance or projects not yet implemented were excluded, as were purely theoretical simulation or projection studies. Also excluded were articles where foreign aid was clearly non-ODA, or the contribution of ODA to overall foreign funding was unclear or negligible.

Figure A1. Prisma chart for systematic review



Screening was conducted in Covidence by two reviewers. Reviewers were blinded to each other's decisions at both title/abstract screening and full-text screening. Conflicting decisions were manually resolved by the reviewers at each screening stage before

moving onto the next stage. Subsequent data extraction was performed in Covidence by one reviewer, with the extraction template containing information on study details, study design, type and period of funding, outcomes assessed, results presented, and conclusions drawn by the authors.

Results

Of 1619 unique articles identified in the search, 25 met the eligibility criteria and were therefore included in the review. Evaluations covered ODA disbursed or committed from 1968 to 2015, with most studies analyzing the impact of funding provided between 1990 and 2010. Of studies specifying a geographic region of aid recipients, the majority (10 studies) focused on Africa, particularly sub-Saharan Africa (5 studies) and the remaining studies on Asia and specifically southeast Asia (3 studies).

Results indicate strong variation in aid definitions used (see Table A1) and outcomes evaluated. Infant health emerges as a dominant topic in the current evaluation literature, with 13 of 25 studies focused on infant mortality as an outcome. Other evaluations focused largely on HIV/AIDS (five studies) or maternal health and maternal health service provision (six studies). Three studies analyzed the impact of ODA on family planning and only one study addressed abortion as an outcome. Notably, gender-based violence, reproductive cancers, sexually transmitted diseases other than HIV/AIDS, FGM and menstrual health were absent from the results, indicating considerable gaps in the current evaluation literature. A detailed breakdown of outcomes is provided below.

Table A1. Definitions of aid used in articles reviewed

| Aid definition | # of Articles |
|----------------------------|----------------------|
| ODA | 7 |
| Foreign aid (= ODA) | 5 |
| Health sector specific aid | 4 |
| ODA for HIV/AIDS | 2 |
| (Foreign) aid for health | 2 |
| Other definitions | 7 |

Note: Two articles used multiple definitions of aid therefore #=27.

Infant health

Thirteen studies assessed the impact of ODA on infant mortality rates. Overall evidence of impact is mixed. Four studies find evidence that ODA significantly reduces IMR (Islam, 2003; Kotsadam *et al.*, 2018; Win and Cho, 2018; Akinlo and Sulola, 2019), with one additional study estimating DFID health programming alone to have resulted in 187,000 newborn lives saved between 2010 and 2014 (Friberg, Baschieri and Abbotts, 2017). However, three studies do not detect any significant effect of ODA on IMR in their analysis (Arndt, Jones and Tarp, 2015; Pallas and Ruger, 2017; Toseef, Jensen and Tarraf, 2019). The remaining studies report aid to significantly decrease IMR mostly in interaction with other factors, such as education (Mukherjee and Kizhakethalackal, 2013), the level of female empowerment (Montinola and Prince, 2018) or human rights commitments (Cole and Reynolds, 2019) in a country. One study reports that depending on the aid measure used, ODA had either no or a detrimental effect on IMR, while increasing aid volatility was associated with reductions in IMR (Wolf, 2007). Lastly, one study remains inconclusive due to internal contradictions (Irfan and Nehra, 2016).

Maternal health (incl. prenatal care and childbirth)

Of four studies assessing the impact of ODA on maternal mortality, one study finds evidence for ODA leading to a significant reduction in maternal mortality (Pickbourn and Ndikumana, 2016), while another study estimates DFID health and family planning programming to have saved 103,000 women's lives between 2010 and 2014 (Friberg, Baschieri and Abbotts, 2017). Two other studies show mixed results, with one study reporting contradictory effects depending on the type of lending provided by the World Bank (Coburn *et al.*, 2017), and another study finding that only aid allocated directly to the reproductive or maternal health sector reduces maternal mortality (Banchani and Swiss, 2019). Evidence for an impact of ODA on prenatal care provision remains inconclusive. One study did not observe an effect of ODA on prenatal care (Mukherjee and Kizhakethalackal, 2013), whereas another study reported that HIV aid improved prenatal care only in countries with low or medium HIV prevalence or low physician density (Grépin, 2012).

HIV/AIDS

Five articles assessed the effect of ODA on HIV/AIDS-related outcomes. Two studies report that ODA significantly reduces HIV/AIDS-related mortality (albeit only in the case of US bilateral aid in one study) (Nunnenkamp and Öhler, 2011; Hsiao and Emdin, 2015). Evidence for ODA lowering HIV/AIDS incidence is inconclusive, with one study supporting and another study refuting an effect (Nunnenkamp and Öhler, 2011; Lee, Yang and Kang, 2016). Two studies evaluating ODA's effect on HIV/AIDS prevalence find no evidence (Lee, Yang and Kang, 2016) and mixed evidence (Yogo and Mallaye, 2015) of a significant impact of ODA, respectively. Lastly, one study reports that increases in foreign assistance for HIV are significantly associated with increases in antiretroviral therapy coverage in 13 African countries (Bendavid *et al.*, 2010).

Family Planning

While outcomes evaluated varied, there appears to be some evidence of ODA impacting family planning in recipient countries. One study observes that ODA significantly reduces adolescent fertility rates (Zhuang, Wang and Daniels, 2020), while another study demonstrates that countries highly exposed to a withdrawal of US bilateral aid under the Mexico City Policy (MCP) experienced a significant concomitant decline in contraceptive use compared to countries with low exposure to the MCP (Brooks, Bendavid and Miller, 2019). Similarly, a third study finds evidence that USAID family planning funding significantly increased prevalence rates of modern contraceptives (Shepard *et al.*, 2003).

Abortion

Only one study evaluated the impact of the Mexico City Policy on abortion rates and concluded that withdrawal of US bilateral aid under the Mexico City Policy resulted in significantly increased abortion rates in highly exposed countries compared to countries with low exposure (Brooks, Bendavid and Miller, 2019).

Quality of Evidence

Overall, the quality of evidence for the effects of ODA on SRH outcomes was assessed as moderate. None of the studies included in this review were experimental in study design. Most studies (n=14) applied a fixed effects analysis using panel data, which is similar to the approach we adopt in our analysis. Three of studies could be described as quasi-experimental in nature, using a difference-in-difference analytical approach. Although they do not employ randomization, both fixed effects and DiD provide some evidence as to a possible causal relationship between ODA and SRH outcomes. The remaining studies were observational, except one which used a structural causal model. Out of the 25 studies that met

the eligibility criteria, all except one have been published in peer-reviewed journals. This lack of grey literature in the final review indicates that grey literature largely did not meet the eligibility criteria specified, with reported effects assessments being frequently qualitative or lacking in statistical analysis. The large differences between the studies in terms of study design, definition of ODA and the variety of outcomes measured make it difficult to say something conclusive about both the completeness and quality of the evidence.

Definition of Study Design Classification

Studies were classified into three categories according to their ability to make a causal claim as to the relationship between ODA and SRH outcomes.

Experimental – Studies employing an experimental study design with randomization. Able to make a causal claim. Considered strong evidence.

Non-Experimental – Studies lacking randomization, but employing a study design that allows to infer causality (e.g. quasi-experimental studies, use of causal models). Able to make a causal claim. Considered moderate evidence.

Observational – Studies that merely test for the association or correlation between ODA and SRH outcomes and do not provide any modelling. Unable to make a causal claim. Considered weak evidence.

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Search Strategy

#1 (Population/Outcome) – Title/Abstract Search

“sexual health” OR “reproductive health” OR “gender-based violence” OR “sexual violence” OR “sexual abuse” OR “antenatal care” OR “childbirth” OR “maternal mortality” OR “maternal health” OR “infant health” OR “infant mortality” OR “postnatal care” OR “abortion” OR “abortion care” OR “menstrual health” OR “menstrual hygiene” OR “HIV” OR “human immunodeficiency virus” OR “STI” OR “sexually transmitted infection” OR “STD” OR “sexually transmitted disease” OR “human papillomavirus” OR “HPV” OR “family planning” OR “adolescent birth rate” OR “unmet need for family planning” OR “reproductive cancer” OR “cervical cancer” OR “FGM” OR “female genital mutilation” OR “female genital cutting”

#2 (Population) – Title/Abstract Search

“less developed countries” OR “low income countries” OR “middle income countries” OR “developing countries” OR “least developed” OR Africa OR sub-Saharan Africa OR “lower middle income countries” OR Asia OR “South America” OR “Central America”

#3 (Intervention) – Title/Abstract Search

“development aid” OR “development assistance” OR “foreign aid” OR aid OR “foreign assistance” OR “development assistance for health” OR “financial support” OR “financial contribution” OR “official development assistance” OR “donor” OR “development partner” OR “bilateral” OR “multilateral” OR “loans” OR “grants” OR “global funds”

#4 – Title/Abstract Search

impact OR effect OR effectiveness OR influence OR role OR cross-country OR “panel regression” OR “fixed effects” OR “causal inference” OR “quantitative assessment” OR affect OR “aid effectiveness”

Country Classification 2002

Below is a list of countries classified as low- income and lower-middle income countries in 2002. Data was gathered from: World Bank 2002. World Development Indicators. Washington, The World Bank. Available at:

<https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/475281468159895302/pdf/multi0page.pdf>

Low Income Countries (2002)

| | |
|--------------------------|----------------------|
| Afghanistan | Ethiopia |
| Angola | The Gambia |
| Armenia | Georgia |
| Azerbaijan | Ghana |
| Bangladesh | Guinea |
| Benin | Guinea-Bissau |
| Bhutan | Haiti |
| Burkina Faso | India |
| Burundi | Indonesia |
| Cambodia | Kenya |
| Cameroon | Korea Dem. Rep. |
| Central African Republic | Kyrgyz Republic |
| Chad | (Kyrgyzstan) Lao PDR |
| The Comoros | Lesotho |
| Congo Dem. Rep. | Liberia |
| Congo Rep. | Madagascar |
| Cote d'Ivoire | Malawi |
| Eritrea | Mali |

| | |
|-----------------------|-----------------|
| Mauritania | Solomon Islands |
| Moldova | Somalia |
| Mongolia | Sudan |
| Mozambique | Tajikistan |
| Myanmar | Tanzania |
| Nepal | Togo |
| Nicaragua | Uganda |
| Niger | Ukraine |
| Nigeria | Uzbekistan |
| Pakistan | Vietnam |
| Rwanda | Yemen, Rep. |
| Sao Tomé and Príncipe | Zambia |
| Senegal | Zimbabwe |
| Sierra Leone | |

Lower Middle-Income Countries (2002)

| | |
|------------------------|--------------------|
| Albania | Cuba |
| Algeria | Djibouti |
| Belarus | Dominican Republic |
| Belize | Ecuador |
| Bolivia | Egypt, Arab Rep. |
| Bosnia and Herzegovina | El Salvador |
| Bulgaria | Equatorial Guinea |
| Cape Verde | Fiji |
| China | Guatemala |
| Colombia | Guyana |

| | |
|-----------------------|---|
| Honduras | Philippines |
| Iran, Islamic Rep. | Romania |
| Iraq | Russian Federation |
| Jamaica | Samoa |
| Jordan | Sri Lanka |
| Kazakhstan | St Vincent and the Grenadines |
| Kiribati | Suriname (or Surinam) |
| Latvia | Swaziland (today Eswatini) |
| Lithuania | Syrian Arab Republic (Syria) |
| Macedonia, FYR | Thailand |
| Maldives | Tonga |
| Marshall Islands | Tunisia |
| Micronesia, Fed. Sts. | Turkmenistan |
| Morocco | Vanuatu |
| Namibia | West Bank and Gaza |
| Papua New Guinea | Yugoslavia, Fed. Republic. |
| Paraguay | Today Croatia, North Macedonia, Montenegro |
| Peru | |

Annex II. Results tables for the main FE analysis

Empirical strategy

As outlined in the main report we used fixed effect (FE) models as main estimation method. FE estimators address the threat of endogeneity from omitted variables bias. The main FE model takes the following form.

$$SRHit = \alpha_{it} + \varphi ODA_{it} + \beta X_{it} + \eta_i + \nu_t + \epsilon_{it} \quad (1)$$

The subscripts i and t denote country and year, respectively. SRH_{it} measures the SRH services of interest in the study. ODA_{it} measures the sectoral ODA disbursed to a country in a certain year (t). In the main model ODA is expressed in per capita terms to account for the effect of ODA after when controlling for the recipient countries' populations. φ_{it} is the main ODA effect estimate. X_{it} is a vector of country-level covariates that might impact SRH services in a country (i), as shown by previous studies. The country fixed effects (η_i) control for unobserved time-invariant factors at the country level. ν_t are the time fixed effects, which account for universal time trends experienced across countries. Finally, α_{it} and ϵ_{it} are the intercept and the idiosyncratic error term, respectively.

Table A1. The effect of health ODA on SRH services, summary of FE estimates

| SRH service indicator | Sectoral Health ODA, USD per capita (2020 constant) | | |
|---------------------------------|--|------------------|--------|
| | SRH ODA | Total Health ODA | RH ODA |
| Modern contraceptive prevalence | 0.628*** | 0.242** | 0.935 |
| Skilled birth attendance | 0.190* | 0.059 | 0.902 |
| ART coverage | 0.531*** | 0.332*** | 0.575 |
| Two-way FE | YES | YES | YES |
| Extended Controls | YES | YES | YES |

Note: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Model 1 was estimated using a linear-linear specification; thus, effect estimates represent the average percentage point change in service coverage associated with a 1 USD per capita increase in sectoral health ODA. The covariates GDP per capita, and population density (per sq. km) were log transformed to facilitate the interpretation of coefficients.

For each combination to ODA measure to SRH service indicator, the random-effect models were favored over the pooled OLS models based on the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier test. Moreover, the Durbin–Wu–Hausman test results suggested that FE models were preferred over the random-effects. All models were run with standard errors clustered at the country level, given significant results ($p < 0.05$) from the Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity and Lagrange-Multiplier test for serial correlation. The tables below include the estimator selection procedures and relevant diagnostics.

Table A2. FE estimation of the effects of sectoral ODA on modern contraceptive prevalence (based on ODA disbursements per capita)

| VARIABLES | (Simple) SRH ODA | (Model 1) SRH ODA | (Simple) TotH ODA | (Model 1) TotH ODA | (Simple) RH ODA | (Model 1) RH ODA |
|-----------------------|-----------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------------|----------------------------|------------------------------|
| Health ODA pc | 0.550*** [0.366 - 0.734] | 0.628*** [0.330 - 0.926] | 0.269*** [0.107 - 0.431] | 0.242** [0.032 - 0.453] | 1.082 [-0.423 - 2.587] | 0.935 [-1.490 - 3.361] |
| ln GDP pc | | 1.735 [-7.796 - 11.266] | | 1.820 [-9.003 - 12.643] | | -0.699 [-11.601 - 10.204] |
| GHE share of CHE | | 0.027 [-0.102 - 0.155] | | 0.061 [-0.084 - 0.205] | | 0.039 [-0.098 - 0.176] |
| Government effective | | 3.995* [-0.471 - 8.461] | | 3.345 [-1.616 - 8.305] | | 3.717 [-2.234 - 9.668] |
| Corruption control | | 1.504 [-3.796 - 6.803] | | 2.372 [-3.543 - 8.286] | | 3.275 [-3.265 - 9.815] |
| ln Population density | | 23.558** [5.116 - 41.999] | | 21.369** [0.149 - 42.589] | | 21.158* [-3.467 - 45.782] |
| Primary schooling | | 0.064 [-0.017 - 0.145] | | 0.050 [-0.034 - 0.135] | | 0.048 [-0.042 - 0.138] |
| Female labor part. | | -0.090 [-0.353 - 0.174] | | -0.149 [-0.456 - 0.159] | | -0.213 [-0.611 - 0.186] |

| VARIABLES | (Simple) SRH ODA | (Model 1) SRH ODA | (Simple) TotH ODA | (Model 1) TotH ODA | (Simple) RH ODA | (Model 1) RH ODA |
|----------------------------|-----------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------------|----------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Observations | 498 | 387 | 503 | 390 | 491 | 383 |
| N. of countries | 113 | 95 | 115 | 96 | 111 | 94 |
| Two-way FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Adj. Within R ² | 0.364 | 0.400 | 0.332 | 0.351 | 0.302 | 0.323 |
| Rho statistic | 0.952 | 0.980 | 0.952 | 0.976 | 0.948 | 0.977 |
| Hausmann Chi2 | | 40.70*** | | 37.57*** | | 39.67*** |
| Testparm i. Year | | 1.05 | | 1.41 | | 1.97** |

Note: All measures of health ODA are in USD per capita (constant 2020). Standard errors are clustered at the country level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, and 95 % CI in brackets.

Data Sources: OECD-CRS, WDI, WGI.

Table A3. Effects of SRH ODA per capita on modern contraceptive prevalence (Estimator selection with diagnostics)

| VARIABLES | Pooled OLS | Random Effects | Year Fixed Effects | Fixed Effects |
|---------------------------|-------------------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------------|------------------------------|
| SRH ODA pc | 0.205** [0.0204 - 0.391] | 0.614*** [0.397 - 0.830] | 0.644*** [0.388 - 0.899] | 0.628*** [0.330 - 0.926] |
| ln GDP pc | 9.577*** [6.709 - 12.44] | 7.715*** [3.691 - 11.739] | -0.083 [-6.872 - 6.705] | 1.735 [-7.796 - 11.266] |
| GHE as share of CHE | 0.231*** [0.102 - 0.360] | 0.065 [-0.060 - 0.190] | 0.012 [-0.118 - 0.143] | 0.027 [-0.102 - 0.155] |
| Government Effectiveness | 8.925*** [2.667 - 15.18] | 2.475 [-1.905 - 6.855] | 4.339* [-0.192 - 8.871] | 3.995* [-0.471 - 8.461] |
| Corruption Control | -5.431** [-10.08 - -0.779] | 0.552 [-3.814 - 4.918] | 1.444 [-3.612 - 6.501] | 1.504 [-3.796 - 6.803] |
| ln Population Density | 1.603** [0.100 - 3.106] | 4.011** [0.898 - 7.124] | 20.414*** [7.662 - 33.166] | 23.558** [5.116 - 41.999] |
| Primary Schooling (gross) | 0.328*** [0.247 - 0.409] | 0.115*** [0.044 - 0.187] | 0.050 [-0.030 - 0.131] | 0.064 [-0.017 - 0.145] |
| Female labor part. | 0.0522 [-0.0273 - 0.132] | -0.103 [-0.236 - 0.029] | -0.137 [-0.385 - 0.111] | -0.090 [-0.353 - 0.174] |
| Observations | 387 | 387 | 387 | 387 |
| Number of countries | | 95 | 95 | 95 |

| VARIABLES | Pooled OLS | Random Effects | Year Fixed Effects | Fixed Effects |
|-------------------|-------------------|-----------------------|---------------------------|----------------------|
| Country FE | NO | NO | YES | YES |
| Year FE | NO | NO | NO | YES |
| Overall R-squared | 0.503 | 0.366 | 0.0277 | 0.0372 |
| Within R-squared | | 0.351 | 0.404 | 0.438 |
| Rho statistic | | 0.923 | 0.977 | 0.980 |
| LM test | | 460.28*** | | |
| Hausman Chi^2 | | | 40.70*** | |
| Testparm i. Year | | | | 1.05 |

Note: For fixed-effect estimators, standard errors are clustered at the country level to control for serial correlation. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 and 95 % CI in brackets. LM test; Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier test.

Data Sources: OECD-CRS, WDI, WGI.

Table A4. Effects of Total Health ODA per capita on modern contraceptive prevalence (Estimator selection with diagnostics)

| VARIABLES | Pooled OLS | Random Effects | Year Fixed Effects | Fixed Effects |
|---------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|
| Total Health ODA pc | -0.0828 [-0.254 - 0.0888] | 0.272*** [0.095 - 0.449] | 0.269** [0.057 - 0.481] | 0.242** [0.032 - 0.453] |
| ln GDP pc | 8.922*** [6.020 - 11.82] | 7.630*** [3.303 - 11.957] | 0.985 [-6.792 - 8.763] | 1.820 [-9.003 - 12.643] |
| GHE as share of CHE | 0.203*** [0.0782 - 0.327] | 0.078 [-0.056 - 0.212] | 0.039 [-0.106 - 0.184] | 0.061 [-0.084 - 0.205] |
| Government Effectiveness | 9.149*** [3.028 - 15.27] | 2.480 [-2.047 - 7.007] | 3.849 [-1.135 - 8.833] | 3.345 [-1.616 - 8.305] |
| Corruption Control | -4.312* [-9.423 - 0.799] | 0.857 [-3.894 - 5.608] | 1.932 [-3.532 - 7.396] | 2.372 [-3.543 - 8.286] |
| ln Population Density | 1.154 [-0.308 - 2.617] | 3.526** [0.454 - 6.598] | 18.000** [4.182 - 31.818] | 21.369** [0.149 - 42.589] |
| Primary Schooling (gross) | 0.360*** [0.279 - 0.442] | 0.109*** [0.034 - 0.184] | 0.044 [-0.041 - 0.129] | 0.050 [-0.034 - 0.135] |
| Female labor part. | 0.0559 [-0.0239 - 0.136] | -0.104 [-0.244 - 0.037] | -0.185 [-0.475 - 0.104] | -0.149 [-0.456 - 0.159] |
| Observations | 390 | 390 | 390 | 390 |
| Number of countries | | 96 | 96 | 96 |

| VARIABLES | Pooled OLS | Random Effects | Year Fixed Effects | Fixed Effects |
|-------------------|------------|----------------|--------------------|---------------|
| Country FE | NO | NO | YES | YES |
| Year FE | NO | NO | NO | YES |
| Overall R-squared | 0.485 | 0.345 | 0.0340 | 0.0381 |
| Within R-squared | | 0.310 | 0.353 | 0.392 |
| Rho statistic | | 0.920 | 0.972 | 0.976 |
| LM test | | 420.23*** | | |
| Hausmann Chi2 | | | 37.57*** | |
| Testparm i. Year | | | | 1.41 |

Note: For fixed-effect estimators, standard errors are clustered at the country level to control for serial correlation. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 and 95 % CI in brackets. LM test; Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier test.

Data Sources: OECD-CRS, WDI, WGI.

Table A5. Effects of RH care ODA per capita on modern contraceptive prevalence (Estimator selection with diagnostics)

| VARIABLES | Pooled OLS | Random Effects | Country Fixed Effects | Fixed Effects |
|---------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------------|------------------------------|
| RH care ODA pc | -1.348 [-3.074 - 0.379] | 1.225 [-0.948 - 3.397] | 1.117 [-1.287 - 3.522] | 0.935 [-1.490 - 3.361] |
| ln GDP pc (PPP, constant) | 9.181*** [6.336 - 12.03] | 8.545*** [4.147 - 12.943] | 1.114 [-7.347 - 9.575] | -0.699 [-11.601 - 10.204] |
| GHE as share of CHE | 0.214*** [0.0868 - 0.341] | 0.069 [-0.057 - 0.195] | 0.014 [-0.121 - 0.150] | 0.039 [-0.098 - 0.176] |
| Gov. Effectiveness | 8.714*** [2.539 - 14.89] | 2.472 [-2.929 - 7.873] | 4.480 [-1.785 - 10.745] | 3.717 [-2.234 - 9.668] |
| Corruption Control | -3.869 [-8.770 - 1.032] | 1.610 [-3.872 - 7.091] | 2.268 [-3.812 - 8.348] | 3.275 [-3.265 - 9.815] |
| ln Population Density | 1.261* [-0.172 - 2.695] | 3.475** [0.355 - 6.596] | 21.223*** [6.764 - 35.682] | 21.158* [-3.467 - 45.782] |
| Primary Schooling (gross) | 0.356*** [0.278 - 0.434] | 0.129*** [0.049 - 0.209] | 0.046 [-0.040 - 0.133] | 0.048 [-0.042 - 0.138] |
| Female labor part. | 0.0438 [-0.0393 - 0.127] | -0.098 [-0.248 - 0.053] | -0.237 [-0.617 - 0.143] | -0.213 [-0.611 - 0.186] |

| VARIABLES | Pooled OLS | Random Effects | Country Fixed Effects | Fixed Effects |
|---------------------|-------------------|-----------------------|------------------------------|----------------------|
| Observations | 383 | 383 | 383 | 383 |
| Number of countries | | 94 | 94 | 94 |
| Country FE | NO | NO | YES | YES |
| Year FE | NO | NO | YES | YES |
| Overall R-squared | 0.508 | 0.394 | 0.0345 | 0.0261 |
| Within R-squared | | 0.252 | 0.316 | 0.367 |
| Rho statistic | | 0.912 | 0.976 | 0.977 |
| LM test | | 410.10*** | | |
| Hausmann Chi2 | | | 39.67*** | |
| Testparm i. Year | | | | 1.97** |

Note: For fixed-effect estimators, standard errors are clustered at the country level to control for serial correlation. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 and 95 % CI in brackets. LM test; Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier test.

Data Sources: OECD-CRS, WDI, WGI.

Table A6. FE estimation of the effects of sectoral ODA on skilled birth attendance (based on ODA disbursements per capita)

| VARIABLES | (Simple) SRH ODA | (Model 1) SRH ODA | (Simple) TotH ODA | (Model 1) TotH ODA | (Simple) RH ODA | (Model 1) RH ODA |
|-----------------------|-----------------------------|--------------------------------|------------------------------|--------------------------------|----------------------------|--------------------------------|
| Health ODA pc | 0.129 [-0.092 - 0.349] | 0.190* [-0.009 - 0.389] | 0.018 [-0.004 - 0.040] | 0.059 [-0.028 - 0.146] | 1.944* [-0.216 - 4.104] | 0.902 [-1.111 - 2.916] |
| ln GDP pc | | 8.615 [-3.896 - 21.126] | | 8.701 [-3.778 - 21.180] | | 6.759 [-5.779 - 19.298] |
| GHE share of CHE | | 0.108 [-0.022 - 0.239] | | 0.108* [-0.021 - 0.236] | | 0.125* [-0.005 - 0.254] |
| Gov. effective | | -4.585 [-10.313 - 1.144] | | -3.935 [-9.289 - 1.419] | | -4.575 [-10.352 - 1.202] |
| Corruption control | | 5.053* [-0.787 - 10.893] | | 4.772* [-0.592 - 10.136] | | 5.812* [-0.299 - 11.924] |
| ln Population density | | 47.320*** [23.962 - 70.678] | | 48.155*** [25.355 - 70.954] | | 44.140*** [20.405 - 67.875] |

| VARIABLES | (Simple) SRH ODA | (Model 1) SRH ODA | (Simple) TotH ODA | (Model 1) TotH ODA | (Simple) RH ODA | (Model 1) RH ODA |
|----------------------------|-----------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------------|----------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Primary schooling | | 0.077 [-0.104 - 0.257] | | 0.076 [-0.103 - 0.254] | | 0.081 [-0.101 - 0.262] |
| Female labor part. | | 0.105 [-0.425 - 0.635] | | 0.106 [-0.424 - 0.635] | | 0.060 [-0.454 - 0.575] |
| Observations | 919 | 685 | 939 | 695 | 878 | 663 |
| Number of countries | 118 | 100 | 118 | 101 | 116 | 100 |
| Two-way FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Adj. Within R ² | 0.350 | 0.437 | 0.343 | 0.432 | 0.378 | 0.448 |
| Rho statistic | 0.907 | 0.987 | 0.907 | 0.988 | 0.911 | 0.986 |
| Hausmann Chi2 | | 139.46*** | | 137.52*** | | 134.43*** |
| Testparm i. Year | | 1.39 | | 1.33 | | 1.38 |

Note: All measures of health ODA are in USD per capita (constant 2020). Standard errors are clustered at the country level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, and 95 % CI in brackets.

Data Sources: OECD-CRS, WDI, WGI.

Table A7. Effects of SRH ODA per capita on skilled birth attendance (Estimator selection with diagnostics)

| VARIABLES | Pooled OLS | Random Effects | Country Fixed Effects | Fixed Effects |
|-----------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| SRH ODA pc | 0.0462 [-0.104 - 0.196] | 0.198* [-0.000 - 0.395] | 0.104 [-0.107 - 0.315] | 0.190* [-0.009 - 0.389] |
| ln GDP pc | 15.91*** [13.49 - 18.32] | 20.237*** [14.189 - 26.285] | 7.914 [-1.772 - 17.601] | 8.615 [-3.896 - 21.126] |
| GHE share of CHE | 0.198*** [0.111 - 0.286] | 0.166** [0.033 - 0.300] | 0.109* [-0.014 - 0.232] | 0.108 [-0.022 - 0.239] |
| Government effective | 5.397** [1.280 - 9.514] | -5.054** [-10.108 - -0.001] | -3.036 [-8.401 - 2.328] | -4.585 [-10.313 - 1.144] |
| Corruption control | -4.941*** [-8.147 - -1.735] | 2.982 [-3.430 - 9.393] | 4.848 [-1.326 - 11.022] | 5.053* [-0.787 - 10.893] |
| ln Population density | 0.232 [-0.840 - 1.305] | 5.504*** [2.340 - 8.668] | 51.833*** [35.542 - 68.124] | 47.320*** [23.962 - 70.678] |
| Primary schooling | 0.193*** [0.0998 - 0.287] | 0.147* [-0.015 - 0.309] | 0.061 [-0.118 - 0.240] | 0.077 [-0.104 - 0.257] |
| Female labor part. | -0.0418 [-0.134 - 0.0500] | 0.034 [-0.203 - 0.272] | 0.106 [-0.430 - 0.642] | 0.105 [-0.425 - 0.635] |

| VARIABLES | Pooled OLS | Random Effects | Country Fixed Effects | Fixed Effects |
|---------------------|-------------------|-----------------------|------------------------------|----------------------|
| Observations | 685 | 685 | 685 | 685 |
| Number of countries | | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| Country FE | NO | NO | YES | YES |
| Year FE | NO | NO | NO | YES |
| Overall R-squared | 0.531 | 0.470 | 0.00330 | 0.00490 |
| Within R-squared | | 0.310 | 0.427 | 0.458 |
| Rho statistic | | 0.820 | 0.989 | 0.987 |
| LM test | | 1436.30*** | | |
| Hausmann Chi2 | | | 139.46*** | |
| Testparm i. Year | | | | 1.39 |

Note: For fixed-effect estimators, standard errors are clustered at the country level to control for serial correlation. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 and 95 % CI in brackets. LM test; Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier.

Table A8. Effects of Total Health ODA per capita on skilled birth attendance (Estimator selection with diagnostics)

| VARIABLES | Pooled OLS | Random Effects | Country Fixed Effects | Fixed Effects |
|-----------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| Tot Health ODA pc | 0.217*** [0.108 - 0.326] | 0.136** [0.013 - 0.259] | 0.044 [-0.035 - 0.123] | 0.059 [-0.028 - 0.146] |
| ln GDP pc | 16.90*** [14.36 - 19.44] | 19.994*** [14.069 - 25.919] | 7.917 [-1.622 - 17.456] | 8.701 [-3.778 - 21.180] |
| GHE share of CHE | 0.192*** [0.106 - 0.278] | 0.161** [0.029 - 0.293] | 0.109* [-0.013 - 0.231] | 0.108* [-0.021 - 0.236] |
| Government effective | 5.152** [1.126 - 9.178] | -4.577* [-9.394 - 0.239] | -2.691 [-7.711 - 2.329] | -3.935 [-9.289 - 1.419] |
| Corruption control | -5.576*** [-8.687 - -2.466] | 3.075 [-2.782 - 8.933] | 4.535 [-1.123 - 10.193] | 4.772* [-0.592 - 10.136] |
| ln Population density | 0.445 [-0.596 - 1.486] | 5.228*** [2.163 - 8.292] | 51.506*** [35.306 - 67.705] | 48.155*** [25.355 - 70.954] |
| Primary schooling | 0.170*** [0.0778 - 0.263] | 0.140* [-0.020 - 0.300] | 0.060 [-0.117 - 0.238] | 0.076 [-0.103 - 0.254] |
| Female labor part. | -0.0297 [-0.121 - 0.0618] | 0.034 [-0.200 - 0.268] | 0.103 [-0.434 - 0.640] | 0.106 [-0.424 - 0.635] |

| VARIABLES | Pooled OLS | Random Effects | Country Fixed Effects | Fixed Effects |
|---------------------|-------------------|-----------------------|------------------------------|----------------------|
| Observations | 695 | 695 | 695 | 695 |
| Number of countries | | 101 | 101 | 101 |
| Country FE | NO | NO | YES | YES |
| Year FE | NO | NO | NO | YES |
| Overall R-squared | 0.539 | 0.480 | 0.00451 | 0.00629 |
| Within R-squared | | 0.307 | 0.423 | 0.452 |
| Rho statistic | | 0.817 | 0.989 | 0.988 |
| LM test | | 1458.89*** | | |
| Hausmann Chi2 | | | 137.52*** | |
| Testparm i. Year | | | | 1.33 |

Note: For fixed-effect estimators, standard errors are clustered at the country level to control for serial correlation. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 and 95 % CI in brackets. LM test; Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier test.

Data Sources: OECD-CRS, WDI, WGI.

Table A9. Effects of RH Care ODA per capita on skilled birth attendance (Estimator selection with diagnostics)

| VARIABLES | Pooled OLS | Random Effects | Country Fixed Effects | Fixed Effects |
|-----------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| RH care ODA pc | 0.00677 [-1.814 - 1.827] | 1.494 [-0.751 - 3.740] | 0.798 [-1.341 - 2.938] | 0.902 [-1.111 - 2.916] |
| ln GDP pc | 16.31*** [13.77 - 18.84] | 20.299*** [14.259 - 26.339] | 7.951 [-1.862 - 17.764] | 6.759 [-5.779 - 19.298] |
| GHE share of CHE | 0.176*** [0.0853 - 0.267] | 0.182*** [0.050 - 0.314] | 0.127** [0.004 - 0.249] | 0.125* [-0.005 - 0.254] |
| Government effective | 4.794** [0.625 - 8.964] | -5.293** [-10.457 - -0.128] | -3.132 [-8.553 - 2.289] | -4.575 [-10.352 - 1.202] |
| Corruption control | -4.201** [-7.527 - -0.876] | 3.901 [-2.832 - 10.634] | 5.735* [-0.686 - 12.156] | 5.812* [-0.299 - 11.924] |
| ln Population density | 0.0696 [-1.015 - 1.154] | 5.187*** [2.091 - 8.283] | 51.485*** [35.177 - 67.794] | 44.140*** [20.405 - 67.875] |
| Primary schooling | 0.196*** [0.103 - 0.288] | 0.151* [-0.012 - 0.313] | 0.063 [-0.117 - 0.242] | 0.081 [-0.101 - 0.262] |
| Female labor part. | -0.0355 [-0.130 - 0.0590] | 0.033 [-0.200 - 0.267] | 0.082 [-0.447 - 0.612] | 0.060 [-0.454 - 0.575] |

| VARIABLES | Pooled OLS | Random Effects | Country Fixed Effects | Fixed Effects |
|---------------------|-------------------|-----------------------|------------------------------|----------------------|
| Observations | 663 | 663 | 663 | 663 |
| Number of countries | | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| Country FE | NO | NO | YES | YES |
| Year FE | NO | NO | NO | YES |
| Overall R-squared | 0.530 | 0.474 | 0.00374 | 0.00416 |
| Within R-squared | | 0.324 | 0.439 | 0.469 |
| Rho statistic | | 0.820 | 0.989 | 0.986 |
| LM test | | 1439.71*** | | |
| Hausmann Chi2 | | | 134.43*** | |
| Testparm i. Year | | | | 1.38 |

Note: For fixed-effect estimators, standard errors are clustered at the country level to control for serial correlation. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 and 95 % CI in brackets. LM test; Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier test.

Data Sources: OECD-CRS, WDI, WGI.

Table A10. FE estimation of the effects of sectoral ODA on ART coverage (based on ODA disbursements per capita)

| VARIABLES | (Simple) SRH ODA | (Model 1) SRH ODA | (Simple) TotH ODA | (Model 1) TotH ODA | (Simple) RH ODA | (Model 1) RH ODA |
|-----------------------|-----------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------------|----------------------------|------------------------------|
| Health ODA pc | 0.561*** [0.386 - 0.736] | 0.531*** [0.380 - 0.682] | 0.326*** [0.178 - 0.473] | 0.332*** [0.193 - 0.471] | 0.401 [-1.272 - 2.074] | 0.575 [-1.081 - 2.231] |
| ln GDP pc | | -1.695 [-16.181 - 12.792] | | -2.335 [-16.971 - 12.300] | | -3.497 [-18.169 - 11.174] |
| GHE share of CHE | | -0.014 [-0.154 - 0.125] | | -0.014 [-0.155 - 0.127] | | -0.047 [-0.185 - 0.091] |
| Government effective | | 6.128* [-0.340 - 12.597] | | 6.088* [-0.346 - 12.521] | | 6.274* [-0.645 - 13.193] |
| Corruption control | | 5.274* [-0.901 - 11.449] | | 5.278* [-1.012 - 11.567] | | 6.412* [-0.142 - 12.966] |
| ln Population density | | 14.208 [-16.392 - 44.807] | | 9.790 [-20.878 - 40.459] | | 9.995 [-23.660 - 43.651] |
| Primary schooling | | -0.052 [-0.193 - 0.089] | | -0.056 [-0.195 - 0.083] | | -0.053 [-0.196 - 0.090] |

| VARIABLES | (Simple) SRH ODA | (Model 1) SRH ODA | (Simple) TotH ODA | (Model 1) TotH ODA | (Simple) RH ODA | (Model 1) RH ODA |
|---------------------|-----------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------------|----------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Female labor part. | | -0.181 [-0.767 - 0.406] | | -0.184 [-0.774 - 0.406] | | -0.246 [-0.863 - 0.370] |
| Observations | 1,816 | 1,306 | 1,820 | 1,307 | 1,788 | 1,290 |
| Number of countries | 97 | 90 | 97 | 90 | 97 | 90 |
| Two-way FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Adj. Within R^2 | 0.856 | 0.857 | 0.853 | 0.854 | 0.845 | 0.845 |
| Rho statistic | 0.644 | 0.897 | 0.654 | 0.850 | 0.663 | 0.861 |
| Hausmann Chi2 | | 1777.05*** | | 1593.31*** | | 1758.69*** |
| Testparm i. Year | | 12.02*** | | 11.07*** | | 9.09*** |

Note: All measures of health ODA are in USD per capita (constant 2020). Standard errors are clustered at the country level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, and 95 % CI in brackets.

Data Sources: OECD-CRS, WDI, WGI.

Table A11. Effects of SRH ODA per capita on ART coverage (Estimator selection with diagnostics)

| VARIABLES | Pooled OLS | Random Effects | Country Fixed Effects | Fixed Effects |
|-----------------------|------------------------------|--------------------------------|----------------------------------|------------------------------|
| SRH ODA pc | 0.713*** [0.554 - 0.872] | 0.907*** [0.609 - 1.205] | 0.534*** [0.243 - 0.826] | 0.531*** [0.380 - 0.682] |
| ln GDP pc | 5.111*** [3.180 - 7.042] | 35.033*** [26.154 - 43.912] | 31.172*** [17.930 - 44.413] | -1.695 [-16.181 - 12.792] |
| GHE share of CHE | 0.0248 [-0.0633 - 0.113] | 0.143 [-0.127 - 0.414] | 0.110 [-0.086 - 0.306] | -0.014 [-0.154 - 0.125] |
| Government effective | 3.033* [-0.487 - 6.554] | 2.013 [-6.457 - 10.483] | 10.537*** [2.833 - 18.241] | 6.128* [-0.340 - 12.597] |
| Corruption control | 1.146 [-2.463 - 4.755] | 1.873 [-6.520 - 10.266] | 4.557 [-2.580 - 11.695] | 5.274* [-0.901 - 11.449] |
| ln Population density | 2.207*** [1.283 - 3.132] | 16.346*** [10.537 - 22.156] | 109.281*** [87.292 - 131.270] | 14.208 [-16.392 - 44.807] |
| Primary schooling | 0.0817** [0.0141 - 0.149] | 0.159 [-0.066 - 0.385] | -0.124 [-0.302 - 0.054] | -0.052 [-0.193 - 0.089] |
| Female labor part. | 0.190*** [0.122 - 0.258] | 0.513*** [0.139 - 0.887] | 0.312 [-0.398 - 1.021] | -0.181 [-0.767 - 0.406] |

| VARIABLES | Pooled OLS | Random Effects | Country Fixed Effects | Fixed Effects |
|---------------------|-------------------|-----------------------|------------------------------|----------------------|
| Observations | 1,306 | 1,306 | 1,306 | 1,306 |
| Number of countries | | 90 | 90 | 90 |
| Country FE | NO | NO | YES | YES |
| Year FE | NO | NO | NO | YES |
| Overall R-squared | 0.168 | 0.100 | 0.0205 | 0.356 |
| Within R-squared | | 0.611 | 0.759 | 0.860 |
| Rho statistic | | 0.593 | 0.995 | 0.897 |
| LM test | | 63.51*** | | |
| Hausmann Chi2 | | | 1777.05*** | |
| Testparm i. Year | | | | 12.02*** |

Note: For fixed-effect estimators, standard errors are clustered at the country level to control for serial correlation. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 and 95 % CI in brackets. LM test; Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier test.

Data Sources: OECD-CRS, WDI, WGI.

Table A12. Effects of Total health ODA per capita on ART coverage (Estimator selection with diagnostics)

| VARIABLES | Pooled OLS | Random Effects | Country Fixed Effects | Fixed Effects |
|-----------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------------------|----------------------------------|------------------------------|
| Total Health ODA pc | 0.638*** [0.522 - 0.753] | 0.828*** [0.602 - 1.055] | 0.343** [0.082 - 0.605] | 0.332*** [0.193 - 0.471] |
| ln GDP pc | 5.894*** [3.901 - 7.886] | 34.393*** [25.548 - 43.239] | 31.766*** [18.298 - 45.234] | -2.335 [-16.971 - 12.300] |
| GHE share of CHE | 0.0171 [-0.0724 - 0.107] | 0.157 [-0.107 - 0.422] | 0.110 [-0.089 - 0.308] | -0.014 [-0.155 - 0.127] |
| Government effective | 6.231*** [2.810 - 9.653] | 3.056 [-5.247 - 11.360] | 10.332** [2.481 - 18.184] | 6.088* [-0.346 - 12.521] |
| Corruption control | -2.555 [-6.202 - 1.092] | 0.511 [-7.750 - 8.773] | 4.418 [-2.846 - 11.682] | 5.278* [-1.012 - 11.567] |
| ln Population density | 2.130*** [1.221 - 3.039] | 15.618*** [10.200 - 21.036] | 106.302*** [84.040 - 128.565] | 9.790 [-20.878 - 40.459] |
| Primary schooling | 0.0696** [0.00264 - 0.137] | 0.125 [-0.085 - 0.335] | -0.123 [-0.297 - 0.052] | -0.056 [-0.195 - 0.083] |
| Female labor part. | 0.198*** [0.129 - 0.267] | 0.513*** [0.144 - 0.881] | 0.327 [-0.391 - 1.046] | -0.184 [-0.774 - 0.406] |

| VARIABLES | Pooled OLS | Random Effects | Country Fixed Effects | Fixed Effects |
|---------------------|-------------------|-----------------------|------------------------------|----------------------|
| Observations | 1,307 | 1,307 | 1,307 | 1,307 |
| Number of countries | | 90 | 90 | 90 |
| Country FE | NO | NO | YES | YES |
| Year FE | NO | NO | NO | YES |
| Overall R-squared | 0.191 | 0.115 | 0.0210 | 0.445 |
| Within R-squared | | 0.602 | 0.756 | 0.857 |
| Rho statistic | | 0.596 | 0.995 | 0.850 |
| LM test | | 674.52*** | | |
| Hausmann Chi2 | | | 1593.31*** | |
| Testparm i. Year | | | | 11.07*** |

Note: For fixed-effect estimators, standard errors are clustered at the country level to control for serial correlation. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 and 95 % CI in brackets. LM test; Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier test.

Data Sources: OECD-CRS, WDI, WGI.

Table A13. Effects of RH care ODA per capita on ART coverage (Estimator selection with diagnostics)

| VARIABLES | Pooled OLS | Random Effects | Country Fixed Effects | Fixed Effects |
|------------------------|------------------------------|--------------------------------|----------------------------------|------------------------------|
| RH care ODA per capita | 2.480*** [0.925 - 4.035] | 2.931** [0.301 - 5.562] | -1.038 [-2.996 - 0.919] | 0.575 [-1.081 - 2.231] |
| ln GDP pc | 4.934*** [2.987 - 6.881] | 37.250*** [27.912 - 46.587] | 32.397*** [18.265 - 46.529] | -3.497 [-18.169 - 11.174] |
| GHE share of CHE | -0.0146 [-0.104 - 0.0751] | 0.094 [-0.181 - 0.368] | 0.075 [-0.114 - 0.263] | -0.047 [-0.185 - 0.091] |
| Government effective | 3.593* [-0.258 - 7.444] | 2.105 [-7.285 - 11.495] | 10.471** [2.136 - 18.807] | 6.274* [-0.645 - 13.193] |
| Corruption control | 3.747* [-0.0430 - 7.536] | 3.807 [-5.302 - 12.916] | 5.318 [-2.339 - 12.975] | 6.412* [-0.142 - 12.966] |
| ln Population density | 1.454*** [0.507 - 2.401] | 16.008*** [9.879 - 22.137] | 111.944*** [90.015 - 133.873] | 9.995 [-23.660 - 43.651] |
| Primary schooling | 0.127*** [0.0578 - 0.196] | 0.186* [-0.032 - 0.405] | -0.111 [-0.284 - 0.062] | -0.053 [-0.196 - 0.090] |
| Female labor part. | 0.203*** [0.134 - 0.272] | 0.523*** [0.137 - 0.910] | 0.248 [-0.492 - 0.988] | -0.246 [-0.863 - 0.370] |

| VARIABLES | Pooled OLS | Random Effects | Country Fixed Effects | Fixed Effects |
|---------------------|-------------------|-----------------------|------------------------------|----------------------|
| Observations | 1,290 | 1,290 | 1,290 | 1,290 |
| Number of countries | | 90 | 90 | 90 |
| Country FE | NO | NO | YES | YES |
| Year FE | NO | NO | NO | YES |
| Overall R-squared | 0.119 | 0.0747 | 0.0185 | 0.394 |
| Within R-squared | | 0.609 | 0.749 | 0.848 |
| Rho statistic | | 0.607 | 0.995 | 0.861 |
| LM test | | 576.13*** | | |
| Hausmann Chi2 | | | 1758.69*** | |
| Testparm i. Year | | | | 9.09*** |

Note: For fixed-effect estimators, standard errors are clustered at the country level to control for serial correlation. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 and 95 % CI in brackets. LM test; Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier test.

Data Sources: OECD-CRS, WDI, WGI.


Annex III. Additional results

Based on the main FE estimation method, we conducted five additional investigations. First, we included an interaction term between ODA and countries' income classification in 2002 (as defined by the World Bank) to test for the effect of ODA on SRH services conditional on the baseline economic welfare of countries.

Second, we investigated whether ODA needs to have a certain volume, relative to government health expenditure, for a positive effect to occur. We created a variable ODA as share of GHE calculated by dividing sectoral ODA per capita (constant 2020 USD) by GHE per capita (current USD). Countries were classified into four categories, using the quantile values of the ODA/GHE variable as cut-off points. Quantiles were defined based on the relevant sample for each analysis. To spot differences between these categories, we included an interaction term between ODA disbursed and the categorical ODA/GHE variable.

Similarly, we investigated whether there is a difference in effect of health ODA depending on the volume of health ODA relative to total ODA received by a country. We created a variable health ODA as share of total ODA, calculated by dividing sectoral ODA per capita (constant 2020 USD) by total ODA per capita (constant 2020 USD). Quantile values of the health ODA/total ODA variable were used as cut-off points to create categories. To spot differences between the categories, we included an interaction term between health ODA disbursed and the categorical health ODA/total ODA variable.

Figure A1. Bilateral vs. multilateral ODA as defined in the OECD-CRS database



Source: [OECD](#)

Fourth, we investigated whether there were differences in ODA effectiveness over time, by including an interaction term between sectoral ODA and three-year periods. This could be indicative of a learning process in ODA utilization.

Fifth, we investigated whether the effectiveness of sectoral ODA differed depending on donor type by comparing the effects of ODA (all donors) to bilateral ODA and multilateral ODA. Bilateral ODA represents flows from official (government) sources directly to the recipient countries. Bilateral ODA includes resources (called non-core/multi-bi) channeled through national or international NGOs active in development to execute a specific project on behalf of the donor. Multilateral ODA represents flows from official (government) sources to ODA-eligible multilateral organizations, also referred to as core contributions. Donor countries typically not specify which projects and programmes are to be funded with these contributions and multilateral agencies use them for their own developmental programmes. Multilateral agencies also receive funds from other sources, not included in the ML ODA statistic (e.g., general public, philanthropy sources).

These five additional analyses were first estimated using the main FE models, with two-way FE (country, time) and time-variant controls i.e., lnGDP per capita, GHE/CHE, government effectiveness, control of corruption, ln population density, primary school enrolment, female labor market participation. Then, the effects were estimated by applying the FE estimator to three-year-averaged values of all variables (to account for the potential influence of missing data), resulting in six three-year time periods.

The results tables from the additional analysis are displayed below. First, we present the tables from the main FE estimation and then the results from the three-year averaged models.

Marginal effect of sectoral ODA on SRH services conditional on countries baseline income classification

Table A1. FE estimation – Marginal effect of ODA on modern contraceptive prevalence in each income group (based on main FE Model)

| VARIABLES | SRH ODA | TotH ODA | RH ODA |
|----------------------------|----------------------|---------------------|--------------------|
| Low income (2002) | 0.852*** (0.140) | 0.360*** (0.136) | 0.572 (1.382) |
| Lower-middle-income (2002) | 0.332*** (0.0816) | 0.116 (0.0993) | 2.536** (1.113) |
| Extended controls | YES | YES | YES |
| Observations | 387 | 390 | 383 |
| Number of countries | 95 | 96 | 94 |
| Within R-squared | 0.453 | 0.402 | 0.372 |

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A2. FE estimation – Marginal effect of ODA on modern contraceptive prevalence in each income group (based on 3-Year-Averages Model)

| VARIABLES | SRH ODA | TotH ODA | RH ODA |
|----------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|------------------|
| Low income (2002) | 0.981*** (0.161) | 0.465*** (0.163) | 1.426 (1.593) |
| Lower-middle-income (2002) | 0.283* (0.152) | 0.0987 (0.127) | 1.899 (2.384) |
| Extended controls | YES | YES | YES |
| Observations | 328 | 328 | 327 |
| Number of countries | 102 | 102 | 102 |
| Within R-squared | 0.464 | 0.436 | 0.392 |

Note: There are six time periods as all variables are averaged over three years to account for yearly fluctuations and missing data. Standard errors are clustered at the country level.
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, and robust SE in parenthesis.

Table A3. FE estimation – Marginal effect of ODA on skilled birth attendance in each income group (based on main FE Model)

| VARIABLES | SRH ODA | TotH ODA | RH ODA |
|----------------------------|------------------|------------------|---------------------|
| Low income (2002) | 0.389 (0.267) | 0.276 (0.197) | 0.669 (1.251) |
| Lower-middle-income (2002) | 0.126 (0.079) | 0.021 (0.036) | 1.635*** (0.623) |
| Extended controls | YES | YES | YES |
| Observations | 685 | 695 | 663 |
| Number of countries | 100 | 101 | 100 |
| Within R-squared | 0.459 | 0.456 | 0.470 |

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A4. FE estimation – Marginal effect of ODA on skilled birth attendance in each income group (based on 3-Year-Averages Model)

| VARIABLES | (1) SRH ODA | (2) TotH ODA | (3) RH ODA |
|----------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|
| Low income (2002) | 0.738*** (0.183) | 0.423*** (0.152) | 2.054 (1.349) |
| Lower-middle-income (2002) | 0.0990 (0.123) | -0.0175 (0.0690) | 1.926 (1.789) |
| Extended controls | YES | YES | YES |
| Observations | 416 | 417 | 412 |
| Number of countries | 104 | 104 | 104 |
| Within R-squared | 0.528 | 0.529 | 0.526 |

Note: There are six time periods as all variables are averaged over three years to account for yearly fluctuations and missing data. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, and robust SE in parenthesis.

Table A5. FE estimation – Marginal effect of ODA on ART coverage in each income group (based on main FE Model)

| VARIABLES | SRH ODA | TotH ODA | RH ODA |
|----------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|------------------|
| Low income (2002) | 0.773*** (0.142) | 0.291*** (0.110) | 0.456 (0.878) |
| Lower-middle-income (2002) | 0.468*** (0.060) | 0.361*** (0.069) | 1.774 (2.380) |
| Extended controls | YES | YES | YES |
| Observations | 1,306 | 1,307 | 1,290 |
| Number of countries | 90 | 90 | 90 |
| Within R-squared | 0.860 | 0.857 | 0.848 |

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A6. FE estimation – Marginal effect of ODA on ART coverage in each income group (based on 3-Year-Averages Model)

| VARIABLES | SRH ODA | TotH ODA | RH ODA |
|----------------------------|---------------------|--------------------|------------------|
| Low income (2002) | 1.012*** (0.224) | 0.361** (0.171) | 1.178 (1.397) |
| Lower-middle-income (2002) | 0.492*** (0.130) | 0.376** (0.118) | 1.201 (2.847) |
| Extended controls | YES | YES | YES |
| Observations | 486 | 486 | 486 |
| Number of countries | 90 | 90 | 90 |
| Within R-squared | 0.872 | 0.868 | 0.862 |

Note: There are six time periods as all variables are averaged over three years to account for yearly fluctuations and missing data. Standard errors are clustered at the country level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, and robust SE in parenthesis.

Marginal effect of sectoral ODA on SRH services conditional on ODA/GHE category

Table A7. FE estimation – Marginal effect of ODA on modern contraceptive prevalence, by ODA relative to GHE (based on main FE Model)

| VARIABLES | SRH ODA | TotH ODA | RH ODA |
|---|---------------------|---------------------|-------------------|
| <25 th percentile ODA/GHE | 0.244 (1.441) | -0.506 (0.674) | -10.57 (7.164) |
| >25 th < 50 th percentile ODA/GHE | 0.365 (0.621) | -0.146 (0.223) | 0.887 (2.879) |
| >50 th < 75 th percentile ODA/GHE | 0.409*** (0.119) | 0.285*** (0.101) | 1.220 (1.637) |
| > 75 th percentile ODA/GHE | 0.692*** (0.120) | 0.127 (0.121) | 0.852 (1.253) |
| Observations | 387 | 390 | 383 |

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. ODA/GHE is calculated by dividing the sectoral ODA (constant 2020 USD per capita) by domestic general government health expenditure (current USD per capita).

Table A8. FE estimation – Marginal effect of ODA on modern contraceptive prevalence, by ODA relative to GHE (based on 3-Year-Averages Model)

| VARIABLES | SRH ODA | TotH ODA | RH ODA |
|---|---------------------|---------------------|-------------------|
| <25 th percentile ODA/GHE | -1.444 (1.400) | 0.001 (0.396) | -13.35 (8.739) |
| >25 th < 50 th percentile ODA/GHE | -0.120 (0.293) | 0.053 (0.110) | 2.397 (2.389) |
| >50 th < 75 th percentile ODA/GHE | 0.558*** (0.143) | 0.373*** (0.108) | 3.548 (2.299) |
| > 75 th percentile ODA/GHE | 0.586*** (0.200) | 0.207* (0.112) | 0.999 (1.459) |
| Observations | 328 | 328 | 327 |

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. There are 6 time periods as all variables are averaged over 3 years.

Table A9. FE estimation – Marginal effect of ODA on *skilled birth attendance*, by ODA relative to GHE (based on main FE Model)

| VARIABLES | SRH ODA | TotH ODA | RH ODA |
|---|-------------------|--------------------|------------------|
| <25 th percentile ODA/GHE | 2.422 (1.867) | -0.948 (0.712) | 13.00 (19.63) |
| >25 th < 50 th percentile ODA/GHE | 0.804 (0.608) | -0.0743 (0.157) | 5.128 (3.285) |
| >50 th < 75 th percentile ODA/GHE | 0.331 (0.243) | 0.0921 (0.0799) | 1.506 (1.312) |
| > 75 th percentile ODA/GHE | 0.199* (0.102) | 0.0428 (0.0368) | 0.914 (1.069) |
| Observations | 685 | 695 | 663 |

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A10. FE estimation – Marginal effect of ODA on skilled birth attendance, by ODA relative to GHE (based on 3-Year-Averages Model)

| VARIABLES | SRH ODA | TotH ODA | RH ODA |
|---|---------------------|--------------------|-------------------|
| <25 th percentile ODA/GHE | -2.853** (1.429) | 0.272 (0.583) | -11.72 (12.46) |
| >25 th < 50 th percentile ODA/GHE | -0.0340 (0.215) | 0.181 (0.195) | 3.063 (2.014) |
| >50 th < 75 th percentile ODA/GHE | 0.394 (0.513) | 0.135 (0.100) | 1.434 (1.767) |
| > 75 th percentile ODA/GHE | 0.361* (0.198) | 0.0906 (0.0883) | 1.924 (1.199) |
| Observations | 416 | 417 | 412 |

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. There are 6 time periods as all variables are averaged over 3 years.

Table A11. FE estimation – Marginal effect of ODA on ART coverage, by ODA relative to GHE (based on main FE Model)

| VARIABLES | SRH ODA | TotH ODA | RH ODA |
|---|----------------------|----------------------|-------------------|
| <25 th percentile ODA/GHE | 0.0450 (1.692) | 0.425 (0.280) | 22.16* (11.67) |
| >25 th < 50 th percentile ODA/GHE | 0.693 (0.453) | 0.287* (0.157) | 0.775 (2.499) |
| >50 th < 75 th percentile ODA/GHE | 0.609*** (0.117) | 0.359*** (0.0684) | 1.810 (1.525) |
| > 75 th percentile ODA/GHE | 0.524*** (0.0780) | 0.293*** (0.0828) | 0.599 (0.818) |
| Observations | 1,306 | 1,307 | 1,290 |

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A12. FE estimation – Marginal effect of ODA on ART coverage, by ODA relative to GHE (based on 3-Year-Averages Model)

| VARIABLES | SRH ODA | TotH ODA | RH ODA |
|---|---------------------|---------------------|-------------------|
| <25 th percentile ODA/GHE | -0.592 (2.671) | 0.950** (0.428) | 28.55* (16.39) |
| >25 th < 50 th percentile ODA/GHE | 0.228 (0.645) | 0.331* (0.190) | 1.815 (2.952) |
| >50 th < 75 th percentile ODA/GHE | 0.575*** (0.162) | 0.361*** (0.101) | 0.909 (2.023) |
| > 75 th percentile ODA/GHE | 0.602*** (0.106) | 0.489*** (0.163) | 1.481 (1.266) |
| Observations | 486 | 486 | 486 |

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. There are six time periods as all variables are averaged over 3 years.

Marginal effect of sectoral ODA on SRH services conditional on sectoral ODA/total ODA category

Table A13. FE estimation – Marginal effect of health ODA on *modern contraceptive prevalence*, by health ODA relative to total ODA (based on main FE Model)

| VARIABLES | SRH ODA | TotH ODA | RH ODA |
|-------------------------|----------|----------|---------|
| <25th percentile | -0.314 | 0.170 | -16.22* |
| HeaODA/TotODA | (0.724) | (0.232) | (9.019) |
| >25th < 50th percentile | 0.585* | 0.156 | -0.616 |
| HeaODA/TotODA | (0.318) | (0.177) | (2.971) |
| >50th < 75th percentile | 0.346 | 0.136 | 0.159 |
| HeaODA/TotODA | (0.463) | (0.160) | (2.043) |
| > 75th percentile | 0.628*** | 0.235** | 0.324 |
| HeaODA/TotODA | (0.147) | (0.111) | (1.251) |
| Observations | 387 | 390 | 383 |

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 HeaODA/TotODA is calculated by dividing the sectoral ODA (constant 2020 USD per capita) by the total ODA received by a country (current USD per capita).

Table A14. FE estimation – Marginal effect of ODA on modern contraceptive prevalence, by health ODA relative to total ODA (based on 3-Year-Averages Model)

| VARIABLES | SRH ODA | TotH ODA | RH ODA |
|--|---------------------|---------------------|-------------------|
| <25th percentile HeaODA/TotODA | -0.0289 (0.302) | 0.147 (0.207) | -2.319 (4.846) |
| >25th < 50th percentile HeaODA/TotODA | 0.223 (0.370) | -0.0264 (0.168) | 0.754 (3.000) |
| >50th < 75th percentile HeaODA/TotODA | 0.461 (0.340) | 0.0258 (0.133) | 3.494* (2.085) |
| > 75th percentile HeaODA/TotODA | 0.578*** (0.165) | 0.299*** (0.101) | 1.339 (1.417) |
| Observations | 328 | 328 | 327 |

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. There are 6 time periods as all variables are averaged over 3 years.

Table A15. FE estimation – Marginal effect of ODA on *skilled birth attendance*, by health ODA relative to total ODA (based on main FE Model)

| VARIABLES | SRH ODA | TotH ODA | RH ODA |
|--|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| <25th percentile HeaODA/TotODA | -0.757 (0.527) | 0.0589 (0.193) | -9.072* (4.911) |
| >25th < 50th percentile HeaODA/TotODA | 0.0356 (0.383) | 0.0911 (0.120) | 0.918 (1.708) |
| >50th < 75th percentile HeaODA/TotODA | -0.0783 (0.409) | 0.0494 (0.101) | 0.295 (1.710) |
| > 75th percentile HeaODA/TotODA | 0.204** (0.102) | 0.0607 (0.0453) | 0.854 (0.972) |
| Observations | 685 | 695 | 663 |

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A16. FE estimation – Marginal effect of ODA on skilled birth attendance, by Health ODA relative to total ODA (based on 3-Year-Averages Model)

| VARIABLES | SRH ODA | TotH ODA | RH ODA |
|--|---------------------|---------------------|-------------------|
| <25th percentile HeaODA/TotODA | -0.0891 (0.192) | 0.0311 (0.0952) | -0.541 (3.384) |
| >25th < 50th percentile HeaODA/TotODA | -0.309 (0.339) | 0.0201 (0.0779) | 1.089 (2.940) |
| >50th < 75th percentile HeaODA/TotODA | 0.476 (0.468) | 0.0220 (0.106) | 0.550 (2.249) |
| > 75th percentile HeaODA/TotODA | 0.399*** (0.148) | 0.171** (0.0846) | 2.020* (1.143) |
| Observations | 416 | 417 | 412 |

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. There are six time periods as all variables are averaged over 3 years.

Table A17. FE estimation – Marginal effect of health ODA on ART coverage, by health ODA relative to total ODA (based on main FE Model)

| VARIABLES | SRH ODA | TotH ODA | RH ODA |
|--|----------------------|----------------------|--------------------|
| <25th percentile HeaODA/TotODA | -1.400** (0.647) | -0.0251 (0.164) | -2.395 (4.986) |
| >25th < 50th percentile HeaODA/TotODA | -0.525 (0.404) | -0.0166 (0.116) | -3.685* (2.107) |
| >50th < 75th percentile HeaODA/TotODA | -0.315 (0.251) | 0.133 (0.0995) | -1.145 (1.964) |
| > 75th percentile HeaODA/TotODA | 0.532*** (0.0702) | 0.329*** (0.0670) | 0.362 (0.883) |
| Observations | 1,306 | 1,307 | 1,290 |

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A18. FE estimation – Marginal effect of health ODA on ART coverage, by health ODA relative to total ODA (based on 3-Year-Averages Model)

| VARIABLES | SRH ODA | TotH ODA | RH ODA |
|--|---------------------|----------------------|-------------------|
| <25th percentile HeaODA/TotODA | -0.900 (1.089) | -0.206 (0.384) | -7.347 (7.823) |
| >25th < 50th percentile HeaODA/TotODA | -0.609 (0.924) | -0.0273 (0.206) | -3.192 (3.334) |
| >50th < 75th percentile HeaODA/TotODA | -0.158 (0.452) | 0.0794 (0.172) | -0.104 (1.856) |
| > 75th percentile HeaODA/TotODA | 0.612*** (0.123) | 0.371*** (0.0991) | 0.649 (1.233) |
| Observations | 486 | 486 | 486 |

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. There are 6 time periods as all variables are averaged over 3 years.

Marginal effect of sectoral ODA on SRH services, by three-year period

Table A19. FE estimation – Marginal effect of ODA on modern contraceptive prevalence in each period (based on main FE Model)

| VARIABLES | SRH ODA | TotH ODA | RH ODA |
|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| 2003-2005 | 0.111 (0.531) | -0.180 (0.252) | 3.441 (3.200) |
| 2006-2008 | 0.372 (0.277) | 0.0348 (0.144) | -2.878** (1.159) |
| 2009-2011 | 0.471*** (0.179) | 0.194** (0.0925) | 2.672*** (0.957) |
| 2012-2014 | 0.627*** (0.218) | 0.159 (0.128) | 1.017 (0.953) |
| 2015-2017 | 1.204*** (0.319) | 0.307 (0.193) | 1.650* (0.968) |
| 2018-2020 | 0.850* (0.487) | 0.0283 (0.241) | 0.0922 (1.667) |
| Observations | 375 | 378 | 371 |
| R-squared | 0.475 | 0.406 | 0.407 |
| Number of countries | 95 | 96 | 94 |

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A20. FE estimation – Marginal effect of ODA on modern contraceptive prevalence in each period (based on 3-Year-Averages)

| VARIABLES | SRH ODA | TotH ODA | RH ODA |
|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|--------------------|
| 2003-2005 | -0.116 (0.555) | -0.00908 (0.245) | 4.171 (4.323) |
| 2006-2008 | 0.219 (0.205) | 0.168 (0.146) | -3.248 (2.147) |
| 2009-2011 | 0.378*** (0.118) | 0.252** (0.0984) | 2.019** (0.879) |
| 2012-2014 | 0.476*** (0.162) | 0.296** (0.122) | 1.936* (1.029) |
| 2015-2017 | 0.811*** (0.249) | 0.339** (0.153) | 2.238** (0.925) |
| 2018-2020 | 0.595 (0.718) | 0.110 (0.105) | 3.269** (1.352) |
| Observations | 328 | 328 | 327 |
| R-squared | 0.471 | 0.440 | 0.438 |
| Number of countries | 102 | 102 | 102 |

Note: All variables are averaged over three years to account for yearly fluctuations and missing data. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, and robust SE in parenthesis.

Table A21. FE estimation – Marginal effect of ODA on *skilled birth attendance* in each period (based on main FE Model)

| VARIABLES | SRH ODA | TotH ODA | RH ODA |
|---------------------|--------------------|----------------------|---------------------|
| 2003-2005 | -0.608 (0.857) | -0.00115 (0.0433) | -1.638 (2.219) |
| 2006-2008 | -0.0422 (0.174) | -0.0416 (0.0851) | -0.842* (0.441) |
| 2009-2011 | 0.0889 (0.104) | 0.0629 (0.0727) | 1.649 (1.062) |
| 2012-2014 | 0.227 (0.160) | 0.0646 (0.0666) | 1.466 (1.393) |
| 2015-2017 | 0.861** (0.353) | 0.221 (0.143) | 3.131*** (1.125) |
| 2018-2020 | 0.798 (0.699) | 0.123 (0.171) | 2.413 (2.839) |
| Observations | 656 | 666 | 636 |
| R-squared | 0.477 | 0.460 | 0.482 |
| Number of countries | 100 | 101 | 100 |

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A22. FE estimation – Marginal effect of ODA on skilled birth attendance in each period (based on 3-Year-Averages Model)

| VARIABLES | SRH ODA | TotH ODA | RH ODA |
|----------------|--------------------|--------------------|---------------------|
| 2003-2005 | -0.636 (0.914) | 0.0561 (0.0984) | 0.785 (2.594) |
| 2006-2008 | 0.0535 (0.189) | 0.0752 (0.145) | -0.838 (0.920) |
| 2009-2011 | 0.0359 (0.120) | 0.0299 (0.0785) | 1.837 (1.274) |
| 2012-2014 | 0.251* (0.140) | 0.152 (0.103) | 2.058* (1.106) |
| 2015-2017 | 0.681** (0.282) | 0.286* (0.165) | 4.134*** (0.922) |
| 2018-2020 | 0.589* (0.302) | 0.0909 (0.0867) | 5.684*** (1.936) |
| Observations | 416 | 417 | 412 |
| R-squared | 0.537 | 0.526 | 0.541 |
| # of countries | 104 | 104 | 104 |

Note. All variables are averaged over three years to account for yearly fluctuations and missing data. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$, and robust SE in parenthesis.

Table A23. FE estimation – Marginal effect of ODA on ART coverage in each period (based on main FE Model)

| VARIABLES | SRH ODA | TotH ODA | RH ODA |
|------------------|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------|
| 2003-2005 | -0.681* (0.393) | -0.294 (0.201) | 1.524 (3.047) |
| 2006-2008 | -0.0278 (0.188) | -0.0655 (0.138) | 1.651*** (0.618) |
| 2009-2011 | 0.178* (0.100) | 0.105 (0.0740) | 0.971 (0.793) |
| 2012-2014 | 0.392*** (0.111) | 0.243*** (0.0775) | 0.185 (0.778) |
| 2015-2017 | 0.611*** (0.158) | 0.406*** (0.0920) | -0.0396 (1.008) |
| 2018-2020 | 0.867*** (0.208) | 0.522*** (0.123) | 1.387 (2.253) |
| Observations | 1,233 | 1,234 | 1,218 |
| Within R-squared | 0.872 | 0.868 | 0.848 |
| # of countries | 90 | 90 | 90 |

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A24. FE estimation – Marginal effect of ODA on ART coverage in each period (based on 3-Year-Averages)

| VARIABLES | SRH ODA | TotH ODA | RH ODA |
|----------------|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------|
| 2003-2005 | -1.373** (0.553) | -0.383 (0.242) | 1.284 (4.140) |
| 2006-2008 | -0.176 (0.238) | -0.0841 (0.145) | 2.637*** (0.998) |
| 2009-2011 | 0.105 (0.153) | 0.114 (0.0907) | 2.021 (1.260) |
| 2012-2014 | 0.316** (0.156) | 0.263*** (0.0860) | 0.811 (1.275) |
| 2015-2017 | 0.569*** (0.197) | 0.453*** (0.104) | 0.637 (1.470) |
| 2018-2020 | 0.793*** (0.258) | 0.495*** (0.144) | 3.034 (2.711) |
| Observations | 486 | 486 | 486 |
| R-squared | 0.888 | 0.881 | 0.863 |
| # of countries | 90 | 90 | 90 |

Note: All variables are averaged over three years to account for yearly fluctuations and missing data. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, and robust SE in parenthesis.

ODA effectiveness depending on donor type

Table A25. The effects of health ODA on SRH services , summary of sensitivity analysis for missing data and measurement error

| Sectoral ODA | Main FE estimation | | | Three-Year Average FE estimation | | |
|-------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------|----------------------------------|--------------------------|--------------|
| | Contraceptive Prevalence | Skilled birth attendance | ART coverage | Contraceptive Prevalence | Skilled birth attendance | ART coverage |
| SRH ODA | | | | | | |
| All donors | 0.628*** | 0.190* | 0.531*** | 0.531*** | 0.315** | 0.593*** |
| Multilateral donors | 0.367 | 0.154 | 0.387 | 0.590 | 0.247 | 0.263 |
| Bilateral donors | 0.750*** | 0.252* | 0.685*** | 0.649*** | 0.426*** | 0.733*** |
| Total Health ODA | | | | | | |
| All donors | 0.242** | 0.059 | 0.332*** | 0.258** | 0.115 | 0.370*** |
| Multilateral donors | 0.226 | 0.052 | 0.422*** | 0.357 | 0.116 | 0.507** |
| Bilateral donors | 0.317** | 0.073 | 0.406*** | 0.359** | 0.137 | 0.453*** |
| RH care ODA | | | | | | |
| All donors | 0.935 | 0.902 | 0.575 | 1.481 | 2.035* | 1.181 |
| Multilateral donors | -0.816 | -0.834 | 1.273 | -1.064 | -0.031 | 2.685* |
| Bilateral donors | 1.904* | 3.004*** | -0.399 | 2.372** | 3.582*** | -0.036 |

Note: All estimators include country and time fixed effects. All measures of health ODA are in USD per capita (constant 2020). Standard errors are clustered at the country level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. In the 3-Year-Average Variables model, all variables are averaged over three years resulting in six 3-year periods.

Table A26. FE estimation of the effects of sectoral ODA per capita on modern *contraceptive prevalence*, by donor type (based on main FE Model)

| VARIABLES | SRH ODA | | | TotH ODA | | | RH ODA | | |
|-----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|
| | All donors | ML | Bilateral | All donors | ML | Bilateral | All donors | ML | Bilateral |
| Health ODA pc | 0.628*** (0.150) | 0.367 (0.334) | 0.750*** (0.212) | 0.242** (0.106) | 0.226 (0.177) | 0.317** (0.145) | 0.935 (1.221) | -0.816 (2.160) | 1.904* (0.961) |
| ln GDP pc | 1.735 (4.800) | 0.367 (5.183) | 0.869 (4.865) | 1.820 (5.452) | 0.515 (5.336) | 1.816 (5.349) | -0.699 (5.490) | -1.147 (5.400) | -0.642 (5.828) |
| GHE share of CHE | 0.027 (0.065) | 0.022 (0.069) | 0.082 (0.060) | 0.061 (0.073) | 0.025 (0.070) | 0.075 (0.075) | 0.039 (0.069) | 0.046 (0.076) | 0.058 (0.054) |
| Gov. effective | 3.995* (2.249) | 3.525 (2.872) | 3.367 (2.232) | 3.345 (2.499) | 3.286 (2.879) | 3.427 (2.556) | 3.717 (2.997) | 3.605 (3.121) | 5.585** (2.317) |
| Corruption control | 1.504 (2.669) | 2.510 (3.013) | 2.156 (3.111) | 2.372 (2.979) | 2.933 (3.212) | 2.634 (2.984) | 3.275 (3.294) | 3.790 (3.378) | 1.197 (3.418) |
| ln Population density | 23.558** (9.288) | 23.090** (11.505) | 25.200** (9.684) | 21.369** (10.689) | 22.016* (11.958) | 22.388** (10.753) | 21.158* (12.400) | 24.525** (12.270) | 35.008** * (9.773) |
| Primary schooling | 0.064 (0.041) | 0.056 (0.043) | 0.042 (0.041) | 0.050 (0.043) | 0.052 (0.044) | 0.053 (0.043) | 0.048 (0.045) | 0.044 (0.043) | 0.037 (0.042) |

| VARIABLES | SRH ODA | | | TotH ODA | | | RH ODA | | |
|-----------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|------------------|
| | All donors | ML | Bilateral | All donors | ML | Bilateral | All donors | ML | Bilateral |
| Female labor part. | -0.090 (0.133) | -0.176 (0.182) | -0.039 (0.136) | -0.149 (0.155) | -0.178 (0.186) | -0.164 (0.159) | -0.213 (0.201) | -0.216 (0.209) | 0.055 (0.143) |
| Observations | 387 | 385 | 375 | 390 | 388 | 390 | 383 | 378 | 336 |
| # of countries | 95 | 94 | 94 | 96 | 96 | 96 | 94 | 94 | 90 |
| Two-way FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Adj. within R-squared | 0.400 | 0.326 | 0.444 | 0.351 | 0.322 | 0.353 | 0.323 | 0.331 | 0.460 |
| Rho | 0.980 | 0.979 | 0.985 | 0.976 | 0.977 | 0.978 | 0.977 | 0.981 | 0.992 |

Note: All measures of health ODA are in USD per capita (constant 2020). Clustered standard errors (country level) in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Abbreviations. ML, multilateral donors.

Table A27. FE estimation of the effects of sectoral ODA per capita on modern contraceptive prevalence, by donor type (based on 3-Year-Averages Model)

| VARIABLES | SRH ODA | | | TotH ODA | | | RH ODA | | |
|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| | All donors | ML | Bilateral | All donors | ML | Bilateral | All donors | ML | Bilateral |
| Health ODA pc | 0.531*** (0.163) | 0.590 (0.467) | 0.649*** (0.182) | 0.258** (0.120) | 0.357 (0.228) | 0.359** (0.149) | 1.481 (1.487) | -1.064 (3.145) | 2.372** (0.909) |
| ln GDP pc | 5.850 (5.047) | 4.926 (5.321) | 6.256 (5.067) | 5.867 (5.713) | 4.656 (5.519) | 6.287 (5.683) | 3.921 (5.549) | 4.841 (5.594) | 3.195 (5.227) |
| GHE share of CHE | 0.028 (0.073) | 0.004 (0.080) | 0.067 (0.060) | 0.045 (0.080) | -0.000 (0.081) | 0.057 (0.083) | -0.010 (0.079) | 0.001 (0.084) | 0.015 (0.060) |
| Government effective | 8.055*** (3.065) | 8.129** (3.473) | 7.281** (3.020) | 7.972** (3.299) | 8.186** (3.529) | 8.033** (3.260) | 8.673** (3.552) | 8.134** (3.777) | 8.045*** (2.900) |
| Corruption control | 0.075 (3.178) | -0.135 (3.389) | 0.211 (3.235) | -0.221 (3.352) | 0.084 (3.557) | -0.265 (3.302) | 0.129 (3.557) | 0.133 (3.638) | 0.283 (2.890) |
| ln Population density | 32.508*** (10.512) | 32.602*** (11.192) | 33.576*** (10.412) | 30.473*** (10.918) | 30.518** (11.627) | 31.518*** (10.765) | 29.334** (11.842) | 31.842*** (11.859) | 38.144*** (10.404) |
| Primary schooling | 0.103** (0.044) | 0.099** (0.043) | 0.085** (0.040) | 0.094** (0.045) | 0.091** (0.045) | 0.097** (0.045) | 0.089** (0.043) | 0.094** (0.045) | 0.072** (0.034) |

| VARIABLES | SRH ODA | | | TotH ODA | | | RH ODA | | |
|-----------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|-------------------|-------------------|------------------|
| | All donors | ML | Bilateral | All donors | ML | Bilateral | All donors | ML | Bilateral |
| Female labor part. | 0.062 (0.153) | 0.019 (0.175) | 0.039 (0.157) | 0.038 (0.157) | 0.006 (0.179) | 0.033 (0.157) | -0.041 (0.195) | -0.018 (0.199) | 0.120 (0.150) |
| Observations | 328 | 327 | 324 | 328 | 327 | 328 | 327 | 325 | 302 |
| # of countries | 102 | 102 | 101 | 102 | 102 | 102 | 102 | 102 | 98 |
| Two-way FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Adj. within R-squared | 0.416 | 0.366 | 0.430 | 0.392 | 0.367 | 0.395 | 0.367 | 0.353 | 0.491 |
| Rho | 0.987 | 0.986 | 0.988 | 0.985 | 0.985 | 0.986 | 0.984 | 0.986 | 0.992 |

Note: All measures of health ODA are in USD per capita (constant 2020). Clustered standard errors (country level) in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Abbreviations. ML, multilateral donors. All variables are averaged over three years resulting in six 3-year periods.

Table A28. FE estimation of the effects of sectoral ODA per capita on *skilled birth attendance*, by donor type (based on main FE Model)

| VARIABLES | SRH ODA | | | TotH ODA | | | RH ODA | | |
|-----------------------|------------|-----------|-----------|------------|-----------|-----------|------------|-----------|-----------|
| | All donors | ML | Bilateral | All donors | ML | Bilateral | All donors | ML | Bilateral |
| Health ODA pc | 0.190* | 0.154 | 0.252* | 0.059 | 0.052 | 0.073 | 0.902 | -0.834 | 3.004*** |
| | (0.100) | (0.183) | (0.136) | (0.044) | (0.098) | (0.060) | (1.015) | (0.726) | (1.011) |
| ln GDP pc | 8.615 | 6.930 | 6.544 | 8.701 | 8.550 | 8.775 | 6.759 | 5.933 | 9.945 |
| | (6.305) | (6.325) | (6.013) | (6.290) | (6.343) | (6.294) | (6.319) | (6.396) | (7.424) |
| GHE share of CHE | 0.108 | 0.107 | 0.102 | 0.108* | 0.108 | 0.109* | 0.125* | 0.121* | 0.106 |
| | (0.066) | (0.068) | (0.063) | (0.065) | (0.066) | (0.065) | (0.065) | (0.068) | (0.070) |
| Government effective | -4.585 | -4.422 | -4.324 | -3.935 | -4.012 | -4.022 | -4.575 | -4.026 | -3.187 |
| | (2.887) | (2.888) | (2.811) | (2.698) | (2.736) | (2.702) | (2.911) | (3.030) | (2.969) |
| Corruption control | 5.053* | 5.433* | 5.026* | 4.772* | 4.803* | 4.641* | 5.812* | 5.906* | 5.568 |
| | (2.943) | (3.024) | (3.012) | (2.704) | (2.710) | (2.711) | (3.080) | (3.208) | (3.580) |
| ln Population density | 47.320*** | 46.400*** | 45.275*** | 48.155*** | 48.925*** | 48.057*** | 44.140*** | 47.838*** | 44.759*** |
| | (11.772) | (12.134) | (12.266) | (11.492) | (11.587) | (11.485) | (11.962) | (12.725) | (13.653) |
| Primary schooling | 0.077 | 0.077 | 0.081 | 0.076 | 0.075 | 0.077 | 0.081 | 0.072 | -0.000 |
| | (0.091) | (0.091) | (0.097) | (0.090) | (0.090) | (0.090) | (0.091) | (0.091) | (0.107) |

| VARIABLES | SRH ODA | | | TotH ODA | | | RH ODA | | |
|-----------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| | All donors | ML | Bilateral | All donors | ML | Bilateral | All donors | ML | Bilateral |
| Female labor part. | 0.105 (0.267) | 0.089 (0.266) | 0.177 (0.248) | 0.106 (0.267) | 0.102 (0.267) | 0.107 (0.267) | 0.060 (0.259) | 0.093 (0.261) | 0.138 (0.267) |
| Observations | 685 | 673 | 649 | 695 | 689 | 695 | 663 | 645 | 537 |
| # of countries | 100 | 99 | 100 | 101 | 101 | 101 | 100 | 99 | 97 |
| Two-way FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Adj. within R-squared | 0.437 | 0.443 | 0.439 | 0.432 | 0.436 | 0.432 | 0.448 | 0.452 | 0.477 |
| Rho | 0.987 | 0.987 | 0.987 | 0.988 | 0.988 | 0.988 | 0.986 | 0.987 | 0.985 |

Note: All measures of health ODA are in USD per capita (constant 2020). Clustered standard errors (country level) in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Abbreviations. ML, multilateral donors.

Table A29. FE estimation of the effects of sectoral ODA per capita on skilled birth attendance, by donor type (based on 3-Year-Averages Model)

| VARIABLES | SRH ODA | | | TotH ODA | | | RH ODA | | |
|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| | All donors | ML | Bilateral | All donors | ML | Bilateral | All donors | ML | Bilateral |
| Health ODA pc | 0.315** (0.120) | 0.247 (0.293) | 0.426*** (0.147) | 0.115 (0.083) | 0.116 (0.137) | 0.137 (0.105) | 2.035* (1.130) | -0.031 (1.379) | 3.582*** (1.296) |
| ln GDP pc | 20.391*** (7.671) | 20.132** (7.988) | 20.435*** (7.698) | 20.563*** (7.810) | 19.871** (7.763) | 20.532*** (7.762) | 18.424** (7.630) | 17.127** (7.755) | 17.197** (7.712) |
| GHE share of CHE | 0.200** (0.084) | 0.190** (0.088) | 0.222*** (0.082) | 0.200** (0.084) | 0.188** (0.088) | 0.199** (0.084) | 0.192** (0.083) | 0.196** (0.090) | 0.207** (0.087) |
| Government effective | -3.480 (4.557) | -3.487 (4.671) | -3.891 (4.653) | -2.857 (4.394) | -2.881 (4.440) | -3.032 (4.431) | -3.505 (4.593) | -4.066 (4.736) | -3.069 (4.808) |
| Corruption control | 4.123 (4.303) | 4.235 (4.368) | 4.015 (4.509) | 3.700 (4.327) | 4.282 (4.352) | 3.798 (4.344) | 4.923 (4.481) | 6.029 (4.587) | 4.635 (4.987) |
| ln Population density | 54.135*** (13.708) | 54.926*** (14.103) | 53.354*** (14.102) | 54.340*** (13.293) | 54.897*** (13.364) | 54.288*** (13.284) | 48.216*** (13.687) | 50.300*** (14.428) | 49.275*** (15.209) |
| Primary schooling | 0.131 (0.103) | 0.128 (0.104) | 0.129 (0.103) | 0.127 (0.102) | 0.124 (0.103) | 0.128 (0.102) | 0.119 (0.103) | 0.127 (0.104) | 0.108 (0.112) |

| VARIABLES | SRH ODA | | | TotH ODA | | | RH ODA | | |
|-----------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| | All donors | ML | Bilateral | All donors | ML | Bilateral | All donors | ML | Bilateral |
| Female labor part. | 0.310 (0.267) | 0.285 (0.271) | 0.325 (0.269) | 0.303 (0.264) | 0.279 (0.264) | 0.295 (0.265) | 0.236 (0.273) | 0.251 (0.265) | 0.350 (0.288) |
| Observations | 416 | 412 | 408 | 417 | 415 | 417 | 412 | 406 | 369 |
| # of countries | 104 | 104 | 104 | 104 | 104 | 104 | 104 | 104 | 103 |
| Two-way FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Adj. within R-squared | 0.508 | 0.503 | 0.510 | 0.504 | 0.503 | 0.504 | 0.511 | 0.512 | 0.528 |
| Rho | 0.987 | 0.987 | 0.986 | 0.987 | 0.987 | 0.987 | 0.983 | 0.984 | 0.983 |

Note: All measures of health ODA are in USD per capita (constant 2020). Clustered standard errors (country level) in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Abbreviations. ML, multilateral donors. All variables are averaged over three years resulting in six 3-year periods.

Table A30. FE estimation of the effects of sectoral ODA per capita on ART coverage, by donor type (based on main FE Model)

| VARIABLES | SRH ODA | | | TotH ODA | | | RH ODA | | |
|-----------------------|---------------------|--------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|-------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| | All donors | ML | Bilateral | All donors | ML | Bilateral | All donors | ML | Bilateral |
| Health ODA pc | 0.531*** (0.076) | 0.387 (0.287) | 0.685*** (0.088) | 0.332*** (0.070) | 0.422*** (0.155) | 0.406*** (0.100) | 0.575 (0.833) | 1.273 (0.921) | -0.399 (1.149) |
| ln GDP pc | -1.695 (7.291) | -3.159 (7.392) | -0.278 (7.566) | -2.335 (7.366) | -3.284 (7.374) | -2.058 (7.369) | -3.497 (7.384) | -3.419 (7.381) | 2.793 (8.940) |
| GHE share of CHE | -0.014 (0.070) | -0.045 (0.071) | 0.026 (0.066) | -0.014 (0.071) | -0.038 (0.073) | -0.017 (0.068) | -0.047 (0.070) | -0.047 (0.070) | 0.063 (0.072) |
| Gov. effective | 6.128* (3.255) | 5.997* (3.410) | 5.994* (3.152) | 6.088* (3.238) | 6.282* (3.312) | 5.885* (3.286) | 6.274* (3.482) | 6.277* (3.537) | 8.115** (3.400) |
| Corruption control | 5.274* (3.108) | 5.862* (3.246) | 5.741* (3.166) | 5.278* (3.165) | 5.627* (3.219) | 5.635* (3.216) | 6.412* (3.298) | 6.679** (3.328) | 3.039 (3.702) |
| ln Population density | 14.208 (15.400) | 10.910 (16.795) | 16.904 (16.204) | 9.790 (15.435) | 8.681 (16.405) | 11.591 (15.579) | 9.995 (16.938) | 10.761 (17.148) | 27.914 (19.679) |
| Primary schooling | -0.052 (0.071) | -0.053 (0.072) | -0.052 (0.071) | -0.056 (0.070) | -0.055 (0.071) | -0.053 (0.071) | -0.053 (0.072) | -0.052 (0.072) | -0.062 (0.081) |

| VARIABLES | SRH ODA | | | TotH ODA | | | RH ODA | | |
|-----------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| | All donors | ML | Bilateral | All donors | ML | Bilateral | All donors | ML | Bilateral |
| Female labor part. | -0.181 (0.295) | -0.222 (0.307) | -0.281 (0.300) | -0.184 (0.297) | -0.206 (0.302) | -0.191 (0.300) | -0.246 (0.310) | -0.263 (0.311) | -0.316 (0.361) |
| Observations | 1,306 | 1,304 | 1,246 | 1,307 | 1,307 | 1,307 | 1,290 | 1,275 | 1,043 |
| # of countries | 90 | 90 | 89 | 90 | 90 | 90 | 90 | 90 | 88 |
| Two-way FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Adj. within R-squared | 0.857 | 0.846 | 0.861 | 0.854 | 0.849 | 0.853 | 0.845 | 0.846 | 0.849 |
| Rho | 0.897 | 0.867 | 0.925 | 0.850 | 0.841 | 0.872 | 0.861 | 0.870 | 0.965 |

Note: All measures of health ODA are in USD per capita (constant 2020). Clustered standard errors (country level) in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Abbreviations. ML, multilateral donors.

Table A31. FE estimation of the effects of sectoral ODA per capita on ART coverage, by donor type (based on 3-Year-Averages Model)

| VARIABLES | SRH ODA | | | TotH ODA | | | RH ODA | | |
|-----------------------|---------------------|--------------------|---------------------|---------------------|--------------------|---------------------|--------------------|--------------------|---------------------|
| | All donors | ML | Bilateral | All donors | ML | Bilateral | All donors | ML | Bilateral |
| Health ODA pc | 0.593*** (0.124) | 0.263 (0.587) | 0.733*** (0.112) | 0.370*** (0.104) | 0.507** (0.243) | 0.453*** (0.133) | 1.181 (1.254) | 2.685* (1.363) | -0.036 (1.462) |
| ln GDP pc | 3.345 (7.802) | 2.395 (7.889) | 4.153 (7.802) | 2.932 (7.987) | 2.153 (7.984) | 3.359 (7.933) | 1.841 (7.944) | 1.998 (7.929) | 3.955 (8.074) |
| GHE share of CHE | 0.002 (0.091) | -0.029 (0.093) | 0.005 (0.088) | 0.006 (0.093) | -0.023 (0.094) | 0.006 (0.090) | -0.037 (0.090) | -0.020 (0.093) | 0.071 (0.097) |
| Gov. effective | 6.429 (4.762) | 6.475 (4.892) | 6.478 (4.817) | 6.769 (4.863) | 7.166 (4.859) | 6.252 (4.881) | 6.660 (4.932) | 6.169 (5.040) | 7.215 (5.013) |
| Corruption control | 4.715 (3.832) | 5.070 (4.044) | 5.657 (3.888) | 4.200 (3.966) | 4.363 (4.055) | 4.814 (3.978) | 5.277 (4.007) | 5.775 (4.062) | 4.648 (4.073) |
| ln Population density | 20.780 (14.736) | 18.561 (15.856) | 23.005 (14.766) | 17.263 (14.869) | 16.319 (15.689) | 19.194 (14.875) | 16.108 (15.717) | 17.596 (15.991) | 31.627* (16.162) |
| Primary schooling | -0.036 (0.075) | -0.043 (0.076) | -0.044 (0.076) | -0.045 (0.074) | -0.046 (0.074) | -0.043 (0.076) | -0.046 (0.075) | -0.040 (0.076) | -0.029 (0.077) |

| VARIABLES | SRH ODA | | | TotH ODA | | | RH ODA | | |
|-----------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| | All donors | ML | Bilateral | All donors | ML | Bilateral | All donors | ML | Bilateral |
| Female labor part. | -0.250 (0.326) | -0.320 (0.338) | -0.301 (0.335) | -0.247 (0.331) | -0.292 (0.334) | -0.262 (0.332) | -0.340 (0.331) | -0.340 (0.333) | -0.353 (0.354) |
| Observations | 486 | 486 | 478 | 486 | 486 | 486 | 486 | 482 | 439 |
| # of countries | 90 | 90 | 90 | 90 | 90 | 90 | 90 | 90 | 89 |
| Two-way FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Adj. within R-squared | 0.867 | 0.858 | 0.867 | 0.864 | 0.860 | 0.864 | 0.858 | 0.858 | 0.860 |
| Rho | 0.934 | 0.925 | 0.945 | 0.914 | 0.911 | 0.926 | 0.912 | 0.921 | 0.967 |

Note: All measures of health ODA are in USD per capita (constant 2020). Clustered standard errors (country level) in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Abbreviations. ML, multilateral donors. All variables are averaged over three years resulting in six 3-year periods.

Annex IV. Sensitivity analysis

Our sensitivity analyses aim to account for shortcomings of the data and the main FE estimation. First, we investigate potential bias from measurement error and missing data. Second, we try to account for the influence of outlying observations with robust FE estimators. Third, we estimate the main model using alternative specifications (log-log, linear-log). Fourth, we investigate the potential of a delayed impact of ODA on service outcomes with a lagged independent variables (IVs) model. Finally, we implemented a dynamic FE estimator, the system-GMM estimator, to account for the potential endogeneity of the regressors.

For each of these approaches, we first provide a summary table showing the ODA effect estimates from the main model next to the effect estimates from the sensitivity analyses. Each summary table is then followed by complete tables, including parameter estimates and robust standard errors.

Sensitivity to missing data and measurement error

Table A1. The effects of health ODA on SRH services, summary of sensitivity analysis for missing data and measurement error

| Sectoral ODA | SRH service outcomes | | |
|------------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------|
| | Contraceptive Prevalence | Skilled birth attendance | ART coverage |
| SRH ODA | | | |
| Main FE Estimator | 0.628*** | 0.190* | 0.531*** |
| FE Interpolated Variables | 0.482*** | 0.247*** | 0.545*** |
| FE 3-Year-Averaged Variables | 0.531*** | 0.314** | 0.593*** |
| Total Health ODA | | | |
| Main FE Estimator | 0.242** | 0.059 | 0.332*** |
| FE Interpolated Variables | 0.196*** | 0.080* | 0.331*** |
| FE 3-Year-Averaged Variables | 0.258** | 0.115 | 0.370*** |
| RH care ODA | | | |
| Main FE Estimator | 0.935 | 0.902 | 0.575 |
| FE Interpolated Variables | 1.113** | 1.413*** | 0.649 |
| FE 3-Year-Averaged Variables | 1.481 | 0.649 | 1.181 |

Note: All estimators include country and time fixed effects. All measures of health ODA are in USD per capita (constant 2020). Standard errors are clustered at the country level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. In the Interpolated Variables model, all covariates and the dependent variable (SRH service indicators) are interpolated with STATA command *ipolate*. In the 3-Year-Averaged Variables model, all variables are averaged over three years resulting in six 3-year periods.

Table A2. Sensitivity for missing data – Effects of sectoral ODA per capita on *modern contraceptive prevalence* (alternative FE estimators)

| VARIABLES | SRH ODA | | | Total Health ODA | | | RH care ODA | | |
|--------------------------|---------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|--------------------|----------------------|
| | Main | Inter- polate | 3-year- avg | Main | Inter- polate | 3-year- avg | Main | Inter- polate | 3-year- avg |
| Health ODA pc | 0.628*** (0.150) | 0.482*** (0.129) | 0.531*** (0.163) | 0.242** (0.106) | 0.196*** (0.065) | 0.258** (0.120) | 0.935 (1.221) | 1.113** (0.455) | 1.480 (1.487) |
| ln GDP pc | 1.735 (4.800) | 4.156 (4.849) | 5.914 (5.060) | 1.820 (5.452) | 4.414 (5.102) | 5.939 (5.725) | -0.699 (5.490) | 3.250 (5.016) | 3.999 (5.561) |
| GHE share of CHE | 0.027 (0.065) | 0.023 (0.052) | 0.028 (0.073) | 0.061 (0.073) | 0.031 (0.054) | 0.044 (0.080) | 0.039 (0.069) | 0.003 (0.053) | -0.010 (0.079) |
| Gov. effective | 3.995* (2.249) | 1.563 (2.169) | 8.048*** (3.063) | 3.345 (2.499) | 1.367 (2.386) | 7.964** (3.297) | 3.717 (2.997) | 1.158 (2.748) | 8.665** (3.551) |
| Corruption control | 1.504 (2.669) | 2.568 (2.263) | 0.070 (3.179) | 2.372 (2.979) | 2.712 (2.396) | -0.227 (3.353) | 3.275 (3.294) | 3.177 (2.583) | 0.120 (3.557) |
| ln Population density | 23.558** (9.288) | 22.457** (10.869) | 32.531*** (10.512) | 21.369** (10.689) | 19.836* (11.828) | 30.499*** (10.918) | 21.158* (12.400) | 18.839 (12.611) | 29.369** (11.839) |
| Primary schooling | 0.064 (0.041) | 0.037 (0.046) | 0.103** (0.044) | 0.050 (0.043) | 0.034 (0.045) | 0.094** (0.045) | 0.048 (0.045) | 0.032 (0.044) | 0.089** (0.043) |

| VARIABLES | SRH ODA | | | Total Health ODA | | | RH care ODA | | |
|-----------------------|-------------------|-------------------|------------------|-------------------|-------------------|------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| | Main | Inter- polate | 3-year- avg | Main | Inter- polate | 3-year- avg | Main | Inter- polate | 3-year- avg |
| Female labor part. | -0.090 (0.133) | -0.072 (0.125) | 0.062 (0.153) | -0.149 (0.155) | -0.129 (0.145) | 0.037 (0.157) | -0.213 (0.201) | -0.175 (0.189) | -0.041 (0.195) |
| Observations | 387 | 1,152 | 328 | 390 | 1,157 | 328 | 383 | 1,132 | 327 |
| # of countries | 95 | 101 | 102 | 96 | 101 | 102 | 94 | 101 | 102 |
| Two-way FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Adj. within R-squared | 0.400 | 0.380 | 0.416 | 0.351 | 0.348 | 0.392 | 0.323 | 0.327 | 0.367 |
| Rho | 0.980 | 0.987 | 0.987 | 0.976 | 0.984 | 0.985 | 0.977 | 0.983 | 0.984 |

Note: All measures of health ODA are in USD per capita (constant 2020). Standard errors are clustered at the country level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, and SE in parenthesis.

Table A3. Sensitivity for missing data – Effects of sectoral ODA per capita on *skilled birth attendance* (alternative FE estimators)

| VARIABLES | SRH ODA | | | Total Health ODA | | | RH care ODA | | |
|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| | Main | Inter- polate | 3-year- avg | Main | Inter- polate | 3-year- avg | Main | Inter- polate | 3-year- avg |
| Health ODA pc | 0.190* (0.100) | 0.247*** (0.075) | 0.314** (0.120) | 0.059 (0.044) | 0.080* (0.043) | 0.115 (0.083) | 0.902 (1.015) | 1.413*** (0.523) | 2.032* (1.130) |
| ln GDP pc | 8.615 (6.305) | 16.344*** (6.153) | 20.513*** (7.694) | 8.701 (6.290) | 16.435*** (6.214) | 20.689*** (7.833) | 6.759 (6.319) | 14.031** (6.037) | 18.546** (7.654) |
| GHE share of CHE | 0.108 (0.066) | 0.110* (0.056) | 0.199** (0.084) | 0.108* (0.065) | 0.105* (0.056) | 0.199** (0.084) | 0.125* (0.065) | 0.110* (0.056) | 0.191** (0.083) |
| Government effective | -4.585 (2.887) | -3.432 (2.556) | -3.482 (4.554) | -3.935 (2.698) | -2.985 (2.469) | -2.860 (4.391) | -4.575 (2.911) | -3.187 (2.655) | -3.507 (4.590) |
| Corruption control | 5.053* (2.943) | 3.459 (2.874) | 4.118 (4.303) | 4.772* (2.704) | 3.274 (2.758) | 3.696 (4.327) | 5.812* (3.080) | 4.213 (3.049) | 4.917 (4.480) |
| ln Population density | 47.320*** (11.772) | 47.544*** (12.927) | 54.167*** (13.699) | 48.155*** (11.492) | 47.295*** (12.718) | 54.373*** (13.284) | 44.140*** (11.962) | 42.268*** (12.830) | 48.259*** (13.677) |
| Primary schooling | 0.077 (0.091) | 0.035 (0.083) | 0.131 (0.103) | 0.076 (0.090) | 0.036 (0.081) | 0.127 (0.102) | 0.081 (0.091) | 0.036 (0.081) | 0.119 (0.103) |

| VARIABLES | SRH ODA | | | Total Health ODA | | | RH care ODA | | |
|-----------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| | Main | Inter- polate | 3-year- avg | Main | Inter- polate | 3-year- avg | Main | Inter- polate | 3-year- avg |
| Female labor part. | 0.105 (0.267) | 0.127 (0.234) | 0.309 (0.267) | 0.106 (0.267) | 0.110 (0.233) | 0.303 (0.264) | 0.060 (0.259) | 0.066 (0.242) | 0.236 (0.273) |
| Observations | 685 | 1,347 | 416 | 695 | 1,360 | 417 | 663 | 1,308 | 412 |
| # of countries | 100 | 103 | 104 | 101 | 103 | 104 | 100 | 103 | 104 |
| Two-way FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Adj. within R-squared | 0.437 | 0.496 | 0.508 | 0.432 | 0.490 | 0.505 | 0.448 | 0.506 | 0.511 |
| Rho | 0.987 | 0.989 | 0.987 | 0.988 | 0.989 | 0.987 | 0.986 | 0.986 | 0.983 |

Note: All measures of health ODA are in USD per capita (constant 2020). Standard errors are clustered at the country level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, and SE in parenthesis.

Table A4. Sensitivity for missing data – Effects of sectoral ODA per capita on *ART coverage* (alternative FE estimators)

| VARIABLES | SRH ODA | | | Total Health ODA | | | RH care ODA | | |
|--------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|-------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| | Main | Inter- polate | 3-year- avg | Main | Inter- polate | 3-year- avg | Main | Inter- polate | 3-year- avg |
| Health ODA pc | 0.531*** (0.076) | 0.545*** (0.079) | 0.593*** (0.124) | 0.332*** (0.070) | 0.331*** (0.070) | 0.370*** (0.104) | 0.575 (0.833) | 0.649 (0.767) | 1.181 (1.254) |
| ln GDP pc | -1.695 (7.291) | 1.798 (7.087) | 3.339 (7.839) | -2.335 (7.366) | 1.464 (7.219) | 2.914 (8.023) | -3.497 (7.384) | 0.347 (7.196) | 1.830 (7.982) |
| GHE share of CHE | -0.014 (0.070) | -0.029 (0.068) | 0.002 (0.091) | -0.014 (0.071) | -0.028 (0.068) | 0.006 (0.093) | -0.047 (0.070) | -0.061 (0.068) | -0.037 (0.090) |
| Gov. effective | 6.128* (3.255) | 5.172 (3.415) | 6.433 (4.760) | 6.088* (3.238) | 5.201 (3.415) | 6.775 (4.862) | 6.274* (3.482) | 5.391 (3.606) | 6.664 (4.930) |
| Corruption control | 5.274* (3.108) | 4.836 (3.077) | 4.717 (3.831) | 5.278* (3.165) | 4.635 (3.155) | 4.204 (3.965) | 6.412* (3.298) | 5.951* (3.252) | 5.280 (4.005) |
| ln Population density | 14.208 (15.400) | 15.592 (14.924) | 20.802 (14.748) | 9.790 (15.435) | 11.600 (15.038) | 17.279 (14.883) | 9.995 (16.938) | 11.923 (16.358) | 16.126 (15.732) |
| Primary schooling | -0.052 (0.071) | -0.038 (0.069) | -0.036 (0.075) | -0.056 (0.070) | -0.041 (0.068) | -0.045 (0.074) | -0.053 (0.072) | -0.037 (0.070) | -0.046 (0.075) |

| VARIABLES | SRH ODA | | | Total Health ODA | | | RH care ODA | | |
|---------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| | Main | Inter- polate | 3-year- avg | Main | Inter- polate | 3-year- avg | Main | Inter- polate | 3-year- avg |
| Female labor part. | -0.181 (0.295) | -0.121 (0.284) | -0.250 (0.326) | -0.184 (0.297) | -0.116 (0.289) | -0.247 (0.331) | -0.246 (0.310) | -0.192 (0.297) | -0.340 (0.331) |
| Observations | 1,306 | 1,434 | 486 | 1,307 | 1,436 | 486 | 1,290 | 1,415 | 486 |
| Number of countries | 90 | 90 | 90 | 90 | 90 | 90 | 90 | 90 | 90 |
| Two-way FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Adj. within R- squared | 0.857 | 0.856 | 0.867 | 0.854 | 0.853 | 0.864 | 0.845 | 0.844 | 0.858 |
| Rho | 0.897 | 0.906 | 0.934 | 0.850 | 0.866 | 0.914 | 0.861 | 0.878 | 0.913 |

Note: All measures of health ODA are in USD per capita (constant 2020). Standard errors are clustered at the country level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, and SE in parenthesis.

Influence of outlying observations

Table A5. The effects of health ODA on SRH services, summary of sensitivity analysis for outlying observations

| Sectoral ODA | SRH service outcomes | | |
|-------------------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------|
| | Contraceptive Prevalence | Skilled birth attendance | ART coverage |
| SRH ODA | | | |
| Main FE Estimator | 0.628*** | 0.190* | 0.531*** |
| Robust FE S Estimator | 0.677*** | 0.142*** | 0.438*** |
| Robust FE MM Estimator | 0.430*** | 0.202 | 0.526*** |
| FE Cook's Distance Outliers Removed | 0.731*** | 0.111 | 0.570*** |
| Total Health ODA | | | |
| Main FE Estimator | 0.242** | 0.059 | 0.332*** |
| Robust FE S Estimator | 0.347*** | -0.014 | 0.294*** |
| Robust FE MM Estimator | 0.309** | -0.001 | 0.306*** |
| FE Cook's Distance Outliers Removed | 0.300*** | 0.006 | 0.345*** |
| RH care ODA | | | |
| Main FE Estimator | 0.935 | 0.902 | 0.575 |
| Robust FE S Estimator | 0.683* | 0.432 | 0.220 |
| Robust FE MM Estimator | 1.339 | 1.218 | 0.148 |
| FE Cook's Distance Outliers Removed | 1.647** | 0.737 | 0.702 |

Note: All estimators include country and time fixed effects. All measures of health ODA are in USD per capita (constant 2020). Standard errors are clustered at the country level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The user-contributed Stata module XTROBREG was used to calculate robust S and MM estimators, which are based on pairwise differencing. Influential observations were defined as observations that had a Cook's D>4/N-k, where N is the number of observations in the sample and k is the number of predictors.

Table A6. Outlier robustness analysis – Effects of sectoral ODA per capita on *modern contraceptive prevalence* (alternative FE estimators)

| VARIABLES | Main FE Estimator | Robust S-Estimator | Robust MM-Estimator | Cooks' D. outliers removed |
|-----------------------|------------------------------|--------------------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| SRH ODA (USD pc) | 0.628*** [0.330 - 0.926] | 0.677*** [0.452 - 0.902] | 0.430*** [0.282 - 0.577] | 0.731*** [0.538 - 0.923] |
| ln GDP pc | 1.735 [-7.796 - 11.266] | -3.663 [-16.008 - 8.682] | 1.497 [-11.260 - 14.255] | -1.234 [-8.119 - 5.651] |
| GHE share of CHE | 0.027 [-0.102 - 0.155] | 0.048 [-0.155 - 0.252] | 0.051 [-0.072 - 0.175] | 0.101** [0.006 - 0.197] |
| Government effective | 3.995* [-0.471 - 8.461] | 2.245 [-2.435 - 6.925] | 1.432 [-3.833 - 6.696] | 2.532 [-0.821 - 5.885] |
| Corruption control | 1.504 [-3.796 - 6.803] | -4.148 [-10.159 - 1.863] | -1.808 [-8.088 - 4.472] | -0.277 [-4.242 - 3.688] |
| ln Population density | 23.558** [5.116 - 41.999] | 22.380*** [12.603 - 32.157] | 26.318*** [9.646 - 42.990] | 23.683*** [10.638 - 36.727] |
| Primary schooling | 0.064 [-0.017 - 0.145] | 0.017 [-0.082 - 0.116] | 0.010 [-0.058 - 0.078] | 0.027 [-0.038 - 0.092] |

| VARIABLES | | Main FE Estimator | Robust S-Estimator | Robust MM-Estimator | Cooks' D. outliers removed |
|--------------------------------------|--|----------------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------------|-------------------------------|
| Female labor part. | | -0.090 [-0.353 - 0.174] | 0.145 [-0.175 - 0.465] | -0.032 [-0.298 - 0.235] | -0.077 [-0.290 - 0.136] |
| Observations | | 387 | 378 | 378 | 365 |
| Number of countries | | 95 | 86 | 86 | 92 |
| Two-Way FE | | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Within R-squared | | 0.438 | | | 0.576 |
| Hausmann p S vs FE | | | 0.017 | | |
| Hausmann p MM vs. S | | | | 0.439 | |
| Total Health ODA (USD pc) | | 0.242** [0.032 - 0.453] | 0.347*** [0.217 - 0.476] | 0.309** [0.052 - 0.566] | 0.300*** [0.181 - 0.419] |
| In GDP pc | | 1.820 [-9.003 - 12.643] | 0.853 [-8.875 - 10.580] | 4.178 [-6.999 - 15.355] | 1.982 [-4.401 - 8.364] |
| GHE share of CHE | | 0.061 [-0.084 - 0.205] | 0.060 [-0.173 - 0.294] | 0.050 [-0.086 - 0.186] | 0.113** [0.015 - 0.211] |
| Government effective | | 3.345 [-1.616 - 8.305] | 2.045 [-1.374 - 5.464] | 1.937 [-1.940 - 5.813] | 2.597** [0.044 - 5.150] |

| VARIABLES | | Main FE Estimator | Robust S-Estimator | Robust MM-Estimator | Cooks' D. outliers removed |
|------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| | Corruption control | 2.372 [-3.543 - 8.286] | -4.130 [-10.275 - 2.016] | -1.220 [-6.175 - 3.735] | 0.107 [-3.842 - 4.055] |
| | In Population density | 21.369** [0.149 - 42.589] | 20.135** [3.029 - 37.242] | 25.082** [5.252 - 44.911] | 26.923*** [14.977 - 38.869] |
| | Primary schooling | 0.050 [-0.034 - 0.135] | -0.000 [-0.098 - 0.097] | -0.004 [-0.080 - 0.073] | -0.004 [-0.070 - 0.061] |
| | Female labor part. | -0.149 [-0.456 - 0.159] | 0.062 [-0.223 - 0.347] | -0.087 [-0.353 - 0.179] | -0.107 [-0.305 - 0.092] |
| Observations | | 390 | 382 | 382 | 363 |
| Number | of | 96 | 88 | 88 | 92 |
| countries | | | | | |
| Two-Way FE | | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Within R-squared | | 0.392 | | | 0.555 |
| Hausmann p S vs FE | | | 0.0149 | | |
| Hausmann p MM vs. S | | | | 0.958 | |

| VARIABLES | | | Main FE Estimator | Robust S-Estimator | Robust MM-Estimator | Cooks' D. outliers removed |
|-----------|------|-----------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|-------------------------------|
| RH | care | ODA | 0.935 | 0.683* | 1.339 | 1.647** |
| (USD pc) | | | [-1.490 - 3.361] | [-0.105 - 1.470] | [-0.490 - 3.168] | [0.257 - 3.037] |
| | | In GDP pc | -0.699 | -5.193 | 1.696 | -0.448 |
| | | | [-11.601 - 10.204] | [-16.097 - 5.710] | [-12.336 - 15.727] | [-8.047 - 7.151] |
| | | GHE share of CHE | 0.039 | 0.018 | 0.061 | 0.100** |
| | | | [-0.098 - 0.176] | [-0.133 - 0.169] | [-0.071 - 0.193] | [0.003 - 0.198] |
| | | Government effective | 3.717 | 2.260 | 2.480 | 3.375** |
| | | | [-2.234 - 9.668] | [-1.277 - 5.797] | [-3.760 - 8.720] | [0.480 - 6.271] |
| | | Corruption control | 3.275 | -4.354* | -0.374 | 0.863 |
| | | | [-3.265 - 9.815] | [-8.720 - 0.012] | [-8.332 - 7.584] | [-3.216 - 4.942] |
| | | In Population density | 21.158* | 24.623*** | 28.886** | 29.923*** |
| | | | [-3.467 - 45.782] | [10.569 - 38.676] | [5.872 - 51.900] | [15.763 - 44.084] |
| | | Primary schooling | 0.048 | -0.015 | -0.006 | 0.006 |
| | | | [-0.042 - 0.138] | [-0.118 - 0.089] | [-0.076 - 0.063] | [-0.056 - 0.069] |
| | | Female labor part. | -0.213 | 0.101 | -0.070 | -0.113 |
| | | | [-0.611 - 0.186] | [-0.233 - 0.435] | [-0.347 - 0.207] | [-0.334 - 0.107] |

| VARIABLES | Main FE Estimator | Robust S-Estimator | Robust MM-Estimator | Cooks' D. outliers removed |
|---------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| Observations | 383 | 374 | 374 | 360 |
| Number of countries | 94 | 85 | 85 | 92 |
| Two-Way FE | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Within R-squared | 0.367 | | | 0.523 |
| Hausmann p S vs FE | | 3.015e-06 | | |
| Hausmann p MM vs. S | | | 0.0652 | |

Note: All estimators include country and time fixed effects. All measures of health ODA are in USD per capita (constant 2020). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 and 95% CI in brackets. The user-contributed Stata module XTROBREG was used to calculate robust S and MM estimators, which are based on pairwise differencing. For the Hausmann tests, p<0.05 represents preference over indicated model. Influential observations were defined as observations that had a Cook's D>4/N-k, where N is the number of observations in the sample and k the number of predictors.

Table A7. Outlier robustness analysis – Effects of sectoral ODA per capita on *skilled birth attendance* (alternative FE estimators)

| VARIABLES | Main FE Estimator | Robust S-Estimator | Robust MM-Estimator | Cooks' D. outliers removed |
|--------------------------|-----------------------------|----------------------------|---------------------------|-------------------------------|
| SRH ODA (USD pc) | 0.190* | 0.142*** | 0.202 | 0.111 |
| | [-0.009 - 0.389] | [0.068 - 0.216] | [-0.135 - 0.539] | [-0.075 - 0.296] |
| ln GDP pc | 8.615 | 0.780 | -1.843 | 4.124 |
| | [-3.896 - 21.126] | [-3.399 - 4.960] | [-9.267 - 5.581] | [-5.253 - 13.501] |
| GHE share of CHE | 0.108 | 0.029 | 0.127 | 0.113** |
| | [-0.022 - 0.239] | [-0.016 - 0.073] | [-0.090 - 0.344] | [0.013 - 0.214] |
| Government effective | -4.585 [-10.313 - 1.144] | -0.497 [-1.314 - 0.320] | 0.182 [-3.179 - 3.543] | -4.164* [-9.123 - 0.795] |
| Corruption control | 5.053* | 0.726** | 1.653 | 6.041** |
| | [-0.787 - 10.893] | [0.078 - 1.374] | [-1.038 - 4.345] | [1.308 - 10.775] |
| ln Population density | 47.320*** | 4.911 | 30.666 | 53.104*** |
| | [23.962 - 70.678] | [-4.531 - 14.353] | [-26.097 - 87.430] | [36.017 - 70.191] |
| Primary schooling | 0.077 | 0.012 | 0.007 | -0.034 |
| | [-0.104 - 0.257] | [-0.012 - 0.036] | [-0.129 - 0.142] | [-0.175 - 0.107] |
| Female labor part. | 0.105 | 0.087** | 0.213 | 0.051 |
| | [-0.425 - 0.635] | [0.013 - 0.162] | [-0.052 - 0.478] | [-0.475 - 0.578] |

| VARIABLES | Main FE Estimator | Robust S-Estimator | Robust MM-Estimator | Cooks' D. outliers removed |
|--------------------------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| Observations | 685 | 680 | 680 | 633 |
| Number of countries | 100 | 95 | 95 | 95 |
| Two-Way FE | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Within R-squared | 0.458 | | | 0.548 |
| Hausmann p S vs FE | | 0.0000 | | |
| Hausmann p MM vs. S | | | 0.0269 | |
| Total Health ODA (USD pc) | 0.059 [-0.028 - 0.146] | -0.014 [-0.036 - 0.009] | -0.001 [-0.095 - 0.093] | 0.006 [-0.076 - 0.088] |
| ln GDP pc | 8.701 [-3.778 - 21.180] | 0.894 [-3.200 - 4.987] | -1.608 [-11.741 - 8.524] | 4.842 [-4.856 - 14.540] |
| GHE share of CHE | 0.108* [-0.021 - 0.236] | 0.030 [-0.022 - 0.081] | 0.123 [-0.182 - 0.428] | 0.117** [0.020 - 0.215] |
| Government effective | 3.345 [-1.616 - 8.305] | 2.045 [-1.374 - 5.464] | 1.937 [-1.940 - 5.813] | 2.597** [0.044 - 5.150] |
| Corruption control | 2.372 [-3.543 - 8.286] | -4.130 [-10.275 - 2.016] | -1.220 [-6.175 - 3.735] | 0.107 [-3.842 - 4.055] |

| VARIABLES | | Main FE Estimator | Robust S-Estimator | Robust MM-Estimator | Cooks' D. outliers removed |
|---------------------------------|--------------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| | In Population density | 21.369** [0.149 - 42.589] | 20.135** [3.029 - 37.242] | 25.082** [5.252 - 44.911] | 26.923*** [14.977 - 38.869] |
| | Primary schooling | 0.050 [-0.034 - 0.135] | -0.000 [-0.098 - 0.097] | -0.004 [-0.080 - 0.073] | -0.004 [-0.070 - 0.061] |
| | Female labor part. | -0.149 [-0.456 - 0.159] | 0.062 [-0.223 - 0.347] | -0.087 [-0.353 - 0.179] | -0.107 [-0.305 - 0.092] |
| Observations | | 390 | 382 | 382 | 363 |
| Number of countries | | 96 | 88 | 88 | 92 |
| Two-Way FE | | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Within R-squared | | 0.392 | | | 0.555 |
| Hausmann p S vs FE | | | 0.0149 | | |
| Hausmann p MM vs. S | | | | 0.958 | |
| RH care ODA (USD pc) | | 0.902 [-1.111 - 2.916] | 0.432 [-0.372 - 1.237] | 1.218 [-0.961 - 3.397] | 0.737 [-0.942 - 2.416] |
| | In GDP pc | 6.759 [-5.779 - 19.298] | 0.089 [-4.651 - 4.830] | -3.509 [-9.871 - 2.852] | 2.784 [-6.414 - 11.983] |

| VARIABLES | | Main FE Estimator | Robust S-Estimator | Robust MM-Estimator | Cooks' D. outliers removed |
|--------------------------|--|----------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|-------------------------------|
| GHE share of CHE | | 0.125* | 0.032 | 0.142** | 0.119** |
| | | [-0.005 - 0.254] | [-0.028 - 0.092] | [0.023 - 0.262] | [0.025 - 0.213] |
| Government effective | | -4.575 | -0.355 | 0.119 | -4.139* |
| | | [-10.352 - 1.202] | [-1.317 - 0.607] | [-2.508 - 2.747] | [-8.960 - 0.683] |
| Corruption control | | 5.812* | 0.928** | 2.660 | 6.695*** |
| | | [-0.299 - 11.924] | [0.103 - 1.753] | [-1.255 - 6.574] | [1.697 - 11.694] |
| ln Population density | | 44.140*** | 5.644 | 36.401 | 50.953*** |
| | | [20.405 - 67.875] | [-5.600 - 16.887] | [-13.438 - 86.240] | [34.407 - 67.500] |
| Primary schooling | | 0.081 | 0.013 | 0.004 | -0.024 |
| | | [-0.101 - 0.262] | [-0.013 - 0.039] | [-0.139 - 0.148] | [-0.160 - 0.113] |
| Female labor part. | | 0.060 | 0.102* | 0.226 | 0.020 |
| | | [-0.454 - 0.575] | [-0.011 - 0.214] | [-0.052 - 0.505] | [-0.473 - 0.513] |
| Observations | | 663 | 656 | 656 | 609 |
| Number of countries | | 100 | 93 | 93 | 93 |
| Two-Way FE | | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Within R-squared | | 0.469 | | | 0.553 |
| Hausmann p S vs FE | | | 4.04e-41 | | |

| VARIABLES | Main FE Estimator | Robust S-Estimator | Robust MM-Estimator | Cooks' D. outliers removed |
|------------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| Hausmann p MM vs. S | | | 4.85e-05 | |

Note: All estimators include country and time fixed effects. All measures of health ODA are in USD per capita (constant 2020). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 and 95% CI in brackets. The user-contributed Stata module XTROBREG was used to calculate robust S and MM estimators, which are based on pairwise differencing. For the Hausmann tests, p<0.05 represents preference over indicated model. Influential observations were defined as observations that had a Cook's D>4/N-k, where N is the number of observations in the sample and k the number of predictors.

Table A8. Outlier robustness analysis – Effects of sectoral ODA per capita on *ART coverage* (alternative FE estimators)

| VARIABLES | Main FE Estimator | Robust S-Estimator | Robust MM-Estimator | Cooks' D. outliers removed |
|--------------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| SRH ODA (USD pc) | 0.531*** [0.380 - 0.682] | 0.438*** [0.330 - 0.546] | 0.526*** [0.355 - 0.697] | 0.570*** [0.438 - 0.702] |
| ln GDP pc | -1.695 [-16.181 - 12.792] | -3.490 [-25.138 - 18.158] | -3.993 [-22.000 - 14.015] | -1.863 [-12.751 - 9.026] |
| GHE share of CHE | -0.014 [-0.154 - 0.125] | -0.007 [-0.172 - 0.158] | -0.009 [-0.162 - 0.145] | -0.019 [-0.129 - 0.090] |
| Government effective | 6.128* [-0.340 - 12.597] | -1.096 [-6.198 - 4.007] | 2.717 [-2.522 - 7.956] | 5.540** [0.678 - 10.401] |
| Corruption control | 5.274* [-0.901 - 11.449] | 7.669*** [2.966 - 12.372] | 6.500** [0.450 - 12.550] | 5.566** [0.529 - 10.604] |
| ln Population density | 14.208 [-16.392 - 44.807] | -3.400 [-27.259 - 20.458] | 4.380 [-29.923 - 38.684] | 14.018 [-8.536 - 36.572] |
| Primary schooling | -0.052 [-0.193 - 0.089] | 0.110* [-0.018 - 0.238] | 0.067 [-0.084 - 0.218] | 0.017 [-0.091 - 0.125] |

| VARIABLES | Main FE Estimator | Robust S-Estimator | Robust MM-Estimator | Cooks' D. outliers removed |
|--------------------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| Female labor part. | -0.181 [-0.767 - 0.406] | 0.029 [-0.538 - 0.595] | 0.055 [-0.511 - 0.620] | 0.034 [-0.366 - 0.435] |
| Observations | 1,306 | 1,306 | 1,306 | 1,236 |
| Number of countries | 90 | 90 | 90 | 90 |
| Two-Way FE | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Within R-squared | 0.860 | | | 0.903 |
| Hausmann p S vs FE | | 0.013 | | |
| Hausmann p MM vs. S | | | 0.299 | |
| Total Health ODA (USD pc) | 0.332*** [0.193 - 0.471] | 0.294*** [0.073 - 0.516] | 0.306*** [0.155 - 0.457] | 0.345*** [0.245 - 0.444] |
| ln GDP pc | -2.335 [-16.971 - 12.300] | -6.305 [-30.686 - 18.076] | -5.076 [-25.584 - 15.431] | -3.500 [-14.653 - 7.653] |
| GHE share of CHE | -0.014 [-0.155 - 0.127] | -0.002 [-0.192 - 0.188] | -0.013 [-0.182 - 0.155] | -0.035 [-0.148 - 0.078] |
| Government effective | 6.088* [-0.346 - 12.521] | -1.528 [-6.728 - 3.671] | 2.536 [-3.121 - 8.192] | 5.591** [0.649 - 10.534] |

| VARIABLES | Main FE Estimator | Robust S-Estimator | Robust MM-Estimator | Cooks' D. outliers removed |
|--------------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| Corruption control | 5.278* [-1.012 - 11.567] | 8.544*** [3.829 - 13.260] | 6.741* [-0.034 - 13.516] | 6.148** [0.911 - 11.386] |
| In Population density | 9.790 [-20.878 - 40.459] | -8.845 [-32.181 - 14.491] | 1.551 [-38.799 - 41.902] | 10.263 [-12.950 - 33.476] |
| Primary schooling | -0.056 [-0.195 - 0.083] | 0.099 [-0.020 - 0.217] | 0.063 [-0.088 - 0.214] | 0.008 [-0.100 - 0.116] |
| Female labor part. | -0.184 [-0.774 - 0.406] | -0.038 [-0.683 - 0.607] | 0.072 [-0.592 - 0.735] | 0.047 [-0.377 - 0.471] |
| Observations | 1,307 | 1,307 | 1,307 | 1,242 |
| Number of countries | 90 | 90 | 90 | 90 |
| Two-Way FE | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Within R-squared | 0.857 | | | 0.898 |
| Hausmann p S vs FE | | 0.0211 | | |
| Hausmann p MM vs S | | | 0.831 | |

| VARIABLES | Main FE Estimator | Robust S-Estimator | Robust MM-Estimator | Cooks' D. outliers removed |
|---------------------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| RH care ODA (USD pc) | 0.575 [-1.081 - 2.231] | 0.220 [-2.660 - 3.100] | 0.148 [-1.692 - 1.987] | 0.702 [-0.777 - 2.181] |
| ln GDP pc | -3.497 [-18.169 - 11.174] | -5.765 [-42.216 - 30.685] | -3.515 [-24.193 - 17.163] | -3.780 [-15.156 - 7.596] |
| GHE share of CHE | -0.047 [-0.185 - 0.091] | -0.013 [-0.304 - 0.278] | -0.037 [-0.192 - 0.118] | -0.053 [-0.168 - 0.063] |
| Government effective | 6.274* [-0.645 - 13.193] | -1.076 [-13.365 - 11.213] | 3.624 [-3.751 - 10.998] | 6.255** [0.779 - 11.732] |
| Corruption control | 6.412* [-0.142 - 12.966] | 8.780** [1.767 - 15.792] | 8.114** [1.559 - 14.669] | 7.037** [1.574 - 12.500] |
| ln Population density | 9.995 [-23.660 - 43.651] | -6.059 [-42.826 - 30.709] | 5.727 [-43.978 - 55.432] | 10.087 [-15.656 - 35.830] |
| Primary schooling | -0.053 [-0.196 - 0.090] | 0.111 [-0.073 - 0.295] | 0.073 [-0.090 - 0.235] | 0.025 [-0.087 - 0.137] |
| Female labor part. | -0.246 [-0.863 - 0.370] | -0.001 [-0.974 - 0.973] | 0.006 [-0.751 - 0.763] | -0.054 [-0.509 - 0.401] |

| VARIABLES | Main FE Estimator | Robust S-Estimator | Robust MM-Estimator | Cooks' D. outliers removed |
|------------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| Observations | 1,290 | 1,290 | 1,290 | 1,220 |
| Number of countries | 90 | 90 | 90 | 90 |
| Two-Way FE | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Within R-squared | 0.848 | | | 0.890 |
| Hausmann p S vs FE | | 0.0302 | | |
| Hausmann p MM vs. S | | | 0.512 | |

Note: All estimators include country and time fixed effects. All measures of health ODA are in USD per capita (constant 2020). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 and 95% CI in brackets. The user-contributed Stata module XTROBREG was used to calculate robust S and MM estimators, which are based on pairwise differencing. For the Hausmann tests, p<0.05 represents preference over indicated model. Influential observations were defined as observations that had a Cook's D>4/N-k, where N is the number of observations in the sample and k the number of predictors.

FE estimation with alternative functional forms

Table A9. The effects of health ODA on SRH services, summary of FE estimations with alternative functional form

| Sectoral ODA | SRH service outcomes | | |
|---|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------|
| | Contraceptive Prevalence | Skilled birth attendance | ART coverage |
| SRH ODA | | | |
| Main FE estimator (linear, USD pc) | 0.628*** | 0.190* | 0.531*** |
| FE estimator (linear-log, USD millions) | 1.904** | 0.239 | 1.121 |
| FE estimator (log-log, USD millions) | 0.0882*** | 0.0149 | 0.0626 |
| Total Health ODA | | | |
| Main FE estimator (linear, USD pc) | 0.242** | 0.0591 | 0.332*** |
| FE estimator (linear-log, USD millions) | 1.203 | -0.224 | 2.004* |
| FE estimator (log-log, USD millions) | 0.0606 | 0.00189 | 0.136*** |
| RH care ODA | | | |
| Main FE estimator (linear, USD pc) | 0.935 | 0.902 | 0.575 |
| FE estimator (linear-log, USD millions) | 1.676*** | 0.830** | 0.711 |

| Sectoral ODA | SRH service outcomes | | |
|--|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------|
| | Contraceptive Prevalence | Skilled birth attendance | ART coverage |
| FE estimator (log-log, USD millions) | 0.0706*** | 0.0265*** | 0.0134 |

Note: All estimations include country and time fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. In the linear-log specification, all IVs are log-transformed, including ODA. The linear-log specification provides the absolute change in service coverage (percentage points) associated with a per cent change in ODA. In the log-log specification, all variables are log-transformed, including SRH service indicators. The log-log specification allows coefficients to be interpreted as elasticities, thus the percent change in service coverage associated with a percent change in ODA.

Table A10. Effects of sectoral ODA on *modern contraceptive prevalence* (FE estimation with alternative functional forms)

| Variables | SRH ODA | | | Total Health ODA | | | RH ODA | | |
|-----------------------|---------------------|--------------------|-----------------------|--------------------|------------------|---------------------|--------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|
| | Main | Linear-Log | Log-Log | Main FE | Linear-Log | Log-Log | Main FE | Linear-Log | Log-Log |
| Health ODA | 0.628*** (0.150) | 1.904** (0.879) | 0.0882*** (0.0327) | 0.242** (0.106) | 1.203 (1.229) | 0.0606 (0.0380) | 0.935 (1.221) | 1.676*** (0.519) | 0.0706*** (0.0228) |
| ln GDP pc | 1.735 (4.800) | 0.124 (5.179) | 0.000302 (0.175) | 1.820 (5.452) | 0.975 (5.310) | 0.0217 (0.177) | -0.699 (5.490) | -0.680 (4.865) | -0.0274 (0.161) |
| GHE share of CHE | 0.0266 (0.0648) | 1.057 (1.527) | 0.00942 (0.0688) | 0.0607 (0.0727) | 1.398 (1.639) | 0.0243 (0.0736) | 0.0393 (0.0691) | 0.728 (1.450) | -0.00362 (0.0662) |
| Government effective | 3.995* (2.249) | 8.595 (5.193) | 0.294 (0.222) | 3.345 (2.499) | 6.800 (5.371) | 0.226 (0.228) | 3.717 (2.997) | 8.406 (5.186) | 0.280 (0.217) |
| Corruption control | 1.504 (2.669) | 0.830 (4.701) | -0.103 (0.207) | 2.372 (2.979) | 2.509 (5.018) | -0.0276 (0.213) | 3.275 (3.294) | 1.586 (4.592) | -0.0631 (0.199) |
| ln Population density | 23.56** (9.288) | 15.85 (12.47) | 1.229** (0.478) | 21.37** (10.69) | 20.22 (13.13) | 1.401*** (0.509) | 21.16* (12.40) | 11.69 (11.94) | 1.090** (0.469) |
| Primary schooling | 0.0643 (0.0407) | 3.792 (4.052) | 0.483** (0.197) | 0.0500 (0.0426) | 3.709 (4.277) | 0.474** (0.207) | 0.0480 (0.0451) | 4.059 (3.987) | 0.495** (0.197) |

| Variables | SRH ODA | | | Total Health ODA | | | RH ODA | | |
|---------------------|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| | Main | Linear-Log | Log-Log | Main FE | Linear-Log | Log-Log | Main FE | Linear-Log | Log-Log |
| Female labor part. | -0.0896 (0.133) | -7.655 (6.092) | -0.286 (0.229) | -0.149 (0.155) | -9.473 (6.991) | -0.380 (0.230) | -0.213 (0.201) | -7.230 (6.603) | -0.275 (0.252) |
| Observations | 387 | 387 | 387 | 390 | 390 | 390 | 383 | 382 | 382 |
| Number of countries | 95 | 95 | 95 | 96 | 96 | 96 | 94 | 94 | 94 |
| Adjusted R-squared | 0.400 | 0.336 | 0.422 | 0.351 | 0.312 | 0.399 | 0.323 | 0.370 | 0.449 |
| Two-way FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |

Note: Standard errors are clustered at the country level to control for serial correlation. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 and a robust SE in parentheses. The main models use ODA in USD per capita. In the log-log and linear-log specifications, ODA disbursements are expressed in millions of USD.

Table A11. Effects of sectoral ODA on *skilled birth attendance* (FE estimation with alternative functional forms)

| Variables | SRH ODA | | | Total Health ODA | | | RH ODA | | |
|-----------------------|----------|------------|-----------|------------------|------------|----------|----------|------------|-----------|
| | Main | Linear-Log | Log-Log | Main | Linear-Log | Log-Log | Main | Linear-Log | Log-Log |
| Health ODA | 0.190* | 0.239 | 0.0149 | 0.0591 | -0.224 | 0.00189 | 0.902 | 0.830** | 0.0265*** |
| | (0.100) | (0.501) | (0.00991) | (0.0439) | (0.557) | (0.0117) | (1.015) | (0.418) | (0.00954) |
| ln GDP pc | 8.615 | 9.247 | 0.280* | 8.701 | 9.950 | 0.291** | 6.759 | 7.762 | 0.261* |
| | (6.305) | (6.422) | (0.147) | (6.290) | (6.308) | (0.145) | (6.319) | (6.308) | (0.144) |
| GHE share of CHE | 0.108 | 3.175 | -0.0351 | 0.108* | 3.188 | -0.0350 | 0.125* | 3.141 | -0.0414 |
| | (0.0658) | (2.180) | (0.0471) | (0.0648) | (2.161) | (0.0469) | (0.0653) | (2.193) | (0.0471) |
| Government effective | -4.585 | -7.845 | -0.181 | -3.935 | -7.186 | -0.168 | -4.575 | -7.909 | -0.187 |
| | (2.887) | (5.570) | (0.110) | (2.698) | (5.306) | (0.105) | (2.911) | (5.708) | (0.113) |
| Corruption control | 5.053* | 6.842 | 0.169* | 4.772* | 6.323 | 0.162* | 5.812* | 7.729 | 0.183* |
| | (2.943) | (4.963) | (0.0923) | (2.704) | (4.551) | (0.0856) | (3.080) | (5.208) | (0.0979) |
| ln Population density | 47.32*** | 46.79*** | 1.010*** | 48.15*** | 49.33*** | 1.067*** | 44.14*** | 41.49*** | 0.897*** |
| | (11.77) | (11.70) | (0.276) | (11.49) | (11.15) | (0.270) | (11.96) | (11.72) | (0.283) |
| Primary schooling | 0.0767 | 6.031 | 0.299* | 0.0756 | 6.187 | 0.307* | 0.0809 | 5.996 | 0.299* |
| | (0.0911) | (8.130) | (0.178) | (0.0901) | (8.101) | (0.178) | (0.0914) | (8.167) | (0.178) |

| Variables | SRH ODA | | | Total Health ODA | | | RH ODA | | |
|---------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|-------------------|------------------|------------------|
| | Main | Linear-Log | Log-Log | Main | Linear-Log | Log-Log | Main | Linear-Log | Log-Log |
| Female labor part. | 0.105 (0.267) | 6.503 (10.33) | 0.300 (0.233) | 0.106 (0.267) | 6.793 (10.18) | 0.294 (0.235) | 0.0605 (0.259) | 7.007 (10.46) | 0.324 (0.230) |
| Observations | 685 | 685 | 685 | 695 | 695 | 695 | 663 | 662 | 662 |
| Number of countries | 100 | 100 | 100 | 101 | 101 | 101 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| Adjusted R-squared | 0.437 | 0.431 | 0.382 | 0.432 | 0.428 | 0.378 | 0.448 | 0.450 | 0.403 |
| Two-way FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |

Note: Standard errors are clustered at the country level to control for serial correlation. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 and a robust SE in parenthesis. The main models use ODA in USD per capita. In the log-log and linear-log specifications, ODA disbursements are expressed in millions of USD.

Table A12. Effects of sectoral ODA on ART coverage (FE estimation with alternative functional forms)

| Variables | SRH ODA | | | Total Health ODA | | | RH ODA | | |
|-----------------------|----------------------|--------------------|---------------------|----------------------|--------------------|----------------------|---------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| | Main | Linear-Log | Log-Log | Main | Linear-Log | Log-Log | Main | Linear-Log | Log-Log |
| Health ODA | 0.531*** (0.0761) | 1.121 (1.029) | 0.0626 (0.0442) | 0.332*** (0.0698) | 2.004* (1.110) | 0.136*** (0.0510) | 0.575 (0.833) | 0.711 (0.490) | 0.0134 (0.0208) |
| ln GDP pc | -1.695 (7.291) | -3.943 (7.532) | 0.740** (0.334) | -2.335 (7.366) | -4.216 (7.637) | 0.703** (0.316) | -3.497 (7.384) | -3.940 (7.441) | 0.761** (0.336) |
| GHE share of CHE | -0.0144 (0.0701) | -2.271 (1.455) | -0.0749 (0.1000) | -0.0140 (0.0709) | -2.193 (1.498) | -0.0676 (0.0988) | -0.0471 (0.0695) | -2.351 (1.471) | -0.0724 (0.100) |
| Government effective | 6.128* (3.255) | 12.46** (5.423) | 0.308 (0.292) | 6.088* (3.238) | 11.98** (5.414) | 0.308 (0.288) | 6.274* (3.482) | 12.56** (5.584) | 0.295 (0.297) |
| Corruption control | 5.274* (3.108) | 8.374 (5.609) | 0.221 (0.222) | 5.278* (3.165) | 8.768 (5.626) | 0.234 (0.224) | 6.412* (3.298) | 9.225* (5.548) | 0.239 (0.229) |
| ln Population density | 14.21 (15.40) | 6.466 (16.56) | 1.334 (0.807) | 9.790 (15.43) | 5.405 (16.42) | 1.228* (0.734) | 9.995 (16.94) | 6.760 (16.20) | 1.483* (0.792) |
| Primary schooling | -0.0522 (0.0711) | -4.625 (6.540) | 0.873** (0.357) | -0.0563 (0.0699) | -5.335 (6.503) | 0.797** (0.339) | -0.0529 (0.0720) | -4.418 (6.640) | 0.897** (0.367) |

| Variables | SRH ODA | | | Total Health ODA | | | RH ODA | | |
|---------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| | Main | Linear-Log | Log-Log | Main | Linear-Log | Log-Log | Main | Linear-Log | Log-Log |
| Female labor part. | -0.181 (0.295) | -15.54 (15.64) | -1.182 (0.768) | -0.184 (0.297) | -15.21 (15.40) | -1.129 (0.758) | -0.246 (0.310) | -16.36 (15.73) | -1.181 (0.773) |
| Observations | 1,306 | 1,306 | 1,159 | 1,307 | 1,307 | 1,160 | 1,290 | 1,289 | 1,143 |
| Number of countries | 90 | 90 | 90 | 90 | 90 | 90 | 90 | 90 | 90 |
| Adjusted R-squared | 0.857 | 0.847 | 0.875 | 0.854 | 0.848 | 0.876 | 0.845 | 0.846 | 0.875 |
| Two-way FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |

Note: Standard errors are clustered at the country level to control for serial correlation. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 and a robust SE in parenthesis. The main models use ODA in USD per capita. In the log-log and linear-log specifications, ODA disbursements are expressed in millions of USD.

Potential delayed effect

Table A13. The effects of health ODA on SRH services, summary of lagged IVs (including ODA) models

| Sectoral ODA | SRH service outcomes | | |
|-------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------|
| | Contraceptive Prevalence | Skilled birth attendance | ART coverage |
| SRH ODA | | | |
| Main | 0.628*** | 0.190* | 0.531*** |
| FE Estimator | | | |
| FE Estimator | 0.732*** | 0.313** | 0.546*** |
| 1-Year Lagged IVs | | | |
| Total Health ODA | | | |
| Main FE | 0.242** | 0.059 | 0.332*** |
| Estimator | | | |
| FE Estimator | 0.315*** | 0.044 | 0.338*** |
| 1-Year Lagged IVs | | | |
| RH care ODA | | | |
| Main FE | 0.935 | 0.902 | 0.575 |
| Estimator | | | |
| FE estimator | 0.280 | 1.094 | 0.568 |
| 1-Year Lagged IVs | | | |

Note: All estimations include country and time fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. In the Lagged IVs model, all independent variables, including ODA, are lagged by one year. Thus, the effect of ODA received by a country in the previous year on current SRH service coverage is estimated.

Table A14. FE estimation – Effects of health ODA per capita on *modern contraceptive prevalence* (main model vs. lagged IVs model)

| VARIABLES | SRH ODA | | TotH ODA | | RH ODA | |
|-----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|--------------------|
| | Main Model | Lagged IVs | Main Model | Lagged IVs | Main Model | Lagged IVs |
| Health ODA | 0.628*** (0.150) | 0.732*** (0.201) | 0.242** (0.106) | 0.315*** (0.099) | 0.935 (1.221) | 0.280 (0.758) |
| ln GDP pc | 1.735 (4.800) | 1.398 (4.367) | 1.820 (5.452) | -1.509 (5.109) | -0.699 (5.490) | -1.586 (5.333) |
| GHE share of CHE | 0.027 (0.065) | 0.049 (0.073) | 0.061 (0.073) | 0.034 (0.074) | 0.039 (0.069) | 0.024 (0.077) |
| Government effective | 3.995* (2.249) | 5.068** (2.304) | 3.345 (2.499) | 5.347** (2.539) | 3.717 (2.997) | 4.420 (3.481) |
| Corruption control | 1.504 (2.669) | 2.812 (1.979) | 2.372 (2.979) | 3.330 (2.238) | 3.275 (3.294) | 3.746 (2.868) |
| ln Population density | 23.558** (9.288) | 26.206** (10.793) | 21.369** (10.689) | 19.811 (12.352) | 21.158* (12.400) | 16.887 (16.439) |
| Primary schooling | 0.064 (0.041) | 0.057 (0.046) | 0.050 (0.043) | 0.052 (0.047) | 0.048 (0.045) | 0.059 (0.051) |

| VARIABLES | SRH ODA | | TotH ODA | | RH ODA | |
|-----------------------|-------------------|------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| | Main Model | Lagged IVs | Main Model | Lagged IVs | Main Model | Lagged IVs |
| Female labor part. | -0.090 (0.133) | 0.044 (0.144) | -0.149 (0.155) | -0.037 (0.161) | -0.213 (0.201) | -0.163 (0.251) |
| Observations | 387 | 376 | 390 | 377 | 383 | 372 |
| Number of countries | 95 | 97 | 96 | 98 | 94 | 97 |
| Two-way FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Adj. within R-squared | 0.400 | 0.444 | 0.351 | 0.414 | 0.323 | 0.337 |
| Rho | 0.980 | 0.984 | 0.976 | 0.978 | 0.977 | 0.970 |

Note: All measures of health ODA are in USD per capita (constant 2020). Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 In the Lagged IVs model, all independent variables, including ODA, are lagged by one year.

Table A15. FE estimation – Effects of health ODA per capita on *skilled birth attendance* (main model vs. lagged IVs model)

| VARIABLES | SRH ODA | | TotH ODA | | RH ODA | |
|-----------------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
| | Main Model | Lagged IVs | Main Model | Lagged IVs | Main Model | Lagged IVs |
| Health ODA | 0.190* | 0.313** | 0.059 | 0.044 | 0.902 | 1.094 |
| | (0.100) | (0.158) | (0.044) | (0.062) | (1.015) | (0.719) |
| ln GDP pc | 8.615 | 11.603* | 8.701 | 11.357* | 6.759 | 10.957 |
| | (6.305) | (6.656) | (6.290) | (6.662) | (6.319) | (6.843) |
| GHE share of CHE | 0.108 | 0.103 | 0.108* | 0.092 | 0.125* | 0.098 |
| | (0.066) | (0.068) | (0.065) | (0.067) | (0.065) | (0.067) |
| Government effective | -4.585 | -5.018** | -3.935 | -4.554* | -4.575 | -5.213** |
| | (2.887) | (2.450) | (2.698) | (2.409) | (2.911) | (2.605) |
| Corruption control | 5.053* | 5.701** | 4.772* | 5.365** | 5.812* | 6.346** |
| | (2.943) | (2.666) | (2.704) | (2.584) | (3.080) | (2.882) |
| ln Population density | 47.320*** | 55.020*** | 48.155*** | 55.040*** | 44.140*** | 51.193*** |
| | (11.772) | (12.280) | (11.492) | (12.257) | (11.962) | (13.486) |
| Primary schooling | 0.077 | 0.107 | 0.076 | 0.112 | 0.081 | 0.118 |
| | (0.091) | (0.097) | (0.090) | (0.096) | (0.091) | (0.098) |

| VARIABLES | SRH ODA | | TotH ODA | | RH ODA | |
|-----------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|-------------------|
| | Main Model | Lagged IVs | Main Model | Lagged IVs | Main Model | Lagged IVs |
| Female labor part. | 0.105 (0.267) | 0.052 (0.255) | 0.106 (0.267) | 0.028 (0.253) | 0.060 (0.259) | -0.023 (0.255) |
| Observations | 685 | 665 | 695 | 670 | 663 | 641 |
| Number of countries | 100 | 101 | 101 | 101 | 100 | 101 |
| Two-way FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Adj. within R-squared | 0.437 | 0.488 | 0.432 | 0.476 | 0.448 | 0.491 |
| Rho | 0.987 | 0.991 | 0.988 | 0.991 | 0.986 | 0.989 |

Note: All measures of health ODA are in USD per capita (constant 2020). Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. In the Lagged IVs model, all independent variables, including ODA, are lagged by one year.

Table A16. FE estimation – Effects of health ODA per capita on *ART coverage* (main model vs. lagged IVs model)

| VARIABLES | SRH ODA | | TotH ODA | | RH ODA | |
|-----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|-------------------|--------------------|
| | Main Model | Lagged IVs | Main Model | Lagged IVs | Main Model | Lagged IVs |
| Health ODA | 0.531*** (0.076) | 0.546*** (0.081) | 0.332*** (0.070) | 0.338*** (0.071) | 0.575 (0.833) | 0.568 (0.773) |
| ln GDP pc | -1.695 (7.291) | -1.030 (7.359) | -2.335 (7.366) | -1.729 (7.445) | -3.497 (7.384) | -2.828 (7.443) |
| GHE share of CHE | -0.014 (0.070) | -0.027 (0.071) | -0.014 (0.071) | -0.028 (0.071) | -0.047 (0.070) | -0.060 (0.070) |
| Government effective | 6.128* (3.255) | 6.772** (3.341) | 6.088* (3.238) | 6.772** (3.328) | 6.274* (3.482) | 6.951* (3.579) |
| Corruption control | 5.274* (3.108) | 5.634* (3.001) | 5.278* (3.165) | 5.655* (3.051) | 6.412* (3.298) | 6.770** (3.206) |
| ln Population density | 14.208 (15.400) | 18.655 (15.619) | 9.790 (15.435) | 14.211 (15.640) | 9.995 (16.938) | 14.155 (17.248) |
| Primary schooling | -0.052 (0.071) | -0.044 (0.073) | -0.056 (0.070) | -0.048 (0.072) | -0.053 (0.072) | -0.043 (0.075) |

| VARIABLES | SRH ODA | | TotH ODA | | RH ODA | |
|-----------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| | Main Model | Lagged IVs | Main Model | Lagged IVs | Main Model | Lagged IVs |
| Female labor part. | -0.181 (0.295) | -0.224 (0.305) | -0.184 (0.297) | -0.230 (0.305) | -0.246 (0.310) | -0.290 (0.319) |
| Observations | 1,306 | 1,306 | 1,307 | 1,307 | 1,290 | 1,290 |
| Number of countries | 90 | 90 | 90 | 90 | 90 | 90 |
| Two-way FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
| Adj. within R-squared | 0.857 | 0.867 | 0.854 | 0.864 | 0.845 | 0.855 |
| Rho | 0.897 | 0.929 | 0.850 | 0.900 | 0.861 | 0.904 |

Note: All measures of health ODA are in USD per capita (constant 2020). Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. In the Lagged IVs model, all independent variables, including ODA, are lagged by one year.

Dynamic FE model – System GMM

The relationship between service coverage and health ODA may be dynamic, meaning that previous SRH services coverage might be correlated with contemporary ODA allocation decisions. To account for the potential endogeneity of ODA (and covariates) due to this dynamic effect, we used a two-step system GMM estimator with country and time fixed effects on our data (Frees 2004, Cameron and Trivedi 2005). For this estimation, we used the community-contributed `xtdpdgm` command in STATA (Kripfganz 2020).

The system-GMM estimator was applied to the three-year averaged data with six time periods, to limit bias from missing data and measurement error. Based on their suggested relevance from the main models, the following covariates were included in the system-GMM models; \ln GDP pc, GHE/CHE, corruption control, \ln population density, and primary school enrollment.

As a starting point, ODA was considered predetermined, and all other covariates were considered endogenous. Lagged forward-orthogonal-deviations (fod) of these variables were used as instruments for the current levels of the regressors. While first-differences (diff) are most commonly used, the fod-GMM estimator retains more information than the diff-GMM estimators in unbalanced panels (Kripfganz 2020), such as ours. Our initial candidate model included all available instruments for the fod-transformed models. The two-step system-GMM was implemented with robust and Windmeijer corrected standard errors and the instrument set was collapsed, to reduce the number of instruments. This was necessary given the relatively small number of countries (N) in our panel.

For each system-GMM model estimated, a Hansen test for overidentifying restrictions was conducted as well as AR(1) and AR(2) tests for first and second-order autocorrelation, respectively. Moreover, the Akaike (AIC) and Bayesian (BIC) information criteria

were computed to compare candidate models and support the specification search. Specifications of individual models were systematically adjusted (from the baseline choice) to fit the stringent identifying assumptions. For instance, we experimented with including a different number of instruments (e.g., limiting instruments to two-period lags). Also, we tested the models when classifying some of the covariates as pre-determined, and even exogenous.

In line with the main FE estimation, the results from the system-GMM estimation generally suggested positive associations between sectoral health ODA and SRH services. However, the magnitude and significance of these positive associations was highly sensitive to model specifications and variable classifications. The GMM modelling approach was designed to estimate models with relatively few time periods and large panels (N) and requires a quite large number of observations to provide robust estimates. Thus, it may not be ideal for our country-level panel data. The reduction in potential endogeneity bias from using the system-GMM estimator may come at the cost of loss in precision (Frees 2004).

References

- Cameron, A. C. and P. K. Trivedi (2005). Microeconometrics: Methods and Applications. New York, Cambridge University Press.
- Frees, E. W. (2004). Longitudinal and Panel Data: Analysis and Applications in the Social Sciences. Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press.
- Kripfganz, S. (2020). Generalized method of moments estimation of linear dynamic panel-data models. 2020 Stata conference 14, Stata Users Group.

Annex V. Data and variable definitions

Table A1. Summary statistics of key variables

| VARIABLE | N | mean | sd | min | max |
|--|----------|-------------|-----------|------------|------------|
| ODA variables | | | | | |
| Total Health ODA, US\$ millions | 2,235 | 113.1 | 185.9 | 0.0143 | 1,346 |
| SRH ODA, US\$ millions | 2,186 | 50.81 | 106.6 | 0.000597 | 778.4 |
| RH care ODA, US\$ millions | 2,115 | 8.211 | 16.72 | -0.0128 | 176.3 |
| Total Health ODA, US\$ pc | 2,235 | 12.71 | 27.52 | 0.0299 | 515.1 |
| SRH ODA, US\$ pc | 2,186 | 3.695 | 7.482 | 0.00102 | 103.3 |
| RH care ODA, US\$ pc | 2,115 | 0.545 | 0.975 | -0.0260 | 21.63 |
| Total Health ODA, US\$ pc (multilateral) | 2,199 | 4.544 | 9.586 | -0.0788 | 303.7 |
| SRH ODA, US\$ pc (multilateral) | 2,138 | 1.526 | 3.610 | -0.0260 | 103.3 |
| RH care ODA, US\$ pc (multilateral) | 2,060 | 0.196 | 0.413 | -0.0260 | 7.232 |
| Total Health ODA, US\$ pc (bilateral) | 2,229 | 8.260 | 23.79 | 0.000743 | 500.0 |
| SRH ODA, US\$ pc (bilateral) | 2,033 | 2.368 | 5.586 | -0.00109 | 58.55 |
| RH care ODA, US\$ pc (bilateral) | 1,673 | 0.447 | 0.959 | 4.07e-07 | 21.63 |
| SRH service outcomes | | | | | |
| Skilled birth attendance (%) | 950 | 82.17 | 22.79 | 5.700 | 100 |
| Modern contraceptive prevalence (%) | 505 | 36.07 | 20.29 | 0.900 | 84 |
| ART coverage (%) | 1,837 | 25.40 | 23.27 | 0 | 98 |

| VARIABLE | N | mean | sd | min | max |
|--|----------|-------------|-----------|------------|------------|
| Skilled birth attendance, Interpolated (%) | 1,724 | 76.01 | 24.75 | 5.700 | 100 |
| Contraceptive Prevalence, Interpolated (%) | 1,384 | 35.33 | 20.37 | 0.900 | 84 |
| ART coverage, Interpolated (%) | 1,840 | 25.36 | 23.27 | 0 | 98 |
| Covariates | | | | | |
| GDP per capita (constant, PPP) | 2,118 | 6,868 | 5,493 | 715.5 | 41,249 |
| GHE as share of CHE (%) | 2,024 | 40.35 | 20.29 | 0.891 | 97.12 |
| Government Effectiveness Index (0-5) | 2,228 | 1.855 | 0.583 | 0.0497 | 3.549 |
| Corruption Control Index (0-5) | 2,240 | 1.890 | 0.563 | 0.584 | 4.163 |
| Population Density (per sq. km) | 2,214 | 124.5 | 187.5 | 1.579 | 1,802 |
| Primary school enrolment (% gross) | 1,721 | 103.4 | 16.49 | 23.36 | 150.0 |
| Female labor market part. (%) | 2,166 | 50.87 | 19.05 | 6.081 | 87.81 |
| TotH ODA as share of GHE (%) | 2,016 | 71.9 | 1.181 | 7.87e-03 | 1161.4 |
| SRH ODA as share of GHE (%) | 1,969 | 26.8 | 0.488 | 4.84e-04 | 505.1 |
| RH care ODA as share of GHE (%) | 1,905 | 5.28 | 0.132 | -0.0416 | 194.9 |

Note: Table A1 presents summary statistics for the 119 LLMIC over the period 2002–2020. The unit of observation is country-year. The panel is unbalanced. Regarding negative ODA values, loan repayments are recorded as negative and deducted from ODA. In some cases, loan repayments are higher than new ODA and net ODA will show as a negative number. Data sources: OECD-CRS, WGI, WDI.

Table A2. Between and within country variation for key variables

| Variable | | Mean | Std. Dev | Min. | Max | Observations |
|----------------------------------|---------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------------|
| Total Health ODA, millions USD | overall | 113.055 | 185.913 | 0.014 | 1345.917 | N = 2235 |
| | within | | 163.343 | 1.193 | 815.679 | n = 119 |
| | between | | 88.822 | -545.705 | 643.293 | T-bar = 18.782 |
| SRH ODA, millions USD | overall | 50.815 | 106.640 | 0.001 | 778.379 | N = 2186 |
| | within | | 92.815 | 0.197 | 442.176 | n = 119 |
| | between | | 51.036 | -372.779 | 389.265 | T-bar = 18.370 |
| RH care ODA, millions USD | overall | 8.211 | 16.715 | -0.013 | 176.323 | N = 2115 |
| | within | | 12.784 | 0.010 | 70.400 | n = 119 |
| | between | | 10.637 | -46.226 | 114.135 | T-bar = 17.773 |
| Total Health ODA, USD per capita | overall | 12.70899 | 27.521 | 0.029 | 515.122 | N = 2235 |
| | within | | 19.405 | 0.113 | 115.783 | n = 119 |
| | between | | 19.498 | -101.633 | 415.909 | T-bar = 18.782 |
| SRH ODA, USD per capita | overall | 3.695 | 7.482 | 0.001 | 103.345 | N = 2186 |
| | within | | 6.098 | 0.033 | 39.273 | n = 119 |
| | between | | 4.490 | -32.653 | 83.495 | T-bar = 18.370 |
| RH care ODA, USD per capita | overall | 0.545 | 0.975 | -0.0260 | 21.625 | N = 2115 |
| | within | | 0.884 | 0.002 | 7.566 | n = 119 |
| | between | | 0.738 | -6.825 | 14.603 | T-bar = 17.773 |

| Variable | | Mean | Std. Dev | Min. | Max | Observations |
|---|---------|----------|----------|-----------|----------|----------------|
| Skilled birth attendance (% of all births) | overall | 82.1727 | 22.794 | 5.7 | 100 | N = 950 |
| | within | | 23.154 | 14.55 | 99.979 | n = 119 |
| | between | | 8.378 | 40.058 | 115.280 | T-bar = 7.983 |
| Modern contraceptive prevalence (% of married women) | overall | 36.071 | 20.286 | 0.9 | 84 | N = 505 |
| | within | | 20.402 | 1.2 | 82.25 | n = 115 |
| | between | | 5.156 | 7.505 | 55.605 | T-bar = 4.391 |
| ART coverage (% of HIV positive) | overall | 25.404 | 23.267 | 0 | 98 | N = 1837 |
| | within | | 11.305 | 3.526 | 56.158 | n = 97 |
| | between | | 20.359 | -26.175 | 87.824 | T-bar = 18.938 |
| GDP per capita (PPP), constant 2017 international \$ | overall | 6868.242 | 5492.844 | 715.454 | 41249.49 | N = 2118 |
| | within | | 5262.352 | 816.498 - | 29441.7 | n = 113 |
| | between | | 1596.93 | 5358.72 | 18676.03 | T-bar = 18.743 |
| Domestic government health expenditure (% current health expend.) | overall | 40.352 | 20.289 | 0.891 | 97.121 | N = 2024 |
| | within | | 19.242 | 5.208 | 87.518 | n = 115 |
| | between | | 6.726 | -2.039 | 66.542 | T-bar= 17.6 |
| Corruption control, rated from 0 (low) – 5(high) | overall | 1.890 | 0.563 | 0.584 | 4.163 | N = 2240 |
| | within | | 0.532 | 0.846 | 3.582 | n = 119 |
| | between | | 0.202 | 0.450 | 2.745 | T-bar = 18.824 |

| Variable | | Mean | Std. Dev | Min. | Max | Observations |
|--|---------|---------|----------|----------|----------|----------------|
| Government effectiveness, rated from 0(low) – 5(high) | overall | 1.855 | 0.583 | 0.050 | 3.549 | N = 2228 |
| | within | | 0.551 | 0.369 | 3.091 | n = 119 |
| | between | | 0.214 | 0.873 | 2.958 | T-bar = 18.723 |
| Population density (people per sq. km of land area) | overall | 124.517 | 187.511 | 1.579 | 1801.807 | N = 2214 |
| | within | | 184.966 | 1.805 | 1332.512 | n = 118 |
| | between | | 30.110 | -227.378 | 593.812 | T-bar = 18.763 |
| School enrollment primary, % gross | overall | 103.394 | 16.492 | 23.364 | 149.957 | N = 1721 |
| | within | | 16.032 | 23.364 | 139.081 | n = 116 |
| | between | | 7.748 | 53.591 | 145.932 | T-bar = 14.836 |
| Female labor market participation rate (% of female pop. ages 15+) | overall | 50.872 | 19.0508 | 6.081 | 87.812 | N = 2166 |
| | within | | 18.993 | 10.025 | 84.2072 | n = 114 |
| | between | | 2.2795 | 39.730 | 65.8904 | T-bar = 19 |

Note. The unit of observation is country-year. The standard deviations show that, while there is variance across countries, there is substantial within-country variation in SRH services outcomes, health ODA received, and covariates. Such within-country variability is required to be able to apply FE models.

Data sources: OECD-CRS, WGI, WDI.

Table A3. Definitions and sources of variables and indicators

| | Variable | Indicator (unit of measurement) | Source (period) | Comment | |
|--|---------------|--|----------------------|---------------|------|
| Independent variables | Health ODA | Health ODA disbursement (constant 2020 USD) | OECD-CRS (2002-2020) | Purpose 120 | code |
| | SRH ODA | Population programs & policies and reproductive health ODA (constant 2020 USD) | OECD-CRS (2002-2020) | Purpose 130 | code |
| ODA collected for multilateral, bilateral and all donors | PP ODA | Population policy & programs ODA (constant 2020 USD) | OECD-CRS (2002-2020) | Purpose 13010 | code |
| | RH ODA | Reproductive healthcare ODA (constant 2020 USD) | OECD-CRS (2002-2020) | Purpose 13020 | code |
| | FP ODA | Family planning ODA (constant 2020 USD) | OECD-CRS (2002-2020) | Purpose 13030 | code |
| | STD ODA | STD-control ODA (constant 2020 USD) | OECD-CRS (2002-2020) | Purpose 13040 | code |
| | PD ODA | Personnel development ODA (constant 2020 USD) | OECD-CRS (2002-2020) | Purpose 13081 | code |
| Dependent variables | SBA | Births attended by SBA (% of live births) | WDI (2002-2020) | | |
| | Contraceptive | Contraceptive prevalence, any modern methods - % of married women (aged 15-49) | WDI (2002-2020) | | |
| | ART coverage | Antiretroviral therapy coverage (% living with HIV) | WDI (2002-2020) | | |

| | Variable | Indicator (unit of measurement) | Source (period) | Comment |
|-------------------|----------------------|--|------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| Control variables | GDP per capita | GDP per capita (constant 2017 international, adjusted for purchasing power parity) | WDI (2002-2020) | PPP |
| | GHE per capita | Domestic general government health expenditure per capita (current US\$) | WDI (2002-2020) | |
| | IG | Income classification | World Bank (2002-2020) | L, LM, UM, H |
| | GHE as share of CHE | Domestic general government health expenditure (% of current health expenditure) | WDI (2002-2019) | |
| | Corruption Control | Control of corruption estimate, -2.5 (low) to 2.5 (high) | WGI (2002-2020) | Re-scaled 0 (low) to 5 (high) |
| | Government Effective | Government effectiveness estimate, -2.5 (low) to 2.5 (high) | WGI (2002-2020) | Rescaled from 0 (low) to 5 (high) |
| | Primary Schooling | Enrolment rate, primary (% gross) | WDI (2002-2020) | |
| | Female labor part. | Labor force participation rate, female (% of ages 15+) | WDI (2002-2020) | |
| | Population Density | Population density (pop. per km ² land) | WDI (2002-2020) | |
| | Population | Total population | WDI (2002-2020) | |

Note: Corruption Control and Government effectiveness estimates were re-scaled from 0-5 to be able to apply logarithmic transformations.

Source: Authors' compilation.

Table A4. Sample of 119 ODA-eligible countries classified as low- or lower-middle-income in 2002

| Country | id | IG 2002 | IG 2020 | Note |
|-----------------------------|----|------------|------------|---------------------------|
| Afghanistan | 1 | L | L | |
| Albania | 2 | LM | UM | |
| Algeria | 3 | LM | LM | |
| Angola | 4 | L | LM | |
| Armenia | 5 | LM | UM | |
| Azerbaijan | 6 | L | UM | |
| Bangladesh | 7 | L | LM | |
| Belarus | 8 | LM | UM | |
| Benin | 9 | L | LM | |
| Bhutan | 10 | L | LM | |
| Bolivia | 11 | LM | LM | |
| Bosnia and Herzegovina | 12 | LM | UM | |
| Brazil | 13 | LM | UM | |
| Burkina Faso | 14 | L | L | |
| Burundi | 15 | L | L | |
| Cabo Verde | 16 | LM | LM | |
| Cambodia | 17 | L | LM | |
| Cameroon | 18 | L | LM | |
| Central African Republic | 19 | L | L | |
| Chad | 20 | L | L | |
| China | 21 | LM | UM | |
| Colombia | 22 | LM | UM | |
| Comoros | 23 | L | LM | |
| Congo, Dem. Rep. | 24 | L | L | |
| Congo, Rep. | 25 | L | LM | |
| Cote d'Ivoire | 26 | L | LM | |
| Cuba | 27 | LM | UM | Lacking data on GDP pc |

| Country | id | IG 2002 | IG 2020 | Note |
|------------------------------|-----------|--------------------|--------------------|------------------------------|
| Djibouti | 28 | LM | LM | Lacking data on GDP pc |
| Dominican Republic | 29 | LM | UM | |
| Ecuador | 30 | LM | UM | |
| Egypt, Arab Rep. | 31 | LM | LM | |
| El Salvador | 32 | LM | LM | |
| Equatorial Guinea | 33 | L | UM | |
| Eritrea | 34 | L | L | |
| Eswatini | 35 | LM | LM | |
| Ethiopia | 36 | L | L | |
| Fiji | 37 | LM | UM | |
| Gambia, The | 38 | L | L | |
| Georgia | 39 | L | UM | |
| Ghana | 40 | L | LM | |
| Guatemala | 41 | LM | UM | |
| Guinea | 42 | L | L | |
| Guinea-Bissau | 43 | L | L | |
| Guyana | 44 | LM | UM | |
| Haiti | 45 | L | LM | Lacking data on schooling |
| Honduras | 46 | LM | LM | |
| India | 47 | L | LM | |
| Indonesia | 48 | L | LM | |
| Iran, Islamic Rep. | 49 | LM | LM | |
| Iraq | 50 | LM | UM | |
| Jamaica | 51 | LM | UM | |
| Jordan | 52 | LM | UM | |
| Kazakhstan | 53 | LM | UM | |
| Kenya | 54 | L | LM | |
| Kiribati | 55 | LM | LM | |
| Korea, Dem. People's Rep. | 56 | L | L | |

| Country | id | IG 2002 | IG 2020 | Note |
|-----------------------|-----------|--------------------|--------------------|---------------------------------------|
| Kosovo | 57 | LM | UM | Lacking data on service coverage |
| Kyrgyz Republic | 58 | L | LM | |
| Lao PDR | 59 | L | LM | |
| Lesotho | 60 | L | LM | |
| Liberia | 61 | L | L | |
| Madagascar | 62 | L | L | |
| Malawi | 63 | L | L | |
| Maldives | 64 | LM | UM | |
| Mali | 65 | L | L | |
| Marshall Islands | 66 | LM | UM | Lacking data on female labor part. |
| Mauritania | 67 | L | LM | |
| Micronesia, Fed. Sts. | 68 | LM | LM | Lacking data on female labor part. |
| Moldova | 69 | L | UM | |
| Mongolia | 70 | L | LM | |
| Montenegro | 71 | LM | UM | Lacking data on GHE/CHE |
| Morocco | 72 | LM | LM | |
| Mozambique | 73 | L | L | |
| Myanmar | 74 | L | LM | |
| Namibia | 75 | LM | UM | |
| Nepal | 76 | L | LM | |
| Nicaragua | 77 | L | LM | |
| Niger | 78 | L | L | |
| Nigeria | 79 | L | LM | |
| North Macedonia | 80 | LM | UM | |
| Pakistan | 81 | L | LM | |
| Papua New Guinea | 82 | L | LM | |
| Paraguay | 83 | LM | UM | |
| Peru | 84 | LM | UM | |
| Philippines | 85 | LM | LM | |

| Country | id | IG 2002 | IG 2020 | Note |
|-----------------------------------|-----------|--------------------|--------------------|-------------------------------------|
| Rwanda | 86 | L | L | |
| Samoa | 87 | LM | LM | |
| Sao Tome and Principe | 88 | L | LM | |
| Senegal | 89 | L | LM | |
| Serbia | 90 | LM | UM | |
| Sierra Leone | 91 | L | L | |
| Solomon Islands | 92 | L | LM | |
| Somalia | 93 | L | L | Lacking data on GHE/CHE |
| South Africa | 94 | LM | UM | |
| South Sudan | 95 | L | L | Lacking data on GHE/CHE |
| Sri Lanka | 96 | LM | LM | |
| St. Vincent and the Grenadines | 97 | LM | UM | |
| Sudan | 98 | L | L | |
| Suriname | 99 | LM | UM | |
| Syrian Arab Republic | 100 | LM | L | Lacking data on GDP pc |
| Tajikistan | 101 | L | LM | |
| Tanzania | 102 | L | LM | |
| Thailand | 103 | LM | UM | |
| Timor-Leste | 104 | L | LM | |
| Togo | 105 | L | L | |
| Tonga | 106 | LM | UM | |
| Tunisia | 107 | LM | LM | |
| Türkiye | 108 | LM | UM | |
| Turkmenistan | 109 | LM | UM | Lacking data on schooling |
| Tuvalu | 110 | LM | UM | Lacking data on service coverage |
| Uganda | 111 | L | L | |

| Country | id | IG 2002 | IG 2020 | Note |
|--------------------|-----|------------|------------|----------------------------|
| Ukraine | 112 | LM | LM | |
| Uzbekistan | 113 | L | LM | |
| Vanuatu | 114 | LM | LM | |
| Vietnam | 115 | L | LM | |
| West Bank and Gaza | 116 | LM | LM | Lacking data on GHE/CHE |
| Yemen, Rep. | 117 | L | L | |
| Zambia | 118 | L | LM | |
| Zimbabwe | 119 | L | LM | |

Note: Data on Income Group classification from the World Bank.

Abbreviations; L, low- income countries; LM, lower-middle-income countries.