EBA



07
2021

IN PURSUIT OF SUSTAINABLE PEACE: AN EVALUATION OF THE FOLKE BERNADOTTE ACADEMY 2008–2019

Nicklas Svensson, Julian Brett, Adam Moe Fejerskov and Charlotte Bonnet

In Pursuit of Sustainable Peace: An Evaluation of the Folke Bernadotte Academy 2008–2019

Nicklas Svensson
Julian Brett
Adam Moe Fejerskov
Charlotte Bonnet

Report 2021:07

to

The Expert Group for Aid Studies (EBA)

Please refer to the present report as: Svensson, N., Brett, J., Fejerskov,AM., Bonnet, C. (2021) *In Pursuit of Sustainable Peace: An Evaluation of the Folke Bernadotte Academy 2008–2019*, EBA Report 2021:07, The Expert Group for Aid Studies (EBA), Sweden.

This report can be downloaded free of charge at www.eba.se

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. To view a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

ISBN 978-91-88143-75-4
Printed by Elanders Sverige AB
Stockholm 2022

Cover design by Julia Demchenko

Nicklas Svensson is a senior consultant with Stockholm Policy Group with over twenty years' experience from international development assignments in fragile and conflict affected countries. He has undertaken numerous evaluations in the areas of peacebuilding, humanitarian assistance; including of, and for, Swedish development agencies, the United Nations and non-governmental organisations.

Julian Brett is a senior development consultant with Tana Copenhagen with over twenty-five years' experience from development and stabilisation assignments in fragile and conflict affected countries. He has undertaken numerous evaluations in the areas of peacebuilding, peace and security; including of, and for, Swedish development agencies and non-governmental organisations.

Adam Moe Fejerskov is a Senior Researcher at the Danish Institute for International Studies in Copenhagen. He has more than ten years of experience in leading research and advisory work within issues of development, peace and conflict, supporting governments, ministries and non-governmental organizations on strategic, organizational, and policy matters.

Charlotte Bonnet is a consultant at Tana Copenhagen with four years' experience conducting evaluations, studies and implementation assignments within the fields of governance, forced displacement and vulnerability, primarily in the Horn of Africa and francophone West Africa regions. She has coordinated and participated in qualitative and quantitative data collection and analysis on 20 assignments in four languages.

Acknowledgements

The evaluation team would like to express its sincere gratitude for the support provided to by FBA, EBA and the many informants who contributed to the evaluation with their experience and knowledge. We would also like to thank Richard H. Sieh in Liberia for his invaluable contribution to data collection, and Tobias Hagmann for his guidance and input as quality assurance expert.

Table of Contents

Foreword by EBA 1

Sammanfattning 3

Utvärderingens syfte och fokus 3

Utvärderingens resultat 4

Övergripande slutsatser och rekommendationer 7

Summary 11

Evaluation findings 12

Overall conclusions 15

Introduction 21

FBA's strategic aims and areas of operation 22

Key strategic and organisational tensions 28

Evaluation approach and method 30

Overall evaluation approach 30

Data collection methods 33

Approach to gender mainstreaming 35

Evaluation limitations 36

Evaluation findings 40

Education, training and exercises 40

Secondments 70

Bilateral cooperation 91

Research, policy and methods 138

Overall conclusions 162

Higher-level impact 164

Scalability 165

Strategic coherence 167

Coordination 168

Expertise and knowledge 169

Three strategic and organisational tensions 170

Recommendations 173

General 173

Education, training and exercises 174

Secondments 175

Bilateral cooperation 175

Research 176

References 178

Evaluations of FBA interventions 179

Internal FBA documents 181

Documents from the MFA and other Swedish ministries or agencies 196

News articles 199

Other 199

Annex 1. Approach and methodology 203

Annex 2. Evaluation matrix 210

Annex 3. Interview guides 218

Structure for interview – FBA's support to ARN 218

Structure for interview – FBA's support to the DRC and Liberia 220

Interview guide and analytical framework for former PCPI course participants – Democratic Republic of the Congo ... 222

Structure for interview – Sida/MFA 224

Structure for interview notes – FBA secondments 225

Structure for interview notes – FBA training 226

Annex 4. Research ethics 227

Research Ethics 227

Principles 227

Annex 5. DRC case study 231

Relevance 231

Efficiency 243

Effectiveness 249

Coordination 268

Annex 6. Colombia case study 274

Relevance 274

Efficiency 281

Effectiveness 283

Coordination 293

Annex 7. Liberia case study 296

Relevance 296

Efficiency 312

Effectiveness 324

Coordination 350

Previous EBA reports 354

Foreword by EBA

Since its founding through a Swedish Government decision in 2002, the Folke Bernadotte Academy (FBA) has become an important actor in Swedish development cooperation, both financially and in terms of mandates within several geographic and thematic strategies. The agency focuses on important areas in Sweden's aid policy (peace, conflict, crisis management, the rule of law and conflict and post-conflict countries) related to SDG 16 on peace, justice and strong institutions.

Between 2007 and 2020, FBA's budget rose from SEK 54 million to SEK 301 million, according to its annual reports. Operations have thus increased sixfold over this period. Much of the expansion took place after FBA assumed responsibility for parts of the recruitment and secondment of Swedish personnel to international organizations from the Sida in 2008. The FBA thus doubled in size between 2009 and 2020. Today, FBA is involved in development work under a relatively large number of geographic and thematic strategies in Swedish development cooperation.

In 2020 the Expert Group for Aid Studies (EBA) initiated an evaluation of FBA with the purpose to investigate whether, and if so in what way, FBA's operations 1) have contributed to the agency's overarching objectives and 2) in their broader context, are coordinated effectively with relevant actors in Sweden and internationally, including in conflict and post-conflict countries.

One important conclusion from the evaluation is that positive changes often remain at the individual level while the agency's impact on peace writ large probably has been more limited. The evaluators mean that this is partly due to a limited contribution to institutional change. The extent to which learning and knowledge from training and education lead to wider effects is difficult to determine.

The evaluators recommend FBA's capacity-building efforts to be linked more closely to political and peace-building processes in partner countries, and for a more well-defined role for FBA to ensure that goals and ambitions are reasonable in relation to available resources and to the local context.

I hope that this report will find its audience at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, FBA, Swedish Embassies as well as among the general public.

The study has been conducted with support from a reference group chaired by Johan Schaar, member of the Expert Group. The authors are solely responsible for the content of the report.

Gothenburg, March 2022

Helena Lindholm

Sammanfattning

Folke Bernadotteakademin (FBA) är en svensk myndighet under Utrikesdepartementet (UD) med fokus på fred, säkerhet och utveckling. Som en del av Sveriges internationella bistånd arbetar FBA för att bygga fred i konfliktdrabbade länder genom utbildning, rådgivning och forskning och för att stödja freds- och statsbyggande. FBA bidrar med civil personal till fredsinsatser och valobservationer som leds av främst FN, EU och OSSE och fördelar bidrag till civilsamhällesorganisationer som arbetar med fredsfrågor.

Regeringen inrättade FBA år 2002. Myndigheten styrs av regeringens instruktion och årliga regleringsbrev som anger de mål, uppdrag och medel FBA har att förhålla sig till. FBAs verksamhet styrs dessutom av strategier för Sveriges utvecklingssamarbete och globala tematiska områden såsom Strategin för hållbar fred. Strategierna anger inriktningen på FBAs insatser globalt och nationellt och vad FBAs insatser förväntas bidra till. FBAs övergripande och långsiktiga målsättningar är (i) att öka människors säkerhet och motståndskraft mot väpnade konflikter i konflikt- och postkonfliktländer (ii) ökad kapacitet för internationella fred- och krishanteringsinsatser att bidra till fred och säkerhet och (iii) stärkta demokratiska institutioner och processer, inklusive ökad respekt för rättsstatens principer i konflikt- och postkonfliktländer. Verksamheten var under den studerade perioden uppdelad i fem arbetsområden: 1) utbildning och övning, 2) personalbidrag, 3) bilateralt utvecklingssamarbete, 4) forskning och metodutveckling, 5) stöd till civilsamhället.

Utvärderingens syfte och fokus

I denna utvärdering analyseras FBAs resultat under perioden 2008–2019, med tonvikt på perioden efter 2014 då FBA för första gången fick i uppdrag att arbeta med strategier för utvecklings-

samarbetet. Utvärderingen bedömer (i) om och i så fall på vilket sätt verksamheten har bidragit till myndighetens övergripande långsiktiga mål och (ii) om verksamheten är effektivt samordnad med relevanta aktörer i Sverige och internationellt, inklusive i konflikt- och postkonfliktländer. Utvärderingens huvudsakliga syfte är att besvara dessa frågor inom fyra av FBAs verksamhetsområden: utbildning och övning, sekunderingar, bilateralt utvecklingssamarbete samt forskning och metodutveckling. Utvärderingen lämnar även ett antal rekommendationer för framtiden.

Utvärderingsmetoden kombinerar tre fördjupande fallstudier på landnivå med datainsamling av både primär- och sekundärkällor. Över 100 personer har intervjuats och ungefär lika många har deltagit i en enkätstudie. Utvärderingsteamet har gått igenom en stor mängd projektdokument, tidigare utvärderingar och enkät-undersökningar kring aktiviteter och kurser.

Utvärderingens resultat

Vad gäller *utbildning och övning* har FBA idag välförtjänt internationellt gott renommé som utbildningsinstitution. Verksamheten bidrar positivt till FBAs egna mål och till Sveriges strategier inom utvecklingssamarbete och humanitärt bistånd. Under åren har flera tusen individer från ett stort antal internationella organisationer, regeringar och civilsamhällesorganisationer deltagit i olika kurser. FBA organiserar också utbildningar tillsammans med andra. Utbildningsverksamheten är relevant och utgör ett betydande bidrag till myndighetens ambitioner, mål och resultat.

Verksamhetsområdet saknar dock förändringsteorier som kan klargöra vad som krävs för att verksamheten ska bidra till hållbar och långsiktig förändring. Medan inlärningsmålen för utbildningarna är tydligt formulerade saknas preciserade antaganden om hur målen ska nås och vilka långsiktiga resultat och effekter utbildningarna har. Denna otydlighet ökar risken för att aktiviteterna inte bidrar till att uppnå resultat på en högre nivå i form av exempelvis ökad

institutionell kapacitet. För ökad måluppfyllelse bör FBA mer systematiskt styra urvalet av kursdeltagare. Särskild hänsyn bör tas till deltagarnas positioner i de institutioner de representerar. Detta är viktigt för att säkerställa att enskilda deltagares kunskap bidrar till ökad institutionell kapacitet. Särskilt viktigt är att urvalskriterierna för kursdeltagare anpassas till förändringsteorin för utbildningen.

FBA *sekunderar* svensk civil personal till fredsinsatser och valobservationer på ett effektivt sätt. Personalbidragen är en central del av FBAs mandat och bidrar till de övergripande svenska målen. Varje år förbereds och sekunderas ca 130 personer. Majoriteten av dessa går till tjänster för olika stödfunktioner, som rådgivare på högkvarter eller i fredsinsatser. Förhållandevis få är seniora sekunderingar. Utvärderingen visar att de sekunderade är väl förberedda och att de bidrar effektivt och ändamålsenligt till sina respektive uppdrag.

Det finns exempel på när sekunderad personal drivit på för svenska ”normer och värderingar” som jämställdhet, samordning och transparens inom ramen för sina uppdrag. Den svenska personalen har dock ett begränsat inflytande inom mottagarorganisationerna då de inte är tillräckligt seniora. Sannolikt skulle mer seniora sekunderingar ha större inflytande. Detta bör beaktas framöver.

2015 fick FBA sitt första uppdrag att arbeta med en strategi för svenskt *bilateralt utvecklingssamarbete*. Regeringen har sedan dess gett myndigheten flera uppdrag inom ramen för strategier med konfliktdrabbade länder. Rapportens tre fallstudier om bidrag till målsättningar i svenskt bilateralt utvecklingssamarbete med Colombia, DRK och Liberia visar att FBAs insatser har varit relevanta men samtidigt otillräckliga.

Utvärderingen visar att myndigheten har bidragit till viktig institutionell förändring genom Agency for Reincorporation and Normalisation (ARN) i Colombia. FBAs partnerskap har där gett ett positivt avtryck i form av stärkt institutionell kapacitet att systematiskt beakta och integrera ett jämställdhetsperspektiv i ARNs arbete med återanpassning av före detta kombattanter.

Fallstudierna i DRK och Liberia visar att FBAs insatser där inte haft motsvarande institutionella effekter. Den politiska kontexten i dessa två länder ser annorlunda ut än i Colombia. Statliga institutioner och nationella processer är mycket svaga vilket gör det svårt att jobba med staten på både central och lokal nivå. Utvärderingen visar att FBAs utbildningsprogram och aktiviteter i länderna stärkt kursdeltagares kunskaper, färdigheter och självförtroende att arbeta med lokala freds-, säkerhets- och utvecklingsfrågor. Många av deltagarna bidrar därmed till lokal förändring men de saknar oftast en stabil struktur för att förankra och implementera nya kunskaper och arbetssätt i respektive organisationer.

Utvärderingen visar att FBAs insatser inte varit dimensionerade för att på ett meningsfullt sätt bidra till att stärka institutioner och processer till gagn för bredare fredsbyggande effekter. Projektbudgetarnas litenhet har begränsat FBAs flexibilitet och möjlighet att använda myndighetens expertis och resurser för att stödja institutionsbyggande och bidra till nationella fredsprocesser i samarbetsländer. Detta visar på behovet av mer strategiska och samordnade insatser.

FBAs arbete i dessa tre länder bör ses som en typ av lärandeprocess då FBA inte tidigare har jobbat under strategier för utvecklingssamarbete. FBA bör i framtiden tydliggöra sina antaganden om vad som krävs för att förändringsprocesserna ska uppnå önskat resultat. Dessutom bör insatserna vara dimensionerade för att kunna nå önskad effekt på en institutionell nivå. Fallstudierna visar att det finns en potential för större samordning mellan FBA och andra svenska och internationella fredsbyggande aktörer i konfliktdrabbade länder.

FBAs arbete med att främja och bedriva *vetenskaplig forskning och metodutveckling* är delvis begränsat i förhållande till de övergripande ambitionerna inom verksamhetsområdet. FBAs ambition att vara en expertmyndighet överensstämmer inte helt med hur verksamhets-området varit prioriterat under den period som utvärderas. Det har funnits en obalans mellan resurssättning och ambition att bedriva

egen vetenskaplig forskning. Trots att det finns insikt och förståelse inom myndigheten för att det fredsbyggande arbetet ska baseras på evidens, forskning och kunskap så används den egna forskningen begränsat i programverksamheten. Samtidigt producerar myndigheten egna forskningsrapporter, man ger bidrag till forskning och är en plattform (organiserar seminarier och konferenser) för diskussion och kunskapsutbyte kring forskning och metodutveckling för både svenska och internationella partners. Forskningskvaliteten är hög bland myndighetens forskare och de bidrar till den akademiska diskursen och viktiga policydiskussioner på området fred, säkerhet och utveckling.

Samordning mellan FBA och andra svenska och internationella aktörer är viktig för att skala upp och nå resultat på en högre nivå. Utvärderingen ger flera exempel på aktörssamverkan men samtidigt har det ofta saknats en mer systematisk ansats för att samordna sig med andra aktörer inom ramen för det bilaterala utvecklings-samarbetet. FBAs samordning med aktörer i samarbetsländerna har också varit ganska begränsad och främst omfattat dialog och informationsutbyte. En bättre samordning mellan FBA och andra aktörer skulle kunna bidra till starkare samarbeten och mer synergier.

Övergripande slutsatser och rekommendationer

Rapporten visar sammantaget att FBA i varierande grad bidragit till de långsiktiga målen: (i) att öka människors säkerhet och motstånds-kraft mot väpnade konflikter i konflikt- och postkonfliktländer, (ii) ökad kapacitet till internationella freds- och krishanterings-insatser för att bidra till fred och säkerhet och (iii) stärkta demokratiska institutioner och processer, inklusive ökad respekt för rättsstatens principer i konflikt- och postkonfliktländer.

Det finns exempel på insatser som har stärkt kvinnor, män och ungdomar på lokal nivå att medverka i fredsarbete. Det finns också exempel på att FBA har bidragit till att stärka det globala fredsarbetet genom forskning och policyutveckling. Utvärderingen visar dock att effekterna av FBAs insatser främst finns på individnivå medan det mer sällan finns resultat och effekter på institutionell nivå. En huvudsaklig slutsats är att insatser för långsiktig institutionalisering av den kunskap som FBA ger deltagare genom kurser och utbildningar är otillräckliga. Det krävs mer långsiktigt och riktat stöd till institutioner för att åstadkomma hållbara förändringar som långsiktigt främjar fred, säkerhet och utveckling i samarbetsländerna. Givet FBAs begränsade budget bör organisationen arbeta mer strategiskt och fokuserat på områden som matchar dess resurser och expertis.

Utvärderingen visar också att det är orealistiskt att förvänta sig att insatser av FBAs storlek ensamma kan ha bredare effekt. Det blir därför avgörande för FBA att använda sin expertis och kapacitet strategiskt för att stödja centrala aktörer i konfliktdrabbade länder med att hantera eller mildra de konfliktorsaker och den konfliktdynamik som undergräver stabilitet och utveckling. Det är viktigt att FBAs roll definieras tydligare och att man tillvaratar myndighetens specifika mervärden i relation till de mål myndighetens insatser ska bidra till. Här finns behov av att tydliggöra balansen mellan å ena sidan tekniskt kapacitetsstöd till individer och aktörer, och å andra sidan den politiska dimensionen av fred, i synnerhet fredsbyggande insatser. FBA har byggt upp en teknisk kompetens och kapacitet som är effektiv med avseende på att utbilda nyckelpersoner inom freds- och statsbyggande organisationer, men det är otydligt vilken strategisk roll FBA ska ha avseende stöd till politiska fredsprocesser. FBA bör här bygga på sin egen institutionella identitet och arbeta närmare politiska aktörer i fredsprocesser för att bidra till hållbar fred.

FBAs fredsbyggande ansats bör knyta tekniskt kapacitetsstärkande och rådgivande arbete närmare till politiska fredsprocesser i konfliktdrabbade länder. Det förutsätter samtidigt att UD och FBA

beaktar ett antal frågor: Vad är rimliga insatser för FBA att bidra till inom politiska fredsbyggandeprocesser? Vad är rimligt att åstadkomma med FBAs resurser och expertis? Hur ska FBA användas strategiskt för att effektivt bidra till fred, säkerhet och utveckling?

Utvärderingens slutsats är att verksamheten behöver tydligare fokus på att nå resultat på institutionell nivå. Det förutsätter att FBAs insatser underbyggs och vägleds av klara antaganden om hur FBA kan stödja institutioner att stärka sin kapacitet för att därigenom bidra till fredsbyggande. FBAs ansats och insatser bör i högre grad fokusera på att förankra den kunskap som kursdeltagare erhåller genom utbildningar i sina respektive organisationer för att på så sätt bidra till ett mer institutionaliserat arbetssätt.

I rapporten diskuteras också betydelsen av att FBA har rimliga förutsättningar att använda sin egen expertis internt och i sin samordning med andra aktörer för att uppnå största möjliga fredsbyggande effekter. Detta leder till slutsatsen att myndigheten bör utveckla en tydligare strategisk samstämmighet inom FBA för att stärka planering, samarbete och lärande mellan avdelningar och enheter, och som tillvaratar organisationens egna resurser och expertis i arbetet för måluppfyllelse i insatser. I utvärderingen påvisas också att det finns ett behov av att stärka rutinerna inom FBA för att integrera och använda egen forskningskapacitet och expertis.

I utvärderingen dras slutsatsen att FBA behöver samarbeta och samordna mer med svenska och internationella aktörer under alla faser från planering till uppföljning av insatser för att få större fredsbyggande effekter. Dialogen mellan UD och FBA kan bidra till att stärka FBAs strategiska inriktning inom ramen för svenska bilaterala utvecklingssamarbeten med konfliktdrabbade länder. Dialogen bör baseras på konfliktanalys anpassad till FBAs operativa nivå, som identifierar strategiska ingångar, som kan vägleda FBAs planering och design av insatser och komplettera Sidas fredsfrämjande arbete.

Rapporten visar att FBA har effektiva samarbeten med andra svenska myndigheter kring personalbidrag till fredsinsatser och valobservationer. En slutsats är samtidigt att motsvarande samarbete inte är framträdande inom övriga verksamhetsområden. Där finns det en stark potential för utökat samarbete, på landnivå, inom 'Team Sweden' och på myndighetsnivå.

FBA har genomfört en omorganisation under 2021 och därmed påbörjat ett arbete med att ta itu med brister som diskuteras i denna rapport samtidigt som man bygger vidare på många av de styrkor och positiva erfarenheter som rapporten lyfter fram. Utvärderingen konstaterar att FBAs verksamhet utvecklas kontinuerligt.

Rapportens huvudsakliga rekommendationer är att FBAs kapacitetsstärkande insatser bör knytas närmare de politiska fredsprocesserna i samarbetsländer och identifiera synergier med Sida och andra svenska och internationella fredsbyggande aktörer genom en tydligare användning av förändringsteorier. FBA och UD bör definiera och tydliggöra FBAs roll i politiska fredsbyggande processer och i högre grad säkerställa att FBAs mål och ambitionsnivå är rimliga i förhållande till tillgängliga resurser och lokal kontext.

Summary

The **Folke Bernadotte Academy** (FBA) is the Swedish government agency for peace, security and development. It forms part of Sweden's international development aid with a mandate from the Swedish government to promote peace in conflict affected countries through training and advice, deployment of civilian personnel to (primarily) UN, EU and OSCE peace operations, production of research, as well as support to civil society. FBA operates on the basis of Swedish government instructions and Swedish strategies relating to peace and security.

The overall purpose of this evaluation is to answer two main questions: (i) whether and how FBA's activities have contributed to the agency's overarching long-term objectives and (ii) whether these are effectively coordinated with relevant actors in Sweden and internationally, including in conflict and post-conflict countries.

The evaluation has assessed FBA's performance over the period 2008–2019, with an emphasis on the period after 2014. FBA's long-term objectives during this period have been: 1) enhanced human security and resilience against armed conflicts in conflict- and post-conflict countries; 2) enhanced capacity for international peace- and crisis management interventions to contribute to peace and security; and 3) strengthened democratic institutions and processes including enhanced respect for rule of law in conflict- and post-conflict countries. FBA has responded to these within the overall framework provided by Swedish strategies and by instructions from the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA). It has had five areas of operation: 1) education, training and exercises; 2) secondments; 3) bilateral cooperation; 4) research, policy and methods; and 5) civil society.

The evaluation has used a mixed-methods approach that combines qualitative and quantitative data and has used primary and secondary sources for data collection. The evaluation team interviewed over 100 persons directly and a similar number were contacted via a

survey (of the training area). A large amount of documentation was studied, including reports and data from FBA on its activities as well as other, external, evaluations. By assessing the cumulative effects within and across FBA's areas of operation, the evaluation answers the two key evaluation questions for four of FBA's five areas of operation.

Evaluation findings

With regard to *education, training and exercises*, the evaluation finds that FBA has a well-deserved international reputation as an efficient training institution within its thematic priority areas, and its training programmes make a positive contribution to its objectives as well as to Sweden's global and bilateral strategies. Over the years several thousand individuals from a multitude of international organisations, governments and civil society have participated in FBA courses and FBA has also contributed to other organisations' training events. The training area thus represents a relevant and significant contribution to the agency's ambitions, objectives and results. Despite this central role, the evaluation finds that FBA's training efforts rarely have used an explicit theory of change and, while learning objectives have been formulated, their underlying assumptions and end effects have not been clearly articulated. The evaluation finds that this weakness presents significant risks due to the many and varied causal links in relation to outcome achievement. To increase outcome effectiveness, the evaluation recommends FBA take a more systematic approach across the agency to the selection of course participants. This should link explicitly to participants' positions within their home institutions. This will help secure institutional anchoring of the knowledge and skills gained and, ultimately, of the longer-term effects. Within such an approach there should be scope for clear tailoring of selection criteria to the underlying change logic of the training proposed.

With regard to *secondments*, the evaluation finds that FBA operates as a highly efficient and effective service provider. Arranging and supporting secondments of Swedish personnel to international peacekeeping and peacebuilding headquarters and missions (including election observer missions) forms a central part of FBA's mandate and contributes to overall Swedish objectives. Every year around 130 individuals are prepared and sent out to various functions. The majority of these are to core or advisory functions within headquarters and missions. The evaluation finds that secondees are well prepared by FBA and contribute effectively to their respective missions. There are examples of where Swedish 'values and norms' are promoted. However, in general, the opportunities for wider influence are limited due to the level of the secondees within the hierarchies in which they are placed. Greater influence could be achieved with senior placements and the evaluation recommends that FBA increase its efforts to utilise all possibilities that exist for this.

Regarding *bilateral cooperation*, the evaluation has focused on three cases that demonstrate multiple lines of efforts within the period evaluated, these being: Colombia, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Liberia. The evaluation finds that FBA's interventions in the three countries have been relevant to the personal and professional needs of the individuals who have participated as well as to the Swedish bilateral cooperation strategies. However, FBA's theories of change for strengthening key institutions in these post-conflict countries did not fully capture what it takes to meaningfully contribute to wider peacebuilding effects. Consequently, there have been gaps between the theories of change, the underlying assumptions, and the actual implementation of activities and their effects.

The case studies show, particularly in the training interventions in the DRC and Liberia, that the lack of scalability has made it difficult for FBA to achieve results at a higher outcome level. The administration and management of training programmes has absorbed a significant

share of FBA's already modest budgets. Consequently, as a self-implementing expert agency, FBA has not sufficiently utilised and leveraged the technical expertise that the agency has to offer to key institutions and political processes within the framework of bilateral cooperation. There is outcome achievement: in Colombia for example, FBA's institutional partnership and collaboration with the Agency for Reincorporation and Normalisation (ARN) generated higher-level outcomes, enabling ARN to work more broadly with gender issues in the reintegration process of ex-combatants. However, the case studies also show that FBA has not sufficiently coordinated with other Swedish or international actors to enhance its leverage.

With regard to *research, policy and methods*, the evaluation finds that FBA is partially effective in the ways it pursues its ambition to promote and conduct research, doctrine and method development aimed at fulfilling its overarching long-term ambitions, but also that fundamental challenges remain in its approach and prioritisation. The agency produces, supports and disseminates quality research, methods development and empirical knowledge with and to Swedish and international partners. Research conducted by the agency's few researchers is published in high-quality and impactful academic outlets, fundamentally contributing to the relevant academic literatures and to key debates on peace, security and development.

Research production by proxy – i.e. research supported through FBA's seven research working groups and by their research grants – is found to be valuable and important, and an effective use of resources, allowing FBA to 'punch above its weight' in global knowledge production within its fields. This contributes to FBA being effective and skilled at maintaining and influencing international policy debates in fora such as the UN, whose middle ground between scientific and practitioner knowledge suits the FBA. In situations guided by a strategically coherent approach, including between research and programme areas, the outcomes are significant and the different activities and modalities available to FBA are lifted beyond the sum of their individual contributions.

At the same time, the evaluation team finds that FBA's ambitions of being an 'expert agency' do not resonate. A pronounced mismatch was found between actual resources devoted to direct research production in the agency and its ambitions of being an organisation deeply embedded in – and a direct producer of – research-based knowledge and evidence. While the importance of evidence and research on peace, security and development to the effectiveness of FBA's activities is acknowledged throughout the agency, there are significant challenges in ensuring that research influences everyday work in programmes, activities or on strategies.

Coordination between FBA and other Swedish and international actors is critical for achieving scalability and higher-level results. While we find instances where FBA staff have succeeded in maintaining a dynamic interaction with key partners and organisations, these efforts are often ad hoc and born out of individual agency and initiative, and not pushed forward in a routinised way by the agency as such. In other instances, including several of the bilateral cases explored, FBA's coordination and pursuit of synergies with other locally present actors has been mediocre and may only include a very formalised dialogue or information sharing.

Overall conclusions

Overall, the evaluation concludes that FBA has achieved many good results by contributing to the fulfilment of mission objectives in peacebuilding missions; it has empowered women, men and youth at local levels, strengthening their participation in peace processes; and it has contributed to a number of relevant global policy processes and improved the global knowledge architecture on issues of peace, security and development. However, these positive changes are found to often reside at the individual level and the agency's impact on peace writ large has been limited. We find that this is partly due to a weak

impact on institutional change – that is, the application of learning and knowledge leading to wider effect is difficult to determine and often rather vague.

It is important for the evaluation team to note that any organisation the size of FBA will see variations in the relevance, effectiveness, or impact of its programmes. We recognise that there are many examples of FBA's work that showcase a cohesive and joined-up approach, both ones that are formally part of this evaluation and others that are not. Likewise, it must be recognised that it is unrealistic to expect a relatively small peacebuilding agency, albeit one with considerable capacity, to achieve impact alone. The questions therefore concern how strategically involved FBA can be in political processes, what level of contribution is reasonable to expect given the resources available, and whether FBA is positioning itself appropriately to deliver this contribution? We find a number of tensions in FBA's position vis-à-vis its technocratic focus, its relationship with the Swedish MFA and Sida, and its own structure and internal workings.

The evaluation findings point to five areas that FBA must consider as it moves forward to deliver on its mandate. These are: i) higher-level impact, ii) scalability, iii) strategic coherence, iv) coordination, and v) use of expertise and knowledge.

Regarding *higher level impact*, the evaluation concludes that FBA is efficient and effective in its service delivery, at carrying out training and secondments, but it can lose sight of methods for achieving wider forms of change. To a certain extent, this is about the need to put outcomes above outputs. The evaluation observes that this could be improved through a stronger and more widespread use of explicitly formulated theories of change. In other words, there is a need to underpin its work through a framework that can support and link the transformational changes occurring at the individual level to the factors that contribute to change beyond this level (uptake and operationalisation by institutions, for example).

Regarding *scalability*, the evaluation concludes there is a need for FBA to become better at coherently mobilising resources and competencies, and harmonising with others, to achieve impact. FBA will need to improve its focus on joining up with other actors and contributing towards a larger 'whole' to ensure that its relatively small interventions do not evaporate because of taking on monumental challenges that even programmes far greater in size have difficulty impacting.

In terms of *strategic coherence*, the evaluation concludes that there is a need for improved institutional mechanisms for cross-programme fertilisation, collaboration and learning between departments to ensure effective use of in-house resources and competences in efforts at policy support and influence. It should do so in a form that does not upset the agency's agility, the use of individual networks, entrepreneurship, and flexibility to swiftly utilise windows of opportunity. In the end these efforts are about maximising impact; to give one example, by ensuring that the very successful revision of the UN's Integrated Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) Standards to which FBA contributed significantly, is actively pushed at country level and in coordinated efforts with partners.

With regard to *coordination,* the evaluation finds examples where FBA staff succeed in maintaining a dynamic interaction with key partners and organisations, driving forward complex processes. FBA has a successful cooperation with other Swedish agencies regarding secondments. In other areas, however, efforts appear ad hoc and born out of individual agency and initiative, and not pushed forward in a routinised way by the agency as such. In view of the limited resources available, the evaluation concludes that there are advantages for FBA in more regular thematic cooperation, especially with Sida, at HQ and in-country level in order to realise ambitions of a joined-up, 'Team Sweden', approach.

With regard to *the use of expertise and knowledge*, the evaluation concludes that there is a need for building up a new set of habits within FBA on research integration that both motivate and place greater emphasis on employees beyond the designated research departments.

Finally, and as a contribution to FBA's ongoing reorganisation, the evaluation offers a discussion of three strategic and organisational tensions running through FBA's work and provides recommendations through which they can be mitigated. These tensions appear most clearly (but not exclusively) in relation to the bilateral cooperation area. They arise from reflections by the evaluation team based upon the evaluation findings which themselves raise the question of whether FBA could do more with the capacity and resources that it has at hand.

1. The first tension concerns the technical vis-à-vis the political nature of peace and in particular peacebuilding efforts. FBA, like many similar institutions, embodies a tension between the political nature of its strategic ambitions and the often-technical form of its activities and interventions in practice. This evaluation confirms that FBA's core relative strength is its ability to train, educate, and second individuals in ways that enhance their individual skills and, in the case of secondments, facilitates their employment in line with FBA's and Sweden's objectives. However, sustainable peace also requires a more political effort addressing (particularly asymmetries within) wider political power, behaviour or violence (including symbolic). These challenges are unlikely to be solved through individual capacity development alone. The evaluation concludes that FBA's technical peacebuilding approach within the framework of bilateral strategies lacks a political dimension that links FBA's technical work with political processes. There is a need for a clearer understanding of how FBA should be used within the bilateral strategies in support of political processes. If this is not apparent, FBA's capacity and resources risk being diluted because of its very broad mandate.

2. A second, and related tension resides in the strategic and operational relationship between FBA, the Swedish MFA, and other Swedish development agencies, notably Sida. This underlines the relevance to FBA, MFA and Sida of a common understanding of the political space where FBA and Sida will intervene in order to maximise FBA's core competencies. The evaluation concludes that FBA should be used more strategically within the frameworks of bilateral cooperation through a more nuanced understanding of when and under what circumstances FBA's comparative advantages can best be realised. In the bilateral cooperation area in particular, there is a need for better complementarity between Sida's and FBA's operations. Underpinning this shared understanding and cooperation, there must be a closer collaboration around conflict analysis facilitating the identification of critical entry and leverage points prior to the development and implementation of interventions in order to affect conflict systems positively.
3. The third tension concerns the identity and institutional form and ambitions of FBA itself. The combination of ambitious mandates and limited resources, particularly pertaining to contributions to bilateral cooperation strategies, creates tension in the degree to which FBA can shape and act on its own strategic ambitions. FBA is expected to simultaneously be an agency of experts and knowledge production, a training academy, a recruitment mechanism, an influencer, a civil society supporter, and a bilateral partner. FBA is also a Swedish government agency and has, therefore, a different status to many other peacebuilding actors, potentially providing it with greater powers of access. And finally, FBA is expected to contribute within a global environment alongside other state, multilateral and non-governmental organisations, although with very modest financial resources compared to its counterparts. A tension therefore exists between the breadth of expectations afforded to it by the Swedish government (and the deliberate decisions it makes itself around its purpose and objectives), and the depth of engagement, competence and finance required to be impactful within each of these.

To summarise, the evaluation's findings concern focusing FBA's efforts on exploiting productive synergies between its technical capacity development function, its complementarities with, especially, Sida, and wider political processes. The use of a thorough theory of change approach will provide a means to demonstrate the logic and causality involved in the steps between FBA's delivery of technical outputs and Sweden's political goals. And, as such, it will demonstrate where gaps need to be filled through, for example, harmonisation and coordination with other actors and processes. Thus, defining FBA's role more broadly in terms of its collaboration with other actors, especially Sida, in relation to each context represents an opportunity to enhance FBA's contributions to its strategic goals.

Introduction

The overall purpose of this evaluation is to provide answers to the two main questions posed in the evaluation's terms of reference: (i) if and how FBA's past activities have contributed to the agency's overarching long-term objectives and (ii) whether these are effectively coordinated with relevant actors in Sweden and internationally, including in conflict and post-conflict countries. The terms of reference ask:

- What difference have the FBA's initiatives made in terms of the agency's three long-term objectives (increased human security and resilience against armed conflict; increased capacity for international peace and crisis management operations; stronger democratic institutions and processes including greater respect for the rule of law)? What has made a difference, for whom, in what circumstances and why?
- Has the FBA coordinated its initiatives effectively with other Swedish and international actors to enable synergies, in order (where necessary) to safeguard collaboration and minimise unjustified overlaps so as to strengthen the combined result where appropriate?

The evaluation examines the cumulative effect of eleven years (2008–2019) of activity by FBA with specific target groups, partner organisations, countries and thematic areas in relation to both FBA's and Sweden's long-term objectives. For reasons that will be explained in the report, the evaluation assesses cumulative effects with an emphasis on interventions after 2014.

The evaluation team recognises that FBA is a relatively young organisation, established in 2002, and is continuously evolving and growing. Indeed, in January 2021, the agency completed an extensive

reorganisation that in certain respects anticipates some of our evaluation findings. An example is the centralisation of certain functions within a department for methods and coordination.[1]

Today, FBA employs some 150 employees in Stockholm and Sandö, with an additional 80 or so experts hired by FBA for secondment to peace operations around the world. The evaluation does not reflect any of the organisational changes implemented after January 2021, as these fall outside the period evaluated.[2]

FBA's strategic aims and areas of operation

FBA's formal mandate during the period evaluated was based on a Swedish government instruction of September 2013 and annual appropriation directions, as well as thematic and geographical strategies. The latter include the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA)'s strategies for Sustainable Peace, International Civil Crisis Management, as well as Human Rights, Democracy and Rule of Law, Sweden's National Action Plan for the implementation of the United Nations Security Council's Resolutions on Women, Peace and Security 2016–2020, and bilateral/regional cooperation strategies.[3]

FBA has three long-term objectives: *(i)* Enhanced human security and resilience against armed conflicts in conflict- and post conflict countries; *(ii)* Enhanced capacity for international peace- and crisis management interventions to contribute to peace and security; and *(iii)* Strengthened democratic institutions and processes including

[1] For example, FBA has now established a training function within its (new) department for methods and coordination. Inter alia, this unit seeks to enhance institutionalisation of results (one of this evaluation's key findings). It also seeks to enhance monitoring and evaluation for the organisation as a whole (which is another key finding).

[2] The Swedish government took a decision on a new instruction to FBA in September 2020 and this entered into force on 1st November 2020.

[3] Strategies for Sweden's development cooperation with partner countries (Afghanistan, Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Mali, Myanmar, Palestine, Somalia, and Sub-Sahara Africa).

enhanced respect for rule of law in conflict- and post conflict countries). These objectives are best considered as vision statements or aspirations rather than as measurable impacts of the organisation's operations. FBA's long-term objectives have not been operationalised directly at intervention level or used for reporting at that level by the organisation. The objectives are broad and encompass the Swedish bilateral and thematic strategies that govern FBA's work. Each of these strategies includes one or more objectives governing and shaping FBA's specific role and responsibility.

FBA's interventions are also designed according to specific tasks commissioned by the MFA through annual regulatory letters. A request from MFA through the annual regulatory letter (which could also be supplemented during the year) might have a very specific objective for an activity/intervention. Examples have included tasking to establish the Swedish Women's Mediation Network as well as strengthening the cooperation between the European Union (EU) and Eastern partnership countries, and the EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) civilian missions. The specific objectives of FBA's interventions therefore vary depending on which MFA strategy or MFA-request is the basis for a particular intervention.

During the period covered by this evaluation, FBA has operated within five areas of operation and expertise ('operational areas'):

1. Education, training and exercises, in which FBA has aimed to strengthen the capacity of individuals and organisations to conduct and develop peacebuilding interventions. Education and training activities are delivered by FBA's own experts and by contracted subject matter experts (SMEs) and are differentiated according to whether they are 'global' (i.e. concerning a specific theme and offered to a variety of partners), 'targeted' (i.e. concerning a specific partner), or 'programme' (i.e. running over an extended period and consisting of various types of capacity development input, including training and mentoring). Exercises concern FBA's participation in Swedish and international crisis management exercises.

2. Secondments, where FBA has been tasked by the Swedish government with seconding personnel to international peace operations led by, for example, the United Nations (UN), the EU and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), as well as election observers to missions led mainly by the EU and the OSCE.
3. Bilateral cooperation, where FBA has been commissioned by the Swedish MFA to implement bilateral cooperation strategies in different countries since 2015. The key function of the department and project teams in the bilateral cooperation area is to operationalise MFA's strategic objectives and mobilise resources for achieving results that contribute to MFA's strategic objectives at country level.
4. Research, policy and methods, which brings together diverse endeavours across research production and support, contributions to international policy processes, particularly in the UN, EU and other international bodies that FBA works with. FBA is specifically tasked with the long-term objective of furthering and conducting research to support effective peace operations.
5. Civil society, where FBA channels grants to Swedish civil society organisations operating within the overall area of peace and security.

Figure 1 shows the balance of funding made available for the five operational areas between 2015–2019, where secondments (including salaries of deployed secondees) form the largest segment followed, most recently, by bilateral cooperation.

Figure 1: Summary of FBA's funding according to areas of operation (Msek)



Source: FBA annual reports.

In order for FBA to be flexible and responsive to MFA's strategies and requests, the agency has had two sets of objectives that are interconnected. The first set of objectives are for each of FBA's five areas of operation (Verksamhetsmål och motivtexter). These are general objectives which refer to enhanced effectiveness of missions; increased peacebuilding capacity of individuals and organisations; more evidence-based research on peacebuilding effectiveness; or improved effectiveness of bilateral cooperation. The second set is FBA's biannual targets and activities (Tvåårsmål och målknutna aktiviteter) focusing on FBA's internal capacity to enable and strengthen the organisational conditions to deliver on the different strategic objectives through interventions in each of its five areas of operation.

In terms of implementing the MFA tasking within the operational areas, FBA has drawn from a toolbox consisting of thematic expertise and various instruments. Examples of FBA's thematic expertise include peacebuilding; security sector reform (SSR); disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR), dialogue and mediation, and women, peace and security (WPS)/gender. Examples

of FBA's tools include training, dialogue, mentoring, research, and policy advice. The combination of expertise and tools is expected to produce results at output and outcome levels contributing to the achievement of MFA's strategic objectives and in line with FBA's own long-term objectives which, as described earlier, are visionary in nature. This is illustrated in Figure 2 below, which summarises the evaluation team's understanding of FBA's overall theory of change during the period evaluated in a simplified form.

Figure 2: FBA's overall theory of change as interpreted by the evaluation team



Key strategic and organisational tensions

A series of core tensions run through the ambitions and efforts of FBA and its interaction and cooperation with the Swedish MFA and other Swedish actors. These will be returned to throughout the evaluation report as they shape FBA's achievement of results for the different strategic objectives and interventions in each of its five areas of operation, and hence we briefly introduce them here. Specifically, these tensions revolve around 1) the technical vis-à-vis the political nature of peace and in particular peacebuilding efforts, 2) the strategic and operational relationship between FBA and the Swedish MFA, and 3) the identity and institutional form and ambitions of FBA itself.

Peace is not stasis nor absence of conflict, but rather a continuous process of cultivating political and social interactions and of recognising how political disagreements may be continuous everyday constants. The very effort of cultivating, maintaining or restoring peace then is, at its heart, a political endeavour.[4] Even so, peacebuilding efforts often appear technical, their translation into practice rendering them rationalised, ordered and bureaucratised as they have to fit organisational norms, management frameworks and theories of implementation.

FBA, like many similar institutions, embodies a tension between the political nature of its strategic ambitions and the oft-technical form of its activities and interventions in practice. A key tension exists in the work of FBA between the political nature of peacebuilding and the often-technocratic efforts of individualised training and education. The focus on skills and technique enhancement leads to strengthening formal institutions, including in the form of government agencies responsible for demobilisation, rule of law,

[4] See, for example, 'Adding up to peace: the cumulative impacts of peace in initiatives', CDA Collaborative Learning projects, April 2018.

electoral democracy or other core peacebuilding issues. Problems of fostering sustainable peace are likely to arise if such efforts are not supported by more political ones addressing (particularly asymmetries within) wider political power, behaviour or violence (including symbolic).[5] These challenges are unlikely to be solved through individual capacity development alone. As a minimum, they will require a focus on leveraging the skills developed into improvements at the institutional level.

A second tension resides in the strategic and operational relationship between FBA, the Swedish MFA, and other Swedish development agencies, notably Sida. Through government instructions, FBA is essentially commissioned to pursue certain objectives and activities to varying degrees of specificity. On the one hand, these can reduce FBA's room for manoeuvre in defining its own objectives and building its own identity as an organisation. On the other hand, every such relationship has varying degrees of agency, and FBA does not appear immobilised nor robbed of potential to define or shape its own strategic path. These concerns extend into a third tension around the identity of FBA itself. Presenting itself as an extremely diverse, hybrid organisation, FBA is expected to be simultaneously an agency of experts and knowledge production, a training academy, a recruitment mechanism, an influencer, a bilateral partner with duty bearers, and a civil society supporter. FBA is also a Swedish government agency and has, therefore, a different status to many other peacebuilding actors, potentially providing it with greater powers of access. And finally, a tension exists between the breadth of expectations afforded to it by the Swedish government (and the deliberate decisions it makes itself around its purpose and objectives), and the depth of engagement, competence and amount of finance required to be impactful within each of these roles.

[5] See, for example, 'Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict', World Bank and United Nations. 2018.

Evaluation approach and method

The evaluation approach and method were outlined in detail in an inception report that was discussed with EBA and the evaluations reference group in October 2020. The reference group comprised of several Swedish and international peacebuilding and evaluation experts, as well as the Swedish MFA, FBA and EBA. Following the October meeting, a revised inception report was produced and has been used as the agreed basis for the evaluation.[6]

Overall evaluation approach

The evaluation team has used a mixed-methods design approach, collecting data from a combination of qualitative and quantitative, primary and secondary sources. Case studies were used in the bilateral cooperation area to provide a lens through which to assess how FBA drew from its capacities across several areas of operation. By assessing the cumulative effects within and across FBA's areas of operation, we answer the two key evaluation questions for four of FBA's five areas of operation. With EBA's agreement, the civil society operational area was removed from the evaluation's scope on the basis that the purpose of the area is to impartially and transparently administer grants directed to Swedish civil society organisations and this has little connection to FBA's other work strands. The evaluation has therefore focused its attention on the other four areas, namely: education, training and exercises; secondments; bilateral cooperation; and research, policy and methods. The two main questions set out in the ToR were developed into an overall evaluation matrix, which is attached as Annex 2.

[6] Revised inception report (IR) to the Expert Group on Aid Studies (EBA) for an evaluation of the Folke Bernadotte Academy (FBA), 17th November 2020.

The evaluation team used a theory-based approach that built upon reconstructed theories of change (ToC) developed during mini workshops with FBA departments using an *if, then, leading to* causality chain that corresponds to outputs, outcomes and impacts. As part of this, we identified the core assumptions underpinning each level of causality (e.g. that course participants are located in positions where they can utilise the knowledge and capacities that have been enhanced; that such utilisation is supported by management and by management systems, etc.) and we tested whether these assumptions held up in practice – in other words, we determined the theory in practice (TiP). This analysis drew from primary (interviews, survey) and secondary (reviews, evaluations) sources. Emerging findings were then *triangulated* so that each finding has been corroborated by several sources.

We assessed FBA's contribution on the basis of a simplified version of John Mayne's approach to contribution analysis that *a)* starts with unpacking the theory/ies of change so that expected causality and assumptions are exposed, *b)* assesses the degree to which these have been upheld in practice (i.e. results achieved, assumptions met), and *c)* identifies other key influencing factors and their significance.[7] During the data collection and analysis, we asked interviewees to identify examples of where they had been able to use FBA's support and what changes and effects were derived from it. We also sought evidence of change and contribution through our review of the available documentation, including reviews and evaluations. In terms of assessing contribution, our interest and focus has been predominantly on what changed as a result of FBA's efforts, for whom, and how significant it was. Our approach to contribution analysis is described in more detail in Annex 1.

It should also be highlighted that the evaluation has drawn from other research and theory, notably in relation to the assessment of the training area. Here we use the Kirkpatrick model for evaluating

[7] 'Contribution analysis – an approach to exploring cause and effect', John Mayne, ILAC paper, 16 May 2008.

training programmes which concerns four levels of assessment: a) Reaction – the degree of participant engagement in the training; b) Learning – concerning what participants have learned and what they have not; c) Behaviour – the degree to which participants apply and are able to apply the training; and d) Results – the outcomes or changes to which the training has contributed.[8]

In assessing FBA's performance, we have also utilised three of the OECD/DAC evaluation criteria, namely: relevance, efficiency, and effectiveness and the chapters of this report present our findings according to these criteria (plus that of coordination and gender).[9] Relevance concerns the extent to which FBA's objectives and interventions respond to beneficiaries, to global, country, and partner/institution needs, policies, and priorities, and whether and how they continue to do so if circumstances change. Efficiency concerns the extent to which FBA delivers, or is likely to deliver, results in a cost-effective and timely way. Effectiveness concerns the extent to which FBA has achieved, or is expected to achieve, its objectives, and its results. We have chosen to use these three criteria as they assist in understanding and assessing the results achieved by FBA and the reasons for this achievement. For example, an understanding of the relevance of FBA's work provides an essential foundation for the usefulness of its work. To these, we added consideration of coordination, being the extent to which FBA has coordinated and aligned its activities with other actors, particularly Swedish actors.

Our approach to *coordination* has sought to understand how FBA coordinates with other Swedish and international actors. We included questions on coordination in our interview guides and examined documentation from the perspective of identifying the main channels and aspects of coordination practiced. We note that

[8] https://www.kirkpatrickpartners.com/Products/Kirkpatricks-Four-Levels-of-Training-Evaluation

[9] https://www.oecd.org/dac/evaluation/daccriteriaforevaluatingdevelopmentassistance.htm

coordination can be embedded in formal institutionalised relations such as working groups, channels of communication and operationalisation. But they may also be more informal through personal contacts, prior working relationships or direct group-to-group interactions not necessarily decided upon by management. As part of the assessment of coordination, we have also sought to highlight and assess possible synergies (both within FBA, with other Swedish agencies, and with external actors). Each chapter of the report includes a section on our findings relating to coordination.

In summary, the use of contribution analysis as described above enabled us to compare the constructed theories of change showing the expected causalities and assumptions with the theory in practice, which is what FBA in fact achieved. This has been possible through strong evidence of FBA outputs (as we note in the report, FBA is generally very good at collating its outputs) and weaker evidence of outcome changes and wider impact. This corresponds to the "ripple-effect" as one moves from attribution at output level to a contribution at outcome and impact levels as external factors become more influential.

Data collection methods

Data collection was undertaken according to the evaluation matrix and workplan, including in relation to case studies. The team collected and analysed both primary and secondary data, through key informant interviews (KIIs), focus group discussions (FGDs), a stakeholder survey, and extensive review of relevant FBA documentation, internal and external evaluations, and surveys.

During the evaluation, we conducted in-depth qualitative interviews with a total of 105 persons, including 33 FBA staff, 8 staff from other Swedish organisations, and 64 direct and indirect beneficiaries of FBA activities. The gender split of persons interviewed was 53 % women and 47 % men. We also conducted our own survey of

training participants. Of the 120 persons targeted, 73 answered the questions which is a 61 % return rate.[10] Fieldwork was undertaken in Liberia by a researcher hired by the evaluation team and operating under direct instructions from the team. Unfortunately, COVID-19 prevented us from undertaking fieldwork in the Democratic Republic Congo (DRC) and Colombia, although stakeholders in both countries were consulted remotely. Likewise, we conducted remote interviews with secondees and persons trained by FBA.

The approach to sampling has struck a balance between the ambition to consult as broad a cross-section of FBA stakeholders and beneficiaries as possible and the time and resource limitations of the evaluation, including COVID-19 travel restrictions. There was also a need to reflect the different character of the four operational areas. As a result, the training area used a mix of KIIs and a survey that targeted randomly selected individuals who had participated in the three main types of training: global courses, targeted courses, and programme courses. The assessment of secondments targeted randomly selected individuals in field missions and headquarters with a weighting towards missions with large Swedish contingents. The bilateral cooperation area used a hybrid modality of remote and field assessment in three case study countries. The case studies were selected according to criteria that included time relevance to the evaluation period, budget size and scope of portfolio. The research area was covered mainly through KIIs, FGDs and an assessment of research products.

Secondary documentation was collected and consulted from a wide range of sources pertaining to FBA and to Sweden's foreign policy, including from academic literature. Documentation from FBA

[10] The survey was conducted between 8 February 2021 to 8 March 2021 and comprised 15 questions, targeting 120 respondents in English, French and Spanish languages sampled from a pool of FBAs training course participants who attended trainings between the year 2009 – 2019, with priority given to courses from 2016 onwards. Respondents included a mix of participants on all the main types of courses offered by FBA.

included public reports, internal work documents, plans, descriptions of areas of intervention, management instructions, policies, instructions, surveys, concept notes, reviews, lessons learned and many more, produced over the course of FBA's years of operation. We also consulted past and ongoing evaluations, both to pursue existing qualitative and quantitative insights, and to triangulate our findings with other sources that in certain cases evaluated interventions close to those targeted by this evaluation.

An in-depth description of data collection methods, sampling and applied ethical considerations can be found in Annex 1 and 4.

Approach to gender mainstreaming

Gender is a crucial factor shaping processes of peace and conflict as highlighted in UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000), amongst others. The evaluation has focused on the extent to which women's as well as men's concerns and experiences form a dimension of the design, implementation, and monitoring of FBA's policies and programmes.[11] Gender mainstreaming is not an end goal but rather a strategic approach that ensures gender-sensitive perspectives are included in design and implementation, for the purpose of achieving gender equality. We have based our conceptual and methodological understanding on UN Women's guide to evaluating programmes and projects with a gender perspective.[12] Doing so has meant examining the extent to which attention is accorded to gender relations, including men's gender roles and identities that have an impact on women. We have sought to understand how FBA and partners are working with addressing the underlying gender norms that drive behaviours of both women and men.

[11] See UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), UN Economic and Social Council Resolution 1997/2: Agreed Conclusions, 18 July 1997, 1997/2.
[12] UN Women. 2014. 'Guide for the evaluation of programmes and projects with a gender, human rights and intercultural perspective'.

Within the broader context of Sweden's feminist foreign policy, focusing on gender relations and analysing gender roles and responsibilities is fundamentally about concerns of inequality and injustice. The evaluation assesses whether FBA has a systematic and purposeful integration of gender into the evaluated activities; the extent to which interventions take into account power relations between women and men; and whether interventions simply 'work around' existing norms or are transformative, i.e. are inherently working with addressing inequalities and injustices. We have combined quantitative and qualitative information to capture the complex nature of gender in FBA's work, e.g. by combining gender-aggregated data with key informant interviews.

Evaluation limitations

The bulk of the evaluation – in particular data collection – concentrates on the time period 2014 to 2019 (six years). The evaluation team collected data from informants associated with a wide range of interventions and focused on the '*strategic value'* and '*learning'* for FBA and the MFA.

As discussed above, a core evaluability challenge has been FBA's limited use of ToCs, which means that FBA has not necessarily systematically worked through the change logic and assumptions (and preconditions) in its areas of intervention. To manage this limitation, we reconstructed the ToCs for each operational area together with FBA staff and then tested them through our interviews and document review. This process worked well and has also contributed to several of our main findings and recommendations.

In relation to the training area, an evaluability challenge concerned the sheer number of FBA courses and participants (386 courses and 4,540 participants between 2015–2019). We undertook a quantitative assessment of courses within this period and, as described above, produced a randomised sample of participants and courses for the interviews and the training survey in order to keep the qualitative assessment manageable within the team's resources.

The evaluability challenges within the area of secondments pertain to the fact that most secondments are effectively service *outputs* that are delivered by FBA and their outcome results depend upon a variety of external factors over which FBA has little control (e.g. institutional culture or broader political dynamics). This is perhaps less the case in terms of UN secondments, which result from close dialogue between FBA and the UN agency concerned, whereas EU and OSCE secondments are mainly in response to advertised positions. We assessed recruitment according to its relevance, effectiveness and efficiency. But the contribution to wider objectives (outcome and impact), which is the focus of our evaluation, is less easy to determine unless the individuals concerned are in positions of influence. To identify the extent of strategic secondments, the evaluation therefore assesses the degree to which FBA's objective of seconding personnel to core positions has been met and identifies examples of results or contributions accruing from such secondments. This involved interviewing secondees (and to a limited extent also management) as well as review of documentation, including other evaluation and review reports as well as reporting to FBA by secondees themselves.

The evaluation of bilateral cooperation strategies for the evaluation period meant that the selection process of country case studies was to a certain extent limited to which strategies would generate most meaningful data and information for the evaluation. The early strategies from 2015–2016 were more likely to offer data, lessons learned and general experiences that the evaluation could draw from, than strategies that were given to FBA from 2017 and onwards. Working with bilateral cooperation strategies was a new way of working for FBA.

The main evaluability challenges within the bilateral cooperation area concerned the difficulty of validating aggregated results, not only in terms of *access* to where change is expected to happen, but also in terms of the *sustainability* of the results.

The short period of implementation of activities within the framework of bilateral cooperation meant that it was difficult to track any cumulative effects. Furthermore, the extremely complex environments in which FBA's initiatives are often located means that it is difficult for small scale interventions to achieve wider impact. This issue was made more challenging due to the lack of systematic monitoring and reporting of higher level outcomes.

FBA's target groups are geographically dispersed – which would have required field visits to meet beneficiaries. Due to COVID-19, the scope for fieldwork was very limited. A further challenge is that results that were achieved in the past may have been undermined in the interim. To manage these challenges, we adopted a hybrid data collection strategy that included limited local fieldwork by a local researcher, remote interviews conducted by the evaluation team, and a review of existing evaluations, reviews and documentation. The evaluation team has been able to triangulate and validate the data and information that was shared through a painstakingly close interaction with multiple sources who have had first-hand experience and observed the work of FBA's partners in the three case-study countries. Subsequently, it is our belief that the overall analysis of results is not affected by our remote data collection and analysis.

Research, policy and methods outputs in the form of publications have been analysed for their quality, but it has been very difficult to assess the degree of research integration, effectiveness of policy processes and individual cases going back to 2008, both because of staff turnover, but also because of limited reporting and documenting of such processes and their effects.

Research integration has been evaluated by examining to what extent FBA's research is referenced in selected FBA documents through formal citation or by referencing its own research, but also from external research. The evaluation of the other areas of operation also reveals the degree to which research and methods have been integrated and have impacted within FBA itself. Whereas the research component is a fairly delimited area of intervention, centred

around the research department (FoU)'s direct and extended activities, policy and methods development are both less clear. The work of the research department should not be equated with these two other components.

Finally, as noted, COVID-19 prevented the team from conducting in-person fieldwork in the case countries. However, this was mitigated by successfully conducting a large number of KIIs remotely through online platforms such as Zoom and WhatsApp; and the team's local researcher on the ground in Liberia was able to conduct KIIs and FGDs in person.

Evaluation findings

In the following sections, we provide our evaluation findings according to the evaluation matrix, which is attached at Annex 2.

Education, training and exercises

Training is a key operational area for FBA and perhaps the product for which the agency is best known. Over the years, several thousand individuals from a multitude of international organisations, governments and civil society have participated in FBA courses, and FBA has also contributed to other organisations' training events. In 2019 FBA delivered 74 training events involving 768 participants with an even split between women and men at a cost of SEK 48.5 million.[13] The data for the period 2015–2019 (see Tables 1 and 2 below) shows that this is fairly representative, with the exception of 2018 when there were more courses.

During the period evaluated FBA has not had a single, centralised training function. Instead, thematic departments have managed and contributed to a wide range of training courses and other learning events, which places high demands on decentralised pedagogical competences. Recognising this, there has been a gradual process of strengthening the use of common approaches and methods, although this remains work in progress. FBA's training activities also contribute to other operational areas, notably secondments and bilateral cooperation. The training area thus represents a major element of the agency's ambitions, objectives and results.

In the sections that follow, we present findings for the education, training, and exercise area against three of the OECD/DAC evaluation criteria as well as coordination and gender. Primary and secondary sources of data for this part of the evaluation include

[13] FBA Annual Report, 2019.

interviews with FBA staff and training participants, a survey addressed to 120 training participants (79 respondents), and documentation that includes course reports and evaluations, FBA policy and guidance, Swedish strategies, and external evaluations. Further details of our approach and method, including sampling, are included in Annex 1.

Findings relating to relevance

The overall objective of the FBA's training activities is to strengthen the capacity of individuals and organisations to conduct and develop peacebuilding activities, including through enhanced leadership. Training is also an important part of the agency's bilateral development cooperation in the field of peace and security and has a role in preparing individuals for secondments, including election observation and support.[14] The evaluation team has assessed how central training is to FBA's mandate, the relevance of FBA's theory of change for training, the relevance of its training to beneficiaries, including FBA's success in selecting the right trainees.

Relevance to Swedish strategies and FBA objectives

Based on the document review, budget assessment, our training survey and the interviews, the evaluation team finds that education, training and exercises have occupied a central and highly visible position in FBA's work during the period and have been relevant to the Swedish strategies and to FBA's own objectives.

Education, training, and exercises are highlighted in the 2013 instruction to FBA and therefore form an important part of the agency's mandate within its various competence areas. The training area is also relevant to the Swedish strategies, including the Strategy for Sustainable Peace, the Results Strategy for Civilian Crisis Management and the Strategy for Women, Peace and Security.

[14] Kategorisering av FBA's utbildningar, 18 March 2018.

For example, objectives from the Strategy for Sustainable Peace to which FBA's training contributes are: a) enhanced capacity to prevent armed conflict and support inclusive peace and state-building processes, and b) enhanced capacity to promote human security in failing and/or conflict states, especially that of women and children.[15]

Training of Swedish personnel as a contribution to international peace missions is specifically mentioned in the Results Strategy for Civilian Crisis Management: "to ensure that personnel are suitably prepared for their roles and able to contribute with respect to Swedish priority areas, such as women, peace and security".[16] In this regard, FBA provides pre-deployment training (insatsförberedande utbildningar – IFU) for all personnel that are seconded (see also the section on secondments below). This includes hostile environment awareness training (HEAT) where appropriate. FBA has also played a significant role in preparing and running the civilian parts of the triennial international crisis management exercise Viking. This exercise has been relevant to Swedish strategies and FBA has been a logical anchor point for the civil aspects given the agency's mandate and focus areas.

FBA training is relevant to FBA's promotion of gender equality. The agency is one of the actors responsible for implementing the Swedish National Action Plan (NAP) for UNSCR 1325 and is included in its reference group. Training and other capacity building activities form part of the NAP. Gender and Women, and Peace and Security (WPS) are among the thematic areas specifically addressed by FBA and there are dedicated courses for them.

FBA's training activities are also relevant to Swedish bilateral strategies, where they are often specifically mentioned (e.g. Liberia, Myanmar, Iraq, and Democratic Republic of Congo). On the basis

[15] Strategy for Sustainable Peace, 2017–2022.

[16] Strategi för internationell civil krishantering och fredsfrämjande 2020–2023. See also the Resultatstrategi för internationell civil krishantering 2014–2017.

of the strategies, FBA develops its own plans for operationalising its contribution, which include participation of selected individuals on FBA global courses (such as UNSCR 1325, SSR, DDR etc.), targeted courses (such as gender advisors), long-term training programmes (such as inclusive peacebuilding in DRC and conflict prevention leadership training in Liberia), as well as pre-deployment training. An overview of the number and thematic coverage of these courses is provided in Table 1 below.

Table 1: Number of education and training courses

	2019	2018	2017	2016	2015
Multifunctional management & collaboration	1	3	1	2	1
Leadership & political advice	3	2	0	2	3
Observation, conflict prevention & conflict resolution	3	9	5	6	6
DDR	4	3	4	2	1
Women, peace and security	5	13	7	4	5
Rule of law, human rights & election support	4	3	6	1	1
SSR	5	5	5	6	6
HEAT	4	5	4	4	8
Pre-deployment	45	48	46	51	34
Total	**74**	**91**	**78**	**78**	**65**

Source: FBA annual reports.

The evaluation team also considered the relevance of exercises to Swedish strategies and FBA objectives. The main activity here is the triennial Viking exercise conducted in cooperation with the Swedish police and Swedish military, as well as international stakeholders, including the UN, EU and NATO. The overall purpose of this exercise is relevant to FBA's mandate and thematic focus, although relevance in the particular case depends upon the scenario. An internal FBA memorandum summarising key lessons from Viking 18 cast some doubt on this aspect – at least from a UN perspective – emphasising that that the scenario and the structure of the leadership in the exercise were not based on the realities of modern interventions. Thus, while exercises are in principle relevant to Swedish strategy on civilian crisis management and to the global peacekeeping architecture, Viking 18 appears to have been less relevant.[17]

Strengthening operational relevance

While FBA's training effort is relevant to Swedish strategies, its operational relevance depends upon a variety of other factors. Our document review and interviews with FBA staff show that FBA's training efforts during the period have rarely used an explicit theory of change (ToC) and while learning objectives have been formulated, their underlying assumptions and end effects (outcomes and impact in terms of wider changes) have not been clearly articulated. This weakness presents significant risks due to the many and varied causal links inherent in training; for instance, that training is relevant to the beneficiary and can be utilised. The implication of this is that, in the worst case, training delivery may be ineffective and lack impact because it fails to take into account the organisational environment of the participants. As discussed further below in the section on bilateral cooperation, this has had negative implications for the effectiveness of training efforts in the DRC and Liberia.

[17] Erfarenhetsberättelse Viking 18, 27 August 2018, FBA.

The absence of explicit theories of change for training has been noted in several other evaluations. For example, the 2018 evaluation of FBA's SSR training (ISaC) recommended that FBA develop both a generic training ToC and specific ToCs for the different types of training implemented.[18] FBA's own performance report on the 2018 Global SSR course described the change logic as "selected individuals will have better knowledge about SSR [and by] application of said knowledge (learning transfer) these individuals will contribute to increased capacity within their respective organisations". The report notes, however, that the course did not utilise an explicit theory of change at the time of its delivery.[19]

The evaluation team would like to acknowledge that this ToC gap is now recognised by FBA and examples are beginning to emerge at the preparatory phases of interventions. For example, the SSR Global Course has used ToC following the 2018 course and the (draft) memorandum for security training in Colombia includes a basic ToC hinging on the spin-off and wider multiplier effects of knowledge gained during the courses. The memorandum notes the expectation that an increase in participation will also increase the chances of promoting change.[20] The use of theory of change to support FBA's training is thus relatively new. FBA explained to the evaluation team that it is now standard practice.

In order to facilitate the current evaluation, we developed a generic ToC for the training area based on the results of the document review and dialogue with FBA staff (see Figure 3 below). This ToC uses the standard results hierarchy (on the left) and includes a number of indicative assumptions (on the right). FBA's scope for influence is also shown and is based upon the key understanding from contribution analysis that influence over results will decrease as one moves up the logic hierarchy.

---

[18] Evaluation of training within the field of security sector reform (SSR) – FBA, Innovative Strategies for Change (ISaC), 16 March 2018.

[19] Performance report: SSR course 2018-03, FBA, 14 June 2019.

[20] Planering och uppföljning av insats inom ramen för bilateralt strategiuppdrag i Colombia: Utbildningssamarbete med säkerhetssektorn inom DDR, SSR och 1325.

Figure 3: Theory of change for education, training & exercises



The documentation, survey and interviews indicate that this model ToC and its assumptions are relevant to Swedish strategies, to FBA's objectives, to participants and to the receiving organisations.

Regarding beneficiary relevance, a key assumption in our ToC – and one with which FBA concurs – is that course participants come from or will be going to positions where they can utilise the knowledge, skills and attitudes gained and influence their home institutions in a manner that adds value to overall goal achievement. In other words, the courses must be relevant to the participants *and* their roles in the organisations they work in. This appears essential to the change logic and intended results, a so-called 'killer assumption' which, if not upheld in practice, will undermine the effort.

This assumption underlines the importance of robust selection procedures, and this is an area that we have explored in some detail. We note that selection is not always within the control of FBA and that there are external factors (such as job rotation and management support) that may mean relevance and utility of the training given is sub-optimal, even in the most rigorous of systems.

The important role that training plays in FBA's bilateral cooperation also means that certain courses are targeted at participants from bilateral cooperation countries. In these cases, there is a focus on individuals that can be expected to gain from and utilise the training in relation to the goals of the bilateral strategy. Examples from our case study countries during the period covered have included the Inclusive Peacebuilding Programme (PCPI) in the DRC; FBA's global DDR and gender advisor courses as well as various targeted courses and workshop events for Colombian participants, including from the key partner (Agency for Reincorporation and Normalisation – ARN); and the participation of Liberian stake-holders in FBA's conflict prevention leadership programme (CPLP), and the dialogue and mediation, security sector reform and rule of law global courses.

The documentation reveals good practice regarding selection upon which FBA can and does capitalise. For example, the criteria used for the PCPI course in the DRC concerned the candidate's motivation, language skills (French), previous training experience in 1325-related issues, working in an organisation/governmental or provincial structure working with security or peacebuilding-related issues, managerial position, and geographical relevance (eastern DRC). Potential participants were also interviewed as part of the selection process. In Liberia, a recent external evaluation noted that FBA had gone to considerable lengths to select the right participants where possible; especially youth participants and, while government officials were appointed, FBA nonetheless decided on the categories to involve, and these were seen as relevant. The evaluation noted that these selection processes were "staff intensive and sometimes painstaking" but that they also contributed to the strength of the (CPLP) programme.[21] An internal FBA evaluation of the gender advisor course, which had used an explicit gender focus in its selection criteria, found that two-thirds of participants had positions that were explicitly gender related, with the largest group comprising gender focal points, followed by gender advisors and gender experts.[22]

Our own research as part of the current evaluation reveals a more nuanced picture, at least for DRC and Liberia, where interviewees point towards increased participant engagement because of the training but limited organisational effects. This suggests that FBA should further prioritise the selection of participants so that they come from organisations that are well-situated and are able to draw institutional benefits from the individuals trained. Further discussion on this point is included in the section on bilateral cooperation.

---

[21] Evaluation of FBA's Liberia project, 2016–2020, Niras.

[22] Internal evaluation of the gender advisor course, 2020, FBA. The evaluation also found, however, that northern European participants were disproportionately represented and recommended therefore a broader geographic representation.

Selection challenges may be somewhat greater where a proportion of participants in global courses do not come from bilateral cooperation countries. In the case of the training on dialogue and mediation provided to the UN Department for Political and Peacekeeping Affairs (DPPA), the course selection criteria used by DPPA (rather than FBA) explicitly state that the course is "primarily aimed at working-level staff who have some experience and/or knowledge of mediation or will need to engage in mediation-related work in the near future".[23] The effects of good selection can be seen in the course's longer-term impact. The 2019 evaluation of the dialogue and mediation course found that in practice around 78 % of course participants had used the knowledge and skills gained either directly or indirectly to support dialogue and mediation activities.[24] However, this high hit rate is not always found. FBA's internal course report on the 2018 SSR global course, for example, notes that 35 % of participants did not have work areas involving SSR and 55 % were not able to influence their organisations as agents of change, indicating that FBA's selection process was not sufficient in this case.[25]

These examples demonstrate the importance of rigorous selection of course participants even though it can be time-consuming. Despite the significant amount of learning with regard to selection, FBA does not have an internal instrument or mechanism where such good practice and experience is collected and disseminated. We conclude therefore that there is scope for systemising selection criteria across FBA departments in order to maximise the potential for course relevance to their current and subsequent employment and ultimately longer-term effects. The experience suggests that this requires both a personal 'motivation' from the participant and a

[23] Call for applications: Designing and Supporting Dialogue and Mediation Processes, 18–25 May 2019, Sandö, Sweden.
[24] Independent evaluation of the Folke Bernadotte Academy (FBA)'s training in dialogue and mediation for the United Nations Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (UN DPPA), 2019. Tana Copenhagen.
[25] Performance report, SSR global course, 2019.

commitment from the beneficiary organisation regarding the subsequent utilisation of the participant and sharing of knowledge gained. Within such an approach, an FBA guideline on selection should be developed with criteria tailored to support the underlying logic (in the ToC) and learning objectives and learning effects of the training proposed.

Findings relating to efficiency

The evaluation team has considered FBA's role as a service provider in terms of its training function, and the degree to which FBA's research and methods work has been integrated with training preparation and delivery.

Based on the documentation, survey and interviews, we find that FBA's training operations benefit from its considerable experience in delivering high-profile training events, often in cooperation with global peacekeeping and peacebuilding actors, such as the UN and EU. FBA's training during the period assessed has been delivered by thematic departments without the involvement of a central training unit. This may not be the most efficient institutional set-up as it presents challenges for cross-departmental learning. This is most obvious in the absence of a common overall ToC, as discussed above. We note, however, that FBA has been taking steps to increase commonality; for example, through the introduction of its pedagogical approach in 2015. FBA is also interested in learning from its training efforts and actively pursues this through post-training surveys, performance reports and evaluations.

FBA's objectives relating to education, training and exercises are operationalised utilising FBA staff and external experts. As shown in Table 2 below, FBA delivers a substantial amount of training within its thematic areas, although it is important to distinguish between the thematic global and targeted courses (31 % of the total in 2019), which are relatively resource-intensive and the shorter, tailored pre-deployment training inputs (69 %) that are often provided to a few

individuals at a time. Between 2015 and 2019 FBA provided 1,059 training days input to 4,540 individuals with a largely even gender balance.[26]

It should also be noted that FBA staff also contribute to courses managed by other institutions; for example, the UN Chiefs of Staff training and the EU Chiefs of Staff Annual Conference.[27] These contributions are not included in the table below.

Table 2: Summary of courses according to type, numbers etc.

	2019	2018	2017	2016	2015
Number of courses	74	90	78	78	64
Global courses	5	3			
Targeted courses	18	30			
Training programmes		1			
Pre-deployment training	51	56			
Total training days	189	214	222	223	211
Total participants	768	1,317	824	859	772
Gender % (w/m/other)	50/48/2	51/36/11	54/41/5	50/50	47/53

Source: Data from FBA annual reports. Note that prior to 2018, global courses were described differently.

As can also be seen from Table 2, FBA provides a substantial number of pre-deployment training sessions each year. These are always tailored to the individuals being seconded and combine orientations about FBA, Swedish policy objectives, the receiving

[26] Data from FBA annual reports.
[27] 2019 Annual Report, FBA.

organisation, as well as thematic, security and administrative information. The numbers involved in any one event are typically very small because they relate to individual secondments, but there is a constant through-flow of secondees and FBA's preparation arrangements are efficient considering how tailored they are to the individual. The arrangements were reviewed and updated in 2018/2019 to increase their efficiency; for example, by further tailoring to the specific country in which the secondees will work. Our interviews with secondees indicate a very high satisfaction rating for these training sessions. Likewise, senior mission staff consulted about the performance of the FBA secondees noted that they were generally very well prepared and able to integrate quickly and efficiently. Further details are provided in the section on secondments below.

Global and targeted courses are delivered by a mix of FBA staff and contracted experts, often persons with whom FBA have well-established relationships. This represents an efficient use of resources where the FBA staff have the requisite competences as it means external trainers can be used to supplement FBA's internal capacity where necessary. The UN Dialogue and Mediation course, for example, has involved a team of trainers comprising two FBA staff members and three or more external experts with longstanding experience of mediation and peacebuilding work. There has been a high degree of continuity amongst the latter group. This has contributed to the courses' efficiency by facilitating the incorporation of experience and lessons learnt. In addition, several other resource persons have been used, including from the UN Mediation Standby Team. The 2019 evaluation of the mediation course found that the trainer team functioned well as a unit and actively reviewed and adjusted the course content during delivery, which helped maintain its efficiency and relevance to participants.[28]

[28] Independent evaluation of the Folke Bernadotte Academy (FBA)'s training in dialogue and mediation), 2019. Tana Copenhagen.

In relation to research and methods, FBA's research department has contributed to certain training, although on an ad hoc basis. For example, research staff have regularly contributed to the DDR global course as speakers, particularly when the course has been held in Sweden. The research department noted that this is mainly because of the good relations between research staff and counterparts in the DDR department. Our interviews also noted that FBA's policy work on DDR feeds into course curricula; an example is the updated UN DDR guidelines to which FBA also contributed and from which FBA's DDR training now draws.

Our interviews with FBA staff also point to a useful contribution from a number of the research department's knowledge dissemination initiatives (such as the research working groups and the database of evidence) and we note that there is a good alignment between these and FBA's thematic focus areas.[29] The research department also mentioned that researchers are regularly asked to assist by enlisting wider contacts who can contribute to evaluating new curricula (e.g., SSR). In these cases, the research department facilitates the contacts. As concluded in the section on research below, the integration of the research department into other departments' work – including training – is rather sporadic and unsystematic. This is despite efforts to strengthen it, such as an internal review of research integration in 2017. Inter alia, the review noted that individual programmes had developed their own practices to stay updated in their research areas, which perhaps explains why the research department has primarily drawn from individual staff connections and initiatives.[30]

[29] The research working groups cover: mediation and peace processes; peace operations; rule of law; SSR; WPS; elections, peace and security; and DDR. The knowledge database was established to further strengthen the exchange and links between the members of the research working groups with the work of FBA by making members' research profiles, research projects and research results accessible to FBA staff.

[30] Forskningsintegrering i praktiken, FBA, 2018.

Findings relating to effectiveness

The evaluation team has assessed the overall results and effects of FBA's training delivery (i.e., whether learning objectives are achieved and what factors facilitated this). It has considered who has benefitted, their perceptions of the training, the kinds of follow-up that have been used, and the effects of this on the sustainability of the knowledge and skills gained.

The evaluation team's overall finding is that FBA's learning objectives for its training courses are largely met. FBA is a very experienced training provider within its thematic areas and has established excellent relations with key global peace and security actors, particularly the UN and EU, which enable it to tailor its training courses to the needs of the beneficiary organisations. The majority of learning objectives are set at the level of knowledge and skills gained (i.e. outputs), which are largely within FBA's ability to control, and good results are achieved. Beyond this (at outcome level), we find that the results are less distinct. The basis for these findings is described below.

An important factor contributing to training effectiveness is that all training by FBA now proceeds on the basis of a learner-centred pedagogical approach that takes account of participants' training needs and utilises a reflective and participatory approach. The approach rests upon a pedagogical profile document developed in 2015 to strengthen FBA's training programmes by making them more learner-centred, reflecting identified learning needs, with clearly articulated learning objectives that are monitored, and support to participants' awareness of their own learning through reflection and self-assessment.[31] This has since been mainstreamed throughout the agency using staff training workshops, the appointment of a pedagogical coordinator and establishment of a resource bank of good pedagogical practice. Lessons learned fora have also been held in order to gather and disseminate experience

[31] FBA's pedagogical profile, 2015.

amongst the various FBA staff involved. They have considered issues such as training needs analysis, use of subject matter experts, and course delivery and evaluation etc.[32]

The introduction of the pedagogical profile was evaluated in January 2018. This found that people who had completed the FBA's internal pedagogical profile training largely seemed to be applying what they learnt in the courses and programmes which they have designed or delivered. It also found that there were some challenges to both individual trainers and the organisation in fully applying the principles of the pedagogical profile, and there were issues which needed to be addressed to ensure that the policy is sustainable. The evaluation noted, however, that external trainers may be less familiar with the learner-centred approach and that it may pose challenges for participants from certain cultures who are unused to reflective learning processes. Overall, the evaluation found that FBA training is well received by participants in courses and programmes, and overall, the organisation seems to have a good reputation for the training that it offers. The evaluation assessed that the pedagogical profile had made a significant contribution to this situation.[33]

The introduction of the pedagogical profile has strengthened FBA's ability to link knowledge and capacity deliverables (outputs) to utilisation (outcomes), although the latter is sometimes rather weak. The 2019 global course on DDR, for example, had six learning objectives, including that participants should be able to describe the components of a DDR programme or process, connect DDR to other peacebuilding processes, and plan a context-specific and evidence-based DDR process.[34] The objectives of PCPI in the DRC included that participants have increased their capacity to identify gender inequalities in their society and have increased their capacities to apply different tools and methods to reduce these gender

[32] Lessons learned forum, FBA's pedagogiska profil, June 2018.
[33] Hopkins, Bryan. Evaluating the impact of the pedagogical profile programme in FBA, Final Report, January 2018.
[34] Concept paper: Revision and launch of FBA's global course in DDR, 2019.

inequalities. In a few of the cases examined, the level of ambition appears to have been unrealistically high; the 2019 evaluation of FBA's dialogue and mediation course for DPPA, for example, found that the objective "to promote uniformity in the United Nations' understanding of and approach to dialogue and mediation" was not realistic for such a limited initiative, although other goals were appropriate. Also, the 2020 internal evaluation of the gender advisors course found that the one-week course was too short to achieve sustainable behaviour change and that a more programmatic approach should be used, adopting pre-learning and follow-up and a more streamlined approach to topics, thereby allowing more depth.[35]

Results at output level are monitored and assessed through a mixture of observations from instructors and exit questionnaires. The latter apply a standard format with questions relating to the relevance of the training and the overall experience, also in relation to learning objectives. Based upon the participants' responses, FBA then produces a course report which also includes any comments and recommendations made. The evaluation team has examined several course reports and concludes that they provide a useful basis for internal learning and preparation for future courses in terms of course preparation and delivery. We agree that a focus on learning objectives at the delivery and output level is needed to assess knowledge and skills transfer, although the exit questionnaires provide only a subjective means of assessing achievement as they are based upon the individual participants' own perceptions of the learning experience and what they have learnt.

The documentation, our survey and the interviews indicate that FBA is generally very good at delivering training that results in knowledge transfer. In our survey, over 80 % of respondents reported that they were satisfied and 71 % considered that they had increased knowledge and skills, as shown in Figure 4 below.

[35] Internal evaluation of FBA's course for gender advisors, FBA, August 2020.

Figure 4: Increased knowledge and/or skills through training provided by FBA



Source: Tana Copenhagen, FBA training evaluation survey, 2021. Of 120 persons targeted, 73 answered the questions which is a 61 % return rate.

Comments made by respondents to our survey refer to FBA courses as "eye opening" whereby participants developed "more advanced thinking" and improved "methods development" that were relevant to them in several ways. Not only personally but also in relation to their jobs even though, in many cases, the persons had some prior experience and knowledge. Only a small minority of our respondents had critical or negative replies on these questions.[36] For example, one senior participant on one of the targeted SSR courses noted that the course was overly simplistic and did not provide [the person concerned] with new knowledge or knowledge that could be applied in practice.[37] Also, some of our direct interviewees noted that there is space for further contextualisation.[38]

[36] Tana Copenhagen, FBA training evaluation survey, 2021.
[37] Survey response, Tana Copenhagen.
[38] Interviews with former course participants undertaken by Tana during this evaluation.

These findings are similar to FBA's own assessments and other external evaluations. For example, all participants on the 2018 senior women's talent pipeline course found it to be either 'excellent' or 'very good'.[39] Participants in the gender advisor's course noted that it had increased their abilities to design gender analysis, support gender mainstreaming and demonstrate key gender advisor knowledge and skills. The 2020 internal evaluation of the gender advisor courses found that 90 % of participants rated them as 'excellent' or 'very good'.[40] Participants on the political advisors training provided to staff at the Palestinian MFA reported that they learned a lot about what makes a good writer and communicator when seeking to be clear and specific in drafting messages, texts, and speeches, and that basing the training on the Political Advisors' Handbook had helped cement this at the workplace.[41]

Results at output level, however, do not tell us about how the knowledge gained has been used, a limitation of which FBA is aware.[42] The agency has therefore been strengthening its focus on outcome measurement for which it has initiated various mechanisms, such as post-training impact surveys. This is in line with the 2017 strategy for training evaluation that reflects the Kirkpatrick model of reaction, learning, behavioural change, and impact and includes a focus on subsequent utilisation of the learning.[43] Kirkpatrick's model has the advantage of moving the focus from assessing the quality of preparation and delivery (i.e. efficiency) to

[39] Utvärdering kursdeltagare SWTP, 2018, FBA.

[40] Internal evaluation of the gender advisor course, 2020, FBA.

[41] Sthlm Policy Group. Evaluation of the POLAD concept, 2018.

[42] Interview with FBA staff, August 2020. See also Resultatuppföljning för 2019/2020 års utbildning: Strategic peacebuilding processes through dialogue and mediation, FBA, 2020.

[43] The Kirkpatrick model for evaluating training programmes concerns four levels of assessment: a) Reaction – the degree of participant engagement in the training; b) Learning – concerning what participants have learned and what they haven't; c) Behaviour – the degree to which participants apply and are able to apply the training; and d) Results – the outcomes or changes to which the training has contributed. Strategy for Training Evaluation, FBA, March 2017.

the effects of the training and its utilisation in the workplace (i.e. outcomes). Monitoring of training outcomes has obvious value in enabling feedback on utilisation that can strengthen the relevance and effectiveness of the training provided.

Use of the Kirkpatrick model is demonstrated, for example, in the SSR global course.[44] In this sense, the use of follow-up surveys six months or so after a course with specific questions on utilisation is a good practice that FBA has partially adopted. We consider, however, that it should be further developed and expanded so that possible institutional changes and wider effects are captured, as discussed below.

To assist outcome contribution, some FBA courses have used specific mechanisms to promote the application of learning, including through action planning and mentoring. Action plans are a way to link training objectives to the work environment; for example, by requiring participants to determine where new learning can be applied within an organisation and the development of approaches using learning from the training to do so. Action planning can involve prior agreement on objectives between the participant and their line management. Mentoring is also a means to strengthen the relevance and utility of training.

The PCPI implemented in the DRC, for example, has used Congolese mentors to assist course participants to implement the new knowledge and skills gained through the course modules. Other strategies to promote utilisation have included alignment with a peacebuilding network and alumni events. The 2019 evaluation of PCPI noted that the training and its follow-up had had results in terms of changed attitudes and practices among course participants and the programme had resulted in a number of changes in the short to medium term, contributing to a strengthening of gender mainstreaming and an increased awareness of the need for a broader

[44] FBA, Strategy for evaluating training, 2017.

understanding of marginalised men and women. However, the evaluation had difficulty identifying wider effects or whether they had been institutionalised and sustained.[45]

The above examples are corroborated by our own survey, in which a high proportion of respondents (80 %) stated that they had applied the knowledge and skills acquired. See Figure 5 below. Respondents pointed towards lower-level outcomes such as improvements in terms of conflict analysis, decision-making, fieldwork, analysis, communication, leadership, women's inclusion, and coordination. In a number of cases, respondents highlighted that they were able to pass on the new knowledge gained to colleagues and other stakeholders. As one respondent put it "our local leadership has begun to understand their roles when it comes to security reform and the security needs of the community. The local [leadership] has also taken ownership of their own security and recommend policy to the central government for implementation. These are changes as a result of what I learned and applied following my training".[46]

[45] Evaluation of PCPI, NCG, 2019.

[46] Respondent to survey.

Figure 5: Extent of application of lessons learned in the training



Source: Tana Copenhagen, FBA training evaluation survey, 2021.

Concrete examples of outcome level results are also described in FBA's evaluations. For example, in the 2019 external evaluation of FBA's dialogue and mediation training for UN DPPA and selected other organisations. According to this, approximately 80 % of respondents stated that they had subsequently been involved in or supported dialogue and mediation processes. This included support to formal Track 1 mediations (e.g. Cyprus, Sudan-South Sudan, Mali and national dialogue in Lesotho) as well as local dialogue at field level (e.g. in Afghanistan), including local negotiation, increasing local participation and strengthening local capacities. More advisory type functions and support to strategic thinking and design were also mentioned. In a few cases examples were given of where participants had used the knowledge and skills gained to develop new institutional structures, including a mediation support unit (in ECOWAS).[47]

[47] Independent evaluation of the Folke Bernadotte Academy (FBA) training in dialogue and mediation), 2019. Tana Copenhagen.

Similarly, FBA's gender advisor's course has benefitted from a high proportion of participants already working in gender advisor or related positions and the documentation points to a number of (lower level) outcome results. These include subsequent implementation of training on gender equality, preparation of gender equality/parity strategies, other initiatives to promote gender parity and women's participation, gender mainstreaming of projects and policies and the development of gender mainstreaming checklists, development of gender focal point systems, and contributions to more gender-sensitive reporting.[48]

We acknowledge that training outcomes can be difficult to measure and attribute as they concern wider changes where extraneous factors can be involved over which FBA has less or no control. And we observe that the impact surveys used during the period have been largely dependent upon participants' own self-assessment. To obtain a more objective picture, a detailed monitoring and evaluation framework is needed that uses clear and realistic result indicators at outcome level (i.e. not only learning objectives which tend to be at output level) and involves beneficiary organisations as well as consideration of possible contributing factors.

While the anecdotal evidence suggests that FBA's training does indeed have positive effects beyond the individual participants, there is also a need to consider the factors that contribute to this. Factors noted in the documentation include the strategic selection of participants (right people, right place), the mixed participant groups (involving both headquarters and field-based staff), and an enabling environment in the place of operation (i.e. there needs to be opportunity). There are also a number of 'disabling factors', such as limited knowledge among colleagues, limited applicability to work (i.e. course not relevant to beneficiary), confidentiality issues, need for more in-depth knowledge, and organisational and leadership

[48] Internal evaluation of the gender advisor course, 2020, FBA.

challenges (e.g. rapid job rotation, non-supportive management).[49] In the case of gender training, hindering factors include internal and external resistance to gender equality followed by lack of resources for gender equality work.[50]

FBA has noted that results achievement also depends upon a variety of factors outside of FBA's full control, including selection, subsequent employment, presence of other change agents and management support. A low level of relevance to the work area will mean that participants are unlikely to be able to influence their organisations (as agents of change), which will obviously reduce outcome achievement. It has also been noted that where participants are mostly single individuals from organisations, this can make transfer of knowledge difficult. Conversely, where there are other FBA alumni, transfer is easier because a 'critical mass' of knowledgeable people is available. A further factor can be the existence or otherwise of a reform agenda and management in the recipient organisation, which can provide institutional backing.[51] This points to the value of a critical mass of people sharing similar thinking and able to push a reform agenda and it underlines the observation made earlier that effective selection and dialogue with the beneficiary organisation is important.

For the current evaluation, our survey respondents provided a number of insights regarding such enabling factors, as illustrated in Table 3 below. It should be noted that, as with the examples above, these are positive factors that contribute to outcome fulfilment and their absence would have a correspondingly negative effect instead.

[49] Independent evaluation of the Folke Bernadotte Academy (FBA)'s training in dialogue and mediation), 2019. Tana Copenhagen.
[50] Internal evaluation of gender advisors course, FBA, August 2020.
[51] Performance report, SSR global course, 2019.

Table 3: Factors contributing to outcome achievement

Individual and organisational factors	External factors	FBA factors
Relevance to context, incl. reform agenda Relevance to position Available resources in beneficiary organisation Supportive management/leadership Positive reception from colleagues Personal drive & adaptability Conducive work environment – willingness of leadership to assimilate new ideas & take ownership Proximity of alumni Organisational ties with FBA, dialogue	Favourable political, security, & economic context Conducive policy framework & reform agenda Receptive beneficiaries Access to government authorities Open communication channels	Relevance of training content and method to actual context Engagement and follow-up by FBA during & after training Learning materials available Wider collaboration between FBA and beneficiary organisation

Source: The evaluation team.

The evaluation team observes that enabling factors such as those outlined above would logically feature in a theory of change for the training area as they are in effect assumptions without which the wider effects of training at outcome level will be weak. By making such assumptions and enabling factors explicit, FBA would strengthen its focus on them during course preparation, delivery, and follow-up. For example, in terms of selection, it would require that candidates and ideally also their management produce a clear linkage between their positions and experience and the thematic content of the course and explicitly reference how the knowledge and skills acquired will be utilised. FBA could then follow up the training at intervals to identify whether there have been any effects.

Findings relating to coordination

The evaluation team has assessed how FBA has coordinated its training and has used training to support other objectives (in terms of synergies) and the degree to which training has enhanced opportunities for networking amongst participants.

In relation to internal coordination, we find that the compartmentalised nature of training activities across FBA departments means that the responsibilities for coordination generally rest with individual departments. On the one hand, this has operated well at the thematic level as it allows subject matter experts within departments and their networks to contribute. On the other hand, there appear to be shortcomings in the degree to which FBA research staff have been utilised. This is particularly relevant to the bilateral cooperation area, where FBA training comprises a significant part of the overall contribution. Moreover, it has also meant that FBA as a whole has not always taken a uniform approach to training methodologies. For example, there has been a widely differing approach to the use of theory of change (largely absent during the period) and a lack of a systematic approach to participant selection – two areas where common procedures would have been valuable. The application of methods to promote institutionalisation has also varied; some departments mentioned that they used action plans to reinforce uptake of learning while others don't appear to do so. This is an aspect that FBA could strengthen. On the other hand, we note the introduction of the pedagogical approach and the efforts to mainstream this across the agency, which the 2018 evaluation concluded had been successful.[52]

In relation to coordination with other Swedish institutions, aspects of pre-deployment training (notably HEAT) are coordinated with the Swedish civil contingencies agency and the Swedish armed forces. FBA has also cooperated with the Swedish police and the

[52] Evaluating the impact of the pedagogical profile programme in FBA, Final Report, January 2018.

Swedish armed forces in relation to exercises, notably Viking 18. FBA's internal assessment of this notes that FBA's late entry into the exercise planning, despite its previous participation in earlier versions of the exercise, caused a number of planning and coordination challenges as certain basic exercise planning assumptions had already been made before they joined in. The late entry had the effect that the Swedish civil contingencies agency (MSB) decided not to participate. A timelier participation could also have strengthened the relevance of the exercise scenario, which would have eased the participation of the UN.[53]

In relation to external coordination, FBA draws on its well-established connections, especially with the UN and EU, to promote its training opportunities. Examples of this are the dialogue and mediation training (for UNDPPA) and the senior women's talent pipeline. We observe that close and effective dialogue with sending organisations is especially important to ensure that curricula are relevant to participants and the organisations themselves and so that selection processes enable qualified individuals to participate.

We also note that FBA's policy work on SSR and DDR has several external synergies. In the case of SSR, FBA's role as chair of the European Security and Defence College's executive academic board on SSR (ESDC EAB SSR), has enabled it to collaborate with other SSR experts (for example on the development of SSR concepts that have underpinned curricula and common approaches, which can be considered an outcome of sorts). Collaborators include the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF). The contribution to the EU has also included training of EU officials – an annual so-called 'In-mission SSR training' is aimed at EU and EU civilian crisis management staff.[54]

[53] Erfarenhetsberättelse Viking 18, 27 August 2018, FBA.

[54] Projektplanering för insatser som genomförs inom ramen för Strategin för Hållbar Fred 2017–2022.

In relation to networking, the documentation and our interviews note that this is a valuable output from many training courses, although the degree and sustainability of the networks varies. We note that the potential for networking sometimes also forms part of FBA's selection criteria, thereby also supporting wider political objectives in relation to Swedish bilateral strategies. Our survey revealed that 38 % of respondents had maintained contact. Other evaluations have noted that alumni networks can help strengthen the application of learning by encouraging exchanges of ideas and experience and offering other forms of support. The latter can include follow-up from resource persons.[55]

Findings in relation to coverage of gender

FBA offers a number of gender and women, peace, and security-specific courses. Examples are the regular gender advisor courses and the senior women's talent pipeline. Gender aspects also comprise a significant part of other courses; PCPI is an example. We find that gender is cross-cutting in the sense that it is incorporated thematically into all FBA training and an effort is made to ensure gender parity where appropriate amongst course participants.

The documentation and our interviews show that FBA's two-pronged approach to gender is successful at the level of knowledge transfer (outputs) and that there are also examples of application and institutional change. The 2018 external evaluation of SSR training concludes that FBA has been effective ("globally very relevant and useful") in integrating gender into its SSR trainings, with particularly positive responses concerning tools for gender analysis, gender budgeting and links between gender mainstreaming and SSR effectiveness. There was also a good balance between women and men participants (44 %/56 %), which is positive given that SSR is heavily male dominated.[56] The 2019 evaluation of PCPI in the DRC

[55] For example, observations from the evaluations of dialogue and mediation (2019), gender advisors (2020).
[56] ISaC, 2018.

notes that all participants had the possibility to bring children and someone to care for them during the course. This gave both women and men the possibility to participate. Throughout the training programme, there have been conscious efforts to cater for the differences. Interviews did not point to any case in the design and set-up of the programme where gender difference was hindering qualitative participation.[57] While the 2020 internal evaluation of the gender advisors course had some concerns about selection and depth, it also found that there were good results at the level of learning transfer as well as examples of application, such as development of gender architecture, policy development, operational procedures as well as (and perhaps primarily) capacity building of staff and counterparts. It also noted that some participants self-assessed that their increase in gender knowledge and skills through the course had had positive impacts on their careers.[58]

Conclusions in relation to the results of the senior women's talent pipeline (SWTP) need to be treated somewhat differently as there is a significant dependence upon the availability of senior UN positions. FBA's training for SWTP participants is regarded by participants as relevant and has met expectations. But its effects in terms of successful appointments appear limited.[59]

Summary of findings on training

FBA has a well-deserved international reputation as an efficient training institution within its thematic priority areas and its training makes a positive contribution to its objectives as well as Sweden's global and bilateral strategies. While global and targeted courses remain relevant, we find that increasing the focus on a more programmatic approach offers potential for increasing wider institutional effects, especially as part of bilateral cooperation.

---

[57] Evaluation of PCPI, NCG, 2019.

[58] Internal evaluation of FBA's course for gender advisors, FBA, August 2020.

[59] Follow-up to SWTP, February 2018, FBA.

Our findings indicate that FBA's training courses increase the knowledge and skills of a significant number of individuals from international organisations, national governments, and civil society every year within the thematic areas prioritised. FBA gathers a considerable amount of data from participants regarding the relevance and value of its courses and commissions internal and external evaluations, which contribute to its learning and course delivery. The documentation (including other evaluations) that we have reviewed, and stakeholders consulted, indicate a generally high level of relevance to the individuals concerned as well as to the organisations they represent. This leads to good results in terms of the achievement of individual learning objectives (which are largely output focused). There is a need to increase the focus on the effects and institutionalisation of this learning (i.e. outcomes). This approach would be strengthened by utilising theory of change across the training area so that change assumptions and causality are clear.

The weak evidence of institutional change suggests a need to enhance monitoring and evaluation at outcome level. Such evidence will provide learning that can be channelled back into FBA's training, secondments and bilateral cooperation as well as in the agency's dialogue with beneficiary organisations. Since 2015, FBA's pedagogical principles have increased the focus on learning objectives; however, there is a need for these learning objectives to move beyond knowledge transfer to its utilisation. If this is not achieved, results will remain at the individual level and wider effects will be missed.

To increase outcome effectiveness, we recommend that FBA take a more systematic approach to selection of course participants across FBA departments that links explicitly to the institutionalisation of learning. Within such an approach, there should be scope for clear tailoring of selection criteria to the underlying change logic of the training proposed. For example, sending organisations should confirm that individuals proposed for training will be or will continue to be in roles where the course learning objectives will be used.

Secondments

Arranging and supporting secondments of Swedish personnel to international peacekeeping and peacebuilding headquarters and missions (including election observer missions) forms a central part of FBA's mandate. Every year around 130 individuals are prepared and sent out. The majority of these are to core or advisory functions within headquarters and missions and relatively few are at a senior level. Secondees operate as integral personnel of the missions to which they are posted and do not fulfil non-mission related tasks (for example in relation to separate Swedish objectives). At the same time, there is an underlying assumption that their presence and activity will serve to promote Swedish core norms and values, such as gender equality.

In the sections that follow, we present findings for the secondments area against three of the OECD/DAC evaluation criteria as well as coordination and gender. Primary sources of data for this part of the evaluation include interviews with FBA staff and secondees. The latter were selected randomly so as to be representative of both field missions and headquarters positions. Secondary sources included internal FBA reports and evaluations, FBA guidance documents, Swedish strategies, and external evaluations. Further details of our approach and method, including sampling, are included in Annex 1.

Findings relating to relevance

The evaluation team has assessed how central secondments are to FBA's mandate, the relevance of FBA's theory of change for secondments, the relevance of its secondments to beneficiaries, and the importance attached by the Swedish MFA to this role.

Based on its document review, budget analysis and interviews, the evaluation team finds that FBA's secondments occupy a central place in FBA's mandate and daily work and are strategically anchored in Swedish government strategies and policy and in FBA's own

objectives. The positions targeted during the period have been relevant to Swedish strategies, FBA objectives, and to the mandates of the receiving organisations. To varying degrees, the positions targeted have also offered opportunities to promote gender equality.

Relevance to Swedish strategies and FBA objectives

The three key strategies relevant to secondments are the Strategy for Sustainable Peace (2017–2022), the Results Strategy for International Crisis Management and Peacebuilding (the most recent edition is for 2020–2023), and the National Action Plan for UNSCR 1325. These strategies include goals relating to enhancing the capacity of actors supporting inclusive peacebuilding and state-building and enhancing the role and contribution of women. In the case of the civil crisis management strategy, the overall goals are to, "achieve global multilateral capacity to act swiftly and effective in civilian crisis management and peacebuilding; and develop the Swedish civil participation in the cooperation and organisations carrying out crisis management and peace support operations." Amongst its sub-objectives are to "support and contribute to international civilian crisis management operations; and promoting peace, within the framework of the mandate and mission of the operations" and to strengthen "gender mainstreaming and gender equality in activities relating to international civilian crisis management."

The most recent civilian crisis management strategy includes requirements that the Swedish participation in crisis management missions contributes to the specific mission's objectives and that priority should be given to seconding personnel for the "management positions, core functions, training programmes and other key services" that support "the operational capabilities of the organisation as well as policy and doctrine". Equally, there is an intention that seconding authorities should contribute to "feedback of experience from the operations".[60] The 1325 NAP adds to this by emphasising that FBA, alongside other agencies, has a responsibility

[60] Strategi för internationell civil krishantering och fredsfrämjande 2020–2023.

for ensuring that gender equality and gender perspectives are included in the selection, preparation, and implementation of Swedish support to peace missions.[61]

Further strategic grounding is provided by the government's bilateral cooperation strategies. These mention the thematic priorities to be pursued as well as, in some cases, the method. The degree to which secondments are specifically mentioned in these varies; for example, in the 2016–2020 Liberia strategy, secondment is included as an option – "action by the FBA may include training, secondments, advice, methods development or policy support" – while in the 2016–2020 Colombia strategy, secondments are not specifically mentioned.[62] Our examination shows that FBA has responded where there has been a specific instruction in the strategy. In Liberia, for example, there is currently an FBA secondee in an advisory position within the UN resident coordinator's office.

Finally, we note that additional direction is provided to FBA through the issuance of Swedish government instructions (*Regleringsbrev* and *Regeringsbeslut*). In the case of election observation, these state the elections where FBA is expected to second observers, although not their precise composition or number.

In relation to FBA's own goals, secondments respond to all three of FBA's long-term objectives, and particularly objective two: "Increased capacity for international peace and crisis management initiatives to contribute to peace and security". These objectives are operationalised through FBA's annual plan (*Verksamhetsplan*), where secondments are also included. The 2018 plan, for instance, includes three two-year objectives (VOs 1–3) with the overall goal of, "improved achievement of objectives and mandates in international peace and election observation operations", and with the explanation (logic) that "FBA seconds women and men with the right skills in

[61] Sweden's National Action Plan concerning women, peace and security, 2016–2020.
[62] Liberia Strategy, 2016–2020, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Sweden.

the agency's areas of expertise, who are well prepared, and placed in positions of high relevance". The two-year goals provide measurable internal targets (i.e. outputs); for example, stating the number of women and men to be seconded to election observation.[63]

While FBA does not have an explicit theory of change for the secondment area, key elements of a possible ToC are in fact articulated in the Swedish global strategies; including, for example, that Swedish influence in an operation depends upon the level of the Swedish commitment (i.e. size, level and type of functions held).[64] At mission level, this change logic is sometimes expressed directly, such as in relation to the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in Georgia where it is stated that "FBA seconds well prepared personnel with appropriate competences to EUMM", with the immediate outcome that "strong capacity enables EUMM to carry out its mission".[65] A 2018 internal FBA note on secondments and strategies also includes a number of relevant assumptions; including that secondments strengthen the ability of the receiving organisation to fulfil its mandate and represent a cost-effective way of contributing to the achievement of mission objectives.[66] Our interviews with persons deployed through FBA confirm the above logic.

In the absence of an explicit ToC, and based on a dialogue with FBA, the evaluation team has developed the model set out in Figure 6 below.

[63] FBA's samlade verksamhetsplan 2018.
[64] Strategi för internationell civil krishantering och fredsfrämjande 2020–2023. See also the Resultatstrategi för internationell civil krishantering 2014–2017.
[65] Bilaga 3 – exempel på hur vår_a_sekunderingar_bidrar_till_strategimål.
[66] FBA's sekunderingar och strategier, 29 August 2018.

Figure 6: Theory of change for secondments



The documentation and interviews indicate that this ToC and its assumptions are relevant to Swedish strategies and to the receiving organisations. We note that the actual selection of missions is primarily determined through MFA instructions and that FBA therefore has limited influence. We find that there is a good degree of alignment at output and outcome levels but that thereafter the contribution becomes less distinct. This is discussed further below in the section on effectiveness.

Beneficiary relevance

With regard to beneficiary relevance, the evaluation team notes that, for EU and OSCE secondments, available positions are identified and advertised by the organisations themselves. Since 2019, FBA has provided part of Sweden's contribution to the Civilian Compact within the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The Compact seeks to strengthen the civilian contribution to CSDP missions.

UN positions are identified through an ongoing dialogue, notably with the UN Development Programme (UNDP), UN Women, and the Department for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA). FBA has a longstanding relationship with these agencies and one that is formalised in the first two cases. FBA also contributes to the UN's joint programme on building national capacities for conflict prevention by supplying peace and development advisors (PDAs), for example to the UN resident coordinator's office in Liberia. The regular dialogue and interaction (also at field level) helps FBA to identify opportunities that are in line with its thematic focus areas and the Swedish strategies – but equally, it provides an opportunity for the UN to promote opportunities itself.

Finally, it should be recalled that guidance regarding secondments is also provided by the Swedish MFA; firstly, via the global and bilateral strategies, and secondly through the annual regulatory letters. In the latter case, there is usually a dialogue between the MFA and FBA where the MFA makes suggestions and FBA then considers how

they can be operationalised and then undertakes the recruitment process. The MFA informed the evaluation team that there are a number of factors that drive the MFA's interests, including an assessment of whether an organisation needs support on a specific issue (gender is an example), the priority attached to the organisation, and the importance attached to its work. In the MFA's opinion, this mechanism works well and there is a good dialogue with FBA.[67]

Our interviews with actual secondees indicate that the EU, OSCE and UN positions to which Swedish personnel are seconded are relevant to the missions concerned, although some felt that the continued relevance and/or functionality of the mission itself was questionable. This latter observation is also made in FBA's own analysis of the observations made in reporting from secondees.[68] While of course such observations are subjective, they nonetheless provide FBA with valuable information regarding which missions to prioritise in the future.

A need to increase the focus on senior positions

FBA's identification and recruitment processes seek to identify relevant and capable candidates for the positions prioritised. FBA uses a checklist for secondments that states that, a position must be within one of FBA's thematic areas, that it contributes to one or more strategy objectives and is in line with FBA's operationalisation of these, that it is affordable, that it has low or no opportunity cost in relation to possible alternatives, offers opportunities in relation to women's needs and participation, and that it holds opportunities for influence.[69] Our interviews, which were a random selection of headquarters and mission positions at various levels, indicate that these priorities are reflected to a substantial degree in the positions concerned.

[67] Interview with Swedish MFA, 20 May 2021.
[68] Analys av insatsavslutande enkät, April 2020.
[69] Checklista sekunderingar, FBA.

While FBA's procedures thus go to some lengths to identify relevant positions, the data reviewed suggests that a substantial majority of secondments are to core functions and advisor positions, and relatively few to managerial positions. 'Core functions' include positions such as monitors and observers; in other words, positions that are essential to the mission's mandate. The majority of postings are at P4 level or equivalent, which in the UN system is someone with a minimum of seven years' work experience.[70] FBA explained that, in the case of the UN, this is because more senior positions are recruited directly by the UN itself and are thus not open to secondees. In other cases, FBA noted that it can be difficult to attract senior secondees due to family reasons, especially where hardship posts are concerned.

The documentation suggests, however, that only around 10 % of positions are at leadership or managerial level.[71] In the data reviewed for 2019, and excluding secondees to election observation missions, we distinguish between positions that are clearly leadership and management from those that are advisory, as well as other functions. The results are set out in Figure 7 below and show that for 2019 around 7 % of positions were clearly leadership and some 31 % were advisory. Of course, both sub-sets provide opportunities for influence, as our interviews also suggest, and if we take this broad view, then around 38 % of secondments in 2019 could be said to offer scope for influence with both these and the remaining 62 % contributing to overall mission objectives.[72]

[70] Könsuppdelad statistik med organisation, insats, stationeringsort, befattning och arbete på hemort per myndighet, 2020.
[71] Analys av insatsavslutande enkät, April 2020.
[72] ÅAK per strategisk tjänst 2019.

Figure 7: Functional distribution of FBA secondments



Source: Categories mirror the categorisation used by FBA in its data concerning secondments. The data is combined from FBA's "ÅA strategiska tjänster 2018-2020", which is derived from salaries paid to individuals seconded.

This is broadly in accordance with the global strategies which prioritise the ability to exercise influence. However, the low level of positions that can realistically be described as leadership and management is at odds with the priority attached to these roles in the strategies. It is also somewhat surprising to find that this is the case in EU and OSCE missions with relatively large Swedish contingents, such as EUMM Georgia, SMM Ukraine and EUAM Ukraine, where the size of the Swedish contingent could justify a greater leadership role. Our interviews with personnel deployed, as well as mission leadership, indicate that FBA is informed about the possibilities for increasing Sweden's presence at this level.

Findings relating to efficiency

The evaluation team has considered FBA's role as a service provider and its role in identifying relevant positions, and the degree to which research and methods have been integrated with secondments, and how knowledge gained through secondments flows back to FBA (and to the MFA).

The evaluation team finds that FBA has operated an efficient secondment service in response to the global and bilateral strategies and other instructions from the Swedish MFA during the period considered. Between 2016–2019 FBA seconded a total of 461 people to the EU, OSCE, UN and a small number of other headquarters and missions. 53 % of these were to EU headquarters and missions. In terms of numbers deployed, significant Swedish contributions were made to the EU monitoring mission in Georgia (EUMM Georgia), the OSCE's special monitoring mission in Ukraine (SMM Ukraine), and the temporary international presence in Hebron (TIPH). In 2019 the number of secondments to these missions were 21, 17 and 9 respectively, i.e. 38 % of the total deployed in 2019. Figure 8 shows the relative balance between the main receiving organisations.

Figure 8: Overview of secondments to HQ and peace missions



Source: The data is derived from statistics provided on secondments provided by FBA and derived from salaries paid to individuals seconded.

In addition to the above, FBA has seconded a total of 605 short and long-term election observers and 27 statisticians, mainly to EU and OSCE missions. The majority of the observers (80 %) have been to OSCE missions – missions within the Eastern and South Eastern Europe and Central Asia areas – whereas EU observer missions have been global as illustrated in Figure 9.[73]

[73] In 2019, for example, FBA deployed election observers to the following countries: Nigeria, El Salvador, Senegal, Malawi, Tunisia, Mozambique, Kosovo, Sri Lanka, Guatemala, Moldova, Ukraine, North Macedonia, Albania, Kazakhstan, Belarus and Uzbekistan.

Figure 9: FBA election observers



Source: The data is derived from statistics provided on secondments provided by FBA and derived from salaries paid to individuals seconded.

FBA operates what one interviewee described as a "well-oiled machine" when it comes to the identification, recruitment, and deployment of Swedish experts. It monitors forthcoming vacancies (especially for EU and OSCE) and holds dialogue with UN agencies regarding opportunities for possible secondments. When positions emerge, FBA considers their strategic relevance, feasibility, and affordability. It organises a recruitment process, provides induction and pre-deployment training, provides relocation support, ensures follow-up and monitoring during the secondment, provides human resource services (including counselling, where necessary), and assesses and reports on overall performance. Each secondee is provided with a specific 'case officer' at FBA with whom they can be in as regular contact as necessary.

From the reports examined by the evaluation team, it is clear that FBA gathers information and feedback from secondees, mainly relating to the preparation and conditions of the secondment and the secondees role in relation to the mission/HQ mandate. However, the section on recommendations offers scope for the secondees to highlight possible upcoming opportunities for future secondments

or factors on which there should be dialogue.[74] In the examples examined, we found that the majority included observations directed towards promoting the effectiveness of the Swedish contribution, such as the scope for adjusting its scale and/or focus. FBA told the evaluation team that these end of tour reports are among the sources used to inform future secondments. Our conclusion is therefore that ample opportunities exist for both secondees and FBA to interact and for FBA to learn about strategically relevant upcoming opportunities.

All our interviewees without exception highlighted the high quality of the comprehensive induction and pre-deployment training provided by FBA, which typically lasts for two to three days and is tailored to the individual mission. In many cases, this training is provided for individuals or small groups, reflecting that many secondments are unique appointments. Interviewees had very few recommendations for improvement to this training. Among the comments received was the need to reflect on the very different (and diverse) management systems that are likely to be encountered (more hierarchical). Senior secondees and those with a lot of prior experience noted that there would be value in focusing more on contextual updates and policy briefings. This perhaps points to the relevance of further tailoring in such cases. The high level of appreciation is broadly mirrored in FBA's own survey-based analysis where 77 % considered that they had received the training and information that they needed and 18 % were partially satisfied.[75]

Our interviews with secondees and mission management indicate that FBA is generally very good at regularly keeping in touch (e.g. through visits and email). This is a factor that is appreciated as it provides opportunities for secondees and mission leadership to provide feedback.

---

[74] Analysis of end of tour reports.

[75] Analys av insatsavslutande enkät, April 2020.

In the case of UN positions, FBA has a close dialogue with the UN based on the joint UNDP/DPPA programme on building national capacities for conflict prevention, and its agreements with UNDP and UN Women. As explained above, this works both ways – enabling FBA to identify strategically relevant positions and allowing the UN to propose opportunities to FBA.

An example of this is the secondment of a DDR expert to UNDP in Geneva as co-chair of the UN Inter-Agency Working Group for DDR (IAWG-DDR). They were able to benefit from FBA's active role in the DDR area – including financially through its support for workshops, consultancies etc. and as a respected and neutral partner. There was also a direct benefit for FBA in that they would be able to utilise a revised and updated IDDRS. Thus, this secondment provided FBA with an opportunity to influence the guidelines (that they could utilise in FBA DDR training) and facilitate its access to relevant partners.

As part of the identification process, FBA considers the 'opportunity cost' of one alternative over another as well as the overall 'fit' of the position with Swedish priorities and the resource base. This led in 2018 to a tightening of the selection processes so that greater emphasis was placed on the likelihood of a successful application with the effect that fewer candidates were forwarded to receiving organisations, but the success rate increased, thus increasing the overall efficiency in terms of staff effort.[76]

Our contacts with senior mission management indicate that FBA's secondees are generally found to be well-prepared and to integrate easily. A major added advantage is their high level of linguistic ability, normally English. In a few instances it was noted that some secondees experienced difficulties initially in appreciating the more hierarchical and male-dominated staffing structures typically found in peacebuilding missions. This suggests that pre-deployment training and selection should highlight these aspects in preparation.

[76] FBA Annual Report, 2019.

In relation to FBA's research and methods work and secondments, we find very limited linkage. In the case of the relatively few secondments that coincide with key FBA research areas (e.g. DDR), there has been some interaction. The previously mentioned secondment to UNDP in Geneva is an example. However, this is the exception, and, in most cases, it is unrealistic to expect a direct linkage.

Regarding learning and knowledge flows to FBA and the MFA from the secondments, opportunities arise during mission visits, the regular reporting from the secondees (three times a year), through end-of-tour debriefings, ad hoc interaction with the case officer, and through secondees' involvement in visits and other events. Interviewees and a brief examination of a sample of regular reporting and end-of-tour reports indicate that much of content of these is management and human resources-focused without much thematic content. A small number of interviewees stated that they were surprised that there was only limited thematic interaction and that concrete opportunities for this should be sought beyond the regular reporting.

Findings relating to effectiveness

The evaluation team has assessed the overall results and effects of FBA's work in the area of secondments, including in terms of Swedish influence, and whether the goals for secondments have been achieved. It has considered what types of secondment have been most influential and who has benefitted.

Overall, the evaluation team finds that secondments contribute to headquarters or mission results in line with the specific job descriptions of the position and the mandate of the organisation concerned. We consider these to be output level results in terms of the theory of change (described above), although there are also some indications of lower-level outcome results. In general, core positions (e.g. observers and monitors) appear to offer relatively fewer

opportunities for influence beyond their contribution to mission objectives. What this means is that, provided the minimum job requirements are met by the secondee, it is likely to make little difference in terms of technical fulfilment of the job whether the person is seconded from FBA or another organisation (or another country).

However, there may be other more subtle values added. The strategies point to an assumption that secondment of Swedish personnel will enable the promotion of Swedish 'norms and values' and we have found some evidence from interviews that this can be the case; for example, in relation to gender equality and management culture.[77] Secondees interviewed gave examples of where they had promoted a more even gender inclusion and a more participatory approach within missions and as part of the mission approach to its mandate.

A 2018 overview of FBA's secondment activity provides a number of examples of how particular positions have contributed to strategic goals.[78] It notes that secondments to EUMM in Georgia enable the mission to monitor the local situation, report violations, and enable relevant actors to respond to prevent an escalation of the conflict. This helps generate trust by diffusing tensions. Our interview with one of the mission's monitors broadly confirmed these observations. This is a relevant observation from a 'do no harm' perspective and underlines the importance of robust selection, preparation and learning, also for core functions. Equally, it is important to reflect that the role of monitors and other secondees can be undermined by factors beyond their control, such as a deterioration in the context or within the mission itself.

---

[77] A number of interviewees noted that it is relevant for FBA to ensure that secondees understand that Sweden's generally flat management culture is not necessarily shared by HQs and missions with more hierarchical structures, such as the UN.

[78] Utredning om sekunderingar och strategier. August 2018. Bilaga 3 - exempel på hur våra sekunderingar_bidrar_till_strategimål.

Our interviews suggest that there is more scope for initiating change that influences results from management and advisory positions; although it depends upon a mix of factors, including the individual skill sets and capacities available, the level of the position within the management hierarchy, access to and degree of delegation from senior management, and contextual and programmatic opportunities.

Our interviews revealed a number of cases where FBA secondees have also been able to utilise their particular skills and interests. The secondment of an experienced training manager to the EU's Security and Defence College (ESDC), for example, has enabled FBA to contribute both to the college's goals in relation to security sector reform training, curriculum design and review while also promoting the incorporation of gender within SSR training. The secondment can also be seen as strategic in view of ESDC's role in setting standards amongst affiliated training institutions, and by extension thereby also promoting gender equality within CSDP missions. Another example relating to gender is the posting of a gender advisor to EULEX in Kosovo, which enabled the establishment of a network of gender focal points in the mission and their coaching and support. Training on gender was also provided through this person to other EU offices in Kosovo, including the EU Special Representative's Office.[79]

Some interviewees provided examples of where they had taken the lead or contributed to developing new strategies or policies. An example from Liberia concerned a UN country team conflict analysis that then was used to frame UN engagements in the country concerned. Another was the leading role taken by an FBA secondee to UNDP in Geneva in the development of new UN guidance for Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS).

In addition, it was noted that senior thematic experts need to use their status to gain access and trust in order to promote results. One of the secondees consulted noted that she had used her position

[79] Insatsavslutande rapport, EULEX.

as head of the rule of law section in an EU mission to promote better coordination amongst rule of law stakeholders, where previously stakeholders had been reticent about sharing data. It was noted that this role was subsequently handed over to the host government which, in principle, shows a degree of sustainability as well as a positive outcome. The same secondee mentioned other examples of outcomes from previous FBA secondments; for example, in relation to the introduction of law enforcement complaints mechanisms and, in another posting (also through FBA), the revision of mission rule of law operational plans and alignment with the host government.

Another senior secondee noted that she had been able to utilise her previous experience and her position as head of planning and evaluation in EUMM Georgia to strengthen the mission's results focus by ensuring more concrete linkages to operational plans. Along similar lines, she had improved data collection that led to a better coordinated, more efficient and more analytical monitoring of the contribution to mission objectives. In her opinion, this has also helped the mission to be less reactive.

Findings relating to coordination

Finally, the evaluation team assessed how FBA has coordinated its secondments with other Swedish seconding organisations and whether use is made of possible synergies with other Swedish and FBA contributions. Overall, we find that operational coordination between the seconding agencies works well but that there are few examples of a consolidated and strategic approach to particular opportunities arising (what we call convergence of interest).

As noted above, FBA performs a 'clearing house' function in relation to EU and OSCE vacancies, which when received are disseminated amongst other Swedish agencies with responsibilities for supplying personnel overseas. These include the civil contingencies agency (MSB), the Swedish police and the probation service, amongst others. FBA participates in a coordination platform with these

agencies which meets every two months to ensure that there is no overlap between the agencies' targeting and to exchange lessons learned. FBA informed the evaluation team that this system functions smoothly.

The other key Swedish agency responsible for supporting external actors is Sida, which, like FBA, is mandated through the Swedish global and bilateral strategies. Sida also recruits personnel for its partners and holds annual meetings with FBA to ensure that each other's work is coordinated. This is supplemented through direct contact on a case-by-case basis as needed.

With regard to synergies, the evaluation team had difficulty in identifying areas where there had been a convergence (in terms of common interests and approach) of FBA's secondments with other operational areas, particularly bilateral cooperation and research, as well as with other Swedish agencies, particularly Sida. There has been convergence in individual cases; for example, the secondment of an advisor to the EU External Action Service (EEAS) whose portfolio included peacebuilding in Afghanistan displays synergies with FBA's (and Sida's) support to the EU Afghanistan Peace Support Mechanism (APSM). However, these examples appear to be quite rare and it is not apparent that FBA makes a deliberate effort to seek out opportunities. The peace and development advisor posted to the UN Resident Coordinator in Liberia, for example, has no contact with the FBA's rule of law project in the same country.

In other cases, reports indicate that secondees have utilised their positions to strengthen links between their receiving organisations and the Swedish MFA. The example is provided of a deployment to the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary General for Yemen (OSESGY) which contributed to the hosting of the Yemen peace talks in Stockholm in 2018.[80] However, our interviews with secondees, also including former MFA employees, indicate that such examples are rare and that there is a willingness for more contact.

[80] Insatsavslutande rapport.

Findings relating to gender equality

With regard to gender equality, the evaluation team finds that FBA applies Swedish gender norms in its selection and recruitment for secondments (where it also specifically targets gender advisor positions) but that the scope for influence on gender is mission dependent and therefore varies.

The identification and selection criteria applied by FBA include the potential for positive gender effects as a key requirement. The criteria ask whether the position offers good possibilities for results in relation to women's needs and participation. In relation to the gender split, the data shows a tendency to second more women than men (in 2019, 52 % were women and in 2017 the figure was 57 %). In terms of positions, of the 125 secondees listed for 2019, 44 are categorised as leadership/advisory (*Ledarskap och politisk rådgivning*), of which 18 (41 %) were women. This is a decrease from 2017 (where of the 35 secondees categorised as leadership/advisory, 18 (51 %) were women) and from 2016 where of the 39 people in this category 19 (49 %) were women.[81] It should be noted, however, that this categorisation can appear a bit arbitrary as there are other positions with an advisory function, such as gender advisors, that are not included. In 2019, of the nine people seconded with a gender or WPS advisory role, seven (7 %) were women. In 2017, of the seven people seconded in this role, 100 % were women.[82] The data thus indicates a decreasing proportion of women in leadership and advisory positions over time, with the exception of specific gender/WPS positions, where a substantial majority are women.

In our interviews with female secondees, some observed that FBA could do more to ensure that secondees were adequately informed about the culture of the receiving organisation or mission, in the light of the semi-military style of certain missions and also the very hierarchical management structure that is pervasive in both missions

[81] ÅAK per strategisk tjänst 2019, 2017, 2016.
[82] Ibid.

and headquarters (compared to administrations in Sweden). These observations align with the results of a 2019 survey sent to FBA secondees where 39 % of those who responded observed that the operations in which they work attached little importance to how gender equality is integrated in the mission's work.[83] Nonetheless, in a number of our interviews, respondents noted that they felt they were able to promote gender equality, alongside other Swedish norms and values, such as inclusion and participation.

In autumn 2019, FBA also arranged a thematic contingent meeting for the first time, where all seconded gender advisors were invited to Stockholm to share experiences and discuss common issues.[84] The evaluation team see this as an important initiative that could be pursued more widely and there would be value in FBA considering how the field experience gained could contribute more directly to FBA's thematic departments.

Summary of findings on secondment

We find that FBA's secondments are relevant and have contributed to Swedish global and bilateral strategies and other government instructions, as well as to FBA's own objectives. Secondees are evenly split between women and men with regard to core, advisory and management positions in headquarters and field missions, although this varies from year to year and within particular types of positions. Attention needs to be given to ensuring that female secondees are adequately equipped for work in headquarters and missions that are male-dominated and hierarchical in structure.

FBA secondees have contributed effectively to their respective missions and there are examples of where Swedish 'values and norms' are promoted. This includes gender equality and participatory approaches. However, in general, the opportunities for wider

[83] FBA Annual Report, 2019.
[84] Ibid.

influence are limited due to the level of the secondees within the hierarchy, although there are exceptions. While missions cannot function without core positions being effectively filled, greater influence could be achieved through senior positions, and it appears that FBA does not utilise all the possibilities that exist for this.

We find that FBA secondees are very well prepared for their assignments. Together with the practice of maintaining regular dialogue between the secondees, the headquarters and mission management, they maintain good selection procedures, this means that Sweden contributes to headquarters and mission objectives. There is an efficient service delivery function in place for identifying vacancies, selecting, recruiting, training and deploying individual secondees. FBA is effective in following up secondees from a duty of care perspective, although greater emphasis could be placed on thematic learning exchanges between FBA and the secondees.

The majority of secondees are at a relatively junior level in the management chain (P4 and equivalent) and there are relatively few senior and management secondees. Due to UN requirements, it is not feasible to second to positions above P4. However, the evaluation team finds that an increase in the number of senior secondees to EU and OSCE missions where Sweden has a relatively large contingent would be commensurate with the size of the Swedish commitment.

Bilateral cooperation

Bilateral cooperation is a new area of operation for FBA. The strategy for Sweden's development cooperation with the Democratic Republic of the Congo 2015–2019 was their first bilateral cooperation strategy and since then FBA has been responsible for

nine bilateral strategies and one regional cooperation strategy.[85] The budget for FBA's contributions to a bilateral strategy varies between SEK 25–30 million across four-to-six-year spans, including both administrative and operational costs. The number of interventions contributing to the goals of a strategy varies between three and eight. FBA notes that the contributions are sprung from an operationalisation process of the objectives given in the strategy, as given by the government. FBA's interventions in a country are not always designed to link with each other to create a cumulative effect on the peacebuilding process. Some interventions are implemented separately from other FBA interventions in the country. FBA notes, however, that "not all objectives point at the peacebuilding process but can also be directed towards strengthened rule of law or increased security sector reform." In the early MFA strategies FBA was more directed by the MFA in terms of what FBA should focus on and do in a country, whereas more recent MFA strategies focus more on what results FBA should contribute. FBA manages interventions remotely from Sweden in combination with frequent travelling by FBA staff to the countries. Since 2018, an FBA staff member has been located at the Swedish embassy in Bogotá in Colombia. In addition, in 2018 and 2019 FBA employed staff at the embassies in Nairobi (for Somalia), Yangon and Kabul.

This section is a synthesis of the three country case studies of this evaluation, covering interventions in Colombia, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Liberia. The detailed findings from these country cases are presented in Annexes 5, 6 and 7. An overview of the three country strategies and FBA's contributions is set out in Table 4 below.

[85] In 2021, FBA was included in the Strategy for Sweden's reform cooperation with the Western Balkans and Turkey for 2021–2027 to contribute to peaceful and inclusive societies.

Table 4: Overview of Colombia, DRC and Liberia contribution

Strategy	Colombia 2016–2020	DRC 2015–2019	Liberia 2016–2020
	Swedish development cooperation with above countries will contribute to:		
Overarching goal	Peacebuilding and state-building, as well as sustainable development. The implementation of a negotiated peace by contributing to sustainable peace and human security.	Strengthened the conditions for sustainable peace and state-building and improve living conditions for people living in poverty and oppression.	Peacebuilding and state-building. Strengthened Liberia's public services and create the conditions for peaceful, inclusive, and sustainable development. Increased gender equality as well as an improved environment and reduced climate impact.
FBA is contributing to:	As above.	Strengthened capacity among individuals and institutions to promote security and human rights.	Strengthened capacity among women, men, and institutions to promote security and human rights.
Budget (total)[86]	SEK 30 million	SEK 25 million	SEK 30 million
# of interventions	8	7	4

[86] The budget includes both administrative costs (personnel costs) and operational costs (e.g. travel and activities).

Strategy	Colombia 2016–2020	DRC 2015–2019	Liberia 2016–2020
Type of interventions	Support to ARN for reintegration and local peacebuilding (2017–2020). Support to ARN for gender mainstreaming (2017–2020). DDR, SSR and 1325 training for the security sector (2018–2020). FBA's global courses for key people (2017–2020). Capacity building of parliamentarians on SSR (2018–2020). Support to the High Commissioner for Peace (OACP) for dialogue and mediation (2019–2020, planning stages).	Inclusive peacebuilding programme (PCPI) (2017–2019). Inclusive peacebuilding programme – organisational support (PCPI 2.0) (2019–2020). Network for inclusive peacebuilding (RCPI) (2017–2020). Local capacity building: facilitation of reintegration of ex-combatants (2017–2020). FBA's global DDR courses for key people (2017–2020).	Conflict prevention leadership programme (CPLP) (2017–2020). Support to national and local security councils (2018–2020). Support to the application of the principles of rule of law within the Liberian public administration (2018–2020). FBA's global courses for key people (2016–2020). Conflict prevention leadership programme county peace dialogues (2020 –, planning stage).

Strategy	Colombia 2016–2020	DRC 2015–2019	Liberia 2016–2020
	Support to the special court for peace (JEP) for gender mainstreaming (2019–2020, planning stages).	Local advisors for reintegration of ex-combatants (DDR–advisors) (2017–2020).	Rule of Law training programme (2020 –, planning stage).
	Support to women's civil society organisations for peacebuilding and leadership for peace (2018–2020, ended earlier).	FBA's global SSR courses for key people (2017–2019).	
	Support to women in peacebuilding linked to natural resources (2018–2019, ended earlier).		
	Support to reintegration for FARC members (2017–2019, ended earlier).		
Result area 1	Strengthened capacity in public institutions and civil society to work on conflict prevention and peacebuilding measures, such as disarmament,	Greater knowledge of human rights, strengthened democratic governance of and within the security sector, and strengthened	Improved capacity for an inclusive Liberian reconciliation process.

Strategy	Colombia 2016–2020	DRC 2015–2019	Liberia 2016–2020
	demobilisation and sustainable reintegration (DDR).	democratic dialogue at national and local level.	
Result area 2	Improved conditions for respect for human rights, gender equality and the principles of the rule of law in security sector reform (SSR) work.	Strengthened women's capacity to participate in peace and security promotion.	Increased application of democratic principles and human rights in the security sector.
Result area 3	Greater influence and meaningful participation for women and girls in the peace process, in accordance with the UN Security Council's resolutions on women, peace and security.	Enhanced ability of local communities to sustainably reintegrate former combatants.	Strengthened opportunities for a legally secure and transparent exercise of public authority, and for accountability.
Result area 4		Enhanced ability of civil society and state structures to prevent sexual and gender-based violence.	

The selection of the three case country studies was based on (i) an implementation period of at least three years, and enough FBA presence (and history) to draw inferences; (ii) broad representation of thematic areas; (iii) feasibility of accessing interviewees remotely using virtual and online tools for interviews; and (iv) feasibility of evaluating coordination and synergies with other Swedish and international actors.

Four of the nine bilateral strategies with a mandate for FBA to contribute to MFA's strategic objectives were commissioned in 2018, one of which was launched in 2017 and thus, the implementation periods were too short to be included in the evaluation. Among the four bilateral strategies that were commissioned in 2015 and 2016, Mali was one. The evaluation team decided however not to include this strategy because of the potential limitations, given the available time and resources for the evaluation team, to access reliable data in times of travel restrictions due to Covid-19.

In the selected countries, we evaluated two or three main interventions of FBA's portfolio during the period of the bilateral strategy. The interventions were selected in terms of FBA's allocation of resources (financial and human resources), the starting date of the intervention to ensure enough time for implementation and potential results, as well as reported achieved 'outcomes' by FBA, according to the most recent 'Vårsamråd'.[87]

The evaluation of bilateral cooperation strategies for the evaluation period meant that the selection process of country case studies was to a certain extent limited to which strategies would generate most

[87] FBA, Bilateralt strategiuppdrag i Demokratiska republiken Kongo: Underlag till Utrikesdepartementet inför vårsamråd 2020, 15 April 2020; FBA, Bilateralt strategiuppdrag Colombia: Underlag till Utrikesdepartementet inför vårsamråd 2020, 15 April 2020; FBA, Bilateralt strategiuppdrag i Liberia: Underlag till Utrikesdepartementet inför vårsamråd 2020, 15 April 2020. FBA reports the level of attainment of each intervention in the Vårsamråds underlag (annual reporting document to the Swedish MFA).

meaningful data and information for the evaluation. The early strategies from 2015–2016 were more likely to offer data, lessons learned and general experiences that the evaluation could draw from, than strategies that were given to FBA from 2017 and onwards. Working with bilateral cooperation strategies was a new way of working for FBA.

The evaluation team's primary data sources were key informants in Colombia, the DRC and Liberia who were interviewed via video link (Zoom, WhatsApp, Skype, etc.) due to Covid-19 which did not allow us to travel. However, in Liberia, a local consultant assisted us with in-person interviews with FBA's partners and stakeholders. Important secondary sources were three recent independent evaluations (2019, 2020 and 2021)[88] of FBA interventions in the three countries. These evaluations helped us validate our own findings and therefore corroborate emergent conclusions. The evaluation team has otherwise relied on documentation review, and interviews with FBA staff, Sida personnel, participants, mentors on FBA training courses, as well as local stakeholders.

The evaluation team has assessed FBA's contribution to MFA's strategic objectives and the agency's objectives, and whether FBA's activities were effectively coordinated with relevant actors in Sweden and internationally. Based on the document review, budget assessment, and interviews, the evaluation team's overall finding is that FBA's bilateral interventions in the three case countries have been relevant to the Swedish bilateral cooperation strategies, and

[88] Nordic Consulting Group Sweden (Jocke Nyberg and Mireia Cano), final evaluation report, evaluation of the Folke Bernadotte Academy's Colombia project within the framework of Sweden's development cooperation strategy 2016–2020 – Contributing to holistic reintegration of former members of Colombian armed groups, 3 March 2021; Niras, (Ian Christplos & Oscar Bloh), evaluation of FBA's Liberia project, within the framework of Sweden's development cooperation strategy, 18 December 2020; and Nordic Consulting Group Sweden (Anna Lidström, Mireia Cano Viñas, and Francoise Mukuku), final evaluation report, evaluation of the inclusive peacebuilding programme (PCPI), Stockholm, 20 June 2019.

FBA's approach and financial and human resources for the implementation of the interventions have affected the degree to which the interventions are relevant to MFA and FBA strategic objectives. Furthermore, the interventions have been very relevant to the personal and professional needs of the individuals who have participated in FBA's training activities within the framework of bilateral cooperation.

What is missing in terms of relevance is that FBA's theories of change for strengthening key institutions in country case studies did not fully capture what it takes to meaningfully contribute to wider peacebuilding effects in these countries. Consequently, there is a gap between the theories of change, the underlying assumptions and the actual implementation of activities and their effects.

A summary of the selected cases is presented below:

Table 5: Overview of selected contributions in Colombia, the DRC and Liberia

Strategy	Colombia	DRC	Liberia
Intervention 1	Support to ARN for reintegration and local peacebuilding (2017–2020).	Inclusive peacebuilding programme (PCPI) (2017–2019).	Conflict prevention leadership programme (CPLP) (2017–2020).
Intervention 2	Support to ARN for gender mainstreaming (2017–2020).	Inclusive peacebuilding programme – organisational support (PCPI 2.0) (2019–2020).	Support to national and local security councils (2018–2020).
Intervention 3		Network for inclusive peacebuilding (RCPI) (2017–2020).	

The chosen interventions constituted mainly training programmes targeting a selected group of individuals who represented civil society organisations or public institutions/government agencies. The training programmes consisted of several, often week-long, modules with different thematic foci during a nine-month period with small peacebuilding activities and assignments in-between each module. FBA's training approach in Colombia targeting ARN-staff was different from the training programmes offered in the DRC and Liberia. Selected ARN-staff were invited to FBA's gender mainstreaming course in Brussels and gender advisor course in Sweden, and workshops were organised in Bogotá. Participants were mentored by local peacebuilding practitioners who had already participated in a previous or similar training programme. The number of participants varied depending on the programme and target group, but the size of the groups ranged between 15 and 25 participants and the number of training cycles since 2015/2016 has been on average one or two groups per year per programme. The total number of participants is therefore, dependent on programme and country, between 30 and 50 participants.[89] In general, it took FBA about a year before the interventions were in full operation because of the planning and recruitment process of participants.

FBA's training programmes in the DRC and Liberia had a strong emphasis on enhancing the individual capacity to influence her or his organisation, or community. The interventions focused on youth, women and security. The selected participants were mostly individuals representing a local civil society organisation with a strong commitment to peace. The background of the participants differed depending on the focus of the training programme. For example, in Liberia where FBA implemented the conflict prevention leadership programme (CPLP), the participants ranged from 16–33 years old, whereas the ages ranged more widely for

[89] FBA's country portfolios are described in FBA's annual reporting to the Swedish MFA (Underlag till Utrikesdepartementet inför vårsamråd), and in the project documents (Insats-PM för Planering och uppföljning av insats inom ramen för bilateralt strategiuppdrag).

participants in the inclusive peacebuilding programme (PCPI) in the DRC. The gender balance was good.[90] Most participants were also well-known in their communities. They had worked within their local contexts on social issues that posed a risk to social cohesion and stability in the communities. Typical social issues in the communities were sexual- and gender-based violence, equal access to health and education, or the promotion or creation of job opportunities for youth.

Findings relating to relevance

For the case study countries the evaluation team assessed FBA's theory of change for the interventions; how relevant FBA interventions in the three countries are to the Swedish bilateral cooperation strategies and to the agency's objectives; and the relevance to the target groups and their organisations.

Relevance of FBA's theories of change and interventions to expected results

Our key finding in relation to relevance is that FBA's interventions in the three case countries concerned shows gaps in the articulation of the theories of change. The underlying assumptions for change linking short-term with intermediate and long-term results were not detailed enough to reflect the pathway for change. Thus, the theories of change for strengthening key institutions in the three case study countries did not fully capture what it takes to meaningfully contribute to wider peacebuilding effects in these countries. Consequently, there is a gap between the theories of change and the underlying assumptions, and the actual implementation of activities and their effects. Thus, the evaluation finds the design of FBA's interventions is less relevant to the capacity conditions of the institutions and organisations in the DRC and Liberia. FBA notes however that the timeframe is too short to measure change of this magnitude. The programs have a long-term focus.

[90] PCPI included 16 women and 8 men in 2017, and 11 women and 13 men in 2018. CPLP included 8 women and 7 men in 2018.

This gap is most obvious in relation to training and advice, which have been key elements of FBA's interventions in all three case countries. An important underlying assumption that did not hold was that strengthened individual capacity would translate into strengthened institutional capacity and organisational effectiveness. FBA notes that this type of change takes time.

FBA's contributions were relevant to the targeted individuals who participated in FBA's training and mentoring programmes. The training programmes were well adapted to their target groups and the professional challenges they face. But FBA's interventions did not yield sustainable results at an institutional level beyond improved knowledge and skills of the participants *when* there was no clear institutional counterpart or process at the national level. The relevance of FBA's interventions is dependent on whether an institutional counterpart or peace and reconciliation process exist, or on the level of functionality of those institutions and processes.

Our own understanding of FBA's theories of change for contribution to the agency objectives is illustrated in Figure 10. It is a summarised version reflecting the main elements of FBA's theories of change for bilateral strategies It also resonates well with the overarching logic for FBA contributions within the framework of bilateral cooperation. More detailed theories of change for selected interventions in the three case countries are described in the annexes for the case countries.

Figure 10: Theory of change for FBA's bilateral programmes



FBA's approach to training within the bilateral cooperation is predominantly shaped by FBA's pedagogical principles with a focus on learning objectives set at the level of knowledge and skills gained, and with the underlying assumption that it will contribute to strengthened organisational/institutional effectiveness. The evaluation team finds that FBA has successfully adapted this generic approach to the local context, the level of capability of the participants, and the specific thematic focus for the training programmes. But linking the results at the individual level from the training with strengthening the organisational effectiveness has been difficult. Thus, the link between these levels of the results chain is weak. As noted above, FBA finds that the time frame of program implementation is too short to be evaluated in order to draw conclusions.

Our interviewees confirmed that participants tried to initiate or apply what they had learned within their organisations. But the organisational ownership was not strong enough to systematically institutionalise the learning. Although these organisations had been active in the peacebuilding field in their countries for several years with collaborations and partnerships with international organisations, their limited financial and human resources capacity did not allow them to systematically capitalise on the training results. What is partly missing is a structured approach among the organisations to capitalise on the participants' learning and to apply them more broadly within the organisation and operationally at field level. However, in Liberia the organisations appreciated the training for the improved individual capacity of some staff members in the rural areas, and the strengthening of their network of young peacebuilders across the country. Moreover, many participants found their own ways of implementing local peacebuilding activities, thanks in large part to FBA's local mentors who provided both moral and technical support. Many participants successfully applied their new knowledge and skills in their own communities due to the empowerment that the training endowed on them. For many participants it was a first step towards being better prepared to work

on peace and conflict, although at a very local level and at small scale. They built their platforms in their local communities, organising activities and responding to rising tensions and disputes whether it be at schools and universities or in the communities.[91] An element that contributed to sustaining achieved results was FBA's alumni networks where former participants met and exchanged experiences. It was greatly appreciated by the participants for upholding what they had learned.

FBA developed a results-based management (RBM) approach in 2019 that will be gradually introduced in the coming years and applied to operations that are governed by MFA strategies. A key aim is to establish a coherent system to better monitor the implementation of interventions and learn about achieved results. So far, FBA documents and updates its activities and achieved results in a project document (Insats-PM) where it also outlines the theory of change and underlying assumptions and risks. FBA used a theory-based approach that was predominantly shaped by the logic of achieving learning objectives inspired by Kirkpatrick Model of training.

The conditions for operationalising new knowledge and skills within an organisation vary depending on the local context and existing organisational capacity and leadership. The evaluation team finds that the conditions for change have not been sufficiently addressed for the training interventions in the DRC (PCPI) and Liberia (CPLP). Consequently, the overall theories of change are less realistic in relation to the higher-level outcomes and long-term objectives of the interventions.

The evaluation team notes that FBA recognised that there are gaps in the assumptions connecting achievements at the individual level with influencing organisational changes. Thus, FBA has developed new interventions to bridge those gaps within PCPI and CPLP to

[91] Examples of achieved results by the participants are provided in the country cases in Annexes 7, 8 and 9.

facilitate organisational changes. PCPI 2.0 started in 2019, building on what was achieved within PCPI 1.0 in terms of having a closer relationship with the participants and their organisations. It focuses on gender mainstreaming in ten organisations (three government agencies and seven CSOs) in eastern DRC. In Liberia FBA developed a concept note in 2020 for CPLP county peace dialogues aiming to strengthen the capacity and increase the possibilities for young Liberians to prevent conflict in their respective communities/counties and to enable locally relevant peace dialogues at the county level.[92] The evaluation team has not been able to assess the effects of these interventions as they have not yet been completed.

The participants in PCPI and CPLP had weak connections to their home organisations, partly because of lack of resources for regular communication and support from the headquarters level to the remote areas where the participants live and work. The organisational affiliation of staff and volunteers in countries like the DRC and Liberia is often not strong. In general, people are drawn into activities and initiatives implemented by a mix of different organisations, people, and networks. We learned from several interviews with participants in the DRC and Liberia that the role of an individual often becomes more important than the role of an organisation. Social or economic transactions occur mostly between people and less between organisations. This underpins the importance of relations between people.

The evaluation team finds that the selected people for CPLP and PCPI were relevant individuals for contributing to social cohesion and local peacebuilding at the community and district levels. However, they were not linked to any national peace processes. FBA's theory of change for the training programmes included networking activities to facilitate contacts between local (participants) and national stakeholders. Events at the end of the

[92] FBA, CPLP County Peace Dialogues 2020 Concept Note, 2020-04-08.

training and alumni network meetings were organised for participants to meet with representatives from the ministries and government agencies. It was an opportunity for the participants to share some of their personal stories or bring attention to critical issues in their communities, but our interviews highlight that many participants felt it was not enough. Instead, they hoped that the FBA training would help them to connect with national policy and decision-makers as an integral part of the training programme to identify pathways for dialogue and collaboration.

Relevance of FBA and MFA's relations to expected results

Some FBA staff and partners maintain that FBA has an added value as a government agency in accessing, establishing, and cooperating with other government agencies and public institutions. Currently, FBA's work goes beyond a typical state-centric approach focusing on promoting capacity of state institutions to generate state legitimacy. But much of FBA's history and identity arose from engagements supporting state-building processes. What the evaluation team has observed in particular is that two of the three country cases (the DRC and Liberia) are peacebuilding in a broader sense, including interventions that target women, youth, and civil society organisations in remote rural areas. It is very different from a typical state-centric, institution-targeted approach. It seems to be partly driven by the overall Swedish policy priorities reflected in the bilateral strategies and translated into instructions for FBA to operationalise.

The evaluation team notes, however, that the current FBA broader approach to peacebuilding is contested among FBA staff. Some staff expressed that it is not an obvious position that FBA should target such a wide range of actor groups in a conflict system. Some argue that the lack of a clear understanding of *how* FBA should be used within the framework of bilateral strategies risks confusing the role of FBA.

FBA's broad mandate within peace, security and development entails that FBA covers a wide range of thematic expertise. FBA has a long history since early 2000 of providing training and advice: in DDR and SSR (and later also dialogue and mediation); on women, peace and security; youth, peace and security; rule of law; human rights; election support; as well as leadership and cooperation. Although not all these areas of expertise are drawn on for each bilateral strategy, the country interventions usually draw on several areas of expertise to respond to MFA's strategic objectives.

The evaluation team finds that this broad mandate appears to dilute FBA's ability to efficiently mobilise its resources (financial and human) to have a more significant and sustainable impact where it operates. FBA is known for its training and secondments, and has a well-deserved reputation for delivering quality. It seems necessary for FBA to define what it can achieve with a very modest budget (approximately SEK 25–30 million for five years during the period that has been evaluated) and how to best leverage its thematic expertise in relation to the conflict issues where FBA is engaged.

Relevance to Swedish bilateral cooperation strategies

We find that FBA's bilateral interventions in the three case countries have been relevant to the Swedish bilateral cooperation strategies. FBA's interventions have been designed in response to the instructions (directives) from the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the objectives of the strategies for development cooperation with these countries. The three country cases represent bilateral cooperation strategies that were part of the first round of geographical strategies in 2015 and 2016. The strategy for Sweden's development cooperation with the Democratic Republic of Congo 2015–2019 was FBA's first operationalisation of a bilateral cooperation strategy. As of 2019, FBA had been instructed by the

Swedish MFA to contribute to ten geographical strategies.[93] The strategies outlined in detail which development sector and thematic area, the geographical level (national/regional/local), and actor group(s) that FBA should focus on. In addition, the strategies proposed in detail what type of activity FBA was expected to conduct to contribute to the defined result areas. The result areas underpin the overarching purpose of the bilateral strategies, as illustrated in the below table. What they have in common is that they all focus on contributing to strengthened capacity among individuals and institutions. MFA's instructions for bilateral cooperation strategies to FBA was during the first period (2015–2017) more governing than for the period 2018 and onwards, it left FBA with fewer opportunities during the first round of strategies to design the contributions. Instead, FBA's main influence on the contributions included the selection of individuals and design of the training and mentoring programmes. FBA's decisions have thus focused on ensuring that the most relevant participants were selected to the training programmes. This meant that the content of the training and mentoring programmes was relevant to the participants' needs and the working conditions were favourable in a way that they could change their own and their organisations' way of working.

The country cases show that FBA's interventions within the framework of bilateral cooperation strategies are to a large extent shaped by the MFA's policy priorities and directions to FBA, which, in turn, are largely aligned with the country's national development plan. Specific interventions were inspired by previous Sida-funded international training programmes on peace and security.

[93] FBA has been instructed by the Swedish MFA to contribute to the following bilateral cooperation strategies: Afghanistan 2018–2019, Colombia 2016–2020, the DRC 2015–2019, Iraq 2017–2021, Liberia 2016–2020, Mali 2016–2020, Myanmar 2018–2022, Palestine 2015–2019, Somalia 2018–2022, and Sub-Saharan Africa 2016–2021.

FBA's operational analyses (OPAs) are in response to MFA's instructions for the bilateral strategies. They were expected to be complemented by continuous conflict assessments at the intervention level, but it has not yet been conducted in a systematic and documented manner. The evaluation team notes the commitment of the FBA staff to learn from being in regular contact with participants, through discussions, and by designing minor peacebuilding projects in their communities as part of the training programmes, in addition to following the political developments in the countries. Overall, FBA staff possess good general knowledge about their respective countries.

However, this knowledge does not shape strategies nor influence the policy development for FBA's contributions to these countries because it is already shaped by the Swedish MFA. FBA notes that it has a possibility to influence the policy development through the process of providing strategy proposals ("underlag till ny strategi") with a view on where and how efforts should be focused in order to achieve results before a new strategy is adopted.

The very modest budget for FBA's operations within Sweden's development cooperation strategies with partner countries limits what FBA can accomplish. The evaluation team finds it critical for both MFA and FBA to create the most conducive conditions for FBA to be used strategically for leveraging both FBA's and Sweden's capacity to prevent violent conflict in countries where FBA operates. The three case countries show that FBA could be used more strategically within the frameworks of bilateral cooperation. It raises questions about *when* and *under what circumstances* FBA should be engaged by MFA.

Sida is MFA's main partner for bilateral strategies, who cooperates under several different sectoral themes with many multilateral, international and local organisations. FBA has, so far, to a lesser extent been complementary to Sida's larger portfolios. However, FBA has instead developed its own portfolio of interventions instructed by MFA's directions without any explicit strategic linkages with Sida-supported peace and security interventions.

It is worth noting that Sida and FBA are two different agencies. While Sida is a donor agency, FBA is a self-implementing agency. In other words, FBA operates at the level of Sida's partners in the partner countries. Consequently, FBA's role should complement what Sida's partners do, and vice versa. The logical corollary of this set-up is close dialogue between FBA, Sida and partners to maximise each actor's capacity.

Complementarity and synergies through coordination are desirable for both Sida and FBA. Both agencies note at the country level the importance of regular and closer communication and coordination. Thus, the evaluation team notes that there is a joint responsibility to ensure, at a minimum, complementarity between Sida-supported partners, and what FBA implements in Sweden's partner countries. But it is not only a coordination issue between Sida and FBA, but also an issue that pertains to MFA's strategic interest in using FBA within the framework of bilateral strategies.

It appears to the evaluation team that MFA needs to better define how it wants to use FBA by understanding more how to link specific conflict systems with FBA's areas of expertise, and using it less as a default function for capacity development. Consequently, the evaluation team notes that the MFA–FBA relationship must be based on a rigorous conflict analysis beyond the OPA to identify what is realistic and desirable to achieve with the budget that is available to FBA.

Relevance of selected interventions in the case countries to peacebuilding

The evaluation team finds that the relevance of the selected interventions in the DRC and Liberia is low because of the lack of achieving or contributing to wider and sustainable peacebuilding effects. Many of the underlying reasons for this lack are partly due to insufficient use of context-specific conflict analysis that identifies specific entry and leverage points for FBA interventions. Furthermore, FBA's training-centric approach for capacity development, modest financial resources and remote partnership

model in highly fragile and complex, conflict-affected, environments make it very difficult for any achievements to be sustained and linked up with other peacebuilding achievements.

The evaluation team notes that FBA's peacebuilding work includes a broad range of both government agencies and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Also, FBA's efforts go beyond the capital cities where most ministries and headquarters for NGOs are based, but reach far into remote areas. FBA recognises that peace means different things to men and women, old and young, urban and rural, majority and minority groups. This broad approach to supporting peacebuilding at local and national levels requires resources that are not currently available to FBA, or strong partnerships with other peacebuilding organisations that share the same peacebuilding goals and interest in collaboration.

FBA's approach to peacebuilding is more technical than political. The beneficiaries of FBA's peacebuilding support gain, foremost, increased technical capacity, particularly at the individual level. What is missing from the selected interventions is the political dimension for contributing to, or strengthening, peacebuilding outcomes. The political dimension does exist in terms of FBA's support to the Agency for Reincorporation and Normalisation (ARN). Although these interventions are also highly technical, they strive to strengthen the legitimacy of ARN as a state institution and the reintegration process of ex-combatants managed by ARN.

Legitimacy is an underlying intention of FBA's support, but it is not formally expressed in policy or strategy documents or guidelines and methods. Much of FBA's work indirectly aims to strengthen the legitimacy of the beneficiary agencies such as ARN or the county security councils in Liberia, or to strengthen an actor group such as youth in Liberia. Legitimacy serves different purposes within FBA's peacebuilding work. FBA's peacebuilding outcomes are not

primarily about 'the absence of violent conflict' but comprise elements of contributing to capacity of agencies and actors to develop tools to manage conflicts authoritatively and legitimately.[94]

However, the evaluation team does not find the selected interventions relevant enough to contribute to such capacities. Even less so did we find strong evidence that the interventions had contributed to institutionalised mechanisms to end conflicts or prevent groups from conducting violence and conflict. The assessment of the selected interventions shows that they were relevant to participants in different training programmes and enabled them to act as peace agents, promoting peace in their home environments. But there is no evidence showing that the enhanced individual capacity translated into increased capacity of local actors (authorities) in the DRC and Liberia are better prepared for resolving conflicts as a result. Nor have we been able to find evidence from FBA's interventions that shows the functioning of local mechanisms for conflict resolution that have earned legitimacy through meaningful political inclusion, transparency, and governance. We have, however, learned about how participants have applied their knowledge and skills in local contexts and facilitated and mediated conflicts. Several examples are presented in the case studies, particularly in the DRC and Liberia.

Relevance to the beneficiaries and local contexts

Interviews revealed that participants in FBA's interventions in the case countries would have welcomed being involved and consulted in the design of the interventions. Meanwhile, however, they appreciated FBA's flexibility to adapt the training along with the implementation of the interventions to their feedback, which ensured that the training was considered highly relevant to their professional needs.

[94] Elizabeth M. Cousens and Chetan Kumar, with Karin Wermester, *Peacebuilding as Politics*, 2001, p. 10–14.

This brings us to ask what FBA's added value is in a specific context given its expertise and resources, and under what circumstances does FBA make a difference to the context? The evaluation team finds that FBA's interventions should be guided to a greater extent by conflict analyses and that FBA should match the financial and human resources, including technical expertise, to the objectives of the bilateral cooperation strategies. This means that FBA interventions should be guided by learning from an evolving conflict system and continuous assessment of the underlying theory of change to identify entry points for critical engagement and leverage points for scalability.

The evaluation team argues that conflict analysis is both a critical instrument and a process to learn about conflict drivers and opportunities for peace and social cohesion. This process can help secure the inclusion and participation of key stakeholders from appropriate levels within the conflict system. The underlying assumption here is that participation will contribute to strengthening the ownership of peace initiatives and make them more sustainable.

A weakness of FBA's planning and implementation of the bilateral strategies is the lack of specific conflict analysis providing critical inputs to the design of interventions and their theories of change. The design of interventions is to a low degree based on context-specific conflict analysis identifying possible points where in the conflict systems FBA and partners could engage to make a difference – and what the possible points of leverage are where FBA can promote change.

FBA notes, however, that specific conflict analyses should be conducted at the intervention level.[95] A meaningful conflict analysis takes time and requires human resources to set up and to organise dialogue meetings with stakeholders. A robust conflict analysis feeds into programming and is a helpful instrument to develop a theory of change, formulate underlying assumptions and for framing an intervention.

[95] FBA, Operationaliseringsanalys bilateralt strategiuppdrag i Demokratiska Republiken Kongo 2015–2019, arbetsmaterial, 17 May 2016, p. 16.

Instead, the design of interventions is guided by FBA's broader and more general operational analyses (OPAs). These are not at a detailed enough level to serve as strategic inputs to design interventions but rather they provide a brief overview of the conflict history, including the key national conflict issues and actors. FBA's approach in the three case countries is highly driven by capacity development (training). This approach takes the specific local power relations within a conflict system into account to a lesser degree, and reflects more general needs within different thematic areas such as youth, women and peace, rule of law, security sector reform, etc.

The case country studies are examples of horrific and traumatic experiences of war and violent conflicts causing thousands of deaths, displacement and poverty. Public institutions are either weak or highly dysfunctional, partly due to corruption. According to the Mo Ibrahim Index, the DRC belongs to the category of African nations where security and rule of law has deteriorated most. It was among the five worst performers in Africa between 2010 and 2019, and it ranked as the worst performer in Africa for anti-corruption in 2019.[96] Sweden's policy was to not channel aid through DRC governmental systems. Hence, FBA could not work *directly* with a ministry, agency or public institution and FBA worked instead with representatives from civil society organisations and local public institutions, while nonetheless seeking institutional counterparts where possible.

Relevance of FBA's support in the DRC

The experience in the DRC also demonstrates the fragility of working in such contexts, where there is a need for flexibility in relation to sudden contextual changes. While FBA was developing its own capacity for managing implementation of contributions within the framework of bilateral cooperation, it also faced colossal peacebuilding challenges where UN missions had been deployed for

[96] Mo Ibrahim Index, pp. 49 & 99.

many years to support local governments to transition from war to peace. This is to say that FBA with its limited human and financial resources faced operational challenges while contributing to peace- and state-building.

For example, FBA's intervention *'Local capacity building: facilitation of reintegration of ex-combatants*' aimed partly to strengthen the national DDR commission, *Unité d'Exécution du Programme National de Désarmement, Démobilisation et Réinsertion (UEPN-DDR),* to improve the conditions for dialogue and networking between UEPN-DDR, as an implementing agency for the national DDR programme (PNDDRIII), and other national and local actors and to create trust between them for the implementation of a reintegration of ex-combatants. FBA invested time and resources in positioning and establishing a working relationship with UEPN-DDR, and in carrying out mapping to inform the reintegration process of ex-combatants, and the training of local actors in sustainable reintegration (community-based reinsertion and community violence reduction) and in how to use the mapping. As part of this intervention *'Local capacity building: Facilitation of reintegration of ex-combatants*' FBA conducted the mapping exercise to identify context-specific factors (e.g. ethnic, religious, psychosocial, stigma, trust) that could have a negative effect on the re-integration of ex-combatants in the communities. The documentation review indicates that the mapping was appreciated by key stakeholders such as UEPN-DDR, MONUSCO and provincial ministers for its relevance to their local development plans for how to manage community-based integration/community violence reduction.[97] The role of the UEPN-DDR weakened after the World Bank ended its funding in 2018 and

[97] FBA, Insats-PM: Planering och uppföljning av insatser inom ramen för strategiuppdrag i Demokratiska Republiken Kongo (DRK): Lokalt kapacitetsbyggande: Facilitering av återanpassning av före detta kombattanter, 26 February 2021, p. 20.

finally ended its mandate.[98] Consequently, FBA's efforts to contribute to strengthened institutional capacity to enhance the ability of local communities to sustainably reintegrate former combatants did not materialise, partly because of the failure of the UEPN-DDR to secure funding. This experience illustrates the complexity of external factors influencing the assumptions of connecting different levels of a theory of change. The assumptions relating to the key national institutional counterparts, which were a key part of the theory of change, did not hold true in practice, which required FBA to alter its strategy. At the time FBA tried to develop the relations with MONUSCO's DDR-unit but without any success as they did not respond to FBA's efforts.[99]

Relevance of FBA's support in Liberia

The security sector reform leadership seminar series (SSR LSS) and the county security council programme officer support programme (PROS) in Liberia focused on local security councils at the county level, thus targeting superintendents of the counties and the programme officers for the county security councils (CSCs). The main counterpart(s) for the trainings were the CSCs but also the National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS) and the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA). The training programmes targeted all 15 counties of Liberia. The superintendents are appointed by the president of Liberia to govern the counties and they are also the chairs of the county security councils. The CSC programme officers

[98] FBA, Insats-PM: Planering och uppföljning av insatser inom ramen för strategiuppdrag i Demokratiska Republiken Kongo (DRK): Lokalt kapacitetsbyggande: Facilitering av återanpassning av före detta kombattanter, 26 February 2021, pp. 3–5, 12, 15, 17. See also FBA, (Luís Martínez Lorenzo, Johanna Malm, Mimmi Söderberg Kovacs, Sergio Triana-E, Sophia Wrede), 'Reintegration or recidivism? Why ex-combatants in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) return to arms', 2021, p. 9.

[99] FBA, Insats-PM: Planering och uppföljning av insatser inom ramen för strategiuppdrag i Demokratiska Republiken Kongo (DRK): Lokalt kapacitetsbyggande: Facilitering av återanpassning av före detta kombattanter, 26 February 2021, p. 16.

are technical assistants to the superintendents. They coordinate and organise CSC meetings to monitor and discuss local security issues at district and local levels. They report to the NSCS and the MIA. Both the superintendents and the programme officers have clear functions, roles and responsibilities for managing the CSCs. This targeted intervention had an institutional component, because of the functions of the selected participants. However, the operationalisation of the gained knowledge and skills among participants contributing to enhanced functionality of the CSCs is still not apparent.

Liberia has a long history of centralised governance but has recently taken steps towards decentralisation and local governance reforms. Nonetheless, human capacity and funding are major constraints for the development of public institutions at the county and district levels. Although SSR LSS and PROS are anchored within an institutional framework that is more likely to generate wider peacebuilding effects on a broader scale in Liberia, the training proved to be most helpful for participants to enhance their knowledge and strengthen their skills for more systematic work on early warning/early response (EWER). However, there is no evidence that greater knowledge and skills of the superintendents and the programme officers translated into enhanced institutional capacity to map potential risk factors for conflict or ability to examine patterns of conflict and cooperation in rural Liberia. The focus of the county security councils today, is more on responding to security threats within the counties, and less on forecasting potential risk factors for conflict. A recurring challenge/obstacle is that there is not enough funding in the budget for the procuring or maintaining of the necessary equipment to efficiently respond to disputes and conflicts in the districts within the counties. Nevertheless, the selected participants are '*key people*' for the local security architecture who have access to national security actors. As a result, they can bring attention to risk factors of conflict at the community level, while pioneering the implementation of an EWER system to avoid the escalation of intra-communal conflicts into

regional or national ones. It makes sense to focus on these target groups despite the weak institutional absorption capacity. They can still contribute to building institutions over time and resolving incidents of interpersonal and collective violence, disputes over land use, tenure, and inheritance, as well as intra-communal and ethnic tensions.

Relevance of FBA's support in Colombia

FBA's approach has been different in Colombia. FBA has a long-term partnership with a government agency, the Agency for Reincorporation and Normalisation (ARN). FBA's emphasis is primarily on the institutional capacity of the HQ in Bogotá through different types of training interventions and advice. Although staff from the field participated in some training activities, FBA targeted the senior management of ARN to convince them to buy in to the gender mainstreaming concept. FBA worked closely with and advised a small core group of technical staff on gender issues (gender unit of ARN). The combination of different training interventions and FBA's continued advice thereby achieved a stronger link between strengthened individual capacity and institutional gender mainstreaming. ARN staff members participated in several different FBA training programmes. One or two ARN staff members participated annually between 2017–2020 in week-long global courses on DDR and UNSCR 1325/Gender advisor that took place in Spain and Sweden, and three-day training courses on '*Integration of a Gender Perspective in CSDP*'[100] in Brussels. They attended these courses together with staff from the Colombian military and police, the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP)[101], and UN Verification Mission Colombia (UNVMC), among other international organisations.

[100] The European Union's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).
[101] The Special Jurisdiction for Peace, also known as Special Justice for Peace, is the Colombian transitional justice mechanism through which FARC members, members of the Public Force and third parties who have participated in the Colombian armed conflict are investigated and put to trial.

We learned from interviews with some participants that this mix of participants from different organisations within the same country was useful for exchange of views and experiences, and some participants fostered relations beyond the training which they found very helpful for their work. This pertained, particularly, to the exchange of information and knowledge about the integration of a gender perspective in the reintegration and reincorporation processes in the territories in Colombia.

In addition, FBA organised DDR courses for the Colombian Ministry of Defence which ARN was invited to attend. FBA organised shorter, half to three-day, targeted training sessions in gender mainstreaming, working breakfasts, research workshops, and policy dialogues for the senior management and members of the gender roundtable. Targeted training for the gender focal points was under way during the period of the evaluation and had not been done yet. The learning from the global courses was adapted by the participants to be used for training at headquarters in Bogotá. Thus, FBA's broad institutional approach to support ARN with gender mainstreaming paid off in several ways in terms of enhancing the gender competence throughout ARN and advancing the formalisation of integration of a gender perspective in ARN's work.

FBA's approach to ARN was very different from that used in the DRC and Liberia. By being a government agency and by establishing a long-term partnership with ARN, FBA garnered the credibility to advise ARN on DDR and gender. It allowed FBA to work with several key people within ARN and on multiple tracks at the same time. FBA used its knowledge of and relations with ARN to identify *where, when,* and *how* to advance the gender mainstreaming agenda. The fact that FBA managed to anchor the gender mainstreaming concept was due to this combination of a scaled-up approach, working with several internal actors simultaneously, with more emphasis by donors on gender, and the inclusion of specific gender measures in the implementation of the reincorporation process which is outlined in the Colombian peace agreement and the national

policy for social and economic reincorporation (CONPES 3931). However, we recognise that *'anchoring a concept'* does not per se translate into actions or results. But with the management buy-in of the gender concept there was a greater willingness to listen and learn about gender mainstreaming in the operations to contribute to the implementation of 18 reincorporation actions with a gender perspective in CONPES, and the enhanced capacity of the gender unit helped to identify and promote the need for a gender-responsive peace process. ARN's participation in the Gender Working Group of the National Council for Reincorporation (CNR)[102] is critical for influencing plans, programmes, and projects on reincorporation. The gathering of information from the field by the gender unit about needs has proved important for promoting a gender-responsive process.

While FBA's interventions supporting ARN were, relatively speaking, less susceptible to being influenced by variation in participants' backgrounds, social status, and links to the home organisation, FBA was instead more exposed to political challenges such as the turnover of senior management of ARN after the change of government in Colombia in 2018, when approximately 80 % of the senior management was replaced with new people. This seems, however, inevitable in any political context where interventions engage political actors. The same is true for the security sector reform leadership seminar series in Liberia. As the superintendents are politically appointed, there is a certain turnover of people during the time of the intervention and afterwards. In a way, any intervention with a theory of change that starts with strengthening the capacity of individuals, and with the assumption that it will translate into institutional change, is vulnerable to variations in the role and capacity of the individual.

---

[102] The working group is the main gender mechanism in Colombia for mainstreaming gender perspective in plans, programmes, and projects of reincorporation. The working group also includes the Office of the Presidential Councillor for Stabilisation and Consolidation and FARC. See NCG Sweden evaluation, p. 22.

The scalability issue

The evaluation team noted that PCPI in the DRC and CPLP in Liberia had restricted scalability because of limited opportunities for participants to influence their own organisations to adopt and operationalise new knowledge and skills and institutionalise practices that are applied more broadly within the organisations across the regions and countries. For example, the opportunity to participate in the CPLP was offered each year to one young professional from each county in Liberia that counted 15 young professionals each year, and a total of 30 participants. The idea to cover all 15 counties was laudable. However, although Liberia is a small country, the size of many counties makes it difficult for one or two people to operationalise what they have learned to have wider effects beyond their immediate communities without an institutional linkage that can leverage the learning across the organisation and country.

Findings relating to effectiveness

The evaluation team has assessed the overall results and effects of FBA's interventions in the case countries (i.e. whether the strategic objectives in the bilateral cooperation strategies are achieved and what factors facilitated this). It has considered what has made a difference, for whom, in what circumstances and why?

The case studies show that there is no convincing evidence that the enhanced *'individual capacity'* led to enhanced *'institutional capacity'*. FBA has not yet at this stage, after two to three years of operations in the case countries, been able to influence peacebuilding issues at a national level, nor to sub-regional level.

There is a weak link in the theory of change that enhanced '*individual capacity'* will lead to enhanced *'organisational/institutional capacity'* that will improve wider national and inclusive processes for peace and reconciliation. FBA's course evaluations and our own interviews with course participants show that the training programmes have enhanced individual (and professional) capacity through CPLP,

PCPI, SSR LSS, and PROS but the results at output level do not translate into an institutional outcome level, which undermines critical assumptions that changes at the individual level will lead to organisational effectiveness.

The level of operationalisation or institutionalisation among the organisations that participated in PCPI and CPLP is weak. What we observed, instead, was that FBA's training contributed to creating new relations between participants and the development of networks for exchanging ideas and mutual support. Some participants explained that their motivation drawn from the training encouraged them to initiate activities and bring in members from the community to work with influential decision-makers and power brokers to prevent and resolve disputes and conflicts. What we see in these examples is increased capacity of people who have the desire to build informal structures and potentially institutions as a basis for conflict prevention and reconciliation. The main results are at the individual and community levels.

The case studies show that FBA's interventions have made a significant difference to participants. FBA's different training programmes empowered participants and made them confident to use their knowledge and skills in their work. Many participants, particularly in CPLP and PCPI, have autonomously taken on tasks, developed initiatives, and sought collaboration with other local peace activists and public actors to reduce tension, settle disputes, support former combatants and violent individuals to change their attitudes and behaviour, and strengthened intra-communal relations.[103] Thanks to their participation in FBA's training programmes, they gained further credibility among community members and local decision-makers and were increasingly called on to participate in resolving disputes and conflicts.

[103] For examples, please see Annexes 5 and 7 for the DRC and Liberia.

There are underlying tensions, disputes, and conflicts at the local level in the communities where most of FBA's participants in CPLP and PCPI live and work that can occasionally escalate into violence and destruction. Conflicts in different communities in eastern DRC and Liberia have their own idiosyncrasies. Conflict drivers range from ethnic and identity clashes to power struggles; access to and ownership of land; local political economy; and the general lack of social services and weak public administration. These are pre-existing conflict causes in the communities and within the states which undermine social cohesion and stability. When a community or country experiences an event around which people with different views and positions mobilise, then these factors can fuel existing divisions and trigger escalation of violence. Some examples of such events referred to by interviewees were the 2017 Liberian general election, land disputes, and apolitical events such as traffic accidents and family disputes that spiral into violence.

What our interviews show is that many participants felt empowered through their FBA training to intervene in these different types of situations by holding meetings and resolving disputes. Other interventions included organising peace events to reconcile disputes and conflicts between different groups in the community, holding workshops and training sessions for youth and women to raise awareness about their rights, or creating safe spaces for women to meet and talk. These are all examples of what participants considered as being the main outcomes from their enhanced personal capacity. The evaluation team recognises that these contributions by the participants are important for building or strengthening social cohesion at the local level, but they do not address structural conflict factors underlying and fuelling some of the eruptions of conflict and violence. There is a very weak link between this level and national political processes, which some interviewees argue should be the focus of FBA's interventions. Some interviewees even argued that FBA in some cases does the work of civil society organisations and does not use their added value of being a government agency by working more strategically with beneficiary agencies.

Participants in FBA activities explain that these different activities have meant a lot to many women, youths, former combatants, and perpetrators. A male participant and mentor in PCPI in eastern DRC decided to contact male members of a local rebel group who were known for their violent past and crimes against children, women, and men in the surrounding communities. He identified a perpetrator (former rebel) who was known for his brutal past and decided to approach him. The participant told us that the FBA training had prepared him to talk and engage with male perpetrators about leaving a violent past behind, and instead embarking on a healthy and peaceful life in their communities. The training in '*positive masculinity'* had convinced him that this was an approach he could use to help members of rebel groups to find a way out of a violent life. He started to engage with the perpetrator and after many sessions of dialogue the man recognised that he had the ability to feel good about himself by changing his old behaviour. The participant kept encouraging him and strengthened his self-esteem. Today, the former rebel tries to convince other rebels in his circle to learn how to use their emotional and physical strengths to champion healthy behaviours to lead peaceful lives with their families in the communities. This man and other participants in eastern DRC and Liberia contributed to 'increased human security' in their communities through a transformation of attitudes, behaviour, and relations at a small scale and within specific actor group(s) in communities. The empowerment of participants is a key result from the trainings by making them confident to engage with parties to a dispute or conflict and local power brokers. Many participants described in interviews and in course evaluations that the training had transformative effects on them; subjects like '*positive masculinity'* and '*mindful communication'* particularly, were considered highly useful for developing a personal toolkit to manage interactions with individuals and groups under stress to resolve disputes and conflicts.

The case studies in the DRC and Liberia show that the results at the community level were generated by the participants themselves and their local partners, rather than by mobilised efforts of their home

organisations. The technical or financial support from and engagement by the home organisations of the participants was often limited. The organisations appreciated that the training increased human capacity of their organisations in the field, and thus strengthened their presence in the rural areas. The actions taken by the participants would probably not have been taken without their participation in FBA's training. Some of these participants explained that they had benefitted from other training and interactions with international organisations. Thus, the evaluation team notes that FBA's contribution is often one of several triggering factors for action that together constitute multiple influences on *when, where, what and how* actions are taken. Thus, these are not actions taken as part of an organisational strategy.

In contrast to the DRC and Liberia, the Colombia case study shows, however, that FBA contributed to strengthening ARN's institutional capacity in terms of gender mainstreaming. FBA's different interventions through training and advice had a cumulative effect on the senior management, who adopted the central concepts and methods of gender mainstreaming and enhanced gender competence of staff, paving the way for the development of a series of internal resolutions formalising ARN's gender equality work; the establishment of the ARN gender roundtable; the gender focal point system; and procedures for preventing and responding to cases of sexual harassment. These are important instruments that are used to operationalise the implementation of the peace agreement and the 18 actions of CONPES (national policy for social and economic integration of former members of FARC-EP.

It is difficult to measure how much influence FBA had on the above results and whether they might have happened anyway without FBA's contributions, but ARN reaffirms that FBA played a significant role. The outputs contributed to establishing an institutional foundation for gender mainstreaming that has endured despite approximately 80 % of the senior management being replaced after the 2018 presidential election. Some of the key factors

that have sustained both efforts and results are the long-term partnership and cooperation with clearly defined counterparts, staff continuity within FBA, longstanding mutual trust between them to discuss strategic issues, and a recognition of FBA's international access to key actors within the peace and security community. Gender mainstreaming remains a great challenge in a patriarchal society like Colombia, and the gender perspective is slowly being integrated into the reintegration and reincorporation processes in the territories.

An important contribution by FBA in this context is to support ARN's efforts to position itself among local actors in the territories as a legitimate actor that is managing the reintegration process. As a third party and partner to ARN, FBA has played an important role during eight regional fora, informing about why and how reintegration and reincorporation are carried out, and by facilitating the interaction with local stakeholders. ARN expressed its appreciation for FBA's involvement, noting that it helped reduce the suspicion of national government agencies among former FARC combatants in the territories.

In Colombia FBA developed an understanding of both formal and informal decision-making processes within ARN through its long-term partnership. FBA had a good enough understanding of the interdependencies of relationships, interactions, and interrelating parts of ARN to know how to work with gender mainstreaming at the headquarters level. FBA had sufficient understanding of ARN's internal system to help contribute to making changes. FBA's interventions were, thus, adapted and aligned with this knowledge of the system. It was not formally documented, but FBA's internal set-up comprised staff who had been involved over a long time period and built relations with their counterparts. There was trust in FBA's role and intentions.

The Colombia case study shows that FBA's interventions contributed to strengthened capacity of ARN as an institution in terms of gender mainstreaming, and thus enhanced the likelihood that it will have greater and wider effects nationally when the existing instruments are fully operationalised.

In summary, FBA's interventions in the DRC and Liberia contributed to '*empowered'* individuals with capacity to intervene with both a gender and conflict perspective in a local context and resolve disputes. In addition, FBA's interventions supported the establishment of regional and national networks of '*peacebuilders'*. Alas, only to a lesser extent, or not at all, did the interventions contribute to organisational effectiveness in terms of generating wider peacebuilding effects.

Findings relating to efficiency

The evaluation team has considered FBA's role within the framework of bilateral cooperation in terms of being a self-implementing agency and its ability to utilise its human and financial resources efficiently.

FBA faced several challenges in the three case countries. The funding of FBA's contributions (interventions) to the result areas in the bilateral strategies was very modest. The average annual budget for FBA's contributions in a case country is approximately SEK 6 million – to cover both administrative and operational costs. Logistics was another challenge.[104] FBA operated remotely from Sweden (except for Colombia from 2018) and relied on regular travel to the countries to develop, maintain and follow up relations with key stakeholders. Similarly, FBA organised activities – in particular training and networking events – from Sweden with some assistance from local consultants.[105] The conditions for travelling in the DRC

[104] FBA's annual reports 2016–2019.

[105] FBA programme documents for CPLP and PCPI.

and Liberia are very difficult, making some areas almost inaccessible. The information, communication, and telecommunications (ICT) infrastructure are not well developed making it difficult to communicate via phone or internet between Sweden and these countries. In addition, the lack of security and high risks make it difficult for FBA staff and local partners to travel in certain areas, particularly in the eastern DRC.

The case studies show that the lack of scalability and leverage of FBA interventions makes training programmes less efficient in terms of staff time. The management of training programmes is very time-consuming and resource intensive. It requires a lot of communication and coordination with participants, their organisations, mentors, trainers, etc. In addition, a significant amount of time is spent on logistics to arrange visas, transportation, and accommodation. Subsequently, less time is allocated to providing advice and technical expertise both to partner organisations and to Team Sweden.[106]

Given that a significant share of FBA's modest budget is allocated to administration of the interventions in the countries, it is a matter of how FBA can best leverage its human resources to work on the interventions to achieve the greatest possible impact. Recognising that FBA is predominantly Sweden-based and only in a few cases present at Swedish embassies, a significant share of the budget is also allocated to travel and accommodation for FBA staff. It further highlights the importance of maximising the human resources and the time they spend in the countries to advance FBA's work.

The evaluation team notes that it has been difficult for FBA to engage with partners in different training programmes to find strategic entry points to support the capacity building process of an institution or facilitate and support a dialogue and mediation process with potential for wider peacebuilding effects. FBA has the analytical capacity (including their research unit) to identify leverage points for

[106] Team Sweden refers to the Swedish foreign representation including embassies, consulates and Swedish government agencies such as Sida, FBA, etc.

their interventions, get access to international networks and platforms (both itself and through the Swedish MFA), and to position and profile itself as a credible provider of technical expertise and training. One such example is FBA's role in relation to the Afghanistan Peace Support Mechanism (APSM). This is a good example of both leveraging FBA's human resources and technical expertise, and of the potential to coordinate closely with Sida and the EU based upon their respective comparative advantages.

Since FBA sets out to contribute to strengthening the peace- and state-building capacity of local and national actors. Scalability is not only about size and volume, but also about maximising the leverage of the interventions. The scalability of an intervention requires careful strategic analysis to find leverage points. This requires a strategic mindset on the part of FBA and partners to analyse contexts, actors, relations, and systems. Absorbing new concepts and perspectives and partly breaking away from old habits of doing things and join a '*new way of thinking*' will take time; it requires resources and a management buy-in.

As a self-implementing government agency, FBA has an advantage over many other international organisations because beneficiary public institutions see FBA as a counterpart. There are certain conditions that need to be in place for FBA to leverage its intervention. FBA's engagements should consider whether there is a clear national public counterpart, or a peace process like in the case of Colombia, involving at least one state actor, for optimising FBA's interventions. Furthermore, there needs to be a certain level of scalability within an institution or system, given FBA and partners' available resources and expertise.

FBA's partnership with ARN is a good example of how a long-term partnership can build trust and it enabled FBA to understand an institution and allowed both organisations to openly discuss and examine opportunities for strengthening the institutional capacity of ARN. Mapping, assessments and analysis can be done, and results and ways forward can be discussed and decided between trusted

partners. It is a long-term endeavour that must overcome and manage changes of government and personnel. The level of trust must go beyond personal relations but be institutional.

FBA's current partnership with the National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS) and the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) in Liberia is an emerging partnership in a different context than that of Colombia. The institutional arrangements within MIA and NSCS governing the security sector in Liberia will continue to evolve over time as Liberia's state-building process continues. Through its training programmes FBA has, since 2017, developed important relations with key people within NSCS and MIA. Although these state actors were responsive to FBA's support and efforts, some interviewees argued that FBA would have been more effective if they could have coached key individuals more consistently in Monrovia. This would have required permanent FBA staffing in Monrovia which FBA did not have.[107]

FBA is called in for assisting or facilitating peace processes. In this context it is also important for FBA to apply a certain level of scalability. Some interviewees among FBA staff argued that FBA's efforts would have greater leverage if the interventions at the community level are linked and feed into national political processes. The interviewees noted that being able to connect work at both community and the national level is very important as it is the communities where people and combatants live that are led into and engage in violence. Communities harbour ideologies that are used by or enhanced by leaders to engage in conflict. Thus, the complexity of drivers and the action of violent conflict coexist within the community. Therefore, there is a need to link communities with the national political leadership engaged in peace and reconciliation processes or peace agreements. As pointed out by one interviewee, if national processes do not involve and engage communities but leave them behind, then the political leadership and the peace

[107] As of 2022, there will be an FBA staff at the Swedish Embassy in Monrovia.

process run the risk of ending up with hardliners and spoilers who will take advantage of and override, circumvent, or damage the peace agreement. Thus, several interviewees argued, there is a need to understand *when* there is a political momentum and movement forward at the national level and then to try to influence the narrative in the communities. Moreover, if the communities are not involved it can lead to dissatisfaction and new narratives are formed creating new groups of combatants, another reason why it is important that these levels are connected with each other. Several peacebuilding organisations are already active working at both community and national political levels, bodies such as Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, Conciliation Resources, and Interpeace. Some FBA staff noted that when FBA, as a very small peacebuilding actor, engages in Colombia, the DRC and Liberia in different peacebuilding activities, then FBA must be more strategically focused and efficient with its available resources.

A different issue is staff rotation, whereby some staff of the beneficiary agency leave their jobs or are only appointed for a limited time. The issue is that time and resources invested in training staff have been wasted when they have left their jobs within the institution. It is almost an inevitable risk that training activities will run into this problem when an organisation like FBA works with strengthening the capacity of public institutions through training of key staff. It undermines both efficiency and sustainability of achieved results. Two recent evaluations note these issues in Colombia and Liberia.[108]

[108] Nordic Consulting Group (Jocke Nyberg and Mireia Cano), Final evaluation report, evaluation of the Folke Bernadotte Academy's Colombia project within the framework of Sweden's development cooperation strategy 2016–2020 – Contributing to holistic reintegration of former members of Colombian armed groups, 3 March 2021. Niras, (Ian Christplos & Oscar Bloh), evaluation of FBA's Liberia project, within the framework of Sweden's development cooperation strategy, 18 December 2020.

The county-level superintendents who participated in FBA's leadership seminar series (SSR LSS) are politically appointed by the president of Liberia and thus hold their positions temporarily. The evaluation of FBA's support to ARN in Colombia noted that three/four out of ten ARN staff who have been trained by FBA left their jobs.[109] These evaluations were not able to say what the impact was, but it was considered a weakness when it came to sustaining achieved results in relation to increasing the capacity of the institutions.

Findings relating to coordination

The evaluation team has assessed how FBA has coordinated within the framework of bilateral cooperation with other Swedish and international actors to achieve its strategic objectives.

The three case studies show that FBA did not coordinate significantly with other Swedish or international actors to enhance its leverage. Members of Team Sweden at the embassies note that regular and systematic coordination within the framework of bilateral cooperation strategies improved gradually towards the end of the strategy periods. The evaluation team finds it reasonable to assume that FBA would have sought more active coordination with different actors if it weren't for its limited financial and human resources and limited leverage. The evaluation team finds that the issue of coordination needs to be further explored between the Swedish MFA, Sida and FBA to draw efficiently and effectively on FBA's expertise. Currently, members of Team Sweden find that FBA's expertise was not fully optimised because too much time was allocated to communicate, coordinate, and manage the logistics around the training programmes.

[109] Nordic Consulting Group (Jocke Nyberg and Mireia Cano), Final evaluation report, evaluation of the Folke Bernadotte Academy's Colombia project within the framework of Sweden's development cooperation strategy 2016–2020 – 'Contributing to holistic reintegration of former members of Colombian armed groups', 3 March 2021, p. 34.

What is missing from FBA's work within the framework of bilateral strategies is a systematic and sustained approach to connect both efforts (interventions) and individuals at the field level with national processes and institutions. Some participants expressed in interviews that the one-off events in conjunction with end-of-training or gathering of alumni networks are insufficient for influencing the national political agenda. A more coordinated approach is needed that credibly includes youth and women in national processes for peace and reconciliation, where FBA can act as a connector. FBA notes that such an approach is currently ongoing. The local (CSOs), regional (counties) and national (government) bodies should be working together on joint projects that help them identify, articulate, and take responsibility and action to address, issues of concern that cut across conflict divides. These issues typically relate to human security and development needs.

Many participants and their organisations in the DRC and Liberia feel constrained from utilising their knowledge and skills more widely within their county or province due to the lack of resources for travel and poor communications infrastructure. There is a certain level of frustration among participants that they sometimes must take money out of their own pockets or cancel planned activities because of their limited mobility to access places or inability to keep up regular communication over the internet and phone. FBA cannot fund beyond travel reimbursements and scratch cards. Some participants have covered costs incurred related to participation in FBA activities. This further highlights the need for close collaboration between FBA and other actors who have the financial resources to support the development of institutions and also support a more effective utilisation of participants' knowledge and skills. As UN agencies are often the key agencies for peace- and state-building in countries like the DRC and Liberia, and as Sweden channels funding through the UN system, it appears to be the space for a future closer dialogue between Team Sweden and the UN agencies that can leverage FBA's interventions and results.

There is room for FBA to play a greater role in the future in mobilising and coordinating with national and international actors to have greater leverage. FBA should continue with its efforts to position itself within Team Sweden, with staff at the Swedish embassies, resulting in enhanced communication, coordination, and coherence with other Swedish and national actors. While ongoing and informal dialogue with these actors is important, FBA's reporting needs to be more analytical in nature to reflect an ongoing assessment of the underlying assumptions of the theories of change in relation to the evolving and dynamic uncertainties in post-conflict contexts. Much of the reporting so far is predominantly an account of the implementation of activities and the immediate results. It would benefit both Team Sweden members and local partners if FBA's documentation were more analytical and strategic.

Summary of findings on bilateral cooperation

Bilateral cooperation is the newest area of FBA's operations. The first bilateral cooperation strategy was operationalised in 2015 and focused on the DRC. Soon followed many more strategies. During the period of this evaluation FBA was responsible for contributing to the objectives of nine bilateral and one regional cooperation strategies. FBA has established a management system for the operationalisation of these strategies that is still under development.

Based on the three country case studies, namely Colombia, the DRC, and Liberia, we found that FBA's bilateral interventions have been relevant to the Swedish bilateral cooperation strategies. The interventions within the selected case country studies have, in particular, been relevant to the personal and professional needs of the individuals who have participated in FBA's training activities within the framework of bilateral cooperation, but FBA's interventions are less relevant to the capacity conditions of the institutions and organisations in the DRC and Liberia. There is a

weak link in the theory of change that enhanced '*individual capacity'* will lead to enhanced *'organisational/institutional capacity'* that will improve wider national and inclusive processes for peace and reconciliation.

FBA's interventions mainly in Liberia and the DRC, show gaps in the articulation of the theories of change. The underlying assumptions for change linking short-term with intermediate and long-term results were not detailed enough to reflect the pathway for change.

FBA's interventions did not yield sustainable results at an institutional level beyond improved knowledge and skills of the participants *when* there was no clear institutional counterpart or process at the national level. The relevance of FBA's interventions is dependent on several factors; whether an institutional counterpart, an existent peace and reconciliation process; or on the level of functionality of those institutions and processes.

What we observed, instead, was that FBA's training contributed to creating new relations between participants and the development of networks for exchanging ideas and mutual support. Some participants explained that their motivation drawn from the training encouraged them to initiate activities and bring in members from the community to work with influential decision-makers and power brokers to prevent and resolve disputes and conflicts. What we see in these examples is increased capacity of people who have the desire to build informal structures and potentially institutions as a basis for conflict prevention and reconciliation. The main results are at the individual and community levels. FBA's different training programmes empowered participants and made them confident to use their knowledge and skills in their work.

In contrast to the selected interventions in the DRC and Liberia, the Colombia case study shows, however, that FBA contributed to strengthening ARN's institutional capacity in terms of gender mainstreaming. FBA's different interventions through training and

advice had a cumulative effect on the senior management, who adopted the central concepts and methods of gender mainstreaming and enhanced gender competence of staff, paving the way for the development of a series of internal resolutions that formalise ARN's gender equality work; the establishment of the ARN gender roundtable; the gender focal point system; and procedures for preventing and responding to cases of sexual harassment.

FBA sets out to contribute to strengthening the peace- and state-building capacity of local and national actors and can achieve this through scalability. Scalability is not only about size and volume, but also about maximising the leverage of the interventions. The scalability of an intervention requires careful strategic analysis to find leverage points. This requires a strategic mindset on the part of FBA and partners to analyse contexts, actors, relations, and systems.

It has been difficult for FBA to engage with partners in different training programmes to find strategic entry points to support the capacity building process of an institution or facilitate and support a dialogue and mediation process with potential for wider peace-building effects. FBA has the analytical capacity (including their research unit) to identify leverage points for their interventions, get access to international networks and platforms (both itself and through the Swedish MFA), and to position and profile itself as a credible provider of technical expertise and training.

The case studies show that the lack of scalability and leverage of FBA interventions makes training programmes less efficient in terms of staff time. The management of training programmes is very time-consuming and resource intensive. It requires a lot of communication and coordination with participants, their organisations, mentors, trainers, etc. Given that a significant share of FBA's modest budget is allocated to administration of the interventions in the countries, it is a matter of how FBA can best leverage its human resources to work on the interventions to achieve the greatest possible impact.

The three case studies show that FBA did not coordinate significantly with other Swedish or international actors to enhance its leverage. Members of Team Sweden at the embassies note that regular and systematic coordination within the framework of bilateral cooperation strategies improved gradually towards the end of the strategy periods. The evaluation team finds it reasonable to assume that FBA would have sought more active coordination with different actors if it was not for its limited financial and human resources and limited leverage.

Research, policy and methods

Findings relating to relevance

FBA's 'Research, policy and methods development' area of operation is tasked with the objective of producing 'more knowledge-based and effective peace-promoting activities'.[110] With the 2013 'Regulation with instruction for the Folke Bernadotte Academy', FBA was instructed by the Swedish government to conduct research to support effective peace operations.[111] This instruction is mirrored in the agency's internal control documents that explicitly state how FBA's activities must be planned and implemented taking into account scientific evidence and proven experience, and thus have research-based knowledge support activities across all of its areas of operation.

[110] Främja och bedriva erfarenhetshantering, doktrin- och metodutveckling och forskning som syftar till ett effektivt genomförande av internationella fredsinsatser, Förordning med instruktion för Folke Bernadotteakademin (2013: 3§).

[111] Förordning med instruktion för Folke Bernadotteakademin (2013: 3§): främja och bedriva erfarenhetshantering, doktrin- och metodutveckling och forskning som syftar till ett effektivt genomförande av internationella fredsinsatser.

Taken together, these ambitions and efforts are complex and simultaneously cut across all operational areas and programmes (who all have responsibility for basing their work in scientific evidence). FBA's specific Research, Development and Evidence Unit (FUE, formerly FoU) is formally positioned under the programme for 'international development cooperation and methods development' and was initially set up back in 2005. FUE works to produce scientific knowledge to promote use of research among practitioners in key partner organisations, and to support the integration of research-based evidence throughout the organisation.

FUE works across at least five clusters of activity.[112] It conducts research; it commissions, financially supports and promotes research by external researchers through a set of international Research Working Groups (RWGs), research workshops and the provision of research grants; it works to increase the visibility and disseminate research within FBA's areas of engagement, both internally to staff (lunch seminars, dissemination of relevant publications, access to RWGs) and externally to partners (through direct engagement as well as through publications such as research briefs); it promotes knowledge transfer and dialogue between research, policy and practice by working to integrate research into the agency's activities; and related to the latter, FUE has an advisory expert function of providing direct access to knowledge within FBA's areas.

The work of FUE alone, however, should not be equated with the broader operational area of 'Research, policy and method development'. While FUE is assessed to be a major contributor to its results, the area also encompasses international policy work done across all programmes, including activities and initiatives such as the Challenges Forum, the Swedish Women's Mediation Network, *Fredsarkivet*, and several others. Due to the patchwork of activities and initiatives, organisational procedures for planning, budgeting and executing, interviewees explained that this area of operation

[112] Programbeskrivning avseende programmet för forskning om fred, säkerhet och utveckling (FoU).

should mostly be seen as an attempt to group together a plethora of efforts under the umbrella of research, policy and methods. For example, activities are grouped under the heading of the area *ex post* annually as annual reports are prepared (see costs for the area below in Table 6) and are not coherently planned *ex ante*.

Table 6: Costs for the area 'Research, policy and method development', 2009–2019

Year	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Costs SEK (millions)	30.8	41.8	36.4	41.7	39	57.4
Year	**2015**	**2016**	**2017**	**2018**	**2019**	
Costs SEK (millions)	62.9	44.9	45.6	57.8	57.5	

Source: Folke Bernadotte Academy, Annual Reports 2009-2019.

The area of operation's research efforts is guided by what the evaluation team finds to be a relevant theory of change that assumes research integration in FBA's programmes will increase the agency's expertise concerning the factors and processes that have the greatest likelihood of contributing to peace, security and development. This in turn is seen as helping to determine which specific forms of programmes, projects and education are best placed to foster peace in different contexts. FBA's research effort thus aims at supporting the organisation in the design of its own activities and approaches. It aims to improve and develop the agency's tools – whether training, technical advice or secondments – by showing which methods, techniques and approaches offer the greatest opportunity to lead to the expected outcome, or to provide higher quality or more long-lasting and sustainable results.[113] Taken together, work in this area is

[113] Programbeskrivning avseende program för forskning om fred, säkerhet och utveckling (FoU).

expected to help FBA achieve its results within its activities and programmes, while also strengthening the agency's external profile and legitimacy as an expert authority. There are also wider synergic ambitions for the efforts pursued, with the outputs expected to contribute to strengthening change theory arguments and basic assumptions in Swedish development work, as well as to reach and impact target groups outside the agency in the long run. This in turn is expected to strengthen FBA's external profile and legitimacy as an expert authority, once again influencing its potential to achieve expected results.

Findings relating to efficiency and effectiveness

In the following, we focus on the efficiency and effectiveness of three specific dimensions of the 'research, policy and methods development' area of operation: 1) FBA's production and commissioning of research, 2) integration of research into FBA's programmatic efforts and related strategies, and 3) FBA's policy and dissemination efforts.[114]

Research production and support

FBA is seen as being an agency of expertise and experts by both itself and its partners. The production, commissioning and financing of original research play an important role in this regard, aiming to push the boundaries of knowledge both within and outside the agency. While the broader thematic and geographic expertise rests across programmes, each with their own portfolios and practical experiences (a few programmes employ staff with research experience), research is largely anchored in the FUE.

[114] These dimensions of evaluation were established in accordance with EBA's reference group for the study.

At the time of evaluation, FUE employed five people: two senior researchers (including the head of unit), and three desk officers (one senior and two juniors) who, were not professionally trained researchers but had experience conducting tasks from research institutions. The two researchers split their time 50/50 between engaging directly in research tasks (that are externally funded by Swedish and international research councils and executed in collaboration with other research institutes and universities, and thus not funded by FBA) and organisational tasks (including organisational processes, workshops, seminars, dissemination, book launches, advisory services etc.).

Despite the notably limited *de facto* resources set aside for original research as compared to the significant mandate and expectations attached in the government instruction, FBA's researchers regularly publish original research in international academic outlets. The research is published in influential, international, peer reviewed journals or in anthologies often positioned at the centre of the relevant peace and conflict literatures.[115]

In addition to the primary research published by the two researchers, FBA publishes a series of outputs at the intersection of applied research and methods development within the broad thematic field of peace, security and development. These span across handbooks,

[115] Recent examples include: Söderberg Kovacs, Mimmi & Jesper Bjarnesen, eds (2018), *Violence in African Elections: Between Democracy and Big Man Politics*. London: Zed; Söderberg Kovacs, Mimmi. 'Negotiating Sacred Grounds? Resolving Islamist Armed Conflicts'. *International Negotiation* 25, no. 3 (2020): 375–388; Roxanna Sjöstedt, Mimmi Söderberg Kovacs, and Anders Themner, 'Demagogues of hate or shepherds of peace? Examining the threat construction processes of warlord democrats in Sierra Leone and Liberia'. *Journal of International Relations and Development* 22, no. 3 (September 2019): 560–83; Söderberg Kovacs, M. 2016. 'Rebel-to-party transformations in civil war peace processes (1975–2011)'. *Democratisation* 23(6); Gelot, L. (2019), 'Deradicalisation as soft counter-insurgency: distorted interactions between Somali traditional authorities and intervening organisations. *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding* 14(2), 2020.

reports, briefs and other forms of publication, sometimes produced in collaboration with key Swedish and international actors in the field, from PRIO to UN Women to Swedish government actors such as the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency. Such outputs have been low in volume for the past years (see Table 8 below) but grew significantly in quantity in 2020 as FBA, PRIO and UN Women launched a series of research briefs.

Table 7: FBA publications 2008–2020

Year	2008	2010	2012	2013	2014
Number of publications	1	2	1	3	2
Year	**2015**	**2016**	**2018**	**2019**	**2020**
Number of publications	3	1	1	3	8

Source: Compiled from Folke Bernadotte Academy's webpage, www.fba.se

Table 8: Examples of FBA publications 2016–2020

Title	Authors	Year
The Sexism and Violence Nexus	Elin Bjarnegård; Erik Melander; Jacqui True	2020
Insights from the Inside: Women's Mediation Networks as a Tool for Influencing Peace Processes	Anna Möller-Loswick; Camilla Riesenfeld; Louise Olsson	2019
Responsive and Responsible: Making Politics Part of UNDP's Rule of Law Agenda	Richard Zajac Sannerholm; Shane Quinn; Andrea Rabus	2016

Source: Selected from Folke Bernadotte Academy's webpage, www.fba.se

As a complement to the research and policy publications produced by FBA staff and associated collaborators, FBA supports research and evidence production *by proxy* through its research working groups and its related research grants. FBA hosts seven research working groups that are together composed of 130 international

academics (74 women and 56 men) attached to international universities and research institutes.[116] They thus cover most (but not all) of FBA's work areas and are meant to enable 'close cooperation between FBA and the academic community', forming a strong scientific network with opportunities for academic seminars to discuss research, methods and results within the individual areas, with members also expected to advise FBA staff when time allows it.[117] The RWGs are effectively seen and used as an 'extended faculty' to offset the small number of researchers within FBA. Our interviews indicate that with relatively few resources the RWGs seem able to bring cutting-edge knowledge to the attention of FBA, strengthening its knowledge and evidence base (in ideal situations forming a research-based 'helpdesk' or database from which evidence and knowledge resources may be extracted). FBA is dependent on the time and interests of the researchers who are not directly compensated. This does not seem to have proven troublesome as many of the members see the research working groups as a form of core community – a peer group of likeminded experts – due to the way in which the groups are organised around specific subthemes of peace, security and development. In their current (and evolving) form the research working groups are found to be an effective way to produce knowledge and open up a path for bringing that knowledge into FBA.

As a further modality for supporting the production of relevant research, FBA annually grants funds to the members of the RWGs for research projects through competitive modus. A modality in place since the launch of the FUE in 2005, FBA has supported approximately 150 research projects, including different forms of data

[116] The seven groups are: mediation and peace processes; peace operations; rule of law; security sector reform; women, peace and security; elections, peace and security; and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration.

[117] In 2018, an internal database was established to further strengthen the exchange and links between the members of the research working groups with the work of FBA by making members' research profiles, research projects and research results accessible to FBA staff.

collection, surveys and experimental studies. The outputs from the targeted support, while not quantified, are reported to FBA and appear significant, especially with a view to the relatively limited resources spent on research grants (see Table 9 below). FBA similarly states that the research grants have 'enabled the publication of a large number of scientific papers, books and articles of relevance to international policy development'. In the current situation of scarce resources devoted to in-house research production in FBA, the return seems both highly relevant and cost-effective because of the nature of the grants (see examples of supported research grants in Table 10). Further, there is a good gender distribution in awarded research grants with the majority of recipients from 2015–2020 being women.

Table 9: Supported research grants 2015–2020

Year	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Number of grants	10	13	10	13	16	13
Total value SEK (millions)	4.1	2.3	2.2	3	3.7	3

Source: Folke Bernadotte Academy, Approved Research Grants 2015–2020.

Table 10: Examples of supported research grants, 2020

Year	Project	Principal Investigator
2020	Post-conflict state-building in comparative perspective: electoral politics, extractive economies, and state consolidation in Mozambique and Angola	Carrie Manning, Georgia State University
2020	Nordic experiences of mediation: exploring the role of mandates in mediation processes	Isak Svensson, Uppsala University
2020	The microfoundations of DDRR: A panel survey of FARC ex-combatants in Colombia	Michael Weintraub, Universidad de los Andes

Source: Folke Bernadotte Academy, Approved Research Grants 2020.

Research integration and uptake in FBA

The evaluation team finds there is broad-based appreciation across FBA of the importance of research-based knowledge and its integration into agency activities. Yet, as also recognised by FBA staff, there are marked differences between observing a researcher present work in greater or less detail, and then having the capacity and ability to both obtain, understand, internalise and have that research make a difference in practice through a process of translation. FBA itself compares research integration to other concepts such as evidence-based practice,[118] maintaining that it refers to the effort of systematically integrating scientific research both into activities implemented and into products used by the agency. FUE specifically suggests defining the effort as a "routine process of incorporating relevant research-based knowledge in the agency's activities, from planning to implementation and evaluation".[119]

While generally conceived as a shared responsibility across the agency, our interviews indicate that research integration is seen by many employees as an explicit responsibility of the FUE – through interacting with the programmes, disseminating research internally, developing methods and producing evidence: "The research unit is there to make sure that everyone is updated on the latest knowledge", as an employee formulated it. FUE actively encourages participation in RWGs, conducts thematic seminars, brown bag seminars, provides access to scientific databases of academic literature, publishes research findings in accessible forms and otherwise promotes the outcomes and outputs of research grant recipients and relevant researchers to different programmes – as illustrated in Tables 11 and 12.

[118] Forskningsintegrering i praktiken: en kartläggning av FBA:s verksamhet. Intern arbetsdokument, 2018.
[119] Ibid.

Table 11: Research presentations at lunch seminars, year and number

Year	2017	2018	2019	2020
Number of research lunch seminars	20	17	17	12

Source: Folke Bernadotte Academy, Research presentations at lunch seminars 2017–2020.
Note: During 2017–2020, the lunch seminars averaged 26 participants.

Table 12: Examples of research presentations at lunch seminars, 2019

Year	Name	Affiliation	Title
2019	Hannah Smidt	German Institute of Global and Area Studies	United Nations peacekeeping locally: strengthening local conflict resolution mechanisms, reducing communal violence
2019	Elin Hellqvist	Stockholms Universitet	Regionala sanktioner i en förändrad världsordning
2019	Nina Wilén	Université Libre de Bruxelles	Gender integration in the post-conflict military

Source: Folke Bernadotte Academy, Research presentations at lunch seminars 2019.

Despite ambitions to base efforts in scientific evidence, the evaluation team finds that practices of integrating research in processes of designing strategies, programmes or other interventions vary greatly across the agency. Some programmes appear well-versed in both appreciating the role of research-based knowledge and attempting to actively integrate it into activities, sometimes through literature use and sometimes through interaction with external researchers. Others see the ambitions of research integration as cumbersome and a resource burden that brings unnecessary complexity and complication to activities. Traceable explanations seem to include research integration treated as one priority among several for programme staff, ambiguous support from top management, as well as the complexity or complications that research may bring to intervention planning and execution.

As for the three bilateral cooperation strategies evaluated, FUE appears to have had limited formal engagement with programme staff and vice versa. Still, the unit has been engaged with the strategies through other means, for example though participation in reference groups, and through the organisation of research policy consultations, research policy dialogues and relevant research outputs. FUE has hosted several research policy consultations/dialogue forums for the purpose of supporting evidence-based policy and practice in the strategies. Throughout the time period considered, staff from the research units have periodically been involved in the reference groups for the strategies, and as such have commented on major draft documents, including operational analyses (OPA).

As part of FBA's engagement in DRC, FUE commissioned an external researcher to produce an analytical report based on data collected by a consultancy firm in 2017. The report is an extension of the data mapping with the objective of producing a scientifically robust analytical publication. This has been part of FUE's engagement in DRC and the report was published in mid-2021. Other activities include 14 research lunch seminars with a geographical focus on the three countries over the years studied. Furthermore, 49 researchers (out of the 130 total) who are members of the research working groups have one of the three countries in question as their area of expertise (17 for Liberia, 17 for Colombia and 15 for DRC).

In situations and instances of thorough research integration in FBA, both in programmatic and in policy work, the evaluation team finds that the end result is often one of significant impact, where the individual parts of FBA's operational efforts leverage an effect greater than the sum of their individual parts. Where research integration is weak, part of the explanation found rests on both lack of awareness among staff of how to integrate research into their work, and on outright resistance. Lack of awareness of both how to conduct research-based work and of the benefits of such an approach may be seen as resting with individual staff but is obviously also a consequence of organisational culture, routines and of the

degree of attention given to it from top and mid-level management either cultivating the necessity of research-based working or downgrading its relevance, as has sometimes been the case. Resistance can likewise both be attributed to individuals who do not see a need for or the use of applying research-based knowledge in their operational situations, and to management who take the same attitude.

Resistance to research integration in FBA seems to follow traditional divides between practitioners and researchers whereby those doubtful of the usability of research see it as overly complicating things and emerging from an 'ivory tower' context far from the tangible realities where the practitioners see themselves operating. This also constructs an unfortunate binary between research and evidence gained through practical experience. These are challenges common to many knowledge organisations where research meets and interrelates with practice and programme realities; not least because primary or basic research is complex and rarely produced with a view to communicating findings to either a broad public or a specialist, practice-based, audience. Because research tells us "we are not being right all the time", as one interviewed FBA staff member explained it, it thus potentially challenges norms and habits in some programmes where experience built up over longer periods of time may not correspond to research findings that question operational approaches.

The evaluation team finds that a challenge rests with limited institutional mechanisms for ensuring systematic approaches and routines in facilitating research integration into strategies, policy or activities. With few institutional mechanisms, research integration is highly dependent on individual initiative and drive. Efforts to work through research-based evidence thus depend on spontaneous initiatives, not institutional incentives, which in an ideal word provides some agility and flexibility for ad hoc and tailormade activities, but in a context of doubt or scepticism means such activities are limited in number. In practice, it means FUE has to

informally keep an eye out for all internal processes that ought to work from research-based evidence and then instigate contact to try and push this through, rather than seeing programme staff organically approach FUE for research support in policy or operational activities, or interaction occurring because of institutionalised mechanisms that e.g. see FUE contribute to all relevant processes.

Because of this mixed effort at research-based working, a 2017 organisational objective was to strengthen research integration across the organisation. To create a baseline, FUE conducted an internal review that showed the differences in how programmes work with research, but also that such practices are limited across several programmes. Based on the report's findings, FUE engaged departments about mainstreaming evidence into their work, while also introducing a checklist for working in an evidence-based way. Interviews indicate, however, that instead of being a lever for action, the report seems to have satisfied internal discussion and ironically formed the end rather than the beginning of discussions on how to improve research integration, and is not working as the instrument of change it was hoped to form.

The evaluation team finds that FBA falls between two stools when it seeks to portray itself as a knowledge organisation based on research, while in fact making limited investments in direct forms of research. This speaks to the fundamental question of what types of evidence and knowledge FBA values and sees itself as both a producer and a diffusor of, to partners and networks. Evidence gained from practical experience on the ground has immense importance, but it may not always correspond to research-based findings, opening up discussions of what forms of knowledge are legitimate where, and used by whom. The discrepancies between how different groups at FBA see the nature of research, evidence and research-based knowledge prompts questions of what it means to be an expert, as well as what counts as evidence.

It is a stated ambition that FBA shall form an "agency of experts", who are explicitly highlighted on communication platforms such as the webpage. While the boundaries between basic and applied research are becoming increasingly blurred as research competencies take up a growing space in CSOs, multilateral organisations and bilateral donors, there are still relevant discussions around the legitimacy of different forms of evidence and knowledge. While organisational struggles over the legitimacy and influence of different knowledge regimes (including across the research–practitioner divide) are to be expected in an organisation like FBA, the important point is to not let those two worlds of knowledge become binaries or to oppose each other. Rather, the agency will need to ensure that the two complement and build on each other to inform strategic and programmatic work in equal measure. Our interviews indicate that the strong centralisation of 'research activities' in a specific unit sometimes entails that other parts of the organisation can too easily dismiss questions of research-based working because 'ensuring we work research-based is obtained by FUE's activities'.

Summing up, the evaluation team finds FBA to be effective in the ways it pursues its ambition to promote and conduct research, doctrine and method development aimed at fulfilling its overarching long-term ambitions. The agency produces, supports and disseminates research (though in a very limited amount), with and to Swedish and international partners. Funded research production by proxy is found to be valuable and important, and an effective resource, allowing FBA to 'punch above its weight' in the global knowledge production within its fields.

At the same time, the evaluation team observes a potential mismatch between actual resources devoted to direct research production in FBA and its ambitions of being an organisation deeply embedded in – and a direct producer of – research-based knowledge and evidence. The research unit has contributed significantly to the agency and its long-term objectives, yet limited resources are consistently made available and invested into research production. FBA will have to

make a strategic choice of whether they would like to be seen as a direct producer (and, by following up in their implementation, a *utiliser*) of research or remain satisfied with supporting research by proxy, outside of the agency. For the moment, the agency falls between two stools, and it fails to fully capture the benefits of either of these models.

The importance of evidence and research on peace, security and development for the effectiveness of FBA's activities is acknowledged throughout the agency. Even so, the evaluation team observes significant challenges in having research influence everyday work in programmes, whether in activities or strategies.

Research integration depends on timing, perceptions, contextual sensitivity and its translation into practice as research findings are turned into operationalised advice. In most instances, we find the relative lack of institutional mechanisms for ensuring research integration means that such efforts are left up to individuals, entailing that demand and supply is also individualised as opposed to institutionalised. This is as much a matter of attitude and culture as one of organisational resources and procedures, yet the issue points towards a need for building up a new set of systematic habits in FBA on research integration that both motivate and place greater emphasis on employees outside the designated research department.

Simultaneously, there is a need to strike a balance between being an entrepreneurial organisation that can swiftly and flexibly engage in policy processes of activities and the structured and institutionalised cooperation necessary to ensure effective use of inhouse resources and competences. A balance must be maintained between more rigid institutional measures and the individual agency to be quick-thinking and agile. Our interviews indicate, however, that the relative lack of institutional mechanisms and operational procedures seems to impede the ambition of ensuring research integration in strategies and activities.

In some instances, these issues are attributable to conventional separations between research and practitioners. "What works in the literature doesn't necessarily work in reality", as one interviewee framed the meeting of these two worlds. In FBA, as elsewhere, some forms of research use seem hard to accept for certain practitioners who rely on their experience on the ground and see this as conflicting with research-based knowledge. This combination will likely always remain a struggle in some regards, over interpretations, resources, politics, turf, and methodologies. Generally speaking, the conditions for carrying out good and original research have to be accepted and are not easily bent; research is complex, its temporality and pursuit of quality mean it works with different time frames, and it is often (purposefully) not designed to feed directly into operational support. In the end, research and evidence-based experience and practical forms of expertise are not substitutes for each other, but neither are they opposites. Having the potential to merge them inside a single organisation ought to improve the chances of ensuring impactful efforts and resulting outcomes.

Together, these issues put into question the position of research competence in FBA. Ideally, discussions on the practical applicability of scientific knowledge should perhaps take place within specific thematic units or groups, where the discussions are situated in specific contexts and thus appear more productive and likely to be resolved with positive outcomes. If centralised too much, such discussions can come to mean that entire units or departments develop resistance to research-based evidence in perhaps well-intended attempts to defend their own 'turf'. Too much decentralisation of the competencies, on the other hand, and the prospects for obtaining impact through strategic coherence are weakened with responsibilities often becoming diluted. We find in these instances that FBA may need to strike a better balance that sees research knowledge and competencies existing in both centralised and decentralised form, also strengthening the potential for sharing responsibilities. Ensuring a balanced supply and demand between

the research unit and the other programmes can be aided by formal organisational structures, procedures and rules. Yet it also requires building a stronger culture of research–programme interaction that can generate and sustain new habits.

Fostering a stronger research-based culture will require wider organisational changes: to institutional incentives, to the attention given to it by management, to values, but also to staff competencies and recruitment. FBA has the potential to achieve a culture where research-based evidence, ideally including that produced by or within FBA, dynamically feeds into bilateral or policy work and processes when these go through strategy updates, when analyses or evaluations are conducted etc. But this will require the agency to critically review institutional mechanisms and operational procedures to ensure research integration during the formation of interventions/strategies and continuously through their lifetimes.

FBA's international policy and dissemination impact

FBA's efforts in contributing to and influencing international policy processes, particularly among partners and relevant actors, encompass a plethora of formal and informal engagements. These *inter alia* include: the publication of handbooks (new ones or updates of the existing, including on DDR, SSR, rule of law, UNSCR 2250, POC) and reports and other publication outputs; internal hosting of important initiatives (Challenges Forum International Secretariat, the Swedish Women's Mediation Network); continuous or institutionalised dialogues with partners such as the UN, EU, OSCE and others; (technical) advisory services and leadership training; research–policy dialogues; and many more. Some of these activities are planned and multi-year in scope whereas others emerge and end extemporaneously, and the same can be said of the diverse impact and the associated results chain – in some instances, outcomes seem to emerge quickly whereas in others such effects may take years to materialise.

These efforts are difficult to quantify or bring together into a complete picture, cutting as they do, across each individual programme and other key areas of this evaluation such as training and secondment. Still, the sampling logic and case selection of the evaluation do make it possible to select a number of policy processes and activities where FBA's role and attributed efforts may be evaluated and complemented by key informant interviews done in the other areas of the evaluation. The purpose then is not to provide a full representation of these efforts but rather to identify circumstances where they have proven effective and what conditions facilitated such.

In the case of international policy processes studied from 2016–2020, the evaluation team observed that FBA has proved to be an effective partner and contributor in the processes it has taken part in. FBA is commended as an important partner whose strengths rest on its willingness to invest and provide resources for important policy processes; its expertise, in-depth knowledge and practice experience within the relevant issues; for its sustained support, not least in certain contexts (including the UN), where rotation creates ruptures and knowledge gaps; for its strong personal networks that allow it to utilise informal channels of communication and interaction; and finally for its approach which often positions the agency as a 'neutral' partner able to negotiate and engage in frank discussions without being seen as biased. These praised capabilities not least come to fruition in situations where FBA is able to draw from different parts of its toolbox, combining experiences on the ground with networks in partner organisations and expertise gained through research-based efforts.

An illustrative example of FBA's international influence on policy processes is the support to and engagement with the UN on the Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS). In 2016, after several modules had been updated along the way, a light stocktaking took place to discuss IDDRS in light of changing conflict dynamics, and it would become clear that a complete review and overhaul of the doctrine

was needed. Over the next two or more years, FBA would play a crucial role in facilitating, negotiating and mediating the processes towards the revised IDDRS officially launched in November 2019 at UN Headquarters in New York.

The involvement was not least inspired by Sweden's crucial role in the original IDDRSs through the Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament Demobilisation Reintegration (SIDDR) that essentially tried to place DDR efforts within the framework of peace processes, and which also saw FBA became involved in the immediate aftermath of the SIDDR work when asked to test the recommendations in ongoing peace talks and by facilitating expert discussions. Along the way during the revision of the IDDRS from 2016 onwards, FBA brought the inter-agency working group to Stockholm for three workshops during which all members negotiated revisions, with the agency providing both funding and support in steering the agenda and chairing sessions. It funded consultancies and, not least, strategically utilised a secondment that had been made already in June 2016, where the agency had seconded an employee to UNDP in Geneva to assist work on DDR and reintegration. This, in particular, turned out to be decisive in ensuring competencies and resources crucial for the IDDRS revision to take place.

The process was also characterised by a strong involvement of FBA's research competencies that managed to generate an interest in the research side of the UN process. These efforts include the establishment of the DDR-focused research working group (RWG), which first met in 2017 at a side-event of the IAWG workshop hosted by FBA in Stockholm. On the second day of a two-day event overlapping with the Stockholm workshop the two events joined together, with researchers presenting and discussing issues with members of the IAWG. Since then, the FBA research unit has actively involved members of the RWG in several activities relevant to the revision of the IDDRS. These include research workshops, research webinars, research–policy dialogues as well as substantial input from scholars to the drafts of the revised IDDRS.

FBA's role and actions in reviewing and revising the IDDRS is characterised by interviewees as "instrumental" and "decisive" in producing the revised IDDRS, with several saying the process would not have been possible without FBA's contributions, both from a finance standpoint but also because of the contributions to the substantive discussions and negotiations. There were certain junctures at which the process was in jeopardy, and where other donors would perhaps have decided to disengage, but where FBA pressed through bilateral talks with co-chairs and mediated. This role as an outsider or neutral partner was invaluable and allowed FBA to sit somewhat outside of the politics and say things that may not be possible otherwise. This process, which some interviewees described as one "putting FBA on the map" seems to have opened new partnerships and strengthened existing ones, something seemingly obtained through not just financing tools but the provision of expertise and a human approach that was seen to create a conducive environment. At the same time, FBA staff involved in the process experienced an important backing from the agency that supported them with resources and political encouragement when needed.

In addition to specific cases of influencing international policy processes, FBA hosts several initiatives that form important contributions to issues of reputation, impact and access in international policy processes. These are in particular the Challenges Forum International Secretariat and the Swedish Women's Mediation Network. Established in 1996, Challenges Forum (CF) is a strategic platform for dialogue for policy, guidance and activities among 23 countries and 50 partners, most of whom are key stakeholders in peace operations. Today, FBA is instructed by the MFA to coordinate and host the Challenges Forum International Secretariat within its operational structure. Excelling at the strategic policy level, CF, like FBA, is very close to the UN, with annual UNSG briefings and a one-time briefing of the UNSC. A 2019 evaluation of CF found it to be an important player in the peace operations arena, effective and relevant in its work and, as of late, good at manoeuvring complex and dynamic conflict trends

including providing a forum for informal dialogue during politically difficult times (e.g. stalemates in the UNSC). CF has been through changes over the past years that seem to have entailed more dynamic interaction in the dialogue forms, revitalising the partnerships or members, work towards RBM systems as well as a process of moving contacts and networks from the personal to the organisational level allowing these to be used more strategically. Its Annual Forum 2019 in Montreal, Canada, was hosted by the Government of Canada and brought together 130 participants from across the world representing the UN, AU, the Challenges Forum Partnership and expert institutions.

The Challenges Forum first and foremost follows the direction of the partnership and the members. Even so, FBA benefits from the close proximity to the secretariat and the good working relationships with staff there, and FBA is formally tasked with chairing (at DG-level) the partner meetings and heading the steering committee. There seems to be a growing recognition in FBA that ample room remains for engaging more strategically with the CF, not as in trying to push priorities through the international secretariat but rather through formal engagement on the platform. This is also reflected in the decision for FBA to host the 2018 CF annual forum together with the Swedish armed forces. Interviewees inside and outside the Challenges Forum praise FBA and the Swedish MFA for the sustained and solid support provided, without which many believe that the platform would not remain in its current form without being 'swallowed up' by another organisation. This is complemented by the view that FBA is good at knowing its role vis-à-vis the platform when it comes to not pushing priorities through the secretariat but rather using its formal positions and role in the forum to expand and utilise its room for influence.

As another comparable key initiative within the FBA's operational framework, the Swedish Women's Mediation Network was established in 2016 through instructions from the MFA. The network's establishment followed priorities established by former

foreign minister Margot Wahlström and the Swedish government's ambitions to pursue a feminist foreign policy, and it was connected to Sweden's action plan around 1325. Like the Challenges Forum, the network is an attempt to respond to increased needs and demands in contemporary peace operations and mediations, emphasising the promotion, empowering and building of capacity of local women peacebuilders, advancing inclusivity as key to achieving sustainable peace. It pursues these priorities within different areas of activity, including capacity strengthening and mentoring, direct support to peace processes (examples of engagement include the Geneva peace talks on Syria and co-facilitation of a high-level meeting in Mali on women with UN women and MINUSMA), advocacy and collaboration with other women's networks (including the Nordic Women Mediators), and smaller efforts of applied research (such as data collection, publication of policy briefs). It consists of current and former Swedish diplomats and public officials, many of them from the Swedish MFA.

Unlike the international nature of the Challenges Forum, the network is a Swedish initiative and as such more closely related to the work of FBA and the MFA. It is largely seen as a separate entity from FBA but at the same time as a relevant avenue for pursuing FBA and MFA priorities. Importantly, there is a growing recognition in the network for a need to increase its strategic focus and utilisation to respond to fewer ad hoc activities during the first years. It has always been easier for the network to reply to requests and concrete proposals coming in from other actors with specific timeframes, themes, needs, and more of challenge to work to identify those needs from within.

There remains a growing focus on finding and working from key points of entry into FBA and Swedish activities and policies, pursuing priorities in a more long-term form to ensure that effects do not just stop when a network member steps out of a process. This has to be done while holding a balance with maintaining the flexibility to engage with windows of opportunity when they appear.

Both the MFA and FBA are focused on increasing the visibility of the network inside their organisations and locally at embassies, and the two counterparts seem to maintain a structured coordination effort, with weekly communication on relevant matters. While some described FBA as an operational counterpoint to the political perspective of the MFA, FBA is generally praised as ideal for both operationally managing and politically driving the network because of its technical expertise.

Summary of findings on Research, Policy, and Methods

The evaluation team finds that FBA is effective and skilled at maintaining and influencing relevant processes and debates in fora such as the UN, whose middle ground between scientific and practitioner knowledge suits the FBA. In situations guided by a strategically coherent approach, including between research and programme areas, the outcomes are significant and the different activities and modalities available to FBA are lifted beyond the sum of their individual contributions.

However, as with research integration, a relative lack of routines and institutional procedures for ensuring such coordination and coherence between programmes and research means that this is only obtained in some cases. Staff members' varied interest in and conceptions of the appropriateness of involving other programmes or drawing larger lines to other agency-avenues of work, means that some, if not many, processes are treated as relatively isolated islands that may be very effective in their delimited space. However, where the wider coherent or strategic lines are not attended to, and FBA's toolbox may not be utilised to its fullest, underlining a technification of outputs that forsakes to pursue wider impacts.

FBA will need to strike a balance that re-emphasises the need for greater strategic coherence as well as structured and institutionalised cooperation necessary to ensure effective use of in-house resources

and competences for policy support and influence. In doing so, they must not upset the agency's agility or the use of individual networks, entrepreneurship and flexibility to swiftly utilise windows of opportunity.

Coordination with Swedish agencies locally and research institutions internationally, requires a dialogue between contributor and recipient as well as recognition of division of labour and co-production as important steps to ensure synergies that affect organisational effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy. FBA works with and through a plethora of partners and collaborators with the stated purpose of contributing to more direct knowledge transfer and dialogue between researchers, practitioners and decision-makers, ultimately working to improve peace and security. The agency generally draws on but also contributes toward strengthening the political visibility of Sweden. Still, the explicit acknowledgement and pursuit of necessary synergies appears uneven across policy efforts. Our interviews indicate that in some instances there is a strong appreciation of working in coordination or coherence with other actors to leverage effects, in others, the aforementioned state of isolationism is predominant and the synergetic potential of working closely both with other Swedish and with international partners is not realised.

Overall conclusions

Overall, the evaluation team concludes that FBA has made a difference in terms of the agency's three long-term visionary objectives of increased human security and resilience against armed conflict, increased capacity for international peace and crisis management operations, and stronger democratic institutions and processes, including greater respect for the rule of law. The agency has contributed towards Swedish strategic objectives as described in the strategies for 1) Sustainable Peace, 2) Bilateral Cooperation, 3) Human Rights, Democracy and Rule of Law, 4) International Crisis Management & Peacebuilding, and 5) the National Action Plan for UNSCR 1325. Through its various activities, FBA has contributed to the fulfilment of mission objectives in peacebuilding missions; it has empowered women and youth at the local level, strengthening their participation in peace processes; and it has contributed to a number of relevant global policy processes and improved the global knowledge architecture on issues of peace, security and development.

Our overarching conclusion is that FBA has achieved many good results in the above areas, however, often at the individual level, and the agency's impact on peace writ large has been limited. We find that this is partly due to weak impact on institutional change – that is, the application of learning and knowledge leading to wider effects is difficult to determine and often rather vague. But we also see that it reflects a number of tensions in FBA's position vis-à-vis its technocratic focus, its relationship with the Swedish MFA and Sida, and its own structure and internal workings. These tensions are discussed further towards the end of this conclusion.

We conclude that FBA has made a significant contribution to numerous individuals working within peace, security and development; building capacity and competence as well as shaping professional and personal norms and values for these. Many of the people interviewed during this evaluation described FBA's efforts as

relevant and timely. For many participants in FBA training programmes and similar initiatives, this has brought about transformational changes at the individual level in the form of perceptions of gender norms, mission leadership, inclusive peacebuilding or the other aims that reside with FBA's training and exercises. There are also examples of where FBA's initiatives have contributed to policy change, method improvement and peace initiatives. FBA has successfully promoted several core Swedish norms and values, particularly gender equality. It has provided an efficient and effective mechanism for seconding Swedish expertise to peace operations globally. Yet, despite these many good individual results, there is a gap between the specific initiatives and the wider impact to which FBA aspires.

It is important for the evaluation team to note that any organisation the size of FBA will see variation in the relevance, effectiveness, or impact of its programmes. In terms of coordination, we recognise that there are many examples of FBA's work that showcase a cohesive and joined-up approach, both ones that are formally part of this evaluation and others that are not. Likewise, it must be recognised that it is unrealistic to expect a relatively small peacebuilding agency, albeit one with considerable capacity, to achieve impact alone. The questions therefore concern how strategically involved FBA can be in political processes, what level of contribution it is reasonable to expect given the resources available and whether FBA is positioning itself appropriately to deliver this contribution?

In seeking to provide answers to these questions, we identified five areas that FBA must consider as it moves forward to deliver on its mandate. These pertain to: i) higher-level impact, ii) scalability, iii) strategic coherence, iv) coordination, and v) use of expertise and knowledge.

Higher-level impact

While FBA has a documented effect on individuals through its training and other activities, there seems to be insufficient attention paid to raising effects beyond this individual level to facilitate institutionalisation of the new learning and capacity. As this report notes, the evidence of FBA's impact on wider institutional change during the period is not strong – that is, the application of the learning leading to wider effects is difficult to determine and often rather vague. FBA is efficient and effective in its service delivery, carrying out training and secondments, but it can lose sight of methods for achieving wider forms of change. To a certain extent this is about the need to put outcomes above outputs. While outcomes are by nature more difficult to control for any organisation because of the variety of contributing factors, a focus on specific outputs can mean that they lose their relevance and impact if they are not influencing higher level objectives.

As this evaluation highlights, very few of the operational areas and their programmes have had explicitly formulated theories of change. These are crucial as the process of formulating them essentially requires one to be explicit about where the challenges to obtaining objectives may lie, what factors can and should be influenced, and how lasting change can be achieved. But a theory of change approach is also an instrument for continuous reconsideration of whether a programme is on track to contribute to its objectives. In many of the cases evaluated, we find that assumptions and end effects (outcomes and impact in terms of wider changes) have not been clearly articulated, with negative implications for their contribution and impact.

Our findings underline a need for FBA to become better at coherently mobilising resources and competencies, and coordinating with others, to achieve impact. There is a need to build a framework or an approach for how to link and support the transformational changes occurring at the individual level to the factors that

contribute to change beyond this level (uptake and operationalisation by institutions, for example). Enabling factors such as political will and buy-in by senior management will logically feature in a theory of change as they are in effect assumptions without which the wider effects of an intervention at outcome level will be weak. Increasing the focus on a programmatic approach will also offer potential for increasing wider institutional effects. So too will employing a developed monitoring and evaluation framework that uses clear, meaningful and realistic result indicators at outcome level (i.e. not only at output level) that can monitor whether assumptions hold in practice, and that involves beneficiary organisations.

There is a further consideration and that is the technical vis-à-vis the political nature of peace and in particular peacebuilding efforts. Extremely adept at tangible and measurable service delivery, FBA's core relative strength could be said to rest in its ability to produce outputs: to train, educate, and second individuals in ways that enhance their individual skills and tangible impacts flow from this. Even so, a growing evidence base suggests the limits of technical efforts of capacity development that are based on the premise that they will automatically translate into social or institutional change beyond individual capacities.[120] Recent developments in Afghanistan provide a case in point of how even decades of state-building and peace-building efforts, including FBA's own contribution which has been technically sound and useful, may be washed away in a matter of weeks if political tensions are not properly articulated and addressed.[121]

Scalability

As many of FBA's interventions remain fairly limited in scope and size, particularly the bilateral efforts, there are obstacles to scalability and harmonisation. Coordination with other actors will be key to

[120] For example, the evaluation of Sida's support to peacebuilding in conflict and post-conflict contexts, Sida, 2019.
[121] Evaluation of Afghanistan Peace Support Mechanism (APSM), Sida, 2020.

ensuring effective implementation and impact. Just as the wider cumulative effects of an individual approach may be limited, smaller programmes risk contributing to fragmentation if they are not strategically positioned as part of larger initiatives on the ground. This may be achieved by, for example, combining different agency initiatives or components, using different tools in a strategic fashion, or strategically finding a niche within a larger package of work that others are implementing. With some important exceptions (DDR policy, secondments) we do not find that FBA is sufficiently using the opportunities that synergies and linkages to wider initiatives offer. In short, certain of FBA's initiatives are overly siloed.

FBA's higher-level objectives contain pronounced ambitions, and we conclude that achieving impact will require a greater focus on their scalability to ensure a critical mass for impact. FBA will need to improve its focus on joining up with other actors and contributing towards a larger 'whole' to ensure that its relatively small interventions do not evaporate by taking on the monumental challenges that even programmes far greater in size have difficulty impacting. There are examples of where FBA has done this – in Afghanistan and in relation to the revision of the DDR guidelines, for example.

But our country case studies show that after approximately three years of full implementation of the bilateral cooperation strategies, FBA has not yet been able to influence peacebuilding issues at national or sub-regional levels in the countries studied. The *main* results are increased capacity of people who have the desire to build structures and institutions as a basis for conflict prevention and reconciliation by working with influential decision-makers and power brokers to prevent and resolve disputes and conflicts. We have also seen in the Colombia case how FBA has contributed to a government agency (ARN) that has institutionalised gender mainstreaming into its processes and procedures for implementation. In contrast to the examples from Liberia and the DRC that we have examined, this case demonstrates a productive approach to institutionalisation that extends beyond the individual.

Our case studies demonstrate that the effectiveness of FBA's implementation of bilateral cooperation strategies are enhanced *when* there is a clear and defined national counterpart to FBA with whom FBA can develop a long-term partnership, or *when* there is a peace or reconciliation process where FBA's expertise can be used for facilitating and supporting dialogue and mediation, or other peacebuilding processes, for example DDR, SSR, or WPS, that lie within FBA's competence.

An effective partnership between FBA and its counterparts must be built on trust and transparency. The Colombia example shows that this requires time, financial and human resources and technical expertise to sustain relations. Clear counterparts and processes higher up the chain than local organisations will enhance FBA's opportunities to identify and follow up on critical leverage points for institutionalisation and peacebuilding through collaboration with other agencies, and together create scalability and wider peacebuilding effects. Thus, the relevance and effectiveness of FBA will be greater when it can support its partners to put in place the conditions that enable an effective operationalisation and institutionalisation of the knowledge and skills gained by FBA's training participants.

Strategic coherence

We find that under the right circumstances, and when employed strategically and coherently, FBA's activities and instruments can obtain impact above and beyond the sum of their parts. Such circumstances may be exogenous to the agency and depend upon successful knowledge transfer, coordination, selection of individuals at the right position in conducive organisational settings, and political environments. But ensuring enabling circumstances is also very much an endogenous question about a strong cross-institutional dialogue and cooperation between programmes, strategic alignment between activities and leveraging different tools from the agency's toolbox in ways that enhance the contribution and impact.

Our interviews and the cases reviewed show how shortcomings in terms of systematised routines or mechanisms for ensuring coherence and synergy across the agency's instruments means processes are often left up to efforts of individual agency. This may be fine in situations where staff have longstanding experience at FBA, a strong network in most corners of the agency, as well as outside the agency, and have the drive and engagement to push collaboration through. But in many other instances, compartmentalisation means synergies and other corporate advantages are not being utilised, programmes push back against cooperation, and the different tools of FBA are not being put properly to use. The limited use of FBA's research department during the period we examined illustrates this.

We conclude that there is a need to introduce improved institutional mechanisms and procedures for ensuring cross-programme fertilisation and collaboration, as well as internal regimes for institutional learning from both successful and unsuccessful cases. FBA should re-emphasise the need for greater strategic coherence coupled with structured and institutionalised cooperation between departments to ensure effective use of in-house resources and competences in efforts of policy support and influence. It should obviously do so in a form that does not hamper the agency's agility, the use of individual networks, entrepreneurship, and the flexibility to swiftly utilise windows of opportunity. In the end, these efforts are about maximising impact; to give one example, by ensuring that the very successful revision of the UN's Integrated DDR Standards to which FBA contributed significantly, is actively pushed at country level and in coordinated efforts with partners.

Coordination

At the core of FBA's strategic positioning should be a robust theory of change. FBA's theory of change should show how effective scalability and strategic coherence can be enhanced through collaboration with other international actors working together to

improve the interaction between local peace and security actors with national actors and process. Coordination between FBA and other Swedish and international actors is critical for achieving scalability and higher-level results.

We find instances where FBA staff succeed in maintaining a dynamic interaction with key partners and organisations, driving forward complex processes. Often, however, these efforts are ad hoc and born out of individual agency and initiative, and not pushed forward in a routinised way by the agency as such. In other instances, including several of the bilateral cases explored, FBA's coordination and pursuit of synergies with other locally present actors is mediocre and included very formalised dialogue or information sharing.

In view of the limited resources for FBA, the often-weak focus on coordination and harmonisation with other relevant actors appears to be a missed opportunity, and we suggest that FBA pursue more regular thematic cooperation, especially with Sida, both at HQ and in-country level in order to realise ambitions of a joined-up Swedish approach. Furthermore, the combination of ambitious mandates and limited resources provided to it by the Swedish MFA, particularly where they pertain to contributions to bilateral cooperation strategies, creates tension in the degree to which FBA can shape and act on its own strategic ambitions. This touches deeply upon the MFA–FBA relationship and its delicate balancing between tasking by the MFA and FBA's room for and mandate to decide how it should strategically and efficiently use its resources.

Expertise and knowledge

We find that FBA's ambition of being an 'expert agency' does not resonate with the pronounced mismatch found between actual resources devoted to direct research production in the agency and ambition of being an organisation deeply embedded in – and a direct producer of – research-based knowledge and evidence. While the importance of evidence and of research on peace, security and

development for the effectiveness of FBA's activities is acknowledged throughout the agency, there are significant challenges in ensuring that research influences everyday work on programmes, activities or strategies. Our interviews with FBA show that the uptake and use of research is uneven across the agency, leaning towards non-use of research in most programmes.

We conclude that there is a need for building up a new set of habits within FBA on research integration that both motivates and places greater emphasis on employees beyond the designated research departments. Ensuring a balanced supply and demand (between the research unit and the other programmes) can be aided by formal organisational concerns of structure, procedures and rules, yet it also requires building a stronger culture of research–programme interaction that can generate and sustain new habits.

Three strategic and organisational tensions

In the introduction to this evaluation report, we noted that there are at least three main strategic and organisational tensions running through FBA's work. In this concluding section, we pick up the three tensions again and provide remarks on them as a contribution to FBA's further development. These tensions appear most obviously (but not exclusively) in relation to the bilateral cooperation area. They arise from reflections by the evaluation team based upon the evaluation findings which themselves raise the question of whether FBA could do more with the capacity and resources that it has at hand.

The first tension concerns the technical vis-à-vis the political nature of peace and in particular peacebuilding efforts. FBA, like many similar institutions, embodies a tension between the political nature of its strategic ambitions and the often-technical form of its activities and interventions in practice. This evaluation confirms that FBA's core relative strength is its ability to train, educate, and second individuals in ways that enhance their individual skills and, in the case of secondments, facilitates their employment in line with FBA's and

Sweden's objectives. However, sustainable peace also requires a more political effort addressing (particularly asymmetries within) wider political power, behaviour or violence (including symbolic).[122] These challenges are unlikely to be met through individual capacity development alone. We conclude that FBA's technical peacebuilding approach within the framework of bilateral strategies lacks a political dimension that links FBA's technical work with political processes. There is a need for a clearer understanding of how FBA should be used within the bilateral strategies in support of political processes. If this is not apparent, FBA's capacity and resources risk being diluted because of its very broad mandate. As already noted several times, we see that the use of a thorough theory of change approach will provide a means to demonstrate the logic and causality involved in the steps between FBA's delivery of technical outputs and Sweden's political goals. And, as such, it will demonstrate where gaps need to be filled through, for example, harmonisation and coordination with other actors and processes.

A second, and related, tension resides in the strategic and operational relationship between FBA, the Swedish MFA, and other Swedish development agencies, notably Sida. This underlines the relevance to FBA, MFA and Sida of a common understanding of the political space where FBA and Sida will intervene to maximise FBA's core competencies. We conclude that FBA should be used more strategically within the frameworks of bilateral cooperation through a more nuanced understanding of when and under what circumstances FBA's comparative advantages can best be realised. In the bilateral cooperation area in particular, there is a need for better complementarity between Sida's and FBA's operations. Underpinning this shared understanding and cooperation must be a closer collaboration around conflict analysis facilitating the identification of critical entry and leverage points prior to the development and implementation of interventions in order to affect conflict systems positively.

---

[122] See, for example, 'Pathways for peace: inclusive approaches to preventing violent conflict'. World Bank and United Nations. 2018.

The third tension concerns the identity and institutional form and ambitions of FBA itself. The combination of ambitious mandates and limited resources, particularly as they pertain to contributions to bilateral cooperation strategies, creates tension in the degree to which FBA can shape and act on its own strategic ambitions. FBA is expected at one and the same time to be an agency of experts and knowledge production, a training academy, a recruitment mechanism, an influencer, a civil society supporter, and bilateral partner. Moreover, FBA is also a Swedish government agency and has, therefore, a different status to many other peacebuilding actors, potentially providing it with greater powers of access. And finally, FBA is expected to contribute within a global environment alongside other state, multilateral and non-governmental organisations, although with very modest financial resources compared to its counterparts. A tension therefore exists between the breadth of expectations afforded to it by the Swedish government (and the deliberate decisions it makes itself around its purpose and objectives), and the depth of engagement, competence and finance required to be impactful within each of these.

Based on the evaluation findings, we conclude that FBA's bilateral efforts in particular need to be more focused on exploiting productive synergies between its technical capacity development function, complementarities with, especially, Sida, and with wider political processes. The use of a thorough theory of change approach will provide a means to demonstrate the logic and causality involved in the steps between FBA's delivery of technical outputs and Sweden's political goals. And, as such, it will demonstrate where gaps need to be filled through, for example, harmonisation and coordination with other actors and processes. Thus, defining FBA's role more broadly in terms of its collaboration with other actors, especially Sida, in relation to each context represents an opportunity to enhance FBA's contributions to its strategic goals.

Recommendations

General

- In view of the relatively modest financial windows available, we see a need for FBA to become better at coherently mobilising its resources and competencies to achieve impact. **We recommend that FBA develop and use a framework or an approach to link and support the transformational changes occurring at the individual level (outputs) with the wider changes sought beyond individual one (outcomes).** Such enabling factors would logically feature in a much more extensive use of theory of change as they are in effect assumptions or preconditions without which the wider effects of initiatives at outcome level will be weak. The assumptions will link more explicitly with political processes. Examples include optimising synergies with other initiatives and partners, increasing the focus on senior (and influential) positions relating to secondments, strengthening the organisational focus and linkages of training, and improving the use of FBA's own research capability. Developing and using a theory of change approach will enhance FBA's planning and monitoring processes with benefit for all operational areas and will also help resolve the three tensions highlighted in this report. By making assumptions/enabling factors explicit, FBA would strengthen its focus on them during preparation, delivery, and follow-up with the result that its operations become even more effective and coherent.
- In view of FBA's broad mandate within peace, security and development, we see the need for the Swedish MFA together with FBA to create the most conducive conditions for FBA to be used strategically. This will involve leveraging both FBA and Team Sweden's capacity to prevent violent conflict in countries where FBA operates. **We recommend that FBA and MFA**

define FBA's value added in relation to MFA's strategic interests within FBA's different areas of operation, and particularly within the framework of bilateral strategies. This should clearly define when and under what circumstances FBA should be engaged by MFA.

Education, training and exercises

- **We recommend further systemising selection criteria for training courses across FBA departments in order to maximise the potential for course relevance to participants' current and subsequent employment and, ultimately, longer-term institutional effects**. Despite the significant amount of learning with regard to selection, FBA does not have any general guidelines where such good practice and experience is collected and disseminated. Systematising requires both personal 'motivation' on the part of the participant and a commitment from the beneficiary organisation regarding the subsequent utilisation of the participant and sharing of knowledge gained.
- **We recommend that further development of FBA's results monitoring of its training efforts is undertaken so that wider effects are captured, thereby also contributing to additional learning.** In this sense the use of follow-up surveys six months or so after a course with specific questions on utilisation is a good practice that FBA has partially adopted. We recommend that it should be further developed and expanded so that possible institutional changes and wider effects are captured. This will require the involvement of institutional stakeholders.
- The application of methods to promote institutionalisation of learning has varied and **we recommend that further development of methods (such as action planning) is undertaken and broadened across the agency.**

Secondments

- Although there are exceptions, generally, the opportunities for wider influence are limited due to the level of the secondees within the hierarchies of the receiving organisations. While missions cannot function without core positions being effectively filled, greater influence could be achieved through senior positions, and it appears that FBA does not utilise all the possibilities that exist to make this happen. **We recommend that FBA increase its focus on targeting senior positions (and other positions of influence) commensurate with the size of Swedish contingents.**

Bilateral cooperation

- To increase the effectiveness of FBA's interventions, the agency needs to carefully assess and prioritise counterparts for long-term partnership and the effects on national political processes of FBA's interventions through facilitation and technical support. **We recommend that FBA should consider prioritising interventions that strengthen the legitimacy of national peace processes and the contribution that FBA can make should be clearly articulated in the theory of change**. For example, the aim could be to strengthen the capacity of a government agency or public institution that has direct peacebuilding effects, or the legitimacy of peacebuilding processes (such as DDR, SSR, WPS).
- To increase the relevance and effectiveness of FBA's interventions, the agency needs to identify and address the specific conditions for operationalising and institutionalising knowledge and skills within organisations and institutions, and to collaborate with other organisations that can join those efforts to strengthen the institutional capacity and the legitimacy of national peacebuilding processes. **We recommend that FBA,**

when developing theories of change, identify key assumptions and pre-conditions linking the different results levels and continuously monitors the assumptions and modifies them as soon as they are not relevant. Furthermore, FBA should document the updating of theories of change together with context and conflict analysis.

- To improve coordination of FBA's efforts with other Swedish and international actors, FBA needs to use its analytical and network capacity to identify critical leverage points for scalability that can have wider peacebuilding effects. **We recommend that FBA increase its efforts to coordinate political economy, and gender and conflict analysis with other actors, and find and use complementarities with these actors, in particular Sida but also other, international, organisations.**

Research

- To improve the uptake and use of research across FBA's programmes and areas of operation, **we recommend building up a new set of systematic habits in FBA on research integration that both motivates and places greater emphasis on employees outside the designated research department.** FBA should ensure a balanced supply and demand between the research unit and the other programmes that can be aided by formal organisational concerns of structure, procedures and rules, but also requires building a stronger culture of research–programme interaction that can generate and sustain new habits. The agency is advised to take a strategic decision on whether to increase investment in resources and competencies for in-house and direct production of research-based knowledge and research capacity in the central research unit, or to remain focused on research production by proxy. A clear strategic vision for either direction will be key in ensuring enhanced research production and interfacing with both outside research

environments and internal FBA staff. FBA may choose to balance the central unit with decentralised research competencies across all programmes by, *inter alia,* making it mandatory to have research-trained staff in all programmes and by conducting strategic recruitment as necessary.

- To ensure research integration at the formation of interventions/strategies and continuously through their lifetime, FBA needs to critically review institutional mechanisms and operational procedures concerning research. The agency may need to introduce new or amend existing procedures and requirements to ensure research integration, in a form that enables substantive issue discussion among relevant parts rather than individualised box-ticking checklist exercises. **We recommend that new structures or initiatives for research integration be embedded in existing organisational and management structures to ensure that the research function is not siloed.**
- Within policy efforts, **we recommend that FBA introduces improved institutional mechanisms and procedures for ensuring cross-programme fertilisation and collaboration, as well as internal regimes for institutional learning from both successful and unsuccessful cases.** This will need to strike a balance that reemphasises the need for greater strategic coherence, for the structured and institutionalised cooperation necessary to ensure effective use of in-house resources and competences in efforts of policy support and influence, and yet does not upset the agency's agility, the use of individual networks, entrepreneurship and flexibility to swiftly utilise windows of opportunity.

References

Cousens, Elizabeth M. and Chetan Kumar (eds.) with Karin Wermester (2001), Peacebuilding as Politics: Cultivating Peace in Fragile Societies, 2001. Lynne Rienner Publishers.

García Pinzón, V. (2020). 'Colombia: between the dividends of peace and the shadow of violence'. German Institute for Global and Area Studies. https://www.giga-hamburg.de/en/publications/18567249-colombia-between-dividends-peace-shadow-violence/

Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, Keough School of Global Affairs, University of Notre Dame. (2018, August 09). Second Kroc Institute Report Shows Steady Progress of Peace Accord Implementation in Colombia. https://kroc.nd.edu/news-events/news/second-kroc-institute-report-shows-steady-progress-of-peace-accord-implementation-in-colombia/

Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies Keough School of Global Affairs University of Notre Dame. (2019, April). 'Barometer Initiative, Peace Accords Matrix: State of implementation of the Colombian final accord: December 2016–April 2019'. https://kroc.nd.edu/assets/333274/executive_summary_colombia_print_single_2_.pdf

Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies. (2020). 'Barometer Initiative, Peace Accords Matrix: Towards implementation of women's rights in the Colombian final peace accord: progress, opportunities and challenges'. https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Towards-Implementation-of-Womens-Rights-in-the-Colombian-Final-Peace-Accord-2.pdf

Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, UN Women, FDIM Sweden. (2019). 'Barometer Initiative, Peace Accords Matrix: Gender Equality for Sustainable Peace: second report on the monitoring of the gender perspective in the implementation of the Colombian peace accord'. http://peaceaccords.nd.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/012820-GENDER-REPORT-DIGITAL.pdf

Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, Keough School of Global Affairs. (2021). 'Peace Accords Matrix Barometer Initiative: Executive Summary, The Colombian final agreement in the era of COVID-19: institutional and citizen ownership is key to implementation'. https://doi.org/10.7274/r0-cffp-qr07

Nixon, H. and Mallett, R. (2017). 'Service delivery, public perceptions and state legitimacy: findings from the Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium'. London: Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium.

Evaluations of FBA interventions

Alffram, H., Cheremshynskyi, M. and Göransson Sandberg, H. (2018). Evaluation of the FBA project 'Local Self-Government and the Rule of Law in Ukraine'– Final report. FCG Swedish Development AB.

Azai Consultores. (2021). Final Evaluation of the Colombia Training Program: 'Capacity building program on the Women, Peace and Security agenda'.

Bergenwall, S. and Hellström, J. (2017). Utvärdering av Folke Bernadotteakademins personalbidrag till SMM Ukraina. FOI.

Bergenwall, S. and Zetterlund, K. (2016). Utvärdering av Folke Bernadotteakademins personalbidrag till EUMM Georgien. FOI.

Bryan Hopkins. (2018). Evaluating the impact of the Pedagogical Profile programme in Folke Bernadotte Academy – Final report.

Christplos, I. and Bloh, O. (2020). Evaluation of FBA's Liberia Project 2016–2020, within the framework of Sweden's development cooperation strategy – Final Report. Niras.

Gouzou, J. (2018). Analysis of FBA's planning, monitoring and reporting documents. Niras.

Innovative Strategies for Change Consulting (IsaC) AB. (2018). Evaluation of trainings within the field of security sector refrom (SSR) – Folke Bernadotte Academy (FBA).

Kruiper, T. (2020). Support to Early Warning and Early Response: County Peace Committees and District Level Political Reconciliation Dialogues and Civic Engagement. Midterm Evaluation – October 2020 Liberiamonitors. Liberia Peacebuilding Office, Office of the National Ambassador, ZOA.

Lidström, A., Cano Viñas, M., Mukuku, F. and Taarup Nordlund, A. (2019). Evaluation of the Inclusive Peacebuilding Programme (PCPI). Nordic Consulting Group, Sweden.

Mast, J. (2018). Lärandestudie Säkerhetskurser: En Jämförande Studie af Högriskkurser Hos Folke Bernadotteakademin och Myndigheten för Samhällsskydd och Beredskab – Slutlig Rapport. Johan Mast Consulting AB.

McGearty, S. and Kotoglu, K. (2019). Review and Lessions Learned Study of the International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations (Challenges Forum)– Final Report. Niras.

Nyberg, J. and Cano, M. (2021). Evaluation of the Folke Bernadotte Academy's Colombia project within the framework of Sweden's development cooperation strategy 2016–2020. Nordic Consulting Group.

Rask, G. (2021a). Executive Summary – FBA's support to EUMM Georgia's Management Development Programme, Lessons learned for FBA. Rask Utveckling.

Rask, G. (2021b). The Folke Bernadotte Academy's support to EUMM Georgia's Management Development Programme – Lessons learned for FBA. Rask Utveckling.

Rothman, J. (2019). Evaluation of EUMM's Management Development Program – Final Report. EUMM Georgia.

Svensson, N. (2018). Evaluation of the Political Advisors' Concept, applied in the Practical Diplomacy Training Package – Final evaluation report. STHLM Policy Group AB.

Tana Copenhagen. (2019). Independent evaluation of the Folke Bernadotte Academy (FBA)'s trainings in dialogue and mediation for the United Nations Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (UN DPPA).

Tana Copenhagen. (2020). External evaluation of the European Union Afghanistan Peace Support Mechanism (EU APSM).

Tana Copenhagen. (2021). FBA training evaluation survey.

Thomas Kruiper, IE University, Universidad Europea. (2020). Mid-term evaluation of the 'Support to Early Warning and Early Response: County Peace Committees and District Level Political Reconciliation Dialogues and Civic Engagement'.

Internal FBA documents

Birkoff, C.F. and Sedyk, J. (2020). Local Self-Government and the Rule of Law in Ukraine: Progress Report 01/01/2019 – 31/12/2019. Folke Bernadotteakademin.

Borgheden, L., Huus, J., Górska, D. and Grenhagen, K. (2016). Planering och uppföljning av insat inom ramen för bilateralt strategiuppdrag i Liberia: Liberianskt deltagande i FBA:s globala kurser. Folke Bernadotteakademin.

Björn, M. (2019a). Performance Report SSR Course 2018–03. Folke Bernadotteakademin.

Björn, M. (2019b). Performance Report SSR Course 2019–02. Folke Bernadotteakademin.

Carleson, J. (2020). Analysis af insatsavslutande enkät. Folke Bernadotteakademin.

Carlsson, K. (2020). Erfarenheter från PCPI 2.0: Dokumentation av åtgärdsplaner, processer och lärdomar från DRK 2019–2020.

Claesson, Å. and Pettersson, O. (2018a). Bilaga 1–3: FBA:s sekunderingar och strategier. Folke Bernadotteakademin.

Claesson, Å. and Pettersson, O. (2018b). FBA:s sekunderingar och strategier. Folke Bernadotteakademin.

Claesson, Å., and Pettersson, O. (2018c). Sekunderingar inom strategin för hållbar fred. Folke Bernadotteakademin.

Edqvist, K.E. (2019a). Bilaga 1, 2: Koncept för FBA:s insatsförberedande utbildning: Folke Bernadotteakademin.

Edqvist, K.E. (2019b). Koncept för FBA:s insatsförberedande utbildning: Folke Bernadotteakademin.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (n.d.-a). Appendix 3 – examples of how our secondments contribute to strategy goals.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (n.d.-b). FBA in Liberia. https://fba.se/en/how-we-work/our-partner-countries/fba-in-liberia/

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (n.d.-c). Management Response för rapporten 'Evaluation of trainings within the field of Security Sector Reform (SSR) – Folke Bernadotte Academy'.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (n.d.-d) Offer for online leadership programmes by FBA to CSDP missions: FBA support for leadership for peace, security and development.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (n.d.-e). Overview of Training Survey Sampling.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (n.d.-f). Programbeskrivning avseende Fredsarkivet.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (n.d.-g). Programbeskrivning avseende programmet för avväpning, demobilisering och återanpassning av före detta kombattanter (DDR).

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (n.d.-h). Programbeskrivning avseende programmet för dialog- och fredsmedling (DPM).

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (n.d.-i). Programbeskrivning avseende programmet för forskning om fred, säkerhet och utveckling (FoU).

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (n.d.-j). Programbeskrivning avseende programmet för insatsförberedande utbildning, val och säkerhet i fält (PES).

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (n.d.-k). Programbeskrivning avseende programmet för internationella insatser och sekundering (IMD).

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (n.d.-l). Programbeskrivning avseende programmet för kvinnor, jämställdhet och unga (WGY).

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (n.d.-m). Programbeskrivning avseende programmet för ledarskap och samverkan i fredsinsatser (LCP).

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (n.d.-n). Programbeskrivning avseende programmet för rättsstatsuppbyggnad (Rule of Law).

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (n.d.-o). Programbeskrivning avseende programmet för Säkerhetssektorreform (SSR).

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2011). Verksamhetsplan 2011.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2012a). Årsredovisning 2011.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2012b). Verksamhetsplan 2012.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2013a). Årsredovisning 2012.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2013b). Verksamhetsplan 2013.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2014a). Årsredovisning 2013.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2014b). Folke Bernadotteakademins resultatförslag till Sveriges utvecklingssamarbete med Demokratiska Republiken Kongo respektive Liberia.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2014c). Resultatförslag för Sveriges internationella bistånd via Folke Bernadotteakademin i Demokratiska Republiken Kongo för 2014–2018.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2014d). Sekundering Verifikat.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2014e). Verksamhetsplan 2014.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2015a). Årsredovisning 2014.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2015b). Concept for FBA's Internal Pedagogical Capacity Enhancement 2015.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2015c). FBA:s samlade VP för 2015.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2015d). Kursstatistik.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2015e). Sekundering Verifikat.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2016a). Årsredovisning 2015.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2016b). Course on Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration in Barcelona, 14–25 November 2016.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2016c). FBA:s samlade VP för 2016.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2016d). Invitation to Course on Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration in Barcelona, Spain, 14–25 November 2016.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2016e). Kursstatistik.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2016f). Operationaliseringsanalys bilateralt strategiuppdrag i Demokratiska republiken Kongo 2015–2019: arbetsmaterial.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2016g). Operationaliseringsanalys bilateralt strategiuppdrag i Demokratiska republiken Kongo 2015–2019: syntes, slutsatser och rekommendationer.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2016h). Operationaliseringsanalys Liberia för strategiperiod 2016–2020 – arbetsmaterial.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2016i). Projektdirektiv Liberia.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2016j). Projektplan för bilateralt strategiuppdrag i Demokratiska republiken Kongo 2015–2019.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2016k). Riktlinjer för strategier inom svenskt utvecklingssamarbete och humanitärt bistånd.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2016l). Schedule DDR Course Barcelona 2016.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2016m). Sekundering Verifikat.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2017a). Årsredovisning 2016.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2017b). Befattningslista valobservation 2017.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2017c). Bilateralt strategiuppdrag i Demokratiska republiken Kongo: Underlag till Utrikesdepartementet inför vårsamråd 2017.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2017d). Bilateralt strategiuppdrag i Liberia, underlag till UD inför vårsamråd 2017.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2017e). Conflict Prevention Leadership Program – draft brief concept note.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2017f). FBA:s samlade verksamhetsplan 2017.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2017g). FBA:s Strategy for Training Evaluation.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2017h). Kursstatistik.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2017i). Kursusutvärdering DDR Barcelona 2017.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2017j). Meeting notes februari och mars 2017.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2017k). Programbeskrivningar.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2017l). Programförklaring SSR programmet 2017.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2017m). Rapport efter avslutat utlandsuppdrag – EUAM Irak.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2017n). Rapport efter avslutat utlandsuppdrag – EUPOL COPPS.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2017o). Sekundering Verifikat.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2017p). Utvärdering Gender Advisor Kurs 2017.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2017q). Utvärdering Global Kurs i SSA 2017.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2018a). Agenda Country Security Council Liberia Security Sector Reform Leadership Seminar Series Phase 1.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2018b). Analysis – Leadership Training EUAM Ukraine June 2018.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2018c). Appendix 2 – Checklist for second rings and strategy / funding / grants.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2018d). Arbetsordning för Folke Bernadotteakademin.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2018e). Årsredovisning 2017.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2018f). Baseline survey LSS phase 1.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2018g). Befattningslista valobservation 2018 MASTER.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2018h). Bilaga 3 – exempel på hur våra sekunderingar bidrar till strategimål.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2018i). Bilateralt strategiuppdrag i Demokratiska republiken Kongo: Fördjupad översyn inför vårsamråd 2018.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2018j). Bilateralt strategiuppdrag Liberia: Underlag till Utrikesdepartementet inför vårsamråd 2018.
Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2018). CPLP, Module 1 and Module 3 – Evaluation.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2018k). Concept Note/Project document: Liberia Security Sector Reform Leadership Seminar Series (SSR LSS).

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2018l). Course on Security Sector Reform – Agenda.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2018m). Course on Security Sector Reform – Schedule.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2018n). Data Evaluation DDR Barcelona 2018.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2018o). Evaluation Answers Course for Gender Advisors 2018.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2018p). Evaluation ESDC Basic Course on Security Sector Reform, 19–20 June 2018, Brussels.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2018q). Evaluation – Leadership Training EUAM Ukraine October 2018.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2018r). Externa förläsare – Course on Security Sector Reform 19–23 mars 2018.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2018s). Fact Sheet: ESDC Course on Security Sector Reform.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2018t). FBA:s uppdrag inom strategin för hållbar fred: Fördjupat underlag till Utrikesdepartementet inför vårsamråd 2018.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2018u). FBA:s verksamhetsplan 2018.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2018v). Final Evaluation SWTP October 2018.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2018w). Follow up evaluation SWTP February 2018.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2018x). Grundkurs valobservation 28 maj–1 juni 2018 Enkätsvar.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2018y). Insatsavslutande rapport – EULEX Kosovo.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2018z). Insatsavslutande rapport – EUMM Georgien.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2018aa). Kategorisering av FBA:s utbildningar.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2018ab). Kursrapport – Course on Security Sector Reform 19–23 mars 2018.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2018ac). Kursstatistik.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2018ad). Meeting notes februari 2018.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2018ae). Missiv avseende underlag till vårsamråd med UD – AF 2018.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2018af). Planering och uppföljning av insats inom ramen för bilateralt strategiuppdrag i Colombia: Deltagande av colombianska nyckelpersoner i FBA:s globala kurser.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2018ag). Post-course survey LSS phase 1.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2018ah). Programbeskrivningar – syfte, format och tidtabell.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2018ai). Projektplanering för insatser som genomförs inom ramen för Strategin för Hållbar Fred 2017–2022.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2018aj). Resurspersoner: Course on Security Sector Reform.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2018ak). Survey – Course on Security Sector Reform.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2018al). Survey DDR Course UNVMC 2018.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2018am). Survey SWTP February 2018.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2018an). The Folke Bernadotte Academy's Pedagogical Profile.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2018ao). Utvärdering Grundkurs valobservation 16–20 april 2018.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2018ap). Utvärdering IFU 2018.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2018aq). Viking 18 – UN Training Audience AAR.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2019a). Agenda Country Security Council Liberia Security Sector Reform Leadership Seminar Series Phase 2 and Phase 3.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2019b). Agenda National Security Council Secretaiat Country Security Council Program Officer Support Program (PROS) Phase 1 and Phase 2.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2019c). Application Form of an individual to be accredited as an official observer from a foreign state / an international organisation for Ukraine's parliamentary elections.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2019d). Årsredovisning 2018.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2019e). Baseline survey LSS phase 2 and phase 3.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2019f). Befattningslista valobservation 2019 MASTER.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2019g). Bilateralt strategiuppdrag i Demokratiska republiken Kongo: Underlag till Utrikesdepartementet inför vårsamråd 2019.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2019h). Bilateralt strategiuppdrag Liberia: Fördjupad översyn inför vårsamråd med Utrikesdepartementet 2019.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2019i). CPLP, Module 1 – Evaluation.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2019j). Concept Note/Project document: Liberia Security Sector Reform County Security Council Program Officer Support Program (PROS).

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2019k). Concept Paper – Revision of FBA's Global Course on DDR.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2019l). Compilation of evaluation results – Pilot Course on Prevention, Release and Reintegration of CAAFAG.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2019m). Course for statisticians 11–12 September 2019 Survey results.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2019n). Ett utvecklat resultatbaserat arbetssätt på FBA: Rapport från resultatarbetsgruppen.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2019o). Evaluation Answers Course for Gender Advisors 2019.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2019p). Evaluation: Workshop on Rule of Law for Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2019q). Fact Sheet – Revised course on Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR).

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2019r). FBA Course on Strategic Peacebuilding Processes through Dialogue and Mediation: Course description.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2019s). FBA:s uppdrag inom strategin för hållbar fred: Fördjupat underlag till Utrikesdepartementet inför vårsamråd 2019.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2019t). Folke Bernadotterakademins rapporter på Sveriges nationella handlingsplan för genomförande av FN:s säkerhetsrådsresolutioner om kvinnor, fred och säkerhet 2018.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2019u). Insatsavslutande rapport – OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2019v). Insatsavslutande rapport – SMM/Ukraina (OSCE).

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2019w). Insatsavslutande rapport – UNDP, New York.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2019x). Insatsöversikt 2019 MASTER aktivitetstyp.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2019y). Kursstatistik.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2019z). LTO course Sandö 25–29 November 2019 End of course survey.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2019aa). Missiv avseende underlag till vårsamråd med UD–AF 2019.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2019ab). Överenskommelse enligt URA 4 § om anställning och villkor för stationering utomlands genom arbetsgivaren Folke Bernadotteakademin (FBA).

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2019ac). Participant List: Workshop on Rule of Law for Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2019ad). Post-course survey LSS phase 2 and phase 3.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2019ae). Post-course survey PROS phase 1 and phase 2.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2019af). Rapport efter avslutat utlandsuppdrag – TIPH.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2019ag). Rapport efter avslutat utlandsuppdrag – UN Ukraine.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2019ah). Rapport efter avslutat valobservationsuppdrag – Uzbekistan.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2019ai). Survey about the Conflict Prevention Leadership Programme (CPLP).

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2019aj). Survey Results SWTP 2019.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2019ak). Training extracts from annual reports 2015–2019.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2019al). Training on the implementation of the OSCE Guidelines on SSG/R Vienna, 10–11 October 2019.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2019am). Underlag till vårsamråd med UD – AF 2019.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2019an). Underlag till vårsamråd med UD – AME 2020.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2019ao). Utvärdering Global DDR-kurs 2019.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2019ap). Utvärdering Global Kurs i SSA 2019.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2019aq). Utvärdering IFU 2019.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2019ar). Utvärdering Integration of a Gender Perspective in CSDP.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2019as). Villkor för valobservationsuppdrag OSSE/ODIHR Ukraina.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2019at). Young Liberians Building Peace: Lessons Learnt from the first Conflict Prevention Leadership Program.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2020a). After Action Review Report – CPLP.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2020b). Årsredovisning 2019.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2020c). Bilateralt strategiuppdrag i Afghanistan: Underlag till Utrikesdepartementet inför vårsamråd 2020.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2020d). Bilateralt strategiuppdrag i Afrika söder om Sahara: Underlag till Utrikesdepartementet inför vårsamråd 2020.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2020e). Bilateralt strategiuppdrag i Colombia: Underlag till Utrikesdepartementet inför vårsamråd 2020.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2020f). Bilateralt strategiuppdrag i Demokratiska republiken Kongo: Fördjupad översyn inför vårsamråd 2020.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2020g). Bilateralt strategiuppdrag i Demokratiska republiken Kongo: Underlag- förlängning av strategiuppdrag under år 2020.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2020h). Bilateralt strategiuppdrag i Demokratiska republiken Kongo: Underlag till Utrikesdepartementet inför vårsamråd 2020.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2020i). Bilateralt strategiuppdrag i Iraq: Fördjupad översyn inför vårsamråd 2019.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2020j). Bilateralt strategiuppdrag i Liberia: Underlag till Utrikesdepartementet inför vårsamråd 2020.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2020k). Bilateralt strategiuppdrag i Mali: Underlag till Utrikesdepartementet inför vårsamråd 2020.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2020l). Bilateralt strategiuppdrag i Myanmar: Underlag till Utrikesdepartementet inför vårsamråd 2020.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2020m). Bilateralt strategiuppdrag i Palestina: Underlag till Utrikesdepartementet inför vårsamråd 2020.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2020n). Bilateralt strategiuppdrag i Somalia: Underlag till Utrikesdepartementet inför vårsamråd 2020.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2020o). Conflict Prevention and Leadership Programm Strategic County Based Mentoring Sessions Report.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2020p). CPLP County Peace Dialogues 2020: Concept Note.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2020). CPLP, Evaluation Module 2 and 3.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2020q). Enkätsvar utsända OSSE EOM Azerbaijdzjan 2020.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2020r). Erfarenhetshantering för 2019/2020 års utbildning 'Strategic Peacebuilding Processes through Dialogue and Mediation.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2020s). FBA:s kompetensgalleri.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2020t). FBA:s organisation.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2020u). FBA:s processbeskrivning för hantering av vakanta roller.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2020v). FBA:s rollgalleri.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2020w). FBA:s uppdrag inom strategin för hållbar fred: Fördjupat underlag till Utrikesdepartementet inför vårsamråd 2020.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2020x). FBA:s verksamhetsindelning.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2020y). Folke Bernadotterakademins rapporter på Sveriges nationella handlingsplan för genomförande av FN:s säkerhetsrådsresolutioner om kvinnor, fred och säkerhet 2019.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2020z). Handbok för att söka projektbidrag: FBA:s stöd till civilsamhället för fred och säkerhet.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2020aa). Insatsavslutande rapport – EUCAP Somalia.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2020ab). Insatsavslutande rapport – EUMM.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2020ac). Insatsavslutande rapport – OSESGY.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2020ad). Insatsavslutande rapport – UN Women Mali.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2020ae). Insatsöversikt 2020 Master NW.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2020af). Internal Evaluation of FBA's Course for Gender Advisors.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2020ag). Intervjulista EBA utvärdering dec 2020.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2020ah). Map of Civilian Personnel in Peace- and Crisis Management Operations May 31, 2020.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2020ai). Monitoring overview organisations 2019–2020.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2020aj). Pedagogiskt utvecklingsprojekt och erfarenhetshantering.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2020ak). Planering och uppföljning av insats inom ramen för bilateralt strategiuppdrag i Colombia: Stöd till ARN: återintegrering och lokalt fredsbyggande.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2020al). Planering och uppföljning av insats inom ramen för bilateralt strategiuppdrag i Colombia: Stöd till ARN inom jämställdhetsintegrering.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2020am). Projektplan för bilateralt strategiuppdrag i Liberia 2016–2020.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2020an). Rapport efter avslutat valobservationsuppdrag – Azerbajdsjan.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2020ao). Rekryteringsstatistik utdrag ReachMee.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2020ap). Resultatuppföljning för 2019/2020 års utbildning 'Strategic Peacebuilding Processes through Dialogue and Mediation.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2020aq). Riktlinjer: FBA:s stöd till civilsamhället för fred och säkerhet.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2020ar). Strategic Mentoring Phase 2020: CPLP County Peace Dialogues – Concept note and Guidelines.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2020as). Underlag till vårsamråd med UD – ASO 2020.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2020at). Underlag till vårsamråd med UD – MENA 2020.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2020au). Villkor för bidrag förmedlade inom Stöd till civilsamhället för fred och säkerhet.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2021a). Årsredovisning 2020.

Folke Bernadottekakademin (2021b). Informella samtal med CPLP alumnis.

Folke Bernadottekakademin (2021c). Notes from meeting with DM Sisters Liberia.

Folke Bernadotteakademin. (2021d). Stakeholder Meeting Report.

Folke Bernadotteakademin, ENTRi. (2015a). Course Concept: Specialisation Course – Gender Advising in Civilian Crisis Management.

Folke Bernadotteakademin, ENTRi. (2015b). Course Schedule: Gender Advisor Course 22–27 november 2015.

Folke Bernadotteakademin, ENTRi. (2015c). Evaluation Form: Gender Advisor Course 22–27 november 2015.

Folke Bernadotteakademin, ENTRi. (2015e). Narrative Report: Gender Advisor Course 22–27 november 2015.

Folke Bernadotteakademin, United Nations Developmet Programme. (2020a). Annex 1: Selection Procedure.

Folke Bernadotteakademin, United Nations Development Programme. (2020b). Framework Agreement for the Deployment of Stand-by Personnel on a Non-Reimbursable Loan Modality between the Folke Bernadotte Academy and the United Nations Development Programme.

Forsberg, L. and Blomdahl, M. (2020). Dokumentation av LCP's ledarskapstöd till EUMM 2018–2019. Folke Bernadotteakademin.

Gorska, D., Öståker, E. and Folkesson, A. (2017). Planering och uppföljning av insats inom ramen för bilateralt strategiuppdrag i Liberia: Stöd för tillämpningen av rättsstatens principer inom den liberianska förvaltningen.

Hanssen, M. and Wilandh, H. (2020). Planering och uppföljning av insatser inom ramen för strategiprojekt i Demokratiska republiken Kongo: Deltagande av kongolesiska nyckelpersoner i FBA:s globala SSR-kurser. Folke Bernadotteakademin.

Huus, J. and Borgheden, L. (2018). Planering och uppföljning av insats inom ramen för bilateralt strategiuppdrag i Liberia: Stöd till Nationella och lokala säkerhetsråd. Folke Bernadotteakademin.

Jakobsson, M. and Grenhagen, K. (2017). Planering och uppföljning av insats inom ramen för bilateralt strategiuppdrag i Liberia: Conflict Prevention Leadership Program. Folke Bernadotteakademin.

Lindblom, S. (2019a). InsatsPM: Fredsbyggarprogrammet 2.0: Planering och uppföljning av insats inom ramen för bilateralt strategiuppdrag i Demokratiska republiken Kongo. Folke Bernadotteakademin.

Lindblom, S. (2019b). Planering och uppföljning av insats inom ramen för bilateralt strategiuppdrag i Demokratiska republiken Kongo: Nätverket för inkluderande fredsbyggande. Folke Bernadotteakademin.

Lindblom, S. (2019c). Planering och uppföljning av insats inom ramen för bilateralt strategiuppdrag i Demokratiska republiken Kongo: Programmet för inkluderande fredsbyggande (PCPI). Folke Bernadotteakademin.

Lindqvist, J., Diaz, M. and Silverryd, M.J. n.d.). Planering och uppföljning av insats inom ramen för bilateralt strategiuppdrag i Colombia: Utbildningssamarbete med säkerhetssektorn inom DDR, SSR och 1325.

Litsgård, E. (2018). Planering och uppföljning av insatser inom ramen för strategiprojekt i Demokratiska republiken Kongo: Lokala rådgivartjänster inom återanpassning av före detta kombattanter. Folke Bernadotteakademin.

Ljungström, L. (2014). Sammanfattande reserapport Liberia 7–16 maj 2014. Folke Bernadotteakademin.

Mellado-Åhlin, E. (2018). DDR-kurs Stockholm den 25 september till den 6 oktober 2017 – narrativ rapport. Folke Bernadotteakademin.

Mellado Åhlin, E. (2020). Narrativ rapport: Global DDR-kurs 2019. Folke Bernadotteakademin.

Möller-Loswick, A. and Grenhagen, K. (2020). Planering och uppföljning av insats inom ramen för bilateralt strategiuppdrag i Liberia: ConflictPrevention Leadership Program (CPLP) County Peace Dialogues. Folke Bernadotteakademin.

Oredsson, M. (2018). Erfarenhetsberättelse Viking 18. Folke Bernadotteakademin.

Torstensson, A. (2020). Narrativ rapport: Pilotkurs i förebyggande, frigivning och återanpassning av barn associerade med väpnade styrkor och grupper 2–7 december 2019. Folke Bernadotteakademin.

Wiklund, T. (2018). Lessons learned forum, FBA: s pedagogiska profil. Folke Bernadotteakademin.

Wiklund, T. and Oredsson, M. (2019). Anteckningar från Lessons learned-forum, 2019.

Documents from the MFA and other Swedish ministries or agencies

Expertgruppen för biståndsanalys. (2018). Instruction for authors of EBA reports.

Expertgruppen för biståndsanalys. (2020). Policy samt riktlinjer för säkerställande av kvalitet i studier och utvärderingar.

Riskrevisionen. (2011). Svenska bidrag till internationella insatser.

SADEV. (2010). Projekt FN Resolution 1325: Utvärdering av Folke Bernadotteakademins kursverksamhet för jämställdhet.

Sida. (2019). Protokoll: Vårsamråd mellan UD, FBA och Sida.

Sida. (2020). Protokoll: Vårsamråd mellan UD, FBA och Sida.

Statskontoret. (2011). Myndighetsanalys av Folke Bernadotteakademin.

Statskontoret. (2012a). Nya tider – nya anslag? En analys av Folke Bernadotteakademins anslag och ekonomiadministration.

Statskontoret. (2012b). Utvärdering av svenskt bistånd: En översyn av utväderingsverksamheten.

Swedish Armed Forces. (2018a). Final Exercise Report Viking 18 (FER).

Swedish Armed Forces. (2018b). Viking 18 – Final Exercise Report – Annex G: Civilian Dimension (May 31).

Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. (2018, April 19). Statement by the Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission Liberia Configuration. www.government.se/statements/2018/04/peacebuilding-commission-liberia-configuration/?

Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. (2013). Förordning med instruktion för Folke Bernadotteakademin. Svensk författningssamling.

Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. (2015a). Strategy for Sweden's development cooperation with the Democratic Republic of the Congo 2015–2019.

Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. (2015b). Strategy for Sweden's development cooperation with Palestine 2015–2019.

Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. (2016a). Strategy for Sweden's development cooperation with Colombia 2016–2020.

Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. (2016b). Strategy for Sweden's development cooperation with Liberia 2016–2020.

Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. (2016c). Strategy for Sweden's development cooperation with Mali 2016–2020.

Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. (2016d). Sveriges nationella handlingsplan för genomförande av FN:s säkerhetsråds-resolutioner om kvinnor, fred och säkerhet 2016–2020.

Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. (2017a). Strategy for Sweden's development cooperation in the areas of human rights, democracy and the rule of law 2018–2022.

Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. (2017b). Strategy for development cooperation with Iraq 2017–2021.

Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. (2018a). Kompletterande strategi för Folke Bernadotteakademins Utvecklingssamarbete och fredsfrämjande i Afghanistan 2018–2019.

Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. (2018b). Strategy for development cooperation with Myanmar 2018–2022.

Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. (2018c). Strategy for development cooperation with Somalia 2018–2022.

Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. (2018d). Strategy for Sustainable Peace 2017–2022.

Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. (2020). Förordning med instruktion för Folke Bernadotteakademin. Svensk författningssamling.

Utrikesdepartementet. (2010). Regleringsbrev för budgetåret 2011 avseende Folke Bernadotteakademin.

Utrikesdepartementet. (2012). Regleringsbrev för budgetåret 2012 avseende Folke Bernadotteakademin.

Utrikesdepartementet. (2014). Resultatstrategi för internationell civil krishantering.

Utrikesdepartementet. (2014). Regleringsbrev för budgetåret 2014 avseende Folke Bernadotteakademin.

Utrikesdepartementet. (2015). Regleringsbrev för budgetåret 2015 avseende Folke Bernadotteakademin.

Utrikesdepartementet. (2016). Policyramverk för svenskt utvecklingssamarbete Skr. och humanitärt bistånd.

Utrikesdepartementet. (2016). Regleringsbrev för budgetåret 2016 avseende Folke Bernadotteakademin.

Utrikesdepartementet. (2017). Riktlinjer för strategier inom svenskt utvecklingssamarbete och humanitärt bistånd.

Utrikesdepartementet. (2017). Regleringsbrev för budgetåret 2017 avseende Folke Bernadotteakademin.

Utrikesdepartementet. (2018). Protokoll från höstsamråd mellan UD-ASO, Sida-HUMASIEN och FBA, 30 november 2018.

Utrikesdepartementet. (2018). Regleringsbrev för budgetåret 2018 avseende Folke Bernadotteakademin.

Utrikesdepartementet. (2019). Anteckningar från höstsamråd 2019 mellan UD, Sida och FBA kring Asien och Oceanien.

Utrikesdepartementet. (2019). Regleringsbrev för budgetåret 2019 avseende Folke Bernadotteakademin.

Utrikesdepartementet. (2019). Strategi för internationell civil krishantering och fredsfrämjande 2020–2023.

Utrikesdepartementet. (2020). Antagande av rådsbeslut om ändring av beslutet om Europeiska unionens polisuppdrag för de palestinska territorierna (EUPOL COPPS).

Utrikesdepartementet. (2020). Svensk deltagande i EU:s valobservationsinsatser 2020.

Utrikesdepartementet. (2020). Svensk deltagande i OSSE/ODIHR:s valobservationsinsatser 2020.

News articles

Al Jazeera. (2019, January 8). 'Major' irregularities with DR Congo vote count: Poll observers. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/1/8/major-irregularities-with-dr-congo-vote-count-poll-observers

Arredondo, J. (2019) The Slow Death of Colombia's Peace Movement. *The Atlantic*. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/12/colombia-peace-farc/604078/

BBC. (2019, January 2). DR Congo pardons two men over President Kabila assassination. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-55516607

Other

Community Security and Cohesion CSSC/UNDP Liberia. (2010). County Security Mechanism.

Deputy Chief of Team – Mitigating Local Disputes in Liberia. (2018, July 17). Devex. https://www.devex.com/jobs/deputy-chief-of-team-mitigating-local-disputes-in-liberia-568457

European Security and Defence College (2020). Civilian Coordinator for Training in Security Sector Reform (CCT-SSR): EAB SSR Report on Training Requirements Analysis for Civilian CSDP Missions.

Executive Office of the Secretary General (2021, June). United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia. https://colombia.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/en_infografia_informe_sg_jun2021.pdf

Government of Liberia. (2011). National Security and Intelligence Act House version.

Human Rights Watch. (2020). Colombia – Events of 2019. https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/country-chapters/colombia#

Interpeace. (2021, June 2). African Great Lakes Region: Investing in mediation at the community level. https://www.interpeace.org/2021/06/investing-mediation-community/

International Crisis Group. (n.d.). Democratic Republic of Congo. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/democratic-republic-congo

International Crisis Group. (2021, January 29). Stabilising the Democratic Republic of Congo after an Apex Power Struggle. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/democratic-republic-congo/stabilising-democratic-republic-congo-after-apex-power-struggle

Liberia Peacebuilding Office, Office of the National Peace Ambassador, ZOA, Midterm Evaluation. (2020). Support to Early Warning and Early Response: County Peace Committees and District Level Political Reconciliation Dialogues and Civic Engagement.

MONUSCO. (n.d.). Stabilisation Strategy (ISSSS). https://monusco.unmissions.org/en/stabilisation-strategy-issss

MONUSCO. (2020, December 18), Mandate. https://monusco.unmissions.org/en/mandate

OECD. (n.d.). Aid at a glance charts: Afghanistan. https://public.tableau.com/views/OECDDACAidataglancebyrecipient_new/Recipients?:embed=y&:display_count=yes&:showTabs=y&:toolbar=no?&:showVizHome=no

OECD (2019a). Annex C: Field visit to Liberia. OECD Development Co-operation Peer Reviews: Sweden 2019. https://www.oecd.org/dac/peer-reviews/Sweden-2019-Field-Visit-Liberia.pdf

OECD (2019b). Field visit to Liberia. OECD Development Co-operation Peer Reviews: Sweden 2019. https://doi.org/10.1787/d63efb11-en

OECD. (2021). OECD. Stat. https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?ThemeTreeID=3&lang=en

Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. (2019). Information Sheet: Request for Short-Term Observers: Early Parliamentary Election Ukraine 21 July 2019. Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).

Promundo. (n.d.). Abotut Us. https://promundoglobal.org/about/

Sánchez-Garzoli, G. (2020) Massacres and Killings of Social Leaders Impede Peace in Colombia: Second Alert. UNOCHA: Washington Office on Latin America. https://reliefweb.int/report/colombia/massacres-and-killings-social-leaders-impede-peace-colombia-second-alert

The World Bank. (n.d.). Net official development assistance received (current US$). https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ODAT.CD

Trocaire (n.d.). Our Work – Why we are working in DR Congo. https://www.trocaire.org/countries/dr-congo/#ourwork

UNFPA Liberia. (n.d.). What We Do: Adolescents and Youth. https://liberia.unfpa.org/en/topics/adolescents-and-youth-4

United Nations and World Bank. 2018. Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict. Washington, DC: World Bank.

United Nations (n.d.). FAQ: Senior Woman Talent Pipeline.

United Nations Development Programme. (n.d.). Liberia Multi-Partner Trust Fund. http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/fund/4LR00

United Nations Mission in Liberia. (2015, December 2). Peacebuilding Commission Informal Meeting of the Liberian Country Specific Configuration 2 December 2015 (3:00 p.m., Conference Room 12) Chair's Summary (2015, December 2). https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/151202_pbc_lib_meeting02dec_summary.pdf

UN Women. (2014). Guide for the Evaluation of Programmes and Projects with a Gender, Human Rights and Interculturality Perspective. UN Women [online]. https://www.unwomen.org/en/digital-library/publications/2014/7/guide-for-the-evaluation-of-programmes-and-projects-with-a-gender-perspective

Williams, B. (n.d.) Assumption Based Planning.

World Health Organisation (2020, October 15). WHO appoints co-chairs of Independent Commission on sexual misconduct during the Ebola response in North Kivu and Ituri, the Democratic Republic of the Congo. https://www.who.int/news/item/15-10-2020-who-appoints-co-chairs-of-independent-commission-on-sexual-misconduct-during-the-ebola-response-in-north-kivu-and-ituri-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo

World Health Organisation. (2021, February 7). Resurgence of Ebola in North Kivu in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. https://www.afro.who.int/news/resurgence-ebola-north-kivu-democratic-republic-congo

Annex 1. Approach and methodology

The evaluation has used a **mixed-methods approach** that combines both primary and secondary and qualitative and quantitative sources for collection and desk review. By assessing the cumulative effects both within and across FBA's areas of operation we answer the two key evaluation questions for four of FBA's five areas of operation. The evaluation questions were developed into an overall evaluation matrix (Annex 2). The evaluation approach and methodology were described in detail in the inception report and key aspects are summarised in the sections below.

We have assessed FBA's contribution on the basis of a simplified version of John Mayne's approach to **contribution analysis** that *a)* starts with unpacking the theory/ies of change so that expected causality and assumptions are exposed, *b)* assesses the degree to which this has been upheld in practice (i.e. results achieved, assumptions met), and *c)* identifies other key influencing factors and their significance.[123] In other words:

> Plausible contribution claim = verified theory of change + other factors accounted for

As theories of change do not exist in most areas of FBA's work during the period, we developed them from FBA's documentation using an *if, then, leading to* causality chain that corresponds to outputs, outcomes, and impact. We identified the core assumptions underpinning each level of causality, e.g. that course participants are located in positions where they can utilise the knowledge and capacities that have been enhanced; that such utilisation is supported by management and by management systems etc. We verified our ToCs during a series of ToC workshops with FBA staff in October 2020. And we tested whether the ToCs and assumptions held true

[123] Contribution analysis – an approach to exploring cause and effect, John Mayne, ILAC paper 16, May 2008.

(or didn't) through our interviews and through documentation review – in other words, we tested the Theory in Practice (TiC). Emerging findings were *triangulated* so that each finding has been corroborated by several sources. This overall approach is illustrated by Figure A1.1 below (in this case for the secondment area – a similar approach was used in the other areas).

Figure A1.1: Illustration of evaluation approach at intervention level



Our use of contribution analysis has therefore focused on identifying: *a)* wider changes in the location of the intervention, *b)* the perceived effects of FBA's interventions collectively and individually and *c)* other factors perceived to have had influence. Our focus is at the outcome level as it is here that FBA's effects shift from attribution (learning, knowledge) to contribution (utilisation of that learning) and where a plausible contribution claim can be made. Other factors (external to FBA) are identified that help explain the change contribution (e.g. government reforms, other development actors).

We have also sought to corroborate evidence of change and contribution through our review of the available documentation, especially independent reviews and evaluations.

The approach to contribution analysis described above has enabled us to compare the constructed theories of change showing the expected causalities and assumptions with the theory in practice, which is what FBA in fact achieved. This has been possible through strong evidence of FBA outputs (as we note in the report, FBA is generally very good at collating its outputs) and weaker evidence of outcome changes and wider impact. This corresponds to the "ripple-effect" as one moves from attribution at output level to a contribution at outcome and impact levels as external factors become more influential.

Primary data has been collected through:

- Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) with FBA staff, MFA, and Sida representatives, and direct and indirect beneficiaries. KIIs were conducted for all of the operational areas evaluated. For bilateral cooperation in Colombia, for example, interviews have been undertaken with FBA staff in the DDR, WGY and SSR units and with key staff in the beneficiary organisations and amongst relevant partners (e.g. UN agencies). A similar approach has been taken in DRC and Liberia.
- In Liberia, we also worked with a local researcher who was able to travel to selected sites and undertake KIIs, which were subsequently transcribed and sent to the evaluation team.
- Focus group discussions (FGDs) have been conducted online where it is feasible to gather people for a joint interview; for example, former course participants. FGDs have the advantage of collecting input from a number of people at the same time (efficiency) but they tend to work best when undertaken face-to-face. Our FGDs have been primarily used with FBA staff.
- KIIs and FGDs have been undertaken on a semi-structured basis with a focus on: changes observed, contextual and other contributing factors supporting or hindering the change process, synergies with other initiatives etc. Our line of enquiry here has

been guided by the areas highlighted in the evaluation matrix. Using a similar interview guide helps triangulation of evidence. KIIs have been used to cover all five areas of operation, with somewhat greater emphasis being placed on the areas and initiatives selected for close examination as case studies.

- Where face to face interviews were not possible due to COVID-19 travel restrictions, we utilised a mix of online tools, including WhatsApp, Zoom, and Skype, as well as email correspondence. These contacts generally worked well and we were able to gather useful information.
- A stakeholder survey has been used in the area of training in order to capture inputs from a wider range of individuals than would otherwise be possible through KIIs or FGDs. The survey was managed through the 'survey monkey' software. We targeted respondents who have participated in FBA global and targeted courses within the last 2–3 years so that memories of the training were still relatively fresh and there was also a possibility for wider results to be identified. The focus here was on the degree of influence achieved (this being one of FBA's parameters) and the factors contributing to or detracting from this. [124]

Sampling methodology. The approach to sampling has needed to strike a balance between the ambition to consult as broad a cross-section of FBA's stakeholders and beneficiaries as possible and the time and resource limitations of the evaluation. There was also a need to reflect the different character of the four operational areas. As a result, the *training* area used a mix of KIIs and a survey that randomly selected individuals who had participated in the three main types of training; global courses, targeted courses, and programme

[124] The survey was conducted between 8 February 2021 to 8 March 2021 and comprised 15 questions, targeting 120 respondents in English, French and Spanish languages sampled from a pool of FBAs training course participants who attended trainings between the year 2009–2019, with priority given to courses from 2016 onwards. Respondents included a mix of participants on all the main types of courses offered by FBA.

courses. Likewise, a random selection of these three types of courses was chosen, provided they fell within the time period. The assessment of *secondments* targeted randomly selected individuals in field missions and headquarters with a weighting towards missions with large Swedish contingents. The *bilateral cooperation* area used a hybrid modality of remote and field assessment in three case study countries. The case study countries were selected according to criteria that included time relevance to the evaluation period, budget size, and scope of portfolio – the aim being to enable data to be gathered that concerned a representative group of FBA interventions, methods and approaches (including training, mentoring, and advisory functions). The *research* area was covered mainly through KIIs, FGDs and an assessment of research products.

The **number of people consulted** directly during the evaluation was 105 persons, including 33 FBA staff, eight staff from other Swedish organisations, and 64 direct and indirect beneficiaries of FBA's activities. It should be noted that many of the interviewees had experience of several of FBA's operational areas (esp. training, secondments and bilateral cooperation) and their responses have therefore fed into several areas of the evaluation. The gender split of persons interviewed was 53 % women and 47 % men. In addition, the training survey targeted 120 persons, from whom 73 answered the questions which is a 61 % return rate.

Secondary data has included strategies and policies, project documentation, course curricula and course evaluations, bilateral reporting, and thematic and contextual documentation relevant to the initiative area. A list of sources consulted is included in this reports reference list.

A further important source of secondary data has been the existing external evaluations that FBA has commissioned over time. FBA's internal reports and reviews have also been examined. While the latter cannot be considered as representing an independent assessment, they do contain data (e.g. course statistics, participants' views) that have been useful.

We have applied an **inclusive and participatory approach** to data collection that *a)* informs the interviewee or survey recipient why the interview is taking place and its role in the evaluation process, *b)* that contributions will be non-attributable, and *c)* that questions will be phrased in a manner that is sensitive from an equality perspective.

Our mix of methods has helped us to triangulate data and emerging findings. Inter alia, this has been achieved through semi-structured interview guides that ask different interviewees the same question for particular areas. We asked interviewees to be as concrete as possible. Likewise, survey data has been triangulated with other sources, including documentation and FBA's own surveys. While these approaches do not remove the risk of bias in responses, the convergence of evidence from multiple sources lends credibility to our findings.

We have applied a **conflict-sensitive approach** to data collection and the presentation of data. This has included the sensitivity of topics discussed; the physical surroundings during the data collection process; and issues pertaining to gender and ethnicity of the interviewee and the interviewer. The team has implemented the assignment in full compliance with the Tana Safeguarding Policy and the Tana Gender Equality and Social Inclusion Policy, which aim at ensuring an inclusive approach which respects the individual interviewee. This further means a guarantee of full anonymity as well as storage of data in accordance with the EU General Data Protection Regulation.

In assessing FBA's performance, we have also utilised three of the **OECD/DAC evaluation criteria**, these being relevance, efficiency, and effectiveness.[125] Relevance concerns the extent to which FBA's objectives and interventions respond to beneficiaries, global, country, and partner/institution needs, policies, and priorities, and continue to do so if circumstances change. Efficiency concerns the extent to

[125] https://www.oecd.org/dac/evaluation/daccriteriaforevaluatingdevelopmentassistance.htm

which FBA delivers, or is likely to deliver, results in an economic and timely way. Effectiveness concerns the extent to which FBA has achieved, or is expected to achieve, its objectives, and its results. We have chosen to use these three criteria as they assist in understanding and assessing the results achieved by FBA and the reasons for this achievement. For example, an understanding of the relevance of FBA's work provides an essential foundation for the usefulness of its work. To these, we added consideration of coordination, being the extent to which FBA has coordinated and aligned its activities with other actors, particularly Swedish actors. Also, gender has been a cross-cutting consideration during the evaluation.

Our approach to **coordination** has sought to understand how FBA coordinates with other Swedish and international actors. We included questions on coordination in our interview guides and examined documentation from the perspective of identifying the main channels and aspects of coordination practiced. We noted that coordination can be embedded in formal institutionalised relations such as working groups, channels of communication and operationalisation. These forms of interaction are usually structured, explicitly agreed upon and may have a high degree of visibility inside organisations. But they may also be more informal through personal contacts, prior working relationships or direct group-to-group interactions not necessarily decided upon by management. Usually, these efforts include the sharing of information, data, experiences and good practices, but across a wide spectrum they can also come to include joint decision-making, planning and forms of harmonisation. While coordination typically ensures lack of duplication, there are no guarantees that it enables division of labour from a strategic point of view that furthers optimum impact. These efforts also increasingly appear political because they include interests, mandates and resources that may not easily be disclosed or genuinely shared across actors. The evaluation has therefore sought to highlight and assess possible synergies (both within FBA, with other Swedish agencies, and with external actors). Each chapter of the report includes a section on our findings relating to coordination.

Annex 2. Evaluation matrix

Evaluation question	Area of operation	Proposed approach
Effectiveness		
• How central is this to FBA's mandate? • What role, if at all, does FBA play in identifying roles to be filled? Is FBA's role primarily technical or political or both? • What were its effects in terms of Swedish influence within international organisations (IOs)? • What importance does the MFA attach to FBA's role in recruitment? • How does knowledge, gained through secondments, flow back into the MFA? • Has FBA targeted relevant positions? • What is FBA's theory of change (ToC)? Is it relevant? • Have FBA's goals been achieved?	Secondment – general	• Case study – to be decided based on results of quantitative analysis. Desk based.[126] • Documentation review for mapping of FBA activity • Quantitative beneficiary analysis (where, when, what?) • Survey with focus on influence • Key informant interviews (KIIs) for quality, utility, timeliness (focusing on IOs or thematic areas where many personnel were seconded)

[126] Note: Instead of a single case study, it was decided to focus on the experiences of selected secondees through KIIs. The secondees represented a range of positions (management/advisory and core) from receiving organisations according to the three main recipients (EU, OSCE and UN). The data was augmented by sampling of FBA's own data collection.

Evaluation question	Area of operation	Proposed approach
• What type of secondments were most influential? Who benefitted? • What factors facilitated this and why? • What could be done better? • How has FBA considered a gender perspective on the secondment? • How has FBA used secondments to support other objectives (synergy effects)? • To what degree is research and methods integrated with secondment, and in what way has it influenced/impacted secondment?		• Existing reviews
• How do those seconded experience the role of FBA in the recruitment process? • What role does FBA play pre-deployment, during deployment, and upon return? What is the effect of this on the secondment?	Secondment – those seconded	• As part of case study – survey with seconded advisors/personnel. Desk based.[127] • KIIs

[127] Note: Instead of a single case study, it was decided to focus on the experiences of selected secondees through KIIs. The secondees represented a range of positions (management/advisory and core) from receiving organisations according to the three main recipients (EU, OSCE and UN). The data was augmented by sampling of FBA's own data collection.

Evaluation question	Area of operation	Proposed approach
• How central is training to FBA's mandate? • Existence of and how realistic are FBA's ToC & assumptions? Are FBA's learning objectives achieved? Esp. outcomes? • What factors facilitated this and why? • Who benefitted? • Training's contribution to lasting and wider systemic effects? • What could be done better? • How has FBA considered a gender perspective on the training? • How does FBA's pedagogical approach contribute to results achieved? • How successful is FBA in selecting the right trainees? • What kinds of follow-up to the training? Effect on sustainability of results?	Training – general	• Case study of results from global and targeted courses – desk based[128] • Typology of training & numbers • Documentation review of concept notes, course reports etc. • Quantitative beneficiary analysis (where, when, what?) • Survey supplemented by KIIs using Kirkpatrick model and feeding into contribution analysis of the case • Use existing evaluations.

[128] Note: instead of a case study, the ET relied upon the results of a participant survey, the results of which were triangulated through KIIs and examination of secondary data from FBA exit evaluations, external evaluations and other documentation.

Evaluation question	Area of operation	Proposed approach
• How has FBA considered a gender perspective on the secondment? • How has FBA used training to support other objectives (synergy effects)? • To what degree is research and methods integrated with the training, and in what way has it influenced/impacted training?		
• How do those trained believe that participating in FBA training has enhanced the quality of their work? • What concrete networking opportunities did participation in FBA training bring?	Training – trainees	• Focus on Kirkpatrick level 4. • Survey • Interviews
• Did FBA conduct its own conflict analysis? • What were the key conflict factors that FBA engaged to address? • Who were the key actors involved in the conflict? • In what way were the local actors involved and participate in the design of FBA's activity/intervention? • How close is FBA to national political processes? • Who is FBA's main local partner(s)?	Bilateral development in post-conflict societies	• Case study – field based, if possible • Documentation review for mapping of FBA activity • Quantitative beneficiary analysis (where, when, what?) • Survey, KIIs, & focus group discussions (FGDs) • Qualitative contribution analysis of

Evaluation question	Area of operation	Proposed approach
• What is the relevance of FBA's focus? • How realistic is FBA's ToC? • What results were achieved? In what way are they sustainable? Is there multiplying or leverage effects? • What factors facilitated this and why? • Who benefitted? • What systemic or wider effects? Why? • What could be done better? • Which policy instruments have been created and what are their impacts on fragile states? • How can FBA activities be categorised? What is the primary emphasis? • What is the gender perspective on the design, implementation and follow-up of the initiatives? • To what degree is research and methods integrated with bilateral cooperation, and in what way has it influenced/impacted bilateral cooperation?		changes reported

Evaluation question	Area of operation	Proposed approach
• Relevance of FBA's focus, direct and indirect research, policy and methods development activities? • What resources are allocated to the area and in what ways are they spent? What is the degree of strategic planning and execution in doing so? • How realistic is FBA's ToC? • Have FBA's goals been achieved? • What factors facilitated this and why? • Who benefitted? • What systemic or wider effects? Why? • What could be done better? • What types of written outputs does FBA produce? Who is the main audience? What kinds of outreach/advocacy strategies are in place? • To what extent is research being integrated across FBA and what is the effect of research integration into FBA's strategies and activities? And to what extent are these efforts institutionalised or ad hoc? • How does FBA see the process of working evidence-based?	Research, policy, method	• Documentation review for mapping of FBA activity • Desk review of quality • Case studies of relevant policy processes conducted by FBA in conjunction with partners (value added by FBA?) • Case studies of relevant internal strategy or programme processes to explore the extent of research • Use existing evaluation case studies of relevant internal strategy or programme processes to explore the extent and effect of research integration • KIIs (programmes & units) • Use existing evaluation

Evaluation question	Area of operation	Proposed approach
What kinds of knowledge are deemed important? • How has FBA considered a gender perspective on the research, policy and methods?		
Coordination		
• Synergies with other agencies? • Systems in place to avoid duplication? What coordination mechanisms is FBA part of? • Comparative advantages with FBA? Which other similar agencies does FBA work with (like ZIF in Berlin)? Intergovernmental organisation, specifically the EU and UN? • Does formal coordination at the Nordic level exists?	Secondment	• As part of case study, if decided • Documentation review • KIIs (FBA, receiving organisations)
• Synergies with other agencies? • Systems in place to avoid duplication? • Comparative advantages with FBA? Which other similar agencies does FBA work with (like the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre in Canada, Clingendael in the Netherlands)?	Training	• Existing evaluations • Documentation review • KIIs (FBA, receiving organisations)

Evaluation question	Area of operation	Proposed approach
• What are the synergies with other agencies? • What systems are in place to avoid duplication? • What are the comparative advantages with FBA? • Specifically, what formal coordination mechanisms exist with the Swedish MFA and Sida? At HQ level and in the field? How do FBA and Sida coordinate in the field? • In what ways do FBA and Sida collaborate on conflict analysis and other relevant analysis for promote peace and security?	Bilateral development	• As part of case study • Documentation review • KIIs (FBA, beneficiaries, esp. Sida)
• Synergies with other agencies, both in production, dissemination and integration of research? • Systems in place to avoid duplication? • Comparative advantages with FBA?	Research, policy, method	• As part of case study • Documentation review • KIIs (MFA, Sida, think tanks)

Annex 3. Interview guides

Structure for interview – FBA's support to ARN

Organisation & position

Location

Name

FBA's intervention in Colombia (component within FBA's support to ARN)

1. Overall opinion

Was FBA's support to ARN useful? Why? What stands out?

2. Relevance

To ARN and local context?

Were there aspects that could have been included but weren't?

3. Effectiveness

Has ARN been able to use the FBA support? How?

Examples of outcomes / changes & effects/potential for outcomes

Contributing factors?

If limited effects, then why?

4. Efficiency

Quality of FBA support?

Could FBA's support have been provided differently?

5. Gender

Was there sufficient attention to gender?

In what way was progress in gender mainstreaming at ARN headquarters in Bogatá translated into influencing operational changes in the territories beyond the regional fora?

6. Regional fora

What kind of outcomes did ARN's and FBA's jointly organised regional fora focusing on community involvement in reincorporation and reintegration yield?

What was FBA's contribution to the exchange of experiences on relevant issues for reintegration/reincorporation among local

authorities, community leaders and representatives of organisations with social initiatives that contribute to the consolidation of peace?

What was FBA's contribution to the establishment of new networks, enriching the social capital of the attendees and their network of allies in the territory?

7. Lessons Learned

8. Recommendations

Structure for interview – FBA's support to the DRC and Liberia

Organisation & position

Location

Name

FBA's intervention in the DRC and Liberia

1. Context

Tell us a bit about who you are? What you did before participating in XXX? What education and training have you received before XXX?

Are you from this community? Do you consider yourself well-connected with local key actors? In what way are you connected with them?

What is it like here? What opportunities and challenges exist in your community? Do you think your situation is typical for the region or your country?

What is the most significant change that has taken place for you in the past years?

What do you think made this possible?

Tell us a bit about your work?

What do you see as the biggest opportunities and what are the biggest challenges you face in your work?

Can you explain why these factors are so important?

2. Overall opinion

Was FBA's support to you and your organisation useful? Why? What stands out?

3. Relevance

To you and local context?

Where there aspects that could have been included but weren't?

4. Effectiveness

Have you been able to use the FBA support? How?

Examples of outcomes / changes & effects/potential for outcomes / What wider effects do you think that your results will have in the community?

Contributing factors? / What results do you need to achieve in your work and how will you achieve them? / What conditions need to be in place for you to be able to achieve them?

If limited effects, then why?

5. Efficiency

Quality of FBA's support?

Could FBA's support have been provided differently?

6. Gender

Was there sufficient attention to gender?

In what way was progress in gender mainstreaming in your organisations translated into influencing operational changes?

7. Lessons Learned

8. Recommendations

Interview guide and analytical framework for former PCPI course participants – Democratic Republic of the Congo

Contextualisation
Tell us a bit about who you are? What you did before participating in PCPI? What education and training have you received before PCPI? Are you from this community? Do you consider yourself well-connected with local key actors? In what way are you connected with them?
What is it like here? What opportunities and challenges exist in your community? Do you think your situation is typical for the region or DRC? What is the most significant change that has taken place for you in the past years? What do you think made this possible? E.g. "we have a massive problem with sexual harassment in this community" -> is the FBA course relevant for the challenges in their context?
Tell us a bit about your work? What do you see as the biggest opportunities and what are the biggest challenges you face in your work? Can you explain why these factors are so important?
Theory of change
What results do you need to achieve in your work and how will you achieve them? I need to protect women What conditions need to be in place for you to be able to achieve them? How? We need to talk to the men/police What wider effects do you think that your results will have in the community?
Results
What achievements are you most proud of? What is the most significant change that has taken place for you in your work in the past years? What do you think made this possible?

Learning
What did you learn from the PCPI training and how were you able to apply it in your work? Please give examples. Did the training help you to produce the results and, if so, why? What else could have helped?
How do you perceive the different activities (PCPI, PCPI 2.0, RCPI)?
Do you think these network meetings and the mentors at the training have been useful?
Did you experience that the training increased the connection between Eastern Congo and Kinshasa?

Structure for interview – Sida/MFA

Organisation & position

Location

Name

FBA's intervention in country X

1. Overall opinion

What is your overall impression of FBA's role within the framework of bilateral strategies? Why? What stands out?

2. Relevance

To Swedish strategic objectives?

To the local national/context?

Is FBA sufficiently linked up with key national institutions? How?

Were there aspects that could have been included but weren't?

3. Effectiveness

Has MFA/Sida been able to use the FBA's support? How?

What are FBA's comparative advantages? How?

Examples of collaboration/coordination contributed to outcomes / changes & effects/potential for outcomes

Contributing factors?

If limited effects, then why?

4. Efficiency

Quality of FBA's work?

Could FBA's work have been provided differently?

5. Gender

Quality of FBA's gender work?

In what way has FBA's gender work translated into results?

6. Coordination

Quality of FBA's coordination with Sida/MFA/Team Sweden?

Quality of FBA's coordination with international and local partners?

7. Lessons Learned

8. Recommendations

Structure for interview notes – FBA secondments

Introduction: mention that the focus of the interview is on the value added by the secondment to the receiving organisation, examples of actual effects and changes (if any), and factors that contribute to this.

Organisation & position

Location

Name

FBA pre-deployment training?

Reason for the secondment?

1. Overall opinion

Has the secondment been useful? Why? What stands out?

2. Relevance

To the receiving organisation and local context?

To you personally?

Could the relevance have been strengthened?

3. Effectiveness

Was the secondment adequately prepared in your opinion? By FBA? By the receiving organisation?

How would you describe the position you occupy? Does it offer scope for influencing positive change?

Examples of outcomes / changes & effects/potential for outcomes

Contributing factors? Constraints?

If limited effects, then why?

4. Efficiency

Quality of FBA preparation and support during secondment?

Aspects that could be improved? How?

6. Other comments

7. Lessons Learned

8. Recommendations

Structure for interview notes – FBA training

Introduction: mention that the focus of the interview is on the application of the knowledge and skills gained following the FBA course, examples of actual effects and changes (if any), and factors that contribute to this.

Organisation & position
Location
Name
FBA course or training and date
Reason for attending?
1. Overall opinion
Was it a useful course for you? Why? What stands out?
2. Relevance
To your job and local context?
To you personally?
Were there aspects that could have been included but weren't?
3. Effectiveness
Have you been able to use the knowledge gained? How?
Examples of outcomes / changes & effects/potential for outcomes
Contributing factors?
If limited effects, then why?
4. Efficiency
Quality of trainers?
Could the training have been provided differently?
5. Gender
Was there sufficient attention to gender?
6. Other comments
7. Lessons Learned
8. Recommendations

Annex 4. Research ethics

Research Ethics

Research and evaluation should always adhere to the highest standards of integrity and ethics. In order to facilitate this Tana has drawn up principles on ethical practice in the research and evaluation process. All research and evaluation conducted by Tana (wholly or partially) is therefore expected to uphold to these principles. At the core, these principles emphasize the need to produce good research and evaluation, and at the same time avoiding doing any harm to the participants as well as the consultants.

'Research' refers to any action or method to seek information from participants, such as interview, focus group discussion, survey, etc.

Principles

Ethical approval and research permit.

Consultants are responsible for identifying any requirements and obtaining any necessary ethical or research approvals for the assignment they are undertaking. This includes, for example, official research permits from national or local authorities in targeted countries, formal approval or confirmation from other stakeholder institutions and formal (or possibly informal depending the context) approval from local community leaders.

Quality of research.

Research must be relevant, high quality and clearly in accordance with Term of Reference. It must be undertaken to a sufficiently high standard that the findings can be reliably used for their intended purpose. Research should only be undertaken where there is a clear gap in knowledge.

Do no harm.

Consultants should avoid doing harm to participants in research. This includes (but is not limited to) physical harm, psychological distress and discomfort, social disadvantage, harm to participants' financial status and an invasion of participants' privacy and anonymity. Consultants should ensure that the basic human rights of individuals and groups with whom they interact are protected. This is particularly important with regard to vulnerable people. The wellbeing and safety of consultants working in the field should also be considered and any harm or discomfort should be minimised to the extent necessary.

Informed consent.

This means that (a) participants of research or evaluation should understand that their participation is voluntary and coercion and/or deception, and (b) they are clearly informed what the research and evaluation require from them. Information given to participants may include the organisation conducting the research, the purpose of the research, the methods being used, the possible outcome of the research and evaluation, as well as associated demands and all foreseeable discomforts, inconveniences and risks that the participants may encounter during and after their participation. Any material information that might influence participants' willingness to give consent should not be withheld from participants.

Right to withdraw.

Participants should always have the right to withdraw from research or evaluation processes and withdraw any data concerning them at any point without fearing any consequences. When a participant chooses to withdraw from the research process, they should not be pressured or coerced in any way to try and stop them from withdrawing.

Confidentiality, data protection and privacy.

Consultants should ensure confidentiality of information, privacy and anonymity of research participants at all times. They should abide to the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 2016/679 ensuring data protection and privacy for all individuals providing information.

Consultants should clearly explain the limits of confidentiality to prospective participants. Consultants should also explain that if they hear or see something that gives cause for concerns, they have a duty to act. That might mean that consultants first encourage the person to talk to someone who could help, or agree that the consultants can talk to someone else on their behalf. In exceptional circumstances such as encountering a serious wrong doing (e.g. corruption or abuse), it may be necessary for the consultants to breach confidentiality without first talking to the participant, given the ethical need to prevent harm to vulnerable people

Commitment to Human Rights.

Consultants should conduct the research in accordance with international human rights conventions and covenants to which Denmark is a signatory, regardless of local country standards. They should also take account of local and national laws.

Culturally sensitive research.

Consultants should adopt a culturally sensitive approach, thus mutual understanding and trust can be fostered and eventually an optimal outcome can be obtained. This means, from planning the research until communicating findings, consultants should take account of and respect differences in culture, local behaviour and norms, religious beliefs and practices, sexual orientation, gender roles, disability, age and ethnicity and other social differences such as class.

Transparency, Openness and Fairness.

Tana is fully committed to transparency and openness in publication, communication and dissemination of all evaluations and research. Transparency includes, but is not limited to, reporting: (a) full methodological details and (b) information on who has undertaken the research, and (c) material and financial resources supporting the research. By fairness, Tana aims to communicate the research fully and fairly reflect the findings. Tana is also open to the sharing of scientific resources, such as methods, measures and (non-personal) data in order to further social science advances. Where possible, and respecting confidentiality requirements, primary data should be stored in files within Tana to allow secondary analyses.

Equal participation.

When conducting research consultants should be inclusive in selecting participants. Consultants shall not exclude individuals as potential participants on the basis of attributes such as gender, race, ethnicity, age, religion, disability or sexual orientation, unless there is a valid reason for the exclusion. Consultants should ensure participation of women and socially excluded groups when relevant. Consideration should however be given to how barriers and risks to participation can be removed.

Annex 5. DRC case study

Relevance

The Folke Bernadotte Academy (FBA) was instructed by the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA) in 2015 to contribute to the fulfilment of the Strategy for Sweden's development cooperation with the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 2015–2019 (hereafter referred to the Strategy with the DRC). FBA was instructed to contribute to *"strengthened capacity among individuals and institutions to promote security and human rights"*.[129] FBA's contributions during the period were financed in accordance with the terms for appropriation in appropriation directions for each financial year. The total budget for FBA's contributions was SEK 25 million for five years. The total financial appropriation for the Strategy with the DRC was SEK 1,250 million.[130]

According to the Strategy with the DRC, FBA activities were to focus on "strengthening capacity for greater respect for human rights in the security sector" and, to achieve this, FBA could, for example, be active in three areas: greater knowledge of human rights, strengthened democratic governance of and within the security sector, and strengthened democratic dialogue at national and local level. In addition, the Strategy with DRC noted that FBA activities are to contribute to "enhancing the ability of civil society and state structures to prevent sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) and strengthen women's capacity to participate in peace and security promotion. Activities are also to focus on enhancing the ability of local communities to sustainably reintegrate former combatants. Contributions could, for example, include training, secondments,

[129] Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Sweden, Strategy for development cooperation with Democratic Republic of Congo, 2015–2019, p. 2.
[130] Ibid., p. 1.

advice, methods development and policy support, and should primarily take place in eastern DR Congo, with the possibility of contributions in Kinshasa".[131]

The Strategy with the DRC set out to focus on some of the root causes of the conflicts and obstacles to development in the DRC, and gender equality was noted as a Swedish priority. Furthermore, the Strategy with the DRC also noted that cooperation with public administration should be a complement to cooperation with other actors, but cooperation should preferably take place with authorities at local level, and a combination of local and strategic national support should be sought. The Strategy with the DRC noted that civil society and the media can be important agents for change. Otherwise, long-term, programme-based support combined with strategic and catalytic contributions should be sought to contribute to strengthened capacity and long-term sustainable results.[132]

Programming

The Strategy with the DRC was the first bilateral cooperation strategy for FBA where it was responsible for contributing to some of Sweden's strategy's goals. FBA conducted an operational analysis (OPA) in response to the instructions from the MFA, including a comprehensive political economic analysis of the DRC and the levels of socio-economic development. The OPA also included a conflict assessment and a general risk assessment of key issues that potentially could affect the cooperation with the DRC. In addition to the broader macro analysis, FBA also conducted assessments of the selected areas of intervention: *(i)* greater respect for human rights within the security sector; *(ii)* prevention of sexual and gender-based violence; (*iii*) women's participation in peace and security promotion processes; and *(iv)* reintegration of ex-combatants. A background

[131] Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Sweden, Strategy for development cooperation with Democratic Republic of Congo, 2015–2019, p. 10.
[132] Ibid, pp. 5–6.

and context assessment of each area, and key actors and national frameworks/processes was produced, followed by a risk assessment. Then, a brief justification of relevance was presented for selected sub-areas of intervention, actors, and processes in the DRC to engage with.

The intervention areas for prevention of SGBV and women's participation in peace and security promotion coalesced under the Programme for Inclusive Peacebuilding (PCPI – Programme de la consolidation de la paix inclusive). The recommendations in the OPA for prevention of SGBV and women's participation in peace and security promotion overlapped. These two areas of intervention emphasised the development of dialogue and relations between representatives from government agencies and civil society at the local level, and the establishment of a local and regional network of participants and experts with capacity to prevent violence and conflicts, as well as collaboration with the Ministry of Gender in DRC.

FBA noted that there was often a lack of interventions that focused on identifying and addressing the root causes of SGBV. FBA also noted that norms and attitudes around masculinity and femininity among men and women were barriers to prevent SGBV.[133] Similarly, FBA noted that norms and attitudes shaping traditions and power structures constitute barriers for women's participation in public life.[134] FBA's approach to address these challenges was to primarily focus on individuals from mostly eastern DRC and assist them to introduce new ways of working by integrating gender analysis into their organisations and activities. FBA notes that "it was a pilot programme in a, for FBA, new context meaning that FBA had to find out what could lead to what, and how to contribute to the

[133] FBA, Operationaliseringsanalys bilateralt strategiarbete i Demokratiska Republiken Kongo 2015–2019: syntes, slutsatser och rekommendationer, 17 May 2016, p. 3.
[134] Ibid., p. 3.

context, as well as identify few incentives to work directly with one key actor due to the fact that many state structures but also CSOs were considered very weak, with unclear mandates and limited resources."

The methods and tools used for this training aimed to have the participants identify different types of violence in their communities and how violence affects women and men differently. Thus, FBA's approach aimed at strengthening the professional and personal skills of participants to understand and identify norms, attitudes, behaviour, and social structures (power) that have an adverse impact on women's security and freedom to actively participate in public life.

FBA's programme on the prevention of sexual and gender-based violence, and women's participation in peace and security promotion processes drew on previous experiences of a Sida-funded international training programme (ITP) on women, peace, and security (UNSCR 1325)[135] in the DRC. This ITP programme had been implemented for several years by the Swedish civil society organisation, Kvinna till Kvinna (KtK), and a Swedish consultancy firm, Niras Indevelop, and engaged participants from the DRC. During the start-up phase, FBA consulted KtK, former ITP participants, the Embassy of Sweden and the Sida office in Kinshasa, MONUSCO and international CSOs. The participating organisations did not partake in designing the training, Programme de la consolidation de la paix inclusive (PCPI) – Programme for inclusive peacebuilding. FBA notes that the "mentors, formerly ITP-participants took part in developing the programme." PCPI was implemented in 2017 and 2018, and targeted individuals representing

[135] UNSCR 1325 – United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security. It affirms that peace and security efforts are more sustainable when women are equal partners in the prevention of violent conflict.

civil society as well as local government agencies such as the police.[136] The purpose of PCPI was to strengthen the capacity of key individuals representing government agencies and civil society to identify gender inequalities between women and men in society, as well as to strengthen the capacity to use different tools and methods to prevent these inequalities.[137]

The organisational set-up

The FBA team responsible for managing the implementation of interventions within the bilateral cooperation strategy with the DRC consisted of a full-time project manager, and approximately two-to-four full-time positions (desk officers). The desk officers did not work full-time on DRC as they were thematic specialists and supported several country programmes. For instance, the number of desk officers for the DRC portfolio varied during 2016 and 2019, from three to six desk officers. During the period 2016–2019, approximately one full-time position worked on disarmament, demobilisation, and re-integration (DDR), and approximately one and a half full-time positions worked on 'women, peace and security'.[138]

It is important to recognise that the different thematic areas are often managed by a single person who is supported by the project manager. The additional thematic staff devote 20 % to 70 % of their time to the specific thematic interventions. Thus, the responsible person for DDR interventions in the DRC does not work with 'women, peace and security', and vice versa. The main organisational set-up is around the project manager and the thematic desk officers.

---

136 FBA, Planering och uppföljning av insats inom ramen för bilateralt strategiuppdrag i Demokratiska republiken Kongo: Programmet för inkluderande fredsbyggande (PCPI), 22 January 2019, p. 4.

137 Ibid., p. 4.

138 25 % of a full-time position was allocated to Security Sector Reform in 2016, 10 % to secondment for research and evidence in 2017, and 3 % to leadership in 2018.

As a self-implementing organisation, FBA did not fund local partners to implement PCPI. The FBA team in Sweden was responsible for designing, implementing, and following up on the training programme. FBA staff worked remotely from Sweden, and the desk officers were in close and regular contact with participants, mentors and contracted local trainers (consultants) in the DRC. The collaboration between the FBA team and the local mentors enabled FBA to have a closer contact with the participants and their organisations. The local mentors contributed to continuously ensuring that the different elements of PCPI were relevant and realistic. Participants were provided with tailored practical advice on gender issues in their contexts.

The evaluation team notes that despite working from a distance, the FBA team monitored their interventions closely, as well as continuously seeking updates, information and feedback on specific questions related to FBA's interventions. Local stakeholders noted that the FBA team had a solid understanding of the DRC context, events, actors, and power relations, as well as destabilising conflict drivers in the communities and societies in eastern DRC, which made the training practical and relevant for them; while also noting that they benefited from learning about gender and conflict from other contexts, enabling them to compare and contrast with Congolese conflict dynamics.

Conflict context

The period of FBA's implementation of interventions in the DRC starts in 2017 after a year of planning. It was a time of political uncertainty in the DRC. The former president Joseph Kabila remained in office although his term ended in December 2016. He continued to rule until Félix Tshisekedi was elected president in December 2018. Although it was the first peaceful transfer of power in the country in nearly 60 years, the election was marred by

irregularities.[139] When Joseph Kabila stepped down, he continued to wield influence and commanded loyalty throughout the security services and control of state institutions and revenue streams.[140] President Félix Tshisekedi and his predecessor, Joseph Kabila, enlist rebels to stoke trouble and intimidate opponents.[141] In eastern DRC, where FBA has mostly operated, armed groups caused instability and insecurity. Interviews with the PCPI participants and mentors have confirmed that armed groups in the east "have strong military capacities and political influence, derived from alliances with provincial and national politicians and businessmen, while others are militias without serious political goals, often active in remote areas. Some are embedded in society, while others are more predatory toward the local population".[142]

The United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) was mandated in 2010 by the UN Security Council (UNSC) to protect civilians, humanitarian personnel and human rights defenders under imminent threat of physical violence and to support the Government of the DRC in its stabilisation and peace consolidation efforts.[143] Despite the fact that demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) has been an area for MONUSCO's mandate, there was no progress due to "the absence of a credible DDR process".[144] Furthermore, the UNSC called upon the Government of the DRC in 2019 to appoint a senior coordinator to address DDR and to "establish a strategy for DDR".[145] The lack of capacity and commitment by the Government of DRC to engage

[139] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/01/08/major-irregularities-with-dr-congo-vote-count-poll-observers/ and https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-55516607

[140] https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/democratic-republic-congo

[141] https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/democratic-republic-congo/stabilising-democratic-republic-congo-after-apex-power-struggle

[142] Ibid.

[143] https://monusco.unmissions.org/en/mandate

[144] United Nations Security Council, S/2019/957/, 19 December 2019, p. 7.

[145] Ibid., p. 6.

in a DDR process has not been easy for MONUSCO to address in the past ten years. Subsequently, there have been very few entry points for FBA to engage in enhancing the ability of local communities to sustainably reintegrate former combatants.

The UNSC has extended the mandate of MONUSCO by one year until December 2021. While the political environment slowly changed after 2018 with president Tshisekedi trying to consolidate his authority and diminish the influence of his predecessor, the UNSC expressed grave concern over "the high number of violations against children, in particular sexual and gender-based violence being committed by security forces, and [calls] on all actors to contribute to the rehabilitation and reintegration of children formerly associated with armed groups and forces".[146] Furthermore, UNSC expressed concerns about the "persistently high level of violence and the intensification of intercommunal violence fuelled by hate speech, and their deleterious effect on the stabilisation, community reconciliation, reconstruction and development efforts in the DRC".[147] The eastern part of the DRC is plagued by recurrent waves of conflict, chronic humanitarian crises, and serious human rights violations, including SGBV.

In addition, the world's second largest Ebola outbreak occurred in the provinces of North Kivu and Ituri (in eastern DRC) between 2018 and 2020, causing 2,300 deaths.[148] The World Health Organisation noted that the humanitarian response to the outbreak was particularly challenging due to insecurity that disrupted

[146] United Nations Security Council, S/2019/957/, 19 December 2019, p. 2.
[147] Ibid., p. 4.
[148] https://www.who.int/news/item/15-10-2020-who-appoints-co-chairs-of-independent-commission-on-sexual-misconduct-during-the-ebola-response-in-north-kivu-and-ituri-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo

emergency efforts.[149] FBA had to cancel activities during the second half of 2019 due to the Ebola outbreak, with FBA staff being restricted from travelling to the region.[150]

These events, amongst others, framed and shaped FBA's ability to implement activities and contribute to the achievement of Sweden's Strategy with the DRC. The socio-political context and the conflict dynamics created an environment that was very complex and where long-term strategic planning had a diminishing benefit because of the uncertainty of the political system in the DRC and the unpredictability of what can be achieved through the efforts of an organisation. It is a context where formal public institutions appear very weak, and the attitudes and behaviour of people are shaped by decades of war and trauma. FBA adapted well to this complexity. It is reaffirmed by interviewees who have participated in or were consulted as mentors for PCPI.

Important to note in relation to the conflict context is that that PCPI is not an initiative focusing on peace processes, but rather on the individuals in a conflict context. PCPI does not aim to facilitate a dialogue or mediation process between different parties to a conflict, but it aims at building the capacity of individuals, especially women and men, to participate and engage in peace and security processes, as well as to prevent violence (SGBV) at local level. The level of conflict and peace to which PCPI contributes is at the interpersonal level as well as the community level, focusing on enhancing and supporting existing skills among Congolese women and men. However, the PCPI offers an opportunity to enhance trust between individuals from civil society and government agencies. The evaluation team recognises that FBA's level of intervention is more

[149] https://www.afro.who.int/news/resurgence-ebola-north-kivu-democratic-republic-congo

[150] FBA, Insats-PM, Planering och uppföljning av insatser inom ramen för strategiuppdrag i Demokratiska Republiken Kongo (DRK): Lokalt kapacitetsbyggande: Facilitering av återanpassning av före detta kombattanter, 26 February 2021, p. 16.

modest and limited than what the Sweden's Strategy with the DRC sets out to achieve. We find there is a gap between ambitions set out in the strategy and the available resources, scope and focus of PCPI and its follow-up interventions (PCPI 2.0 and RCPI-network for inclusive peacebuilding) to achieve wider peacebuilding effects.

Swedish and international engagements in the DRC

This section does not try to map all the actors within FBA's fields of operation in the DRC but aims to illustrate the complexity of the landscape of actors that shapes FBA's work in DRC. Some of these actors are funded by Sida and others are funded from elsewhere. The analysis of FBA's contribution and results should be understood in this broader context, because participants in an FBA training programme who are employed by a local organisation may be highly dependent on the partnership with another international organisation. That is one of the many factors in play that entail that FBA's contribution to the empowerment of the individual participant may be highly relevant and successful, yet the larger social effects come from broader efforts made by many organisations and their contributions.

The Strategy for Sweden's development cooperation with the DRC, 2015–2019, comprised a total of SEK 1,250 million for the period, of which SEK 1,225 million was for activities conducted by Sida. According to OECD statistics, the Official Development Assistance (ODA) to the DRC was between USD 2–3 billion annually during the period 2015–2019, with the United States and the World Bank as the largest donors to the DRC, providing 35 % of ODA between them.[151] Other donors were the Global Fund, EU institutions, United Kingdom, United Nations, African Development Bank, Africa Development Fund, GAVI, Germany and Belgium.

[151] https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?ThemeTreeID=3&lang=en

The International Crisis Group noted that "under Kabila, international partners were reluctant to contribute, because the government often misused the funds and did not deliver the desired results". [152] The Swedish strategy with the DRC noted that "cooperation with the government administration and its agencies at central level may take place if it is deemed strategic for contributing to state-building. Otherwise, cooperation should preferably take place with authorities at local level". Furthermore, "use of the national systems should also increase gradually as a part of long-term state-building. The Swedish government assesses that general budget support is not an option at present".[153]

Some of Sida's partners within the peace and security sector in the eastern part of the DRC were International Alert, Life and Peace Institute, Oxfam, Search for Common Ground, Trócaire, as well as UNICEF, MONUSCO, the World Bank, and World Food Programme. These organisations implement a range of different interventions in Eastern DRC, ranging from MONUSCO's role in the International Security and Stabilisation Support Strategy (ISSSS) supporting the implementation of the National Stabilisation and Reconstruction Programme (STAREC) in the DRC,[154] to bringing together humanitarian, livelihoods and women's empowerment components with the same communities. [155] In addition, Sida supports PROMUNDO, an international CSO focusing on advancing gender equality and preventing violence by engaging men and boys in partnership with women, girls, and individuals of all gender identities.[156]

---

[152] https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/democratic-republic-congo/stabilising-democratic-republic-congo-after-apex-power-struggle

[153] Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Sweden, Strategy for development cooperation with Democratic Republic of Congo, 2015-2019, p. 2.

[154] https://monusco.unmissions.org/en/stabilisation-strategy-issss

[155] https://www.trocaire.org/countries/dr-congo/#ourwork

[156] https://promundoglobal.org/about/

It is important to recognise that FBA's interventions in eastern DRC are one of many international efforts. FBA's budget for its interventions in the DRC is relatively modest compared to other international efforts. The work of the UN mission, MONUSCO, as well as international civil society organisation's such as Trócaire included targeted efforts to contribute to prevention of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) and women's participation in peace and security promotion processes. There were also non-Sida funded organisations that worked on similar issues in eastern DRC such as Interpeace.

Interpeace has been implementing a project aiming to strengthen capacities of those on the frontline of peacebuilding at the community level and establishing a network of these community mediators. Interpeace believes that the training of community mediators will empower local communities to identify, analyse and resolve local conflicts themselves.[157]

FBA's efforts to contribute to reintegration of ex-combatants in eastern DRC had a slightly different approach and focused partly on interactions with actors such as MONUSCO, the World Bank, the Congolese DDR commission, *Unité d'Exécution du Programme National de Désarmement, Démobilisation et Réinsertion* (UEPN-DDR), and local DDR organisations in eastern DRC. A partnership approach was an element of the DDR efforts by linking national and local actors, and giving civil society organisations in eastern DRC a voice on reintegration issues, particularly on issues pertinent to former female combatants and youth groups.[158] The DDR process in the DRC was very political, and affected by the political transition from Joseph Kabila to Félix Tshisekedi, as well as by international donors'

[157] https://www.interpeace.org/2021/06/investing-mediation-community/
[158] FBA, Insats-PM, Planering och uppföljning av insatser inom ramen för strategiuppdrag i Demokratiska Republiken Kongo (DRK): Lokalt kapacitetsbyggande: Facilitering av återanpassning av före detta kombattanter, 26 February 2021, pp. 7 & 10.

willingness to fund the DDR process (the World Bank funding ended in December 2018), and therefore UEPN-DDR's role diminished after 2018.

When Félix Tshisekedi, after winning the presidential election, could form a new government in August 2019, he appointed inter alia a new minister of planning. Subsequently, the priorities were changed. FBA noted that the future of UEPN-DDR became unclear. In addition, MONUSCO's future role in the DDR process was unclear.[159]

Efficiency

The Programme for Inclusive Peacebuilding (PCPI) was launched in 2017. PCPI aimed to contribute to two objectives within the framework of Sweden's strategy for development cooperation with the Democratic Republic of the Congo, thus, to: i) Strengthen the capacity of women's participation in peace and security promoting processes; and ii) Strengthen the capacity of the civil society and government institutions to prevent sexual and gender-based violence.

FBA noted in the planning and reporting document (*Insats-PM* for the PCPI), that the expected results from implementing PCPI would be enhanced capacity of targeted key government institutions and the civil society organisations to identify gender inequalities between women and men in society, as well as to strengthen the capacity to use different methods and tools to prevent these inequalities.[160] FBA also noted that PCPI aimed to promote enhanced dialogue between civil society and government institutions to enable broader cooperation in the long term.[161]

---

[159] Ibid., pp. 15, 17 & 21.
[160] FBA, Planering och uppföljning av insats inom ramen för bilateralt strategiuppdrag i Demokratiska republiken Kongo: Programmet för inkluderande fredsbyggande (PCPI), 22 January 2019, p. 4.
[161] Ibid., p. 8.

PCPI enrolled 24 participants (16 women and eight men) from Bukavu (South Kivu) in 2017, and 24 participants (11 women and 13 men) in 2018 from Goma (North Kivu) and two small regions in North Kivu, and one person from Kasai (central-south of the DRC). In 2018, eight of the participants worked in a government institution, and 16 participants worked for civil society. The target group for PCPI, according to FBA, was individuals (*'change agents'*) with strategic and senior positions within government institutions and civil society organisations in South- and North Kivu in eastern DRC whose institutional or organisational mandate related to Sweden's strategy with the DRC, such as DDR, Security Sector Reform (SSR), and UNSCR 1325.[162] Two participants from each organisation were enrolled during each training cycle (seven-to-nine months) to facilitate collaboration between the participants in order to improve the organisational capacity. By targeting the same organisations for the two training cycles, FBA hoped to establish deeper relations with the selected organisations, and thus ensure greater and sustained achievements.[163] This approach developed into a new programme, Inclusive Peacebuilding Programme – organisational change (PCPI 2.0), in 2018/2019, focusing on strengthening gender mainstreaming within ten participating organisations (three state institutions and seven CSOs).

FBA's approach to contributing to the prevention of SGBV and to women's participation in peace and security promotion processes focused on improving the conditions for individuals and organisations to work on those issues by foremost strengthening the knowledge and skills amongst participants (individuals). The analysis underlying the design and implementation of PCPI had to ensure that the content offered through PCPI was relevant to the context, participants and their organisations. Furthermore, the analysis also had to ensure that the most relevant participants were selected to

[162] FBA, Planering och uppföljning av insats inom ramen för bilateralt strategiuppdrag i Demokratiska republiken Kongo: Programmet för inkluderande fredsbyggande (PCPI), 22 January 2019, p. 16.
[163] Ibid., pp. 9 & 15.

effectively leverage their learning and influence their organisation and community. They are expected to take on a role as 'change agents' within their organisations. The analysis provided an understanding of the need for a network of key individuals (both men and women) with a certain level of social status or standing in terms of her or his informal leadership who could

FBA's expectation was that participants would gain strengthened capacity, and positively contribute to promote women's participation on issues related to peace and security as well as to prevent sexual and gender based violence. The programming of the training (PCPI) was not set out to '*solve'* specific conflicts but to empower women to actively participate in issues related to peace and security and to support men to play an active role in changing norms and attitudes particularly around masculinity. FBA's broader understanding of the context and conflict factors helped understandings of women's vulnerability to sexual violence, and the general lack of recognition within the society of the role and contribution of women to local peace and security processes. In addition, it was apparent to FBA that there was limited interaction and communication between public authorities and civil society at the local level in eastern DRC. These were insights influencing the design of the training.

According to an external evaluation by the Nordic Consulting Group (NCG) in 2019, participants attending the training were largely mid-level management and many of them were "able to influence at least some sectors and departments in their workplaces".[164] However, this was not a universal view as one mentor stated that "most of the people who came in, they didn't have power to make a change and the only thing they did was make a report to their manager but when it comes to profound changes, that was not easy. There were some in training who were really the responsible ones, but others were just

[164] FBA, Planering och uppföljning av insats inom ramen för bilateralt strategiuppdrag i Demokratiska republiken Kongo: Programmet för inkluderande fredsbyggande (PCPI), 22 January 2019, p. 20.

delegated and had no power to bring changes".[165] The NCG evaluation noted that although knowledge transfer "seems to have worked well and contributed to changes also within the organisations and among other staff, more work is needed to support knowledge transfer within the organisation" in order to achieve systematic and sustainable results (i.e. changes at the organisational level).[166]

PCPI consisted of three modules focusing on training participants to: *(i)* learn how to conduct a gender analysis and gender mainstream their organisations; *(ii)* promote women's participation in peace and security processes by using relevant tools; and *(iii)* prevent violence, and particularly sexual and gender-based violence by using relevant tools. Each module was five to six days long and was held in French in eastern DRC over a period of seven to nine months. The participants worked on an assignment during each module that was relevant to the daily work of their home organisation. Their work should produce an action plan on promoting gender equality and preventing SGBV. The participants were supported by Congolese mentors who were part of the group of trainers during the training and supported participants during the development and implementation of their action plans. The action plans after each module were a central element for the participants to engage their home organisations on a particular gender issue. FBA in Sweden supported the mentors in the DRC by providing both training and advice. The mentorship was a central element of PCPI, and FBA developed a concept for mentorship and training to clarify the roles and responsibilities between mentors and FBA. An external consultant was hired for training on conflict prevention. Furthermore, a local consultant was hired to assist FBA with managing logistics around the training, hotel arrangements, travel, etc.

---

[165] FBA, Planering och uppföljning av insats inom ramen för bilateralt strategiuppdrag i Demokratiska republiken Kongo: Programmet för inkluderande fredsbyggande (PCPI), 22 January 2019, p. 20.
[166] Ibid., pp. 22 & 24–25.

Other central components for facilitating learning and enabling sustainable results were FBA's Pedagogical Profile – a learner-centred approach – and the Kirkpatrick model for evaluation. FBA noted that the training was '*demand-driven'* and aimed to respond to local needs, and thus more adequately empower participants and secure local ownership.[167]

FBA's monitoring and evaluation (M&E) framework of PCPI tracked the percentage of participants who carried out a gender analysis; used FBA tools and methods to promote women's equal participation within their work; and carried out an analysis on how their organisation can contribute to prevent violence, specifically SGBV-related. Lastly, it aimed to identify "documented examples of changes in way of working/new initiatives".[168] The M&E framework was largely built on self-assessment of the extent to which they perceived improved capacity. In addition, FBA asked participants at the start of each week-long module to conduct an in-test, and then an out-test at the end of the module to monitor their learning during the training. The presentation of the action plans seemed to have been a key element of knowing whether the training actually translated into increased knowledge and changed practice within the home organisation or beyond in the community.

Following the PCPI training, FBA invited participants to be part of a local alumni network (RPCI) to continue exchanging and communicating with other participants as well as attending an annual Alumni meeting. RPCI consists of PCPI participants and former ITP participants (on UNSCR 1325) in the DRC and is a platform for sharing of practical examples, knowledge and dialogue around issues related to gender equality, including an aim to increase interaction and dialogue between duty bearers and right holders and to highlight the realities of different groups of women and men, including groups

[167] FBA, Planering och uppföljning av insats inom ramen för bilateralt strategiuppdrag i Demokratiska republiken Kongo: Programmet för inkluderande fredsbyggande (PCPI), 22 January 2019, p. 15.
[168] Ibid., p. 6.

affected by conflict, as well as aiming to contribute to institutional changes within the participating organisations. FBA notes that RPCI involved sharing of practical examples, knowledge and dialogue around issues related to gender equality, including an aim to increase interaction and dialogue between duty bearers and right holders and to highlight the realities of different groups of women and men, including groups affected by conflict.

FBA followed up PCPI with PCPI 2.0 in 2018 by focusing on the institutionalisation of gender mainstreaming. FBA stated in the planning and reporting document (Insats-PM for PCPI 2.0) that the purpose of PCPI 2.0 was to facilitate organisational change processes to strengthen gender mainstreaming practices in eight organisations (six CSOs and two government institutions, two organisations collaborate), represented by two participants per organisation (total of 16 participants in PCPI 2.0). FBA then signed a '*letter of cooperation'* with these organisations. PCPI 2.0 hoped to gain the buy-in and commitment from the leadership and management of the participating organisations to support gender mainstreaming initiatives developed by participants in the FBA workshops. FBA signed agreements with Congolese mentors who would support the selected organisations. FBA implemented three workshops in 2019 focusing on strengthening the strategic competence and capacity to apply different gender tools within the organisations to prioritise and address gender inequalities.[169] Some of the planned workshops were cancelled due to the Ebola outbreak.

Table A5.1 shows FBA's annual administrative and operational expenses between 2016 and 2019. The annual financial disbursement varied during the period.

[169] FBA, Planering och uppföljning av insats inom ramen för bilateralt strategiuppdrag i Demokratiska republiken Kongo: Fredsbyggarprogrammet 2.0, 2 March 2020, pp. 4, 7 & 10.

Table A5.1: Annual administrative and operational expenses for FBA's DRC portfolio

	2016 (tSEK)	2017 (tSEK)	2018 (tSEK)	2019 (tSEK)
Administration	2,811	3,665	4,786	4,217
Operations	970	2,539	7,033	4,451
Total	3,781	6,204	11,820	8,668

Source: FBA, Annual Reports, 2016–2019.

As Table A5.2 shows the annual operational expenses on PCPI, PCPI 2.0 and RCPI are very modest. The operational expenses for PCPI, PCPI 2.0 and RCPI are approximately 37–41 % of the administrative expenses for each year.

Table A5.2: Annual operational expenses for FBA's different interventions in the DRC

	2016 (tSEK)	2017 (tSEK)	2018 (tSEK)	2019 (tSEK)
Facilitation of re-integration of ex-combatants	0	516	3,524	1,251
PCPI	0	1,193	1,744	0
PCPI 2.0	0	0	0	1,071
RCPI	0	187	209	503
Other activities	970	643	1,556	1,625
Total	970	2,539	7,033	4,451

Source: FBA, Utfall Verksamhetskod, 2021-06-11.

Effectiveness

Sweden's strategy for development cooperation with the DRC was the first bilateral cooperation strategy for FBA to operationalise. As described above, FBA conducted an operational analysis (OPA) and then made decisions on which interventions to implement. FBA's

portfolio consisted initially of interventions to promote SSR, DDR, and WPS and prevent SGBV in the DRC. The portfolio evolved over time but within the framework and instructions of the Strategy with the DRC. FBA consistently worked on WPS and SGBV during the strategy period and, in accordance with the development cooperation strategy with the DRC, focused on strengthening the capacity of individuals and their organisations to include a gender perspective, promote equal participation of women and men in issues related to peace and security, and increase knowledge and skills to prevent SGBV.

Theories of change

The basic assumptions underpinning the Inclusive Peacebuilding Programme's (PCPI) theory of change was that training would contribute to increased knowledge and capacity of individuals, and thus contribute to positive norms and attitudes towards gender equality. The principal idea was that participants would use gained knowledge and tools to promote gender equality in their professions and prevent gender inequalities, such as lack of women's participation.

Figure A5.1: Theory of Change of the PCPI training



The focus of PCPI was on individuals, and then increasingly on institutions through PCPI 2.0 and RCPI. It is important to emphasise that PCPI was not about a specific peace process. Instead, it rose out of a recognition that a mutual understanding between civil society organisations (rights-bearers) and government institutions (duty-holders) about issues related to women, peace and security, and SGBV would contribute to collaboration on gender equality.[170]

[170] FBA, Planering och uppföljning av insats inom ramen för bilateralt strategiuppdrag i Demokratiska republiken Kongo: Programmet för inkluderande fredsbyggande (PCPI), 22 January 2019, p. 19.

In a 2019 FBA brief, *'Supporting Inclusive Peace Processes'*, FBA stated that "any serious conflict resolution efforts to achieve sustainable peace, need to ensure that all groups in society have opportunity to be heard and have their concerns addressed, but inclusion of marginalised groups demands genuine inclusion". Furthermore, "it will require a certain level of organisational, societal and cultural adjustment and change".[171]

The OPA and the design of PCPI identified a set of process and context factors that enabled and constrained the selection process of participants and their organisations. As mentioned earlier, FBA collaborated initially with KtK, Sida and local development actors in the DRC (particularly in eastern DRC) and drew on their experiences and networks for the selection process. An NCG evaluation of PCPI in 2019 noted that "there are other structures that FBA also should consider for their training programme".[172] It referenced leaders in religious communities, local chiefs and traditional leaders in both urban and rural areas.

FBA's monitoring and evaluation system does not yet provide any information about the long-term effects of PCPI. It raises questions about what can be expected from a training programme over nine months, including three one-week modules, development of the action plans and mentoring. All participants of PCPI were asked to send in an application to participate in the PCPI 2.0 if they were interested and had the management on-board for initiating a process to work on a gender inequality problem within their organization or in the external activities of the organization. FBA selected six CSOs and two government institutions to join PCPI 2.0 in 2019, an initiative to build on both existing relations with participating organisations and achievements from PCPI. FBA notes that "all participants of PCPI were asked to send in an application to participate in the PCPI 2.0 if they were interested and had the

[171] FBA, FBA Brief 2019, Supporting Inclusive Peace Processes, pp. 2–3.
[172] Nordic Consulting Group, Evaluation of Inclusive Peacebuilding Programme, 20 June 2019, p. 19.

management on-board for initiating a process to work on a gender inequality problem within their organisation or in the external activities of the organisation."

Key components of PCPI 2.0 were workshops and mentoring. FBA monitors and documents the processes for each partnership and tracks progress.

FBA held two workshops with the organisations in Bukavu and Goma to kick off the planning of the action plans for the organisations. Local mentors were assigned ten days per organisation during the year to support them with the development and implementation of action plans. Some mentors felt that the mentoring was insufficient due to working remotely with the organisations and not enough face-to-face time with the leaders of the organisations. Consequently, they felt that the implementation of activities was '*sluggish*'. FBA noted that the initiation of the action plans required more time than expected.[173] FBA notes that "many of the organisations had never before worked with trying to reach a desired change, they were mainly focused on doing workshops for a large amount of people, without reflecting on what change they wanted to achieve and how to get there."

FBA had planned several workshops for 2019, but many of them had to be cancelled during the second half of 2019 due to the Ebola outbreak. Some of the cancelled workshops were planned to focus on leadership issues. At the end of 2019, FBA managed to co-organise a workshop in Rwanda with one of the partners, Heal Africa. It focused on '*unconscious bias*' and aimed to address gender problems within the organisational culture.

Before the Ebola outbreak FBA supported a two-day workshop organised by Centre Olame, targeting 20 religious leaders (priests and nuns) in Bukavu. The participants of the workshop were introduced to using gender analysis to discuss the roles of men and women in

[173] FBA, Erfarenheter från PCPI 2.0, Dokumentation av åtgärdsplaner, processer och lärdomar från DRK 2019-2020, 30 March 2020, pp. 4–5.

their parish, and to find support for gender equality in the Bible. The results of the workshop were going to be used for implementing the action plan. The representative from Centre Olame who participated in PCPI 2.0 played a critical role in taking this forward. Any progress was dependent on the buy-in from higher-level management to support the implementation of the action plan and its purpose. FBA reported that changing attitudes is difficult. Although some of the religious leaders showed an interest in learning and using a gender-sensitive approach and inclusive language, Centre Olame was not able to demonstrate any institutional changes by the end of 2019.

The NCG evaluation noted that the institutionalisation of knowledge and skills that the participants gained during the training was less visible than the personal development they experienced. Some participants were not able to transfer their gained knowledge to the workplaces, which is a key assumption underlying PCPI's theory of change.[174] Although some participants noted that they were able to influence old practices at their workplaces, such as planning, organising and holding meetings (i.e. equal attendance and participation of women at meetings, using inclusive language), or editing written material to ensure it was aligned with the principles of 'inclusive language' and gender-disaggregated statistics, the NCG evaluation found that "no organisations had made systematic changes on a policy level" and "comprehensive structural changes have not been developed within the organisations".[175] This conclusion can be nuanced though as the evaluation provided several examples of PCPI's contributions from training participants in conducting gender analysis and using inclusive language and identifying gender-specific needs. According to the NCG evaluation many participants feel they are part of a movement to change the gender roles in society.[176]

---

[174] Nordic Consulting Group, Evaluation of Inclusive Peacebuilding Programme, 20 June 2019, pp. 22 & 33.
[175] Ibid., pp. 24–25 & 32.
[176] Nordic Consulting Group, Evaluation of Inclusive Peacebuilding Programme, 20 June 2019, p. 26.

The evaluation team notes that the institutionalisation of gender equality is a long-term process as attitudes, norms and behaviour do not change easily. FBA is very much aware of this challenge and is encouraged by the positive response it gets from the participants. Most organisations participating in PCPI 2.0 struggle with institutionalisation of gender equality, and in many cases the mentors and the representatives from the participating organisations have worked very hard to establish an action plan. Producing an action plan is an achievement in itself, then implementing activities can be even harder because it requires buy-in from the management and not least the capacity, availability and commitment by the participant who represents the organisation to lead the implementation of the action plan.

For example, FBA's cooperation with the Police Nationale Congolaise (PNC) focused on promoting gender equality at two police stations in South Kivu. The PCPI 2.0 participant prioritised one head of unit who turned out to be very difficult to engage in activities. The participant and FBA's mentors put a lot of efforts into engaging the head of unit, who was considered critical for institutionalising gender equality with the police in South Kivu. After several months, the head of unit started to be responsive to the mentors and the participant's call for implementing the action plan. Almost a year into the implementation of the action plan the increased responsiveness by the head of the unit at the police was one of the main results, besides having organised a larger workshop for 20 police officers to discuss gender issues within the police.[177]

A mentor raised a concern that "foreign ideas are difficult to introduce, and it is vital that ideas come from the people themselves in the communities, and not from Europe". Similarly, a participant noted it was challenging to change customs: People would ask her "why do you want to change our customs?", and she realised that in order to successfully bring more women into public discussions and

[177] FBA, Monitoring overview organisations, 2019–2020. (Excel-file).

meetings, the elders in the communities had to be targeted as they are the '*keepers of customs'*. Their role is to ensure that customs are respected. They told her and others who promote gender equality that they have no right to push for gender equality and changes of old customs in the communities. She and other PCPI participants believe that any efforts to promote gender equality at the local level must be coordinated with systematic and institutional efforts at the national level. She continued noting that any efforts must start with sensitisation of men and women and to learn about the attitudes and behaviour around gender issues in order to change traditional customs. She welcomed greater collaboration between UN agencies and FBA to support local initiatives by facilitating dialogue with provincial authorities.

The annual RCPI meetings that bring together alumni from PCPI and ITP have also been used for inviting the director of the legal department at the Ministry of Gender, Family and Children who is also the national coordinator for UNSCR 1325 and a member of RCPI. She and other colleagues participated during one RCPI meeting in conjunction with the 20-year anniversary of Resolution 1325, as well as in other meetings. The occasion seems to have been an opportunity to introduce the participants and their work to the director, but it is unclear whether the interaction has so far had any further impact on how local NGOs in eastern DRC liaise with the national institution. As FBA noted that "one of the aims of the RCPI is to create a link between actors in the east with the national level to make visible the voices of conflict affected women and men. However, the ministry is generally a very weak structure with hardly any resources." One participant was not particularly impressed by the Ministry of Gender, Family and Children in Kinshasa as he noted they seemed rather clueless about the challenges facing women's organisations in eastern DRC.

The evaluation team recognises that the main results from FBA's work to promote gender equality and prevent sexual and gender-based violence are at the individual level. It is critical to understand

the scope of FBA's interventions and the different partnerships within PCPI, PCPI 2.0 and RCPI. FBA's work through these interventions has the potential to encourage individuals in their organisations and communities to be champions for gender issues and engage other individuals. FBA's intervention targets the individual level, but in a very complex and fragile environment shaped by culture, norms and customs that are very different from the meaning of gender equality. Of course, it matters if a few individuals are empowered to pursue the ideals and principles of gender equality and preventing SGBV, but it is critical to understand that FBA's interventions were not designed to address the institutionalisation of gender equality at a national level or even at a level that engages national or larger processes. FBA notes that "the interventions were developed within the framework of the national action plan on UN Security Council Resolution 1325, a national policy framework that the work of FBA aims to contribute to." The evaluation team finds that this is a gap in FBA's approach which should have linked explicitly with other international organisations and UN agencies' efforts that work on similar issues.

Therefore, it would have been helpful if FBA's theory of change had explicitly linked PCPI's efforts around the transformational changes occurring at the individual level with how it could contribute to changing behaviour and norms in the community and the society, and how it affects peace, security and development. FBA refers to link between gender equal norms and attitudes and levels of violence in the OPA. Participants highlighted the importance of identifying people who have changed their attitudes and behaviour within the communities and organise community dialogues where these people testify and tell others about their own transformation and the effects it has had on their family and community. These are according to many participants "powerful agents of change" because they are known by the community and therefore the change is noticeable.

At the heart of FBA's work is changing attitudes towards gender equality through workshop activities discussing strategic approached and a focus on change processes. FBA's efforts are laudable given the highly complex environment and limited resources, but the achievements are unfortunately confined to their local context and with weak links to national institutions and processes, although the Ministry of Gender is very much part of FBA's work, it is the Ministry that is responsible for the WPS issues in the DRC.

The evaluation team thinks it was wise of FBA not to use a strict planning and M&E system, as it would likely not have been meaningful for such an unpredictable and uncertain context, and with FBA's limited influence on partners and implementation of activities. Thus, what is missing is a framework or an approach for how to link and support the transformational changes occurring at individual level with changing behaviour and strategies for solving complex problems around norms and attitudes towards masculinity and femininity. Some participants showed effective ways of working that enabled them to adopt solutions to prevalent problems. These examples could be better documented, and other people could learn what works and what does not from these.

FBA's own research unit could have been utilised more effectively to provide inputs and recommendations on how to optimise FBA's role in the DRC context. The evaluation team recognizes that the research unit was also involved in the analysis and OPA of the second strategy period in 2020 (which is not covered by this evaluation period). The evaluation team thinks, however, that there is need for better understanding of how change in knowledge leads to change in attitudes and behaviour. PCPI did not describe these linkages and assumptions well enough to build on the change in knowledge of gender equality and SGBV.

Further to PCPI, the theory of change focused on the relationship between the individual and the institution, and the role the specific government institution could have on promoting gender equality and

preventing SGBV, but on the other hand, PCPI in practice focused on empowering individuals to lead and live their lives by the principles of gender equality.

FBA set out that PCPI aimed to strengthen the capacity of duty-holders (state actors – the police, courts, specific commissions (small arms and light weapons & DDR), ministries of gender and justice) to ensure men and women's rights in the society, or rights-bearers (journalists, human rights defenders, religious organisations and other CSOs) to represent and advocate for better living conditions for women and men among vulnerable groups. [178] The difference between what PCPI set out to achieve and what PCPI actually contributed to is pronounced. There are a few issues with PCPI's theory of change in relation to the long-term objectives and outcomes. PCPI was far too modest in size and intensity to mobilise resources for achieving institutional changes in the DRC. The number of duty-holders was low, and the interaction with the participating institutions was largely limited to the training occasions and the efforts by the mentors in-between the training modules. FBA's staff are in regular contact with participants and seem to have a very close working relationship. The participating government institutions were provincial and represented by mid-level staff.

These institutions included the Division of Justice in North Kivu and the Divisions for Health and Gender in South Kivu. The institutions also included the Ministry of Gender in South Kivu, the division of Gender at the territorial level in South Kivu, the Division of Gender in North Kivu, the PNC in South Kivu, the Division for Social Affairs in North Kivu, the Commission on small arms and light weapons in South Kivu, the national DDR agency, UEPN-DDR and the civil protection agency in Beni. One mentor reflected and noted that FBA should have created a link between the ministries and the organisations in PCPI (including also 2.0) and

[178] FBA, Planering och uppföljning av insats inom ramen för bilateralt strategiuppdrag i Demokratiska republiken Kongo: Programmet för inkluderande fredsbyggande (PCPI), 22 January 2019, p. 18.

RCPI to facilitate collaboration, but the feeling was that they were working alone and not connected with the national secretariats within the ministries. Although as FBA noted "the Ministry of Gender has been represented and has presented their work in each network meeting of RCPI between 2017 and 2020. Work has also focused on increasing collaboration, which has resulted in a few new collaborations. During these occasions, the PCPI organisations has been able to present their work, including successes and lessons learned", the perception is still that there is a weak link between the work in the eastern territories and the ministries in the capital.

Furthermore, the mentor said that she would have expected FBA to have documented the work of the organisations to collect '*success stories*' to be shared with the ministries and other national key actors. This would have increased visibility and recognition of the effectiveness of the training and created momentum for wider institutional change.

The evaluation team finds that cases demonstrating transformational changes of individuals should have been built upon, not as much from an institutional perspective but from a network perspective because capacity building of institutions and organisations requires significantly more technical support than what FBA could offer. The evaluation team believes that RCPI is an initiative that could be further developed to support, facilitate and increase the exchange of experiences among PCPI alumni. Mentors have noted that participants seek collaboration with others to achieve changes. As noted in the NCG evaluation, "knowledge should be spread both to cover important national structures as well as other more traditional and religious structures".[179] The evaluation team believes that this is better done through continuing to empower individuals rather than targeting organisations and government institutions.

[179] Nordic Consulting Group, Evaluation of Inclusive Peacebuilding Programme, 20 June 2019, p. 34.

As mentioned by several participants and mentors, FBA should be better at documenting and sharing '*success stories'* within their network. Furthermore, mentors believe that FBA's pedagogical approach can be further developed to capitalise on the capacity and experiences of individuals. The institutionalisation of a gender perspective in the government institutions is very important, but there need to be comprehensive long-term strategies that identify entry points for interventions and strong management buy-in for institutionalising a gender perspective. Such strategies and approaches were not part of FBA's theory of change.

What difference have the FBA's initiatives made?

FBA's contributions through PCPI to peace are at the individual level. It indirectly contributed to reinforce greater commitment and capacity to peacefully manage conflicts that arise in society. FBA's efforts helped participants and mentors in PCPI to go into the communities and talk about the roles and responsibilities of men and women to support peace. This indirect and sometimes informal way of contributing to social cohesion and peace is also well aligned with the Swedish MFA's strategy with the DRC.

The NCG evaluation noted that "many participants have changed their norms and attitudes as a result of the programme, which is reflected in changes in behaviour both in their professional and private lives".[180] It concluded that "the strongest result from the programme is that course participants have gained new insights, they recognise gender inequalities both in their private and professional life to a larger extent than before".[181]

The evaluation team reaffirms the findings of the NCG evaluation that many PCPI participants found their experience during the training programme personally transformative. Listening to the participants describing what achievements they were most proud of;

[180] Nordic Consulting Group, Evaluation of Inclusive Peacebuilding Programme, 20 June 2019, pp. 21 & 23.
[181] Ibid., p. 33.

their stories were strikingly personal. Male participants often spoke about how the training had changed their attitudes and behaviour towards gender equality at the household level and opened their eyes to pay attention to be more aware of gender-specific needs at work and in the community. What we heard from participants and mentors of PCPI were stories about changes that often started with the participants themselves. As one participant stated, "FBA contributed to small changes that have the potential to bring bigger changes", because learning the instrument for applying gender analysis helped her start advocating for changes in her own household and community, and as time has gone by, she is starting to see more changes in her life and those around her. Both men and women come to ask her questions about how they should relate to gender equality within their families and with neighbours.

What seem to be the main effects of PCPI are empowered individuals who are inspired and motivated to use tools and methods offered by PCP, for gender equality and prevention of SGBV in communities in North and South Kivu. In most cases, participants made use of what they learned by suggesting changes to how their home organisations should communicate in an inclusive language, ensure a gender balance or gender inclusion at meetings and working groups and that everyone can express herself/himself, make it possible for women to attain decision-making positions, pay attention to gender-specific issues and gender-disaggregated data and information when analysing and drafting reports. Interviewees explained to the evaluation team that they used the learning and material from PCPI when they designed their own training exercises for their colleagues, partners or people in the communities.[182] In a context where women and young girls are sexually abused and exploited by the warring parties during the war, and not allowed to participate in discussions, FBA's training helped PCPI participants

[182] FBA, Planering och uppföljning av insats inom ramen för bilateralt strategi-uppdrag i Demokratiska republiken Kongo: Programmet för inkluderande fredsbyggande (PCPI), 22 January 2019, pp. 23–24.

to start talking about sexual and gender-based violence. Today, several participants feel they can actively participate in discussions because they feel confident. One participant felt particularly proud of having established a Women's Forum of 15 women and girls who meet once a week to discuss gender issues in the community, and having secured a place for a woman from this forum to work with the local authorities to improve the response to protection of women in the community. In addition to the forum, a network consisting of local NGOs has been organised for holding meetings about protection issues in the community.

Overall, FBA's own documentation reveals that PCPI 2.0 contributed to increased interest in and knowledge of social structures and gender norms, and confidence and motivation at the individual level. The empowerment of individuals encouraged many participants to initiate activities to promote gender equality. Some participants felt encouraged and prepared to take on new roles and responsibilities such as running for student council or a board position. At the University of Bukavu, female students accepted to be spokespersons and faculty delegates and engaged in decision-making processes, and male teachers started to integrate a gender perspective into their teaching. In some projects, participants carried out studies and mapping of existing gender inequalities within organisations and communities.[183] Some organisations learned from their internal gender analysis that women were discriminated against, as only men benefitted from medical care. If this issue could be resolved it would be a positive result from a gender analysis, but it cannot be accounted for as evidence for overall institutionalisation of a gender perspective in FBA's partner organisations.

[183] FBA, Erfarenheter från PCPI 2.0, Dokumentation av åtgärdsplaner, processer och lärdomar från DRK 2019–2020, 30 March 2020, pp. 5-26. FBA, Monitoring overview organisations, 2019–2020. (Excel-file).

PCPI 2.0 was very process-oriented by supporting and facilitating the design and implementation of the action plans. Although the focus of PCPI 2.0 was supposed to be more on institutionalisation of gender equality, the process remained largely focused on informing individuals about gender equality.

FBA's efforts in the eastern part of the DRC were not linked to any specific peace or security processes, but aimed to build individual and institutional capacity in gender equality and prevention of SGBV. Although FBA's efforts were not explicitly linked with any local peace processes, they seemed to have created opportunities for positive unintended effects on participation of women and inclusion of gender equality in processes to strengthen dialogue and collaboration in communities.

What has made a difference, for whom, under what circumstances and why?

What is striking about FBA's small-scale efforts are that the participants themselves were able, during the training programme, to identify existing problems and formulate solutions for their wider local context. The combination of '*action plans'* and traditional lectures and seminars seem to have contributed to a strong sense of ownership among participants. This is partly why the programme reporting covers many different gender-related issues that have been worked on by participants. Interestingly, some participants from a government institution showed strong motivation, despite the inability or unwillingness of their organisation to financially support their work at the village level in Goma. The Division Provinciale de Genre/Maison de la Femme in Goma did not pay the transport for the representatives in PCPI 2.0 to visit the Comité de Paix et de Dévelopment du Quartier (CPDQ) to work on gender mainstreaming in the local peace and development plans at the village level. FBA assisted the participants through the local consultant who provided transport. Another government institution, Division de la Justice, ended its cooperation with FBA, probably due to the financial reason that they were not able to fund the activities

within the PCPI 2.0.[184] FBA was very careful to not raise expectations of financial support among partners. FBA consistently communicated that they are not able to fund work and projects within their programme. It is partly the empowerment of and opportunity for many participants in the training to influence their workplace and community that have engendered ownership. PCPI's process approach seems to have offered participants time to reflect and enabled them to understand and identify linkages between gender equality and peace, security and development. In addition, it also allowed participants to understand what it requires from them and their organisations to achieve desired results. Finally, it seems to have made many participants recognise the importance of trust, relationships, time and flexibility to promote gender equality and prevent SGBV.

Participants and mentors appreciated learning from FBA and PCPI's different modules, exercises, and development of action plans after the modules. They often described that the learning of new tools and methods helped them see 'things' differently in their personal and professional lives, and they have enjoyed using what they have learned. The application of what they learned depended largely on the confidence of the participant to take it forward within her or his organisation, or initiate an activity in the community.

The participants decided what they wanted to focus on when developing their action plans for each module (consequently each participant produced three action plans). Subsequently, subject matters for the action plans differed widely among the participants depending on their professional orientation or organisational association. For instance, after finishing the first module (focusing on conducting a gender analysis), participants representing the provincial divisions for health and gender in North Kivu conducted a joint mapping of women and men's access to public health services.

---

[184] FBA, Planering och uppföljning av insats inom ramen för bilateralt strategiuppdrag i Demokratiska republiken Kongo: Fredsbyggarprogrammet 2.0, 2 March 2020, pp. 17 & 23.

The mapping disaggregated the data from a gender, ethnic and socioeconomic perspective. The results demonstrated widespread discrimination in terms of equal access to health. Another organisation (local interfaith CSO) used PCPI's tools and material and FBA's mentoring for developing training for religious actors to change norms and attitudes towards gender equality.[185]

When we asked PCPI participants to describe how people live in the communities in eastern DRC, they shared stories of horrific violence, political instability and highly patriarchal structures. Their or neighbouring villages had been attacked by rebels and militias, children in the villages were missing, killed, abducted and raped. Both adults and children suffered from severe physical and psychological trauma. It is a very fragile society, vulnerable to manipulation and social destruction. The state institutions at the national level have almost no meaning in eastern DRC, and local institutions have extremely weak institutional capacity to protect citizens from physical and psychological harm. Participants noted that people are more dependent on multilateral organisations (different UN agencies) and international CSOs for their well-being rather than on national government institutions. Sadness, anxiety, and grief are emotions experienced by many adults and youth. Thus, when a mentor reflected what he felt proud of, he stated "to have convinced an infamous rebel with '*blood on his hands'* to change his life away from a violent past fighting for the rebels to start leading a peaceful life in his community". There, the PCPI's contributions to peace have a very tangible meaning. This was not an achievement of a government institution after it had successfully developed institutional capacity and gender mainstreamed its processes to include a gender perspective, promote equal participation of women and men in peace processes, or preventing SGBV. This was an achievement by a mentor in PCPI who felt empowered and inspired by FBA to challenge local norms and attitudes around masculinity and femininity in the communities by speaking directly to rebels.

---

[185] FBA, Planering och uppföljning av insats inom ramen för bilateralt strategi-uppdrag i Demokratiska republiken Kongo: Programmet för inkluderande fredsbyggande (PCPI), 22 January 2019, p. 25.

Furthermore, asked about the opportunities emerging from participation in PCPI, participants answered that FBA helped them support women to raise their voices at the provincial level. Thanks to feeling connected and associated with a 'larger' network through RCPI, their confidence allowed them to engage with the women in the communities and advocate for protection against sexual and gender-based violence at the provincial level. One participant organised a petition and collected 316 signatures from local NGOs in eastern DRC to stop the violence against women and girls in the context of Covid-19, which was launched by the UN Secretary General.

This is an example of how PCPI could have linked PCPI's efforts at transformational changes on the individual level with how it could contribute to changing behaviour and norms in the community and the society. As several PCPI mentors noted, many criminal men, old as well as young, who are members of militia are ready to listen when the mentors speak about positive masculinity and the benefits of changing their violent way of life. They believed in the concept of being a 'champion' who can advocate and convince others in their network to change their behaviour. Therefore, building networks of 'champions' to effectively contribute to changing norms and attitudes was their advice. They also emphasised that PCPI enabled local '*champions'* to go deeper into the communities that have been affected by violence and help people to change their behaviour. The killings and violence are often senseless. People often do not even know why they are killing other people, but revenge feeds revenge. Children are born into a culture of violence and war. There is a lack of role models. Thus, it takes a lot of courage and commitment to go into those communities and engage community members in dialogue about positive masculinity, which often starts with talking about fathers caring for their children, and involvement in domestic tasks. According to the mentor, those households in the communities become more resilient, but engagement in the communities requires flexibility, adaptiveness and innovation to both communicate and educate parents about their roles and

responsibilities in the household and in the community. It also requires continuity in the form of repeated interventions to communicate and raise awareness in order to change behaviour, which is hard to maintain due to insecurity and lack of funds.

Thus, the primary purpose of training is to increase individuals' knowledge, but when the evaluation team asked participants and mentors what enables changing attitudes and norms in the communities, they answered that it is dedicated individuals who are willing to serve other people, and have fully 'bought into' the concept of gender equality and mainstreamed it into their own lives. These individuals are considered 'champions' and are personally convinced and committed, and have therefore the motivation that it requires to '*spread the gospel*'. One mentor took gender equality as part of her life after she participated in the training. She was 'converted' and experienced a feeling of being a gender equality champion.

The NCG evaluation concluded that PCPI participants found the training "unique in relation to other gender trainings in the DRC", and "it is clear that participants would try to continue to be 'gender champions' within their families and communities".[186]

Coordination

Sweden's strategy for development cooperation with the Democratic Republic of the Congo commissioned both FBA and Sida to contribute to the fulfilment of the Strategy. These two government agencies have different mandates. FBA is a self-implementing organisation and Sida is a donor agency for international development cooperation. Sida managed a budget of SEK 1,225 million, while FBA managed SEK 25 million for activities in the DRC during 2015–2019. Sida's country portfolio

[186] Nordic Consulting Group, Evaluation of Inclusive Peacebuilding Programme, 20 June 2019, p. 2.

consisted of many partnerships with both UN agencies and NGOs to contribute to the fulfilment of the Swedish strategy, while FBA designed and implemented its own interventions in the DRC.

There are no tangible cumulative results from any collaboration between FBA and Sida. There are not yet any clear strategic synergies or catalytic effects from the coordination between Sida and FBA.

Sida staff for the DRC country programme are located at the embassy of Sweden in Kinshasa, while FBA staff are located in Sweden. FBA and Sida's cycles for planning and follow-up do not overlap in time. There is no joint undertaking or collaboration on conflict analysis or other relevant analysis, but each agency has its own process. FBA's OPA and other analyses are often conducted by staff members within FBA's DRC team, but with rather limited interaction with FBA's own research unit. The evaluation team believes that in such a complex environment as the DRC, and particularly eastern DRC, it would have been meaningful to strengthen the link between research and programme design to identify and validate as many underlying assumptions as possible for strengthening the connections between different result levels.

The collaboration between Sida and FBA evolved over the years and improved. It was a period of learning for both agencies. All communication is between FBA in Sweden and Sida in the DRC. The embassy in the DRC is fully delegated and has the decision-making power over aid funds. As a self-implementing organisation, FBA's operational level was mostly at the level of Sida's partners. Sida's partners were mostly international organisations and FBA was mostly interested in local organisations in the DRC, and particularly eastern DRC. As FBA started planning for interventions in the DRC, Kvinna till Kvinna was particularly helpful during the inception phase with providing contacts and information about local organisations. The inception period for PCPI lasted for a year and involved several exchanges with KtK. At the beginning, the exchange of information was not as extensive with Sida, partly because FBA's role and mandate were new to Sida. FBA organised

an event in 2019 at the Swedish embassy in Kinshasa with a focus on strengthening the collaboration with Sida, and explaining what FBA's role and mandate is, and FBA's tools and networks. However, FBA noted that synergies existed between FBA and the Swedish embassy; for instance, when FBA helped the embassy with contacts and meetings with the DDR commission in Kinshasa. Similarly, the embassy helped put FBA in contact with actors at the national level, or provided contacts with Sidas partners.

FBA and Sida have had a regular dialogue for sharing information and use each other's networks, but did not undertake joint planning sessions. Sida and FBA met physically on an annual basis and remotely on digital platforms every month. Sida and FBA worked more closely together during the planning of Sweden's new strategy for development cooperation with the DRC 2021 and forward.

Sida believes that its partner organisations in the DRC were an asset for FBA. For instance, FBA collaborated with some of Sida's partners that suggested different local organisations to PCPI. Similarly, FBA's network in the DRC, and particularly eastern DRC, is valuable to Sida, as FBA, according to Sida, has raised awareness of UNSCR 1325 in this region. Furthermore, Sida staff think that Sida and FBA complement each other well within the peace and security sector, and particularly the 1325 agenda in the DRC, and how to work with state actors on these issues. Sweden does not fund any state actors nor have any cooperation frameworks with state actors, but it can work through its partners such as UN agencies (UNICEF, UNDP, UN Women) that work closely with state actors.

Sida staff believe that the collaboration with FBA will become more effective when FBA has an office in the DRC, because FBA's remote work did not offer regular exchanges and consultations that can benefit the implementation of interventions. Furthermore, Sida staff believe that FBA can play a more active role if they are located in the DRC and communicate more easily with national and provincial government institutions to advocate for peace and security issues and achieve results.

FBA and Sida have to some degree coordinated their activities with each other within the peace and security sector, and more specifically within women, peace and security. The coordination included sharing information, inviting each other to activities but less in terms of including FBA in a Sida-specific strategy for women, peace and security, or including Sida's partners in FBA's strategy for women, peace and security. Some Sida staff consider FBA to be an expert organisation in different thematic areas such as gender (women, peace and security), dialogue, DDR, etc. However, some FBA staff noted that FBA could probably be more effective when FBA's role is more clearly defined in relation to a national political process, rather than working more broadly with building capacity at the individual level and mostly within civil society, where there are already many other international CSOs. What seems to be desired at large from within FBA is to clearly identify what FBA's comparative advantage is in the implementation of Sweden's development cooperation strategies. FBA staff beyond the DRC team raised this issue and asked whether FBA should be a Swedish government agency that mostly provides training to individuals within civil society, when other international organisations can do a similar job. Some FBA staff found that one of FBA's comparative advantages is that FBA can link civil society with government institutions. RCPI is one example that allowed representatives from CSOs in eastern DRC to meet representatives from national state actors during an annual meeting in Kinshasa. But according to FBA staff, it would have been difficult to go beyond RCPI activities because FBA did not have the entry point or the resources in the DRC to work more strategically with national state actors. Since FBA and Sida cannot work directly with state actors in the DRC, it appears as a paradox that Sweden's strategy aims to build and strengthen the rule of law, gender equality, and human rights. Some FBA staff found that it was problematic to work in parallel with the state structure but working directly with it would also have been very complicated because the state is 'dysfunctional'. There is a general recognition that the state in the DRC has low willingness to reform, weak capacity to change,

a weak mandate and no resources. In such a context, working with individuals through training and mentoring was one of the few options that FBA staff believed could work. Sida staff noted that FBA successfully contributed to increasing the knowledge and raising awareness about UNSCR 1325, and increased women's participation in peace processes. Sida recognised FBA's very modest budget for activities in the DRC and believed that FBA's strategy to focus on UNSCR 1325 in eastern DRC was a good path forward to establish itself within this thematic area.

FBA's coordination with international actors to strengthen combined results

The key international actors in the DRC are UN agencies. FBA's focus on women, peace and security meant that UN Women was a key UN agency for collaboration and exchange of information. The country director of UN Women participated in one of the RCPI meetings. Staff from UN Women also participated in FBA's global training course. UN Women is also the main UN agency in the DRC to liaise with the Ministry of Gender. These two organisations 'own' the gender agenda in the DRC, and other UN agencies are expected to coordinate with them. It was however not easy for FBA to find a way to collaborate with them because it was difficult for them to define how FBA could assist them with advancing their work on agenda 1325. FBA collaborated with the embassy of Sweden, the Ministry of Gender, UN Women, MONUSCO, and a national movement in the DRC on organising the event to celebrate the 20th anniversary of UNSCR 1325, which took place in conjunction with FBA's RCPI meeting in Kinshasa.

Within the WPS sector, the interaction with MONUSCO was limited, although FBA seconded staff to MONUSCO in Goma and Kinshasa. It seems as if the scope and the different layers of bureaucracy of the UN agencies make it less meaningful for FBA to seek active collaboration with them, as it would require that FBA have the available resources to adequately engage with them.

The NCG evaluation stated that "FBA should engage in liaising with other international organisations and agencies to encourage and support strong synergy effects. It could be particularly important to engage other donors in jointly supporting the network structure and the continuation of the mentors' group engagement and to ensure that they can spear the knowledge they have gained further, beyond the FBA programme".[187]

[187] Nordic Consulting Group, Evaluation of Inclusive Peacebuilding Programme, 20 June 2019, p. 34.

Annex 6. Colombia case study

Relevance

The Folke Bernadotte Academy (FBA) was instructed by the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA) in 2016 to contribute to the fulfilment of the Strategy for Sweden's development cooperation with Colombia, 2016–2020 (hereafter referred to as the Strategy with Colombia). FBA was instructed to contribute to *"peacebuilding and state-building, as well as sustainable development. The aim is to support Colombia in the implementation of a negotiated peace by contributing to sustainable peace and human security"*.[188] FBA's contributions during the period was financed in accordance with the terms for appropriation in appropriation directions for each financial year. The total budget for FBA's contributions was SEK 30 million for five years. The total financial appropriation for the Strategy with Colombia was SEK 950 million.[189]

According to the Strategy with Colombia, FBA was commissioned to contribute to the following three intervention areas:[190]

- Strengthened capacity in public institutions and civil society to work on conflict prevention and peacebuilding measures, such as disarmament, demobilisation and sustainable reintegration (DDR).
- Improved conditions for respect for human rights, gender equality and the principles of the rule of law in security sector reform (SSR) work.

[188] Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Sweden, Strategy for development cooperation with Colombia, 2016–2020, p. 3.
[189] Ibid., p. 3.
[190] Ibid., p 4.

- Greater influence and meaningful participation for women and girls in the peace process, in accordance with the UN Security Council's resolutions on women, peace and security.

The Strategy with Colombia noted that FBA should "help improve the capacity of the national Colombian actors involved in the implementation of the peace process and who aim to disarm, demobilise and reintegrate the agreement's combatants and other people associated with them into civilian life. The FBA's activities should also contribute to increased application of democratic principles, respect for human rights and greater gender equality in the security sector. Particular attention and support are to be given to women's and girls' participation in all parts of the peace process. The starting point should be national priorities, human rights, gender equality and the principles contained in Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security and subsequent resolutions".[191]

Programming

The cooperation between FBA and the Agency for Reincorporation and Standardisation (ARN) goes back many years, to 2008. ARN is a government agency under the Presidential Office to support the transition of former combatants to live a peaceful and civilian life. It facilitates the reintegration and reincorporation processes after people have been demobilised. ARN is present throughout Colombia through 20 regional offices. FBA's support focused on ARN's efforts to successfully reintegrate members of Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia/the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) – Ejército del Pueblo (EP). ARN's efforts were part of the final peace agreement to support affected population as well as former combatants. ARN's main role is to lead

[191] Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Sweden, Strategy for development cooperation with Colombia, 2016–2020, pp. 8–9.

and coordinate the design and implementation of the reintegration and reincorporation processes to contribute to coexistence, reconciliation and sustainable development in Colombia.

The role of FBA in the partnership with ARN was to provide training, mentorship and advise on the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) process, as well as gender mainstreaming and women's rights. FBA supported ARN with the DDR process through four regional forums in conflict/fragile areas, convening both representatives from local government and civil society actors. Secondly, FBA supported parliamentarians, the Office for National Security Council, the Ministry of Justice and national think tanks through SSR training. Thirdly, FBA supported ARN to mainstream gender in its organisation and operations through training and advice to better serve the needs of both male and female ex-combatants in the DDR process and peace process.

The organisational set-up

Like FBA's interventions in the DRC and Liberia, the scope and number of the interventions in Colombia were modest. The budget for the period 2016–2020 comprised a total of SEK 30 million for activities implemented by FBA. The total budget for Sweden's development cooperation with Colombia 2016–2020 was SEK 950 million, of which SEK 920 million was for activities implemented by Sida. FBA's budget covered both administrative and operational costs for FBA's three main intervention areas focusing on DDR, gender and SSR. The administrative costs constituted between 48 %–76 % of the total annual financial disbursement between 2016–2019. The number of full-time (100 %) staff for FBA's bilateral cooperation with Colombia increased from 1.40 in 2016 to 5.11 in 2019. FBA's portfolio for the bilateral cooperation in Colombia was coordinated by a full-time project manager throughout the period 2016–2019. In addition, the percentage of time spent on ARN by the thematic project managers varied from

65 % on DDR and 50 % on gender activities. Also, a consultant was hired in 2017 for six months to be a gender advisor to ARN. The financial disbursement during the period 2016–2019 on gender-related support to ARN comprised approximately SEK 420,000, and approximately SEK 230,000 on DDR-related support to ARN. In addition, the costs for training activities on DDR, UNSCR 1325, and SSR for different actors was approximately a SEK 2.6 million between 2016–2019. In 2019 FBA deployed a full-time employee based at the embassy of Sweden in Bogotá who coordinates with Team Sweden and cooperates mostly with Sida, but also with the embassy of Sweden, which has used some of his time for non-programme-specific work. The consultant, and then later the placement of a person at the Swedish embassy in Bogotá, were critical in contributing to the achievements in terms of gender mainstreaming. The close dialogue and collaboration helped to advance the work.

Conflict context

Civil conflict in Colombia has left as many as 220,000 dead, 25,000 disappeared, and five–seven million displaced over the last half century. A peace process between the government and leaders of FARC, the country's largest insurgent group, halted the violence in 2016. The 2016 Nobel Prize winner President Juan Manuel Santos was ineligible for re-election, having already served for two terms. Santos began negotiations with the FARC in 2012 and reached a historic peace agreement in 2016. Since then, the process has faced many challenges. Political parties supporting the peace agreement lost a plebiscite in October 2016 to the opposition by a wafer-thin margin.[192] A few months later, a revised version of the peace accord was ratified. The former president Álvaro Uribe was a fervent opponent to Santos' efforts to negotiate peace with the FARC. His political party Democratic Centre (Centro Democrático, CD) was opposed to the peace process from the outset. CD's candidate,

[192] 50.2 % of voters rejected the peace agreement, and 49.8 % voted for it.

Iván Duque, was elected president in 2018.[193] President Duque has been criticised for trying to '*undermine'* the peace agreement since he became president. Our interviews with FBA's stakeholders in Colombia note that the political environment in Colombia is still highly polarised and mistrust and suspicion of the Colombian state runs deep among FARC-Ep combatants as well as others.

The peace agreement outlined a timetable for FARC's members to gather in cantonments across the country to turn in their arms to a UN commission (the UN Verification Mission in Colombia), as well as setting out a pathway for former fighters to enter civilian life again. In late 2016 FARC members moved to provisional settlement areas, referred to as *'Territorial Areas for Training and Reintegration Spaces'* (Espacios Territoriales de Capacitación y Reincorporación, ETCRs), administrated by ARN. In the ETCRs, ARN carried out training and reintegration activities to facilitate reintegration/reincorporation of the members of the FARC-Ep to civilian life. Similarly, the ETCRs aimed to contribute to better relations between FARC members and the community stakeholders. It was a platform for convening different local stakeholders (governments and mayors) and the FARC members and their families. In June 2017 the United Nations political mission in Colombia verified that FARC guerrillas who accepted the peace agreement with the government had handed over their weapons to the mission. 13,589 members of the FARC have been demobilised and accredited. Close to 10,000 former combatants reside outside former ETCRs.[194] FARC formed a political party, the Revolutionary Alternative Force of the Common People, FARC-Ep in the autumn of 2017.[195]

---

[193] German Institute for Global and Area Studies, https://www.giga-hamburg.de/en/publications/18567249-colombia-between-dividends-peace-shadow-violence/

[194] United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia, https://colombia.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/en_infografia_informe_sg_jun2021.pdf

[195] Human Rights Watch, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/country-chapters/colombia#

The Kroc Institute of the Notre Dame University has monitored the implementation of the Colombian peace agreement. Data from the Kroc Institute in May 2018 showed that implementation of the peace agreement made progress in areas related to the ceasefire, demobilisation and disarmament, and the transformation of the FARC into a political party.[196] Although the progress slowed slightly in some areas as the new Duque administration took office and leadership of the responsible agencies changed hands in 2018, the government introduced a new political and conceptual framework centred on equity, stabilisation, and legality, incorporating some of the key commitments in the agreement. Meanwhile, the institutions and programmes created under the previous administration were maintained.[197] Data from Kroc Institute in April 2019 showed that 23 % of total stipulations of the peace agreement had been fully implemented, and only 30 % of the commitments had not been initiated.[198] Concerns were reported that the reintegration of FARC fighters was facing difficulties, investments were lacking in rural areas that were the most affected by the war, and illicit drug production was increasing. In addition, the government failed to protect dissenters and human rights activists.[199] Furthermore, Kroc Institute concluded that the "implementation shifted in 2019 towards the medium- and long- term commitments, especially those focused on the territories most affected by the armed conflict. This new phase requires greater inter-institutional coordination and intense deployment at the local level".[200]

---

[196] Kroc Institute, https://kroc.nd.edu/news-events/news/second-kroc-institute-report-shows-steady-progress-of-peace-accord-implementation-in-colombia/

[197] Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies Keough School of Global Affairs University of Notre Dame, State of Implementation of the Colombian Final Accord, December 2016 – April 2019, Executive Summary, p. 1.

[198] Ibid., p. 2.

[199] *The Atlantic,* https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/12/colombia-peace-farc/604078/

[200] Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies Keough School of Global Affairs University of Notre Dame, State of Implementation of the Colombian Final Accord, December 2018 to November 2019, p. 2.

Several reports highlight the lack of protection and security of social leaders and human rights defenders in the territories as a serious challenge.[201] It also concerns women leaders who face gender-specific risks, such as sexual violence. The delay in the implementation of commitments related to collective and community protection has allowed for risk factors for female social leaders and human rights defenders, especially for women in ethnic and rural communities.[202] Furthermore, Human Rights Watch reports that gender-based violence, including by armed groups, remains widespread in Colombia. Lack of training and poor implementation of treatment protocols impede timely access to medical services and create obstacles for women and girls seeking post-violence care and justice. Perpetrators of violent, gender-based crimes are rarely held accountable.[203] The Kroc Institute noted that the peace agreement included 130 specific commitments that place women at the centre of its implementation. As of August 2019, there was still a gap between the implementation of the peace agreement and those provisions related to the initiation and implementation of measures for gender equality.[204]

---

[201] Washington Office on Latin America, https://reliefweb.int/report/colombia/massacres-and-killings-social-leaders-impede-peace-colombia-second-alert

[202] Barometer Initiative, Peace Accords Matrix, Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, UN Women, FDIM, Sweden, Gender Equality for Sustainable Peace. Second Report on the Monitoring of the Gender Perspective in the Implementation of the Colombian Peace Accord, (Report 2, University of Notre Dame, United States of America and Bogotá, Colombia, 2019), p .12.

[203] Human Rights Watch, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/country-chapters/colombia#

[204] Kroc report shows that 42 % of these gender-based commitments had not been initiated, compared to 27 % of the general commitments – a difference of 15 %. Additionally, among those that have been initiated, there are a smaller number of commitments focused on gender that have been fully implemented compared to general commitments in the accord (25 % of general commitments have been completed compared to 8 % of the commitments with a gender focus; the gap is 17 % throughout the Accord). Barometer Initiative, Peace Accords Matrix, Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, UN Women, FDIM, Sweden, Gender Equality for Sustainable Peace. Second Report on the Monitoring of the Gender Perspective in the Implementation of the Colombian Peace Accord, (Report 2, University of Notre Dame, United States of America and Bogotá, Colombia, 2019), p .11.

Swedish and international engagements in Colombia

The Strategy for Sweden's development cooperation with Colombia 2016–2020 comprised a total of SEK 950 million for the period, of which SEK 920 million was for activities conducted by Sida. The net Official Development Assistance (ODA) to Colombia ranged, according to the OECD statistics, from USD 850.4 million in 2017, to USD 1,781 million in 2018, to USD 902 million in 2019.[205] The United States was the most influential foreign actor in Colombia, followed by Germany, France, the EU, Norway and the United Kingdom.

The European Union provides support through the European Trust Fund for Colombia (EUTF). It was established in December 2016 and provides technical and financial support to implement the peace agreement. The EUTF has a total of EUR 127 million in contributions aiming at strengthening institutions, social fabric, reconciliation, and social and economic incorporation of ex-combatants. It also includes work in the ETCR.

Efficiency

FBA's support to the DDR process and gender mainstreaming targeted ARN as an institution. FBA organised different activities that aimed to enhance the institutional capacity of ARN to deliver on its objectives. FBA has worked closely with ARN's gender division to discuss ways to strengthen a systematic integration of the gender perspective in ARN's organisation and operations. In 2016 FBA initiated a mentorship programme led by a gender expert for a group of three ARN professionals. They became the engine for driving gender mainstreaming within ARN. The mentoring helped empower the group to raise awareness among the senior

[205] OECD, https://public.tableau.com/views/OECDDACAidataglancebyrecipient_new/Recipients?:embed=y&:display_count=yes&:showTabs=y&:toolbar=no?&:showVizHome=no

management and mid-level managers to get their buy-in for the integration of a gender perspective throughout ARN and its operations. They focused on developing a gender mainstreaming strategy and instruments for the implementation of the strategy.

FBA has advised ARN in this process and assisted with setting up different mechanisms to strengthen the institutionalisation of gender within ARN and its operations. An internal gender working group (referred to sometimes as the gender roundtable/committee) of five women delegated by the director of ARN was established with the help and technical support of FBA. The working group promotes gender mainstreaming within ARN to ensure gender equality and prevent gender-based violence. The function of the working group is governed by internal regulation, and it meets formally once every quarter. Another mechanism is a network of gender focal points of the territories in Colombia, that is, those that serve the population in the reintegration process. The network includes 90 gender focal points. FBA has trained single gender focal points (GFPs) as they were included in the international courses, there were GFPs in the regional forums and advised ARN during two planning meetings regarding the implementation of the National Policy for Social and Economic Reincorporation (CONPES 3931), [206] including 18 specific actions at national and local levels to include a gender perspective in the annual planning of the government entities. It provides a roadmap for the integration of a gender perspective in the reincorporation programme at the local level for female ex-combatants and their families. FBA's basic gender training has been helpful for ARN's gender focal points who are currently participating in an advanced gender training programme by an international organisation.[207]

---

[206] CONPES 3391 – Consejo Nacional de Politica Ecónomica y Social.

[207] Barometer Initiative, Peace Accords Matrix, Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies. 'Towards implementation of women's rights in the Colombian Final Peace Accord: Progress, opportunities and challenges'. (University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN and Bogotá, Colombia, 2020), p. 33.

Effectiveness

In our interviews with ARN staff, we learned that they found that FBA's support to ARN was useful and strategic. Through this process, they stated that ARN institutional capacities have been strengthened. Similarly, through the support of FBA, it has been possible for ARN to implement strategies at the territorial level that are seen to benefit ex-combatants, communities and different actors at the local level. One ARN staff member who has worked with FBA for a long-time notes that "the permanent disposition of FBA in responding to requests for technical support from ARN stands out in a main way".

Training and mentoring were key activities contributing to the Strategy for Sweden's development cooperation with Colombia 2016–2020. Sweden's support to ARN on gender issues began already in 2009 with a gender specialist (2009–2012) who developed strategic documents and operational and training practices. Sida funded the gender expert, and FBA could later in 2016 use the gender action plan for ARN that had been produced. FBA staff was also involved in the peace process in Colombia, partly thanks to their very good contacts in Colombia. They held informal meetings with the Office of High Commissioner for Peace under the President's Office and the UN system in Colombia. Contacts with Colombian counterparts became more formalised in 2013–2014, and FBA started to provide technical support to the DDR process. FBA was one of several agencies providing support to the DDR process in Colombia. Other organisations supported the DDR process, inter alia the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the United Nations.

Theories of change

FBA's work became more systematic with Sweden's bilateral cooperation strategy in 2016 with training of staff on the DDR commission in Colombia. FBA staff noted that this is a time-consuming endeavour. FBA used training very consciously, when FBA finally was accepted as a service provider and advisor, to systematically get its '*message'* through. FBA's training approach for DDR differed from other training programmes that have been reviewed for this evaluation. FBA staff noted that there must be a critical mass, not just a few individuals, inside an institution to change how it operates in terms of processes, procedures, and routines, as one interviewee put it: "if you only get a few people, the resistance will be too large". Furthermore, they noted that it has to be a holistic approach that keeps the participants occupied with the new concepts and is sustained over time, combined with social elements such as exchanges of experiences in other countries (e.g. Nepal, the Philippines, etc.). Thus, they believe that the modality, frequency and number of participants are critical factors of the training for triggering sustained changes. Furthermore, FBA staff noted that it is not effective and sustainable to work alone, and that it is critical to work with other institutions and organisations to initiate change.

FBA's explicit theory of change for its work with ARN is illustrated in Figure A6.1 below.

Figure A6.1: Theory of change of the work with ARN



An FBA staff member noted that "if we can institutionalise gender mainstreaming, then it will be transferred down to people (staff)". This assumption is shared by other team members who emphasise that institutionalisation needs to happen through the integration of a gender perspective in the staff induction, decisions/resolutions, policies, routines, and guidelines. Interesting to note here is the assumption of top-down institutionalisation through different mechanisms, rather than using individual training as a trigger for change. FBA managed, however, to organise training and advise senior management on gender mainstreaming. The theory of change does not follow a strict sequence of activities and results, but

encompasses a two-pronged approach that combines training and advisory work in parallel with each other. Another assumption that is raised in interviews is how FBA must have the resources to respond to emerging opportunities and the time to overcome challenges. A current concern among FBA staff is that available human resources are spread too thinly and hinder a deepening of the institutionalisation of gender mainstreaming, which would require more interaction and field visits to Colombia. Responsiveness is important and requires availability of human resources to respond to new ideas and initiatives, which can be triggered by unexpected results. For instance, the resolution by the senior management of ARN to establish a network of gender focal points covering all the territories where ARN operates became an opportunity for FBA to engage and train the gender focal points. But this also requires resources.

The theory of change is in general shaped by the problem that is going to be addressed and the available resources to do so. FBA initially believed that their role would be to work directly with reintegration of members of FARC, because there was a lack of understanding of how to carry out a DDR process. FBA believed they would deliver training material and a training course for the trainers, but this did not materialise. Instead, IOM conducted work along these lines, taking FBA by surprise when they realised. The British Council also provided training on women's rights in the field, which was likewise unknown to FBA at the time of implementation. The main focus of the cooperation with ARN was on the headquarters, and less on the field level, partly because of a stronger sense of ownership by the senior management, and also partly due to FBA's remote working relationship until 2018.

What difference have the FBA's initiatives made?

As for FBA's training interventions in the DRC and Liberia, it is difficult to determine FBA's footprint in Colombia, because the effects are intangible to a certain degree. Most changes are at the individual level in terms of attitudes and some behaviour. In general, FBA does not systematically conceptualise, document, or monitor degrees of change induced by their work, but FBA has continuously demanded of ARN that changes need to be made, routines created, internal policy created, structures (GFPs) being created so that the support provided would not disappear with the staff that had been trained. FBA notes that "the initial High Level Gender Mentoring done by FBA as a start of the support was a mapping of what existed and not within the ARN, everything that then came in to place such as internal policy, inclusion in induction training, clear routines on sexual harassment, creation of internal gender roundtable and GFP-network are documented progress of the support. This is what FBA advised them to do, and they did it."

ARN staff in interviews estimated that FBA's technical cooperation has been implemented by ARN in three main ways: *(i)* ARN staff and key stakeholders who have been trained by FBA today apply the knowledge in their daily work and have replicated the learning with the teams in the territory; *(ii)* through territorial workshops, communities, ex-combatants and institutions use their knowledge in their work; and *(iii)* ARN is currently implementing gender mainstreaming at the institutional level.

An important contribution by FBA is, according to ARN staff, that ARN as a government agency started to "talk about gender and what it means" and establish a process for gender mainstreaming, which would not have happened without FBA's contribution. As an example, ARN did not have a gender mainstreaming strategy until recently. It is now being implemented at the central and territorial (regional) levels, and a gender perspective is integrated into the reintegration and reincorporation processes. ARN reckons that FBA's contribution to a gender mainstreaming strategy is one of the

key outcomes of the partnership over the past years. It is not only a document at the HQ level, but one sought to be implemented by the gender focal points in the territories in the reintegration process. It is followed up by the gender working group (gender roundtable) and strives for a strong internal ownership. FBA itself reckons that many of the issues highlighted by FBA are increasingly discussed in Colombian society, such as gender and democratic oversight of the security sector.

ARN staff noted that FBA's technical cooperation is pertinent to ARN because of FBA's DDR experience, which contributed to strengthening the capacity of individuals within the strategic function (director general's office) and technical and programme levels for reintegration. It helped members of these functions within ARN to expand their knowledge on concepts and implementation of DDR, as well as applying gender mainstreaming to strategically address reintegration issues. FBA's support to improve gender mainstreaming seems to have been essential for strengthening reintegration and reincorporation processes, as well as for institutional management. ARN claims that, thanks to improved capacity of key ARN staff, the DDR process is strengthened and yields a better service to those people who are involved in or targeted by the DDR process. As ARN is leading the implementation of the reintegration process of ex-combatants from different armed groups, the technical cooperation between FBA and ARN on DDR-related issues is highly relevant.

In our interviews with ARN staff, it was highlighted that FBA played an important role in ensuring that gender mainstreaming was a component of the territorial workshops during the DDR process.[208] The territorial workshops were held in municipalities with security challenges and with the aim of bringing knowledge to communities and local authorities for risk prevention. The topics that were

[208] FBA participated in two regional workshops/fora (Vista Hermosa and Mesetas in the META department) targeting ex-combatants of the FARC, cooperation workers, and members of the community also participated.

included in the territorial workshops were: *(i)* transitional justice; *(ii)* DDR – international experiences; *(iii)* reintegration in Colombia; *(iv)* gender; *(v)* community reintegration; and *(vi)* security. Local authorities participated in territorial workshops and met local people to discuss broader human security issues such as health and education issues from a gender perspective. Women were included in meetings and could voice their needs and concerns.

The evaluation team has not been able to travel to the territories to validate some of the outcomes claimed by ARN, but they believe that the three key outcomes are: *(i)* strengthened gender approach in the reintegration and reincorporation processes; *(ii)* the capacities of communities and ex-combatants in peacebuilding material have been strengthened; and *(iii)* strengthened capacities of ARN collaborators (e.g. mayors, government agencies, private and public sector actors, and universities).

A recent evaluation concludes that FBA's involvement in the territorial workshops was successful for the improvement of relations among participants. It was noted that the workshops created a shared understanding among the participants that reintegration and reincorporation of ex-combatants was a relevant matter to everyone in the society. However, the evaluation team could not establish whether the increased interaction has led to any social or organisational networks.[209]

ARN noted that through the support from FBA, it was possible to broaden the knowledge among ARN collaborators in the territory. Most of the ARN staff work in the territories and have direct contact with the targeted population. Participants in the training have used their new knowledge and skills to educate others, contributing to

[209] Nordic Consulting Group (Jocke Nyberg and Mireia Cano), Final evaluation report, evaluation of the Folke Bernadotte Academy's Colombia project within the framework of Sweden's development cooperation strategy 2016–2020 – Contributing to holistic reintegration of former members of Colombian armed groups, 3 March 2021, p. 25.

wider effects. ARN noted that strengthened capacity at the headquarters (HQ) level is also reflected in the territories, and the training of field staff strengthens what is achieved at the HQ level. The training of ARN staff in the regional offices motivated them to change their way of working with women. Local actors were sensitised to the importance of reintegration processes and working with communities. The training made it possible to strengthen capacities of local authorities to make decisions that would benefit ex-combatants and strengthen risk prevention. These workshops established and reinforced alliances between ARN's territorial offices and the police, the mayor's office, governorships, civil society organisations, and communities. The workshops helped give legitimacy to ARN as a government agency leading the DDR process in the territory in collaboration with the alliances to support the community and strengthen the social fabric.

The level of trust between ARN and its collaborators has improved, but ARN is still facing challenges and difficulties with the perception of being a government agency among local stakeholders who are critical or sceptical about the intentions of ARN. FBA was recognised for playing an important role in facilitating the territorial workshops, because it vouched that these events and spaces were safe places for different groups from opposite sides of the conflict lines to participate in discussions about peacebuilding. Still, there is an underlying suspicion and mistrust among ex-combatants of government institutions. They are reluctant to participate when events are under government auspices. Similarly, actors from the other side view ex-combatants as perpetrators and therefore do not want to engage with them. FBA's facilitating role was therefore important to help bridge the division and overcome the animosity and enable parties to talk with each other. The presence of FBA as an international actor in the territory generated confidence and made it possible for ARN to communicate with actors with whom they were not previously able to meet and discuss. Having FBA as part of the workshops brought in more actors to be included and learn, which contributed to broader local support for the reintegration and

reincorporation processes. Through its relationship with the FBA, ARN has managed to position the reintegration and reincorporation processes at both the local and international levels.

More broadly, FBA staff highlight that the Swedish approach to peacemaking in Colombia is different from that of other international actors. This is also reflected in the surveys and course evaluations after FBA training courses. The Swedish and FBA's approach is more holistic and makes linkages between conflict transformation, democratic oversight of the security sector reform, and human rights, whereas a security perspective on peace would not have made these linkages. FBA and Team Sweden's broader human security perspective on the peace agreement has, according to FBA staff, contributed to strengthening the gender perspective in the implementation of the peace agreement. However, FBA staff note that the agency needs to be better at working with civil society on human security issues.

What made a difference?

An important element of FBA's implicit theory of change in Colombia that proved meaningful for playing a role in the DDR process was trust-building with key individuals who were change agents within the Colombian system for the peace and DDR process. FBA staff highlighted that before the agency can establish a partnership with a government institution, their key staff must be confident in FBA's ability to provide timely and quality services, and trust that FBA is a long-term partner. Through these interactions, FBA learned about what triggered change within the system. At the same time, basic elements were important for trust-building, such as FBA staff speaking Spanish and spending significant amounts of time during their visits to Colombia meeting and working with different people and key actors. FBA was perceived as an international actor to rely on.

In addition, FBA facilitated the sharing of Colombia's experiences in terms of DDR with the international community. Colombia's DDR experience was important to the drafting of the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS) providing guidance in post-conflict contexts where DDR forms an integral part of the comprehensive peace agreements. FBA's support in facilitating Colombia's experiences within the UN system was appreciated and also brought credibility and legitimacy to the DDR process. It also created a thrust for ARN to constantly work in line with IDDRS. FBA staff think that ARN has established a balance today to work with DDR from both social inclusion and a counter-insurgency perspectives coming together as fundamental peacemaking, as opposed to security actors (MoD) that focus on combatants.

ARN asked FBA in 2016 for support with gender mainstreaming, because it was a significant part of the 2016 peace agreement. FBA reassessed the previous work of the Sida-funded gender expert and adapted it to ARN's request. Together with a consultant, FBA developed a plan for ARN's senior management highlighting the importance of their commitment and ownership of gender mainstreaming of ARN, including mapping of steering and guiding documents for gender and ARN. Although FBA and the senior management had a good working relationship, FBA faced resistance from middle management to accept gender mainstreaming. Staff were moderately interested in gender and had their own notions of what gender mainstreaming meant. FBA's focus on the leadership is considered effective and successful, according to FBA staff, although ARN basically underwent close to a complete turnover of senior and managerial staff after the elections in 2018. The feeling within ARN is that the gender work has partly started over again, but that there is an institutional foundation to continue building on. However, FBA has since then engaged with the new leadership of ARN and the response has been positive so far.

FBA has undergone significant organisational growth and development in the past six to seven years. Some staff find the '*new*' organisation overly bureaucratic and remote from the field. They note that in cases when it cannot work directly with an institutional government agency, it does not work. This is an interesting reflection that resonates with FBA's interventions in the DRC, where FBA had no institutional partner, or in Liberia, where the institutional partner is very weak. There is a feeling that FBA senior management and the MFA do not recognise what it takes to network, develop relations, be responsive to needs and opportunities and have a long-term effect within a specific system in a country. They note that it requires going beyond a *'nine to five'* job and is a commitment for several years for those individuals who are involved in these processes, because any opportunity for partnership and collaboration is built on trust. What can fill this gap is secondments and FBA staff based at the embassies in the countries where FBA has a strategic interest, who can work locally and liaise with key actors and individuals and create entry points for bigger FBA interventions. There is a great concern that the recent trend over the past five years of increasing numbers of bilateral strategies for FBA to manage can negatively affect FBA's footprint, because resources are spread too thinly. This argument also resonates with the observations made during this evaluation, where the evaluation team notes that the annual budgets for the bilateral cooperation strategies are very modest in relation to the strategic objectives set out in the geographical strategies. Some FBA staff find it frustrating that the current set-up of FBA's interventions does not allow them, as experts, to interact with people with local knowledge.

Coordination

Sida and FBA coordinate to create synergies through their different interventions and partnerships. There is a feeling now within FBA's Colombia team that the team composition is good, but the concern, which has been repeatedly stressed in interviews, is the limited resources to keep up with delivering FBA's services. This sometimes

puts constraints on FBA's flexibility and availability. As an implementing agency, FBA allocates significant amounts of time to communication with staff members of ARN to nurture the relation and discuss issues and opportunities for collaboration.

The social and political dynamics in Colombia create an atmosphere of complexity and sensitivity where continuous changes affect the collaboration and plans. Long-term planning becomes difficult and instead FBA must be continuously alert and adaptive to new ideas and initiatives. It is essential to define technical agendas between ARN and FBA every year, with the aim of establishing the thematic areas on which there are technical cooperation needs. In the same way, it is essential to develop actions in the territory with the aim of linking to more beneficiaries of the community and ex-combatants. The gender approach is essential for the implementation of the reintegration processes, and at the institutional level it is necessary to continue developing training processes with the entity's collaborators. ARN stated that FBA's technical support and cooperation are of high quality, taking into account the experience of accompanying different DDR processes in the world. The knowledge is relevant and always responds to the needs of ARN.

FBA's consultations with Kvinna till Kvinna (KtK) in the DRC developed into further collaboration in Colombia, which was considered good, according to staff members. KtK liaised with FBA when implementing a one-year training programme on UNSCR 1325 for 23 participants from the Colombian military and police.[210] According to an evaluation of KtK's training programme, FBA's experience in Colombia was key in helping KtK with adapting the training to the Colombian context and recruiting participants.[211] The collaboration between FBA and KtK is more organised today.

---

[210] FBA, Alumni 2018–2020, 1325/Jämställdhetsintegrering inom ramen för samarbetet med försvarsministeriet. 15 December 2020.

[211] Azai Consultores, Final evaluation of the programme: Colombia Training Program: 'Capacity building program on the Women, Peace and Security agenda' with Colombian Ministry of Defence participants. 2 February 2021, p. 27.

Both organisations have combined their alumni networks from the gender training programmes to better utilise the enhanced capacity of the participants. FBA and KtK seek closer cooperation within the framework of Sweden's new strategy for development cooperation with Colombia 2021–2025 to support the Ministry of Defence (MoD) in Colombia to strengthen the capacity of gender units of the MoD, the military and police through training and advisory input to their action plans.

Annex 7. Liberia case study

Relevance

The Folke Bernadotte Academy (FBA) was instructed by the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA) in 2016 to contribute to the fulfilment of the Strategy for Sweden's development cooperation with Liberia, 2016–2020 (hereafter referred to as the Strategy with Liberia). FBA was instructed to contribute to *"strengthened capacity among women, men and institutions to promote security and human rights"*.[212] FBA's contributions during the period were financed in accordance with the terms for appropriation in appropriation directions for each financial year. The total budget for FBA's contributions was SEK 30 million for five years. The total financial appropriation for the Strategy with Liberia was SEK 1,350 million.[213]

According to the Strategy with Liberia, FBA was commissioned to contribute to the following three intervention areas:[214]

- Improved capacity for an inclusive Liberian reconciliation process.
- Increased application of democratic principles and human rights in the security sector by increased civilian and parliamentary control of the security sector, based on the principles of the rule of law.
- Strengthened opportunities for a legally secure and transparent exercise of public authority, and for accountability.

[212] Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Sweden, Strategy for development cooperation with Liberia, 2016–2020, p. 4.
[213] Ibid., p. 3.
[214] Ibid., pp.10–11.

The Strategy with Liberia noted that "action by the FBA may include training, secondments, advice, methods development or policy support".[215]

Programming

The Strategy with Liberia was one of the early strategies that FBA operationalised. FBA's operationalisation analysis (OPA) for Liberia provided a comprehensive context analysis, including a political-economy analysis, conflict analysis, general risk analysis, as well as a problem analysis of each intervention area, including stakeholder analysis and specific risk analysis. The OPA in 2016 concluded that Liberia suffered from weak institutions due to weak administrative and management capacity. In addition, Liberia suffered from a high level of corruption and low public trust in public agencies, and low or non-existent presence of public agencies outside the capital Monrovia.

The programming of the MFA's instructions built on the OPA in 2016 and ensuing analyses of the specific interventions in 2017. Three main interventions were designed for FBA's Liberia portfolio:

1. The Conflict Prevention Leadership Programme (CPLP)
2. The Security Sector Reform Leadership Seminar Series (SSR LSS) and the Programme Officer Support Programme (PROS)
3. Support to Liberia Institute of Public Administration

The programme designs of the interventions were carried out independent of each other by FBA's different thematic experts who drew initially on the same OPA, which was based on extensive in-country visits. The interventions (i.e. the separate programmes) were continuously adapted as the implementation progressed to better reflect the needs and interests of the target groups. Complementarity

[215] Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Sweden, Strategy for development cooperation with Liberia, 2016–2020, pp.10–11.

and synergies between the programmes were not explicitly pursued at the outset of the programme design, but several participants in CPLP and PROS have engaged with each other during and after implementation, and particularly through county security council meetings.

The conflict prevention leadership programme (CPLP)

The overall aim of the CPLP was to prevent violent conflict and increase inclusivity in the conflict prevention and reconciliation processes in Liberia through strengthening the capacity of 15 young peace leaders and their peace organisations in leading, designing and facilitating conflict prevention and transformation initiatives, such as dialogue and mediation efforts. The overall aim included the following objectives at three levels:

- Strengthen the capacity and self-confidence of the young Liberian peace leaders in leading, designing and facilitating conflict prevention and transformation initiatives, particularly dialogue and mediation initiatives = *individual level.*
- Strengthen the capacity of four Liberian civil society organisations (CSOs) focusing on youth and peace to work strategically with long-term conflict prevention initiatives, especially through dialogue and mediation efforts = *institutional level of CSOs.*
- Increase the level of experience-sharing, networking and constructive collaboration between individual peace leaders, and youth and peace CSOs in Liberia = *national level.*

The one-year long training programme included three five-day modules with mentoring in between each module, and with an opportunity to participate in a dialogue forum with national decision-makers.

The CPLP was initiated in 2017, and a second training cycle was implemented in 2019/2020. The selected participants represented member-based youth peace organisations with presence in all 15 counties in Liberia. The organisations were selected because of their focus on peacebuilding and capacity to work strategically. The 15 participants had to be between 18 and 35 years of age with a minimum of one year's experience of peacebuilding activities. An important aspect of the selection of participants was that they were based in their county. One of FBA's underlying assumptions was that CPLP should contribute to creating conditions for peaceful, inclusive and sustainable development by focusing on Liberian women and youth peacebuilding organisations in both rural and urban areas.[216] FBA highlighted that youth (less than 25 years old) made up 63 % of the population in Liberia according to UNFPA Liberia.[217]

FBA's basic theory of change was that by strengthening the capacity of women and youth, they would be able to actively participate in reconciliation, dialogue and mediation processes at the national and district levels. Having finished CPLP, the participants would have the capacity to take part in peacebuilding in their communities.

FBA paid attention to local customs and traditions in Liberia for solving conflicts at the local level. FBA travelled extensively during field visits to Liberia to learn about the local conflict drivers, different roles of women and youth in the communities, and how community mediation and reconciliation in the provincial areas in Liberia worked.[218] The programming was inspired by and built on several sources such as above-mentioned field visits to Liberia, a Liberian Youth Peacebuilding National Conference in 2017, but also by the previous, Sida-funded, international training programme (ITP).[219]

---

[216] FBA, Operationaliseringsanalys Liberia för strategiperiod 2016–2020: arbetsmaterial, 1 November 2016, p. 61.
[217] UNFPA, https://liberia.unfpa.org/en/topics/adolescents-and-youth-4
[218] FBA, Operationaliseringsanalys Liberia för strategiperiod 2016–2020: arbetsmaterial, 1 November 2016, pp. 33–35.
[219] Ibid., p. 33.

The security sector reform leadership seminar series (SSR LSS) & the programme officer support programme (PROS)

This programme consists of two sets of interventions. The first was the security sector reform leadership seminar series (SSR LSS), initiated in 2018. It is in support of the National Security Council, developed and implemented jointly with the National Security Council Secretariat. The target group of LSS is the county superintendents and for the PROS the program officers. The politically appointed superintendents also lead the county security councils and channel information about security threats to the National Security Council. The second intervention has been the county security council programme officer support programme (PROS), initiated in 2019 and directed towards county security council programme officers (CPOs) who are civil servants (former police[220], effectively seconded from the Liberian national police (LNP) and tasked with the servicing the county security councils and the superintendents.[221] The training aimed at enabling the county security council programme officers to effectively and efficiently deliver administrative, technical and support services to the national and county security councils.

The National Security Council is the highest government body responsible for national security.[222] In the fifteen counties, the local security councils are chaired by the county superintendents who are politically appointed by the President of Liberia. They have the administrative responsibility for the counties, including liaising with the National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS) and the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MoIA).

---

[220] They are former police seconded from Liberia National Police (LNP).
[221] Niras, (Ian Christplos & Oscar Bloh), Evaluation of FBA's Liberia project, within the framework of Sweden's development cooperation strategy, 18 December 2020, p. 4.
[222] FBA, Concept Note/Project document: Liberia Security Sector Reform Leadership Seminar Series (SSR LSS), 5 October 2018, p. 1.

Both training programmes aimed to contribute to:[223]

- Strengthen capacity and leadership skills of key local SSR positions (*individual level*);
- Strengthen capacity of County Security Structures (*institutional level*);
- Increase the level of experience-sharing, networking and constructive collaboration between actors responsible for local security mechanisms and structures at national and local level (*national and regional level*).

FBA was invited in late 2016 by the NSCS and the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) to support a nationwide assessment of the county security councils, their capacity and potential need for support. The assessment concluded that "efforts aimed at increasing the capacity of the local security council members and their understanding of Liberian Security Sector Reform Architecture are needed".[224] The NSCS and FBA agreed to jointly develop a capacity strengthening programme for the leadership of the county security councils by strengthening the professionalisation of staff, improved routines and transparent policy-making processes which subsequently would enhance the application of democratic principles and human rights in the security sector. FBA and the Liberian NSCS developed a security sector reform leadership seminar series targeting 15 superintendents from all counties, and the programme officer support programme (PROS) targeting 15 county security council programme officers.

FBA highlighted in its analysis that key security institutions at both national and local levels were institutionally weak and in need of institutional support. The Liberia National Security Reform and Intelligence Act of 2011 established county security councils.

---

[223] FBA, Concept Note/Project document: Liberia Security Sector Reform Leadership Seminar Series (SSR LSS), 5 October 2018, p. 2.
[224] Ibid.

According to FBA, the County security councils is an early warning mechanism, and are to provide the National Security Council with policy recommendations as well as ensuring a coordinated and effective response to security issues by county leadership and local security entities. Furthermore, according to FBA "the county security councils is an early warning mechanism, response should be coordinated through a different body (albeit with several of the same members included)."

They are also to serve as an early warning mechanism for assessing local security concerns. The county security council programme officers are central to the local security mechanisms in Liberia as they are responsible for coordinating compilation and reporting of security-related issues to the NSCS, and serve as the main focal points of the National Secretariat in county security councils.[225]

The organisational set-up

As a self-implementing organisation, the different interventions were implemented by a dedicated part-time thematic desk officer who was supported by the full-time project manager in designing, implementing and following up on programme activities. The interventions were, during the years of implementation (2018–2019), managed largely by less than one and a half desk officers. The human resources for managing all interventions in Liberia ranged from two staff in 2016, to three in 2017, four (4.5) in 2018 and five in 2019. The CPLP was basically managed by one person (0.75 in 2017, 1.05 in 2018, 1.30 in 2019). Similarly, the SSR training programmes and the support to Liberia Institute of Public Management were also managed by one to one and a half staff during the years of implementation.[226]

---

[225] FBA, Concept Note/Project document: Liberia Security Sector Reform County Security Council Program Officer Support Program (PROS), 21 March 2019, p. 2.
[226] FBA, ÅAK, 2021-06-28.

FBA staff worked remotely from Sweden, and the desk officers were in close and regular contact with participants, mentors and contracted local trainers (consultants) in Liberia. All interventions were though developed jointly with local Liberian partners. The collaboration between the FBA team and the local mentors for CPLP enabled FBA to have a closer contact with the participants and their organisations. The local mentors contributed to continuously ensuring that the different elements of the programme activities were relevant and realistic through tailored practical advice. Despite working from distance, the FBA team monitored their interventions closely, as well as continuously seeking updates, information and feedback on specific questions related to FBA's interventions. Local stakeholders noted that the FBA team had a solid understanding of the Liberian context, events, actors and power relations, and destabilising conflict drivers in the communities and society in Liberia.

FBA worked with a local partner organisation to assist the agency with logistics in Liberia, Platform for Dialogue and Peace (P4DP).

Conflict context

FBA's implementation of Sweden's Strategy with Liberia occurred at a time when Liberia was going through an important period in its transition, with elections in October 2017 and the final drawdown of the United Nations peacekeeping mission in March 2018. FBA and many other organisations recognised that the country still had a number of urgent peacebuilding priorities that needed to be addressed, although steady progress in transitioning from decades of civil conflict into a new democracy was being made. The president at the time, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, stepped down and handed power to George Weah. Under former President Johnson Sirleaf a number of legal reforms, national strategies and peacebuilding activities were instituted to address the root causes of violence.

The national peacebuilding framework consists of several key documents that set the priorities for Liberia. It includes a post-conflict vision, *Liberia Rising 2030*, the agenda for transformation (2012–2017), which was adopted as a five-year plan focusing on four pillars: peace, security, rule of law; economic transformation; human development; and governance and public institutions. In addition, there was the Liberian strategic roadmap for national healing, peacebuilding and reconciliation (2012–2030).[227]

In 2010, at the request of the Liberian government, Liberia was placed on the agenda of the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC). Since then, the PBC has been engaged in building peace in Liberia. The statement of mutual commitment (SMC) between the Government of Liberia and the PBC has been a key mechanism in the PBC's engagement with Liberia. The SMC was considered one of the most comprehensive documents confirming the Liberian government's peacebuilding priorities, namely *(i)* Enhancing human security, *(ii)* Strengthening the rule of law, and *(iii)* Promotion of national reconciliation. Within these areas, a number of issues were identified for action such as promoting social cohesion through strengthening local mechanisms of peace and strengthening the capacity of local peace structures to manage and resolve conflicts through training in peacebuilding, conflict analysis, conflict prevention and transformation, mediation, and conflict sensitivity, as well as supporting and accelerating national conflict early warning and early response activities. Cross-cutting issues such as decentralisation and empowering youth and women were also noted.[228] Almost 70 % of Liberia's population is under 30 years of age. Despite this, young people are often excluded from politics by the formal leaders, and they tend to be viewed as potential sources of violence. Platforms to support youth engagement in efforts for

---

[227] Institute for Security Studies, Amanda Lucey & Liezelle Kumalo, ISS Paper 302, February 2017, p. 4.

[228] UN Peacebuilding Commission, 2 December 2015, https://www.un.org/peacebuilding/sites/www.un.org.peacebuilding/files/documents/151202_pbc_lib_meeting02dec_summary.pdf

peace and security are lacking, especially platforms including youth outside of Monrovia.[229] When FBA drafted the OPA, it was stated that very little had been done to establish an inclusive national reconciliation process.[230]

The Swedish chair of the Peacebuilding Commission Liberia Configuration noted in April 2018 that "several root causes of the conflict in Liberia remain, addressing decentralisation and land issues, as well as ensuring greater access to justice and increased capacity in the security and justice sectors, are crucial for continued consolidation of peace".[231] It was stated in an independent report by several international think tanks in 2017 that "Liberia still faces myriads of challenges. The root causes of conflict relate to patronage and corrupt political systems, marginalisation and exclusion, ethnic/tribal divisions, human rights violations without redress, disputes over land, centralisation of power and economic disparities. It has weak human and institutional capacity, inequality and low levels of human development".[232] In a UN project document in 2019 it is noted that "land/property disputes were the most predominant conflict driver in all 15 counties of Liberia". Furthermore, it noted that "land conflicts often disguise other societal problems and may erupt along ethnic, class, or factional lines".[233] In several interviews

---

[229] https://fba.se/en/how-we-work/our-partner-countries/fba-in-liberia/

[230] FBA, Concept Note/Project document: Liberia Security Sector Reform County Security Council Program Officer Support Programme (PROS), 21 March 2019, p. 27.

[231] https://www.government.se/statements/2018/04/peacebuilding-commission-liberia-configuration/?TSPD_101_R0=088d4528d9ab2000b17b304126d0126c57e65730437320ef6f0a5aea3192c0d049717a48662cd40e088c99271c1430009f4fdb11487a043b817cb7c3eb02b025e5507ffe61762bc4f0ff6fbd9fccd56646aeae96a58317412ccc55ca0ebbf847

[232] Institute for Security Studies, Amanda Lucey & Liezelle Kumalo, ISS Paper 302, February 2017, p. 3.

[233] UN Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO), Liberia Multi-Partner Trust Fund (LMPTF), Project Document, p. 4.

with participants in FBA's training interventions, they pointed out that conflicts between Liberians over land threaten reconciliation in a country where a majority of people depend on agriculture.

A large number of activities was implemented by UN agencies and the Government of Liberia after the comprehensive peace agreement (CPA) was signed in 2003. The United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) played a critical role for 14 years to stabilise peace and security. The transition of UNMIL was a significant change to the context and dynamics in Liberia. UNMIL's mandate focused on the security sector with regard to protection of civilians, the professionalisation of the Liberian national police (LNP), combating sexual- and gender-based violence, and the promotion of sustainable peace. UNMIL's mission ended in 2018 and left a feeling of vacuum behind.

FBA noted in the OPA that the Liberian security sector, including the police, is facing many challenges. It has no presence in large parts of the country and the rural population is often dependent upon informal actors for security. In an effort to improve state presence and oversight, local security councils have been established in every county in Liberia. They provide the National Security Council with information about the situation in each area.

The primary national actor tasked with responding to Liberia's peacebuilding priorities was the Liberia Peacebuilding Office (PBO) under the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MoIA) with the responsibility for the implementation of the Liberia Strategic Roadmap for national healing and reconciliation from 2012. In addition, the National Commission on Human Rights (INCHR) also worked on peacebuilding initiatives, primarily related to the strategic roadmap – to enhance peace and national reconciliation through the implementation of the recommendations by the Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). A key issue for INCHR was

crimes committed during the civil war, and particularly sexual- and gender-based violence.[234] These organisations often worked in close collaboration with international and local civil society organisations.

FBA and Sweden's priorities were well aligned with SMC's priorities guiding the cooperation between the Government of Liberia and the UN. The SMC also emphasised the importance of working with local traditional peace mechanisms such as Palava and Peace Huts, a meeting place to solve conflicts in Liberia through community mediation, conflict resolution, dialogue and early warning. The Liberian people have great confidence in Palava and Peace Huts. At the county level, the county security councils (CSC) are important peace and security mechanisms for early warning and early response. Under CSC are the district security councils (DSC) and the community forums (CF) from where information is collected and funnelled upwards, or issues are handled. Issues are documented, compiled and reported to the National Security Council headed by the President of Liberia as chairperson. It is repeatedly highlighted by superintendents in the interviews that their organisations lack resources in terms of enabling the logistics for the staff, which includes vehicles, computers, and other administrative resources. The mobility of staff within the counties is a challenge which subsequently adversely affects the monitoring, engaging and following up with stakeholders within the county.

FBA aligned its interventions to the local structures. The security sector reform leadership seminar series (SSR LSS) targets the county security councils and the superintendents to strengthen their capacity to collect and share information to be used for appropriate responses to security issues.

[234] FBA, Operationaliseringsanalys Liberia för strategiperiod 2016–2020: arbetsmaterial, 1 November 2016, p. 29.

As noted by FBA but also by other organisations, "more must be done to form a social compact between the government and civil society (particularly in the counties)". [235] Furthermore, the 2015 review of the UN peacebuilding architecture noted that "peace needs to emerge organically from within society, addressing the multiple concerns and aspirations of different sectors, and seeking common ground so that all sectors feel invested in strategies, policies and mechanisms that offer the way forward".[236]

Interviews with participants in FBA interventions help us understand the community context and how it affects peace efforts to address major social problems. They often experience difficulties in engaging youth in activities and keeping them involved over time. They find that young people lack trust and confidence in the broader political and socio-economic system, which often also spills over into social initiatives that try to support them. Many are suspicious of participating in initiatives because of mistrust of the intentions and of the effects it will have on their lives. Too many promises have been broken and too often politicians are seen to be using youth for their own political agendas. Former youth combatants who are jobless and with different substance abuse are often considered as outcasts (referred to as '*Zogos, and Zogies*' in the Liberian context).

A phenomenon emerging after the civil war was the business of motorcyclists which provides an economic livelihood and also constitutes a space of socio-political youth mobilisation. Motor-cyclists are often organised into a union and can be a powerful force for community cohesion and stability. Sometimes, the tension between motorcyclists and police runs high due to unresolved incidents causing riots. It was noted in an interview with a superintendent that the police were not able to provide safety and

---

[235] Institute for Security Studies, Amanda Lucey & Liezelle Kumalo, ISS Paper 302, February 2017, p. 4.

[236] UN, Report of the Advisory Group of Experts for the 2015 Review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture, The Challenge of Sustaining Peace, 29 June 2015, p. 21.

security in some communities in the county. When there is threat or violence in a community and the police are called upon to intervene, it becomes difficult because the police are not mobile since they do not have any vehicles. The police have to rent cars or motorbikes to pursue issues. In some counties there is only one police depot for every five districts. The motorcyclists can then sometimes take the law into their own hands, or the community people take charge before the police arrive. In this context, conflicts arise out of desperation and frustration, but underlying root causes are rarely addressed. Many young people harbour anger and feel they are burdens or failures to the society. Young people lack role models in their lives who can guide and support them.

Another conflict driver is tribal division. In some counties, tribal groups consider themselves to be the original people and the owners of the land. Consequently, members of a minority tribe are discriminated against, and their lives can be difficult. The discrimination affects job opportunities and equal access to public services. When the government, corporations or foreign aid spend money on development-related projects, communities are very sensitive to how the money is spent or invested and whether they might favour any group. This feeds resentment and grievances. According to some superintendents, this is an issue neglected by the national leaders.

Superintendents often also refer to boundary disputes among communities, districts and towns as a challenge to the stability in the county. Lastly, land issues are a conflict trigger in several counties. A reason is that land has often not been deeded from the beginning. Family members sell their land, but when the new landowners settle down, members of the extended family claim it is their '*historical*' land. This often requires meetings and consultations with the Liberia land authority to resolve disputes and reduce tension.

The lack of leadership at the community level implies that community members are taking the law into their own hands. Some FBA participants experience a division between community leaders and the members, causing serious cracks in the social cohesion and coexistence of the community. Very frequently these conflicts and tensions go unnoticed by the national government and its institutions.

Swedish and international engagements in Liberia

The Strategy for Sweden's development cooperation with Liberia 2016–2020 comprised a total of SEK 1,350 million for the period, of which SEK 1,320 million was for activities conducted by Sida. The net Official Development Assistance (ODA) to Liberia, according to the World Bank statistics, during the same period ranged from USD 507 million to USD 819 million.[237] Sweden was the eighth-largest donor to Liberia after the United States (the largest donor), the World Bank, EU, Germany, IMF, and African Development Fund.[238] Coordination in Liberia is in general difficult since UNMIL completed its mandate and the new government assumed power. The Swedish annual average development assistance to Liberia, converted into USD, was approximately USD 30 million.[239] Sweden's funding was not insignificant, but FBA's annual budget for working with Liberia was less than USD 1 million. Sida's financial support to organisations within the broader peace sector (including rule of law) in Liberia during the 2016–2019 period was approximately SEK 112 million, including approximately SEK 67 million to UNDP.

[237] https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ODAT.CD?end=2019&locations=LR&start=2010

[238] OECD, https://www.oecd.org/dac/peer-reviews/Sweden-2019-Field-Visit-Liberia.pdf

[239] Using an exchange rate of 9 SEK/USD.

Figure A7.1: Net ODA received (mUSD)



Source: OECD DAC.

Sida and FBA implemented the national youth peace conference together, but did otherwise not implement any joint programmes together, but Sida's partners and FBA's programmes achieved some complementarity during the strategic period. For example, FBA's training programmes for superintendents and county security council programme officers in all 15 counties served indirectly as a complement to Sida's support to UNDP's programme on 'Strengthening the Rule of Law in Liberia: Justice and Security for Liberian People'. The professionalisation of staff at the county level would have a positive effect on UNDP's larger interventions within the rule of law in Liberia. Another example is that some participants in FBA's 'conflict prevention leadership programme' for young peace leaders also participated in a Sida-funded project on 'early warning and early response: county peace committees and district level political reconciliation dialogues and civic engagement' aiming to contribute to "enhanced national reconciliation, civic engagement and peaceful coexistence, and reduced conflicts in 15 counties of

Liberia". The project is implemented by ZOA, Liberia Peacebuilding Office and the Office of the National Peace Ambassador (ONPA) under the MoIA. Youth were trained in peacebuilding at the national and county levels to be 'youth agents of peace'. they participated in peacebuilding activities, including early warning and early response (EWER) consultations and training workshops, intergroup reconciliation dialogues, public participation and civic trust town hall meetings.[240] Sida has also supported ZOA's community-based socio-therapy work which sought to improve conflict resolution, civic trust and reconciliation at community level, while improving individual well-being and family dynamics, including more gender-equal relations at the household level.

Efficiency

FBA's work in Liberia has evolved since it started in 2016 with the OPA, followed by the design and implementation of the three capacity-strengthening interventions. As a self-implementing organisation, FBA relies mostly on its own expertise and experience within the different thematic areas of intervention. Without any presence in Liberia, FBA used for a specific intervention (CPLP) both a local consultant with extensive peacebuilding experience in Liberia, and a local NGO, Platform for Dialogue and Peace (P4DP), for logistical support. As described above, the available human resources were few but the scope of the interventions was also limited. Nevertheless, the implementation of the interventions required at times significant personal effort and commitment from the FBA staff because of the complexity of remotely coordinating these types of training interventions.

[240] Liberia Peacebuilding Office, Office of the National Peace Ambassador, ZOA, midterm evaluation, Support to Early Warning and Early Response: County Peace Committees and District Level Political Reconciliation Dialogues and Civic Engagement, October 2020, pp. 5, 7 & 9.

FBA's core competencies and resources for training programmes were critical to the positive feedback from participants. FBA's pedagogical profile and use of mentors were key elements that contributed to the appreciation among participants of the trainings. FBA's open and accessible 'style' also contributed to building close working relationships with participants, and the local mentoring played a significant role. The course module evaluations for all interventions are overwhelmingly positive, with many statements confirming the relevance of the content.[241]

A recent evaluation noted that FBA's interventions were relevant to fostering a general understanding of the importance of a holistic, human security perspective on the application of Liberian peace and security policies. It confirmed that the interventions contributed to reinforcing the weak sub-national infrastructure for micro-level early warning/early response and conflict mediation.[242]

The same evaluation raises an important point that resonates with our own interviews, namely that FBA's training of individuals in rural parts of Liberia increased their capacity to enable them to create the basis for mechanisms to prevent conflicts and find peaceful solutions, but the training has not thus far enhanced the capacity of existing institutions or organisations.[243] FBA's efforts managed to contribute to empowering individuals and, plausibly, informal institutions and structures at the local level. At the same time, our interviews indicate a concern about whether the results in terms of raised awareness and improved skills can translate into wider effects within and across the counties at a national level. The evaluation team also agrees with the recent evaluation that institutionalisation will require closer coherence with other agencies, explicit

---

241 FBA, Planering och uppföljning av insats inom ramen för bilateralt strategiuppdrag i Liberia. Both CPLP and LSS/PROS.

242 Niras, (Ian Christopolos & Oscar Bloh), evaluation of FBA's Liberia Project, within the framework of Sweden's development cooperation strategy, 18 December 2020, p. 9 & 11.

243 Ibid., p. 12.

organisational development mandates and financial resources, as well as logistical capacity to work with partners in all 15 counties, and it raises a concern to what degree FBA will be able to sustain and institutionalise achieved results.[244]

Interviews revealed that no one was questioning the relevance of FBA's training programmes in Liberia. Stakeholders emphasised, however, their recognition that gathering all 15 superintendents in one training programme was an achievement, as these individuals are the most senior officials in the counties.

Other stakeholders voiced a concern that the training programmes seemed to have 'consumed' FBA's human resources within the Liberia team with heavy administration needed to manage annual training programmes of 15 participants without a clear multiplier effect to achieve wider effects. The fact that FBA appeared to be absorbed by the implementation of activities reflects perhaps the availability of human resources for the different interventions and how time-consuming it can be to coordinate and manage training programmes, including the comprehensive selection process of participants. A significant amount of time was devoted to developing routines, guidelines and methods for both the selection process, and the pedagogy and mentoring. In addition, the main FBA manager of the CPLP faced many challenges during the first year such as the loss of two participants,[245] and coordination with the local consultant about logistics.

Unfortunately, it also appeared as a consequence that FBA did not seem to have used their analytical role of providing thematic expertise that is often considered by many to be one of FBA's core strengths. Furthermore, FBA's research capacity was not sufficiently utilised within the bilateral strategy with Liberia, even though an

---

[244] Niras, (Ian Christopolos & Oscar Bloh), evaluation of FBA's Liberia Project, within the framework of Sweden's development cooperation strategy, 18 December 2020, p. 16.

[245] One person died in September 2018, and another person left CPLP in conjunction with the course module in Sweden.

FBA-funded researcher worked on gender issues in the security sector and sexual and gender-based violence in Liberia, according to some of our interviews. It is believed that FBA could use its unique thematic expertise within Team Sweden more strategically which would benefit all members of Team Sweden.

As illustrated in Table A7.1 , both the administrative and operational budgets increased from 2016, and in 2018 and 2019 the operational budget more than doubled from 2016. It coincided with when the training programmes were in full implementation, as illustrated in Table A7.1. The remote management of the interventions implied high investments in travel and accommodation.

Table A7.1 Annual administrative and operational expenses for FBA's Liberia portfolio

	2016 (tSEK)	2017 (tSEK)	2018 (tSEK)	2019 (tSEK)
Administration	2,367	3,855	4,926	5,616
Operations	411	1,444	3,799	4,234
Total	2,778	5,298	8,724	9,851

Source: FBA, Annual Reports, 2016–2019.

Table A7.2 below shows the annual operational expenses for FBA's different interventions in Liberia, and it shows that the costs for CPLP increased significantly from 2017 to 2018 and 2019. Some key expenses for CPLP were transportation of participants to Sweden and South Africa, as well as accommodation in Monrovia.

Table A7.2 Annual operational expenses for FBA's different interventions in Liberia

	2016 (SEK)	2017 (SEK)	2018 (SEK)	2019 (SEK)
Conflict Prevention Leadership Programme		402,092	2,263,813	2,286,633
Support to national and local security councils (SSR LSS and PROS), including mapping and analysis of local security councils in 2017		162,555	467,010	1,019,856
Support to Liberia Institute of Public Administration			737,762	442,395
Total	0	564,647	3,468,585	3,784,884

Source: FBA, Utfall Verksamhetskod, 2021-06-15.

The Conflict Prevention Leadership Programme (CPLP)

30 participants between 18–33 years from all 15 counties in Liberia, representing four civil society organisations, participated in 2018 and 2019/2020 in three interconnected course modules, two individually adapted mentor phases, and a one-day dialogue session. The first training in 2018 included one course module in Stockholm with visits to the Swedish MFA and local youth actors. The second training in 2019 included a course module in South Africa.

The three focus areas for the modules are: *(i)* conceptual knowledge of conflict prevention, dialogue and mediation; *(ii)* practical skills for active listening and facilitation during mediation; as well as *(iii)* personal development in terms of leadership and inclusion. FBA used storytelling to enable the participants to talk about their own experiences in relation to conflicts and conflict prevention.

FBA used an adaptive and process-oriented approach although CPLP was guided initially by its learning objectives. The participants were tasked with applying their gained knowledge and work on a strategic initiative (minor peacebuilding activities) that could help their organisation and county to learn and benefit from their gained knowledge. FBA used local mentors to support the participants with their strategic initiatives. The mentoring was both bilateral (mentor and participant) and peer-to-peer (participant to participant). The peer-to-peer system was believed to have contributed to strengthening networking between participants. As mentioned earlier, the mentoring was highly appreciated because of the tailored support, and particularly among participants in distant rural areas of Liberia. The mentoring contributed to raising the motivation and participants' confidence in CPLP.

In parallel, FBA involved the national leaders of the four local partner organisations to strengthen their commitment to support CPLP and enable both their participants and organisations to use tools and methods. FBA organised different activities for the national leaders/focal points, inter alia a one-day workshop in 2018 to promote dialogue and collaboration between these organisations, as well as a three-day study trip to Sweden in 2019 to strengthen the cooperation between FBA and the partner organisations, and their commitment to institutionalise what CPLP offers in terms of improving knowledge and practice in conflict prevention with a focus on youth, peace and security.[246] FBA felt that the partnerships with the four organisations improved, and they showed a stronger ownership of their participation in CPLP.

FBA reported that participants in CPLP described and showed increased knowledge, improved skills and strengthened self-confidence as peace leaders and facilitators. Behavioural changes were also reported in terms of more active listening and readiness

[246] FBA, Planering och uppföljning av insats inom ramen för bilateralt strategiuppdrag i Liberia: Conflict Prevention Leadership Programme Insats-PM, 1 July 2020, p. 24.

for taking initiatives. One concrete output was strengthened mutual confidence between participants from different organisations and counties thanks to the networking that CPLP offered. The participants established the Liberia national youth peacebuilding network (LNYPnet).

FBA reported that higher-level outcomes or 'institutional impact' would be difficult to attain in terms of organisational capacity development, although the partner organisations showed increasingly more willingness to cooperate with CPLP and started to strengthen their local engagement. FBA noted, however, that the relevance of the effects of CPLP would be at the 'community level' and in contexts where participants are involved but not necessarily within the specific partner organisation.[247] As the external evaluation points out with reference to FBA's plan to focus on organisational and institutional outcomes, supporting youth leaders in diffusing their knowledge and strengthening their organisations and more strategic engagement in county level processes 'is a natural and relevant next step to build on the primarily human resource and personal development focus thus far'.[248]

In 2019, FBA published a report, 'Young Liberians building peace: lessons learnt from the first conflict prevention leadership programme', disseminating experiences and lessons learnt to key stakeholders such as representatives from the government and parliament, embassies, UN agencies, and international and national CSOs in Liberia. In the report, the 2018 participants spoke about their peace work at the community level and the importance of involving youth in peacebuilding and conflict prevention at the national level. FBA continued to collaborate with the 2018

[247] FBA, Planering och uppföljning av insats inom ramen för bilateralt strategiuppdrag i Liberia: Conflict Prevention Leadership Programme Insats-PM, 1 July 2020, pp. 16 & 19.
[248] Niras, (Ian Christoplos & Oscar Bloh), evaluation of FBA's Liberia Project, within the framework of Sweden's development cooperation strategy, 18 December 2020, p. 16.

participants and developed relations with Liberia PBO and the Office for National Peace Ambassador (ONPA). FBA's collaboration with PBO and ONPA created opportunities for the CPLP alumni to be involved in a Sida-funded project implemented by ZOA, PBP and ONPA. ONPA was also an important link to the LSS and the PROS programme and connections with the county security councils. FBA also succeeded in inviting the Minister of Internal Affairs to the global dialogue and mediation course in 2019, which FBA believed contributed to the strengthening of strategic partnership with national key actors.[249]

The testimonies of the alumni in the report, 'Young Liberians building peace', emphasise how CPLP contributed to strengthening the self-confidence and change in attitudes of the young participants to talk about peace in their communities. For most participants, CPLP was an experience that personally changed them as individuals to manage their anger and frustration, and instead use their energy to serve as peace leaders in their community and motivate others.[250]

The Security Sector Reform Leadership Seminar Series (SSR LSS) & the Programme Officer Support Programme (PROS)

FBA established a formal partnership with the Liberia National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS) and the National Security Advisor in 2018 to develop and implement the security sector reform leadership seminar series (LSS) targeting both superintendents and technical staff from all 15 counties, county security programme officers, as well as key individuals at the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The initiation of the programmes was partly delayed due to the Liberian election in 2017 and the appointment of superintendents who are politically appointed by the president of Liberia. FBA noted

[249] FBA, Planering och uppföljning av insats inom ramen för bilateralt strategi-uppdrag i Liberia: Conflict Prevention Leadership Programme Insats-PM, 1 July 2020, pp. 24–25, & 27.
[250] FBA, 'Young Liberians building peace: lessons learnt from the first conflict prevention leadership programme', 2019.

that the general low institutional capacity of the Liberian security actors made it sometimes challenging to effectively implement the intervention. FBA collaborated with the Liberia Institute of Public Administration (LIPA), Civil Service Agency (CSA) and the Liberia Peace Building Office (PBO). Their respective expertise was used during different sessions of the training programme. PBO focused for instance on cooperation and local coordination mechanisms for early warning, e.g. the county peace committees (CPC).

FBA and NSCS decided to run two separate training programmes after the first joint training at the end of 2018. Five, week-long training modules for each training programme were conducted in parallel between the end of 2018 and the end of 2020. The modules focused on structure of the security councils and the implementation of new laws for the security sector.[251] FBA reported that LSS and PROS were closely coordinated with FBA's other programmes on dialogue and peace mediation, rule of law, and leadership and cooperation in peacebuilding.[252]

The LSS continued to focus on the leadership of the counties, i.e. the superintendents. Three of 15 superintendents were women. The LSS focused on roles and responsibilities, and mandates of superintendents and the local security councils. The PROS was developed for the county security programme officers (CPO). The PROS was tailored towards the specific role and duties of the county security programme officers.

---

[251] The modules focused also on other thematic areas, such as early warning, leadership, developing tools for more effective county security council meetings etc. Another important component is the relationship building between the participants. A couple of more SSR-related thematic areas such as gender integration in the security sector, democratic management and civil control in the security sector.

[252] FBA, Planering och uppföljning av insats inom ramen för bilateralt strategiuppdrag i Liberia: Stöd till Nationella och lokala säkerhetsråd Insats-PM, 20 August 2020, pp. 9–10.

Both LSS and PROS aimed to strengthen the functionality of the county security councils (CSC) by holding regular meetings attended by permanent members who are tasked to be on the council, and educating these members about their roles and responsibilities on the council. In addition, the intervention aimed to promote documentation of the meetings and information sharing of meeting notes with members of the CSC. Information sharing about security issues has historically been weak in Liberia. Many participants seem to have had a very low capacity for and understanding of fulfilling their roles and responsibilities within CSC.[253]

FBA notes small improvements, although not satisfactory in terms of the frequency, attendance and documentation of meetings, as well as information sharing. FBA introduced a reporting 'human security template' for the county security councils, but since few superintendents used it sufficiently for reporting to NSCS, it was decided to be used for documenting meeting notes to be shared internally. Instead, the county security programme officers developed a separate template for meeting notes to be used for reporting to NSCS. This is a separate template that was developed by the programme officers under PROS I implementation was later approved by the superintendents under LSS II. FBA notes that "this is a small but a positive example of FBA knowledge products being adopted, adjusted to fit their own needs and implemented through a local ownership."

FBA's own course evaluations reveal that superintendents lack confidence in technical staff because of their unsatisfactory work, and many lack knowledge of laws and frameworks related to the security sector.[254]

---

[253] FBA, Planering och uppföljning av insats inom ramen för bilateralt strategi-uppdrag i Liberia: Stöd till Nationella och lokala säkerhetsråd Insats-PM, 20 August 2020, p. 12.
[254] Ibid., p. 15.

The recent external evaluation provides a more positive view of the effects the training had on particularly the CPOs. According to the evaluation, many CPOs felt professionally empowered to manage reporting and information, as well as to mediate in local conflicts. The intervention was, however, not designed to primarily strengthen the capacity of CPOs to mediate. On the other hand, the evaluation noted scepticism among interviewees regarding the plausibility that 'the support they received through the leadership seminar series would lead to significant outcomes'.[255] In FBA's own evaluation, FBA notes that "participants show in the evaluations that they find the programme very useful and valuable."

One superintendent was very concerned about the efficiency of the LSS & PROS training because his CPO was located in Monrovia and did not visit the county regularly. The government did not pay per diem and thus it was difficult for the CPO to travel. As the role of the CPO was to take notes at the CSC meetings, and prepare and submit reports to the NSCS, the efficiency of the working relationship between the superintendent and the CPO suffered. According to the superintendent, "you will just be wasting money and you will not see good results because these people are not able to go to their areas of assignment and perform; it means that the effort is just in vain". It shows the importance of ensuring that the participants in the training fulfil the requirements, but it is also beyond FBA's ability to control who exactly will be the CPO representative in the county. It is largely up to the county and the NSCS, as well as the police who provide the representatives. Otherwise, the working relationship between the CPOs and the superintendents is overwhelmingly positive thanks to FBA's training. When the superintendent cannot attend a meeting, the CPO chairs the meeting, and they work jointly on the reporting to NSCS.

[255] Niras, p.13-14.

FBA's reporting also suggests that the intervention improved relations between the participants. Superintendents started to collaborate to manage border disputes between counties. Furthermore, LSS was an opportunity for the superintendents to collaborate with the national security advisor and the minister for the MoIA.[256] These achievements made FBA reconsider the focus of the intervention to make more efforts to facilitate networking and relationship-building between the participants, rather than emphasising the actual reporting from the CSCs to the NSCS. The intervention continued to focus on different thematic areas, but the collaboration between participants became a priority since, as FBA noted, successful local conflict resolution and collaboration on 'early warning' depends on functioning relationships across counties.[257] Nonetheless, our interviews reveal that the training helped strengthen the working relationship between the superintendent and the CPO. The below example demonstrates how a superintendent and a CPO came together to find an effective strategy to solve an emergent conflict.

Box A7.1: Strategy to solve emergent conflict

A story that was shared with the evaluation team described how a politician heading a group called the Nimba Education Guide demanded that a company, MetalSteel, should employ about 5,000 persons and give them strategic positions, while staff who were not from Nimba should be dismissed and replaced by Nimba citizens. The politician threatened to mobilise 25,000 men to vandalise the company facility otherwise. Members of the CSC learned about these threats and informed the superintendent. The CPO and superintendent brought the county legislative caucus, the traditional council, and the company together for a round table discussion. The issue was handled amicably and some of demands of the politician and his group were accommodated, according to the CPO and superintendent.

[256] Niras, p. 11 & 18.
[257] Ibid., p. 19.

Effectiveness

FBA's entry point for change in Liberia is mainly the training of individuals and associated increases in their knowledge and awareness of managing and leading peace and security (conflict prevention, conflict management, dialogue and mediation, as well as security sector reform) initiatives. The theory of change is that the increased knowledge and practical skills will empower individuals to apply new knowledge and play a leading role in their organisations and communities for changes of behaviour and practice. At a higher outcome level, the use and application of knowledge and skills will translate into enhanced effectiveness of the organisations in promoting peacebuilding and preventing conflicts. FBA identified a number of assumptions for achieving results at different levels along the trajectory towards 'strengthening the capacity for an inclusive Liberian peace process' and 'enhanced application of democratic principles and human rights in the security sector'.

FBA made contributions to peace in Liberia through its interventions at an individual level. The interventions empowered individuals and strengthened their individual capacity to work more effectively with peacebuilding at the community and county levels. FBA's interventions also contributed to creating and strengthening relations and networks amongst participants in the training programmes. But the interventions are not enough to build momentum for institutional change at a national level. Achievements at the individual level have so far not translated into action at the socio-political level. The interventions thus have no discernible effect on peace.

A recommendation is that FBA's interventions should be more closely interconnected and coordinated in order to create synergies, as well as seek complementarities with other programmes within Team Sweden and other international and national peace actors. An impeding factor for FBA's coordination with other actors is its remote management of the interventions from Sweden, causing

irregular communication and information sharing with national and other international actors. FBA is addressing this by employing a staff member at the embassy.

FBA has built relations with both state and non-state actors in Liberia and FBA is very much appreciated as a partner for its collegial relationship with stakeholders. There is still room for a greater level of participation of local actors in the design of interventions to enhance ownership and sustainability of achieved results. For the future, FBA is well positioned to work in a closer and more engaged way with national political processes.

Theories of change

FBA's interventions were continuously adapted to new learning from surveys and interviews with participants and their organisations. This reiterative and adaptive approach seemed to have been more effective than strictly following a log frame with pre-defined indicators for results at different levels.

In 2019 FBA developed a results-based management (RBM) approach for all MFA strategy-governed interventions (e.g. bilateral cooperation/geographical strategies and thematic strategies/ sustainable peace, etc.). FBA began gradually introducing an RBM approach in 2020, with FBA's bilateral cooperation strategies being among the first to use an RBM approach.[258] FBA developed specific theories of change for each intervention in Liberia describing the results chain from activities to higher-level outcomes, the underlying assumptions, and the causality between different result levels.

[258] FBA, Ett utvecklat resultatbaserat arbetssätt på FBA: Rapport från resultatarbetsgruppen, 9 December 2019.

Figure A7.2: Theory of change for two FBA interventions in Liberia



Both the CPLP and SSR LSS/PROS targeted individuals who were expected to apply their training within their contexts. The programmes differed in terms of FBA's control and influence on the selection of participants in the training programmes. FBA worked closely with the four partner organisations to ensure that the most relevant individuals were selected for CPLP (only individuals within the partner organisations could apply for CPLP), whereas the participants (superintendents) in SSR LSS/PROS were requested by the NSCS to participate. FBA had no influence on the appointment of the county programme officers by highlighting the ideal profile of candidates for PROS. FBA successfully recruited young leaders for the CPLP, although concerns were raised about how deeply rooted some participants were in their communities.

The partnerships with the four national youth peace organisations were important entry points not only for recruiting relevant people to CPLP, but also for anchoring CPLP in an institutional context and supporting the participants in their peacebuilding work within the CPLP framework.

Whereas the analysis of who FBA should work with and recruit for CPLP was to a certain extent open-ended in terms of actors and individuals within the youth and peace sector in Liberia, FBA's decision to work on the security sector at the local level in Liberia left no other choice than working with the county security councils and NSCS and their key staff. The challenges with SSR LSS/PROS were different.

The evaluation team agrees with the Niras external evaluation that the theories of change for these programmes have not sufficiently concretised the linkages between different aspects of capacity development. The linkage between human resource development and organisational and institutional development (i.e. ensuring that skills can be operationalised) was weak. In particular, it is not clear

how young CPLP participants from rural areas will diffuse new knowledge within their organisations when the home organisation is based in Monrovia.[259]

Key challenges

A main challenge was that the superintendents are politically appointed and can be replaced at any time. It makes it difficult to institutionalise any achievements made at the individual level. FBA notes however that there has been very limited turnover of superintendents. In fact more program officers have changed than superintendents. In addition, more program officers according to FBA have changed than superintendents. After the new government came to power in 2018, only three of the fifteen retained their positions. Given that the superintendents are serving a political mandate, there are suggestions that they are therefore more sensitive to local politics. A mid-term evaluation of the 'Support to early warning and early response: county peace committees and district level political reconciliation dialogues and civic engagement' by Liberia Peacebuilding Office, Office of the National Peace Ambassador, and ZOA suggests that superintendents are more motivated by politics than by serving their community.[260] Another key issue therefore concerns the attitudes and values of the superintendents and how that affects relations and trust with the local communities. The same evaluation indicates that the public confidence in superintendents in some counties is low.[261]

---

[259] Niras, pp. 23 & 33.

[260] Thomas Kruiper, IE University, Universidad Europea, Mid-term evaluation of the 'Support to early warning and early response: county peace committees and district level political reconciliation dialogues and civic engagement', October 2020, p. 5.

[261] Ibid, p. 24.

Another main challenge is the capability of the superintendents. FBA's own reporting indicates that the capability of superintendents to effectively fulfil their mandate varies because of insufficient competence and capabilities for learning and applying knowledge within the SSR context. The unequal level of knowledge is a challenge and requires more individual support. Given that SSR LSS/PROS to a large extent was dependent on the role and mandate of the superintendents, it makes the programme vulnerable to their capabilities and commitment to learning and applying new tools and methods.

The evaluation team identified some challenges for both CPLP and SSR LSS/PROS. Individuals and organisations lack the resources to cover expenses for transportation and communication that enable them to access isolated rural areas where conflicts occur. The Liberian government is not yet in a position to provide financial support to cover these expenses. Many participants highlighted in various evaluations, including this evaluation, the need for financial assistance. FBA's mandate does not include funding or financial support, but it has been suggested that FBA should coordinate better with other international organisations to financially step in and support the participants with their peacebuilding work in the rural areas. According to FBA, this was done to an extent via PROS as Sida provided funding to UNDP to give top-ups to the program officers and provide them with logistical material and transportation". Some interviewees believe that the effects of the training will otherwise be limited to the immediate community or area where the participants are located.

Critique of key assumptions

The evaluation team finds the scale of the interventions modest in relation to the higher outcome levels. As described above, both the conflict prevention leadership programme (CPLP) and the support to national and local security councils (SSR LSS and PROS) were designed and implemented with the same basic ideas for achieving

change through empowering individuals and thus contributing to change and wider effects in their organisations and communities. FBA's strategy in Liberia included working with a very small number of individuals from all 15 counties to address fundamental weaknesses undermining peace, security and development. FBA's strategies for CPLP, and SSR LSS and PROS differ in one major sense that the participants in SSR LSS and PROS have a formal function to fulfil within an organisation or government structure, while participants in CPLP are local youth leaders in their communities.

The CPLP participants are either high schoolers, university students, or graduates who are employed by or represent FBA's four partner organisations and live across the 15 counties in Liberia. They often joined their organisations as volunteers or were members of local peace clubs at the high school or university. In their communities, they work on different issues related to peace, security and human rights. They do not have any formal power or influence in their communities. They were not 'key people' who were critical to making progress towards resolving existing conflicts. During the two rounds of training, CPLP trained in total 28 individuals from the four partner organisations and across Liberia. The CPLP participants are individuals who, plausibly, are the peace leaders of tomorrow.

The interviews with CPLP participants show that FBA's added value is at the personal level. They gained broader perspectives on their own personal and professional circumstances and how to grow as a person and a professional. Key elements were mentorship, learning about 'mindful communication', and being able to meet with people from other counties who were working on similar issues. These elements have empowered particularly CPLP participants to feel confident to take actions in cooperation with others. These actions are often at a scale that might affect individuals, young men and women.

When asked whether they feel well connected with local actors, the CPLP interviewees confirmed that they are well connected with both local networks of young peace activists and social groups, and with

the county administration. Many CPLP participants were, however, still at a stage in life when they need confidence and motivation to engage with local authorities and stakeholders. The participants were mostly not part of the formal power structure at the local level. The evaluation team finds that an underlying implicit assumption is that the CPLP participants would be able to gain credibility and authority in their community through the FBA training. Thus, by creating a new leadership group for each county, infused with relevant concepts and provided with critical skills, FBA would foster more effective and responsive leadership which will have the capacity to facilitate dialogue and mediate conflicts at the community level. Below are some short stories told by participants about how they have applied their training in their local contexts to contribute to local peace in their communities. These accounts show what different triggers can escalate tension and conflict, and how the participants have contributed to reduce tension or even resolve some disputes.

Box A7.2: Youth tensions are rising high

When a riot broke out in a county, the local CPLP participant called her CPLP colleagues to help organise a two-day peace festival. The riot between the police and the youth in the county was triggered because the youth considered the local police slow in responding to a fatal incident where a young motorcyclist was hit by a car. During the riot, houses and vehicles were damaged, and it caused serious tensions for weeks between the youth, the police and other stakeholders, making the community unsafe. The peace festival targeted all affected communities, the police, the Christian and Muslim communities, the youths, the motorcyclists, the students and the elders. The violence amongst young people ended, and the relations between the youth and police improved.

A similar collaboration between CPLP participants was organised to resolve a conflict between communities that started with a motorcyclist being accused of stealing a motorcycle. The CPLP members mediated between the two motorcyclists, family members and the communities. The police worked with the CPLP members to mediate and resolve the matter without going to court. The two CPLP members were greatly recognised and appreciated by local stakeholders and the communities for their involvement.

However, the evaluation team finds a lack of scalability for CPLP that makes it difficult for FBA to achieve results at a higher outcome level. This is currently addressed by FBA's new program which is taking place after this evaluation period. This critique is highlighted in other evaluations of the programme as well. The concern is both about the scope of people and also whether the 'right individuals' are included in the training. The CPLP engaged a very small number of young people from all 15 counties to learn and develop their knowledge and skills in designing and facilitating conflict prevention and particularly dialogue and mediation initiatives. The evaluation

team understands that the role of CPLP participants, after they have completed their training, is to use their knowledge and skills to create opportunities for particularly young people to be included in local peacebuilding processes to voice their interests and concerns. What is not clear to the evaluation team is the linkage between the CPLP and the 'inclusive reconciliation processes in Liberia'. FBA notes that "in consultation with the MFA, FBA have been allowed to deviate from the initial strategy goal – as there has not been a holistic national reconciliation process to support, and instead work on conflict prevention, mediation and reconciliation at the local level."

While CPLP works with empowering individuals, the link to the higher outcome level, namely: 'strengthened capacity of Liberian CSOs to work strategically with long-term conflict prevention initiatives,' is weak.

FBA's efforts have not had an impact on peace 'at large' in Liberia. Peace work, however, is not a linear process. Thus, major results and wider effects might appear many years later. It would therefore be very useful for FBA to continue monitoring or tracing the CPLP participants in a systematic way to learn what happened next. Many participants might play important roles in the future for peace and security in Liberia.

The assumption is that the four partner organisations will institutionalise and utilise what their CPLP participant has learned and gained from the training. However, there are multiple factors influencing the uptake of the individual's knowledge and skills by the organisations, and then their ability to utilise it in a systematic way and at a scale to make a significant contribution to improving the capacity for inclusive reconciliation processes in Liberia. The evaluation team believes that an important factor is the organisational capacity to adopt new ways of working and develop peacebuilding approaches that encompass multiple layers of society and reflect the multifaceted reality on the ground through enhanced

inclusivity. In addition, the willingness to adopt new ways of working is dependent on the leadership and its capability to strategically move from an idea to practice.

Furthermore, another important factor is the availability of financial and human resources to move beyond the 'idea' of engaging stakeholders to create peace, to essentially ensure they actually have a meaningful participation and influence in the decision-making process. The efforts will require people who have the capability to work on these issues, and money to finance transportation, communication and activities. There are many steps in a very long and mostly unpredictable process to achieve enhanced inclusive peacebuilding and inclusive reconciliation, and different actors have different roles and mandates to exert their power and influence over these processes.

FBA was aware of the gap between the CPLP and explicit efforts to increase the inclusion of youth in existing community-based mechanisms for resolving disputes, e.g. County peace councils (CPC). FBA has therefore recently started to strengthen the link within the CPLP-CPD.

It was noted by FBA and by an external evaluation that CPLP participants from some counties have engaged with CPOs and attended county security council meetings.[262] An example shared with us in an interview with participants in SSR LSS and PROS training is illustrated in the below text box.

[262] Niras, p. 19.

Box A7.3: Strengthening local security councils

The LSS and PROS training helped a superintendent and a CPO to strengthen the CSC and expand the number of members from 25 to 45. The members represent security personnel, civil society organisations, community-based organisations, and youth groups. The range of members helped to strengthen the security–community relations. Although the number of male representatives is twice as high as the number of women in the CSC, their participation contributed to increased protection of women's rights. Similarly, the participation of youth improved within the framework of the community peace committee (CPC) in different communities where they advocated for their interests. The CPC is considered to support the local authorities and the legal justice system in their effort to mitigate tension. The superintendent and CPO explained that in the past, when youths were roaming about and not going to school, it was a security concern. Now, they claim that the involvement of youth from different townships in CPC resulted in less tension.

The LSS and PROS training helped many participants to see security through a broader lens. A superintendent and the CPO used the county security council to deal with issues related to youth – 'zogos' – by creating a safe environment for them and providing psychosocial counselling in the county. The superintendent tried to reassure the youth that "the government has not forgotten about them and that they should not transfer their aggression on the citizens".

Although FBA's four partner organisations are national, their presence and capacity in the counties is not particularly strong in all counties. Some CPLP participants have a rather distant, isolated, and tenuous relationship with their organisation. The infrastructure and transportation in Liberia is daunting. It takes many hours and sometimes days to travel within the country due to bad road conditions and weather. Although communication can be conducted

via phone and social media, it does not replace the effectiveness of working together in a group in the same place. An external evaluation also noted that there "sometimes appears to be weak ownership among Monrovia-based leadership of these organisations of the concept that the mobilised rural youth should be drivers within their organisations. This relates both to entrenched hierarchical relationships and practical logistical obstacles Monrovia-based organisations face when working closely with youth leaders across the country".[263]

It is also important to be reminded of the political administrative complexity of districts, chiefdoms, clans, cities and towns. Liberia's administrative divisions form a highly complex system with a formal structure of authority within the counties and where power lies at different levels.

Thus, the evaluation team recognises the CPLP is an instrument for empowering individuals to raise awareness among their youth colleagues, and facilitate local disputes in their own community, but perhaps most importantly to contribute to building local institutions for peace and reconciliation. However, the role and influence of a CPLP participant on his or her organisation at the national level, and political processes at the local level is modest, but many CPLP participants might gain credibility and legitimacy and increase their influence in the future. Some CPLP participants already felt that they gained more recognition from other local leaders in the community after the CPLP training. The practical, minor, peacebuilding activity in the home community responded to what FBA reported as challenges around participants' limited confidence to facilitate workshops in dialogue and mediation or peace club meetings at schools, as well as the struggle to engage local community members. As a result of the minor peacebuilding activity, FBA reported, communities began to recognise the CPLP participants' intentions

[263] Niras, p. 15.

and role as peace leaders.[264] Whether or not FBA selected the 'right' individuals is difficult to judge. FBA had a system and a selection process that was well-anchored within the Liberia team of FBA. The criteria focused on geographical location, gender, peacebuilding experience, personal motivation, etc., but it is difficult to judge who will be a future peace leader.

The evaluation team thinks that, as only one person from each county participated in the CPLP's annual training, it would have been important to ensure that the selected individual had a local platform, apart from the organisational association with one of the four partner organisations, to use and link her or his increased capacity with strategic initiatives that could trigger multiplying effects or scalability within the county. The partner organisations do not seem to have amplified the results at the individual level nor facilitated or liaised any contacts with local authorities or influential power brokers. A recent external evaluation notes that "relatively little attention has been given to developing a deeper approach to fostering sustainability (and finding ways to scale up) due to the limits FBA has in providing more comprehensive institutional support". Furthermore, it is a "conundrum that institutional sustainability has not been more in focus given that the FBA mandate in Liberia is premised on developing capacities".[265]

FBA's mentors played a critical role in accompanying the CPLP participants to reassure them that they are not alone, and the CPLP network of participants from different counties contributed to boosting the confidence and motivation of the participants to be actively involved in peacebuilding and conflict prevention in their communities. CPLP had some direct engagement with local and formal community peace mechanisms, such as the County security councils and EWER and CPC representatives. FBA organised a Dialogue Day for representatives of the Ministry of Youth and

[264] FBA, Young Liberians building peace: lessons learnt from the first conflict prevention leadership programme, 2019, p. 16.
[265] Niras, p. 32.

Sports, the Peacebuilding Office, the Independent National Human Rights Commission, the National Peace Ambassador, the four partner organisations, the Swedish Ambassador and FBA's Director General under the theme, 'What would it take for all Liberians, including the young generation, to work together in order to build a peaceful country?'.[266] The evaluation team notes the difficulties the Liberian government faces to systematically and successfully reach out to the rural areas in all 15 counties within different policy sectors (e.g. health, education, security, etc.), and the value in terms of achieving concrete results is therefore questionable for CPLP participants to have the opportunity to meet with government representatives to discuss the above question.

Although FBA worked closely with superintendents and county programme officers (CPO) at the county level, these opportunities could possibly have been further expanded to enhance the inclusion of youth in reconciliation processes. It seems to be a missed opportunity for synergy. However, as noted in an external evaluation "the CPOs and CPLP alumni have shown themselves to be playing largely effective roles and as such can be seen to represent relevant entry points to convene a range of actors for conflict dialogue and mediation in rural areas. The CPOs are proud of their increased capacity to engage with local civil society, even though they also express some frustration regarding the extent to which they can maintain and expand these linkages".[267]

The CPLP is neither an approach aiming to engage increasing numbers of people in actions to promote peace, nor does it focus on involving people critical to the resolution of an existing conflict due to their power and influence. The evaluation team finds that the CPLP tries to secure both these aims for the future instead, by empowering young leaders who can play a critical role in the time ahead, when they have gained greater legitimacy or authority in their communities to directly engage in conflicts, and developed broader

[266] FBA, Young Liberians building peace, p. 17.
[267] Niras, p. 26.

networks to promote peacebuilding and reconciliation. Legitimacy is partly dependent on the time it takes for the CPLP participants to demonstrate their capacity to intervene in community dispute settlements, and contribution to preventing and resolving local conflicts.

The scalability is less of a problem for SSR LSS and PROS because the intervention targets the key individuals of the local security councils. It can possibly expand to include more staff at the local security councils and the NSCS and MoIA. In many interviews, superintendents and CPOs urge the agencies to expand the training to also include members and staff who co-chair the county security councils and the district security councils (DSCs) because they hold important positions and the security council would benefit from their enhanced capabilities. It could also include police commanders in the county. As mentioned above, a key assumption of the LSS and PROS training is that the staff and participants are based in the county and not elsewhere. Although the Monrovia-based CPO seems to be an exception, it is critical that the basic assumptions of the training are in place, otherwise the entire results chain will be affected.

What difference have the FBA's initiatives made?

The interviews with CPLP, SSR LSS and PROS participants reveal that FBA's main contribution to peace is at the individual level. Many participants talk about some kind of personal transformation that has motivated them to change things in their communities and counties. We learned that the training triggered a lot of action by the participants in their communities where they live and work. These actions are partly a result of the CPLP and SSR LSS and PROS but are also partly due to other actors in the community and the county. These actors have often been influenced by different cooperation and collaborations with external actors. In the case of CPLP, most actions focus on organising workshops and meetings to raise

awareness about gender issues and resolving disputes, as well as training courses to improve the life skills of youth. The CPLP participants rarely seemed to take actions that are only implemented by their own organisations but more often did so in collaboration with other local or external actors. The actions taken by super-intendents and county programme officers focus on intervening at the community level to resolve disputes or conflicts. These actions are often in response to an ongoing dispute, often a land dispute. Their actions in resolving disputes and conflicts are claimed to be professionalised by a better understanding of how to structure a dialogue and mediation process. It means that their actions such as organising community forums are more inclusive of stakeholders and encompassing of issues affecting the stability of the community.

Most interviewed participants in SSR LSS and PROS find that FBA's added value lies within the programme content of the training, helping them to better understand a broadening of human security that different social groups have different security needs. Several participants found that the training enhanced their understanding of different perspectives on security. Furthermore, the training also helped them to better understand the roles and the responsibilities of different functions and the early warning and early response mechanisms linking the community peace committees, community forums, DSCs, CSCs and the NSCS. The democratic oversight of the security sector had not been clear to many participants. Now, the participants claim they better understand who is responsible for what and where to seek information or who to communicate with, and how to better manage an early warning and early response mechanism. There is a sense of empowerment among the participants to be better prepared for intervening in disputes and conflicts.

FBA added value to the CPLP participants by connecting them through the training, which established new relations and collaborations across counties and organisations. Sharing the same experience seemed to establish a sense of togetherness and

confidence in each other's capacity to intervene in resolving conflicts. Similarly, bringing representatives from all 15 counties together through LSS and PROS to meet, discuss and learn from each other has been very appreciated by the participants.

FBA's contribution is often one of many triggering factors for action. The casual relationship is that actions come after a participant experiences a level of personal transformation itself, induced through training. However, the triggering factors that influence when, where, what and how actions are taken can be multiple. These actions often aim to address social problems for specific groups in the community, and when successfully addressed, the result can be that young women are safer or included in the community, or the number of crimes has gone down in the community.

The interviews with participants in different FBA interventions also reveal cases when the personal development has triggered actions that have had wider effects under certain local circumstances or situations in the communities. In most cases the personal development is the main reason behind these actions rather than the enhanced capacity of an organisation. Although actions taken by participants in LSS and PROS are partly a result of the collaboration between the superintendent and the CPO, it does not mean that these actions are the results of a formal organisational process and procedures. However, some of the wider effects are somewhat institutional, although we do not know how sustainable they are, while other effects are related to dispute settlement and conflict resolution. The evaluation team has learned through interviews about a number of examples when these effects have been achieved.

Mediation of conflicts

Participants in FBA's interventions have been involved in dispute settlement and conflict resolution processes. Some participants managed interventions between groups with different interests to calm down tensions, mediate conflicts and claims over land issues, or social and economic injustices. Most conflicts are related to land

issues in peripheral areas of the counties. For instance, a concession to use land for commercial purposes was given without any consultation with the local communities by the government to a company. It triggered anger among the affected local communities who had questions which went unanswered by the government and the company. The concerns pertained environmental impact, access to land and water, and opportunities to benefit from the operations through job opportunities. Some of FBA's participants in both CPLP and LSS and PROS claim that they have been able to contribute to resolving such disputes or conflicts through setting up committees for mediation processes. The outcomes from these efforts have been that affected communities and the company are collaborating, and that community members benefit financially from the operations. The evaluation team has not been able to verify the outcomes.

A long-term (82 years) land boundary dispute between some districts and indigenous peoples (Lorma and Mandingo) in Lofa county experienced rising tensions. The superintendent and the CPO developed a plan and used the CSC to calm down and resolve the conflict. A committee was formed with the conflicting parties and agreed on a framework for the mediation process that would ensure that the outcome was a 'win-win' situation. The parties reached an agreement and, according to the superintendent and the CPO, the different members of the community now live together peacefully.

What made a difference?

Many CPLP participants describe that larger changes in the society must start with changes of oneself, because, in a war- and conflict-torn society like Liberia, people are marked by scars and wounds from the past that need to be healed. Frustration, resentment, grievances and anger are all symptoms of post-conflict stress people experience. Therefore, activities focusing on strengthening and empowering the individual are key to this healing process. It has been

repeated by CPLP participants that FBA's focus on dialogue and mediation was very meaningful for them. The concept of '*mindful communication'*[268] was a particularly powerful tool to build trust between different individuals and actors, and manage dialogues to identify and talk about root causes of, and solutions to, a problem. They feel they are good communicators thanks to FBA. The training helped them to understand their own personal feelings and that achieving peace is a gradual process that requires ongoing attention and care.

FBA's contributions to strengthened self-confidence and empowerment of the participants through, the mentoring, the field study trip to South Africa, and implementation of the minor peace-building activities in the communities, have been very meaningful to many participants. Today, they have the confidence to voice their opinions and be public speakers, but above all to initiate new projects based on what they learned. This personal transformation is a highly psychological process at an individual level which is influenced by other parallel engagements. It is apparent that several participants work with several organisations and participate in different training programmes at the same time. It is close to impossible to differentiate and know what contributes to what, but what stands out about FBA is the focus on 'mindful communication', as it is the element that is most often referred to as an eye-opener. It is often said that young people need someone to listen to them, to trust and to give them assurance.

Some CPLP participants use the techniques of 'mindful communication' every day to calm tensions or nerves. It has been shared with the evaluation team that there is need for even more knowledge about the psychological processes and particularly the

[268] The principles of mindful communication include setting an intention, being fully present, remaining open and non-judgmental, and relating to others with compassion. Mindful communication is about bringing a greater level of awareness to the two major components of communication: listening and speaking.

role of the well-being in understanding capabilities and experiences of humans, as the mindsets of people are often barriers to change. For example, community dwellers often complain of their need for electricity. However, when these facilities are installed, some people destroy the electric wires and bulbs for petty reasons. How can this be so, the participants ask? How can we approach this? The major problem is how to help the young people to reconstruct their minds in a positive way.

One CPLP participant described what made a difference to his work was the way he learned how to communicate through 'mindful communication' with others in how it has helped to build confidence and trust. The training taught him "if you want to make change, the change should start with yourself." His CPLP experience reinforced his commitment to hold himself accountable and transparent to whom he serves, and not only identify problems but also solutions. He explained that his name is now well-known in the community and particularly among young people. Thanks to CPLP, he now holds a radio talk show on the community radio station (Radio Gbezon) where every Saturday he highlights some of the challenges that women face, and promotes the empowerment of young people. Through the radio station he has been able to reach a wider community within the county, where he invites women from different communities to discuss the dangers of rape by targeting mothers to induce men and boys in their environment to respect women and girls, and tries to engage the local government to take the problem of rape seriously.

Another CPLP participant explained that she felt confident in herself thanks to the leadership skills she gained from the CPLP training. Now, youth in the community trust in her to abilities to lead, to motivate them, and also advocate for their interests. She mentors other youth peace leaders in the community and organises meetings.

Box A7.4: Reducing sexual and gender-based violence

In collaboration with the Carter Center, an international peacebuilding organisation, a CPLP participant used his experience from the CPLP training to resolve legal and quasi-legal disputes without resorting to litigation. The Carter Center's alternative dispute resolution (ADR) methodology and the participant's skills in 'mindful communication' helped the community to avoid civil court cases and instead resolved them through mediation. The CPLP-participant claimed that the combination of his training and ADR contributed to a reduction of domestic violence (such as battering women), and violent conflicts between men relating to 'snatching' of women from each other.

A different action taken by a CPLP participant was to organise a campaign to raise awareness about the need to end a practice among men of improperly calling their under-aged daughters 'wives'. The campaign aimed to change the attitudes among parents to not tolerate men's behaviour which seems to have caused a culture of tolerating rape. The campaign reached six communities with approximately 15,000 people through door-to-door awareness-raising and the community radio station. The campaign advocated for a need to create safe spaces for women and girls to learn, discuss and exchange their experiences to prevent sexual abuse and violence. The campaign required close collaboration with other local actors. A follow-up by the organiser of the campaign suggested that they successfully made parents think critically and reconsider their behaviour or practice. Mothers decided that they will not permit men to refer to their little girls as wives.

Her visibility in the community has also created new opportunities and relations with the Carter Center. Through this the collaboration she has been able to apply her skills in 'mindful communication', facilitation and mediation from the CPLP training, while mediating community civil cases using the alternative dispute resolution (ADR) process to minimise court cases in her community.

Often, participants collaborate with other organisations on an individual basis as well as through their home organisations, but we learned that many participants seek opportunities to collaborate with other persons and organisations that can help advance their work on conflicts in the communities.

Some CPLP participants explained that the CPLP training helped them develop their own way of interacting with others in a more constructive and peaceful manner. The acquired knowledge and skills about leadership enabled them to not only collaborate and handle, but to resolve conflicts with and between people at the community level. They know now how to mediate and resolve conflicts. Through their involvement in peace clubs in schools, they have managed to raise awareness about gender issues. In one school, they organised 'intellectual forums' to exchange ideas on how to handle crisis, and in a different school, they settled conflicts among students.

Thanks to the CPLP training, both people and local government in the county recognise several CPLP participants for their contribution to '*building peace',* which has enabled them to work along with the local actors and institutions focusing on peacebuilding, such as the county peace community. As a CPLP participant noted, "if your community leaders are not giving you the full cooperation, it becomes difficult for the community dwellers to trust you and to take you seriously. If community leaders do not support your work, it is a huge challenge". This demonstrates what helps implement activities is continuous support from the community leaders and the home organisation, demonstrating that the CPLP participants are not alone in their efforts.

In collaboration with an international organisation, the Carter Center, the participant started to organise youth leadership structures for some districts in the county managed by a youth leader to address politicians' manipulation of youth for their own political agenda.

Some participants work at a youth centre where many young people see them as opportunity to connect for mentorship and coaching. Other youth groups call on them when they are faced with crucial decisions. At the youth centre, they organise vocational training and life skills training focusing on small businesses, savings, and general life skills. One participant is a youth trainer at the Carter Center youth training programme where they teach young people. Other participants have organised meetings to discuss teenage pregnancy and sexual and reproductive health. While organising workshops seems to be a common approach to raising awareness, another activity is going house-to-house to raise awareness on conflict prevention, rape, women's self-esteem, and women's participation in decision-making, to discourage women from sitting behind the scenes and depending on men. For many female CPLP participants, these types of activities would not have been possible without the FBA training that gave them the confidence to meet people face to face to inform and convince them. It has encouraged other young women to follow their efforts. The CPLP participant explained that they create a willingness and passion to participate and to defeat fear and build self-confidence.

Some superintendents claim in our interviews that the capacity of the county security councils is strengthened. They feel they personally benefitted from the training and are able "to do the right thing now". It mostly refers to leadership skills such as demonstrating and respecting transparency and accountability, and being a role model for others. In addition, some superintendents find that the training helped them to hold inclusive community and town hall meetings and, particularly, organise the participation of women to talk about women's' issues such as sexual and gender-based violence in the

community. It also prepared them when organising processes for dispute resolution, ensuring that everyone has an opportunity to express their grievances and concerns. Some participants found the training helped them to improve their dialogue skills to act impartially and carefully listen to the different views, and not quickly jump to conclusions based on their previous biases. Our observations resonate with the recent evaluation of FBA's Liberia project 2016–2020 that noted that the capacity of CPOs to mediate in local conflicts had improved and was valuable.[269]

The personal development also refers to improvements of their administrative capabilities. It may seem obvious, but superintendents and CPOs refer, for example, to the fact that they recognise the importance of being on time, submitting reports on time, and sharing information with others. This is reflected also in an external evaluation stating that "some of the skills that were described as having been enhanced with FBA support appear to be more related to basic management and leadership, rather than being conflict-related per se".[270]

Several superintendents find that the two training programmes (LSS and PROS) were very well linked with the functions of the superintendents and the CPOs. They note that the CPOs have enhanced their skills in engaging with relevant actors and monitoring security issues in districts and preparing monthly reports to NSCS. Some CPOs find the reporting templates useful at making the reporting simple and easy. An evaluation stated that "it has proven relevant for enabling actors within the security sector to better manage reporting and information flow between county and national levels".[271] The training was useful to improve the capacity to judge when to raise the alert for rising tensions and escalation of violation, and who should be alerted and engaged. In some counties, the superintendents claim, the CSC has established channels for

[269] Niras, p. 14.
[270] Ibid., p.13.
[271] Ibid.

information and communication with the traditional leaders, local security actors, and other stakeholders (e.g. CPC, interreligious council, elders), and also defined their functions to avoid negative interference with each other and achieve collaboration. Overall, there is a feeling, which has also been tested in some situations, that the training has prepared the superintendents and CPOs to manage complex tasks for sustaining peace and security in the communities.

Conditions for achievements

The enabling factors described above helped build relations between the CPLP participants and the communities they served. The self-confidence and communication techniques helped them access and build trust with members and stakeholders in the communities. They sought ways to liaise with local leaders to work with them on dividers and connectors in the communities to strengthen social cohesion and coexistence.

The achievements matter because they give some people and their communities a certain level of dignity, although on a very small scale. For example, it can be keeping the community safe and clean. For many young people, and particularly young women, being listened to and respected can imply that they dare to return to school and improve their lives.

Supporting youth and women

Many CPLP participants work with young men and women on a daily basis in the communities which has helped to build valuable relationships. For example, the trust between some CPLP participants and young women has created a mutual understanding of the challenges facing young women. It motivates them to work together to find solutions. The CPLP participants find themselves in a role where young people look up to them for direction as a role model. A participant explained that a young girl she was counselling told her: "I am happy about what you are doing and I want to be like

you". The girl is a school dropout, but the support from the CPLP participant enabled her to access a vocational school. She is now learning hairdressing.

The work of the local security council's targets a wider segment of the population in the communities in the counties. When the collaboration between the community forums, DSCs and CSCs functions smoothly, it improves safety and security for the community and benefits particularly women and youth.

The evaluation team has learned from interviews that a gender perspective has been systematically integrated with the training, and thus improved the awareness among participants in the training to pay attention to gender issues. Interviews reveal that several superintendents and CPOs try to include women's organisations in CSCs and other community forums for peace and security. This has been particularly important for recognising and following up on gender issues such as sexual and gender-based violence. Violence against women is a very real and serious problem in most counties in Liberia. An evaluation report states that "CPOs recognise the value of a holistic perspective on gender and feel that it has influenced their work, for example by being alert to how to integrate concerns about sexual and gender-based violence into the work of the county security councils".[272]

Coordination

Interviews suggest that FBA's interventions would have been more effective if Sida and FBA worked closer together to maximise the impact of achieved results. Although linkages existed between Sida-supported partners and FBA, they were not explicitly aligned to intentionally pursue greater impact. The evaluation team believes that closer coordination could have achieved greater results.

[272] Niras, p. 28.

Sida's and FBA's different mandates and roles might have caused difficulties in the joint programming and operationalisation of Sweden's Strategy with Liberia, and so also did the absence of FBA staff at the Swedish Embassy in Liberia. In addition, the planning cycles were not institutionally synched with each other. Both Sida and FBA staff believed that coordination between their organisations in Liberia will be strengthened in the future when FBA has a presence at the embassy. The interaction between them included mostly information sharing, progress updating of activities and programmes, and attending each other's events. Interviews confirmed that the interactions were often too activity-focused and compartmentalised along different thematic areas, lacking linkages to strategic processes. It is difficult to be strategic in a highly complex political environment, and as FBA mostly relies on training as an instrument to contribute to capacity building of peacebuilding actors within FBA's thematic areas, it is critical for FBA to be an active member of Team Sweden and other actors to avoid compartmentalisation but be strategically coherent with Team Sweden.

The evaluation team finds that there has been very little complementarity between Sida and FBA. This is also confirmed by the Niras evaluation that notes that "there have been insufficient interfaces to find and act upon potential synergies where FBA priorities overlap with those of the rest of Team Sweden (and possibly other actors as well)".[273] It is clear from many interviews with representatives from the county security councils that in order for the superintendents and CPOs to be more effective in their peacebuilding work, FBA's efforts must be more closely coordinated with other agencies with "more explicit organisational development mandates and financial resources, and which have logistical capacity to maintain closer, regular contact with partners in all 15 counties".[274] What was partly missed was a joint analysis and coordination

[273] Niras, p. 29.
[274] Ibid., p. 16.

between FBA and Sida in terms of identifying joint entry points for strategic interventions within a larger peacebuilding context in Liberia. FBA's own efforts were not sufficient to ensure that the organisations that the participants represented would be able to institutionalise and systematically apply the knowledge on a wider scale in Liberia.

In a peer review report of Sweden's development cooperation with Liberia from the late 2018, the OECD Secretariat noted that "there is scope to explore greater collaboration and undertake joint programming, given the two organisations' complementary skills and given that capacity building on human rights is also a Sida objective within the country strategy. Promoting shared planning and reporting procedures for FBA and Sida programming in Liberia could be one way to facilitate this".[275] Interviews indicate that there is greater awareness today about the need for coordination and collaboration to create synergies between FBA and Sida, and to better draw on each other's strengths and resources.

FBA's coordination with international actors to strengthen combined results

After the drawdown of UNMIL in Liberia, the Liberian Configuration with the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) has been a particularly important platform for international attention and political support to the Liberia Peacebuilding Plan.[276] The Swedish embassy in Liberia works closely with the Swedish mission to the UN in New York. There is a close dialogue at the ambassadorial level, as Sweden is chairing the Liberian Configuration, to promote

[275] OECD (2019), 'Field visit to Liberia', in *OECD Development Co-operation Peer Reviews: Sweden 2019*, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/d63efb11-en, p. 5.
[276] International Peace Institute, Agathe Sarfati, Operationalizing the Sustaining Peace Agenda: Lessons from Burkina Faso, Liberia, and Papua New Guinea, June 2020, pp. 8–9.

an integrated, strategic and coherent approach to peacebuilding in Liberia across the UN. The Swedish embassy and the UN resident coordinator office (UNRC) are the primary focal points for the PBC in Liberia, assisting PBC with analysis and inputs to ambassadorial meetings for the Liberian Configuration.

Interviews with stakeholders in several counties noted that the phased-out American programme 'mitigating local disputes in Liberia' (MLDL) funded by the US State Department filled a gap in terms of equipping county security councils (CSCs), district security councils (DSCs) and community forums (CFs). MLDL is described as a programme to build the institutional and human capacity of local government officials and citizens to manage disputes and security concerns by focusing on developing and expanding CSCs, DSCs and CFs.[277] The superintendents and CPOs believed that if FBA's efforts had been combined with MLDL's support, it could have achieved greater results. Although MLDL's support was limited in terms of material support, their stationery supplies were helpful for conducting basic tasks for monitoring, documenting, reporting and communicating issues related to early warning and early response.

Identifying, assessing and developing collaborations with similar initiatives in the future seems to be critical for greater impact because most of FBA's partners at the county and district levels are insufficiently equipped to fully utilise the knowledge and skills they gained from the training.

[277] https://www.devex.com/jobs/deputy-chief-of-team-mitigating-local-disputes-in-liberia-568457

Previous EBA reports

2021:06 *Informerad eller kunnig? Utvärdering av insatser för information och kommunikation om bistånd 2010–2020,* Maria Grafström och Cecilia Strand

2021:05 Supporting Elections Effectively: Principles and Practice of Electoral Assistance, Therese Pearce Laanela, Sead Alihodžić, Antonio Spinelli, Peter Wolf

2021:04 *Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights: Measuring Values and Norms to Guide Swedish Development Cooperation,* Anna Kågesten, Karin Båge, Jesper Sundewall, Helena Litorp, Bi Puranen, B., Olalekan Uthman, Anna Mia Ekström

2021:03 *Credible Explanations of Development Outcomes: Improving Quality and Rigour with Bayesian Theory-Based Evaluation,* Barbara Befani

2021:02 *Målbild och mekanism: Vad säger utvärderingar om svenska biståndsinsatsers måluppfyllelse?,* Markus Burman

2021:01 *Data Science Methods in Development Evaluation: Exploring the Potential*, Gustav Engström and Jonas Nóren

2020:07 *Effects of Swedish and International Democracy Aid*, Miguel Niño-Zarazúa, Rachel M. Gisselquist, Ana Horigoshi, Melissa Samarin and Kunal Sen

2020:06 *Sextortion: Corruption and Gender-Based Violence,* Åsa Eldén, Dolores Calvo, Elin Bjarnegård, Silje Lundgren and Sofia Jonsson

2020:05 *In Proper Organization we Trust – Trust in Interorganizational Aid relations,* Susanna Alexius and Janet Vähämäki

2020:04 *Institution Building in Practice: An Evaluation of Swedish Central Authorities' Reform Cooperation in the Western Balkans*, Richard Allen, Giorgio Ferrari, Krenar Loshi, Númi Östlund and Dejana Razić Ilić

2020:03 *Biståndets förvaltningskostnader För stora? Eller kanske för små*?, Daniel Tarschys

2020:02 *Evaluation of the Swedish Climate Change Initiative, 2009–2012,* Jane Burt, John Colvin, Mehjabeen Abidi Habib, Miriam Kugele, Mutizwa Mukute, Jessica Wilson

2020:01 *Mobilising Private Development Finance: Implications for Overall Aid Allocations*, Polly Meeks, Matthew Gouett and Samantha Attridge

2019:09 *Democracy in African Governance: Seeing and Doing it Differently,* Göran Hydén with assistance from Maria Buch Kristensen

2019:08 *Fishing Aid – Mapping and Synthesising Evidence in Support of SDG 14 Fisheries Targets,* Gonçalo Carneiro, Raphaëlle Bisiaux, Mary Frances Davidson, Tumi Tómasson with Jonas Bjärnstedt

2019:07 *Applying a Masculinities Lens to the Gendered Impacts of Social Safety Nets*, Meagan Dooley, Abby Fried, Ruti Levtov, Kate Doyle, Jeni Klugman and Gary Barker

2019:06 *Joint Nordic Organisational Assessment of the Nordic Development Fund (NDF)*, Stephen Spratt, Eilís Lawlor, Kris Prasada Rao and Mira Berger

2019:05 *Impact of Civil Society Anti-Discrimination Initiatives: A Rapid Review*, Rachel Marcus, Dhruva Mathur and Andrew Shepherd

2019:August *Migration and Development: the Role for Development Aid*, Robert E.B. Lucas (joint with the Migration Studies Delegation, Delmi, published as Delmi Research overview 2019:5)

2019:04 *Building on a Foundation Stone: the Long-Term Impacts of a Local Infrastructure and Governance Program in Cambodia*, Ariel BenYishay, Brad Parks, Rachel Trichler, Christian Baehr, Daniel Aboagye and Punwath Prum

2019:03 *Supporting State Building for Democratisation? A Study of 20 years of Swedish Democracy Aid to Cambodia,* Henny Andersen, Karl-Anders Larsson och Joakim Öjendal

2019:02 *Fit for Fragility? An Exploration of Risk Stakeholders and Systems Inside Sida*, Nilima Gulrajani and Linnea Mills

2019:01 *Skandaler, opinioner och anseende: Biståndet i ett medialiserat samhälle*, Maria Grafström och Karolina Windell

2018:10 *Nation Building in a Fractured Country: An Evaluation of Swedish Cooperation in Economic Development with Bosnia and Herzegovina 1995–2018*, Claes Lindahl, Julie Lindahl, Mikael Söderbäck and Tamara Ivankovic

2018:09 *Underfunded Appeals: Understanding the Consequences, Improving the System,* Sophia Swithern

2018:08 *Seeking Balanced Ownership in Changing Development Cooperation Relationships*, Nils Keizer, Stephan Klingebiel, Charlotte Örnemark, Fabian Scholtes

2018:07 *Putting Priority into Practice: Sida's Implementation of its Plan for Gender Integration*, Elin Bjarnegård, Fredrik Uggla

2018:06 *Swedish Aid in the Era of Shrinking Space – the Case of Turkey*, Åsa Eldén, Paul T. Levin

2018:05 *Who Makes the Decision on Swedish Aid Funding? An Overview*, Expertgruppen för Biståndsanalys

2018:04 *Budget Support, Poverty and Corruption: A Review of the Evidence*, Geske Dijkstra

2018:03 *How predictable is Swedish aid? A study of exchange rate volatility,* Númi Östlund

2018:02 *Building Bridges Between International Humanitarian and Development Responses to Forced Migration*, Alexander Kocks, Ruben Wedel, Hanne Roggemann, Helge Roxin (joint with the German Institute for Development Evaluation, DEval)

2018:01 *DFIs and Development Impact: an evaluation of Swedfund,* Stephen Spratt, Peter O'Flynn, Justin Flynn

2017:12 *Livslängd och livskraft: Vad säger utvärderingar om svenska biståndsinsatsers hållbarhet?,* Expertgruppen för biståndsanalys

2017:11 *Sweden's Financing of UN Funds and Programmes: Analyzing the Past, Looking to the Future*, Stephen Browne, Nina Connelly, Thomas G. Weiss

2017:10 *Seven Steps to Evidence-Based Anticorruption: A Roadmap*, Alina Mungiu-Pippidi

2017:09 *Geospatial analysis of aid: A new approach to aid evaluation*, Ann-Sofie Isaksson

2017:08 *Research capacity in the new global development agenda*, Måns Fellesson

2017:07 *Research Aid Revisited – a historically grounded analysis of future prospects and policy options*, David Nilsson, Sverker Sörlin

2017:06 *Confronting the Contradiction – An exploration into the dual purpose of accountability and learning in aid evaluation*, Hilde Reinertsen, Kristian Bjørkdahl, Desmond McNeill

2017:05 *Local peacebuilding – challenges and opportunities*, Joakim Öjendal, Hanna Leonardsson, Martin Lundqvist

2017:04 *Enprocentmålet – en kritisk essä*, Lars Anell

2017:03 *Animal health in development – it's role for poverty reduction and human welfare,* Jonathan Rushton, Arvid Uggla, Ulf Magnusson

2017:02 *Do Anti-Discrimination Measures Reduce Poverty Among Marginalised Social Groups,?* Rachel Marcus, Anna Mdee, Ella Page

2017:01 *Making Waves: Implications of the irregular migration and refugee situation on Official Development Assistance spending and practices in Europe*, Anna Knoll, Andrew Sherriff

2016:11 *Revitalising the policy for global development,* Per Molander

2016:10 *Swedish Development Cooperation with Tanzania – Has It Helped the Poor?,* Mark McGillivray, David Carpenter, Oliver Morrissey, Julie Thaarup

2016:09 *Exploring Donorship – Internal Factors in Swedish Aid to Uganda,* Stein-Erik Kruse

2016:08, *Sustaining a development policy: results and responsibility for the Swedish policy for global development,* Måns Fellesson, Lisa Román

2016:07 *Towards an Alternative Development Management Paradigm?,* Cathy Shutt

2016:06 *Vem beslutar om svenska biståndsmedel? En översikt,* Expertgruppen för biståndsanalys

2016:05 *Pathways to change: Evaluating development interventions with Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA),* Barbara Befani

2016:04 *Swedish responsibility and the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals,* Magdalena Bexell, Kristina Jönsson

2016:03 *Capturing complexity and context: evaluating aid to education,* Joel Samoff, Jane Leer, Michelle Reddy

2016:02 *Education in developing countries what policies and programmes affect learning and time in school?,* Amy Damon, Paul Glewwe, Suzanne Wisniewski, Bixuan Sun

2016:01 *Support to regional cooperation and integration in Africa – what works and why?,* Fredrik Söderbaum, Therese Brolin

2015:09 *In search of double dividends from climate change interventions evidence from forest conservation and household energy transitions,* G. Köhlin, S.K. Pattanayak, E. Sills, E. Mattsson, M. Ostwald, A. Salas, D. Ternald

2015:08 *Business and human rights in development cooperation – has Sweden incorporated the UN guiding principles?,* Rasmus Klocker Larsen, Sandra Atler

2015:07 *Making development work: the quality of government approach,* Bo Rothstein and Marcus Tannenberg

2015:06 *Now open for business: joint development initiatives between the private and public sectors in development cooperation,* Sara Johansson de Silva, Ari Kokko and Hanna Norberg

2015:05 *Has Sweden injected realism into public financial management reforms in partner countries?,* Matt Andrews

2015:04 *Youth, entrepreneurship and development*, Kjetil Bjorvatn

2015:03 *Concentration difficulties? An analysis of Swedish aid proliferation*, Rune Jansen Hagen

2015:02 *Utvärdering av svenskt bistånd – en kartläggning*, Expertgruppen för biståndsanalys

2015:01 *Rethinking Civil Society and Support for Democracy*, Richard Youngs

2014:05 *Svenskt statligt internationellt bistånd i Sverige: en översikt*, Expertgruppen för biståndsanalys

2014:04 *The African Development Bank: ready to face the challenges of a changing Africa?,* Christopher Humphrey

2014:03 *International party assistance – what do we know about the effects?,* Lars Svåsand

2014:02 *Sweden´s development assistance for health – policy options to support the global health 2035 goals,* Gavin Yamey, Helen Saxenian, Robert Hecht, Jesper Sundewall and Dean Jamison

2014:01 *Randomized controlled trials: strengths, weaknesses and policy relevance,* Anders Olofsgård

Folke Bernadotteakademin har blivit en allt viktigare organisation i det svenska biståndet. Myndigheten fokuserar på områden av stor vikt för svensk biståndspolitik: fred, konflikt, krishantering, rättsstatens principer och mål 16 i de Globala målen om fredliga och inkluderande samhällen. Denna utvärdering undersöker om FBA:s insatser bidragit till övergripande målsättningar och koordinerats effektivt.

Folke Bernadotte Academy has become an important actor in Swedish aid. The agency focuses on important areas in Sweden's aid policy: peace, conflict, security, the rule of law, related to Sustainable Development Goal 16 on peace, justice and strong institutions. The purpose of the evaluation is to investigate whether the FBA's initiatives and operations have contributed to the agency's overarching objectives and have been coordinated effectively.

EBA
www.eba.se

Expertgruppen för biståndsanalys (EBA) är en statlig kommitté som oberoende analyserar och utvärderar svenskt internationellt bistånd.

The Expert Group for Aid Studies (EBA) is a government committee with a mandate to independently analyse and evaluate Swedish international development aid.