PRACTICING PEACEBUILDING PRINCIPLES: A STUDY OF SWEDEN’S ENGAGEMENT IN FRAGILE AND CONFLICT-AFFECTED STATES

Gary Milante, Jannie Lilja, Jups Kluyskens, Johanna Lindström
Practicing Peacebuilding Principles: A Study of Sweden’s Engagement in Fragile and Conflict-Affected States

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to
The Expert Group for Aid Studies (EBA)

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List of acronyms

ARTF  Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund
APSM  Afghanistan Peace Support Mechanism
AU    African Union
CSO   Civil Society Organization
CSPSS Civil Society Platform on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding
DAC   Development Assistance Committee
DDR   Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DRC   Democratic Republic of Congo
EBA   Expert Group for Aid Studies
EQ    Evaluation Question
EU    European Union
EU APSAM EU Afghanistan Peace Support Mechanism
g7+   Group of self-identified fragile and conflict-affected countries that signed the New Deal
FBA   Folke Bernadotte Academy
FFP   Feminist Foreign Policy
FSPs  Fragile States Principles
ICRC  International Committee of the Red Cross
IDPS  International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding
IFI   International Financial Institution
IGAD  Intergovernmental Authority on Development
INCAF International Network on Conflict and Fragility
ISAF  International Security Assistance Force (Afghanistan)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IU</td>
<td>Department for International Development Cooperation (Swedish MFA)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDPA</td>
<td>Multidimensional Poverty Analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td>MFA</td>
<td>Ministry for Foreign Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Nongovernmental Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSP</td>
<td>National Solidarity Programme (Afghanistan)</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSG</td>
<td>Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCA</td>
<td>Swedish Committee for Afghanistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDG</td>
<td>Sustainable Development Goal</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sida</td>
<td>Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRHR</td>
<td>Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>UN Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>UN Population Fund</td>
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<td>UNMIL</td>
<td>UN Mission in Liberia</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>UN Children’s Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>UN Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSCR</td>
<td>UN Security Council Resolution</td>
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<td>US</td>
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Foreword by the EBA

In 2011, the international donor community, together with a group of states defined as fragile and conflict-ridden, signed the ‘New Deal for engagement in fragile states’. This agreement was part of the wider process of aid effectiveness in which harmonisation and alignment with countries’ own systems were key. Domestic ‘ownership’ of the development process was to be strengthened, which in the case of fragile states first required increased focus on peace- and state-building.

As a donor, Sweden had been a driving force in the aid effectiveness process, as well as in the process leading up to the ‘New Deal’. In its role as co-chair of the ensuing International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (IDPS), Sweden continued its engagement for fragile states. In 2016, a conference was organised in Stockholm with the purpose of injecting new energy into the support to fragile states. The ‘Stockholm declaration’ updated the objectives and principles for engagement.

An increasing share of the world’s people experiencing extreme poverty reside in situations that are considered fragile. Ensuing conflicts tend to be protracted and create further humanitarian catastrophes. Hence, the Swedish engagement with fragile states and the international process around peace- and state-building have been highly warranted. Development cooperation in fragile and conflict-affected states provide intricate and complicated challenges. Results are difficult to achieve, since new crisis tend to repeatedly emerge. Thus, a decade after the signing of the ‘New Deal’, the question arose as to what happened to its implementation? While such a question would be almost impossible to answer, given the multitude of actors and factors at play in every fragile situation, perhaps Sweden’s own implementation could be mapped out? Hence, EBA wanted to know how Sweden had applied the internationally agreed
principles in its’ own work. It is our hope that lessons from this inquiry will benefit actors within the MFA, Sida, FBA and the Swedish security forces working with fragile states. The insights gained may hopefully also be relevant for actors in the wider donor community as well as for domestic actors in fragile states.

The present study has been carried out by a team from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI, and FCG Sweden. Their work has been accompanied by a reference group led by EBA member Magnus Lindell. The analysis and conclusions remain the full responsibility of the authors.

Gothenburg, December 2021

Helena Lindholm
Sammanfattning


Resultat

Område 1 – Kontextförståelse: Över tidsperioden kom referenser till kontext- och sårbarhetsanalys alltmer att inkluderas i svenska strategidokument, vilket kan tolkas som ett ökat anammande av New Deal-principerna. År 2015 fick Sida en instruktion att systematiskt integrera ett konfliktperspektiv i allt utvecklingssamarbete. Formella


**Område 3 – Ägarskap och inkludering:** Att Sverige antagit principer för ägarskap och inkludering framgick tydligt i de svenska strategidokumenten. När det däremot gäller det praktiska främjandet av nationellt ägarskap skiljde det sig åt mellan länderna. Variationen var till synes knuten till partnerregeringens vilja och förmåga att

**Område 4 – Förändringar i utvecklingssamarbetet:** Sveriges stöd till landspecifika samordnade fonder och icke-öronmärkt kärnstöd till internationella organisationer kan ses som belägg för att Sverige har tillämpat New Deal. Gemensam finansiering anses vara det främsta sättet för att främja användningen av nationella system, att fördela risker och öka samstämmighet. Men även om svensk givarpraxis är förenlig med New Deal, är det svårt att hävda ett linjärt orsakssamband. Svenska aktörer var involverade i utformningen av New Deal-principerna, och svensk praxis har därefter formats av principerna, vilket snarare tyder på en parallell, ömsesidig, påverkan.

**Sverige tillämpar New Deal-principerna inom de fyra områdena.** Sverige är högt uppskattat av internationella och nationella aktörer som är insatta i New Deal. De beskriver ofta Sverige som en förebild bland givare i fråga om genomförandet och förespråkandet av New Deal-principerna. Respondenterna i denna studie tenderar att jämföra Sverige i förhållande till andra givare, snarare än i förhållande till Sveriges uppfyllande av New Deal-principerna som sådana.


### Hur förklara resultaten

The necessity of coordination


Rekommendationer

1. Skapa en “Triple Nexus plus” policy, med tillhörande processer och åtgärder för dess praktiska genomförande

Sverige borde anta en policy som systematiskt för samman svenskt utvecklingssamarbete, fredsbyggande med humanitärt stöd med eventuellt säkerhetsrelaterade insatser i konfliktdrabbade miljöer. En sådan samstämmighetspolicy vore i linje med OECD-DAC Triple Nexus Recommendation ¹ men skulle också omfatta insatser bortom biståndet inom området för säkerhetssektorreform.

Åtgärder för att operationalisera den nya policyn vore att:

- Låta policyn påverka utformningen av framtida landstrategier;
- Etablera en mekanism för koordinering och informationsutbyte mellan UD, andra departement, Sida, FBA och andra berörda myndigheter;
- Länka och harmonisera planering och budgetering för Sveriges humanitära-, utvecklings-, och fredsbyggande engagemang i utdragna humanitära kriser;
- Stärka informations- och rapporteringsmekanismer samt återkopplings-loopar mellan multilaterala och regionala processer, instrument, och initiativ och föra samman dem med fredsbyggandearbete på landnivå.

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2. **Etablera en fokalpunkt för fredsbyggande**
   - Etablera en global fokalpunkt för fredsbyggande på ambassadörsnivå med ett team som också innefattar FBA:s tekniska experter, för att tillhandahålla kunskapsstöd och utbildning kring freds- och statsbyggande för svenska ambassadanställda och för att systematiskt samla lärdomar;
   - Bygga upp en personalstyrka av UD- och Sidaanställda med fredsbyggande och statsbyggande profiler för att säkra tekniskt kunnande och för att minska den sårbarhet som är kopplad till personalrotation i sviktande stater.

3. **Förstärk engagemanget på landnivå**
   - Tillförsäkra tillräcklig bemanning på ambassader i konfliktdrabbade och sviktande stater, inklusive åtgärder för adekvat UD-närvaro;
   - Matcha bemanningsprofiler med Sveriges engagemang i freds- och statsbyggande, med betoning på koalitionsbyggande-, samordnings-, och dialogfärdigheter;
   - Vidta åtgärder för att sätta ett nära samarbete mellan ambassadören och biståndschefen i system;
   - Främja koalitionsbyggande på landnivå systematiskt; först genom att identifiera och engagera motparter från regering och civilsamhälle för att säkra hållbarhet och ökad användning av nationella system; därefter genom att föra ihop givare och andra internationella aktörer kring samlad finansiering och gemensamma plattformar.

4. **Stärk multilateral och regional samstämmighet**
   - Ställ som ett krav för att erhålla svenskt kärnstöd att enskilda FN-organisationer och internationella finansiella organisationer förbinder sig att delta i gemensamma ansatser på landnivå i konfliktdrabbade och sviktande stater;
• Främja stärkt samarbete, samstämmighet och komplementaritet med humanitära aktörer;

• Stöd och driv på ett starkare EU-engagemang för samstämmighet mellan utvecklings-, humanitära-, freds- och säkerhetsinsatser i konfliktdrabbade och sviktande stater.
Summary

The New Deal was a landmark agreement between fragile states, development partners and civil society to improve development practice in conflict-prone settings. The aspiration was to move out of a chronic crisis response mode and to promote cooperation based on mutual commitments. Signed in 2011 in Busan by more than 40 donor and development partner countries and organizations, the New Deal was informed by the 2007 Paris Principles on Good International Engagement in Fragile States and was subsequently reinforced by the Stockholm Declaration in 2016. During the past decade, the three principles frameworks (Paris, Busan, and Stockholm) have been coevolving in a changing global context alongside other policy frameworks and initiatives.

To empirically study Sweden’s adoption and application of the New Deal principles, this report examines four areas: Understanding Context; Coherence; Ownership and Inclusion; and Changing Development Cooperation. These four areas reflect the 44 individual principles contained in the three principles frameworks. The number and complexity of the New Deal principles along with a lack of metrics for follow up on individual principles posed a methodological challenge for this study, which was managed through a variety of measures. The main focus is on the country level through six cases: Afghanistan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Mali, Somalia and South Sudan in the 2011–2020 period. The findings are organized according to the four areas described below.

Findings

Area 1 – Understanding Context: Context and fragility analysis language was increasingly included in Swedish strategy documents over the time period, reflecting increased adoption of the understanding conflict principles. In 2015 Sida also received an instruction to systematically integrate a conflict perspective into all
development cooperation. While formal fragility assessments were carried out in Liberia and Somalia, contextual understanding was largely attained through joint, continuous assessment processes. These were considered more important for contextual understanding than one-off and formal written analyses. Five out of six countries studied were experiencing high-intensity conflicts during the period, which had implications on how sensitive information and conflict assessments were approached. Swedish embassy staff were seen as committed to fragility assessment and joint analysis. Small Swedish embassy staffing numbers and competencies affected the ability to undertake context assessments. The value of local staff to promote contextual understanding was highlighted.

**Area 2 – Coherence:** While coherence can be evidenced through explicit references in Swedish strategy documents, there is a lack of an overall policy framework or mechanism that systematically brings together Swedish development and peace engagement with humanitarian and security action at the country level. The variation in coherence across the countries in part seemed linked to the personal agency of Swedish actors. Strong coherence was driven by a close relationship between the ambassador and head of development cooperation having a shared sense of ownership for different instruments. When embassy teams were able to directly connect with Swedish colleagues at the UN, the EU, and in Stockholm, coherence was further reinforced. Fragmented national counterparts complicated efforts to promote coherence. Sweden is generally perceived as furthering external coherence by supporting collaborative efforts with and between national and international partners through joint working groups, pooled funds, and initiatives to bring government and civil society actors together. Sweden was also acknowledged for promoting coherence at the UN and in other international fora.
Area 3 – Ownership and Inclusion: Adoption of ownership and inclusion principles was evident in Swedish strategy documents. As for the practical promotion of national ownership, there was variation across the countries seemingly tied to the willingness and capacity of the partner government to prioritize and promote a peacebuilding agenda. Sweden was applying inclusion principles across all countries, and the promotion of women’s inclusion in particular. Swedish support to civil society resonates with the need to support inclusive national ownership beyond the sitting government for the purpose of sustainability. Sweden’s contributions to pooled funds and joint platforms have reportedly promoted broader national ownership and inclusion. Such mechanisms can reconcile tensions between different country stakeholders and allow for the use of country systems. Promoting ownership and inclusion is described as labour-intensive. Adequate Swedish embassy staffing is required to understand and engage on the needs and priorities of different stakeholders.

Area 4 – Changes in Development Cooperation: Evidence of New Deal alignment is found in Sweden’s support to country-specific trust funds, and in its unearmarked core support to international organizations. Pooled funding is regarded as the “preferred” New Deal modality to promote national systems, solve risk-sharing problems, and promote concerted action. However, while Swedish donor practices are consistent with the New Deal, it is difficult to assert linear causality. Swedish actors were involved in the creation of the New Deal principles, and Swedish practices have subsequently been shaped by the principles, thus suggesting a co-evolution rather than direct contribution. Sweden’s support to civil society is often channeled through international NGOs, which partner with local organizations or employ local staff. The Swedish Committee for Afghanistan (SAC) is a notable example of longstanding Swedish-supported efforts to promote local ownership. There is a perceived disconnect between Swedish peace and development efforts and Swedish humanitarian assistance, especially in protracted humanitarian situations. Security sector engagement is
seen by Swedish actors as a critical component in peacebuilding and state building efforts who call for an increase in non-ODA resources as entry points to critical policy dialogue and engagement in security sector reform.

Sweden is applying the New Deal principles as reflected in these four areas. Sweden is highly regarded by international and national actors familiar with the New Deal – often cited as a model donor – for implementing and championing the New Deal principles. Respondents in this study tend to compare Sweden in relation to other donors, among which it is highly regarded, rather than in relation to Sweden’s fulfilment of the New Deal principles as such.

Taken together, the available evidence suggests that the strongest overall application of the principles is found in Somalia and Liberia, and the weakest in South Sudan – whereas Afghanistan, DRC and Mali fall somewhere in between. Mali, not a New Deal signatory, was used as a comparator country for which the results did not seem to differ notably from the others. The study relied significantly on a select number of key informants; many of whom had been part of the New Deal implementation. The risks of this affecting the validity of the findings were managed and mitigated by triangulating strategic document review with expert interviews and survey responses, and, where possible, with data on aid and staffing. Still, the results should not be seen as fully representative and should be interpreted with caution.

**Explaining Findings**

Three sets of factors contribute to a variation in the extent to which Sweden has applied the New Deal principles across different countries: 1. National counterpart ownership, 2. International community alignment, and 3. Swedish agency. All three factors need to be in place for there to be traction on the New Deal. The figure below shows that, as in a machine, if one cog is stuck, movement of the other cogs will be limited, or the machinery will be blocked. As a
result, Sweden will find it difficult unilaterally apply New Deal principles if neither national counterparts nor international community partners are willing to engage (shown on the right). Team Sweden also needs to be working in the same direction as international and national counterparts, and must demonstrate internal coherence, shown on the left-hand side of the figure.

**The necessity of coordination**

![Diagram](image)

Source: Authors

Swedish agency reflects both personnel related- and structural factors. Personnel factors is about what Swedish actors are doing and how they are doing it. For example, to what extent they engage in political dialogue with national counterparts, drive fragility assessments, or build coalitions and mobilize national and international partners for peacebuilding purposes. Somalia stands out as a case of active engagement by Swedish embassy staff backed up with solid ministerial support. Structural factors constrain or enable Swedish embassy personnel. Such factors relate to embassy staffing levels, ODA-to-staffing ratios, rotation rules, centralized or decentralized planning or decision-making, and the lack of a framework or mechanism to promote coherence between different strategies. Such structural factors impact the ability to develop a contextual understanding (area 1), to promote coherence (area 2),
national ownership and inclusion (area 3), and to ensure that aid modalities are fit to context (area 4). Ensuring adequate staff capacity in fragile states remains a critical challenge for Sweden.

National counterpart ownership of the peacebuilding agenda is needed. Not all national actors need to be equally committed, but a minimum coalition must exist to make progress. The incumbent government plays a central role together with other key national partners. Active obstruction or elite capture limits traction. Where partnership with government counterparts was halting or lacking, traction was limited as in the cases of South Sudan and DRC. Recent developments in Afghanistan highlight the critical importance of buy-in beyond the sitting government, and the risk of conflating “national” ownership with “government” ownership.

International community alignment. The application of the New Deal principles is a collective undertaking. The priorities and engagement of other international actors, including the political or security engagement of other donor countries, matters. While Sweden’s development cooperation in Liberia was small in absolute terms, the limited presence of other donors allowed Sweden to advance a peacebuilding agenda in partnership with Liberian actors and other partners actively engaged in the country. In Afghanistan, which became a focus for Swedish development cooperation, extensive engagement by other countries with strong priorities not always fully aligned with the New Deal made it challenging for Sweden to significantly shape collective priority-setting.

**Recommendations**

The recommendations use an ‘arrow of action’ approach focused on peacebuilding efforts in conflict-affected partner countries, involving core national and international partners, systematically supported and enabled by Stockholm and by Swedish multilateral
and regional engagement in New York, DC, Geneva and Brussels (see figure below). While this approach has been practiced to some extent, the suggestion is to systematize it.

1. **Create a new “Triple Nexus+” policy along with processes and practices for its operationalization**

   Sweden should issue a global policy that systematically connects Swedish development, peace, and humanitarian action with security engagement in conflict-affected settings. Such a policy for coherence would align with the OECD-DAC Triple Nexus Recommendation but would also cover non-official development assistance efforts in the security realm. Measures to operationalize the new policy would be to:

   - Reflect the policy provisions into future country strategies;
   - Establish a coordination exchange mechanism between the MFA, other ministries, Sida, FBA, and relevant agencies;
   - Align and harmonize country-level analysis, planning and budgeting of humanitarian, development and peacebuilding engagement in the protracted humanitarian settings;
   - Strengthen information or reporting mechanisms and feedback loops to connect relevant multilateral and regional processes, instruments, and initiatives with country-level peacebuilding efforts.
2. **Establish a peacebuilding focal function**
   - Establish a global peacebuilding focal point at ambassadorial level with a team that also entails FBA technical experts to provide knowledge backstopping and training on peacebuilding and statebuilding for Swedish embassy staff, and to systematically collect lessons learned;
   - Build a global cadre of MFA-Sida peacebuilding and statebuilding staff to ensure technical know-how and reduce the volatility associated with turnover in hardship postings.

3. **Strengthen country level engagement**
   - Ensure adequate embassy staffing in conflict-affected and fragile states, including specific measures to ascertain sufficient MFA presence;
   - Match staffing profiles with the nature of the Swedish peacebuilding and statebuilding engagement, with an emphasis on coalition-building, coordination, and dialogue skills;
   - Take measures to systematize close collaboration between the ambassador and the head of development cooperation;
   - Systematically promote in-country coalition building for traction on peacebuilding by, first, identifying and engaging with government and nongovernment counterparts to ensure sustainability and increased use of country systems; Second, by coalescing with donors and other international stakeholders around pooled funding and joint platforms.

4. **Strengthen multilateral and regional coherence**
   - Have individual UN and international financial organizations commit to joined-up approaches at the country level in conflict-affected and fragile settings as a prerequisite for Swedish core support;
   - Promote strengthened collaboration, coherence and complementarity with humanitarian actors;
• Support and promote strengthened EU engagement on coherence between development, humanitarian, peace and security action in fragile and conflict-affected states.
Introduction

In 2020, EBA commissioned a study of Sweden’s adoption and application of the internationally agreed upon New Deal Principles for Engagement in Fragile States. The purpose of this study is twofold:

1. To gain an in-depth understanding of Sweden’s application of the principles constituting the ‘New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States’ and the ‘do no harm’ principle.
2. To generate lessons to inform future application of principles as guidance for development cooperation interventions.

The study is guided by three questions:

1. To what extent has Sweden in its development cooperation applied the principles that constitute the ‘New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States’ and the ‘do no harm’ principle? What have been enabling as well as hindering factors or processes for doing this? What have been observable changes in Swedish development cooperation that could be attributed to the implementation of the ‘New Deal’?

2. To what extent has coordination and cooperation with Swedish actors outside of the development cooperation sphere changed as a result of the implementation of the ‘New Deal’ principles? More specifically: How has coordination and cooperation between development interventions and the political dialogue evolved as a result of implementation of the ‘New Deal’?

3. What lessons can inform Swedish development cooperation based on internationally agreed principles?

The study puts Sweden’s contributions in a wider context of development cooperation guided by internationally agreed principles. The timeframe for the study is 2011 until 2020 and includes the three main New Deal principles regimes: the Paris Principles (including the so-called ‘do no harm’ principle), the Busan
Principles, which included the Peace-building and State-building Goals (PSGs) as well as the FOCUS and TRUST principles, and the Stockholm Declaration. The study has a global scope, but focuses on Sweden’s partner countries: Afghanistan, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Liberia, Somalia and South Sudan as well as Mali as a comparator country.

The study was accompanied by a Reference Group, which was tasked to support the team in the research process. The team held regular presentations and exchanges with the Reference Group, including on the final draft report. This final version has been revised after comments from the Expert Group.

The structure of the report is the following: Executive Summary, Introduction, Methodology, Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations. For the original text of the full invitation for proposals, see Annex 8.

The New Deal in a changing world

The New Deal was a landmark agreement made between fragile and conflict-affected states represented by the g7+, development partners and civil society to improve the practice of development in fragile and conflict-affected states. It was signed in November 2011 by more than 40 countries and organizations at the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan (see Klausen et al. 2021). Sweden was one of the signatories.

The call for better development cooperation in fragile situations represented a continuation of a series of ongoing global dialogues on aid effectiveness (See Figure 1). The New Deal emerged after the Third High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Accra and was informed by the Paris Principles on Good International Engagement

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2 In this study, this group of principles is referred to as the “principles regimes” or the Paris, Busan and Stockholm principles.
in Fragile States (hereafter, the Paris Principles), agreed by donors with inputs from developing countries through the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 2007. Another significant achievement of the New Deal was the stakeholder consensus attained through the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (IDPS) in 2016.

Sweden pledged to abide by the principles and commitments of all three frameworks – Paris, Busan, and the Stockholm Declaration. Sweden, as co-chair of the IDPS from 2015 to 2018, was central in the promotion and adoption of the Stockholm Declaration. These policy frameworks have developed alongside a changing global context – and coevolved with other policy frameworks and concepts, including the Addis Ababa Action Agenda, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the United Nations’ ‘sustaining peace’ agenda.

Other key policy developments concurrent with the adoption and application of the New Deal are shown graphically in Figure 1, Timeline. The timeline demonstrates how different declarations and policies coevolved from 2011 onwards.

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5 The three pillars of the Triple Nexus – peace, humanitarian and development assistance - were brought together by UN Secretary General Gutierrez in 2016. For the purposes of this report, the OECD DAC Recommendation on the Humanitarian–Development–Peace Nexus is used when referring to the Triple Nexus. Adding security to the Triple Nexus, as envisioned in the New Deal Peace and Statebuilding Goals, may be complicated by humanitarian principles. Hereafter the confluence of these different lines of action is referred to as “Triple Nexus+” – a term which is used by a number of respondents, but has no clear origin.
As a result of this coevolution, many of the principles promoted through the New Deal have been adapted, understood and applied — even internalized — more broadly and through other terms. For example, stakeholders undertaking political economy analysis or conflict analysis to be more ‘conflict-sensitive’, may be undertaking a ‘fragility assessment’ without calling it as such (language specified in the New Deal). In other cases, joint planning exercises and priority-setting with the UN and national actors may serve the purpose of ‘compacts’ as described in the New Deal. Likewise, national actors may consider pooled funding, and shared accountability tools as manifestations of the use of country systems principle. As a result of these considerations, this study focuses on tracing change or uptake related to the original intentions of the New Deal rather than the specific form or wording used in the New Deal.

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6 ‘A Compact is a key mechanism to implement the ‘one vision, one plan’. According to the New Deal, it should be based on a broad range of views from multiple stakeholders, including government, the public, and donors, and reviewed annually through a multi-stakeholder review. The Compact also recognizes differences in states of fragility and national contexts; it may therefore take different forms at different points in transition processes. A Compact can also guide the choice of aid modalities and provide a basis to determine the allocation of donor resources aligned to the national priorities’ ([www.pbsbdialogue.org/en/new-deal/new-deal-principles/](http://www.pbsbdialogue.org/en/new-deal/new-deal-principles/)).
Figure 1: Timeline of key policy developments

Source: Adapted by the authors, including with Swedish country-level policies, from Klausen et al. (2021).
Methodology

This section summarizes the methodology used for this study (see Annex 1 for a more detailed version). It is divided into four parts: 1) overview of the overall approach, 2) the framework, including the process of data collection, analysis and iteration, 3) an introductory description of the four areas under investigation, and 4) the limitations of the study.

Overall approach

The focus of this study is adoption and application of the New Deal by Swedish actors over the period 2011–2020. The study has been guided by Michael Quinn Patton’s utilization-focused evaluation approach\(^7\). The research process, from design to feedback, has accordingly been designed to promote use\(^8\).

While the original intention was to apply Patton’s principles-focused evaluation approach\(^9\) to this study, several reasons made this approach difficult to apply in practice: First, as the principles themselves are not being evaluated, the GUIDE framework on evaluation of principles was less relevant. A particular challenge was that many respondents highlighted shortcomings of the New Deal, whereas the task was to evaluate the extent to which Sweden adopted and applied the principles. Second, there are no readily available metrics for the principles (Evaluable, the E in GUIDE). Unlike the Paris

\(^8\) In practical terms, this has implied close engagement with the users as represented in the Reference Group (RG). The RG, including representatives from the Swedish MFA and Sida, were involved throughout the process. Several RG members also participated in the study as interview and/or survey informants. The report has been revised multiple times to promote useability with inputs from RG members, the Expert Group and other experts.
Principles on Aid Effectiveness, which had specific goals and targets attached, allowing for monitoring, evaluation and reporting\textsuperscript{10}, the architects of the New Deals principles and the Stockholm Declaration did not attach indicators for monitoring adoption and application. Third, there are many New Deal principles, and several are interrelated. Taken together, the 10 principles from Paris, the 15 sections of Busan (including the five Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals, five FOCUS and five TRUST components) and the 19 clauses of the Stockholm Declaration amount to 44 principles in total. Some are complex and have multiple sub-principles. Fourth, it would be unrealistic to expect that policymakers and practitioners would know about each of these 44 principles, let alone their sub-clauses. Fifth, the principle regimes considered in this study have both been co-evolving alongside Swedish policy and practice and been influenced by Swedish policy and practice. Since Swedish actors were involved in the development of the New Deal, the principles cannot be considered exogenous to Swedish development policy. This limits the ability to isolate Sweden’s adoption and application of New Deal principles from Swedish influence on the formulation of the principles.

Framework and evidence foundation

To respond to these significant methodological challenges, the authors applied an inductive approach, which aimed to generate new theory emerging from data collected through an iterative process (see Figure 2):

Step 1: Distill the 44 principles into a manageable number of areas. This was done through a mapping exercise, connecting principles conceptually into four areas: Context Analysis, Coherence, Ownership and Inclusion, and Adaptation: Changes in Development Cooperation (the areas are described in further detail below). This mapping was tested for relevance and accuracy with the Reference Group. It was also reflected in the structure of interviews and survey questions (see Table 1 below, Annex 3, 4 and 5 for more detail).
## Table 1: Mapping the principle regimes onto four areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Paris Principles</th>
<th>Busan principles</th>
<th>Stockholm Declaration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Principles</td>
<td>PSGs</td>
<td>FOCUS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1) Understanding Context</td>
<td>1, 4, 8</td>
<td>1–3</td>
<td>1, 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Coherence – Internal and External</td>
<td>1–3, 5, 7–9</td>
<td>1–5</td>
<td>2–5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Ownership and Inclusion</td>
<td>1–3, 4, 6–10</td>
<td>1–5</td>
<td>2–5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Changes in Development Cooperation</td>
<td>3, 4, 7, 10</td>
<td>1–3</td>
<td>2, 3, 5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors based on Annex 5.

### Step 2: Assemble evidence.

Because of the complexity and the challenges in tracing the application of principles into practice, multiple sources of evidence were used. The study relied heavily on triangulating between review of strategic documents (reflecting the de jure adoption of the principles), expert perception captured by interviews and surveys (reflecting the de facto application of the principles) (see Annex 2) and, where possible, data on aid and staffing (the ex-post realization of the application). Practices of coordination, coherence and inclusion are often not independently documented, necessitating evidence in the form of tacit knowledge and accounts of actors involved, at times presenting a challenge for triangulation.11

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Step 3a: Analyze the evidence. The authors used the evidence collected in Step 2 to analyze the adoption and application of the 44 principles across the four areas to answer the three research questions. The focus was primarily at the country level, while Sweden’s influence of global policy adoption and application was also considered. For country cases, the authors analyzed evidence for five of Sweden’s New Deal partner countries: Afghanistan, DRC, Liberia, Somalia and South Sudan, representing diversity in region, capacity, progress, scale/scope of engagement by Sweden and era of the principles. These are all members of the g7+. While Mali is not a g7+ country, it is a conflict-affected low-income state in which Sweden has an embassy and a military presence in country, so it was added as a comparison country. The analysis considers the following:

- **The context:** Sweden’s success in applying the principles at different levels is heavily dependent on the country context and on the actions of national and international counterparts.
- **The limits of Sweden’s contribution:** Sweden cannot be held singularly responsible for the success or failure of development in a partner country. Swedish adoption and application of New Deal principles may be necessary for development success, but not sufficient. Furthermore, Sweden adopted the principles in the interest of reducing fragility, thereby promoting resilience and development. However, evaluating development and fragility outcomes is beyond the scope of the study. As a result, the study does not use language relating to “outcomes” or “impact”.

In order to strengthen the reliability and validity of the findings, triangulation involved different methods of gathering data (as described above), different stakeholder perspectives (see Table 2)\(^\text{12}\), and analysis and validation across study team members (through regular team meetings and joint analysis). Where possible, the perspectives of non-Swedish respondents are juxtaposed with Swedish responses, for validation.

\(^{12}\) Survey and interview respondents were asked if the team had missed anything/had anything else to add in an effort to reduce the team’s own blinders and promote triangulation.
Table 2: Four respondent categories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Swedish</th>
<th>Non-Swedish</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primarily country experience working for/with Sweden</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[14/10/3]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primarily global/multilateral experience working for/with Sweden</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[0/4/2]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The main number in each case is the total number of unique respondents for both interviews and surveys. The first number in brackets indicates the number of persons who were only interviewed, the second number indicates interviewees who also responded to the survey and the third number indicates survey respondents only. Surveys were by invitation only but were anonymous, accordingly, experience and affiliation (voice) were self-assessed by survey respondents.

Source: Authors’ count.

Step 3b. Iterate. Because of the complexity, the authors adapted their approach throughout the study, requesting inputs from the Reference Group and other stakeholders. Early versions of the study framework were shared and tested with the Reference Group before data collection was designed. The stakeholder mapping was a rolling document that expanded whenever stakeholders identified additional relevant actors, with interviews taking place through June 2021. Document review continued throughout the entire study process. Staffing data was included late in the study process after multiple interviewees identified how staffing constraints affected application in country. Early findings, conclusions and recommendations were validated with the RG. The report has been revised multiple times with inputs from RG members, the Expert Group and other experts. The results of this iterative and inductive approach are presented in the conclusions section where the study attempts to develop an explanatory framework about the conditions under which Sweden adoption and application has been successful.
Format of this study: For each of the four areas, the study presents the available evidence using the following format:

- **Summary:** A short summary of the main findings is presented by area.
- **Document review:** Analysis of relevant strategy, policy and other review documents, including other evaluations and academic literature. Where these resonate with other sources of evidence (below), they are cited as well.
- **Data:** Where relevant (primarily areas 2 and 4) data is used to ground the analysis and provide a further objective metric reflecting application.
- **Interviews and surveys:** The bulk of the analysis is grounded on interviews and survey results (described above in Table 2).
- **Assessment of empirical evidence:** For each area, possible limitations and qualifications of the evidence is presented.
- **Explanation of the variation across cases:** Within each area, variation in the adoption and application of the principles is analyzed across country cases and problematized.

The four areas of analysis

As described above, the 44 principles have been mapped on to four areas, to structure the analysis and presentation of findings. These four areas are briefly described here, with more detail in the expanded methodology in Annex 1.

**Area 1: Understanding context:** Area 1 draws on the first FOCUS principle of the New Deal – the use of a fragility assessment: ‘Conducting a periodic country-led assessment on the causes and features of fragility and sources of resilience as a basis for the “one vision, one plan” part of the strategy,’ the first Paris Principle, ‘Take context as the starting point’, and similar language in the Stockholm Declaration. Analysis in this area is based on the prevalence of conflict and fragility analysis and assessments, conflict filters, peace lenses, political economy- or related contextual analysis, as well as the joint engagement and knowledge sharing of these assessments.
Area 2: Coherence: Thematically, this area is about connecting development with political and security work. It reflects the range of the peacebuilding and statebuilding goals and builds on Paris Principle 5: ‘Recognize the link between political, security and development objectives’ and the New Deal’s fourth FOCUS principle: ‘Support political dialogue and leadership.’ The Stockholm Declaration has further connected humanitarian and development action. Coherence is also about different actors acting in a coherent manner. Here, it is largely about Swedish actors’ ability to act coherently internally as Team Sweden and to promote external coherence among national, regional and international partners. Internal coherence could also be referred to as “whole of government” or “comprehensive approach” on the part of Swedish actors. External coherence between Sweden and the recipient country may also involve coherence between government and society in the recipient country, reflected further below under ownership and inclusion.

Area 3: Ownership and inclusion: “Ownership” is about the identification and the setting of priorities and plans by national actors. Ownership is most prominently highlighted in the New Deal’s third FOCUS principle, wherein “Consensus around a Compact” is used as the ‘basis to determine the allocation of donor resources aligned to the national priorities’ identified through one vision/one plan. However, who the national actors are and the degree to which they ‘own’ priorities is a political matter. Different actors may pursue competing priorities. “Inclusion” is about diverse voices being involved in priority-setting. These voices thus need to transcend the political elite establishment, based on for example gender, age, ethnic, regional or religious affiliation. Inclusion has taken various forms in the Paris and FOCUS/TRUST principles,

13 The study at times uses the concept of “Team Sweden”, which then refers to Sida, the MFA, the FBA and, when relevant, other Swedish security actors and government agencies at the country level, without drawing ex-ante conclusions about the effectiveness of this internal coherence.
including in the design of the IDPS through a civil society platform. It is most explicitly identified in the Stockholm Declaration, which promotes gender, youth and attempts to make politics more inclusive. The promotion of ownership by and inclusion of national partners in decision-making in fragile and conflict-affected environments is challenging as it is often the lack of inclusion that drives conflict and fragility.\textsuperscript{14}

**Area 4: Adaptation – Changes in development cooperation, including modalities and mechanisms:** Changes in development cooperation are drawn from the TRUST principles of the New Deal, which cover change in donor behavior vis-à-vis recipient countries, and include Transparency, Risk-Sharing, Use of Country Systems, Strengthening Capacities and Timely and Predictable Aid. Other relevant principles in the Stockholm Declaration include increased proportion of country programmable aid, risk management, resource mobilization, new partnerships and learning, and support to the peacebuilding architecture. Application of the New Deal requires adaptation, which may encompass changes in volumes, modalities, and mechanisms of development cooperation and dialogue, also including political level engagement.

**Limitations of this study**

The study relies significantly on a select number of key informants; many of whom have been part of the implementation of the New Deal. Fully independent voices have been difficult to find because the people who know about Swedish engagement in the New Deal are personally involved with the New Deal and with Sweden. This creates a potential bias that has been partly mitigated by the triangulation process described above, but which cannot fully be eliminated. Furthermore, despite efforts from the team to assess the

extent of Sweden’s adoption and application of the New Deal principles objectively, interview informants often compare the efforts of Team Sweden to that of other donors thus introducing a relative dimension to Sweden’s adoption and application.

The survey was developed primarily to supplement the interview process, with the response rate relatively low. The response rate (33 per cent, 51 responses out of 155 invitations) was lower than desired, albeit not unusual for this type of study, despite several reminders to the non-respondents.

The Covid-19 pandemic had a considerable impact on this study. The team was not able to conduct any fieldwork or to collect additional data in the six case countries. Efforts to mitigate this were also complicated by the difficulty of consulting government officials in developing countries. Accessing people who worked in or on Mali was particularly challenging, since turnover of staff was high during the entire period. The small scale of the Swedish presence in South Sudan also contributed to difficulties of accessing people working in and on that country. As a result of these limitations, fewer national respondents, particularly government officials, from case countries are included than the team wanted. These limitations were overcome in some ways by including additional non-Swedish civil society perspectives in the survey (see Table 2).

The timeframe of the New Deal from 2011, in particular the period up to the Stockholm Declaration in 2016, posed a challenge in terms of data collection, which was compounded by challenges around institutional memory and high staff turnover in some instances. Institutional memory in all organizations (including other donors) was limited; people had moved on or retired. The team added a chronological document review capturing the Swedish response to the agreement of the New Deal to supplement missing institutional memory. While the timeline constituted a challenge, it also provided an opportunity to evaluate Sweden’s application of the New Deal
and to interview diverse respondents who could retrospectively reflect on the entire period, even if their perception was limited to specific parts of it.

The approach taken manages and mitigates the risk of these limitations affecting the validity of the findings. As such this study can serve as a useful jumping-off point for discussion on issues related to future engagement in conflict affected and fragile settings, grounded in a snapshot of what can be known in a year-long mostly virtual review process during a pandemic. The results in this report should be read as indicative, and should not be interpreted as conclusive, exhaustive or fully representative. The authors note that while the approach may be imperfect and the findings may be limited by the current conditions, it is hoped that the publication of this report can inform future studies and promote better application of the principles associated with the New Deal.
Findings

Findings are introduced for the four areas of analysis: (1) Understanding Context; (2) Coherence – Internal and external; (3) Ownership and Inclusion; and (4) Adaptation: Changes in Development Cooperation.

Area 1: Understanding context

Key findings

Context analysis and fragility assessment language was increasingly included in Swedish strategy documents over the time period, reflecting increased adoption of understanding context principles. From 2015 onwards, Sida received a formal instruction to systematically integrate a conflict perspective into all development cooperation.

The practical application of the understanding context principles is not as easily captured. Formal fragility assessments were undertaken in Liberia and Somalia. Evolving high-intensity conflict situations in five out of six case countries affected how sensitive information and conflict assessments were approached.

Respondents overwhelmingly agreed that active engagement in joint continuous assessment processes was more important for understanding context than one-off formal written down conflict-fragility analyses.

Non-Swedish respondents viewed Swedish embassy staff as generally committed to fragility assessments, and as engaged in- and promoting joint analysis.

Stafﬁng numbers and competencies affected the ability to undertake context assessments. Personal agency can to some extent compensate for short staffing. However, very low staffing levels can create a reliance on fragility assessments carried out by others. Local staff contribute to better contextual understanding.
Understanding the context is a central feature of working in fragile and conflict-affected environments. This set of principles is expected to be manifested through conflict-, fragility- risk, political economy- or context analysis, conflict filters, or peace lenses, as well as in the joint nature of analyses and assessments, and the sharing of results to inform policy and practice.

**Understanding context from document review**

Adoption of the New Deal principles is evidenced in the increasing uptake of New Deal language on context analysis in thematic policies and strategies over the time period. For example:

- The 2010–2014 Policy for Security and Development invokes the importance of conflict sensitivity based on preceding OECD, Accra and Good Humanitarian Donorship principles.
- The 2014–2017 Human Security Strategy cites the New Deal when invoking the importance of conflict sensitivity and the ability to ‘analyze and handle risk’ (p. 3).\(^{15}\)
- The 2017 Policy Framework for Swedish Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid explicitly references the New Deal and reiterates the importance of conflict analysis.

From 2015 Sida was explicitly instructed to integrate a thematic conflict perspective across its development cooperation support. At the same time, gender and climate perspectives were also to be integrated.

The geographic (country and regional) strategies contain conflict sensitivity and risk analysis language, with explicit New Deal references included over time. For example, the 2010 regional sub-Saharan Africa strategy and the early Somalia country strategy make

references to risk analysis. The most pronounced examples of New Deal adoption and application are the 2014 strategy for Afghanistan, the 2015 strategy for DRC and the 2016 strategy for Liberia, which included explicit language on the ‘five peacebuilding and statebuilding goals’ of the New Deal. In the Mali country strategy (not a New Deal signatory), neither the New Deal nor fragility assessments were explicitly invoked, but it mentions the need for ‘a risk assessment and management’, which later materialized into a joint ‘system analysis’ involving Sida, the MFA, and the embassy, according to interviews.

Understanding context from interview and survey responses

The process of assessment and analysis was deemed more important than the fragility assessment ‘product’ itself, according to many Swedish and international respondents. This is because joint analytical processes help to build a shared understanding for more coordinated action, e.g., through joint priority setting, planning, and political dialogue. In conflict- and fragility situations where needs are vast, the challenge of maintaining coherence is often linked to priority setting. A Swedish respondent noted that an additional positive effect of joint analysis is learning from others. Because fragility assessments are by definition multidimensional, they benefit from incorporating multiple perspectives. Many actors, Swedish, national and international, pointed to the need for continuous, joint assessment in fragile situations rather than one-off analyses.
Respondents highlighted Liberia and Somalia as country cases where joint analysis had led to common understanding and to more concerted action.\(^\text{16}\) In Afghanistan, Liberia and Somalia, respondents highlighted the value of hiring and incorporating local staff into ‘rolling analyses’ for improved understanding of context. Occasionally, Sweden also seconded staff to the UN or other organizations with placements in conflict areas, which has helped support contextual understanding. The Somalia case highlighted the importance of high-frequency visits of Swedish embassy staff to Mogadishu for joint analysis as they could not be based in country. Likewise, other respondents noted that joint field visits, including with the UN and other donors, informed learning and programming in DRC and Liberia.

Available evidence from Afghanistan suggests less joint analysis relative to, for example, Somalia, and a disconnect between international military and development engagement. Asked if Sweden had the right mix of knowledge and expertise in Afghanistan, a Swedish interview respondent stated that none of the international actors in Afghanistan had sufficient analysis. A non-Swedish national respondent noted that national actors had undertaken a fragility assessment as part of the New Deal process. However, this was not used by any of the donors, Sweden included, which could be seen as a missed opportunity for common assessment with national partners. Still, unlike other donors, numerous non-Swedish and Swedish respondents noted that the Swedish presence in Afghanistan was able to draw on the deep contextual knowledge of the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan (SCA), a Swedish NGO with a 40-year engagement and 6,000 local staff throughout the country.

Several non-Swedish national and international and Swedish respondents connected staffing issues to the ability to engage in fragility or conflict assessments. Respondents familiar with Somalia noted the value of having more, qualified Swedish embassy staff for undertaking solid contextual analysis in recent years. Sida has more staff in Swedish embassies in fragile states than the MFA, which may facilitate engagement in formal analysis (see staffing data below). Such analysis is required in preparation for country strategies. The MFA was found to predominantly use ‘verbal sourcing’ and rolling assessments of the politico-economic situation. Many respondents noted the importance of the ambassador, working closely with the Sida head of development cooperation for a comprehensive contextual understanding.

The downsides to small teams were, first, that embassy staff are stretched thin, working on many issues, and that exceptional capacity was needed to make assessments. The very low staffing of the Swedish section office in South Sudan meant that it had to rely on assessments made by others, notably the (now defunct) joint donor office and donor team in Juba. In Somalia, a non-Swedish respondent expressed admiration of how a Swedish head of mission managed to “put together information with no staff”, which may suggest that staffing constraints may to some extent be compensated by exceptional personal agency. With small teams, there is a risk that staff turnover results in institutional memory loss. Therefore, multiple Swedish respondents welcomed the increased engagement of FBA in strategic analysis and planning to promote continuity, contributing to institutional memory and to act as a backstop for Swedish embassies.

Non-Swedish respondents generally found Swedish embassy staff forthcoming in terms of engaging in and sharing fragility analyses and assessments, while Swedish respondents were generally more critical of Team Sweden. Many non-Swedish interviewees found Swedish embassy staff to have the expertise necessary to undertake analysis, and to be committed to fragility assessment processes and
joint analysis. Some were more critical of problems linked to fragility assessment processes, including the sharing of results, but they were not necessarily linked to Sweden as such. 88 per cent of survey respondents agreed that gender equality was integrated in Sweden’s conflict and fragility analyses and that deliberate efforts were made to differentiate between the needs and experiences of women and men.

International observers noted that Sweden at global level, in its role as co-chair of the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, was particularly vocal about conflict and fragility assessments. Sweden was seen to ‘lead by doing’ through its Liberia and Somalia engagement. This was important because all donors do not equally adopt and apply the understanding context principles. One international respondent noted that many other donors “often did their own evaluation and disappeared from consultations.” Additionally, Sweden promoted the use of conflict analysis in relation to other actors including the EU. Sweden also actively promoted the integration of a conflict and fragility analysis lens in the 2030 Agenda negotiation, and in its UN Security Council and UN Peacebuilding Architecture engagement (Peacebuilding Fund and Peacebuilding Commission). In situations where explicit language around ‘conflict’ was deemed sensitive, terms were reframed around fragility or risk.

**Understanding context – Assessing empirical sources**

Whereas the increased adoption of “understanding context principles” can be evidenced through formal Swedish strategy document references to conflict-, risk- and fragility analysis and assessments, the practical application of this set of principles is not as easily captured. One reason may be that during the time period examined, Afghanistan, Mali, South Sudan, DRC, and Somalia were

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17 Also, see Hearn 2016 (as in footnote 4).
experiencing *high-intensity armed conflict*\(^{18}\) with implications on how sensitive information and assessments have been approached. Particularly if the information and analysis concern government involvement in corruption, human rights violations etc. An absence of written formal conflict and fragility assessments does not necessarily mean that no assessments are being made. Lacking access to confidential cables, classified reports, and closed-door meetings where verbal assessments are shared between donors, diplomats, civil society, other national counterparts and security actors, this study has had to rely on accounts from actors involved in these processes through interviews and surveys.

Survey and interview respondents overwhelmingly agreed that active engagement in joint continuous assessment processes, was key for understanding context, more so than one-off large and formal conflict-fragility analyses. As a result, the most useful evidence is that linked to ongoing process use of contextual understanding, rather than specific written outputs.

While an assessment of the New Deal understanding context principles as such is beyond the scope of this study, these principles seem to pre-assume a “post-conflict scenario”. In other words, a situation when conflict has ended and where international partners together with the government and other national counterparts engage in joint assessments through which a shared understanding and common priorities can be generated. Among the six cases studied, only Liberia can be considered as a post-conflict situation.

Explaining variation in understanding context

The evidence suggests that both Liberia and Somalia were cases where joint analyses were made, promoted by Swedish staff, and leading to shared understanding at the country level. These findings are corroborated by several non-Swedish respondents who were not recipients of Swedish support, and by results of the OECD-DAC Peer Review, which included a specific assessment of Liberia\textsuperscript{19}. In South Sudan, on the other hand, low staffing levels (elaborated in the next section) had a direct reported impact on Swedish ability to conduct conflict or fragility assessments according to Swedish respondents. For Mali, not a New Deal country, the New Deal principles of understanding context seemed to have been applied in the form of joint comprehensive risk systems analysis.

For Afghanistan and DRC, results are less conclusive. The evidence for Afghanistan suggests that the international community as a whole did not have sufficient understanding of the situation. Structural constraints for most international staff working in Afghanistan, being a hardship posting, was shorter-term contracts and regular rest and recuperation breaks, which could possibly have impacted the ability to undertake contextual analysis.\textsuperscript{20} There was a reported disconnect between the US-led military presence and the rest of the international community. Our evidence does not single out Sweden as particularly deficient in understanding context among the international actors in Afghanistan. On the contrary, the long-standing ties between the Swedish Committee on Afghanistan as an implementer of Swedish aid and the formal Swedish presence suggest that Sweden may have been relatively well informed. Information on DRC is relatively scarce. In all cases, local staff at the Swedish embassies are perceived to contribute positively to context assessments.

\textsuperscript{20} The next section will describe measures undertaken by Sida to promote continuity in staffing.
Area 2: Coherence – internal and external

Key findings

Formal adoption of coherence principles is evidenced through explicit references to coherence in strategy documents.

However, there is a lack of an overall policy document or mechanism that systematically brings together Swedish development and peace engagement with humanitarian and security action at the country level. This is especially notable for the protracted humanitarian situations.

The variation in the promotion of coherence across the countries in part seemed linked to the personal agency of Swedish actors. Coherence was driven by a close relationship between the (MFA) ambassador and (Sida) head of development cooperation and a sense of shared ownership for different instruments. Challenges to promoting coherence were accentuated in contexts where national counterparts were very fragmented.

When embassy teams were able to directly connect with Swedish colleagues at the UN (New York, Geneva), the EU, and Stockholm, coherence was further reinforced.

Sweden is generally perceived as promoting external coherence by supporting collaborative efforts with and between national and international partners. Main vehicles were joint working groups and pooled funds, but also initiatives to bring government and civil society actors together.

At the UN and in other international fora, Sweden is acknowledged for promoting coherence.
Converting a contextual understanding into peacebuilding and statebuilding action calls for coherence. This involves both Swedish actors’ ability to act coherently internally as Team Sweden and to support and promote external coherence among national, regional and international partners.\(^{21}\)

**Coherence in strategic documents**

Adoption of New Deal principles related to coherence is evidenced in Swedish strategy documents. Early adoption of coherence principles can be found in the 2010-2014 *Peace and Security for Development Policy* which noted that, ‘Activities should have as their basis the needs and priorities of partner countries’ in line with Paris and Accra. This was further developed through the 2014–2017 *Result Strategy for Global Initiatives for Human Security*, which stipulates that, ‘The New Deal gives the ability to integrate politics, economics and security.’ The 2017 *Policy Framework for Swedish Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Assistance* noted that ‘peace, sustainable development and human rights go hand in hand’ and that, Sweden’s work for peacebuilding and statebuilding will be in accordance with the New Deal in fragile states.’ Coherence is also stressed in the 2019 *Handbook on Sweden’s Feminist Foreign Policy*. The 2017–2022 *Strategy for Sustainable Peace* specifies that, ‘Swedish development cooperation is in line with UN Resolutions (1325, 2242, 2250 and 2282) and the International Dialogues on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding which includes experiences from the New Deal.’

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\(^{21}\) Obviously, Sweden cannot force other actors (other donors or national or international actors) to deliver coherently across the PSGs. In many ways applying the New Deal principles requires “working with the grain” on what is possible politically in a complex environment (see Levy, B., 2014. *Working with the grain: Integrating governance and growth in development strategies*. Oxford University Press.).
However, with the exception of the *Strategy for Sweden’s Development Cooperation with Somalia 2018-2022*, there is a lack of country level strategies that bring together Swedish development and peace engagement with humanitarian action more comprehensively. Moreover, the country level strategies only cover DAC-able activities which implies that Swedish non-DAC activities are addressed separately.

**Internal coherence from staffing data, interviews, and surveys**

Internal coherence is explored through staffing data, along with interviews and survey findings which can provide a qualitative assessment of coherence within Team Sweden.

Staffing data reveal that the number of Swedish embassy staff with assignments relevant for New Deal application, i.e., reporting and agency, aid and development cooperation, ranges from 1 (South Sudan, 2012) to 14 (Somalia, 2019–2020) across the embassies in the time period. On average, countries had 8.5 ‘New Deal relevant’ staffing positions in a country year. In South Sudan, Sweden is not represented with a full embassy, but with a section office, reflected in lower staffing levels. Swedish embassy teams may thus be small in absolute terms, in relation to those of other New Deal donor countries, or to the volumes of development aid to be managed and administered. (See below on staffing-to-ODA ratios). Several respondents identified limited staffing as a constraint to ‘doing more’ in country. Serving in fragile countries was noted as labor-intensive.

Data on staffing composition show that all Swedish embassies could be described as ‘Sida embassies’. More specifically, international and locally hired Sida staff constitute more than 70 per cent of total staff time devoted to reporting and development cooperation work.

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23 For the sake of convenience, the report refers to ‘embassies’ for all countries.
(see Figures 3a–3f: Staffing numbers 2011–2020 (full time equivalent, FTE), six countries).  

**Figure 3: Staffing numbers 2011–2020 (full time equivalent), six countries**

3a. Afghanistan  
3b. DRC  
3c. Liberia  
3d. Mali

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24 Please note that all administrative support, consular work, etc., is excluded. Only tasks that could be relevant for New Deal implementation are included: Reporting and Agency (Rapportering och Aktörsskap) and Aid and Development Cooperation (Bistånd och utvecklingspolitik).
Notes: The data presents full time equivalents (FTE). Some staffing positions are not full time devoted to ‘New Deal relevant’ assignments of reporting or development cooperation which is reflected in fractions of staffing numbers. For example, for a position dedicated to working 0.7 on development cooperation and 0.3 to consular affairs, only 0.7 will be registered. In South Sudan, Sweden is not represented with a full embassy, but with a section office, as reflected in lower staffing totals due to part-time posts. In Somalia, staffing numbers were not reported separately as the Somalia staff were physically located in the Swedish embassy to Kenya in Nairobi. Therefore, Somalia and South Sudan staffing statistics 2012–2014 were compiled from staff estimates, rather than from the time reporting used for all other staffing numbers. ‘Other staff’ category content differs across countries. For Afghanistan, it refers to the Swedish Police and the Swedish Migration Agency; for DRC, Liberia, Somalia these are FBA; for Mali, the Swedish Armed Forces (armed forces were not included in Afghanistan staffing numbers).

MFA staff made up around 10 per cent of staffing time across the countries. In many cases, the ambassador occupied the single MFA position. Afghanistan typically had more than two MFA staff in country, which is slightly more than the others. On the other hand, Kabul is a non-family duty station with higher rotation rates and frequent rest and recuperation for international staff, implying that de facto staffing at any given point in time is lower. Afghanistan is followed by Somalia which has experienced an increase in MFA staff since 2017. Three of the countries show relatively low MFA staffing levels: Mali, where there for several years was less than one full-time

25 For the sake of convenience, the report refers to ‘embassies’ for all countries.
MFA person on staff (0.8 staffing position in 2013, 1.4–1.5 in 2014–2019, and 0.3 in 2020). South Sudan, being a section office, also had less than one MFA position throughout the period covered. Liberia similarly lacked MFA presence in 2017. The Swedish MFA peacebuilding ambassador, based out of New York but working exclusively on Liberia 2013–2014, offers a different modality for country engagement.

The proportion of locally hired (Sida) staff has been increasing across all embassies over time, notably since 2015. In 2020, more than a third of every office comprised local staff. The last category, ‘other staff,’ refers to staff from other Swedish government agencies, including the Folke Bernadotte Academy, the Swedish Police, the Swedish Migration Agency, and the Swedish Armed Forces. The presence of other staff is variable across time and by government agency.

To put the staffing numbers in context, staffing data for each embassy is paired with ODA levels for the country in question, which yields an ODA-to-staffing ratio (see Figures 4a (Sida only) and 4b (all Swedish staff, ‘Team Sweden’). This ratio gives an idea of the estimated amount of aid that an individual embassy staff member with a ‘New Deal relevant’ position as defined above on average is responsible for. As figure 4b indicates, the ODA-to-staffing ratio was high in Afghanistan, Somalia, as well as in South Sudan, and varied over time suggesting different capacities and expectations of staff in country. In Liberia and Mali, Swedish assistance was approximately SEK 20–25 million per staff member. In South Sudan in 2019 and 2020, Swedish assistance was over SEK 200 million per staff member. Afghanistan resembled South Sudan, exhibiting a

26 This is all embassy staffing with the exception of South Sudan, where Sweden has a smaller section office.

27 ODA-to-staff ratios were calculated by dividing ODA disbursement per year by total number of embassy staff for the same year. It is acknowledged that not all staff in the embassy work on development or aid and not all work equally, but the number is included to be informative on aid practice.
number of years with assistance over SEK 100 million per staff member, reflecting the size of the Afghanistan portfolio, however, this declined to SEK 75 million in 2020 as a result of decreasing aid levels and increasing staffing. DRC and Somalia ranged in the middle with SEK 50–80 million per staff per year.

**Figure 4a: Ratio of Swedish Official Development Assistance (ODA) to Staff, Sida**
Staff turnover data, useful for assessing the level of institutional memory and social networks, was not available. Mitigation efforts for reducing the impact of turnover have included recruitment of local staff with contextual knowledge and expertise, Swedish–Somalis (Somalia), and rotating staff working on the same country back to Sida headquarters (Afghanistan). This innovation has allowed Team Sweden members to continue to work together on a specific country, while accommodating a work–life balance for non-family duty stations. Swedish and non-Swedish respondents working on Somalia noted the importance of Swedish embassy staff physical presence in Mogadishu, by being able to travel there, rather than having meetings in Nairobi. Sida has recently tried to ensure continuity by building up a staff cohort with fragile states experience. Swedish interviewees noted that a more continuous and coherent approach was helped by FBA’s increasing involvement in joint strategic planning, consultation processes, and as a helpdesk function.
While a small team size allowed Team Sweden to be nimble, the approach relies heavily on individuals and their skills and talents. Whereas several non-Swedish international and national counterparts lauded Swedish staff for their engagement, entrepreneurial approach, collaboration talents and ability to punch ‘above Sweden’s weight class’, there were also two instances of Swedish international staff being considered too inexperienced for the tasks at hand. Non-family duty stations such as Afghanistan were generally seen as harder postings to recruit for. A non-Swedish interviewee noted that Sweden was increasingly ‘sending the best people to the worst places’.

Collaboration of Swedish embassy staff came up as a crucial aspect in several interviews with Swedish respondents. For internal coherence, the importance of close collaboration between the ambassador and the head of development cooperation was stressed. The full range of instruments available to Team Sweden was apparent only when putting together the development tools, with diplomatic, political and security instruments. The head of mission should “feel ownership for all of the instruments, not just the politics and diplomacy”, a former Swedish embassy staff explained. This was also reflected in non-Swedish country respondents speaking to the Somalia case where the leadership of the ambassador was described as essential for promoting internal and external coherence. Swedish respondents report integrated embassy work where development, political and humanitarian staff meet weekly to compare notes and do joint analysis.

Some Swedish respondents found there to be room for more Swedish engagement and knowledge transfer on security sector reform (SSR) and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), including for countries in active conflict. Notwithstanding the experience from Afghanistan, where early attempts at joined up security-development work through Provincial Reconstruction
Teams pre-dating the New Deal had led to mixed results, respondents perceived that Sweden had more to contribute to SSR through, for example, FBA expertise and trainings. FBA resources such as the FBA Security Sector Reform for Practitioners (2020) and The SSR Adviser’s Handbook (2016) were highlighted.

External coherence from surveys and interviews

Externally, Sweden made efforts to promote coherence with and between regional actors, multilateral bodies, country-specific configurations, and civil society.

The main vehicles for promoting coordination with national and international actors in country have been joint working groups and pooled mechanisms, including multi-donor trust funds. International non-Swedish respondents noted that Sweden often contributed unearmarked funds to pooled funding mechanisms, which reinforced perceptions of Sweden being neutral and lacking a geopolitical agenda).

For example, in DRC, joint work took place through the International Stabilization and Support Strategy, which later become the Peace and Stability Working Group whose work informed the Stabilization Fund. Also in DRC, Sweden was chairing the local Triple Nexus group aiming for greater coherence between development, peace and humanitarian action. In South Sudan, 28

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28 Afghanistan deployed special Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Mazar-e Sharif from 2002 to 2014, i.e., pre-dating the New Deal. The PRTs consisted of civil military collaboration for local development delivery. Previous evaluations and interview respondents suggest that PRTs had little discernible effect, positive or negative. The Swedish PRT experience was concluded less than 3 years after the New Deal was signed. Additional details can be found in the Statens Offentliga Utredningar 2017. Sverige i Afghanistan 2002–2014 – Betänkande av Afghanistanutredningen. SOU 2017:16; and Lindell, M.T. and Wiklund, C.H. 2011. Jakten på synergin: erfarenheter av civil-militär samverkan i PRT Mazar-e Sharif. Stockholm: FOI-R.
Sweden formed part of the Joint Donor Office, serving as a coordination platform. In Afghanistan, Sweden engaged with multi-donor trust funds to promote coordination and influence outcomes.

In Somalia, internal and external coherence with partners stood out in a positive way. Sweden was seen as an engaged member in the management of the Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility multi-donor trust fund, pushing for inclusivity. Sweden also co-chaired the Somalia New Deal Working Group on Inclusion. Non-Swedish respondents noted the importance of active ambassadors, meeting regularly with national and international partners, and were seen as both influential and critical. A non-Swedish respondent noted on a Swedish ambassador “If he wanted something, he could bring the international support from the UK, the US, the UN special representative along with him and the Swedish position.” Similarly, visits by Swedish ministers raised the profile of Swedish peacebuilding engagement in Somalia and also Liberia. On security sector reform in Somalia, a Swedish respondent reported “On SSR, Sweden has given support through the regular aid budget. In these challenging political conflict-marked environments you need a political approach. Having just the UNDP with a project manager defeats the purpose of the program”.

Non-Swedish respondents gave high marks to Sweden for the breadth and depth of the whole of government response. These respondents noted that Sweden is “ahead of other donors” and “leads by example” in promoting coherence. Positive responses came from respondents with Somalia, DRC and Liberia experience. However, while a non-Swedish respondent felt that Sweden promoted coherence through the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) and promoted national priorities and not earmarking funding in Afghanistan, another one felt that the Swedish engagement was not marked by a “coherent vision”.

Joined-up approaches depend on a minimum degree of coherence in partner countries. While this can be supported from the outside, it cannot be built by donors. In the words of a respondent “Priorities collide when something negotiated by one branch of the [partner] government
encounters other branches. The finance minister cannot prioritize for the Justice minister. That won’t happen in Sweden. Why would it happen in Liberia?" Nevertheless, there were Swedish efforts in both Liberia and Somalia to promote a shared understanding between different government actors. In Somalia, Sweden tried to promote statebuilding in the health sector by encouraging political agreement on a division of labor between the states and the federal government. The New Deal Compact between the Government of Somalia and donors gave an overall strategic direction to the engagement.29

External coherence at global level from surveys and interviews

A majority of international, non-Swedish respondents highlighted Sweden’s role in promoting the New Deal globally. Being an original member of the IDPS in Busan 2011, Sweden thereafter actively promoted the inclusion of peacebuilding and statebuilding in the 2030 agenda. Sweden was also engaged in UN peacebuilding, including through its chairmanship of the UN Peacebuilding fund in 2012-2014 and by chairing the UN Peacebuilding Commission Liberia configuration through a full-time ambassador in 2013-2014. Sweden is also one of the top five bilateral contributors to peacebuilding funding globally.30 Sweden’s engagement intensified with its seat on the UN Security Council (UNSC). While Sweden was on the UNSC, there were, for example, weekly meetings for Mali, involving New York–Stockholm–Bamako. Several Swedish embassy staff noted the value of connecting information and action across New York (UN), Brussels (EU), Stockholm and partner countries.31

30 Veron, P. & Sherriff, A. 2020. International funding for peacebuilding: will covid-19 change or reinforce existing trends? ECDPM.
31 This is the so-called ‘square of action’ connecting Stockholm, New York (UN), Brussels (EU) and a country where Team Sweden is promoting development cooperation. This square can be expanded to include Geneva (humanitarian actors) and Washington, DC (International Financial Institutions).
Non-Swedish interviewees noted the heavy lifting of Sweden in co-chairing the IDPS from 2015 to 2018. This included the contribution of the Stockholm Declaration in 2016, which reconfirmed the commitment to the New Deal. Several respondents noted that the efforts to promote peacebuilding and statebuilding principles transcended Swedish national interests and contributed to adoption and application of the New Deal principles more broadly. “Sweden dedicates a lot of heavy lifting to the New Deal, not just in talk but in action through support at the UN and other fora, including the Stockholm Forum. These coordination efforts and promotion of the principles around the New Deal with UN actors bridged political, development and humanitarian efforts and pushed efforts for peacebuilding in the UN forward,” a non-Swedish interview respondent said on Sweden’s global engagement.

Coherence – Assessing empirical sources

As for the formal adoption of coherence principles, strategy documents do reference external coherence but there is a lack of overall policy documents or mechanisms that bring together Swedish development and peace engagement with security and humanitarian action more systematically. The country strategies only cover the development and peacebuilding engagement, but humanitarian assistance and large parts of the Swedish security related engagement (aside of the FBA SSR work) are not covered in these strategies. While internal coherence is important for Sweden’s ability to act coherently vis-à-vis national and international partners, internal coherence is not systematically addressed.32

When it comes to the practical application of coherence principles at country level, empirical data on internal coherence comes from staffing data and from Swedish respondents. Combined, these sources point to the relevance of staffing related factors – staffing levels, composition, rotation, collaboration, profiles and skills – as

32 This is also noted in the OECD Development Cooperation Peer Review: Sweden 2019 (p.12).
factors affecting the practical application of coherence at the country level. These sources of evidence indicate increasing internal coherence, particularly between MFA and Sida staff, but also more recently with FBA staff, which can also be supported by independent sources. 33

Based on the empirical data collected, this study cannot make general statements on the overall levels of administrative budgets in fragile states, but the staffing data and interviews clearly suggest that the administrative budgets are inadequate for the practical application of coherence principles.

This is corroborated by the 2019 OECD Peer Review, which recommends increases in the administrative budget for working in fragile situations. 34 Recent increases in the overall administrative budget seem to reflect a change in this direction 35, however, further analysis (beyond the scope of this report) could be done to assess whether these increases have also benefitted fragile states proportionally.

As for external coherence, non-Swedish sources give Sweden positive marks. This could stem from a mix of global and country level engagement where Sweden is seen to walk the talk through its peacebuilding funding and role in driving international and national processes and engagement. Sources tend to compare Sweden to other donors rather than in relation to any absolute principle of

coherence, and Sweden comes across in a positive light because of this. It cannot be ruled out that, as a result of iterative stakeholder mapping, the stakeholders interviewed had a positive disposition toward Sweden.

Explaining variation in coherence

While deeper cross-case analysis is beyond the scope of this study, there are still some patterns across the cases that could be highlighted.

One constant feature that runs across all cases is the lack of policy or strategy documents that comprehensively and systematically bring together Swedish development and peace engagement with security and humanitarian action at the country level. The current Somalia strategy (2018–2022) includes a more coherent view of development, peace, and humanitarian action. Still, even this strategy only covers DAC activities, thus leaving aside Swedish non-DAC engagement.

The personal agency of Swedish staff in actively promoting coherence emerges as a variable factor. Swedish staff efforts in Somalia stand out in a positive way in this regard. Swedish actors’ ability to promote external coherence was also contingent on national counterparts having a “coherent enough” vision. Where such a national vision was lacking, such as in DRC, South Sudan and Mali to a certain extent, there were limits to what outsiders could do. Afghanistan is a mixed case, possibly because the national plan was divergent from the international one (primarily driven by the US) and possibly because Sweden was a relatively small international community actor in Afghanistan. Finally, a large humanitarian share of Swedish ODA to a given country may complicate internal coherence, such as in South Sudan, see further under area 4.

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Area 3: Ownership and inclusion

Key findings

Adoption of ownership and inclusion principles is evident in Swedish strategy documents.

As for the practical application of ownership principles, there is variation across the countries, which seems tied to the willingness and capacity of the partner government to prioritize and promote a peacebuilding agenda.

Sweden applied inclusion principles across country cases, and the promotion of women’s inclusion in particular. 92 per cent of survey respondents found Sweden’s key contribution at the country level to be the advancement of gender equality. Support to civil society is a priority for Sweden. Inclusive ownership beyond a sitting government is necessary for sustainability.

Sweden’s support to and engagement in pooled funds and joint platforms has reportedly promoted ownership and inclusion. These mechanisms can be used to reconcile tensions between stakeholders and support the use of country systems.

Promoting ownership and inclusion is described as labor-intensive by Swedish respondents. Adequate Swedish staffing in country is required to understand and engage on different needs and priorities of various national stakeholders.

Ownership of and inclusion in decision-making in fragile and conflict-affected environments is often challenging. It is often the very lack of inclusion that drives conflict and fragility. “Ownership” is the identification and setting of priorities and plans by national actors. However, who these national actors are and the degree to which they ‘own’ priorities is a political matter. Different

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actors may pursue competing priorities. “Inclusion” is about diverse voices being involved in priority-setting. These voices thus need to transcend the political elite establishment, based on for example gender, age, ethnic, regional or religious affiliation. Tensions between ownership and inclusion can complicate adoption and application of the principles.

Ownership and inclusion from document review

Sweden’s adoption of the principles related to ownership and inclusion is clearly reflected in the evolution of strategy documents over the last decade. Gender related issues, with a specific emphasis on the inclusion of women, are systematically mainstreamed throughout thematic and geographic (regional and country) strategies from 2014 with the establishment of the Swedish Feminist foreign policy, and annual instructions to Swedish government agencies. The Afghanistan and DRC strategies in particular put these issues into focus. Ownership and inclusion aspects are pronounced in the thematic strategies for support via Swedish CSOs of 2010–2014 and 2016–2022. These have focused on ‘local ownership’ taking account of ‘existing coordination and organization forms’, though not explicitly referencing the New Deal. Uptake of inclusion and ownership principles is prevalent when comparing the 2010–2014 Peace and Security Policy to the 2014–2017 Strategy for

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38 For instance, “Increased gender equality and women’s and men’s active participation in democratic processes on different levels are important conditions for sustainable and peaceful economic and social development. An important priority is to strengthen women’s and girls’ knowledge of, and ability to enjoy, their human rights.” MFA 2014a. Results Strategy for Sweden’s International Development Cooperation with Afghanistan 2014–2019. Stockholm: MFA. (p.6–7).

39 For instance, “attention should be paid to, inter alia, gender equality, children’s rights, and the rights of other vulnerable individuals and groups that are discriminated against.” (p.5) and “the rights of marginalised groups and the rights of the child, freedom of expression and human rights defenders…” (p.7) MFA 2015a. Strategy for Development Cooperation with the Democratic Republic of Congo April 2015–December 2019. Stockholm: MFA.
Human Security. The former invoked the Paris and Accra Action Agenda principles of ownership, adaptation and harmonization, whereas the latter explicitly referenced the need for a country’s own willingness and ability to own and lead the process. As such the strengthening local and national capacities, including women’s participation, is to be encouraged. The 2017–2022 Strategy for Sustainable Peace stipulates that: ‘Activities shall be context specific and inclusive and provide support to nationally and locally owned and led peace processes which are prerequisites for sustainable peace’ with ‘support to organizations based in developing countries and fragile and conflict-affected states to strengthen their capacity to contribute to policy development’.

Ownership from surveys and interviews

The extent to which Swedish actors promote national ownership varies across the countries during the period according to interview and survey respondents, which in part appeared linked to the willingness of the government to drive a peacebuilding and statebuilding agenda. While some Swedish and non-Swedish actors unequivocally affirmed that Sweden promotes ownership, a majority of responses were “yes, given certain circumstances…” . One non-Swedish respondent explained that the practical application of the ownership principles is limited by the willingness of national actors to ‘…“take” the ownership. Does the counterpart want to take ownership?’ Swedish respondents noted that the promotion of wider national ownership in practice was labor-intensive, requiring staffing and expertise in country to carry out dialogue to understand the priorities and needs of various national stakeholders.

The variation in findings is explored across the different country contexts.
In Somalia ‘Sweden recognizes the essential need for government ownership,’ according to a non-Swedish respondent. This is done by “building trust with key stakeholders”, according to another non-Swedish respondent. Sweden for example promoted national ownership through support to the Gender Ministry as a way to invest in country systems. Swedish support to work on gender and women’s health, were clear instances of national Somali priorities aligning with Swedish priorities, as noted by many (Swedish and non-Swedish) respondents familiar with Somalia. Sweden and other donors supported efforts by Somali civil society to increase the quota for representation of women in parliament to 30 per cent. Meanwhile, multiple Swedish respondents noted that making progress under the agreements and mutual accountability framework between Somalia and the donor partners federal government was, required constant, facilitated dialogue between states and the federal government. This demonstrates the labor-intensive approach needed and the high transaction cost for supporting national ownership in fragile settings marked by a high degree of contestation.

In Liberia, Sweden was described by non-Swedish respondents as playing a role in quietly pushing forward conversations and processes involving the national government and civil society actors, particularly through land reform, decentralization, reconciliation and gender equality. Multiple Swedish respondents noted that it took long to bring other international actors, donors and multilaterals, along toward supporting national plans. This may be because, until 2018, UNMIL served as the main organizing structure to promote coherence among external actors. Swedish strategies for Liberia supported the Agenda for Transformation (2012-2017) and the current Pro-Poor Agenda for Prosperity and Development (2018-2023), invoking the principles of the New Deal. National Liberian actors sought direct bilateral budget support from Sweden for these plans. Swedish respondents remarked that its approach to budget support in fragile settings is to provide this through its support to multilateral organizations, or, as in this case, through the EU.
DRC was flagged by Swedish respondents as a case where government ownership had been a challenge, resulting in an overall lack of traction for the peacebuilding and statebuilding work of the New Deal. The challenges in the DRC are related to continuing armed conflict and humanitarian crises in the east of the country. Sweden has supported the ISSSS initiative to promote human security in the region. Since the DRC government has not developed a peacebuilding strategy along the lines of “one vision, one plan” in the New Deal FOCUS principles, Sweden has attempted to build ownership with local actors. For example, although development funds could not be channeled through the national government for reasons of fiduciary risk, Sweden is supporting the health ministry’s work on midwifery through community level initiatives, according to a non-Swedish respondent. Another non-Swedish respondent noted that peacebuilding support was provided through local organizations, and raised the issue about the sustainability of these interventions.

In South Sudan, Swedish respondents similarly noted that the ongoing political conflict in South Sudan complicated national ownership for peacebuilding. Despite regular meetings with the government and civil society, it was reportedly “difficult to know to what degree Swedish and the South Sudanese government’s priorities aligned.”

Despite recent setbacks in Afghanistan, interviews with non-Swedish and Swedish respondents on the country were generally positive about the degree to which Sweden was supporting national priorities and promoting ownership. Health, education, livelihoods and human rights, particularly sexual and reproductive health and rights, were priorities promoted by Sweden, particularly through the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) but also through the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan. The ARTF was seen by Afghanistan counterparts as a way to promote national ownership. A non-Swedish interviewee said that the ARTF and similar mechanisms provided a “robust platform for coherence on fiduciary controls, helps to move progress forward around the full suite of institution building.”

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Note: The interviews were conducted in late 2020, early 2021.
In Mali, ownership was promoted according to the limited survey and interviews conducted with Swedish respondents. For instance, FBA experts are supporting the Malian Ministry of Reconciliation and the National Human Rights Commission. As the FBA is an implementing agency, they are dependent on building trust and developing a joint understanding with national counterparts, reportedly encouraging ownership.

**Inclusion from surveys and interviews**

Non-Swedish and Swedish interview respondents overwhelmingly confirmed that Sweden promoted inclusion in all the country cases. On inclusion, Sweden is best known for supporting the representation of women and gender equality. Almost all survey respondents, 92 per cent, found the advancement of gender equality to be Sweden’s single most important contribution across the six countries. Many non-Swedish interviewee and survey respondents noted the primacy of gender equality and women’s inclusion in working with Swedish counterparts. “Gender equality—you will never sit in a meeting without a Swedish diplomat mentioning it,” a non-Swedish respondent said. Sweden is ‘walking the talk in the composition of Sweden’s country team, gender and background,’ another non-Swedish respondent said.

In Somalia, Sweden took on a leadership role in promoting inclusion more generally in the framework of the Somali Compact by co-chairing the Inclusive Politics Working Group. The development of a wider network of Somali counterparts was made possible through frequent shuttling of Swedish embassy staff to Mogadishu, according to Swedish respondents. Non-Swedish interviewees credited Sweden with trying to push the envelope on civil society involvement. Non-Swedish respondents noted that Swedish views were important among Somali government officials because of the Swedish ambassador’s credibility and willingness to speak candidly. A stakeholder noted that Sweden’s approach was to provide both targeted and mainstreamed support related to women’s inclusion.
In Liberia, Sweden encouraged dialogue between government and civil society and included the latter in the peacebuilding process through the UN Peacebuilding Commission. Sweden also worked with the Liberian Ministry of Gender, in collaboration with UN Women. The regular meeting of a breakfast club, supported by Sweden and with the UN, raised issues related to gender and youth inclusion, promoting coordination between civil society, the government and the international community.

In Afghanistan, Sida in partnership with the FBA, supported the EU Afghanistan Peace Support Mechanism (EU APSM) created in 2019. The mechanism promotes the inclusion of war victims and groups that often lack voice in peace processes with the aim of supporting the people of Afghanistan on their path towards peace. A broad and diverse spectrum of Afghan perspectives, concerns and needs from across the country and diaspora, are transferred in a structured manner to the negotiating table. The mechanism also feeds information from the negotiating table back to the public. Developments in Afghanistan in 2021 show the challenge of balancing the inclusion of victims and civil society actors in dialogues around peace with that of armed actors who have the capacity to spoil peace efforts. Notably the APSM is continuing even after the Taliban takeover, suggesting that it represents a credible dialogue mechanism, though the question of ownership remains open. In Afghanistan, Sweden supported organizations like Women for Afghanistan Women, to promote the inclusion of women and to counteract violence against women.

In DRC, Sweden systematically encouraged their partners to do gender analysis. However, inclusion in DRC has many dimensions and as such creates challenges for programming, according to a Swedish respondent. Apart from gender and youth aspects, inclusion issues also encompass ethnic groups and internally displaced persons.
In South Sudan, Swedish respondents noted that Sweden tried to engage with actors from the South Sudanese government administration, and also consulted domestic civil society while offering support to strengthen civil society capacity.

In Mali, Sweden, for example, supported UN Women to increase women’s participation and inclusion, including through incorporating gendered language in the context of peace talks, and supported the National Human Rights Commission’s work on inclusion broadly speaking.

Notwithstanding Sweden’s steadfast support for gender inclusion, some survey and interview respondents (Swedish and non-Swedish) wished ‘more could be done’ to promote the inclusion of groups marginalized and discriminated on other grounds, such as youth, displaced populations, and minorities. Respondents noted that this was true for all donors, so this was not necessarily a critique of Sweden.

**On tensions between ownership and inclusion from surveys and interviews**

Respondents noted tensions between ownership and inclusion. Several respondents, Swedish and non-Swedish, noted an increase in the number of civil society actors and in the tendency of donors to support civil society when donors do not find traction with government counterparts. A non-Swedish interview respondent remarked that for Afghanistan “Many donors use civil society to undermine the concept of national ownership by government.” The proliferation of civil society could lead to tension and a new type of incoherence, as a non-Swedish, international respondent said: ‘Donors promote the participation of civil society, even when there is no clear idea of who they are or how qualified they are to understand national development challenges.’ However, other respondents noted that change agents within government welcomed civil society participation and cited the convening power of Sweden and others to bring these voices to the table.
Pooled funds and joint platforms have been able to resolve some tensions between government ownership and broader societal inclusion. The use of dual accountability mechanisms, used in the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF), allowed for the identification of national priorities through joint planning processes and implementation by national and international actors. Sweden was able to promote priorities in these contexts without pushing individual programming. Multiple respondents cited examples of how work with the UN Resident Coordinator, the Deputy Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General or a UN mission could promote coordination among donors around national priorities.

Swedish respondents report that principles of ownership and inclusion are increasingly used in countries that do not identify as fragile. One Swedish respondent for example commented that “Even if the New Deal is not talked about in Ethiopia, we talk about ownership, inclusion and linking politics, security and development”.

Ownership and Inclusion – Assessing empirical sources

Whereas the adoption of ownership and inclusion principles is clearly detectable in formal strategy documents, an assessment of the application in practice would have benefited from extensive national or local non-Swedish respondent input, which was hampered by the inability of doing field work during the pandemic.

For Somalia the empirical sources are relatively extensive, allowing for more certainty around the findings. For Liberia, few national counterparts are interviewed, but findings are corroborated by other sources, for instance and an evaluation of FBA’s Liberia project
2016-2020\textsuperscript{41} and the OECD/DAC Peer Review of 2019\textsuperscript{42}. The same goes for Afghanistan, where few national counterparts were interviewed, but where our findings on inclusion are corroborated by, for instance, an evaluation of the ASPM conducted in 2020\textsuperscript{43}. With regards to ownership, Paine (2021) notes that although the ARTF was designed to create government ownership, the fact that donors controlled investment choices and that the government had limited ability to generate domestic revenue limited the actual authority and ownership of the ARTF.

For DRC, South Sudan and Mali, the data on ownership and inclusion is weak due to the fact that only Swedish input was gathered, and that independent sources were not available.

Despite the variation in the robustness of primary data collected in this study, many independent sources are available on Sweden’s prioritisation and application of ownership and inclusion principles at a global level. This is particularly highlighted in the 2019 OECD/DAC Peer Review, which covers both ownership and inclusion, and the 2019 Evaluation of Sida’s Support to Peacebuilding in Conflict and Post-Conflict Contexts, which uses Somalia as a case study and that concludes that Sida has had a significant role in promoting gender equality, although less so in supporting the rights of marginalised groups\textsuperscript{44}. Another example is

\textsuperscript{41} This notes that gender has been a strong feature of the FBA project, although specific examples of how awareness raised has turned into action was difficult to find. (Christoplos, I. & Bloh, O. 2020. Evaluation of FBA’s Liberia Project 2016–2020, within the framework of Sweden’s development cooperation strategy. Niras.)
\textsuperscript{42} OECD Development Cooperation Peer Review: Sweden 2019, page 115 (inclusion) and 117 (ownership).
\textsuperscript{43} This has an extensive section on gender, which notes several challenges encountered, but that the ASPM has been an important tool to support the inclusion of women in the peace process (Collin, C et al. 2021. Evaluation of the EU Afghanistan Peace Support Mechanism. Sida Decentralised Evaluation 2021:7).
\textsuperscript{44} Bryld, E., et al. 2019 (as in footnote 33).
the 2020 Evaluation of Sida’s application and effects of a Human Rights Based Approach to development, which concludes that Sida is as a global champion of inclusion and gender equality.45

Explaining variation in ownership and inclusion

Government ownership emerges as an important factor, which varies across the countries during the period. Both DRC and South Sudan were flagged as countries where government ownership of peacebuilding and statebuilding was a perceived challenge. In South Sudan and DRC, support to government ownership reportedly proved difficult because there was no solid counterpart to turn to. Somalia appears as the clearest contrasting case with more solid ownership where Sweden is recognized to support government ownership while also promoting broad the inclusion of civil society and facilitating shared understanding between the federal and state level.

Ownership, or “political will” for peaceful development, is not easily affected by outsiders. The New Deal design underestimated the importance of internal politics and the difficulties that government actors encounter in anchoring peace and statebuilding initiatives and processes across different ministries and constituencies across a country. Recent developments in Afghanistan also show how ownership needs to extend beyond the sitting government to also include potential spoilers as well as civil society actors.

Inclusion is a prioritized issue for Sweden across all the countries, and the promotion of women’s inclusion in particular. However, for Somalia and Liberia it is clear that Swedish actors have taken on extra efforts to lead or spearhead the international community’s efforts for

inclusion in these contexts. The Swedish co-chairing of the New Deal inclusion working group in Somalia, and the role as chair of the UN Peacebuilding Commission Liberia configuration has allowed Sweden to promote wider participation and to liaise between government and civil society.
Area 4: Adaption: Changes in development cooperation

Key findings

Evidence of adaptation and changes in development cooperation is found in Sweden’s support to country-specific trust funds and through its unearmarked core support to international organizations. Pooled funding is regarded as the preferred modality to promote the use of national systems and more concerted action, as well as address risk-sharing problems.

While Swedish donor practices are clearly New Deal-aligned, they are not easily attributable to the New Deal. Swedish actors were involved in shaping the New Deal principles and Swedish practices have subsequently been shaped by the principles, suggesting a co-evolution rather than causality.

Sweden’s support to civil society is often channeled through international NGOs, which partner with local organizations or employ local staff. The Swedish Committee for Afghanistan (SAC) is a notable example of long-standing Swedish-supported efforts to promote local ownership.

Political level engagement is an important dimension of development cooperation. When Swedish development ministers connected their global engagement (in OECD-DAC and UN), with country engagement in Liberia and Somalia, this reportedly advanced peacebuilding and statebuilding efforts on the ground.

There is a perceived disconnect with Swedish humanitarian assistance in protracted humanitarian situations. Non-Swedish and Swedish respondents call for a more systematic approach to joint analysis, planning, and more aligned humanitarian-development and peace action.

Non-ODA resources for fragile contexts were considered too small by Swedish respondents who regard them as entry points for policy dialogue and engagement on security sector reform. Security sector engagement is seen as an important component in peacebuilding and state building efforts.
Changes in development cooperation reflect the “how” of the New Deal. In focus here are the changes in modalities and mechanisms for delivering aid. The role of political engagement is highlighted.

As Swedish strategies typically set out the “what”, they are not expected to provide significant information on changes in development assistance flows or modalities. Therefore, official development assistance data is presented first.

**Changes in development cooperation from official development assistance data**

Annual ODA flows demonstrate aid increases to all six countries over the decade of observation, with significant increases in Afghanistan and Somalia as seen in Figure 5. The high volume for DRC in 2011 represented one-off debt relief of SEK 1 billion. Despite the overall increases, notable declines in assistance occurred in some countries during specific years: Afghanistan (2019–2020), DRC (2013–2014), Mali (2019–2020) and South Sudan (2012–2016). Afghanistan and Somalia emerged as the largest recipients of Swedish aid globally over the time period. These substantial allocations to conflict-affected fragile states are notable when compared to earlier periods of Swedish development aid. Afghanistan received the most aid during the period, with steady increases between 2011 and 2018 followed by a decrease in 2019-2020. However, Swedish aid to Afghanistan, represented only a small share of total international aid to Afghanistan since 2001 given the high level of donor engagement in the country, which

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46 Data comes from Sida’s statistics department but represents the same data that is on OpenAid. The figures for 2020 are provisional. Debt relief in DRC in 2011 included retirement of principal and interest as part of the Paris Club commitments.

prompted one respondent to state that “Afghanistan is big for Sweden, but Sweden is small for Afghanistan”. In Somalia, a steep increase in development aid from around SEK 400 million in 2011 to a peak in 2018 of nearly SEK 930 million can be witnessed. Respondents described this as a result of opportunities presented by the peace-conflict context in Somalia on the one hand, and the agency of Swedish embassy staff on the other. In the words of one non-Swedish interviewee, Sweden ‘punches above its weight here’. However, the aid figures are not adjusted for populations that vary significantly in size. Given its small population, Liberia received the most aid per capita, at approximately SEK 60 per person per year; after an initial decrease in development support between 2011 and 2013, ODA levels remained stable until 2017, when they increased significantly. Somalia received approximately SEK 45 per person per year. Afghanistan and South Sudan received nearly SEK 40 per person per year. Mali and DRC received SEK 16 and 9 per person per year, respectively.

Figure 5: ODA for six country cases

![Figure 5: ODA for six country cases](image)

Source: Authors’ calculations based on Sida ODA data and OpenAid.

A main objective of the New Deal TRUST principles is to increase predictability and reduce volatility in aid (TRUST 1, 5, see Annex 5). Adjusting for slope, i.e., the increase in aid over time, the most volatility occurs in aid flows to Afghanistan (2016, 2018–2020),

**Changes in development cooperation from document review**

While Swedish strategies as such are not expected to convey substantial information on changes in the modalities of development cooperation, as mentioned above, the principle of flexibility is underlined in the 2010–2014 *Policy for Security and Development in Swedish Development Cooperation*, and the 2017–2022 *Strategy for Sustainable Peace* commits to financing “for increased local participation in peace processes, human security, stabilization and confidence-building measures”, consistent with New Deal principles.

For the fragile settings covered, Sweden channels much of its development assistance through pooled funding and unearmarked core support. As regards pooled funding, Sweden is a big contributor to country-specific trust funds during the time period. For example, in Somalia, Sweden was the largest contributor to the Somalia Trust Fund. In DRC, Sweden was the second largest contributor to the DRC Security and Stabilization Support Strategy fund. In South Sudan, Sweden was the fourth largest in the South Sudan Multipartner Trust Fund. In Afghanistan, Sweden was among

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48 The effectiveness of this type of support is outside the scope of this report, but is analysed in the following key references: Swedish National Audit Office 2021. Swedish development aid to multilateral organisations – the Government’s and Sida’s work - Summary and recommendations. Ref no 3.1.1-2020-0222. RIR 2021:28:2021:28; Browne, S., Connelly, N., & Weiss, T.G. 2017. Sweden’s Financing of UN Funds and Programmes: Analyzing the Past, Looking to the Future. Rapport 2017:11 till Expertgruppen för biståndsanalys (EBA); Bryld, E. et al. 2019 (as in footnote 33).

49 See [https://mptf.undp.org/portfolio/fund](https://mptf.undp.org/portfolio/fund) for specifics on each of the funds mentioned here.
the top ten donors for the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) though the ARTF represents the largest commitment in the Swedish portfolio in absolute terms over the period. The increases in Afghanistan development aid that took place during the period were largely directed into existing mutual accountability frameworks and modalities. Pooled funds that include dual accountability mechanisms can serve as a vehicle for supporting partner country priorities and a whole of government. For example, the ARTF allowed for the identification of national priorities through joint planning processes and implementation involving national actors. When it comes to pooled funds at the global level, Sweden was, for instance, one of the largest contributors to the UN Peacebuilding Fund, the Joint SDG Fund and the Conflict Related Sexual Violence Multi-Partner Trust Fund.

Sweden also provides high levels of unearmarked core support to multilateral and non-governmental organizations 50. Such unearmarked core funding can provide flexibility and adaptability for recipients to address peacebuilding and statebuilding opportunities under uncertain circumstances. The UN, including for example the UNDP, UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP, receive the majority of Swedish multilateral core support, followed by the World Bank. 51 Sweden’s core support to non-governmental civil society organizations is often channeled through Swedish and international NGOs to accompany and support the capacity development of national or local civil society. When conditions allow, support is channeled directly to national CSOs. At the regional level, Sweden supports, for example, the Economic Community of West African States, the African Development Bank, the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) and the EU–Africa Infrastructure Trust Fund with engagement in fragile settings. 52

51 Ibid, p. 55.
However, it is challenging to get a complete overview of funding channels and partners of Swedish development aid in any of the six countries as funding is linked to several strategies that run in parallel.53 In a given country, funding under a country strategy may thus be paralleled with funding stemming from a regional strategy, while multilateral actors active in the country receive core support under multilateral (global) strategies, and civil society organizations receive core funding from thematic (global) strategies.

**Changes in development cooperation from interviews and surveys**

Swedish and non-Swedish respondents highlighted pooled in-country funding to core support to international organizations to promote the New Deal principles – reflected in positive experiences in Somalia, Afghanistan, and Liberia. The pooled funding modality reportedly solves more problems relating to coherence, coordination and risk-sharing, and was seen by national respondents as a modality that reduces volatility in aid and promotes predictability. However, pooled funds are not a panacea. As one international respondent noted, pooled funds ‘have limitations, they are often not informed by fragility assessments or monitoring and can be highly political as a result of negotiation between donors.’ In some cases, respondents remarked that pooled funds could still be earmarked and used for donor ‘pet projects’, and that pooled funds could be more difficult for civil society to access.

Various innovations in modalities of development aid and aid delivery across the six countries reflect flexibility and adaptation as envisioned in the New Deal:

In Afghanistan, the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund was a major recipient of Swedish aid54 but steady Swedish funding to the

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work of the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan (SCA) is as noteworthy for the way that it has been set up and operating. The SCA is an NGO with a 40-year field presence in Afghanistan, 6,000 staff (mostly local) and work across the entire country. Some interviewees stated that SCA’s trusted role, its deep contextual knowledge, wide geographic reach and networks, has benefited the Swedish official presence and also allowed Sweden to have a unique small footprint compared to other donors. The EU Afghanistan Peace Support Mechanism (APSM) is another innovative mechanism, intended to influence the quality of future peace by supporting a comprehensive group of Afghan stakeholders through a partnership approach, and provision of technical and thematic support, and by providing a transfer mechanism to official actors.\(^{55}\)

In DRC, Sweden has been working through and with international and national NGOs as a second-best option when engagement with the DRC government has not been possible. In DRC, Sweden has overall been collaborating closely with and through the UN, the World Bank, the EU and other bilateral donors. In the eastern parts, FBA secondments provide policy support and training.\(^{56}\) In eastern DRC, Sweden also supports Life and Peace Institute’s pioneering local peacebuilding work.\(^{57}\)

In Liberia, Swedish support to joined up approaches to peacebuilding has been exercised through the UN Peacebuilding Commission and the UN Peacebuilding Fund, as well as the EU aid

\(^{55}\) The EU APSM was extended for a second phase, after a positive evaluation (see Collin, C. et al 2021 as in footnote 43) and as of the writing of this study, continues to operate after the Taliban takeover.

\(^{56}\) MFA 2015a. (as in footnote 39), p. 10.

architecture. Sida supports the strengthening of country systems, while FBA focuses on capacity-building through training, secondments, and policy support.\textsuperscript{58}

In Somalia, Sweden supports peacebuilding work through international NGOs such as Interpeace. Capacity-building is carried out to implement sustainable and inclusive security sector reform, to counter violent extremism and to promote human rights and accountability. FBA capacity-building is aimed at women and young people. Partnerships include those with the EU and other multilateral organizations.\textsuperscript{59}

Across the different settings, Sweden has supported women’s organizations to promote gender equality, the inclusion of women, and to counteract violence against women, such as Women for Afghanistan Women and Kvinna till Kvinna in DRC and Liberia.

For Somalia and Liberia, Swedish and international respondents raised political engagement as a key modality of ‘development cooperation’. For Somalia, the Swedish development minister’s co-chairing of the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (IDPS) reportedly allowed for a different type of political dialogue with Somali counterparts, which raised profile for common objectives and helped to advance peacebuilding and statebuilding efforts in country. Visits to Mogadishu by multiple Swedish development ministers reportedly helped progress on the New Deal Compact. In Liberia, Sweden’s peacebuilding engagement


\textsuperscript{59} MFA 2018a; noted that this represented a significant departure from activities in the previous strategy, described as ‘funding to promote conflict management and reconciliation. As well as the creation of livelihood opportunities and DDR efforts’ (MFA 2013a. \textit{Results Strategy for Sweden’s International Development Cooperation with Somalia 2013–2017.} Stockholm: MFA).
was a result of an agreement between Liberian President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf and the Swedish development minister, which essentially connected the Swedish global engagement in the UN and OECD DAC with country engagement. Sweden came to chair the UN Peacebuilding Commission’s Liberia configuration and to partner with Liberia and the US for a New Deal country pilot in Liberia. A Swedish peacebuilding ambassador – based in New York and heading the Peacebuilding Commission Liberia configuration – worked full time on the country for two years, shuttling frequently to Liberia and Stockholm.

**Missing from “development cooperation”: Humanitarian assistance and non-ODA funding**

Several non-Swedish and Swedish interview and survey respondents – entirely unsolicited – highlighted the need to factor in humanitarian aid into the application of New Deal principles, although humanitarian response never formed part of the New Deal.

To follow up on this unexpected input, the analysis is expanded to include the humanitarian share of total Swedish ODA per country, and changes therein for the six countries in the 2011–2020 period. Figure 6 shows development (blue) and humanitarian (yellow) assistance for all six countries per year. Pie charts with a larger blue area have higher development assistance as a share of total ODA. Pie charts with a larger yellow area have a higher share of humanitarian assistance of total ODA for that year. Liberia begins with around 10 per cent humanitarian assistance and then drops below 5 per cent for the duration of the period (except for the 2014 Ebola crisis). Afghanistan shows a fairly consistent humanitarian aid share at 15–20 per cent of total aid over the time

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60 More specifically, this analysis looks at Sida’s country-allocable humanitarian support. The MFA-administrated humanitarian organizational core support cannot be easily tracked to individual countries. Also, the data includes debt relief for DRC in 2011 and a small amount in 2012.
period. However, the absolute level of humanitarian aid is high in Afghanistan. Somalia begins with a primarily humanitarian focus in 2011, which continues through the middle of the decade, and begins to shift towards development assistance by 2020. Mali in 2011 was peacefully developing and resembled recent Liberia. However, with the onset of conflict in 2012, the Swedish aid portfolio in Mali became more humanitarian-focused, with such aid ranging from 25 to 35 per cent between 2012 and 2020. DRC, meanwhile, has always experienced 38–53 per cent of aid in humanitarian assistance, with particularly high levels in the latter half of the decade. South Sudan, like Mali, started out with a high share of development assistance in 2011 but almost immediately became a country of humanitarian focus in 2012/13; humanitarian assistance continued to be more than half of total aid until 2019.

**Figure 6: Composition of aid in case countries**

![Composition of aid in case countries](image)

Source: Authors’ calculations based on Sida ODA data and OpenAid.

Figure 6 shows that the share of development assistance is higher in countries during the periods where there is perceived traction on the New Deal. In relation to the protracted humanitarian situations in
Afghanistan, South Sudan, and DRC, the Swedish and national respondents called for a clearer, longer-term vision for Swedish humanitarian aid and what it was trying to achieve. South Sudan was described by a non-Swedish interviewee ‘as a real stress test of the New Deal principles’. As seen above, humanitarian assistance has made up an increasing share of total Swedish aid flows to South Sudan since the country’s independence in 2011. Several violent conflicts, limited government direction and perceived corruption have complicated development and peace efforts. One interviewee therefore favored a separation between development, peace efforts and humanitarian work, whereas others expressed frustration about the disconnect between humanitarian aid and longer-term development cooperation aimed at prevention and sustainable results.

Some respondents (both Swedish and non-Swedish) noted that challenges often had to do with a lack of alignment between the Swedish humanitarian and development funding streams. Sweden’s humanitarian allocation to each country is made according to a set of global needs-based criteria, including for example scale and severity of humanitarian needs and national capacities to respond. Decisions about development assistance allocations, in contrast, are linked to country- or other strategies. Joint country-level analysis, information exchange, and planning between the humanitarian and development sides does not happen upstream in a systematic manner even in ‘predictable’ humanitarian recipient countries, according to Swedish respondents. Implementing partners in a given country may be funded both through Swedish development and humanitarian assistance, with different conditions and different time horizons attached to the different funding streams. Alternatively, humanitarian and development implementing organizations may differ entirely, which often complicates information-sharing. While

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61 A vision of moving past humanitarian assistance was made explicit in the Swedish Afghanistan strategy of 2014 ‘to reduce demand for humanitarian assistance and focus on democratic statebuilding, strengthened human rights and improved transparency and accountability’ (p. 7).
humanitarian implementing organizations may have the deep contextual understanding, unparalleled access and a willingness to address the structural causes behind recurring humanitarian crises, they may not have the mandate or incentives to tackle these underlying issues.

Non-ODA resources for fragile contexts are too small according to multiple Swedish respondents. Security sector reform, in particular, is often a critical area for peacebuilding and statebuilding efforts to be sustained. Given Sweden’s human security approach to security sector work, there is a sense that Sweden has a lot to offer in this area but that the funds to support this work are minimal compared to ODA. At the country level, even small non-ODA funds for security sector reform issues are seen to provide entry points to critical policy dialogue with national counterparts and offer a ‘seat at the table’ with other donors and national counterparts.

Changes in development cooperation – Assessing empirical sources

ODA data demonstrates general increases in aid allocations for the six countries, and relatively larger increases for Afghanistan and Somalia emerging as top global recipients of Swedish aid during the time period. This manifest focus on fragile least developed countries could be interpreted as evidence of Sweden’s application of the New Deal principles.

Beyond changes in these country level allocations, it is hard to draw firm conclusions about changes in overall development cooperation from only dyadic aid data (directly from a donor to recipient). Dyadic aid data cannot provide a complete overview of Swedish ODA flows, modalities, and partners for any given country as Swedish ODA enters a country through parallel modalities under different country, regional, multilateral and thematic strategies – much in the form of core support or through pooled funds (as outlined above). Furthermore, while Swedish aid modalities have adapted to integrate
many of the New Deal principles, Sweden was influential in the formulation of the New Deal principles and already a progressive donor, so these adaptations may reflect changes in Swedish behaviour already underway when the principles were adopted. Sweden’s significant contributions to country specific trust funds over the period suggest that Sweden is a major provider to a funding modality that is explicitly preferred by fragile states respondents and others for aligning with several New Deal principles, which include the use of country systems, coherence and predictability.

The innovations in aid delivery modalities at the country level reported by foremost Swedish respondents can be corroborated with independent sources. Yet, the perceived disconnect with humanitarian aid, especially in the predictable humanitarian settings, was raised by non-Swedish respondents, including national counterparts, and Swedish respondents.

On a final note, many of the findings in this section resonate with results of the OECD DAC peer review of Sweden from 2019.62

Explaining variation in changes in development cooperation

Whereas several features of development cooperation are the same across the countries, and whereas there is also a justifiable variation in delivery modalities as a function of different contexts, there is variation across the cases that could be analysed.

The variation in the development-humanitarian ratio across the cases appears to link back to the partner government’s ability or preference to prioritize peacebuilding and statebuilding, reflecting the intensity of internal divisions and violence dynamics. A high or increasing development share of total Swedish country-level aid corresponds with respondents’ perceived traction on the New Deal in Liberia and

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Somalia specifically. The opposite situation – a high humanitarian share of total ODA – is found in South Sudan, and DRC to some extent where the perceived lack of government counterpart engagement in peacebuilding and statebuilding was addressed earlier. Both Afghanistan and Mali demonstrate quite stable humanitarian to total aid ratios 2016-2020. Absolute levels of humanitarian aid were very high in Afghanistan.

As for the variation in the country specific aid allocations over the time period, the role of personal agency at the Swedish embassy and ministerial level deserves mention. During the period, Somalia emerged among the top recipients of Swedish aid. Non-Swedish respondent input pointed to the role that Swedish embassy staff in Somalia played, allowing Sweden to punch above its weight. Liberia, a relatively small country with active Swedish engagement, had the largest aid per capita allocations among the cases considered here. There was strong personal engagement by Swedish development ministers both in Somalia and Liberia connecting global work in the OECD-DAC and the UN to country level peacebuilding and statebuilding.
Conclusions and recommendations

Study question 1

To what extent has Sweden in its development cooperation applied the principles that constitute the ‘New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States’ and the ‘do no harm’ principle? What have been enabling as well as hindering factors or processes for doing this? What have been observable changes in Swedish development cooperation that could be attributed to the implementation of the ‘New Deal’? To what extent has Sweden applied the principles?

Sweden is applying the New Deal principles reflected in four areas: i) context analysis, ii) coherence, iii) ownership and inclusion, and iv) adaptation at country level. Sweden is highly regarded by international and national actors familiar with the New Deal – often cited as a model donor – for implementing and championing the New Deal principles. Experts consulted for this study tend to compare Sweden in relation to other donors rather than assess Sweden’s application of principles against a global standard. On ‘doing no harm’, the principles provide little guidance on what donors ought to do when government counterparts are, for example, perpetrating violence against civilians. In these cases, supporting government priorities or doing nothing could be ‘doing harm’. In such situations, Sweden invested in international and national non-governmental organizations, pooled funds, supported informal dialogue and peacebuilding initiatives, promoted broader UN-led efforts, and provided humanitarian support.

Due to the complexity of the New Deal principles it is methodologically not possible to determine or quantify the exact extent to which Sweden has applied the principles. The three regimes from Paris, Busan, and Stockholm

63 Reflected in the Paris Principles and reiterated in the Stockholm Declaration.
contain in total 44 individual principles. Without objective metrics attached to each individual principle, the tracking of progress against a global standard is impossible. As a result, the approach employed in this study is to triangulate various sources ranging from strategic documents, other literature and data with interviews and surveys of experts. The risk of relying on key informants many of whom have been part of the New Deal implementation was mitigated by such triangulation. Still, the results should not be seen as fully representative and should be interpreted with caution.

*Evidence suggests a variation in Sweden’s application of the principles across the countries that could be analysed.* The following variation in application by thematic area could be observed across the six countries during the period of study:

- **On context understanding:** The evidence suggests that in Liberia and Somalia, joint fragility analysis and assessment was actively promoted by Swedish actors. In South Sudan, on the other hand, low Swedish staffing levels reportedly affected Sweden’s ability to engage in fragility assessments, resulting in a reliance on others for analysis. For Afghanistan, conclusions can only be drawn with less certainty. The evidence for Afghanistan suggests that the international community as a whole did not have sufficient understanding of the situation and that there was a reported disconnect between the US-led military presence and the international donor community. National Afghan actors had undertaken a fragility assessment as part of the New Deal process that was not used by any of the donors, Sweden included. However, the available empirics do not single out Sweden as particularly deficient in understanding among the international actors in Afghanistan. The close ties between the Swedish embassy and the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan with its 40-year presence and extensive networks across the entire country suggest the contrary. In Mali, not a g7+ country, joined up risk analysis indicates that the notion of joint fragility assessments is being applied beyond the New Deal countries.
• **On coherence:** Somalia came out as the most evident case of a strong application of coherence principles together with Liberia. South Sudan exhibited the least coherence. Non-Swedish interview and survey respondents, comparing Sweden to other donors, concluded that Team Sweden worked well together to deliver on priorities that aligned with national actors. Coherence was also built with other donors, the UN, and others. Obviously, the challenge in promoting coherence was accentuated in contexts where national counterparts were very fragmented, lacking a coherent national vision, which was the case in South Sudan and the DRC.

One source of variation in the promotion of coherence appears linked to staffing numbers and profiles. Sweden relies heavily on individual embassy staff. At one point, the section office in South Sudan had one staff. Meanwhile, the Somalia embassy had as many as 14. Liberia exhibited a stable ODA-to-staff ratio over the years. Whereas this study does not quantify the size of Sida and MFA administrative budgets to support staff working in fragile and conflict affected countries more generally, our staffing data and interviews, together with independent sources, suggest that the Sida and MFA administrative budgets may not be sufficient for the practical application of the New Deal principles. The number of MFA staff is notably low across the six countries, averaging 10 percent of total relevant embassy staff. The MFA was often only represented through the ambassador. The staffing profiles and skills identified as important for promoting coherence were the ability to drive and mobilize joined up approaches between national and donor counterparts, and to bring together political and security instruments with development instruments.

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64 This reliance is highlighted in for example, Bryld Erik et al. 2019 (as in footnote 33); Alffram, H. et al 2020 (as in footnote 45).
A constant structural factor in all country cases is the lack of a policy or mechanism that systematically and comprehensively brings together Swedish development and peace work with humanitarian and security engagement.\textsuperscript{66} This is especially notable in the protracted humanitarian situations. Interviewees reported a disconnect between Swedish development and humanitarian support in countries with high volumes of humanitarian aid - South Sudan but also Afghanistan and DRC.

- **On ownership and inclusion:** Government ownership for peacebuilding and statebuilding emerges as an important variable factor across countries as indicated above. Ownership by the government counterpart was a reported challenge in both South Sudan and DRC during the period. Somalia appears as the clearest contrasting case with broader government ownership. In Liberia, there was strong ownership of the New Deal at the highest political level. This “political will” for peaceful development cannot be created by outsiders. The New Deal designers arguably underestimated the importance of internal politics for anchoring peace- and statebuilding initiatives across different ministries and constituencies, as noted by respondents. Also, donor support to national or local civil society may be perceived as threatening by some government actors.

Sweden’s promotion of inclusion comes across as a constant in all the countries, women’s inclusion in particular. It is clear that for Somalia and Liberia, Swedish actors have taken on extra efforts to lead or spearhead inclusion efforts. In Somalia, Sweden was co-chairing the New Deal inclusion working group, and Sweden chaired the UN Peacebuilding Commission Liberia configuration as well as led informal processes to promote wider participation and liaise between government and civil society. In

\textsuperscript{66} This is consistent with findings in OECD Development Cooperation Peer Review: Sweden 2019.
Afghanistan, the long-standing Swedish-supported engagement through the SCA and the more recent EU APSM provided opportunities broad engagement of civil society, women and youth.

- **On adaptation:** Over the last decade, Sweden increased development cooperation assistance for all six countries, with relatively larger increases for Afghanistan and Somalia making them top global recipients of Swedish aid. This prioritization of fragile low-income states could be interpreted as evidence of Sweden’s application of the New Deal principles. For Somalia, the personal agency of Swedish embassy personnel was highlighted by non-Swedish respondents as allowing Sweden to punch above its weight. There was also political engagement by Swedish development ministers both in Somalia and Liberia connecting Swedish global OECD-DAC and UN work to country level peacebuilding and statebuilding engagement. Beyond the changes ODA allocations linked to country strategies, it is harder to draw firm conclusions about changes in overall development cooperation in the six countries since Swedish ODA also enters a country in parallel through regional, multilateral and thematic strategies in the form of organizational core support. Significant Swedish contributions to country specific trust funds suggest that Sweden is a major funder of a funding modality that is explicitly preferred by fragile states respondents for aligning with New Deal principles, including the use of country systems, coherence and predictability.

The variation in the development-humanitarian assistance ratio across the countries appears linked to the government counterpart’s ownership or ability to prioritize peacebuilding and statebuilding. A high or increasing development share of total Swedish country-level aid corresponds with perceived traction on the New Deal in Liberia and Somalia. The opposite – an increasing humanitarian share of total ODA – is found in
South Sudan and DRC. Both Afghanistan and Mali demonstrate quite stable humanitarian to total aid ratios 2016-2020, noting that absolute levels of humanitarian aid were very high in Afghanistan.

*Taken together, the strongest overall application of the principles is found in Somalia and Liberia, and the weakest in South Sudan — whereas Afghanistan, DRC and Mali fall somewhere in between.* Below we analyze the factors that can help explain the variation observed across the six countries.

**Enabling and hindering factors and processes?**

*Three sets of factors could help explain the variation in the extent to which Sweden has applied the New Deal principles across countries: 1. National counterpart ownership, 2. International community alignment, and 3. Swedish agency.*

The three cogs below to the right illustrate the need for national counterparts, the international community, and Sweden to each apply the New Deal principles. When this is done, there will be traction, captured by the actual *movement* of the cogs. As in a machine, if one cog is stuck, movement of the other cogs will be limited, or the machinery will be blocked all together. As a result, Sweden will find it difficult unilaterally apply New Deal principles if neither national counterparts nor international community partners are willing to engage. Team Sweden, in turn, needs to be marked by internal coherence, as showed on the left-hand side.
First, *national counterpart ownership*. The government and other key national counterparts need to demonstrate ownership of the peacebuilding agenda. In post-conflict Liberia, leadership at the highest political level was willing to push for peacebuilding reforms and purposefully partnered with Sweden to that effect. In Somalia, there was also broader government buy-in for the New Deal principles brought about by the Somalia Compact. Not all national actors need to be equally committed, but a minimum coalition must exist to make progress. Active obstruction or elite capture limits traction. Where partnership with government counterparts was halting or lacking, traction was limited. This could help explain the different experiences in Somalia, Liberia, and Afghanistan, which, during the period, generally had a coherent government vision. On the other hand, in DRC, Mali and South Sudan, many respondents noted that these conditions were lacking. The fact that there was armed conflict in five out of six countries during the time period, where the country governments were involved, underlines the deeply contested contexts that Sweden and international actors had to navigate. Recent developments in Afghanistan highlight the critical importance of buy-in *beyond* the sitting government, and the need not to equate “country” ownership with “government” ownership.
Second, *international community alignment.* The application of the New Deal principles is a collective undertaking. The engagement and priorities by the international community matters, which also includes the political or security engagement of other donor countries. For example, while Sweden’s development cooperation in Liberia was small in absolute terms, the scarce presence of other donors gave Sweden the opportunity to advance a peacebuilding agenda in partnership with Liberian actors and other key international partners in the country. In Afghanistan, which became a focus for Swedish development cooperation, extensive engagement by other countries, particularly a large country like the US, with strong priorities that were not always fully aligned with the New Deal, made it challenging for Sweden with a small embassy team in country to significantly contribute to collective priority-setting.

Third, ‘Swedish agency,’ reflects both personnel related- and structural factors. Personnel factors relate to what Swedish actors are doing and how they are doing it. For example, to what extent Swedish actors engage in political dialogue with national counterparts, drive fragility assessments, or mobilize other international partners for peacebuilding purposes. Somalia is an example of active engagement and coalition-building efforts by Swedish embassy staff. Joined up efforts by the ambassador and the head of development cooperation, backed by ministerial involvement, allowed Sweden to punch above its weight and influence other donor countries. For Liberia, an out-of-country Swedish peacebuilding ambassador shuttled back and forth between Monrovia, New York, and Stockholm, suggesting a different engagement modality not built on permanent in-country presence.

Structural factors constrain or enable Swedish embassy personnel. Such factors relate, for example, to ODA-to-staffing ratios, rotation rules, lacking incentives to serve in hardship postings, or centralized planning or decision-making processes. Such structural factors may impact the ability to develop a contextual understanding, to promote
coherence, national or local ownership, and inclusion. The ODA-to-staffing ratio matters significantly for Swedish agency in fragile conflict settings. Large-scale support to country trust funds necessitates active Swedish governance and mobilization to ensure alignment with peacebuilding and statebuilding priorities. However, also small-scale scattered funding to national civil society may call for labour-intensive accompaniment. Ensuring adequate staff capacity in fragile states remains a critical challenge for Sweden.67

‘New Deal’ aligned changes in Swedish development cooperation

There are numerous observable changes in Swedish development cooperation during the 2011–2020 period. New Deal language, including explicit references to peacebuilding and statebuilding goals, inclusion, and ownership, have increasingly been invoked in Swedish development strategies. The systematic integration of a conflict perspective in all Sida development cooperation was formalized during the past decade. Sweden’s Feminist Foreign Policy from 2014 also helped to raise the bar and ensure consistency regarding inclusion in Swedish international engagement. Development assistance volumes increased to the six conflict-affected fragile states studied, and two of them emerged as the top recipients of Swedish aid, which could be interpreted as evidence of Sweden’s application of the New Deal principles. Swedish also ramped up its contributions to country specific trust funds over the period, thereby becoming a major funder of a modality that is explicitly preferred by fragile states respondents for aligning with New Deal principles on the use of country systems, coherence, and predictability. Sweden has also promoted coalitions at country level for joint assessments and improved coherence according to non-Swedish respondents.

However, Sweden’s active role already in the formation of the New Deal principles, creates an endogeneity problem that makes strict attribution difficult. Some Swedish informants in this study were involved in the making of the principles. Sweden has advocated and applied the New Deal principles at the global level through its leadership within the International Dialogue for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (IDPS), and through its multilateral engagement in the UN, but also in the World Bank. Before, during, and after its UN Security Council membership, Sweden was engaged in the UN’s work on peacebuilding. Sweden also actively promoted a standalone peace goal in the 2030 Agenda.

Swedish development cooperation has thus been “co-evolving” with the New Deal. Swedish actors have both shaped global principles to reflect Swedish development practice and allowed Swedish development practice to be shaped by the principles.

**Study question 2**

To what extent has coordination and cooperation with Swedish actors outside of the development cooperation sphere changed as a result of the implementation of the ‘New Deal’ principles? *More specifically: how has coordination and cooperation between development interventions and the political dialogue evolved as a result of implementation of the ‘New Deal’?*

The logic underlying the New Deal – to connect development cooperation with political dialogue, and peace and security engagement – resonated with long standing Swedish ambitions of increased coherence in promotion of development. The whole-of-government approach outlined in the New Deal aligned with Sweden’s 2003 Policy Coherence for Development, which stresses the centrality of internal coordination between
different Swedish actors. This reinvokes the endogeneity problem highlighted above - Swedish actors were involved in shaping the New Deal and then adopted and applied New Deal principles. As a result, assessing the influence of the New Deal on Swedish development cooperation remains a challenge and radical changes in the Swedish approach after 2011 are neither expected nor observed. Nonetheless, there is some evidence of increased internal coherence within Team Sweden.

In the most successful case of internal coherence, Somalia, cooperation between the Swedish (MFA) ambassador and the (Sida) head of development cooperation was very close, ensuring that political dialogue and engagement on security sector reform and justice was linked to development assistance, and subsequently also humanitarian aid. There was a sense of common purpose and joint responsibility for the entire range of instruments backed up by ministerial engagement. FBA technical peacebuilding expertise was also added over time. While Somalia can be highlighted as a success, there is an opportunity for Sweden to take a more systematic approach to strengthening its internal coherence for engagement also in other conflict-affected settings (see Figure 7).

Swedish agency in country was made even stronger when embassy staff could systematically connect to and communicate with Swedish colleagues in the UN (New York, Geneva) or EU (Brussels). During the Swedish membership on the UN Security Council there were regular check-ins connecting the Swedish embassies with the Swedish UN Mission in New York and MFA-Stockholm to discuss country situations. Sweden’s engagement as chair of the Liberia UN Peacebuilding Commission helped to tie together global and country-level efforts.

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Study question 3

What lessons can inform Swedish development cooperation based on internationally agreed principles?

Lessons that can inform future Swedish development cooperation broadly revolve around how to further strengthen coherence between Swedish actors and ensure that successful approaches from individual countries can be more systematically applied in other conflict-affected states.

The recommendations below use an ‘arrow of action’ approach focused on peacebuilding efforts in conflict-affected partner countries, involving core national and international partners, systematically supported and enabled by Stockholm and by Swedish engagement in New York, DC, Geneva and Brussels (see figure).

Stockholm

Create a new “Triple Nexus +” policy

- MFA and other relevant ministries: Issue a global policy that systematically connects Swedish development, peace, and humanitarian action with security engagement in conflict-affected settings to ensure coherence. Such a policy would align with the Triple Nexus Recommendation of the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (DAC-OECD)\textsuperscript{69} but would also
cover non-official development assistance efforts in the security
realm. Stronger coherence with humanitarian efforts would be
expected in protracted humanitarian settings but not for short
term humanitarian emergencies.

This recommendation is based on findings regarding Swedish
internal coherence, which suggest the need to more systematically
connect Swedish development and peace work with its humanitarian
support and security engagement. This recommendation is
consistent with the 2019 OECD-DAC Peer Review that calls for a
consolidation of the existing Swedish policy framework to ensure
that synergies between strategies are better recognized and exploited
in fragile settings.

**Operationalize the policy: Processes, interaction mechanisms,
and alignment of country strategies**

- MFA and Sida: Reflect provisions of the new global policy into
country strategies.

- MFA, Sida, FBA, MSB and Swedish security and judiciary
agencies: Establish a coordination exchange structure for the
operationalization of the new policy.

- MFA, Sida and embassy: Align and harmonize country-level
analysis, planning and budgeting of humanitarian and
development work, along with peacebuilding engagement, for
collective outcomes and the operationalization of the new policy.

- MFA, Sida, New York, DC, Geneva, Brussels, and embassy:
Strengthen information or reporting mechanisms and feedback
loops to connect relevant multilateral and regional processes,
instruments, and initiatives with country-level peacebuilding and
statebuilding efforts.

\textsuperscript{69} OECD 2021b. DAC Recommendation on the Humanitarian–Development–
Peace Nexus, OECD/LEGAL/5019.
This set of recommendations similarly derives from lessons learned related to Swedish internal coherence and to removing structural constraints to Swedish agency at the country level. The experience from the Swedish UN Security Council membership is also considered.

Create a peacebuilding focal point:

- MFA, Sida, FBA: Establish a global peacebuilding focal point at ambassadorial level with a team that also entail FBA technical experts to provide knowledge backstopping and training on peacebuilding and statebuilding for Swedish embassy staff, and to allow for adaptive learning.

- Build a global cadre of MFA-Sida peacebuilding and statebuilding staff to ensure technical know-how and to reduce the volatility associated with turnover in hardship postings.

This set of recommendations build on lessons learned with regard to ensuring contextual understanding and promoting staffing continuity in hardship locations, linked to Swedish internal coherence.

**Country level**

- **Ensure adequate embassy staffing in conflict-affected and fragile states**, including specific measures to ensure that the MFA administrative budget is adequate to respond to the particular needs of working in these countries.\(^7^0\)

- **Match staffing profiles with the nature of the Swedish peacebuilding and statebuilding engagement**, with an emphasis on coalition-building, coordination, and dialogue skills.

\(^7^0\) This resonates with OECD Development Cooperation Peer Review: Sweden 2019.
• Take measures to systematize collaboration between the ambassador and the head of development cooperation to ensure that Team Sweden ‘delivers as one’. Collaboration could take the form of joint analysis, strategizing, and adaptive learning on how different instruments could best advance peacebuilding.

• Systematically promote in-country coalition building

  – Systematically identify and engage with government and nongovernment peacebuilding counterparts to ensure sustainability and increased use of country systems.

  – Systematically coalesce with donor and other international stakeholders around pooled funding and joint platforms, together with national counterparts.

This set of recommendations center around findings pointing to the centrality of staffing to ensure contextual understanding, and the active promotion of national ownership, inclusion, and external cohesion. An adequate staffing presence is also needed to ensure that development cooperation modalities are continuously fit to context.

**Multilateral and Regional Coherence (New York, DC, Geneva, Brussels)**

• Have individual UN and international financial organizations commit to joined-up approaches at the country level in conflict-affected and fragile settings as a prerequisite for Swedish core support.\(^{71}\)

• Promote strengthened collaboration, coherence and complementarity with humanitarian actors.\(^{72}\)

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\(^{71}\) This would be consistent with Swedish National Audit Office 2021. *Swedish development aid to multilateral organisations – the Government’s and Sida’s work – Summary and recommendations.* Ref no 3.1.1-2020-0222. RIR 2021:28.

\(^{72}\) In line with the OECD 2021b. *DAC Recommendation on the Humanitarian–Development–Peace Nexus,* OECD/LEGAL/5019.
• Support and promote strengthened EU engagement on coherence between development, humanitarian, peace and security action in fragile and conflict-affected states.

This set of recommendations are drawing on Swedish actor experiences in promoting coherence and is trying to systematize them. Experiences are drawn from Somalia and Liberia, and from Sweden’s 2017-2018 UN Security Council membership when an arrow of action approach was used, connecting Swedish embassies, with Swedish missions at the UN in New York, Brussels and Stockholm. The recommendations align with those of the OECD/DAC (2019) on the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus and with Swedish Audit Office (2021) findings regarding multilateral support.
References


In addition to the references above, the study also reviewed several documents. These documents included:

Annual letters of appropriation from 2011 – 2020 for Sida and FBA:


Sida annual reports from 2011:

Appendix 1: Expanded methodology

This annex presents the detailed methodology used for this study (summarized in the methodology section). It is divided into five main sections: 1) overview of the overall approach, 2) the framework and evidence foundation, 3) the four areas under investigation, 4) data collection and analysis, and 5) detailed limitations of the study.

Overall approach

The focus of this study is adoption and application of the New Deal by Swedish actors over the period 2011–2020. The study has been guided by Michael Quinn Patton’s utilization-focused evaluation approach. The research process, from design to feedback, has accordingly been designed to be useful for the intended users. In practical terms, this has implied close engagement with the users as represented in the Reference Group (RG). The RG, including representatives from the Swedish MFA and Sida, were involved throughout the process. Several RG members also participated in the study as interview and/or survey informants. The report has been revised multiple times to promote useability with inputs from RG members, the Expert Group and other experts. The approach taken is also aligned with current thinking around working with the grain and thinking and working politically in international development cooperation. While the original intention was to apply Michael Quinn Patton’s principles-focused evaluation approach to this study, several reasons made this approach difficult to apply in practice:

- First, as the principles themselves are not being evaluated, the GUIDE framework on evaluation of principles was less relevant. A particular challenge was that many respondents highlighted shortcomings of the New Deal or components of the principles regimes as such, whereas the task was to evaluate the extent to which Sweden adopted and applied the principles.
• Second, there are no readily available metrics for the principles (Evaluable, the E in GUIDE). Unlike the Paris Principles on Aid Effectiveness, which had specific goals and targets attached, allowing for monitoring, evaluation and reporting, the architects of the New Deals principles regimes did not attach indicators for monitoring adoption and application.

• Third, there are many New Deal principles and several of them are interrelated. Taken together, the 10 principles from Paris, the 15 sections of Busan (including the five Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals, five FOCUS and five TRUST components) and the 19 clauses of the Stockholm Declaration amount to 44 principles in total. Furthermore, each of these principles has sub-clauses that contain additional elements, see Annex 5.

• Fourth, it would be unrealistic to expect that policymakers and practitioners would know about these 44 principles, let alone their sub-clauses. The principles regimes may be endorsed by Sweden and understood in theory, but the users (policymakers and practitioners) may not know in detail about the principles.

• Fifth, the principle regimes considered in this study have both been co-evolving alongside Swedish policy and practice and been influenced by Swedish policy and practice over the last decade. The New Deal is not one standalone document but reflects an ongoing evolution of policy and practice that was already underway from 2007 with the Paris Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and the Accra Agenda for Action (2008). The meeting in Busan in 2011 where the New Deal was formally endorsed was followed by the Stockholm Declaration by the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding in 2016. Since Swedish actors were involved in all of these processes, the New Deal cannot be considered exogenous to Swedish development policy. Swedish actors, including Swedish respondents in this study, were involved in the formulation of all three principles regimes suggesting that the principles were likely informed by changes in
Swedish development policy. The principle regimes themselves also reflect evolving changes in learning and adaptation of behavior, norms and policy. All in all, these factors limit the ability to isolate Sweden’s adoption and application of New Deal principles from Swedish influence on the formulation of principles.

- Sixth and finally, coevolution of the New Deal concepts with other large policy developments over the past decade, including the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the ‘three pillars’ that would become the Triple Nexus, have meant that there has been a variation in the adoption and application of the New Deal over different contexts and at different times. In many cases, policymakers have had to balance reforms in line with the principles against reforms associated with other commitments (e.g., on climate or the SDGs).

**Framework and evidence foundation**

To respond to these significant methodological challenges, the authors applied an inductive approach, which aimed to generate new theory emerging from data collected, using an iterative process (see Annex Figure 1):
**Figure A1: Framework**

**Step 1:** Distill the 44 principles into a manageable number of areas. This was done through a mapping exercise, connecting principles conceptually using Kumu. Originally, this resulted in six areas, which were further refined to four areas: Context Analysis, Coherence, Ownership and Inclusion, and Changes in Development Cooperation (the areas are described in further detail below). This mapping was tested for relevance and accuracy with the Reference Group and was reflected in the structure of interviews and survey questions (see Annex Table 1 below and Annex 5 for more detail).

Source: Authors’ formulation based on the research process.

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73 https://kumu.io/
Table A1: Mapping interview questions onto the principle regimes (see Annex 5)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Paris Principles</th>
<th>Busan principles</th>
<th>Stockholm Declaration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PSGs</td>
<td>FOCUS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1) Understanding Context</td>
<td>1, 4, 8</td>
<td>1-3</td>
<td>1, 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Coherence – Internal and External</td>
<td>1-3, 5, 7-9</td>
<td>1-5</td>
<td>2-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Ownership and Inclusion</td>
<td>1-3, 4, 6-10</td>
<td>1-5</td>
<td>2-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Changes in Development</td>
<td>3, 4, 7, 10</td>
<td>1-3</td>
<td>2, 3, 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors based on Annex 5.

Step 2: Assemble evidence. Because of the complexity and scope of the issues and the challenges in tracing formal adoption of principles through strategy to practice, multiple sources of evidence were used. The study relies heavily on triangulating between review of strategic documents (reflecting the de jure adoption of the principles), expert assessment captured by interviews and surveys (reflecting the de facto application of the principles) and, where possible, data on aid and staffing (the ex-post realization of the application). Important to note is that the assessment of the adoption and application of these principles in many cases mean the assessment of evidence in the form of tacit knowledge and internal and external processes and practices which are often undocumented, presenting a challenge for triangulation. The sources are described in further detail below and in the section on evidence.

74 Compare Pain (2021) on practices being “hidden in plain sight”.

113
Step 3: Analyze the evidence. The authors use the evidence collected in Step 2 to evaluate the adoption and application of the 44 principles across the four areas and to answer the three study questions. The focus was primarily at the country level, while Sweden’s influence of global awareness and policy development and adoption by multilaterals was also considered. For country cases, the authors compared evidence for five of Sweden’s New Deal partner (members of the g7+) countries: Afghanistan, DRC, Liberia, Somalia and South Sudan, representing diversity in region, capacity, progress, scale/scope of engagement by Sweden and era of the principles. While Mali is not a g7+ country, this is a conflict-affected low-income state in which Sweden has an embassy and a military presence in country, so it was added as a comparison country. The analysis considers the following:

- **The context:** Sweden’s success in applying the principles at different levels is heavily dependent on the country context and the actions of national and international counterparts. The context in which Sweden operates, where it is one among many actors in a complex field globally, nationally, and in the partner countries. In addition, there exists a ‘dual track’ challenge in monitoring change at country and global level and associated spillovers (e.g., assessing the implications of action at the UN or EU for country-level progress).

- **The limits of Sweden’s contribution:** Sweden cannot be held singularly responsible for the success or failure of development in a partner country. Swedish adoption and application of the New Deal may be necessary for development success, but not sufficient. The authors were careful not to conflate perceived setbacks (most notably in Afghanistan 2021 while this study was being finalized) with a study of Sweden’s adoption and application of the New Deal (see study questions). Furthermore, Sweden adopted the principles in the interest of reducing fragility, thereby promoting resilience and development. Still, while the ground-level outcomes and impact resulting from
adopting and applying the principles in terms of reduced fragility and increased resilience is the objective, evaluating development and fragility outcomes is beyond the scope of the study. Hence, the authors reviewed the findings repeatedly with the RG and interviewees to ensure that the study-maintained focus. As a result, the study does not use language relating to “outcomes and impact”.

**Step3b. Iteration.** Because of the complexity, the authors adapted their approach throughout the study, requesting frequent inputs from the RG and other stakeholders. Early versions of the analytical framework were shared and tested with the Reference Group before data collection was designed. The stakeholder mapping was a rolling document, expanded whenever stakeholders identified other relevant actors, with interviews through June 2021. Document review continued throughout the study process and often included new documents shared by interviewees and experts. Staffing data was only included late in the study process after multiple interviewees identified how staffing constraints affected application in country. Preliminary findings and conclusions were tested with participants in a closed-door, Chatham House rule session titled “ReNEWing the Deal” at the Stockholm Forum on Peace and Development, May 2021. Some participants in this Forum session were interviewees and survey respondents. Early findings, conclusions and recommendations were validated with the RG. The report was revised several times. The results of this iterative and inductive approach are presented in the conclusion sections where the study attempts to develop theory about the conditions under which Sweden adoption and application has been successful.
**Format of this study:** For each of the four areas, the study presents the available evidence using the following format:

- **Summary:** A short summary of the main findings is presented by area.
- **Document review:** Analysis of relevant strategy, policy and other review documents, including other evaluations and academic literature. Where these resonate with other sources of evidence (below), they are cited as well.
- **Data:** Where relevant (primarily areas 2 and 4) data is used to ground the analysis and provide a further objective metric reflecting application.
- **Interviews and surveys:** The bulk of the analysis is grounded on interviews and survey results (described above in Table 2).
- **Assessment of empirical evidence:** For each area, possible limitations and qualifications of the evidence is presented.

Explanation of the variation across cases: Within each area, variation in the adoption and application of the principles is analyzed across country cases and problematized.

**The four areas: Understanding context, Coherence, Ownership and inclusion, and Adaptation**

As described above, the 44 principles have been mapped on to four areas, to simplify the analysis and presentation of findings.

**Area 1: Understanding context:** This area looks at the prevalence of conflict and fragility analysis and assessments, conflict filters, peace lenses, political economy- or related contextual analysis, as well as the joint engagement in these analyses and assessments. The area is drawing on the first FOCUS principle of the New Deal – the use of a fragility assessment: ‘Conducting a periodic country-led assessment on the causes and features of fragility and sources of
resilience as a basis for the “one vision, one plan” part of the strategy,’ the first Paris Principle, ‘Take context as the starting point’, and similar language in the Stockholm Declaration.

**Area 2: Coherence (internal and external):** Coherence is largely about Swedish actors’ ability to act coherently internally as Team Sweden and to promote external coherence among national, regional and international partners. Thematically, this area is about connecting development with political and security work. It reflects the range of the peacebuilding and statebuilding goals and builds on Paris Principle 5: ‘Recognize the link between political, security and development objectives’ and the New Deal’s fourth FOCUS principle: ‘Support political dialogue and leadership.’ The Stockholm Declaration has further connected humanitarian and development action. Internal coherence could also be referred to as “whole of government” or “comprehensive approach” on the part of Swedish actors. External coherence between Sweden and the recipient country may also involve coherence between government and society in the recipient country, reflected further below under ownership and inclusion.

One of the main contributions of the New Deal is that it marries development cooperation with political and other forms of engagement. The study therefore uses the concept of “Team Sweden” to acknowledge the holistic approach necessary to implement the commitments of the New Deal principles at the country level, but importantly, without drawing ex-ante conclusions about the effectiveness of this internal coherence. Team Sweden includes Sida, the MFA (which includes civil servants and political level), the FBA and to a lesser extent other Swedish security actors and government agencies working in or on fragile and conflict-affected settings.

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75 Hearn (2016).
Area 3: Ownership and inclusion: The promotion of ownership by and inclusion of national partners in decision-making in fragile and conflict-affected environments is challenging as it is often the lack of inclusion that drives conflict and fragility.\textsuperscript{76} “Ownership” is about the identification and the setting of priorities and plans by national actors. Ownership is most prominently highlighted in the New Deal’s third FOCUS principle, wherein a compact is used as the ‘basis to determine the allocation of donor resources aligned to the national priorities’ identified through one vision/one plan. However, who the national actors are and the degree to which they ‘own’ priorities is a political matter. Different actors may pursue competing priorities. “Inclusion” is about diverse voices being involved in priority-setting. These voices thus need to transcend the political elite establishment, based on for example gender, age, ethnic, regional or religious affiliation. Inclusion has taken various forms in the Paris and FOCUS/TRUST principles, including in the design of the IDPS through a civil society platform. It is most explicitly identified in the Stockholm Declaration, which promotes gender, youth and attempts to make politics more inclusive.

Area 4: Adaptation – Changes in development cooperation, including modalities and mechanisms: Application of the New Deal requires adaptation, which may encompass changes in volumes, modalities, and mechanisms of development cooperation and dialogue, also including political level engagement. Change in development cooperation are drawn from the TRUST principles of the New Deal, which cover change in donor behavior vis-à-vis recipient countries, and include Transparency, Risk-Sharing, Use of Country Systems, Strengthening Capacities and Timely and Predictable Aid. Other relevant principles in the Stockholm Declaration include increased proportion of country programmable aid, risk management, resource mobilization, new partnerships and learning, and support to the peacebuilding architecture.

Data collection and analysis

As outlined above, multiple sources of evidence were necessary to triangulate study between de jure and de facto adoption and application of the principles. All the evidence used for this study was collected during the period September 2020 to June 2021.

Document review: Review included strategic documents, including but not limited to country strategies and thematic strategies, and other policy documents (see Annex 7 on Sweden’s policy framework: Tracing principles to strategy) and evaluations where relevant. The team reviewed documents throughout the study period, including those published in 2021. There were not equal amounts of documentation available for all four areas. For instance, for area 1, understanding context, fragility assessments were often not documented in written open sources accessible to the authors, but through ongoing assessment processes of a confidential nature, meaning that the actors involved in such processes became the main sources of information. Also, it was beyond the scope of the study to look at detailed documentation for every project or program for every country (see bibliography for a full accounting of documents reviewed), however, the team reviewed annual letters of appropriation and annual reports for countries since 2011.

Stakeholder analysis: A stakeholder analysis was conducted early in the research process to identify key informants and to ensure a broad representation of informants and facilitate triangulation. The analysis was an iterative process whereby relevant individuals and institutions were identified either from document review, early interviews or by recommendation from key persons within the Reference Group, Sida and embassies.

The demands on respondents were extensive due to the subject matter and the need to find stakeholders with an in-depth understanding of internal coherence and cooperation practices within Team Sweden (Swedish MFA, Sida, FBA and Swedish security actors), but also of interactions between broader Team
Sweden and international and national partners. By default, the analysis ended with a selection of stakeholders who have themselves been part of global and country level efforts to the New Deal, often at a high level, and included Ambassadors, Heads of Development Cooperation, Heads of research institutes, think tanks and NGOs, UN Special Representatives etc. Country respondents were identified across the country cases, including Mali as a comparator: Afghanistan, DRC, Liberia, Mali, Somalia and South Sudan. Previous assessments of the New Deal have similarly relied on key informant interviews (Hearn 2016; Klausen et al 2021). Because the stakeholder mapping relied on references from other stakeholders and could not be complemented by country visits (due to Covid-19), countries with smaller footprints in staffing resulted in smaller networks of interviewees.

Based on the stakeholder analysis, stakeholders were divided into Swedish and non-Swedish informants and then further into those who had worked with Team Sweden in case countries and those who had worked with Team Sweden primarily globally or multilaterally. As a result, there are four different types of respondents, or four ‘voices’: (1) Swedish country actors, (2) non-Swedish country actors, (3) Swedish global actors and (4) non-Swedish global actors.

Stakeholder analysis was used to select both interviewees and survey respondents. The Covid-19 pandemic impacted the authors’ abilities to interview in person and most interviews were conducted via zoom.

**Semi-structured interviews:** Interviews were held with more than 50 stakeholders based on the stakeholder mapping (see Annex 2 for interviewee list77 and Annex 3 for semi-structured interview scripts). The interview questions were tested with two members of the Reference Group and then expanded for use in interviewing the

77 Note that Annex 1 primarily lists the current position and title of the interviewees, but this does not necessarily signify the position that was relevant for the interview.
four different types of respondents, all the while remaining aware that these respondents might have shifted post and could be informants for both country and global level interviews, or for multiple countries. Transparency about the type of respondents who had provided particular input had to be balanced with considerations of confidentiality and protecting the anonymity of the respondent. Many respondents were not familiar with the language of the New Deal but were clearly implementing components of it. Since the study was focused on content, process and use rather than form, it was important not to ‘test’ interviewees on the New Deal concepts and to use open-ended questions to assess adoption and application. The interview data were coded into categories and the team cross-validated coding scored by question in two separate rounds to ensure consistency in interpretation.

**Electronic survey:** An electronic survey informed by first-round interviews, including questions covering all four areas, was conducted. The surveys were customized for each “voice” (i.e. Swedish and non-Swedish respondents familiar with country cases or more familiar with multilateral / global action) - see Annex 4 for survey questions for each respondent group. Invitations for the survey targeted individuals who could not be interviewed owing to time restrictions and a selection of those who were interviewed. Multiple reminders were sent to prospective survey respondents, though their responses were anonymous. The survey respondents were chosen to supplement interviewee representation of specific countries, given uneven interviewee availability and because the team could not collect data in country owing to the effects of COVID-19 (see Annex 4). Survey results were tabulated (and cross-tabulated by country and Swedish/non-Swedish respondent). Results were compared with scoring of the interviews.

To ensure consistency of interview and survey questions and ensure coverage of the four areas, the team developed a table (see Table 1 above and Annex 5) to map questions according to the different principle regimes for country respondents. For this exercise, each
principle area was mapped onto different questions – some principles were mapped on to more than one question (owing to subclauses in each principle), nearly all questions were mapped on to multiple principles. Survey and interview respondents were asked if they had anything else to add in an effort to reduce author blinders and further promote triangulation. Survey and interview responses were very consistent, regardless of whether survey respondent had been interviewed (self-reported).

**Six country cases:** To the five partner countries included in the invitation for proposals, a sixth country was added, Mali. Mali is not a New Deal signatory. It was added as a low-income conflict-affected country for comparison, where Sweden both had an embassy and armed forces on the ground. The key question was whether there would be significant differences in Sweden’s approach and implementation of the New Deal principles in a “non-New Deal” country. Data for countries was compared by country and across countries. Exhaustive narratives were written for each country case before the study was concluded. Only portions of those country cases are included here in the findings.

**Analysis of the FFP:** A deeper analysis of the concurrent rollout of the FFP, used as a comparator for policy in the Swedish experience. The history of the FFP was written as a draft deep dive and then integrated into the findings to present its evolution and compare it with the New Deal. This is available from the authors by request.

**Timeline:** Mapping the evolving concepts over time is complex as their use has adapted to the changing global context. The team responded to this challenge by adding a timeline of all the events surrounding the New Deal (see Figure 1).

**Analysis of aid data from Sida and OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) databases:** This data was used to understand volumes and composition, modalities for delivery and differences within the Swedish aid portfolio for the different countries. The issue of the relationship between humanitarian and
development assistance in fragile states came up frequently in interviews. Additional data on humanitarian assistance as a share of official development assistance (ODA) was analyzed.

**Analysis of data on staffing levels:** In the course of the interviews, the centrality of staffing levels was raised often. Therefore, staffing data was requested and proved most useful, including for cross-country comparison.

**Process of analysis and triangulation**

The evidence gathered was organized and interpreted through the four areas, primarily focusing on the country level, to ensure consistency and relevance with the principles. In order to strengthen the reliability and validity of the findings, triangulation involved different methods of gathering data (as described above), different stakeholder perspectives (see Annex Table 2)78, and analysis across investigators/team members (through regular team meetings and joint analysis). Where possible, the perspectives of non-Swedish respondents are juxtaposed with Swedish responses, for validation.

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78 Survey and interview respondents were asked if the team had missed anything/had anything else to add in an effort to reduce the team’s own blinders and promote triangulation.
Table A2: Four respondent categories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Swedish</th>
<th>Non-Swedish</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primarily country experience working for/with Sweden</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[14/10/3]</td>
<td>[5/8/13]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primarily global/multilateral experience working for/with Sweden</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[0/4/2]</td>
<td>[6/5/6]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The main number in each case is the total number of unique respondents for both interviews and surveys. The first number in brackets indicates the number of persons who were only interviewed, the second number indicates interviewees who also took the survey, and the third number indicates survey respondents only. Surveys were by invitation only but were anonymous, accordingly, experience and affiliation (voice) were self-assessed by survey respondents.
Source: Authors’ count.

Importantly, the Reference Group were also involved in this process to validate findings and promote use as described above. The team shared initial findings with the Reference Group in March 2021. Based on the findings and the Reference Group inputs, the team developed conclusions highlighting the key overall insights, successes, and shortcomings. Interview and survey recommendations were brought together and grouped around themes relevant to the research questions. This resulted in the recommendations, in which the principles are reflected combined with strategic and operational implications. These conclusions and recommendations were presented to the Reference Group in June 2021 for discussion and validation and contributed to the final recommendations presented in this report. The report was subsequently submitted to the Expert Group in September 2021 and revised based on their comments.
The limitations of this study

The study relies significantly on a select number of key informants; many of whom have been part of the implementation of the New Deal. Fully independent voices have been difficult to find because people that know about Swedish engagement in the New Deal are personally involved with the New Deal and with Sweden. This creates a potential bias that has been partly mitigated by the triangulation process described above, but which cannot fully be resolved. Furthermore, despite efforts from the team to assess the extent of Sweden’s adoption and application of the New Deal principles objectively, interview informants often compare the efforts of Team Sweden to that of other donors thus introducing a relative dimension to Sweden’s adoption and application.

The survey was developed primarily to supplement the interview process. The response rate (33 per cent, 51 responses out of 155 invitations) was lower than desired, albeit not unusual for a study such as this, despite several reminders to the non-respondents. The survey data was therefore used to (1) triangulate the data from the interviews; (2) broaden the number of stakeholders consulted and (3) collect additional information using the interview questions, including additional responses on missed opportunities and recommendations. Despite the attempt to promote a diversity of perspectives (see Table 2 and Annex 2), caution should be taken in generalizing results based on interviews and surveys as they cannot be considered fully representative.

COVID-19 had a considerable impact on this study. The team was not able to conduct any fieldwork or to collect additional data in the six case countries. Efforts to mitigate this were also complicated by the difficulty of consulting government officials in developing countries. In particular, it was difficult to find national actors with historical perspectives dating back to the early parts of the decade, following adoption of the New Deal. Accessing people who worked in or on Mali was particularly challenging, since turnover of staff was high during the entire period. The small Swedish presence in South
Sudan also contributed to difficulties of accessing people working in and on that country. As a result of these limitations, fewer national respondents, particularly government officials, from case countries are included than the team wanted (and that would have been possible with country visits). These limitations were overcome in some ways by including additional non-Swedish civil society perspectives in the survey (see Table 2).

The timeframe of the New Deal from 2011, in particular the period up to the Stockholm Declaration in 2016, posed a challenge in terms of data collection, which was combined with challenges around institutional memory and high staff turnover in some instances. Institutional memory in all organizations (including other donors) was limited; people had moved on or retired. Institutions do not maintain a directory of staff with expertise on the New Deal. The team added a chronological document review capturing the Swedish response to the agreement of the New Deal to supplement missing institutional memory. While the timeline constituted a challenge, given the multiple changes and discourses that have emerged since 2011, it also provided an opportunity to evaluate Sweden’s application of the New Deal and to interview diverse respondents who could retrospectively reflect on the entire period, even if their perception was limited to specific parts of it.

The approach taken manages and mitigates the risk of these limitations affecting the validity of the findings. As such this study can serve as a useful jumping-off point for discussion on issues related to future engagement in conflict affected and fragile settings, grounded in a snapshot of what can be known in a year-long process during a pandemic. The results in this report should be read as indicative, and should not be interpreted as conclusive, exhaustive or fully representative. The authors note that while the approach may be imperfect and the findings may be limited by the current conditions, it is hoped that the publication of this report can inform future studies and promote better application of the principles associated with the New Deal.
## Appendix 2: List of people interviewed

### Table A3: List of people interviewed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position, organization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amadee Fikirini</td>
<td>Director, Peace Life Institute for DRC East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anders Öhrström</td>
<td>Head of Development Cooperation, Embassy of Sweden in Bangladesh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andreas von Uexkull</td>
<td>Deputy Head of Department for Asia and the Pacific, Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs (Afghanistan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andrew McCoubrey</td>
<td>Head of Development, FCDO, Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bengt Johansson</td>
<td>Country Director, Sida 2010–2013 for Somalia and Sudan (including what is now South Sudan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Altpeter</td>
<td>Senior Dialogue and Mediation Officer, FBA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christina Etzell</td>
<td>Head of Development Cooperation, Consulate General of Sweden, Jerusalem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clare Lockhart</td>
<td>Director and co-founder of the Institute for State Effectiveness (ISE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elisabeth Hårleman</td>
<td>Head of Development Cooperation, Embassy of Sweden in Liberia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ellen Swedenmark</td>
<td>Corona Response Team, Global work, MFA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elvira Tillerman</td>
<td>Programme Manager, Human security and Rule of Law, Embassy of Sweden in Liberia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emma Nilenfors</td>
<td>Head of Unit for Peace and Human Security, Sida</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farid Zarif</td>
<td>Former Special Representative of the SG, Head of UN Mission in Liberia, UNDPO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Francois Van Lierde</td>
<td>Independent consultant/DRC expert (civil society and stabilisation support)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Position, organization</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Habib Ur Rehman Mayar</td>
<td>g7+ Secretariat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Halima Farah Godane</td>
<td>Executive Director, Somalia Women’s Solidarity Organisation, Jubaland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helena de Medeiros</td>
<td>Programme Officer, Embassy of Sweden in Bamako</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henk-Jan Brinkman</td>
<td>Chief of Peacebuilding Strategy and Partnership UN PBSO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henric Råsbant</td>
<td>Ambassador, Embassy of Sweden in Kinshasa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henrik Hammargren</td>
<td>Executive Director, Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, former Sida head of Conflict division, former OECD-DAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ingrid Wetterqvist</td>
<td>Ambassador, Embassy of Sweden in Liberia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jessica Pellrud</td>
<td>Team Leader EU APSM Afghanistan Unit, Sida</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joachim Beijmo</td>
<td>Head of Development Cooperation, Embassy of Sweden in Kinshasa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jocelyn Mason</td>
<td>Resident Representative, UNDP, country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joel Hellman</td>
<td>Dean, Georgetown School of Foreign Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judy McCallum</td>
<td>Executive Director, Life &amp; Peace Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juliana Huus</td>
<td>Acting Project Manager for Liberia, FBA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katie Blanchette</td>
<td>Senior Operations Officer, World Bank, Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, donor relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kevin Schumacher</td>
<td>Deputy Executive Director, Women for Afghanistan Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Larry Attree</td>
<td>Head of Global Policy and Advocacy, Saferworld</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Position, organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lena Nordström</td>
<td>Deputy Director-General, Human Resources, Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mattias Mayr</td>
<td>Senior Operations Officer and Programme Manager (Manage MDTF), CNU, World Bank, Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mikael Lindvall</td>
<td>Ambassador, Political and Security Committee, Permanent Representation of Sweden to the European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minna Naucler</td>
<td>Desk officer, FBA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paul Murphy</td>
<td>Executive Director, Saferworld</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Sevastik</td>
<td>Head of Development Cooperation, Embassy of Sweden in Kabul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peter Nordström</td>
<td>Coordinator, UN Peacebuilding Fund, Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peter van Sluijs</td>
<td>Coordinator, Civil Society Platform for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (CSPPS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petra Smitmanis Dry</td>
<td>Head of Development Cooperation with Somalia, Sida</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard De La Falaise</td>
<td>Head of Stabilisation Support Unit (SSU) – part of MONUSCO and managing the Trustfund, DRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rolf Hultman</td>
<td>Special Attaché/Military Adviser at the Permanent Representation of Sweden to the EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saeed Parto</td>
<td>Director of Research, APRO (co-founder – national organisation) ASBL (Non-profit network)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sara Batmanglich</td>
<td>Fragility, Conflict and Violence Group, World Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Position, organization</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sarah Cliffe</td>
<td>Director, Center for International Cooperation (CIC-NYU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sigrún Rawet</td>
<td>Deputy Director-General, Head of Global Agenda Department, Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staffan Tillander</td>
<td>Swedish Ambassador to Somalia, former Peacebuilding Ambassador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stan Nkwain</td>
<td>Director, UNDP Regional Service Center for Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stephen Schartz</td>
<td>US Ambassador, Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Susanne Allden</td>
<td>Head of Cooperation Embassy of Sweden in Ouagadougou</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tobias Thyberg</td>
<td>Swedish Ambassador to Ukraine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Sjöström</td>
<td>Charge d’affaires; Head of Department; Swedish Focal points for IDPS/INCAF, Sida</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Åsa Palmgren</td>
<td>EU/DEVCO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 3: Interview scripts

Script 1: Semi-Structured Interview – International Actors (Global/Multilateral)

Q1a) Could you please tell us what issues you worked on related to the New Deal? Q1b) Which periods you worked on these issues? Q1c) What was your position during that (those) period(s)?

Understanding Context

Q2) Has Sweden promoted the use of political economy analysis/fragility assessments in fragile situations?

Q3) Has Sweden engaged with others to produce or share fragility assessments?

Q4) What are good examples of fragility assessments in use?

Linking politics, security, development, and humanitarian response

Q5) From your perspective, does/did Sweden link politics, security, development and humanitarian effectively for engagement in fragile contexts? Q5b) Can you give practical examples?

Q6) BLANK

Q7) Are there ways in which Sweden supported multilateral or global initiatives that support the Triple Nexus (Humanitarian-Peace-Development)? What was their role and contribution?

Q8) What was Sweden’s role in supporting the adoption of the New Deal principles? Q8b) Has its position and voice changed since 2011? Did the 2016 Stockholm Declaration make a difference? Q8c) What is Sweden’s role in the international dialogue on peacebuilding and statebuilding?
Priorities, Ownership and Inclusion

Q9a) To what extent are Sweden’s key priorities in development respond to the priorities of fragile countries – civil society, government, women, minority groups etc.? Q9b) Do you sense that Sweden is playing a particular role in the wider international community in relation to fragile states? E.g. by focusing on specific thematic areas or sectors?

Q10a) How has Sweden promoted key peacebuilding and statebuilding priorities through multilateral organizations or global initiatives? Provide concrete examples. Q10b) What were missed opportunities or challenges?

Q11) What are good examples of promoting ownership and inclusion, by Sweden. How does Sweden do in comparison to other donors?

Swedish support approaches in practice

Q12a) Did Sweden make available additional financing or were other resources made available to promote the New Deal multilaterally / globally? If yes, for what? Did it lead to particular results? Q12b) Did Sweden provide new modalities of support including for example, trust funds or support to civil society?

Q13a) Do you think that Sweden has taken risks to promote the New Deal globally? Q13b) Are there examples where Sweden innovated to promote the New Deal?

Q14a) Are there other ways in which Sweden supported other actors (multilaterally, globally, G7+)? What were the results? Q14b) What was Sweden’s role?
Last Reflections

Q15) Have we missed anything?

Q16) What are, in your opinion, three areas that Sweden needs to address to improve the implementation of the New Deal? (prioritize?)

Script 2: Semi-Structured Interview – International Actors in Country

Q1a) Could you please confirm in which countries you worked with Swedish counterparts? Q1b) Which periods you’ll be speaking to? Q1c) What was your position during that (those) period(s)?

Understanding Context

Q2a) Do you think that Sweden has/had an adequate understanding of the peacebuilding and statebuilding context? Q2b) Was this done through some joint fragility analysis or assessment?

Q3) From your perspective, did Sweden have the right mix of knowledge and experience in country to come to a strong and relevant understanding of the context?

Q4) Please give examples of how Swedish actors understood (or did not) understand the political, security and peace-building context

Linking politics, security, development, and humanitarian response

Q5) From your perspective, has Sweden linked politics, security, development, and humanitarian response effectively? Can you give practical examples?

Q6) How flexible is Sweden in responding to needs on the ground compared to other bilateral donors?

Q7a) How did national actors link security, political, development and humanitarian action? Q7b) Did Sweden support this? Q8) Given your experience in country, do you feel that Swedish actors have “room to manoeuvre” on the ground?
Priorities, Ownership and Inclusion

Q9a) What did you observe to be Sweden’s key priorities in the country? Q9b) From your perspective, were these the right priorities given the analyses, assessments etc. you mentioned before? If not, did Sweden still respond effectively to the country needs?

Q10a) What were the main accomplishments linked to these priorities during this period? Q10b) What were missed opportunities or challenges?


Swedish support approaches in practice

Q12a) Was additional Swedish financing or were other resources made available? If yes, for what?

Q12b) Were new modalities used including (for example, multilateral or support to civil society)? If no: why not

Q13a) Do you think that Swedish actors were prepared to take risks? What affected their risk taking? Please give concrete examples of risk taking.

Q14) Are there other ways in which Sweden supported other actors in the country? What were the results? Q14b) What was Sweden’s role?

Last Reflections

Q15) Have we missed anything?

Q16) What are, in your opinion, three areas that Sweden needs to address to improve the implementation of the New Deal? (prioritize?)
Script 3a: Semi-Structured Interview – Swedish Actors with Country Experience

Q1a) Could you please tell us what countries you’ve worked in? Q1b) Which periods you’ll be speaking to? Q1c) What was your position during that (those) period(s)?

Understanding Context

Q2a) What kind of analysis did Sweden use to gain an understanding of peacebuilding and statebuilding needs? Q2b) Was this analysis or assessment done jointly with others or shared?

Q3) From your perspective, did Sweden have the right mix of knowledge and experience in country to come to a strong and relevant understanding of the context?

Q4) Please give examples of how Swedish actors understood (or did not) understand the political, security and peace-building context.

Linking politics, security, develop. And human. Response

Q5) From your perspective, what does it mean to link politics, security, humanitarian response and development effectively? Can you give practical examples of how this was done?

Q6) Was staffing/co-location adapted to link politics, security, humanitarian and development in your country context(s)? Q6b) If no, were there other means of communication/interaction to allow for concerted action by for example MFA-Sida-Swedish security actors? Q6c) If yes, was it effective? Q7) To what extent were approaches between Embassy MFA staff and Sida (and other Swedish actors) joined up following the New Deal? Can you give examples?

Q7) To what extent was decision-making delegated to the field, both politically and financially? Q7b) Can you provide examples of where you had (or didn’t have) room to manoeuvre to make decisions? Q7c) If yes, was it effective?
Priorities, Ownership and Inclusion

Q9a) What were key priorities in Sweden’s country strategy and Q9b) Were these priorities the right ones from your perspective given the analyses, assessments etc. you mentioned before?

Q10a) What were the main accomplishments linked to the above priorities during this period? Q10b) What were missed opportunities or challenges?

Q11a) What did inclusion mean in practice in this context? (e.g. Gender, youth, minorities, vulnerable groups). Did Sweden actively promote gender equality? Q11b): Did Sweden promote ownership to country partners? Give examples? Q11c) Were there tensions between Swedish, national government and citizen/civil society priorities? If yes, how did Sweden address this?

Swedish support approaches in practice

Q12a) Was additional financing or were other resources made available? If yes, for what? Q12b) Were new modalities used including, for example, multilateral or support to civil society)? Why? Q12c) If no, why did Sweden not change its financial support or modalities of support?

Q13a) Did your work require risk-taking personally, professionally or institutionally? Q13b) Did you or others have to make exceptions to work in your country context? What were examples?

Q14a) To what extent has Sweden supported or advocated the practical implementation of New Deal principles through the EU, other regional or multilateral organizations (e.g. the UN or the development Banks). Q14b) Provide concrete examples? Q14c) What were the results?
Last Reflections

Q15) Have we missed anything?

Q16) What are, in your opinion, three areas that Sweden needs to address to improve the implementation of the New Deal? (prioritize?)

Script 3b: Semi-Structured Interview – National Counterparts in Country

Q1a) Could you please confirm your country of expertise? Q1b) Which periods you’ll be speaking to? Q1c) What was your position during that (those) period(s)?

Understanding Context

Q2a) Do you think that Sweden has/had an adequate understanding of the peacebuilding and statebuilding context Q2b) Was this done through some joint fragility analysis or assessment?

Q3) From your perspective, did Sweden have the right mix of knowledge and experience in country to come to a strong and relevant understanding of the context?

Q4) Please give examples of how Swedish actors understood (or did not understand) the political, security and peace-building context.

Linking politics, security, development, and humanitarian response

Q5) From your perspective, did Sweden link their political/diplomatic, security, development and humanitarian response effectively? 5b) Which Swedish actors were involved? 5c) Can you give practical examples? 5d) What were the results (or lack of results)?

Q6a) How well did Sweden do link up their political-security-development etc. response? 6b) In comparison to other bilateral donors?
Q7a) How do national actors link politics, security, development?  
Q7b) Did Sweden support this?  

Q8) Did you see change in how Sweden worked with your government over time?  

Priorities, Ownership and Inclusion  

Q9a) What did you observe to be Sweden´s key priorities in the country?  
Q9b) From your perspective, were these the right priorities given the analyses, assessments etc. you mentioned before?  
Q9c) If not, did Sweden still respond effectively to the country needs?  

Q10a) What were the main accomplishments linked to these priorities during this period?  
Q10b) What were missed opportunities or challenges?  

Q11a) What did inclusion mean in practice in this context? For example, gender, youth, minorities, other vulnerable groups?  
Q11b) Was this inclusion promoted by Sweden? Was it promoted by the government? By civil society?  

Swedish support approaches in practice  

Q12a) Was additional financing or were other resources made available? If yes, for what?  
Q12b) Were new modalities used including, for example, multilateral support (e.g. UN, World Bank) or support to civil society)?  
Q12 c) If no, why do you think this was not the case?  

Q13a) How was cooperation with Sweden most difficult?  
Q13b) Did Swedish actors help you to solve these problems?  
Q14a) Were there other ways beyond financing through which Sweden supported peacebuilding and statebuilding in the country?  
Q 14b) Provide concrete examples?  
Q 14c) What were the results?
Last Reflections

Q15) Have we missed anything?

Q16) What are, in your opinion, three areas that Sweden needs to address to improve the implementation of the New Deal? (prioritize?)
Appendix 4: Survey questions

Table A4: All survey questions. Answer options – in italics

Common questions (Q1–4)

Q1. How many years, in total, have you worked on/with/in fragile states/situations?  
*Total number of years*

Q2. How would you describe your background working on fragile states? (main experiences, up to 3)  
*Perspective, Working for..., On ... / Other (please specify)*

Q3. Have we interviewed you for this study? (pick one)  
*Yes/No/We have scheduled an interview, but it has not occurred yet*

Q4. Would you say your experience with Sweden and the New Deal is primarily from more of a general multilateral/global perspective (i.e. working on adoption and application of the New Deal principles) or from a specific country experience (i.e. working with Swedish actors in/on a developing country, whether you are national or international). If the latter, which country have you primarily worked on from a New Deal perspective? (please pick one)

- Primarily multilateral/global
- Primarily Afghanistan
- Primarily DRC
- Primarily Liberia
- Primarily Mali
- Primarily South Sudan
- Primarily Somalia
- Other (please specify)

Questions for Country respondents (Q5–20)

Q5. Which years were you based in this country? (add years)  
*Start & End*

Question for Global respondents (Q21–34)

Q21. In what fora have you worked with Sweden on the New Deal? (pick all that apply)
UN/ Other multilateral/
International Dialogue for
Peacebuilding and Statebuilding
(IDPS)/ International Network on
Conflict and Fragility (INCAF)/
Jointly through the EU/ Other
(please specify)

Q22. Overall, would you say that
the New Deal principles have been
impactful? (pick one)
Significantly impactful/ Somewhat
impactful/ Not at all impactful/
Don’t know / No opinion

For Q6–10: In your experience,
what are key determinants of
success in applying the New Deal?
(pick only one in each area):

Q6. Area 1. Understanding context:
(pick one)
– formal, joint
collision/political/fragility
assessment
– informal, joint,
collision/political/fragility
assessment as part of an
ongoing diagnostic process
– formal, independent
collision/political/fragility
assessment (more expert
based analysis)
– informal, long-term
engagement/embeddedsens in the
country to build
contextual expertise and
knowledge
– other (please specify)
– don’t know / no opinion

For Q23–26: In your experience,
what are key determinants of
success in applying the New Deal?
(pick only one in each area):

Q23. Area 1. Understanding
context: (pick one)
– formal, joint
collision/political/fragility
assessment
– informal, joint,
collision/political/fragility
assessment as part of an
ongoing diagnostic process
– formal, independent
collision/political/fragility
assessment (more expert
based analysis)
– informal, long-term
engagement/embeddedsens in the
country to build
contextual expertise and
knowledge
– other (please specify)
– don’t know / no opinion
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>– <strong>physical proximity and interaction</strong> – being able to meet counterparts in different sectors regularly</td>
<td>– <strong>physical proximity and interaction</strong> – being able to meet counterparts in different sectors regularly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– systematic information sharing</td>
<td>– systematic information sharing</td>
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<tr>
<td>– coordination from central authority to sync efforts</td>
<td>– coordination from central authority to sync efforts</td>
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<tr>
<td>– local/domestic ownership and agenda setting allowed to shape cross-sectoral interaction and collaboration</td>
<td>– local/domestic ownership and agenda setting allowed to shape cross-sectoral interaction and collaboration</td>
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<td>– other (please specify)</td>
<td>– other (please specify)</td>
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<tr>
<td>– don’t know / no opinion</td>
<td>– don’t know / no opinion</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Q8. Area 3. Priorities, ownership and inclusion: (pick one)</th>
<th>Q25. Area 3. Priorities, ownership and inclusion: (pick one)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>– gender equality</td>
<td>– gender equality</td>
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<tr>
<td>– government ownership and leadership</td>
<td>– government ownership and leadership</td>
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<tr>
<td>– focus on excluded or marginalized groups through e.g. civil society engagement</td>
<td>– focus on excluded or marginalized groups through e.g. civil society engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– an active lead donor</td>
<td>– an active lead donor</td>
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<tr>
<td>– support of regional actors</td>
<td>– support of regional actors</td>
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<td>– other (please specify)</td>
<td>– other (please specify)</td>
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<tr>
<td>– don’t know / no opinion</td>
<td>– don’t know / no opinion</td>
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<tr>
<td>– support for essential services through humanitarian actors</td>
<td>– support for essential services through humanitarian actors</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Common questions (Q1–4)

- anti-corruption mechanisms
- establishment and use of a joint financing facility (like a multi-donor trust fund)
- predictable financing
- funding multilateral organizations
- support to civil society
- other (please specify)
- don’t know / no opinion

Q10. Overall, would you say that in this country, the New Deal principles have been adopted and applied? (pick one)
Significantly/ Somewhat/ Not at all

Q27. Who have been the main champions of the New Deal? (pick the top three)
EU/ National governments/ International NGOs/ National/local civil society / the UN/ IFIs (World Bank, Regional Development Banks)/ the g7+/ Sweden/ Other bilateral Donors/ None of the above

Q11. Who have been the main champions of the New Deal? (pick the top three)
- EU
- National governments
- International NGOs
- National/local civil society
- the UN
- IFIs (World Bank, Regional Development Banks)
- the g7+
- Sweden
- Other bilateral Donors
- None of the above

Q28. Does the New Deal promote any of the following? (pick all that apply)
How would you assess progress? & What was Sweden’s contribution?
In Development/ Peace / Gender equality/ Reducing humanitarian needs/ Democracy/representation / Other area (please specify including Sweden’s contribution)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Common questions (Q1–4)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q12. Would you say that in this country, during the time period you identified above, there has been progress in any of the following areas?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How would you assess progress? &amp; What was Sweden’s contribution?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Development/ Peace/ Gender equality/ Reducing humanitarian needs/ Democracy/representation/ Other area (please specify including Sweden’s contribution)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q13. If Sweden has contributed, what were the key contributions of Sweden to the implementation of the New Deal in this country?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open-ended answer: 1/2/3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q14. What were missed opportunities by Sweden in implementation of the New Deal in this country?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open-ended answer: 1/2/3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q15. Which Swedish actors did you work with in this environment? (pick all that apply)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did you work with them? &amp; Were they effective?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swedish Embassy/Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs/Sida/Folk Bernadotte Academy/Swedish military actors/Swedish police and prison services/Swedish NGOs/Swedish advocacy groups/Other (please specify)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q29. How relevant is the New Deal for the following areas? (pick one)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highly relevant/ Semi-relevant/ Irrelevant:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development/ Peace/ Gender equality/ Reducing humanitarian needs/ Democracy/representation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q30. What would you say have been three key contributions of Sweden to the promotion of the New Deal?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open-ended answer: 1/2/3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q31. What were missed opportunities by Sweden in promotion of the New Deal?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open-ended answer: 1/2/3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q32. Which Swedish actors have you worked with on the New Deal? (pick all that apply)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did you work with them? &amp; Were they effective?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swedish Embassy/ Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs/ Sida/ Folk Bernadotte Academy/ Swedish military actors/ Swedish police and prison services/ Swedish NGOs/ Swedish advocacy groups/ Other (please specify)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Common questions (Q1–4)

Q16. Would you agree that the actors you identified above worked with each other? (pick one)
   - Increasingly over time/Decreasingly over time/No change over time/Did not work with each other at all/Don’t know/no opinion
   - Please provide comments on specific actors

Q33. Would you agree that the actors you identified above worked with each other? (pick one)
   - Increasingly over time/Decreasingly over time/No change over time/Did not work with each other at all/Don’t know/no opinion
   - Please provide comments on specific actors

Q17. For each of the following statements on the integration of gender equality, please tell us how much you agree: (pick one for each statement)
   Strongly agree/Somewhat agree/Disagree/Don’t know/no opinion:
   - In its conflict/peace/fragility assessments/analysis, Sweden differentiates between the situations faced or needs experienced by women and men
   - In setting priorities at the country level, Sweden includes the needs and perspectives of both women and men
   - In allocating resources at the country level, Sweden funds women led civil society organizations, or organizations that promote gender equality

Q34. For each of the following statements on the integration of gender equality, please tell us how much you agree: (pick one for each statement)
   Strongly agree/Somewhat agree/Disagree/Don’t know/no opinion:
   - In its conflict/peace/fragility assessments/analysis, Sweden differentiates between the situations faced or needs experienced by women and men
   - In setting priorities at the country level, Sweden includes the needs and perspectives of both women and men
   - In allocating resources at the country level, Sweden funds women led civil society organizations, or organizations that promote gender equality
Common questions (Q1–4)

Q18. For each of the following statements, please tell us how much you agree: (pick one for each statement)
Strongly agree/Somewhat agree/Disagree/Don’t know / no opinion:

− A joint conflict/peace/fragility analysis was conducted in the context
− Sweden participated in the joint analysis
− Sweden worked with national stakeholders
− Sweden worked through national systems and helped to build capacity

Q19. For each of the following areas, please tell us what role Sweden took: (pick one for each area)
Leads in promoting/ Engaged with/ Not involved:

− Peace/ Gender equality/ Democracy and representation/ National priorities for development/ Inclusion

Q20. What modalities did Sweden use to support the New Deal? (pick all that apply)

− joint financing through eg. a multi-donor trust fund
− development projects implemented by the country
Common questions (Q1–4)

− supporting civil society actors (INGOs, NGOs)
− supporting humanitarian actors
− capacity building in the government
− facilitating and strengthening coordination between actors
− supporting multilaterals (UN, WB)
− promoting the inclusion of civil society
− political dialogue
− other (please specify)

Common questions (Q35–37)

Q35. Looking ahead, what are your recommendations for Sweden to promote the peacebuilding and statebuilding principles of the New Deal (add up to three recommendations)?
Open-ended answer: 1/2/3

Q36. What features of the New Deal are essential for success in promoting progress at the Triple Nexus (Peace, Humanitarian, Development) in fragile situations?
Open-ended answer

Q37. Do you have any other suggestions for the authors?
Open-ended answer
# Appendix 5: Summary glossary

## Glossary of Paris Principles, the New Deal principles and the Stockholm Declaration

Table A5: Mapping interview questions for country respondents onto the principle regimes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IQ #</th>
<th>Question Text</th>
<th>Paris Principle</th>
<th>New Deal Principle</th>
<th>Stockholm Declaration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PSGs FOCUS TRUST</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Area 1 (Understanding Context)

2a What kind of analysis did Sweden use to gain an understanding of peacebuilding and statebuilding needs?  
1 1 1.3, 3.4

2b Was this analysis or assessment done jointly with others or shared?  
1.8 1 2 1.3

3 From your perspective, did Sweden have the right mix of knowledge and experience in country to come to a strong and relevant understanding of the context?  
1 3.4
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IQ #</th>
<th>Question Text</th>
<th>Paris Principle</th>
<th>New Deal Principle</th>
<th>Stockholm Declaration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Examples for Swedish actors with country experience – questions were adapted for other actors or experience, see Annex 3)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Please give examples of how Swedish actors understood (or did not) understand the political, security and peace-building context.</td>
<td>4 1-3 1,3 2 1.3, 3.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Area 2 (Linking Politics, Security, Development and Humanitarian Response)**

<p>| 5    | From your perspective, what does it mean to link politics, security, humanitarian response and development effectively? Examples? | 1, 3, 5 1-5 2, 4, 5 | 1.1, 1.2, 4.4 |
| 6a   | Was staffing/co-location adapted to link politics, security, humanitarian and development in your country context? | 8 1-5 | 1.2, 4.4 |
| 6b   | Were there other means of communication/interaction to allow for concerted action by, for example, MFA-Sida-Swedish security actors? | 5, 8 5 | 1.2, 2.2, 4.2 |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IQ #</th>
<th>Question Text (Examples for Swedish actors with country experience – questions were adapted for other actors or experience, see Annex 3)</th>
<th>Paris Principle</th>
<th>New Deal Principle</th>
<th>Stockholm Declaration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6c</td>
<td>To what extent were approaches between Swedish actors joined up following the New Deal?</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2, 3</td>
<td>1,2, 4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7a</td>
<td>To what extent was decision-making delegated to the field? Politically, financially?</td>
<td>7, 9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7b</td>
<td>Can you provide examples where you had (or didn’t have) room to maneuver to make decisions?</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Area 3 (Priorities, Ownership and Inclusion)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>What were key priorities in Sweden’s country strategy?</th>
<th>1-5</th>
<th>2, 3</th>
<th>2.1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9a</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9b</td>
<td>Were these priorities the right ones, based on analysis, assessments you mentioned before?</td>
<td>1, 8</td>
<td>2, 3</td>
<td>3.4, 4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IQ #</td>
<td>Question Text (Examples for Swedish actors with country experience – questions were adapted for other actors or experience, see Annex 3)</td>
<td>Paris Principle</td>
<td>New Deal Principle</td>
<td>Stockholm Declaration</td>
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<tr>
<td>------</td>
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<td>----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10a</td>
<td>What were the amin accomplishments linked to the above priorities during this period?</td>
<td>8, 9</td>
<td>2, 4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10b</td>
<td>What were missed opportunities or challenges?</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11a</td>
<td>What did inclusion mean in practice in this context?</td>
<td>4, 6, 10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.4, 1.5, 1.6, 2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11b</td>
<td>Did Sweden promote ownership by country partners?</td>
<td>3, 7</td>
<td>3, 5</td>
<td>4, 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11c</td>
<td>Were there tensions between Swedish, national government and citizen/civil society priorities?</td>
<td>3, 7</td>
<td>1-5</td>
<td>3, 4, 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Area 4 (Modalities for Support)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12a</td>
<td>Was additional financing or were other resources made available?</td>
<td>7, 10</td>
<td>1, 5</td>
<td>2.1, 3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12b</td>
<td>Were new modalities used including, for example, multilateral or support to civil society?</td>
<td>3, 7</td>
<td>2, 3</td>
<td>1, 3, 4, 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IQ #</td>
<td>Question Text</td>
<td>Paris Principle</td>
<td>New Deal Principle</td>
<td>Stockholm Declaration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<td>-----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13a</td>
<td>Did your work require risk-taking, personally, professionally or institutionally?</td>
<td>3, 7 1-3</td>
<td>1, 2, 3, 4</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13b</td>
<td>Did you or others have to make exceptions to work in your country context?</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>To what extent has Sweden supported or advocated the practical implementation of New Deal principles through the EU, other regional or multilateral organizations?</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.1, 4.2, 4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>What are three areas that Sweden could address to improve implementation of the New Deal?</td>
<td>(Used to inform recommendations section)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors from interview script and mapping exercise (originally done with Kumu). Questions have been paraphrased for exposition. Questions 8 and 15 were adapted for global country respondents (See Annex 3).
Table A6: Paris principles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Label</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PARIS 1: Take context as the starting point</td>
<td>It is essential for international actors to understand the specific context in each country, and develop a shared view of the strategic response that is required. It is particularly important to recognise the different constraints of capacity, political will and legitimacy, and the differences between: (i) post-conflict/crisis or political transition situations; (ii) deteriorating governance environments, (iii) gradual improvement, and; (iv) prolonged crisis or impasse. Sound political analysis is needed to adapt international responses to country and regional context, beyond quantitative indicators of conflict, governance or institutional strength. International actors should mix and sequence their aid instruments according to context, and avoid blueprint approaches.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PARIS 2: Do no harm</td>
<td>International interventions can inadvertently create societal divisions and worsen corruption and abuse, if they are not based on strong conflict and governance analysis, and designed with appropriate safeguards. In each case, international decisions to suspend or continue aid-financed activities following serious cases of corruption or human rights violations must be carefully judged for their impact on domestic reform, conflict, poverty and insecurity. Harmonised and graduated responses should be agreed, taking into account overall governance trends and the potential to adjust aid modalities as well as levels of aid. Aid budget cuts in-year should only be considered as a last resort for the most serious situations. Donor countries also have specific responsibilities at home in addressing corruption, in areas such as asset recovery, anti-money laundering measures and banking transparency. Increased transparency concerning transactions between partner governments and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Label</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PARIS 3: Focus on state-building as the central objective</td>
<td>Companies, often based in OECD countries, in the extractive industries sector is a priority. States are fragile when state structures lack political will and/or capacity to provide the basic functions needed for poverty reduction, development and to safeguard the security and human rights of their populations. International engagement will need to be concerted, sustained, and focused on building the relationship between state and society, through engagement in two main areas. Firstly, supporting the legitimacy and accountability of states by addressing issues of democratic governance, human rights, civil society engagement and peacebuilding. Secondly, strengthening the capability of states to fulfil their core functions is essential in order to reduce poverty. Priority functions include: ensuring security and justice; mobilizing revenue; establishing an enabling environment for basic service delivery, strong economic performance and employment generation. Support to these areas will in turn strengthen citizens’ confidence, trust and engagement with state institutions. Civil society has a key role both in demanding good governance and in service delivery. Action today can reduce fragility, lower the risk of future conflict and other types of crises, and contribute to long-term global development and security. International actors must be prepared to take rapid action where the risk of conflict and instability is highest. A greater emphasis on prevention will also include sharing risk analyses; looking beyond quick-fix solutions to address the root causes of state fragility; strengthening indigenous capacities, especially those of women, to prevent and resolve conflicts; supporting the peacebuilding capabilities of regional organisations, and undertaking joint missions to consider measures to help avert crises.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PARIS 4: Prioritize prevention</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Label</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PARIS 5: Recognize the link between political, security and development objectives</td>
<td>The challenges faced by fragile states are multi-dimensional. The political, security, economic and social spheres are inter-dependent. Importantly, there may be tensions and trade-offs between objectives, particularly in the short-term, which must be addressed when reaching consensus on strategy and priorities. For example, international objectives in some fragile states may need to focus on peacebuilding in the short-term, to lay the foundations for progress against the MDGs in the longer term. This underlines the need for international actors to set clear measures of progress in fragile states. Within donor governments, a “whole of government” approach is needed, involving those responsible for security, political and economic affairs, as well as those responsible for development aid and humanitarian assistance. This should aim for policy coherence and joined-up strategies where possible, while preserving the independence, neutrality and impartiality of humanitarian aid. Partner governments also need to ensure coherence between ministries in the priorities they convey to the international community.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PARIS 6: Promote non-discrimination as a basis for inclusive and stable societies</td>
<td>Real or perceived discrimination is associated with fragility and conflict, and can lead to service delivery failures. International interventions in fragile states should consistently promote gender equity, social inclusion and human rights. These are important elements that underpin the relationship between state and citizen, and form part of long-term strategies to prevent fragility. Measures to promote the voice and participation of women, youth, minorities and other excluded groups should be included in state-building and service delivery strategies from the outset.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PARIS 7: Align with local priorities in different ways in different contexts

Where governments demonstrate political will to foster development, but lack capacity, international actors should seek to align assistance behind government strategies. Where capacity is limited, the use of alternative aid instruments —such as international compacts or multidonor trust funds—can facilitate shared priorities and responsibility for execution between national and international institutions. Where alignment behind government-led strategies is not possible due to particularly weak governance or violent conflict, international actors should consult with a range of national stakeholders in the partner country, and seek opportunities for partial alignment at the sectoral or regional level. Where possible, international actors should seek to avoid activities which undermine national institution-building, such as developing parallel systems without thought to transition mechanisms and long term capacity development. It is important to identify functioning systems within existing local institutions, and work to strengthen these.

PARIS 8: Agree on practical coordination mechanisms between international actors

This can happen even in the absence of strong government leadership. Where possible, it is important to work together on: upstream analysis; joint assessments; shared strategies; and coordination of political engagement. Practical initiatives can take the form of joint donor offices, an agreed division of labour among donors, delegated co-operation arrangements, multidonor trust funds and common reporting and financial requirements. Wherever possible, international actors should work jointly with national reformers in government and civil society to develop a shared analysis of challenges and priorities. In the case of countries in transition from conflict or international disengagement, the use of simple integrated planning tools, such as the transitional results matrix, can help set and monitor realistic priorities.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Label</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>PARIS 9: Act fast...</strong>&lt;br&gt;but stay engaged long enough to give success a chance</td>
<td>Assistance to fragile states must be flexible enough to take advantage of windows of opportunity and respond to changing conditions on the ground. At the same time, given low capacity and the extent of the challenges facing fragile states, international engagement may need to be of longer-duration than in other low-income countries. Capacity development in core institutions will normally require an engagement of at least ten years. Since volatility of engagement (not only aid volumes, but also diplomatic engagement and field presence) is potentially destabilising for fragile states, international actors must improve aid predictability in these countries, and ensure mutual consultation and co-ordination prior to any significant changes to aid programming.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PARIS 10: Avoid pockets of exclusion</strong></td>
<td>International actors need to address the problem of “aid orphans” – states where there are no significant political barriers to engagement, but few international actors are engaged and aid volumes are low. This also applies to neglected geographical regions within a country, as well as neglected sectors and groups within societies. When international actors make resource allocation decisions about the partner countries and focus areas for their aid programs, they should seek to avoid unintentional exclusionary effects. In this respect, coordination of field presence, determination of aid flows in relation to absorptive capacity and mechanisms to respond to positive developments in these countries, are therefore essential. In some instances, delegated assistance strategies and leadership arrangements among donors may help to address the problem of aid orphans.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table A7: New Deal – building peaceful states PSGs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Label</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PSG1: Legitimate politics</td>
<td>Foster inclusive political settlements and conflict resolution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSG2: Security</td>
<td>Establish and strengthen people’s security.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSG3: Justice</td>
<td>Address injustices and increase people’s access to justice.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSG4: Economic foundations</td>
<td>Generate employment and improve livelihoods.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSG5: Revenues and services</td>
<td>Manage revenue and build capacity for accountable and fair service delivery.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table A8: FOCUS – country-led pathways out of fragility

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Label</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FOCUS1: Fragility assessment</td>
<td>Conducting a periodic country-led assessment on the causes and features of fragility and sources of resilience as a basis for the ‘one vision, one plan’ part of the strategy. The assessment should include key national stakeholders and non-state actors and should build upon a harmonised methodology, including a fragility spectrum, developed by the g7+ and supported by international partners.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOCUS2: One vision, one plan</td>
<td>Developing and supporting one national vision and one plan to transition out of fragility. This vision and plan should be country-owned and led, developed in consultation with civil society and based on inputs from the fragility assessment. Plans should be flexible so as to address short-, medium- and long-term peace-building and statebuilding priorities, and they should be the guiding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Label</td>
<td>Description</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Label</td>
<td>framework for all country-led identification of priorities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A Compact is a key mechanism to implement the ‘one vision, one plan’. It should be drawn up from a broad range of views from multiple stakeholders and the public, and should be reviewed annually through a multi-stakeholder review. The Compact also recognises differences in states of fragility and national contexts; it may therefore take different forms at different points in transition processes. A Compact can also guide the choice of aid modalities and provide a basis to determine the allocation of donor resources aligned to the national priorities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOCUS3: Compact</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOCUS4: Use PSGs to monitor</td>
<td>Using the PSG targets and indicators to make sure that country-level progress is closely monitored.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOCUS5: Support political dialogue and leadership</td>
<td>Increasing support for credible and inclusive processes of political dialogue, as well as supporting global, regional and national initiatives to build the capacity of government, civil society leaders and institutions. Specific support should be targeted to promote youth and women’s participation in political dialogue and leadership initiatives.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table A9: TRUST – commitment for results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Label</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>TRUST1: Transparency</strong></td>
<td>Aim to ensure a much more transparent use of aid (ODA and non-ODA) in the future. This should be done by monitoring, through the DAC, overall resource flows to fragile states and tracking international assistance against individual goals. On a local level, countries receiving international support should strengthen national reporting and planning systems that take into account elements such as budgets, transparency portals or aid information management systems. They should also provide support to domestic oversight mechanisms including national parliaments and should solicit citizens’ views to assess the transparency of domestic resources and aid.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TRUST2: Risk-sharing</strong></td>
<td>Accept the risks of engaging during transition, recognising that the risk of non-engagement in this context can outweigh almost any risk of engagement. Identify context-specific, joint donor risk-mitigation strategies, which will require different approaches to risk management and capacity development. It is also crucial to conduct joint assessments of the specific risks associated with working in fragile situations. This will help identify and use joint mechanisms to reduce and better manage risks so as to build the capacity of, and enhance the use of, country systems. Jointly identify the oversight and accountability measures required to enhance confidence in, and to enable the expanded use and strengthening of, country systems. Those governments receiving help, with support from international partners, should take all reasonable measures to strengthen their public financial management systems and be absolutely</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Label</td>
<td>Description</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TRUST3: Use and strengthen country systems</strong></td>
<td>International partners have also agreed to increase the percentage of aid delivered through country systems on the basis of measures and targets jointly agreed at the country level, while recipient governments will look to increase the proportion of public expenditure funded by domestic revenues. To ensure that fragile states can build critical capacities of civil and state institutions in a balanced manner, increase the proportion of funds for capacity development through jointly administered and pool-funded facilities. Substantially reduce programme implementation units per institution and target the use of external technical assistance, ensuring they report to the relevant national authority. Work towards an understanding on remuneration codes of conduct between government and international partners for national experts, as well as facilitating the exchange of South-South and fragile-fragile experiences on transitions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TRUST4: Strengthen capacities</strong></td>
<td>Develop simple and accountable fast-track financial management and procurement procedures to improve the speed and flexibility of aid delivery in fragile situations. Commit to increasing the predictability of aid: first through publishing three- to five-year indicative forward estimates (as committed in the Accra Agenda for Action), and through making more effective use of global and country level funds for peacebuilding and statebuilding. Finally, provide necessary data to the Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TRUST5: Timely and predictable aid</strong></td>
<td>transparent about it. In doing this, they should also build related fiduciary and administrative capacity within country institutions at national and local levels.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Label</td>
<td>Description</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistance Committee (DAC) so that regular and accurate reports on volatility will always be available.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table A10: Stockholm Declaration**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Label</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Labels are extracted from the text for easy reference (they were not originally labelled in the Stockholm Declaration). Some labels were added for clarity, these are included in [brackets].</td>
<td>The Stockholm Declaration was divided into four sections (identified below): 1) Commitment to address root causes, 2) Delivering Agenda 2030 through the New Deal, 3) Innovative aid, and 4) Wider and stronger partnerships.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STDEC1.1 Accelerate PSGs</td>
<td>Commitment to address root causes (StDec1) / Therefore, the International Dialogue commits to accelerating and improving the implementation of the New Deal’s Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals and using them as tools to guide our interventions to address the root causes of fragility, conflict and violence;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STDEC1.2: Advance UNSG’s agenda for humanity</td>
<td>advancing the UN Secretary-General’s Agenda for Humanity, as a way to transcend the divide between humanitarian and development actors to achieve collective outcomes supporting the implementation of the 2030 Agenda in fragile and conflict affected contexts;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STDEC1.3: [Addressing obstacles to new deal]</td>
<td>Commitment to address root causes (StDec1) / Therefore, the International Dialogue commits to identifying and addressing obstacles to the implementation of New Deal principles,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Label</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STDEC1.4: [Promoting gender in new deal]</td>
<td>and difficulties in operationalising country-led fragility assessments; Commitment to address root causes (StDec1) / Therefore, the International Dialogue commits to strengthening gender approaches and women’s active participation in peacebuilding by linking the implementation of the New Deal to the implementation of UNSCR 1325 and related resolutions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STDEC1.5: [Promoting youth in new deal]</td>
<td>Commitment to address root causes (StDec1) / Therefore, the International Dialogue commits to recognising and harnessing the positive potential of youth for peacebuilding and statebuilding by aligning the implementation of the New Deal with UNSCR 2250;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STDEC1.6: Inclusive politics</td>
<td>Commitment to address root causes (StDec1) / Therefore, the International Dialogue commits to developing coherent approaches to make politics inclusive;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STDEC1.7: Promoting conflict resolution and reconciliation</td>
<td>Commitment to address root causes (StDec1) / Therefore, the International Dialogue commits to building effective mechanisms for conflict resolution and reconciliation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STDEC2.1: Political and financial efforts for 2030 agenda</td>
<td>Delivering Agenda 2030 through the New Deal (StDec2) / Therefore, the International Dialogue commits to make concerted political and financial efforts to operationalise and implement the 2030 Agenda in line with the New Deal principles and taking into consideration the specific context of countries in fragile situations;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STDEC2.2: Promoting multi-stakeholder dialogue</td>
<td>Delivering Agenda 2030 through the New Deal (StDec2) / Therefore, the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Label</td>
<td>Description</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Dialogue commits to strengthen multi-stakeholder dialogue at country level; Delivering Agenda 2030 through the New Deal (StDec2) / Therefore, the International Dialogue commits to streamline bureaucratic procedures to increase timely delivery of development support;</td>
<td><strong>STDEC2.3: Reducing bureaucracy</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delivering Agenda 2030 through the New Deal (StDec2) / Therefore, the International Dialogue commits to support the creation of capacities by national statistical agencies, ministries and other stakeholders to produce data to monitor progress.</td>
<td><strong>STDEC2.4: Strengthen national capacities</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Innovative Aid (StDec3) / Therefore, the International Dialogue commits to aim to increase the proportion of country programmable aid in countries most in need, including those affected by fragility, violence and conflict;</td>
<td><strong>STDEC3.1: Increased proportion of country programmable aid</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Innovative Aid (StDec3) / Therefore, the International Dialogue commits to strengthen national public financial management systems and adopt proven risk management strategies in order to reduce fiduciary risks so that the wider use of country systems becomes possible;</td>
<td><strong>STDEC3.2: Public financial management and risk management</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Innovative Aid (StDec3) / Therefore, the International Dialogue commits to implement the Addis Ababa Action Agenda on Financing for Development, including by scaling up the levels of development support invested in domestic resource mobilisation by 2020, with a special focus on tackling</td>
<td><strong>STDEC3.3: Addis Ababa action agenda</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Label</td>
<td>Description</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>STDEC3.4: Conflict-sensitive aid</strong></td>
<td>tax evasion schemes in line with the Addis Ababa Tax Initiative; and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Innovative Aid (StDec3) / Therefore, the International Dialogue commits to make relevant development aid conflict-sensitive, based on a rigorous analysis of conflict and fragility drivers and ‘do no harm’ principles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>STDEC4.1: Promoting peer learning in fragile situations</strong></td>
<td>Wider and stronger partnerships (StDec4) / Therefore, the International Dialogue commits to support peer learning, exchange and cooperation between countries affected by conflict and fragility on how to build resilience after a crisis and how to manage complex aid relationships, beginning with existing mechanisms, such as the g7+ countries’ ‘Fragile-to-Fragile Cooperation’ initiative;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>STDEC4.2: New partnerships</strong></td>
<td>Wider and stronger partnerships (StDec4) / Therefore, the International Dialogue commits to expand its capacity to build partnerships and to work more coherently with existing forums, other bi-lateral and multilateral actors, regional organisations, new development partners, humanitarian actors, the private sector and countries affected by conflict currently outside the g7+ network;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>STDEC4.3: Un peacebuilding architecture</strong></td>
<td>Wider and stronger partnerships (StDec4) / Therefore, the International Dialogue commits to promote closer collaboration and work in more complementary ways with the UN peacebuilding architecture; and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>STDEC4.4: [Triple nexus]</strong></td>
<td>Wider and stronger partnerships (StDec4) / Therefore, the International Dialogue commits to work more closely</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Label</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>with development and humanitarian actors and promote increased incorporation of conflict sensitive and longer-term development approaches and financing into humanitarian operations in protracted crisis situations, to achieve context-appropriate collective outcomes.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 6: Expanded timeline of policy and strategy developments on fragility, global and Swedish

Global timeline

1995 • DAC establishes a special taskforce on conflict prevention, focusing on how development partners could promote peace and prevent conflict

1997 • Guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation, OECD

1999 • Do No Harm – How Aid Can Support Peace – or War, published by Mary A. Anderson

2000 • Millennium Development Goals ‘as the guiding framework for thinking about development results’

2001 • Revised Guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation, OECD

2005 • Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, OECD

• A Proposal for Monitoring Resource Flows to Fragile States, OECD’s first report on fragile states

• Draft Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations, OECD

2007 • Endorsement of Fragile States Principles (FSPs) by OECD-DAC ministers

• Paris Principles for Good Engagement in Fragile States, OECD

2008 • Accra High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness Roundtable Co-Chaired by the DRC, France, and the African Development Bank (AfDB)

• Establishment of International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (IDPS)

• FSP piloted in six fragile countries; these ‘came to constitute the g7+ (seven countries after Côte d’Ivoire joined) at the High Level
• Forum in Accra (2008)

2009
• International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF) created by DAC
• First FSP implementation review (OECD, monitored through a voluntary survey, which relies on national consultations)

2010
• First global meeting of IDPS, Dili (IDPS consisting of INCAF, g7+ and Civil Society Platform on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (CSPPS))
• Official launch of g7+, Dili
• 2008–2010: IDPS drafts ‘an “action plan” that later took shape as the New Deal’

2011
• New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States (Busan Agreement) – Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness
• Second implementation review of FSPs (OECD, monitored through a voluntary survey, which relies on national consultations)
• Second global meeting of IDPS, Monrovia (launch of Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (PSGs))
• UN Secretary-General launches UN Task Team on the Post-2015 Development Agenda

2012
• Liberia launches Fragility Assessment

2013
• Establishment of the New Deal Trust Fund in the UN Development Programme
• Third Global Meeting of IDPS, Washington, DC

2014
• Timor-Leste, a member of g7+, pledges US$2 million to Ebola crisis, ‘[p]utting into practice the New Deal principle of timely aid channelled through country systems’
• Implementing the New Deal for Fragile States (Monitoring Report)

2015
• UN reviews peace operations
• Addis Ababa Action Agenda on Financing for Development
• International Standards for Responsible Business in Conflict-Affected and Fragile Environments
• High-level visit of Xanana Gusmao, g7+ Eminent Person of the Advisor Council and Former Prime Minister of Timor-Leste, to Central African Republic in context of fragile-to-fragile diplomacy

• IDPS creates ‘framework for effective recovery’ for Ebola

• Launch of fragility spectrum by OECD’s States of Fragility Report

• Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), including Goal 16, focusing on institutions and justice (Transforming our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development)

2016 • UN General Assembly Resolution 70/262 and Security Council Resolution 2282 on Sustaining Peace 2282 ‘define a “sustaining peace” agenda, and echo the Stockholm Declaration’s call to prevention by addressing the root causes of conflict and fragility through a political approach to peacebuilding, based on inclusivity and national ownership’

• Independent Review of the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States

• High Level Panel on Humanitarian Financing ‘recognised the need to invest more in reducing fragility and fragile situations, and in building country systems and institutions, in order to shrink humanitarian needs in the long-term’

• Stockholm Declaration: Addressing Fragility and Building Peace in a Changing World (Fifth Global Meeting of the International Dialogue)

2017 • Workshop on gender inclusivity in Somalia’s National Development Plan

• UN–World Bank joint report: Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Prevention

2019 • IDPS Peace Vision (2019–2021)

• DAC Recommendation on the Humanitarian–Development–Peace Nexus

2020 • IDPS Joint Statement on Safeguarding Peace during the COVID-19 Pandemic

Swedish timeline

Pre-1999 • No Swedish government or Sida global policy or strategy available pre-1999 relating to peacebuilding. Sida’s approach in conflict perspective began earlier with the principle of ‘do no harm’, originally developed by Collaborative Learning Projects in 1999

1999 • Strategy for Conflict Management and Peacebuilding Sida policy includes definitions:
  − Conflict management: aid-financed projects implemented during armed conflict
  − Conflict prevention: activities aimed at preventing violence or escalation of violence
  − Peacebuilding: influencing parties involved in armed conflict

2005 • Policy for Promoting Peace and Security through Development Cooperation. Sida policy approaches include:
  − Risk awareness: understanding the effects of development cooperation in a violent context
  − Conflict sensitivity: ensure development cooperation does not have a negative impact
  − Promote peace and security: target attitudes and behaviors of parties to conflict (e.g. house and road construction, good governance and democracy that is inclusive of marginalized groups; trade; media; agriculture; security sector reform). The interventions must contribute to prevention or resolution of conflict

2010 • Policy for Security and Development in Swedish Development Cooperation 2010–2014 Swedish government policy
  − The policy defines peacebuilding as the process that endeavors to support the transition from armed conflict to sustainable peace, reconciliation and stability (including creating increased trust between the parties to a conflict; peace negotiations; implementation of peace agreements; participation
of women and their influence in the peace process; creating reconciliation and actions that address the structural causes underlying the conflict)

- Objectives: promoting peace – influencing actors to support peacebuilding, capacity development to manage conflicts, involvement of women in peacebuilding process; Promoting security – security and justice sector reform, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), arms control, demining, support to victims, awareness-raising; Peace dividends – improvement in people’s lives to ensure population support for peace (jobs, health, education, etc.)

2013
- Government Communication 2013/14:131 Aid Policy Framework, sub-Objective 5: Safeguarding human security and freedom from violence. Focus on:
  - Reduced vulnerability to conflict and lapsing back into conflict
  - Greater human security in conflict and post-conflict situations
  - A reduction in gender-based violence

2014
- Sweden adopts Feminist Foreign Policy
- Results Strategy for Global Initiatives for Human Security 2014–2017
  Result area 1: Human rights and freedom from violence. Focus on:
  - Conflict sensitivity and lapsing back into conflict
  - Gender-based violence in conflict and post-conflict environments
  - Human security in conflict and post-conflict contexts

Result area 2: Strong democracy and enhanced respect for human rights and freedom of expression. Focus on strong democratic processes and institutions and rule of law
• Sida’s dedicated Department of Conflict and Post-Conflict Cooperation is dissolved. New structure comprises a Peace and Security thematic network, which consists of conflict advisors located in the regional sections at Sida HQ and in some embassies.

July 2015

• Sida’s government instruction prescribes an integrated conflict perspective in all development cooperation activities. A conflict sensitivity assessment is compulsory.

2016

• Government Communication 2016/17:60 Policy Framework for Swedish Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Assistance. Key peacebuilding related points include:
  − Focus on statebuilding and tackling the underlying causes of conflict and vulnerability. Including effective, responsible, open and inclusive institutions and for human rights
  − Strengthening capacity to withstand crises and handle conflict by peaceful means
  − Support to inclusive dialogues and mediation processes
  − Working in line with the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States
  − Contributing to strengthening the influence of women and girls and their meaningful participation in peace processes in line with UN Security Council Resolution 1325
  − Work for transitional justice that incorporates the right to combat impunity

2017

• Strategy for Sustainable Peace 2017–2022 Swedish Government Strategy. Objective(s): to improve the prevention of armed conflict, effective conflict resolution, sustainable peace- and statebuilding; increased human security
  − National and local support during critical stages of prevention of armed conflict including in forgotten and protracted conflicts
- Strong emphasis on women, youth and marginalized groups
- Emphasis on UN and OECD-DAC alignment
- Support should be long term yet fast/responsive, flexible and with a calculated risk, and rights-based and with the perspective of poor people on development
- Support must be economically, socially and environmentally sustainable and gender-equal and considered in an integrated context

2017
- Multidimensional Poverty Analysis (MDPA) and Conflict Analysis concepts introduced. Peace and conflict toolbox and its concept introduced as well as other tools (Building and assessing institutional capacity to integrate conflict sensitivity and Conflict sensitivity in program management)
- Specific country-level MDPAs conducted by Sida country staff including Afghanistan (2016–2017), Cambodia, Iraq, Kenya, Kosovo, Middle East and North Africa and Mozambique.
- Government guidelines for strategy reporting in Swedish development cooperation and humanitarian aid. References the New Deal and other significant international agreements. Includes guidelines for Sida, FBA and embassy annual reports and in-depth reviews to MFA

2017–2018
- After being elected by a wide margin to the UN Security Council, Sweden was a non-permanent member of the Council for the 2017–2018 term

2018
- Issue briefs on Conflict Sensitivity and Dialogue Facilitation and mediation are the latest published documents in 2018. The previous peace and conflict tools have not been updated since 2017

2019
- Latest update on conceptual framework on MDPA.
- Updated document on environment and climate change in MDPA

2020
- Brief on COVID-19 and Dimensions of Poverty.
• Updated document on gender perspective in MPDA in November 2020

Source: Interviews; Authors, adapted from Evaluation of Sida’s Support to Peacebuilding in Conflict and Post-Conflict Countries, Bryld et al., 2019.
Appendix 7: Tracing principles to application

For principles like the Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and the New Deal to be adopted and applied, they must enter practice through strategies and guidance from government-to-government agencies. Annex Figure 2 presents a circular structure for strategies, planning and reporting for all Swedish cooperation. For each of the four areas studied this report, the analysis follows the same logic as this diagram – looking first at the adoption of the principles first in the overall or thematic strategies, and then focus on regional and country strategies ‘downstream’. Where possible, the analysis has included annual reporting or other documents.

Figure A2: Relationships between principles, strategies, action plans and reporting
Process for geographic and thematic strategies

Step 1: Policy framework

In the policy framework, the Government of Sweden presents the overall direction of Swedish development cooperation and humanitarian assistance. This direction forms the basis for strategies for development cooperation. Sweden has committed to complying with relevant international agreements on aid effectiveness and effective development cooperation as follows: the Paris Declaration (2005), the Accra Agenda for Action (2008), the Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (Busan (2011), the Outcome Document from the Second High-Level Meeting of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation in Nairobi (2016) and the Stockholm Declaration (2016). In Busan, Sweden also committed to comply with the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States.

Step 2: Instructions

Instructions are brief documents that consist of one to two pages in which the government sets out the overall direction of development cooperation in the relevant context. The responsible department at the MFA drafts instructions in consultation with the Department for International Development Cooperation (IU) at the MFA. It is important to note that results documented during the implementation of a strategy (including in annual strategy reports) are an important basis for the drafting of new instructions.

Consultations in connection with the drafting of instructions include relevant departments, ministries and government agencies that are expected to be commissioned by the government to implement the strategy.

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79 Strategies for humanitarian and multilateral organizations are central to Sweden’s broader foreign policy framework but they were beyond the scope of this study.
Step 3: Strategies

For geographic and thematic strategies, the government agency that has received a commission in the form of instructions drafts a proposal for the strategy. Normally, designated agencies are given two to four months to prepare the supporting information. Normally, a strategy proposal will be 15–20 pages in length.

Step 3.5: Formulating and implementing strategies through action plans

Based on the instructions and the proposal, the department responsible in the government offices (MFA) prepares a draft strategy for development cooperation, which the government then adopts. Geographic strategies and thematic strategies (such as human rights, democracy and rule of law) are normally valid for five years.80 After adoption of the strategy, Sida, the FBA or another government agency is commissioned to implement all or part of it. This step usually includes action plans to operationalize the strategy, detailing partners to work with and how best to achieve the goals.

Objectives in a strategy will be sufficiently precise to provide governance and enable monitoring, whilst being sufficiently broad to allow the government agency responsible to formulate activities according to the particular context, and the flexibility to make adjustments if conditions change.81 Countries in a conflict situation or countries where there is great political uncertainty usually have more flexible strategies.

It is at the action plan level that application of the principles can be observed.

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80 www.sida.se/en/about-sida/how-we-are-governed

81 Ibid.
**Step 4: Monitoring and follow-up of the strategy through annual results reports**

Implementation and results of the strategy are monitored and followed up at several levels.

- Organizations with operational responsibility for implementation, usually in partner countries, are responsible for monitoring and following up their own activities.

- Government agencies commissioned to implement the strategies are responsible for the continuous monitoring of the activities and must report results to the government in relation to the objectives of the strategy. Regular follow up meetings (“samråd”) are held between the MFA and the government agencies concerned to track progress and set-backs.

- The government follows up the aggregate implementation of the strategy by the agencies and reports back to the Riksdag. A strategy can be amended, when required, following a government decision.

- A report on every geographic and thematic strategy is prepared annually by the agency responsible. When several agencies have commissions to implement a strategy, separate reports are prepared. These annual reports also feed into the consultations at the beginning of the process, which normally take place in the spring. The annual report will reach the government offices (MFA) no later than 15 April (unless otherwise agreed).

**Completing the circle**

The diagram in Annex Figure 2 shows a circular structure, whereby a policy framework (in the form of a government communication to the Riksdag) outlines the direction of Swedish development cooperation and humanitarian assistance, informed by reporting. This is then applied in budgets and through the government’s
instructions in strategies (geographic, thematic and organizational strategies for multilateral organizations), and appropriation letters (not included in this graph). Implementation through action plans, followed by annual results, is followed up on the basis of these instruments and reported to the Riksdag in the budget bill and in government communications.
Appendix 8: Invitation for Proposals

Invitation for Proposals: Evaluation of Sweden’s Application of Internationally Agreed Principles for Engagement in Fragile States

The Expert Group for Aid Studies (EBA) is a government committee mandated to evaluate and analyse the direction, governance and implementation of Sweden’s official development assistance (ODA). The EBA engages researchers and other experts to carry out studies of relevance for policymakers and practitioners.

The EBA works with ‘dual independence’. This means that the EBA independently defines what issues to explore and which studies to commission, while the author(s) of each report is responsible for the content and the conclusions.

The EBA hereby invites proposals for an evaluation of Sweden’s application of internationally agreed principles for engagement in fragile countries.

Background and motivation for the study

At the 4th High Level forum for Aid Effectiveness in Busan, South Korea 2011, ’the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States’ (the New Deal henceforth) was launched. A prime argument was that 1,5 billion of the poorest people in the world live in fragile situations and that ongoing efforts at reaching the millennium goals largely bypassed these groups. Today, mention is seldom made of the New Deal. However, its core principles still form the basis of more recent initiatives and the initiative remains a reference point in some of Sweden’s steering documents for development cooperation.
In 2011, Partnerships for peace, resilience and functional institutions were seen as key requisites for poverty reduction in fragile situations. This insight has later influenced discussions leading up to the formulation of the sustainable development goal 16 on peaceful and inclusive societies. Another insight was that this is only possible to achieve if the aid effectiveness agenda is implemented and hence cooperation is built on countries own systems and ownership – also in the case of fragile countries.

The New Deal was agreed upon by the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and State-building (IDPS), currently consisting of three separate entities: the g7+ group\(^\text{82}\); the OECD International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF) and the Civil Society Platform for Peacebuilding and State-building (CSPPS).

The New Deal comprises several principles that aim to change donor approaches to investing in conflict prone and fragile situations, and simultaneously build a base for peace- and state building led by national governments. Donors, civil society organizations and governments have jointly agreed on **three sets of principles**:

1. ‘The Peacebuilding and State building Goals’ (PSG)

   The PSG principles aim at i) inclusive politics with particular focus on ii) building and reinforcing security and justice sectors, iii) a stable macroeconomic foundation for societies that iv) enables stable flows of income and v) procurement of basic social services to citizens.

2. ’The FOCUS principles’ that seek to map factors driving fragility, to build joint plans and ensure mutual accountability

\(^{82}\) The g7+ group is a self-selected group of countries in fragile-, conflict- and transitory situations. The group currently comprises 20 member counties: Afghanistan, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Liberia, Papua New Guinea, São Tomé and Príncipe, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Solomon Islands, South Sudan, Timor-Leste, Togo and Yemen. Countries in bold are partner countries in Sweden’s development cooperation.
The FOCUS principles are Fragility assessment; One vision, one plan; Create a compact Use PSG to monitor progress and Support political dialogue and leadership. In other words, these principles provide a political basis for the New Deal.

3. ‘The TRUST principles’ dealing with Aid effectiveness and national capacity building.

The TRUST principles, in turn, deal with Aid Effectiveness: Transparency; Risk-sharing; Use and strengthen country systems; Strengthen capacities; and Timely and predictable aid.

The Swedish government has, in its policy framework for Swedish development cooperation and humanitarian aid (2016/17:60) stated that: “Sweden shall work in accordance with the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States that connect political dialogue and development cooperation” in fragile and conflict-ridden states. The bilateral result strategies for relevant countries either directly (Liberia, DRC) or indirectly and partly (South Sudan, Sudan, Somalia, Mali, Colombia, Afghanistan) refer to the New Deal. Thus, these principles constitute guidance for Swedish development cooperation.

**Implementation of the New Deal**

Implementation and adherence to the New Deal was scrutinized in an international evaluation in 2016. Nine overriding lessons from the first five years were formulated. Overall, the New Deal was assessed to had won increased (albeit insufficient, not least in terms of funding) adherence and influence. Mistakes, due to political insensitivity, were made when launching the initiative. The G77 group within the UN initially criticized the initiative as OECD-driven and even interventionistic in its character. Development interventions linked to institution building, judicial systems and governance were seen as sensitive. The G77 countries feared that such interventions connected to international conflicts and security
issues would risk to open up for foreign interventions. This was clearly not seen to be in the interest of these governments and risked ultimately to threaten national sovereignty.

However, with time the New Deal has come to be integrated in international normative processes, primarily in the SDG 16 aiming at peaceful and inclusive societies where rule of law prevails, and citizens have access to justice.

In April 2016, the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and State-building (IDPS) agreed on the ‘Stockholm Declaration’ entitled ‘Addressing Fragility and Building Peace in a Changing World’. This declaration was a means to renew the adherence to the New Deal principles – the PSG, FOCUS and TRUST. Furthermore, it was agreed that the parties shall i) address root causes behind fragile situations, conflict and violence; ii) contribute to fulfilling the Agenda 2030 by applying the New Deal principles; iii) use development cooperation more innovatively; iv) promote stronger and wider partnerships.

However, 2016 also became a year with the highest number of countries experiencing violent conflicts in nearly 30 years, accompanied by high numbers of battle-related deaths. Gradually, the general character of violent conflicts has also transformed, with operations increasingly taking place outside of state-based frameworks. As a reaction, the UN and the World Bank conducted a joint study and initiative on ‘Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict’ entitled ‘Pathways for Peace’. A main message from this study and initiative is that more efforts and resources ought to be placed on prevention, as compared to general practice. The eight main messages for prevention that the study promotes basically follow the logic of the PSG and the FOCUS principles and hence great similarities are displayed between the two approaches. ‘Pathways for Peace’ further reinforces the need for cooperation and convergence between diplomatic, security and development instruments. In the ‘Pathways for Peace’, clear reference is made to the New Deal, and the aid effectiveness component is discussed in
some detail. Based on experiences of highly fragmented, volatile, and at times even conflict augmenting, modes of aid delivery the role of aid is qualified (see below) and a do-no-harm principle is called for.

Against this backdrop, ‘Pathways for Peace’ concludes that country level contexts are decisive. Unevenly distributed aid can potentially reinforce grievances along identity lines; delivery mechanisms (budget support or project aid) can have opposite effects in different contexts; and aid may replace local capacity and undermine national government legitimacy and reinforce market distortions. Furthermore, most aid is delivered in post-crisis situations and not before violence takes hold. To deal with such potentially negative impacts the do-no-harm-principle calls upon donors to

‘…identify issues, elements or factors that divide societies as well as local capacity for peace that brings societies together. It also requires donors to consider what aid will do for whom, who are the responsible actors and stakeholders, and who has access to aid.’

With the inclusion of such qualifications regarding the role of development cooperation, the New Deal continues to be a reference point for development cooperation interventions in fragile situations due to its integration into wider international normative initiatives. However, to what extent are the constituting principles of the New Deal practiced in Sweden’s development cooperation with fragile states?

The key development problem to solve is how to support socio-economic inclusive and sustainable development in fragile countries. The extent of Swedish ODA allocated to such endeavors is shown in the following table.
The aim of this evaluation is twofold:

(i) To gain an in-depth understanding of Sweden’s application of the principles constituting the ‘New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States’ and the do-no-harm principle.

(ii) To generate lessons to inform future application of principles as guidance for development cooperation interventions.

The EBA expects the evaluation to deepen the knowledge and understanding of how adherence to, and application of, internationally agreed principles contribute to effective development cooperation interventions in fragile states and situations, and to highlight lessons learned that may inform current and future Swedish development cooperation adherence to, and application of, internationally agreed principles in such states and situations.
Three evaluation questions (with sub-questions in italics below) shall guide the evaluation:

1. To what extent has Sweden in its development cooperation applied the principles that constitute the ‘New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States’ and the do-no-harm principle? What have been enabling as well as hindering factors or processes for doing this? What have been observable changes in Swedish development cooperation that could be attributed to the implementation of the ‘New Deal’?

2. To what extent has coordination and cooperation with Swedish actors outside of the development cooperation sphere changed as a result of the implementation of the ‘New Deal’ principles? More specifically: how has coordination and cooperation between development interventions and the political dialogue evolved as a result of implementation of the ‘New Deal’?

3. What lessons can inform Swedish development cooperation based on internationally agreed principles?

The evaluation is expected to put Sweden’s contributions in a wider context of development cooperation guided by internationally agreed principles. The team will choose the period of study and delimitations in terms of countries to study. It is not required to study all fragile states where Sweden pursues development cooperation, however a comparative perspective is suggested.

The main objective of the evaluation is to provide grounded and elaborate responses to the questions above. However, tenderers are, within methodological limits set below, encouraged to let their expertise guide the choice of approach in answering the evaluation questions (including design of the analytical framework, methodological approach and delimitations). We hope that this open approach will be attractive and stimulate innovation in submitted proposals.
Intended users

Primarily intended users of this evaluation are staff responsible for Swedish development cooperation and other engagement with fragile states at the Swedish MFA, at Sida and at the Swedish Embassies in such countries. Secondary target groups include people working with development cooperation in general, Swedish media and the general public in Sweden and fragile states.

General structure and conditions

The suggested method to apply is the ‘Principles-Focused’ method developed by Michael Quinn Patton. However, within this framework, authors are given an open mandate regarding implementation, focus and design of the evaluation with the aim to let their expertise as much as possible guide the choice of approach in answering the evaluation questions.

The proposal shall include a detailed analytical framework for the study proposed. While the evaluation concerns Swedish support to fragile states during the period after the implementation of the New Deal up until the present, it is up to the authors to choose study design and delimitations. Choices should be justified.

The proposal shall be written in English.

Potentially important sources of information are written sources from the MFA, Sida and partner organizations, evaluations, mid-term reviews, final reports, previous research etc. While there is no requirement for the main applicant to understand Swedish, the evaluation team should include someone with the ability to analyse documents written in Swedish.

The EBA works under what is termed “double independence”. This means that the EBA defines which questions and areas are to be studied, independently of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. At the same time, analysis, conclusions and recommendations in each study are the responsibility of the author(s).
For all studies, the EBA sets up a reference group consisting of experts in the field of study (members are designated by the EBA in dialogue with the authors). The overall purpose of the reference group is to strengthen the quality of the report. The group will be chaired by one of the EBA members.

The evaluator(s) shall deliver a report (in English) presenting the results from the study to be published in the EBA report series (www.eba.se/en/published-reports/). The length of the report should not exceed 40,000 words (about 80 A4-pages) (www.eba.se/en/published-reports/).

The evaluator(s) shall present preliminary results at a pre-launch meeting with the MFA, Sida and the EBA, and present the final report at a public dissemination event (details to be specified in consultation with the EBA at a later stage).

**Procurement procedure, budget and timetable**

The maximum cost for this evaluation is SEK 1,400,000 excl. VAT. The budget shall be denominated in SEK. Since the procurement is under the EU threshold value, applicable law is Chapter 19 of the Swedish Public Procurement Act (2016:1145). The procedure will be a two-stage selective procedure with possible negotiation.

**First stage: Application to submit tenders**

All suppliers have the right to apply to submit tenders (expression of interest). The EBA will invite three (3) suppliers to submit tenders and may negotiate with one or more tenderers.

Selection of applicants to invite to submit tenders will be based on the team leader’s CV and proven prior expertise in conducting similar evaluations and studies.

Applications to submit tenders shall be registered at the tender portal Kommers Annons eLite www.kommersannons.se/elite, no later than 14 April 2020. The application should contain:
1. CV of the team leader/principal investigator
2. Preliminary team
3. A list of relevant evaluations and studies (including company references)
4. At most three sample evaluations or studies carried out by members of the proposed team

 Suppliers must submit a self-declaration in the form of a European Single Procurement Document (ESPD) by filling in the tender form at www.kommersannons.se/elite. Please make sure enough time is allocated for completing the ESPD form when submitting the expression of interest.

Second stage: Submission of tenders

The proposal shall be no longer than 15 pages, including a presentation of the members of the evaluation team, detailed schedule, allocation of time and tasks between the members of the group and budget (stated in SEK).

CVs and at most three sample evaluations or studies carried out by members of the proposed team (may be the same or different from the application to submit tenders) shall be appended.

At least one person in the evaluation team must speak and read Swedish.

The budget shall enable two to four meetings with the study’s reference group (to be appointed by the EBA following dialogue with the authors), a workshop in Stockholm and participation at the launching event. The reference group will meet in Stockholm, but one or two meetings may be conducted by video link. The following timetable should be considered.

Tenderers shall give an account of all potential conflicts of interest pertaining to members in the evaluation team, as this may be a ground for excluding tenders.
The proposal shall be registered at the tender portal Kommers Annons eLite www.kommersannons.se/elite, no later than 20 May 2020. Tenderers are advised to monitor the tender portal regularly, as it is not possible to guarantee the receipt of e-mails.

Proposals shall be valid until 30 August 2020.

During the procurement process, the EBA is not permitted to discuss documentation, tenders, evaluation or any such questions with tenderers in a way that benefits one or more tenderers.

Questions shall be sent, by 11 May 2020, to the Questions and Answers function (“Frågor och svar”) on the procurement portal Kommers Annons eLite, www.kommersannons.se/elite. Questions and answers to questions are published anonymously and simultaneously to everyone registered for the procurement.

**Table A11: Timetable**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Date/Time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Invitation to apply to submit tenders</td>
<td>25 March - 15 April 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Invitation to (3) suppliers to submit tenders</td>
<td>17 April 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Last day to submit tender</td>
<td>20 May 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Possible Negotiation</td>
<td>25–29 May 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision by the EBA</td>
<td>10 June 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standstill period (10 days)</td>
<td>June 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contract signed</td>
<td>June/July 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presentation of preliminary findings</td>
<td>Specified at a later stage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Final report delivered (the latest date possible to suggest in proposal)</td>
<td>30 April 2021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Launching event</td>
<td>Q2 2021</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Selection of proposals in the second stage

An assessment group comprising members of the Expert Group and the secretariat will assess proposals received based on the relationship between price and quality. The following criteria will be used when assessing proposals received:

1. Quality of proposal, in terms of design, methods and plan for implementation (weight: 60 per cent).

2. Experiences and qualifications of team members in the areas of 1a) Principle-based evaluation and advanced studies of development assistance; 1b) Fragile state development including security and justice sectors; 1c) Development cooperation interaction with political dialogue; 2) Quality of previous evaluations/studies conducted by team members (based on studies attached to the proposal); 3) Academic merits of the team members (weight: 25 per cent).

3. Cost (weight: 15 per cent).

See the table at the end of this document for the factors that will be considered under each of these three criteria. The assessment of each proposal will be based on the material submitted by the tenderer by the end of the bidding period. Negotiation may take place, but the EBA reserves the right to award the contract based on an original tender.

Confidentiality

After the communication of the EBA’s selection, all submitted proposals will become official documents, meaning that the Swedish principle of public access to official records applies.

Sentences, sections or paragraphs in a document may be masked in the public version if “good reasons” (thorough motivations in terms of causing economic damage to the company) can be provided and deemed valid. The tenderers are fully responsible for making their claims of confidentiality.
About the Expert Group for Aid Studies (EBA)

The Expert Group for Aid Studies (EBA) is a government committee mandated to evaluate and analyse the direction, governance and implementation of Sweden’s official development assistance with a specific focus on results and efficiency. The aim is to contribute to an efficient implementation of well-designed aid. The EBA focuses primarily on overarching issues within Swedish development assistance, not on individual projects. The EBA consists of an expert group of ten members, and a secretariat placed in Stockholm.

In 2020 the Expert Group consists of: Helena Lindholm (chair), Johan Schaar (vice chair), Kim Forss, Torgny Holmgren, Sara Johansson De Silva, Staffan I. Lindberg, Magnus Lindell, Joakim Molander, Julia Schalk, Janet Vähämäki and Anders Trojenborg (adjunct expert from the Swedish MFA).
Previous EBA reports


2021:05 *Supporting Elections Effectively: Principles and Practice of Electoral Assistance*, Therese Pearce Laanela, Sead Alihodžić, Antonio Spinelli, Peter Wolf


2021:03 *Credible Explanations of Development Outcomes: Improving Quality and Rigour with Bayesian Theory-Based Evaluation*, Barbara Befani

2021:02 *Målbild och mekanism: Vad säger utvärderingar om svenska biståndsinsatsers måluppfyllelse?*, Markus Burman


2020:06 *Sextortion: Corruption and Gender-Based Violence*, Åsa Eldén, Dolores Calvo, Elin Bjarnégård, Silje Lundgren and Sofia Jonsson

2020:05 *In Proper Organization we Trust – Trust in Interorganizational Aid relations*, Susanna Alexius and Janet Vähamäki
2020:04 Institution Building in Practice: An Evaluation of Swedish Central Authorities’ Reform Cooperation in the Western Balkans, Richard Allen, Giorgio Ferrari, Krenar Loshi, Númi Östlund and Dejana Ražić Ilić

2020:03 Biståndets förvaltningskostnader För stora? Eller kanske för små?, Daniel Tarschys


2020:01 Mobilising Private Development Finance: Implications for Overall Aid Allocations, Polly Meeks, Matthew Gouett and Samantha Attridge

2019:09 Democracy in African Governance: Seeing and Doing it Differently, Göran Hydén with assistance from Maria Buch Kristensen

2019:08 Fishing Aid – Mapping and Synthesising Evidence in Support of SDG 14 Fisheries Targets, Gonçalo Carneiro, Raphaëlle Bisiaux, Mary Frances Davidson, Tumi Tómasson with Jonas Bjärnstedt

2019:07 Applying a Masculinities Lens to the Gendered Impacts of Social Safety Nets, Meagan Dooley, Abby Fried, Ruti Levtov, Kate Doyle, Jeni Klugman and Gary Barker

2019:06 Joint Nordic Organisational Assessment of the Nordic Development Fund (NDF), Stephen Spratt, Eilís Lawlor, Kris Prasada Rao and Mira Berger

2019:05 Impact of Civil Society Anti-Discrimination Initiatives: A Rapid Review, Rachel Marcus, Dhruva Mathur and Andrew Shepherd

2019:August Migration and Development: the Role for Development Aid, Robert E.B. Lucas (joint with the Migration Studies Delegation, Delmi, published as Delmi Research overview 2019:5)

2019:04 Building on a Foundation Stone: the Long-Term Impacts of a Local Infrastructure and Governance Program in Cambodia, Ariel BenYishay, Brad Parks, Rachel Trichler, Christian Baehr, Daniel Aboagye and Punwath Prum
2019:03 *Supporting State Building for Democratisation? A Study of 20 years of Swedish Democracy Aid to Cambodia*, Henny Andersen, Karl-Anders Larsson och Joakim Öjendal

2019:02 *Fit for Fragility? An Exploration of Risk Stakeholders and Systems Inside Sida*, Nilima Gulrajani and Linnea Mills

2019:01 *Skandaler, opinioner och anseende: Biståndet i ett medialiserat samhälle*, Maria Grafström och Karolina Windell


2018:09 *Underfunded Appeals: Understanding the Consequences, Improving the System*, Sophia Swithern


2018:07 *Putting Priority into Practice: Sida’s Implementation of its Plan for Gender Integration*, Elin Bjarnegård, Fredrik Uggla

2018:06 *Swedish Aid in the Era of Shrinking Space – the Case of Turkey*, Åsa Eldén, Paul T. Levin

2018:05 *Who Makes the Decision on Swedish Aid Funding? An Overview*, Expertgruppen för Biståndsanalys

2018:04 *Budget Support, Poverty and Corruption: A Review of the Evidence*, Geske Dijkstra

2018:03 *How predictable is Swedish aid? A study of exchange rate volatility*, Númi Östlund

2018:02 *Building Bridges Between International Humanitarian and Development Responses to Forced Migration*, Alexander Kocks, Ruben Wedel, Hanne Roggemann, Helge Roxin (joint with the German Institute for Development Evaluation, DEval)
2018:01 DFIs and Development Impact: an evaluation of Swedfund, Stephen Spratt, Peter O’Flynn, Justin Flynn

2017:12 Livslängd och livskraft: Vad säger utvärderingar om svenska biståndsinatsers hållbarhet?, Expertgruppen för biståndsanalys


2017:10 Seven Steps to Evidence-Based Anticorruption: A Roadmap, Alina Mungiu-Pippidi

2017:09 Geospatial analysis of aid: A new approach to aid evaluation, Ann-Sofie Isaksson

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2017:07 Research Aid Revisited – a historically grounded analysis of future prospects and policy options, David Nilsson, Sverker Sörlin

2017:06 Confronting the Contradiction – An exploration into the dual purpose of accountability and learning in aid evaluation, Hilde Reinertsen, Kristian Bjørkdahl, Desmond McNeill

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2016:08, *Sustaining a development policy: results and responsibility for the Swedish policy for global development*, Måns Fellesson, Lisa Román

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2016:06 *Vem beslutar om svenska bistärdsmedel? En översikt*, Expertgruppen för bistärdsmalys

2016:05 *Pathways to change: Evaluating development interventions with Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA)*, Barbara Befani


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2015:05 Has Sweden injected realism into public financial management reforms in partner countries?, Matt Andrews

2015:04 Youth, entrepreneurship and development, Kjetil Bjorvatn

2015:03 Concentration difficulties? An analysis of Swedish aid proliferation, Rune Jansen Hagen

2015:02 Utvärdering av svenskt bistånd – en kartläggning, Expertgruppen för biståndsanalys

2015:01 Rethinking Civil Society and Support for Democracy, Richard Youngs

2014:05 Svenskt statligt internationellt bistånd i Sverige: en översikt, Expertgruppen för biståndsanalys

2014:04 The African Development Bank: ready to face the challenges of a changing Africa?, Christopher Humphrey

2014:03 International party assistance – what do we know about the effects?, Lars Svåsand

2014:02 Sweden’s development assistance for health – policy options to support the global health 2035 goals, Gavin Yamey, Helen Saxenian, Robert Hecht, Jesper Sundewall and Dean Jamison

2014:01 Randomized controlled trials: strengths, weaknesses and policy relevance, Anders Olofsgård
Agreed at the Busan meeting, in 2011, South Korea, the ‘New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States’ lay out principles for how donors, development agencies, security forces and governments ought to cooperate and act to rebuild states and promote peace. This study investigates how Sweden has adopted and applied these and related principles ever since.