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**LIKE-MINDED IN PRINCIPLE OR IN PRACTICE?  
PRIORITIES AND ALLOCATIONS IN EU  
MEMBER STATES' FOREIGN AID**

Olof Karlsson, Jonas Tallberg





# Like-minded in Principle or in Practice? Priorities and Allocations in EU Member States' Foreign Aid

Olof Karlsson och Jonas Tallberg

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**Olof Karlsson**, MA in Political Science, Stockholm University

**Jonas Tallberg**, Professor of Political Science, Stockholm University.

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## Foreword by EBA

The sphere of international aid development is in many ways defined by the number of different actors and how they collaborate, interact and partner in different forums. Donor and partner countries as well as multilateral and local actors form different relationships in different contexts to further their respective development agendas. Sweden has long been an active voice in many of these instances, pursuing an ambitious development agenda, often in close collaboration with other EU member countries.

Together, the EU institutions and the 27 member states constitute the by far largest provider of Official Development Assistance (ODA) in the world. Several member countries have been important donor countries for a long time, while many are emerging. Understanding the development policy of our fellow member states, as well as that of the EU institutions, is thus an important step in identifying potential future partnerships in international development.

In this working paper the authors, Olof Karlsson and Jonas Tallberg, present a mapping of the development policies of all EU member states. The “development policy profiles” are complemented with data on allocation of ODA, and patterns and alignment of development policies and allocation are discussed. As a final exercise, they relate member states’ profiles to Sweden to identify “like minded” states in development cooperation.

It is our hope that this this working paper will be of use not only to us here at the EBA, but also to colleagues at Sida and the MFA who are interested in the development policies of our fellow EU member states.

EBA working papers are shorter studies that investigate a question of limited scope or that complements a regular EBA study. Working papers are not subject to a formal decision from the expert group but instead reviewed by the secretariat before publication. The authors are, as with other EBA publications, responsible for the content of the report and its conclusions.

Stockholm, May 2021

Jan Pettersson, Managing Director

## Executive summary

The purpose of this report is to map and compare the policy priorities of the EU27 in the field of development co-operation. The report puts a particular emphasis on identifying EU member states (MS) with development profiles that are similar or dissimilar to Sweden's. The data and material used throughout the report include (a) relevant policy documents of the respective member states, and (b) Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) data on the allocation of Official Development Assistance (ODA). More specifically, the report draws primarily on the OECD Creditor Reporting System<sup>1</sup> (CRS), as well as the recently launched Development Co-Operation Profiles.<sup>2</sup>

In mapping and comparing the EU27, a distinction is made between the EU's "small" and "large" donors based on respective ODA/GNI ratios, whereby the top ten are considered "large." Countries exhibiting the most pronounced similarities with Sweden are found almost exclusively among the latter, and include the Netherlands, Finland, Denmark, Ireland, Belgium, as well as Italy just outside of the top ten. These like-minded member states are united through, inter alia, high levels of ODA, a strong focus on Africa and Least Developed Countries (LDCs), as well as a high level of financial commitment to both gender and climate/environment goals. The "small" donors are made up primarily of Central Eastern European Countries (CEECs). Given their primary focus on recipients within the Eastern Partnership and overall low ODA levels, the overlaps with the Swedish profile are generally limited.

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<sup>1</sup> OECD Creditor Reporting System: <https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=CRS1>

<sup>2</sup> OECD Development Co-Operation Profiles:

<https://www.oecd.org/development/development-co-operation-profiles-2dcf1367-en.htm>

## **Abbreviations**

CEECs	Central Eastern European Countries
CRS	(OECD) Creditor Reporting System
EDF	European Development Fund
EIB	European Investment Bank
GNI	Gross National Income
LDCs	Least Developed Countries
MS	(EU) Member States
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OECD-DAC	(OECD) Development Assistance Committee
RDBs	Regional Development Banks
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
UN	United Nations

# 1 Introduction

Development policy is an area of “shared competence” between Brussels and the member states. While the European Union (EU), under the leadership of the Commission, engages in substantial development co-operation, the member states retain the ability (and are required) to pursue national programs as well (Bodenstein et al., 2017, p. 443; Furness et al., 2020, p. 91). Together, the EU institutions and the 27 member states constitute the by far largest provider of Official Development Assistance (ODA) in the world (European Commission, 2020). At the same time, the differences between member states are considerable, both in terms of national policy, and preferences regarding common action at the EU level.

## 1.1 Purpose

The primary aim of this report is to map the national policy priorities of the EU27 in the field of development co-operation. The report does this by engaging both with the member states’ self-proclaimed priorities and ambitions, as well as data on the actual allocation of funds. This material provides a broad overview of EU27 development efforts. In addition, the report pursues the related goal of identifying member states that resemble Sweden in their general profile and in terms of level of ambition.

## 1.2 Structure of the report

The report consists of four parts, as well as three appendixes. The rest of this first section describes the policy context for this report as well as notes on data, methodology and previous research. Section 2 discusses the priorities and ambitions of the EU27 as conveyed in national policy documents. Section 3 introduces the OECD allocation data and provides an overview of the member states’ ODA levels, sectoral and geographic priorities, as well as performance in relation to key policy issues. Section 4 departs from Swedish priorities and discusses similarities/dissimilarities with other EU donors and summarizes the main findings.

The report is accompanied by an appendix that offers two-page “development policy profiles” of all member states, as well as of the EU institutions (Appendix C). These profiles constitute a key part of the report and serve as a backdrop for the core analysis of the report. Moreover, Appendix A contains comprehensive background material on the EU27 allocation patterns discussed in Section 3. Appendix B provides an overview of other relevant EU donors in Sweden’s top recipient countries.

### **1.3 Policy context**

The development policies of the EU and its member states are embedded in a web of international agreements and frameworks. Some of these are of particular importance to this report. At the global level, the United Nations (UN) 2030 Agenda, with its 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), constitutes the most important frame of reference. This agenda ties together “traditional” development goals with broader issues such as social and environmental sustainability and is of major importance to donor activity world-wide. Other important norms guiding donor behavior include the general target for rich countries to provide 0.7 percent of their Gross National Income (GNI) as ODA.

Next to the UN, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is one of the most influential organizations and acts as a hub for data gathering and facilitation of international co-operation in this policy field. For example, the OECD coordinated the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, which aims at harmonizing policies and reducing unnecessary duplications among donors. The OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) is an important forum housing most of the world’s largest donors, including many EU member states. The OECD-DAC reviews both international and national development efforts and strives to, among other things, increase impact, transparency, and effectiveness of development co-operation (OECD, 2020).

At the European level, the most central document is the 2017 European Consensus on Development.<sup>3</sup> Anchored in the 2030 Agenda, this agreement articulates common focal points, priorities, and perspectives. While the member states are free to pursue independent policies, a common set of norms, guidelines and recommendations (“soft law instruments”) should inform the way they conduct development co-operation (Lightfoot & Szent-Iványi, 2014, p. 1263; Szent-Iványi & Kugiel, 2020, p. 124). Important principles laid down in the Consensus and other relevant legal and political frameworks include gender equality, democracy, human rights, the rule of law, as well as a commitment to policy cohesion and increasing effectiveness. Moreover, member states have in paragraph 103 of the new European consensus reaffirmed their commitment to a collective ODA/GNI-ratio of 0.7, with the aim of reaching this level by 2030. For member states that joined since 2004, the individual target is set at 0.33 percent. Success in reaching the collective 0.7 target hinges on some, preferably large, member states significantly overperforming. As part of their national commitments, the member states finance EU-level development efforts through the development share of the EU budget, and by contributing to, for instance, the European Development Fund (EDF), the European Investment Bank (EIB) as well as other instruments such as EU Trust Funds.<sup>4</sup>

Sweden has a long history of ambitious development co-operation. Its development policy is characterized by consistently high levels of ODA (evidenced by a unilateral commitment to a 1 percent ODA/GNI ratio), a strong focus on Least Developed Countries (LDCs), a firm engagement with the multilateral system, and an explicit emphasis on issues such as good governance, gender equality, and democracy. In 2018, no other EU member state had a higher ODA/GNI ratio, and Sweden is often praised for its development efforts (OECD, 2019).

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<sup>3</sup> European Union (2017), *The New European Consensus on Development: ‘Our World, our Dignity, our Future’*, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A42017Y0630%2801%29>

<sup>4</sup> With the 2021-2027 Multiannual Financial Framework, the EDF has been integrated into the EU budget.

## 1.4 Operationalization and data

This report primarily draws on two different sources in mapping member state priorities: official policy frameworks and OECD data on the allocation of ODA across a wide set of areas and issues.

The sectoral priorities are discussed against the background of four OECD categories (“sectors”): “social infrastructure and services,” “economic infrastructure and services,” “production,” and “multi-sector.” Each sector consists of several sub-sectors, which are also incorporated into the analysis where appropriate. In addition, unit-level data from the CRS database offers even more fine-grained information regarding specific expenditure areas. Different kinds of development efforts falling outside of these sectors (non-sector-allocable ODA) are also considered. Although not a perfect proxy for thematic priorities, the distribution of funds across categories allows for an evaluation of similarities and dissimilarities in how member states decide to focus their aid. The geographic priorities are discussed in relation to several different factors, such as regional focus, degree of concentration (measured through the share going to the top-ten recipients), and attention paid to LDCs. Furthermore, the report evaluates member states’ commitment to gender and environment/climate ambitions. While the OECD data are comprehensive and can be disaggregated in various useful ways, the national policy frameworks exhibit some limitations (see Section 2). Nonetheless, both sources contribute in important ways to the overall picture and the general purpose of the report.

## 1.5 Methodological notes

All OECD data concern 2018, which is the most recent year for which there is complete data across all areas. When referring to ODA, we rely on the OECD-DAC definition.<sup>5</sup> Section 3 introduces allocation data for three different channels of ODA: core multilateral, earmarked multilateral (“multi-bi”), and strictly bilateral, thereby following the division used in the OECD Co-operation Profiles. For the most part, however, we refer

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<sup>5</sup> OECD DAC: <https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-standards/official-development-assistance.htm>

to the combination of the latter two. This excludes core contributions to the multilateral system over which member states have only limited or no direct influence once disbursed. Moreover, the report refers to two different ODA flow types: commitments and (gross) disbursements. We follow the structure of the OECD Co-Operation Profiles and use commitments as far as ODA across sectors is concerned, otherwise referring to gross disbursements. The data are primarily retrieved from the OECD CRS database and are organized around the DAC 5 purpose codes, as well as CRS-specific codes for individual activities. These codes relate to and let us distinguish between different sectors, sub-sectors, and specific aid activities. The report focuses on relative rather than absolute figures. Lastly, it should be noted that the statistics presented in the analysis are not always identical with those in the country profiles in Appendix C, since the figures vary slightly depending on what data are included/excluded in the underlying calculations. In the country profiles we strive for comprehensiveness, whereas the analysis tends to focus more on the comparison of specific aspects, at times using only certain subsets of the data material.

## **1.6 Previous research**

Previous research proposes several different classifications of EU donor countries. A distinction commonly made is that between the EU's most ambitious donors, and its new or emerging donors.

The Nordic countries have historically been viewed as “generous donors, driven by solidarity, altruism, moral and humanitarian concerns, rather than material interests” (Elgström & Delputte, 2016, p. 30). Given their longstanding tradition of expansive development policy, these countries have been considered both “frontrunners” (Delputte et al., 2016, p. 79) and representatives of a “Nordic exceptionalism” (Elgström & Delputte, 2016). However, the literature also notes that other progressive member states are moving in the same direction. This has led to new groupings or classifications such as the “Nordic plus” or the “like-minded,” including also Ireland and the Netherlands (Elgström & Delputte, 2016, p. 31; Saltnes, 2019, p. 537; Selbervik & Nygaard, 2006, pp. 2–3). Furthermore, countries such as France and Germany have on some issues shown significant overlaps with these member states, leading to the notion of a



“Nordic plus plus” constellation in some contexts (Elgström & Delputte, 2016, p. 34). Due both to high ambitions and large actual contributions, these members are viewed as wielding substantial influence at the European level.

In addition, the Central Eastern European Countries (CEECs) are attracting significant attention in the literature. In contrast to the group of ambitious donors described above, most of the EU’s new members had little or no historic experience of development co-operation before implementing such programs in connection with their accession to the EU (Szent-Iványi & Tétényi, 2013, p. 821). At a general level, these countries stand out through a strong emphasis on recipients in their vicinity, low levels of engagement with the poorest regions, and their insistence on drawing upon their own transitional experience as a comparative advantage (Horký, 2012; Lightfoot & Szent-Iványi, 2014; Szent-Iványi, 2012). In the literature, the CEECs have been described as “reluctant donors” that have undergone “shallow” or only very limited Europeanization (Horký, 2012; Lightfoot & Szent-Iványi, 2014, p. 1269). It has been argued that they pay lip-service to EU norms and guidelines (Szent-Iványi & Kugiel, 2020, p. 128), having simply learned to “talk the talk” (Szent-Iványi & Tétényi, 2013, p. 830) of Brussels. Moreover, their perspectives on development policy are strongly influenced by overarching foreign policy goals and geopolitical considerations (Andrespok & Kasekamp, 2012; Szent-Iványi & Tétényi, 2013). The salience of development policy as a stand-alone policy area has been low (Horký, 2012, p. 68; Szent-Iványi & Kugiel, 2020, p. 125) and it can be questioned to what degree these countries would engage in development co-operation, were it not for their European obligations.

The two abovementioned groups do not cover all member states, and it has been pointed out that some countries, such as Austria, are harder to place than others and have been called “fence-sitters” (Saltnes, 2019, p. 537). Furthermore, it is possible to make additional distinctions based on other determinants (See Baydag et al., 2018). Nonetheless, these studies suggest an important divide in the EU27. This report contributes to the existing body of literature by offering a comprehensive and systematic review of all member states, using the most recent data available. Furthermore, the emphasis on Swedish priorities as an analytical focal point provides a novel angle.

## 2 Ambitions and priorities

To provide structure and coherence to development efforts, all EU donors base their engagements on some kind of policy framework. The formats of such frameworks vary and can, for instance, include legal texts, budgetary documents, or other forms of strategy papers. In general, the purpose of these documents is to flesh out national priorities across areas and issues, while also anchoring policy at the global/European level.

Policy documents available online and in English have been analyzed, compared, and contrasted. The following section deals with this corpus and highlights three key findings. It is worth noting that these three points illustrate, to some degree, the difficulty in drawing far-reaching conclusions from an independent reading of stated policy ambitions. The main takeaway is that a full picture can emerge only by combining stated policy ambitions with the actual allocation of funds. This is done later in the report.

*Finding 1: The EU27 policy frameworks share a common foundation*

While the respective policy frameworks of the EU27 differ in terms of format, scope, and level of detail, it is strikingly clear that they share a common basis. All member states refer to the UN 2030 Agenda and the SDGs, and most of them also explicitly anchor policy documents in agreements at the European level, in particular the new European Consensus on Development. The alignment with international agreements means that the policy documents of the EU27 – despite differences in terms of style, detail, and form – are quite homogenous in content. The stated overarching aims and ambitions are virtually the same (e.g., reduction/eradication of poverty; climate protection), with only slight differences in nuance, as are the guiding principles and values (e.g., respect for human rights; gender equality). This homogeneity could reflect the success of international policy frameworks in shaping the policy priorities of states, or strategic adaptation on the part of the latter to appear in conformance with such international expectations. As noted in the literature, different forms of strategic adaptation seem to be particularly pronounced among the CEECs (See Szent-Ivanyi & Kugiel, 2020, p. 128; Szent-Iványi & Tétényi, 2013, p. 830). One important consequence of this

tendency is that it is hard to identify genuine similarities and differences between member states without also examining budget allocations.

*Finding 2: The scope of stated priorities is in many cases considerable*

In general, the policy documents exhibit a considerable scope in terms of thematic and geographic priorities. To be sure, there are notable and expected differences between large and small donor countries, with the latter usually stating a smaller number of priority areas. Nonetheless, the scope remains large for many member states. Taking Sweden as an example, it can be noted that no less than five cross-cutting perspectives, eight thematic priority areas, and over thirty geographic strategies form the basis for its development co-operation. It may be argued that Sweden has the capacity to match these objectives to a reasonable extent, given its ambitious foreign aid budget.<sup>6</sup> However, many small donors present extensive lists of priority areas as well, although the underlying ODA volumes are much more limited. In many cases, it is therefore questionable to what extent the stated scope is reflected in the actual distribution of funds. The same pattern appears with regard to thematic or sectoral priority areas: in many cases, these priority areas are so broad and numerous that it is hard to differentiate the member states from one another. Priorities like democracy promotion, human rights protection, or the strengthening of the rule of law are shared by a majority of the member states.

*Finding 3: The clearest differences between member state policies relate to geographic focus*

Despite the overall homogeneity, the documents present some interesting patterns. One of the strongest is the focus on recipients in Eastern Europe and Central Asia among the CEECs. All eastern member states that have joined the EU since 2004 in one way or another emphasize their commitment to development efforts along the EU's borders and within the Eastern Partnership. Despite some internal differences, this regional focus of the CEECs constitutes a distinctive feature of the CEECs and is well documented in the literature (Horký, 2012, p. 63; Szent-Iványi, 2012, pp. 74–75). In large part the CEECs justify this geographic focus with

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<sup>6</sup> It shall be noted that Sweden's large scope is viewed critically by the OECD-DAC and was raised as one of the main points of criticism in the 2019 peer review (OECD, 2019).

reference to their “comparative advantages” in the region. Although in principle encouraged at the European level, this practice has caused some irritation among some of the other member states, which view it as a way to, for instance, evade a stronger focus on other regions or LDCs (Lightfoot & Szent-Iványi, 2014, p. 1265). At the same time, it is only natural that small donors are more limited in their reach than established donors. Moreover, it is interesting to note that donors with a history of colonialism tend to – more or less explicitly – highlight former territories as focus regions, perhaps most clearly so in the case of Portugal. Among some of the larger donors the approach is different, with a stronger focus on LDCs, fragile states or simply reaching those “furthest behind first.”

## **2.1 Section summary**

The policy documents outline the gist of the respective countries’ development efforts. Most include geographic and thematic priorities, as well as cross-cutting perspectives. A comparative analysis reveals a striking homogeneity between member states, as a result of shared agreements at the global and European level. Furthermore, the policy frameworks generally lack clear differentiations among priorities, leading to broad scopes that are – in many cases – unlikely to be backed by sufficient funds. Lastly, the analysis shows that the differences between member states are most visible where geographic priorities are concerned, with the CEECs focusing primarily on Eastern Europe/Central Asia, whereas many large donors emphasize LDCs and otherwise fragile regions. Actual priorities cannot be deduced from a reading of these documents alone. Rather, it is necessary to also consider data on budget allocations to identify EU member states’ foreign aid profiles.

## 3 Comparative country analysis

This section introduces OECD budget allocation data and consists of four sub-sections. First, the general profiles of the EU27 are presented against the background of data on both absolute and relative ODA levels, the distribution of ODA across channels, as well as preferred multilateral arrangements. This first sub-section introduces the distinction between “large” and “small” donors referred to throughout the report. Second, development efforts are disaggregated by sector and sub-sector to highlight respective priority areas. Third, the geographic profiles are addressed by focusing on three key aspects: regional focus, geographic spread, and the share of bilateral ODA allocated to LDCs. Fourth, the member states are compared in their commitment to gender equality and environment/climate protection, using OECD policy markers. The last part summarizes the findings and offers some concluding remarks.

### 3.1 ODA of the EU27: levels and distribution

#### 3.1.1 Absolute ODA volumes

The ODA levels of the 27 EU donors differ significantly. Unsurprisingly, absolute ODA volumes mirror the member states’ size and economic strength to a high degree. The largest single donor is Germany, followed by France, Sweden, the Netherlands, and Italy. Worth stressing, however, is the immense gap between the volumes of the EU’s big donors and the large group of member states capable (or willing) of providing only a fraction of these. In 2018, the five abovementioned donors accounted for no less than 79 percent of the EU member states’ combined ODA. At the same time, the bottom fifteen - concentrated in the EU’s eastern and southern regions – accounted for just four percent. Considering bilateral and “multi-bi” ODA only, the number is even lower with the bottom fifteen states accounting for less than two percent of the EU27 total (Table 1).

**Table 1: EU27 Gross bilateral ODA volumes, running total.**

Country	Gross Bilateral ODA, USD millions	Running total	Running total %
Germany	22 425	22 425	45,7%
France	95 43	31 968	65,1%
Sweden	3 953	35 921	73,2%
Netherlands	3 833	39 754	81,0%
Italy	2 248	42 002	85,5%
Denmark	1 853	43 855	89,3%
Belgium	1 351	45 206	92,1%
Spain	1 095	46 301	94,3%
Ireland	530	46 832	95,4%
Finland	494	47 326	96,4%
Austria	492	47 818	97,4%
Luxembourg	352	48 170	98,1%
Poland	265	48 434	98,6%
Portugal	188	48 622	99,0%
Hungary	129	48 751	99,3%
Czechia	100	48 851	99,5%
Romania	59	48 910	99,6%
Greece	39	48 949	99,7%
Slovakia	32	48 981	99,8%
Slovenia	29	49 011	99,8%
Estonia	22	49 032	99,9%
Malta	21	49 053	99,9%
Croatia	17	49 070	99,9%
Lithuania	12	49 082	100,0%
Bulgaria	10	49 091	100,0%
Latvia	5	49 096	100,0%
Cyprus	3	49 100	100,0%

Source: Own compilation. Data: OECD Creditor Reporting System (CRS). Note: The column 'Running total' presents the cumulative sum of volumes from largest to smallest.


### 3.1.2 Relative ODA levels

The member states' ODA contributions differ substantially also in relative terms. In 2018, Sweden was at the top of the list with a 1.07 percent ODA/GNI ratio and was thereby one of only three member states to reach the general 0.7 percent target, which has been a point of reference for rich countries since 1970. Among the new member states, Malta and Hungary present the highest ODA levels, at 0.25 percent and 0.21 percent

respectively, while the remainder are below 0.20 percent. At the bottom of the list is Latvia with a 0.10 percent ODA/GNI ratio. Regarding the CEECs, it is interesting to note that not all countries follow the exact same path. While Czechia, Lithuania, and Bulgaria have achieved no or only small increases since 2010, the ODA/GNI ratios have grown considerably for Hungary (0.09 → 0.21), Poland (0.08 → 0.14) and Estonia (0.10 → 0.16).

It remains to be seen how the ODA levels change in the coming years, but currently most member states fall below the agreed upon 0.33/0.7 targets. Still, there are notable differences among the EU27. The ten member states with the highest ratios are here considered “large” donors, whereas those falling below are referred to as “small” donors. Basing the definition on relative rather than absolute ODA levels counterbalances the massive differences in size between the EU member states, but as shown in Figure 1, the member states with the biggest overall volumes are – with some exceptions – also exhibiting the highest ODA/GNI ratios. Naturally, there are internal differences within both camps, but at a general level this distinction serves the purpose of highlighting important patterns.

**Figure 1: EU27 ODA levels as % of GNI**




Source: Own compilation. Data: OECD Development Co-operation Profiles.

### 3.1.3 ODA by channel

There are considerable differences between “small” and “large” donors also in relation to the channels used. One example of this divide is the share of ODA that each country disburses bilaterally. While Germany in 2018 managed 65 percent of its overall ODA in strictly bilateral arrangements, the corresponding figure for Latvia was 9 percent. The EU27 country average was 34 percent, with most of the small donors falling below this share. Besides being a possible expression of national policy preference, this finding also relates to the economies of scale involved – bilateral arrangements are costly and require extensive infrastructure, “favoring” large donors like Germany, France, or the Netherlands. Many small member states instead channel the largest share of overall ODA as core support to multilateral organizations, in part explained by mandatory EU budget contributions (Figure 3). Nonetheless, these allocation patterns have important implications: not only are the overall volumes concentrated to a handful of established donors, but many of the smaller countries direct large shares of their already limited funds to the multilateral system as core support. This means that the ODA that is left for independently set priorities through bilateral channels is, for some donors, negligible.

**Figure 2: EU27 ODA distribution by channel**



Source: Own compilation. Data: OECD Development Co-operation Profiles




### 3.1.4 Multilateral ODA by organization

As noted above, engagement with the multilateral system is for many small donors almost exclusively limited to the EU institutions (Figure 3). Croatia, for instance, directs 95 percent of multilateral ODA to or through the EU framework, leaving minimal shares for other organizations. At the opposite end is Sweden, which – despite being the eighth largest contributor in absolute terms – directs only 13 percent of multilateral ODA to the EU. It shall be noted that Sweden is more of an outlier in this regard than Croatia, with an EU share far below the country average at 65 percent, and also significantly below Luxembourg (21 percent) at second place from the bottom. As mentioned above, this generally strong focus on the EU is in large part a consequence of the mandatory contributions via the membership fee: for many of the smaller EU donors, contributions made through the development share of the EU budget account for a large portion of multilateral ODA.<sup>7</sup> Considering that many of these member states at the same time have only very limited bilateral programs, this means that automatic financing through the EU in practice makes up a significant portion of overall development efforts.

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<sup>7</sup> On average (2018), the development share of the budget accounted for 71 percent of member states' total contributions to and through the EU institutions. Beyond budget contributions, member states allocate funds directly to, for instance, the European Development Fund (EDF) and the European Investment Bank (EIB). Source: OECD Creditor Reporting System.

**Figure 3: EU27 multilateral ODA distribution by organization**



Source: Own compilation. Data: OECD Creditor Reporting System (CRS). Note: Hungary reports no contributions through the EU budget, while Luxembourg reports no contributions through the EDF. These are likely errors in the reported data. Total EU contributions amount to 77 and 21 percent, respectively.

Similar to Figures 1 and 2, Figure 3 shows that the EU27 are clearly divided along the lines of size and overall ODA levels. The countries with an above-average EU share are concentrated to the EU’s geographical east and south and include the smaller donors.

In sum, this sub-section highlights three interconnected patterns.

- First, there are major differences among the EU27 in terms of ODA volumes and ODA shares, with a handful of economically stronger (northern) member states towering at the top.
- Second, the distribution across channels follows the same line of division, with large donors opting for bilateral arrangements to a much higher degree than smaller donors.
- Third, the engagement with the multilateral system and the role of the EU differs strongly between member states. Whereas smaller donors engage almost exclusively with EU institutions (partly due to mandatory membership fees), large donors tend to distribute their contributions more evenly between a broader set of organizations, including the UN system, the World Bank, and major Regional Development Banks (RDBs).

In two of these three respects, Sweden is an outlier. Sweden’s ODA/GNI levels are exceptionally high and in 2018, it outperformed all other member states. Moreover, Sweden’s multilateral profile is uniquely wide in scope, with funds distributed relatively evenly between its major partner organizations. In particular, Sweden’s small EU share sets it apart from other member states, including the other large donor countries.

## 3.2 Sectoral priorities

The following sub-section considers the distribution of bilateral ODA across sectors. One important distinction is between expenses that are counted as sector-allocable ODA and those that are not. The former category includes all commitments assigned to activities within clearly defined sectors/sub-sectors such as “education” or “health.” The latter category is more disparate and consists of miscellaneous commitments that are *not* assigned to such a sector and include, inter alia, administrative costs, humanitarian aid, and perhaps most importantly, costs connected to refugees and asylum-seekers within the donor countries. For some member states these non-sector-allocable types of ODA make up large shares of overall commitments.

### 3.2.1 Distribution of sector-allocable ODA

Sector allocable ODA is made up of the following sectors: (1) “social infrastructure and services,” (2) “economic infrastructure and services,” (3) “production,” and (4) “multi-sector.” The sectors vary in scope, with “social infrastructure and services” covering the largest set of issues. Unsurprisingly, then, it also accounts for the largest shares of sector-allocable ODA. In fact, in 2018, this was the primary sector for all 27 member states, as illustrated by Table 2.

**Table 2: EU27 distribution of bilateral ODA across sectors, country average**

Social infrastructure and services	Economic infrastructure	Production	Multi-sector
72%	8%	8%	11%

Source: Own compilation. Data: OECD Creditor Reporting System (CRS).

In total, there are 17 sub-sectors distributed across the four main sectors and they have here been assigned a number of points based on the relative priority they have for each member state (Table 3). The sub-sector with the highest share of commitments was assigned 5 points, the second 4 points, and so on. Sub-sectors outside of the top-five were assigned 0 points. This means that 15 points have been distributed for each member state, amounting to a total of 345 points for the 23 countries for which there is sufficient data.<sup>8</sup> Of the 17 sub-sectors, six are particularly highly prioritized by the member states.

**Table 3: EU27 prioritized sub-sectors, distribution of “priority points”**

Education	Government and civil society	Agriculture-forestry and fishing	Other multi-sector	Other social infrastructure & services	Health
89/345	88/345	29/345	27/345	27/345	25/345
26%	26%	8%	8%	8%	7%

Source: Own compilation. Data: OECD Creditor Reporting System (CRS).

Collectively, the member states strongly prioritize the sub-sectors “education” and “government & civil society.” Together, these sub-sectors account for more than half of all the distributed points. Outside of the top-six, the sub-sectors “water supply and sanitation” and “energy” are relevant, but beyond that, few of the remaining sub-sectors attract any significant shares.

As shown in Table 4 below, most member states make more than 75 percent of their sector-allocable commitments in the six (collective) priority sub-sectors, indicating a relatively strong convergence around these issues. The overlap is especially pronounced when it comes to “education” and “government and civil society” which virtually all member states prioritize. One partial exception from the general pattern is Germany, committing only 51 percent of sector allocable ODA to the top-six sub-sectors, instead focusing on areas such as “energy” and “water supply and sanitation” outside of the top-six. Sweden commits 73 percent of sector-allocable ODA to the top-six and is therefore more or less in line with the EU average. However, it must be noted that Sweden’s strong concentration in “government and civil society” is a contributing factor

<sup>8</sup> Not included: Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, and Malta.

here, given that remaining funds are distributed quite evenly over a large set of sub-sectors. It is also worth noting that Sweden has the smallest “education” share of all the EU members.

**Table 4: EU27 bilateral ODA commitments by member state (MS) in collectively prioritized sub-sectors, % sector allocable ODA**

Sector \ MS	Education	Gov't & Civil Society	Agriculture – forestry & fishing	Other social infrastr. & services	Other multi-sector	Health	Total
AT	43	8	5	5	6	5	75
BE	13	14	11	3	17	11	70
HR	13	3	1	17	10	53	95
CZ	20	34	13	3	6	4	80
DK	10	41	8	6	7	2	73
EE	29	31	0	1	7	3	73
FI	12	34	5	10	7	7	75
FR	18	13	6	2	15	3	56
DE	14	17	4	2	9	4	51
HU	55	2	10	11	0	3	80
IE	16	26	11	9	7	22	90
IT	17	21	12	7	11	15	83
LV	9	42	3	0	43	0	97
LT	49	30	1	6	4	1	90
LU	22	12	11	5	9	12	71
NL	10	25	14	3	9	2	63
PL	42	35	16	3	2	1	98
PT	45	9	1	12	7	6	78
RO	96	3	0	0	0	1	99
SK	30	40	2	1	0	12	85
SI	45	9	1	9	0	0	64
ES	12	33	11	5	8	11	80
SE	6	41	8	9	6	3	73

Source: Own compilation. Data: OECD Creditor Reporting System (CRS).


As shown by the complete sector analysis (Appendix A), there are no major differences between the small and the large donors in terms of which sectors or sub-sectors they prioritize. However, the concentration of funds to one or a few categories (within sectors) is generally much higher among the small donors. The overall volumes are for some member

states so small that is likely neither feasible nor desirable to distribute the allocated funds over a wider set of sub-sectors. Sweden’s sectoral priorities are largely in line with the EU27, with a comparably low focus on “education” and large allocations to “general environment protection” as two interesting deviations.

### 3.2.2 Distribution of non-sector-allocable ODA

Two important types of expenditure falling outside of sector-allocable ODA are “in-donor refugee costs” and “humanitarian aid.”

**Figure 4: EU27 in-donor refugee costs and humanitarian aid, % bilateral ODA commitments**



Source: Own compilation. Data: OECD Creditor Reporting System (CRS).

Several factors likely contribute to the observable differences between member states in terms of in-donor refugee costs (see Figure 4), such as geography or domestic politics. For instance, Malta’s, Greece’s, and Italy’s high costs in this area can, at least in part, be attributed to them being natural points of entry for refugees and asylum seekers from Africa and the Middle East. Also displaying substantial in-donor refugee costs – albeit well below the high levels of Malta, Greece, Bulgaria, and Italy – are a group of member states spread across the EU’s different regions: Czechia, Latvia, Spain, and several of the northern European states all range between 10-25 percent. Commitments in the area of humanitarian aid are, with some exceptions, more even. Cyprus, Greece, Bulgaria, Denmark, and Ireland present the largest shares, ranging from 85 to 24 percent of

bilateral ODA directed towards different forms of humanitarian aid. In 2018, the country average was 16 percent, with Sweden slightly below (11 percent).

In sum, there is a strong convergence around “social infrastructure and services” and in particular some of its broader sub-sectors. One possible explanation for this is the relative context-independence of these areas. Regardless of whether aid is directed to Eastern Europe or sub-Saharan Africa, issues such as education or democracy promotion are highly relevant. Sweden’s strong emphasis on “government and civil society” is in line with these general trends, although the Swedish scope is broader than that of many other countries. In terms of non-sector allocable bilateral ODA, in-donor refugee costs and humanitarian aid are the primary categories. While costs connected to these issues dominate for some small donors, such as Cyprus, Malta, Greece and Bulgaria, the levels are far lower for most other member states. Nonetheless, it is not unusual that these two areas combined account for 20-40 percent of bilateral ODA. Sweden is below the EU27 country average in both categories.

### **3.3 Geographic priorities**

The geographic ambitions and priorities are presented in relation to three different aspects: (1) regional focus, (2) the degree of geographic concentration (measured as the share going to the top-ten recipients), and (3) the attention paid to LDCs.

#### **3.3.1 Regional focus**

At a general level, the most highly prioritized regions are (Eastern) Europe, Africa, and Asia. As many as 26 of the 27 member states have one of these three as the primary recipient region. The only exception is Spain, which due to historical and cultural ties directs its largest share to Latin America and the Caribbean.

As is evident from Table 5, the CEECs seem to share a commitment to recipient countries in their vicinity. In fact, among the countries that have joined the EU since 2004, only Hungary has a primary recipient region other than Europe.

**Table 5: EU27 geographic focus – primary region, % of bilateral ODA (excluding costs not specified by region)**

Europe	Africa	Asia	Latin America and the Caribbean
13/27	10/27	3/27	1/27
Austria (36)	Belgium (69)	Cyprus (91)	Spain (49)
Bulgaria (73)	Denmark (48)	Germany (48)	
Croatia (90)	Finland (48)	Hungary (64)	
Czechia (44)	France (50)		
Estonia (57)	Ireland (78)		
Greece (84)	Italy (46)		
Latvia (51)	Luxembourg (57)		
Lithuania (70)	Malta (45)		
Poland (48)	Netherlands (63)		
Romania (89)	Portugal (79)		
Slovakia (41)	Sweden (55)		
Slovenia (90)			

Source: Own compilation. Data: OECD Creditor Reporting System (CRS).

Some potential explanations for this are geopolitical considerations, cultural and historical ties, as well as the search for comparative advantages in development co-operation more generally. Recent experiences of systemic transitions, for instance, are viewed as valuable strengths when it comes to development in Eastern European countries. The larger and more established donors, on the other hand, focus more strongly on Africa. For these member states, purely geographic aspects generally play a less pronounced role. Instead, a commitment to assisting the poorest or least developed regions appears to be the predominant factor (Figure 5).


### **3.3.2 Geographic concentration and LDC share**

The geographic scope differs substantially between the EU member states, ranging from very wide to very narrow. A useful proxy for geographic spread is the share of overall funds going to the ten largest recipient countries: the higher the share, the higher the concentration, and vice versa. In terms of ODA allocated by country, the top-ten shares of the EU27 range from 100 percent to 47 percent. Unsurprisingly, one noticeable pattern is that larger donors tend to have a larger spread, while



smaller donors focus more strongly on a narrow set of recipient countries. At one end of the spectrum are Cyprus, Croatia, and Latvia with concentration levels of 100 percent or just below. At the other end are large donors such as Germany, France, and Sweden, with concentration levels below 50 percent.

**Figure 4: EU27 share of bilateral ODA to top ten recipients and LDCs, % country/income group allocated ODA**




Source : Own compilation. Data: OECD Development Co-operation Profiles.

The EU27 differ strongly also in their commitment to LDCs. In terms of ODA allocated by income group, LDC shares range from 0 percent (Latvia) to 75 percent (Ireland). Small donors focusing primarily on Europe tend to have smaller LDC shares, whereas large donors more active in Africa and Asia have higher shares. Member states focusing most strongly on LDCs include Ireland, Portugal, and Luxembourg, with around 70 percent of income-group allocable ODA flowing to this group of countries. In the case of Latvia, on the other hand, LDCs received no ODA at all in 2018. Eight member states had LDC shares below 10 percent. Sweden’s share of 64 percent places it within the top-five.

### 3.4 Performance in key areas

In order to gauge and evaluate adherence to certain shared policy ambitions, so called “policy markers” have been developed. The most commonly used markers measure donor performance in relation to environment/climate protection and gender equality, which are both central elements of international agreements such as the Agenda 2030, the European Consensus, and the European Gender Action Plan. Stated simply, these markers measure what percentage of bilateral allocable ODA is committed to these policy goals, as either a principal or significant objective. Figure 6 presents the performance of the EU27 as well as the EU institutions in relation to these markers, sorted from highest to lowest gender score. It should be noted that strict comparisons between donors are made difficult by large discrepancies in the underlying ODA volumes, possibly skewing the results. Greece, for instance, reported an almost perfect gender score in 2018, but based on very small volumes concentrated to only two sectors. Moreover, not all member states report against the markers, which makes it difficult to determine their level of commitment in the respective areas. Nevertheless, some interesting patterns are discernible through the comparison of the EU member states’ performance against these markers.

**Figure 6: EU27 performance against OECD gender and environment markers, share (%) of bilateral allocable ODA committed as either principal or significant objective.**



Source: Own compilation. Data: OECD Development Co-operation Profiles. For the following member states, data for both markers are missing: Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Malta, and Romania.

In relation to the gender marker, Greece (98 percent), Sweden (87), and Ireland (78) are the top performers, followed by several member states hovering at around 60 percent. The EU institutions also perform very well, committing 63 percent to gender equality and women's empowerment. Including Greece, 12 member states have scores above 50 percent. At the other end of the spectrum, member states such as Portugal, France, and Poland present significantly lower scores. It should be noted, however, that data are missing for eight of the small member states. In terms of a focus on the environment, Sweden commits 56 percent of bilateral allocable ODA to this end, followed by Slovenia (54), Germany (49), and Belgium (45). The EU institutions achieve a score of 31 percent, while Estonia, Latvia, and Slovakia fall well below 10 percent. Data are lacking for six member states.

The discrepancies presented in Figure 6 exist despite the fact that virtually all member states have expressed their commitment to these issues at both the European level and in their respective national policy frameworks. Not only the top performers, but also the laggards, identify these areas as priorities and claim to work actively with them in their development policies. This pattern illustrates how difficult it is to deduce priorities from a reading of policy documents alone, and why it is necessary to complement such material with data on the allocation of funds.

### **3.5 Section summary and conclusions**

The EU consists of 27 donors with substantially different capacities, levels of ambition, and focal points.

First, a vast majority of overall funds are concentrated to the largest donors, which are also the most ambitious in terms of ODA/GNI ratio (Table 1 and Figure 1). A large group of member states in the EU's eastern and southern regions have a much more limited engagement with development co-operation. As a result, the dividing line between the EU's "large" and "small" donors is visible across almost all areas and aspects covered in this report.

Second, the EU27 differ greatly in the distribution of ODA across channels: large donors tend to have significant bilateral shares, as well as broad engagements with several different multilateral organizations. Many

of the small donors, on the other hand, handle only a fraction of funds in strictly bilateral arrangements, while financing the multilateral system in large part through the (mandatory) EU membership fee.

Third, the differences between member states are less pronounced in terms of sectoral priorities compared to geographic priorities. In fact, all member states allocate the largest share of bilateral ODA to “Social infrastructure and services” and tend to resemble each other in prioritizations at the sub-sector level as well (Appendix A). At the same time, the degree of sectoral concentration is naturally higher for the small donors. In terms of geographic priorities, smaller donors tend to focus strongly on countries in their vicinity (primarily eastern Europe), with comparably high levels of geographic concentration. Partly as a result of differences in geographic focus, high LDC shares are found almost exclusively among the large and established donors.

Fourth, although the policy frameworks of the EU27 share a strong focus on both gender equality and environment/climate protection, we find considerable differences regarding the allocation of funds to these aims. Greece, Sweden, and Ireland are the top performers in relation to the gender marker, followed by other large donors such as Finland and the Netherlands, but also some CEECs such as Slovenia and Lithuania. At much lower levels we find countries such as France and Luxembourg, as well as several of the small member states (of which many do not yet report). In relation to the environment/climate marker, Sweden is the top performer, followed by Slovenia and Germany. The smaller donors, including many of the CEECs, exhibit generally lower scores. Due to large discrepancies in reporting practices, ODA volumes, and the degree of sectoral/geographic concentration, these results should be interpreted with care. However, it is interesting to note that Sweden is the top performer and one of few member states to achieve high scores in both categories.

Whereas the policy documents analyzed in Section 2 paint the picture of a relatively homogenous group of donors, the budget allocation data presented here highlight the considerable divide that nonetheless exist among the EU27, primarily between the so called “large” and “small” donors.

## 4 Overlapping priorities: Sweden and the EU27

In the following section the analytical focus is reversed by using Sweden, rather than the EU27, as the point of departure. The primary aim here is to highlight overlaps in priorities and identify donors that can be classified as *like-minded*. The first part of the section includes a brief overview of the Swedish profile and its important characteristics. In the second part, the data presented in section 3 are used to identify member states with similar priorities. The last part summarizes the findings and discusses important implications of these patterns of likemindedness for Swedish and EU development co-operation.

### 4.1 Swedish development co-operation

Sweden is generally considered one of the most ambitious and influential donors worldwide, providing consistently (very) high ODA-levels.<sup>9</sup> As stated in the current policy framework, the overarching goal of Swedish development efforts is to “create preconditions for better living conditions for people living in poverty and under oppression” (Government Offices of Sweden, 2016). Important guiding principles include the perspective of poor people on development, as well as the horizontal integration of issues such as gender equality, environmental/climate protection, and human rights. In the literature, Sweden has been referred to as, for instance, altruistic, development-driven, and a frontrunner (Baydag et al., 2018; Elgström & Delputte, 2016; Szent-Iványi, 2012). To some degree, this also corresponds to Sweden’s self-image, which revolves around the notion that Sweden should assume a leading position in (at least) some areas of development co-operation, such as human rights, gender equality and environmental sustainability. The most important defining traits of Swedish development co-operation include a generally high level of ambition, the incorporation of progressive policies, and a strong focus on the actual needs of recipients rather than overarching foreign policy goals.

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<sup>9</sup> See also Sweden’s development profile, Appendix C.

Section 3 corroborated the picture of Sweden as an ambitious donor. In 2018, Sweden provided more ODA than any other EU member state as a percentage of GNI, while performing very well in relation to both gender and environment markers. Furthermore, Sweden directs a large share of bilateral ODA to LDCs, with all of its top-five recipient countries found within this group. In terms of sectoral priorities, Sweden strongly emphasizes the sub-sector “government and civil society,” with remaining funds spread quite evenly across areas. It is against this background that similar donors are discussed.

## 4.2 Like-minded donors

Which EU member states bear most resemblance to Sweden in their donor profiles and can be described as like-minded? “Like-minded” is understood empirically and refers to those member states with donor profiles pulling in the same direction as Sweden’s, exhibiting similar traits across several areas. Table 6 (page 36) offers a scheme for identifying such overlaps, based on aspects addressed in earlier parts of the report. While this table compares priorities at a general level, and therefore might miss similarities and differences at more detailed levels, it provides a useful overview of the EU27 and states’ respective relations to Swedish development priorities.

According to this scheme, the most like-minded donor is the Netherlands, with considerable overlaps in all categories. Finland comes in second spot, only missing an overlap on one criterion: an environment-score above 25 percent. The other member states with significant overlaps are Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, and Italy. These findings corroborate previous research on the topic, which has identified groupings such as the “Nordic,” “Nordic plus,” or the “like-minded” consisting of many of these progressive member states (Delputte et al., 2016, p. 77; Elgström & Delputte, 2016, p. 29; Saltnes, 2019, p. 537). In general, these results corroborate the main line of division identified throughout the report so far: the EU27 are to a high degree separated into large and small donors, with Sweden’s like-minded partners found among the former (with the exception of Italy). The smaller donors have significantly less pronounced overlaps with the Swedish profile.

**Table 6: EU27 - overlaps with Swedish priorities**

Country	ODA/GNI -ratio	Primary region	LDC- share	Top 5 recipients	Primary sub-sector	Gender score	Environ- ment score
Sweden	1.07%	Africa	64%	Afghani- stan, Tanzania, Somalia, Ethiopia, DRC	Govern- ment & civil society	87%	56%
	> 0.30%	"	> 30%	Over- lapping	"	> 50%	> 25%
Austria	-	-	-	1	-	✓	✓
Belgium	✓	✓	✓	1	-	✓	✓
Bulgaria	-	-	-	-	✓	-	-
Croatia	-	-	-	1	-	-	-
Cyprus	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Czechia	-	-	-	1	✓	-	-
Denmark	✓	✓	✓	2	✓	-	✓
Estonia	-	-	-	1	✓	-	-
Finland	✓	✓	✓	3	✓	✓	-
France	✓	✓	-	-	-	-	✓
Germany	✓	-	-	-	-	-	✓
Greece	-	-	-	-	-	✓	-
Hungary	-	-	-	-	-	-	✓
Ireland	✓	✓	✓	2	✓	✓	-
Italy	-	✓	✓	2	✓	✓	✓
Latvia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Lithuania	-	-	-	-	-	✓	-
Luxem- bourg	✓	✓	✓	-	-	-	✓
Malta	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Nether- lands	✓	✓	✓	2	✓	✓	✓
Poland	-	-	✓	1	-	-	✓
Portugal	-	✓	✓	-	-	-	-
Romania	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Slovakia	-	-	-	-	✓	✓	-
Slovenia	-	-	-	-	-	✓	✓
Spain	-	-	-	-	✓	✓	✓

Source: Own compilation.

Generally speaking, the six member states that are here identified as like-minded share the following characteristics with Sweden: high ODA levels, a primary focus on Africa and LDCs, sectoral prioritization of issues connected to government and civil society, as well as a strong commitment to both gender equality and environmental protection. Beyond this, it is interesting to note that these countries also frequently operate in the same recipient countries as Sweden (Appendix B). According to the scheme used here, the two largest donors, Germany and France, do not seem particularly strongly aligned with the Swedish profile. To some extent, however, this is likely a consequence of their massive ODA volumes, which allow for broader scopes in terms of both sectoral and geographic priorities. The comparably small LDC shares and low scores against the highlighted policy markers are more surprising.

As is evident from Table 6, the EU's smaller (and newer) member states exhibit far lower levels of direct overlap with Sweden, at least in terms of budget allocations. Both the CEECs and southern member states such as Greece, Malta, and Cyprus provide ODA at far lower levels, focusing their efforts primarily in contexts not highly prioritized by the Swedish government. With some notable exceptions, these donors also fall well behind Sweden in terms of ODA shares committed to gender equality and environment/climate protection. Stated simply, these countries are less similar to Sweden than the large and established donors.

### **4.3 Section summary and conclusions**

This section reversed the focus by using Sweden, rather than the EU27, as the starting point for the analysis. The purpose was to identify which countries exhibit the most similarities with Sweden, and in what ways. Six member states were identified as most like-minded, all but Italy belonging to the same group of large and established EU donors. In other words, even though the stated priorities of the member states are often strikingly homogenous, the ODA allocation patterns reveal substantial differences between the EU donors, making some more closely aligned with Sweden than others.

These patterns suggest three implications for Swedish and EU development co-operation. First, they point to a group of member states



whose political priorities in development co-operation make them natural allies for Sweden in the EU and other multilateral contexts. As EU development policy is further developed beyond the recently adopted Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI), Swedish success in advancing its priorities will be dependent on coalitions with other member states. Likewise, as Sweden seeks to promote its particular brand of development policy in other international fora, including the UN, World Bank, and RDBs, it can count on support from this particular group of like-minded European countries.

Second, these patterns point to a coherent group of supporters of an ambitious and progressive development policy in line with the stated policy goals of the EU27. While a majority of member states have difficulties living up to agreed ambitions in terms of ODA/GNI ratios, investments in LDCs, gender equality goals, and environmental/climate standards, these like-minded countries have all been able and willing to match political aims with allocated funds. By virtue of their example, they form a powerful constituency for the type of development policy the EU27 have pledged to pursue in the European Consensus on Development.

Third, these patterns should simultaneously stimulate discussions concerning the risk that overlapping priorities might result in duplication of efforts. Overlapping allocation is not necessarily positive from the perspective of an optimal use of limited funds. As such, these patterns might indicate a lack of appropriate division of labour among donors – another key principle in EU development policy.<sup>10</sup> Instead, a genuine pursuit of comparative advantages, as evidenced in the donor profiles of the EU27, might be preferable, for the purpose of achieving the greatest possible impact with available funds. For the future effectiveness of Swedish and European development policy, ensuring that donor activities are coordinated to avoid overlaps and contradictions is therefore of utmost importance.

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<sup>10</sup> See, for instance, Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labour in Development Policy and MS commitment to policy coherence in European Consensus of Development.

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
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# Appendix A Comparative sector analysis

## A1.1 Sector analysis

Figure A1 shows the relative priority of each main-level sector for all 27 member states. The countries are united in their general prioritization of “social infrastructure & services.” The country average for this broad sector is 72 percent, far above “multi-sector” at 11 percent. Perhaps unsurprisingly, it seems that small donors are more likely to have higher degrees of concentration in one or two sectors, compared to large donors spreading commitments more broadly. In terms of sector-level priorities, Sweden is closely aligned with the EU27 country average and does not stand out from its peers to any significant degree. In order to find potential overlaps or differences it is necessary to analyze the thematic priorities of the EU27 at a more detailed level. The following sub-sections disaggregate the data presented in Figure A1 by showing the distribution of funds across sub-sectors, within each sector.<sup>11</sup>

**Figure A1: EU27 sector allocable ODA, distribution across sectors**



Source: Own compilation. Data: OECD Creditor Reporting System (CRS).

<sup>11</sup> Excluded due to lack of data: Bulgaria, Cyprus, Malta.

### **A1.1.1 “Social Infrastructure & Services”**

“Social infrastructure & services” is the by far most highly prioritized sector among the EU27. It includes six different sub-sectors, of which “education” and “government & civil society” dominate. In fact, apart from Croatia (“health”), all MS direct the largest share of funds to one of these two sub-sectors. This distribution implies that there are two main camps among the EU27 in this sector. Sweden’s strong focus on “government & civil society” and small “education” share makes it easily categorized. The table below presents the distribution across all sub-sectors in more detail.

**Table A1: Sub-sector distribution, “Social infrastructure & services”**

Primary	Country	Total, % sector allocable ODA	Total, USD millions	Education	Health	Pop. Policies	Water supply & sanitation	Gov. & civil society	Other social
Government & civil society	Sweden	68.2%	1 951	9.4%	4.3%	4.1%	9.4%	60.3%	12.5%
	Belgium	49.1%	292	27.3%	22.5%	4.5%	10.6%	28.7%	6.5%
	Czechia	71.3%	30	28.5%	5.0%	1.0%	13.6%	47.0%	4.9%
	Denmark	70.6%	700	13.6%	2.5%	14.0%	3.7%	58.1%	8.1%
	Estonia	66.2%	9	44.4%	7.7%	0.0%	0.0%	46.9%	1.0%
	Finland	65.9%	298	18.2%	9.9%	2.3%	1.8%	52.0%	15.7%
	Germany	48.7%	8 365	29.1%	9.0%	1.5%	20.0%	35.8%	4.6%
	Ireland	77.7%	213	20.3%	27.8%	4.6%	2.3%	33.5%	11.4%
	Italy	67.3%	590	25.1%	21.7%	1.9%	10.0%	31.7%	9.7%
	Latvia	50.9%	1	17.5%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	82.1%	0.4%
	Netherlands	56.4%	1 300	17.5%	3.6%	17.8%	12.5%	43.6%	5.0%
Slovakia	94.5%	13	32.0%	12.4%	0.0%	11.5%	42.6%	1.5%	
Spain	74.1%	438	16.3%	14.2%	4.9%	13.4%	44.4%	6.8%	
Education	Austria	70.3%	256	61.0%	6.5%	0.0%	13.7%	11.2%	7.6%
	France	47.4%	3 166	37.4%	6.2%	1.4%	24.5%	26.4%	4.0%
	Greece	55.5%	2	98.6%	0.7%	0.0%	0.0%	0.7%	0.0%

Primary	Country	Total, % sector allocable ODA	Total, USD millions	Education	Health	Pop. Policies	Water supply & sanitation	Gov. & civil society	Other social
	Hungary	88.6%	102	61.6%	3.5%	4.1%	16.8%	1.9%	12.1%
	Lithuania	85.3%	5	57.0%	0.9%	0.0%	0.0%	34.9%	7.3%
	Luxembourg	65.3%	154	33.5%	17.9%	6.6%	14.9%	18.9%	8.1%
	Poland	80.7%	178	52.2%	0.7%	0.2%	0.3%	43.5%	3.1%
	Portugal	79.7%	101	56.5%	7.0%	1.2%	9.2%	11.5%	14.7%
	Romania	98.8%	48	96.7%	0.5%	0.0%	0.1%	2.6%	0.1%
	Slovenia	73.2%	19	61.1%	0.3%	0.2%	14.0%	12.0%	12.5%
Primary: Health	Croatia	85.1%	12	14.8%	61.7%	0.0%	0.4%	3.0%	20.1%

Source: Own compilation. Data: OECD Creditor Reporting System (CRS).

Sweden shares its primary focus on “government & civil society” with twelve other member states. In 2018, this sub-sector accounted for 60.3 percent of Sweden’s commitments, with only Latvia having a larger share. Other member states with a comparatively strong focus on this sub-sector include Denmark and Finland. There is, however, substantial variance even within this sub-sector. Sweden focuses primarily on democratic participation and civil society, civilian peace-building, and human/women’s rights. Among the other member states, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, and Ireland seem to exhibit the closest overall resemblance to the Swedish profile, albeit with respective idiosyncrasies.

### **A1.1.2 “Economic Infrastructure & Services”**

The sector “economic infrastructure” is internally less broad than “social infrastructure & services” and is also much less prioritized by the EU27. In 2018, the EU country average was merely eight percent. The highest shares are found in countries such as Germany (28.6 percent), Slovenia (23.2), Estonia (19.7) and France (18.3). Sweden is placed in the middle with its share of nine percent. Five countries have shares below one (1) percent. The sector consists of five sub-sectors: “transport and storage,” “communications,” “energy,” “banking and financial services,” and “business and other services.”



**Table A2: Sub-sector distribution. “economic infrastructure & services”**

Primary	Country	Total. % sector allocable ODA	Total, MUSD	Transport & storage	Communi- cations	Energy	Banking & f-s	Business & o-s
Energy	Sweden	8.9%	255	0.2%	0.7%	44.8%	10.9%	43.4%
	Austria	11.9%	43	19.1%	3.4%	41.6%	28.9%	7.0%
	Denmark	12.2%	121	25.0%	1.0%	45.7%	2.6%	25.7%
	Germany	28.6%	4913	1.3%	0.3%	70.4%	19.4%	8.6%
	Hungary	1.0%	1	0.0%	1.7%	94.0%	0.0%	4.3%
	Italy	3.0%	26	6.5%	15.9%	36.8%	8.8%	32.0%
	Slovenia	23.2%	6	0.0%	1.0%	93.9%	5.0%	0.1%
	Lithuania	6.8%	<1	7.9%	5.2%	63.6%	0.6%	22.9%
	Romania	0.7%	<1	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Business & o-s	Belgium	13.8%	82	6.0%	1.4%	9.9%	0.0%	82.7%
	Czechia	8.4%	4	1.9%	1.1%	41.8%	13.2%	41.9%
	Ireland	0.8%	2	0.9%	3.1%	3.4%	24.1%	68.5%
	Latvia	0.2%	<1	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%
	Poland	0.9%	2	0.0%	1.7%	14.2%	19.6%	64.4%
	Portugal	9.9%	13	14.6%	3.5%	0.6%	7.3%	74.0%
	Slovakia	2.7%	<1	0.0%	0.0%	49.5%	0.0%	50.5%

Primary	Country	Total. % sector allocable ODA	Total, MUSD	Transport & storage	Communi- cations	Energy	Banking & f-s	Business & o-s
Banking & f-s	<b>Finland</b>	<b>14.5%</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>0.3%</b>	<b>10.9%</b>	<b>14.0%</b>	<b>56.9%</b>	<b>17.9%</b>
	Luxembourg	12.6%	30	0.0%	16.9%	7.0%	71.4%	4.7%
	Netherlands	12.5%	288	3.3%	0.0%	19.9%	42.9%	33.9%
	Spain	3.4%	20	12.0%	4.3%	17.4%	52.8%	13.5%
Transport & storage	France	18.3%	1219	37.8%	0.3%	37.1%	24.5%	0.3%
	Croatia	2.8%	<1	89.3%	7.2%	0.0%	2.9%	0.6%
Communication	Estonia	19.7%	3	0.0%	56.6%	3.5%	0.0%	39.9%
No commitments	Greece	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Source: Own compilation. Data: OECD Creditor Reporting System (CRS).

Collectively, the most prioritized sub-categories are “energy,” and “business & other services,” which is in line with how Sweden distributes funds. In the former, Sweden focuses primarily on renewable energy generation, and energy distribution. These same areas are prioritized by, for instance, Germany, Slovenia, and France. Within the latter, Sweden’s main focal points are policy and administration, which it shares with several other member states, most notably, Belgium, Netherlands, and Portugal. Interestingly, Sweden also directs notable funds to the area “responsible business conduct,” – a focus shared by no other country to the same degree.

### **A1.1.3 “Production”**

In 2018, the country average for the sector “production” was eight percent, with Sweden slightly above (10.3). Members with the largest shares going to this sector include the Netherlands (20.3), Italy (16.1), and Poland (16.5). The sector consists of four sub-sectors: “agriculture – forestry & fishing”, “industry, mining, construction,” “trade policies & regulation,” and “tourism.”

**Table A3: Sub-sector distribution. “Production”**

Primary	Country	Total. % sector allocable ODA	Total, MUSD	Agriculture – forestry & fishing	Industry, Mining, construction	Trade policies & regulation	Tourism
Agriculture	Sweden	10.3%	294	76.0%	19.9%	4.1%	0.0%
	Austria	10.1%	37	50.9%	43.0%	0.2%	6.0%
	Belgium	13.3%	79	84.7%	1.8%	13.5%	0.0%
	Croatia	0.6%	<1	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Czechia	13.3%	6	97.2%	2.3%	0.0%	0.5%
	Denmark	8.6%	85	89.7%	6.5%	3.9%	0.0%
	France	13.1%	873	47.6%	28.5%	23.5%	0.3%
	Germany	6.9%	1177	64.0%	7.9%	28.1%	0.0%
	Hungary	9.7%	11	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Ireland	12.1%	33	90.4%	3.2%	6.4%	0.0%
	Italy	16.1%	141	77.1%	20.1%	0.0%	2.8%
	Latvia	3.6%	<1	80.2%	0.0%	19.8%	0.0%
	Luxembourg	12.4%	29	84.7%	7.1%	6.3%	1.9%
	Netherlands	20.3%	468	71.1%	17.2%	11.7%	0.0%
	Poland	16.5%	36	96.5%	1.0%	0.0%	2.5%
	Slovakia	2.7%	<1	63%	32%	5%	0%
	Slovenia	1.3%	<1	81%	17%	1%	0%
	Spain	12.6%	74	91%	4%	3%	2%

Primary	Country	Total. % sector allocable ODA	Total, MUSD	Agriculture – forestry & fishing	Industry, Mining, construction	Trade policies & regulation	Tourism
Trade policies	Estonia	3.1%	<1	10.1%	0.0%	50.0%	39.9%
	Lithuania	2.3%	<1	26.4%	13.5%	59.4%	0.7%
Industry. mining. construction	Finland	11.2%	51	48.1%	50.9%	1.0%	0.0%
Tourism	Portugal	3.4%	4	15%	5%	2%	78%
No commitments	Romania	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Greece	-	-	-	-	-	-

Source: Own compilation. Data: OECD Creditor Reporting System (CRS).

Apart from a few countries, most member states, including Sweden, have “agriculture – forestry & fishing” as their primary sub-sector. In terms of specific expenditure areas within this sub-sector, there is a strong convergence around agricultural development, with some countries such as Ireland, Netherlands, and Spain focusing also on food crop production, likely reflecting geographical dimensions. In the sector “production,” then, Sweden resembles many other EU donors both in terms of relative prioritization and specific expenses (agricultural development). One exception is Sweden’s relatively strong focus on forestry, which it shares with only a few other countries, for example Germany and Finland.

#### **A1.1.4 “Multi-sector”**

This sector consists of only two sub-sectors, each covering a substantial range of issues: “general environment protection” and “other multi-sector.” The member states with the largest shares include Greece (44.5 percent), Latvia (45.3), Belgium (23.8) and France (21.2). Sweden’s 12.7 percent places it slightly above the EU average. For all member states except Sweden and Slovenia, the sub-sector “other multi-sector” receives the largest share. Sweden and Slovenia, instead, direct their largest shares to “general environment protection.” In Sweden’s case, this sub-sector is even among the top-five across all sectors (see country profile, Appendix C), with areas such as environmental policy and environmental research driving costs. For most other member states, expenses subsumed under “other multi-sector,” such as multi-sector aid, rural development, urban development, or research/ scientific institutions, make up the primary drivers of cost.

At the level of specific expenditure areas, countries like Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, as well as France and Germany share Sweden’s attention to environmental policy and administrative management. Within the sub-sector “other multi-sector,” Sweden’s largest expenditure area is ‘research and scientific institutions’ — a focus that it shares with, for instance, Belgium, Denmark, and Finland.

**Table A4: Sub-sector distribution, “Multi-sector”**

Primary	Country	Total, % sector allocable ODA	Total, USD millions	General environ- ment protection	Other multi- sector
General environ- ment protection	Sweden	12.7%	363	54.3%	45.7%
	Slovenia	2.4%	<1	84.6%	15.4%
Other multi- sector	Austria	7.7%	28	19.6%	80.4%
	Belgium	23.8%	142	27.1%	72.9%
	Croatia	11.6%	2	13.7%	86.3%
	Czechia	7.0%	3	14.0%	86.0%
	Denmark	8.5%	85	15.9%	84.1%
	France	21.2%	1 417	30.1%	69.9%
	Germany	15.9%	2 731	45.3%	54.7%
	Hungary	0.7%	<1	41.4%	58.6%
	Ireland	9.4%	26	28.3%	71.7%
	Italy	13.6%	119	20.3%	79.7%
	Latvia	45.3%	<1	4.2%	95.8%
	Luxembourg	9.6%	23	1.3%	98.7%
	Netherlands	10.9%	250	15.1%	84.9%
	Poland	2.0%	4	5.4%	94.6%
	Slovakia	0.0%	<1	0.0%	100.0%
	Spain	9.9%	59	15.5%	84.5%
	Estonia	11.0%	1	38.2%	61.8%
	Lithuania	5.6%	<1	27.3%	72.7%
	Finland	8.3%	37	21.5%	78.5%
	Portugal	7.0%	9	5.8%	94.2%
Romania	0.4%	<1	9.5%	90.5%	
Greece	44.5%	2	0.1%	99.9%	

Source: Own compilation. Data: OECD Creditor Reporting System (CRS).

## Appendix B Recipient country analysis

### **B1.1 Afghanistan**

In 2018, Afghanistan was the recipient country receiving the single largest share of Swedish bilateral ODA. Table A5 presents the distribution of ODA for Sweden and other relevant donors across sub-sectors. Apart from Estonia, these are all large donors.

Most donors focus strongly on the broad sector “social infrastructure & services” with sub-sectors such as “government & civil society,” and “education” as main priorities. The former is the primary sub-sector for all countries, except for the Netherlands, for which it is second to “reconstruction, relief, rehabilitation.” In terms of specific areas of expenditure within “government & civil society,” it is interesting to note that Sweden focused less on areas connected to conflict, peace & security than the other countries. Instead, Sweden focused on support for subnational government, elections, and public sector policy. The first area especially sets Sweden apart from the others. Overall, however, there seems to be a relatively high degree of consensus among the donors to direct substantial funds to the strengthening of social infrastructure in Afghanistan.



**Table B1: Afghanistan - thematic priorities of top donors**

Country	Volume MUSD	% country allocable ODA	Top 5 sub-sectors, % of country total				
<b>Sweden</b>	146.3	7.8	Government & civil society (26.3)	Other social (21.9)	Education (21.6)	Emergency response (10.1)	Energy (6.0)
<b>Denmark</b>	87.1	11.1	Government & Civil Society (30.2)	Education (29.0)	Agriculture - forestry & fishing (15.6)	Emergency response (10.9)	Industry, mining, constructions (6.9)
<b>Estonia</b>	1.5	13.6	Government & civil society (37.5)	Unspecified (34.9)	Education (12.4)	Health (11.3)	Emergency response (3.9)
<b>Finland</b>	22.8	8.7	Government & civil society (44.2)	Education (18.6)	Other social (16.1)	Administrative costs (6.0)	Population policies (5.7)
<b>Germany</b>	438.1	3.4	Government & civil society (57.5)	Other multi-sector (9.3)	Energy (8.3)	Education (7.2)	Health (5.2)
<b>Italy</b>	95.1	11.8	Government & civil society (60.4)	Transport & storage (15.3)	Other multi-sector (13.1)	Emergency response (5.6)	Health (2.8)
<b>Netherlands</b>	54.9	5.6	Reconstruction, relief, rehabilitation (43.0)	Government & civil society (20.3)	Emergency response (17.3)	Development food assistance (11.8)	Agriculture - forestry and fishing (3.9)

Source: Own compilation. Data: OECD Creditor Reporting System (CRS).

## **B1.2 Tanzania**

The second largest recipient of Swedish ODA in 2018 was Tanzania, not far behind Afghanistan. Other member states with large shares going to Tanzania include Poland, Denmark, Ireland, and Finland, while Germany and France allocate substantial volumes, although with lower shares.

Compared to the situation in Afghanistan, the heterogeneity of donor priorities is striking. To be sure, the sector “social infrastructure & services” remains strongly emphasized, but the distribution across sub-sectors is less concentrated. Whereas France, Ireland and Germany share a strong focus on “health,” Poland, for instance, allocates almost all funds to “agriculture – forestry & fishing.” Sweden’s largest sub-sector is “other multi-sector.” This is not the case for any of the other donors. Furthermore, Sweden stands out through its focus on energy, and renewable energy generation more specifically. Germany also allocates substantial funds to this area, but with a significantly lower prioritization. In the sub-sector “education,” Sweden’s focus is again different from that of other donors, with a primary emphasis on policy and administrative management. In sum, the donors active in Tanzania collectively exhibit a greater thematic scope than is the case for Afghanistan, with Sweden standing out somewhat through high multi-sector aid and a large share devoted to the sub-sector “energy.”

**Table B1: Tanzania - thematic priorities of top donors**

Country	Volume, MUSD	% country allocable ODA	Top 5 sub-sectors, % of country total				
<b>Sweden</b>	127.1	6.8	Other multi-sector (28.3)	Energy (24.1)	Education (22.5)	Government & civil society (12.1)	Banking & financial services (4.5)
<b>Belgium</b>	12.2	1.8	Agriculture – forestry & fishing (26.9)	General environment protection (18.7)	Other multi-sector (18.2)	Education (12.9)	Government & civil society (9.4)
<b>Denmark</b>	55.1	7.0	Business & other services (35.6)	Government & civil society (33.8)	Health (25.5)	Population policies (2.2)	Industry, mining, construction (1.9)
<b>Finland</b>	15.0	5.7	Agriculture – forestry & fishing (39.6)	Government & civil society (22.3)	Education (12.0)	Administrative costs (9.1)	Other multi-sector (7.7)
<b>France</b>	28.2	0.4	Health (64.5)	Water supply & sanitation (23.4)	Energy (3.0)	Government & civil society (2.3)	Education (1.5)
<b>Germany</b>	40.0	0.3	Health (14.3)	General environment protection (14.1)	Water supply & sanitation (11.2)	Emergency response (10.8)	Government & civil society (10.4)
<b>Ireland</b>	28.4	8.4	Health (43.9)	Government & civil society (15.8)	Agriculture – forestry )& fishing (9.4)	Emergency response (8.9)	Other social (4.9)
<b>Poland</b>	28.1	11.2	Agriculture – forestry & fishing (96.2)	Education (1.8)	Health (0.7)	Water supply & sanitation (0.6)	Industry, mining, construction (0.4)

Source: Own compilation. Data: OECD Creditor Reporting System (CRS).

## **B1.3 Somalia**

With a 5.7 percent share of country allocable ODA, Somalia was the third largest recipient of Swedish bilateral ODA in 2018. Other member states active in the country are again found primarily among the EU's largest donors. In terms of thematic priorities, comparably large shares are directed towards humanitarian aid through sub-sectors such as “emergency response” and “reconstruction, relief & rehabilitation.”

Sweden's primary sub-sector in Somalia is “other multi-sector,” with a familiar emphasis on multi-sector aid. “Government & civil society” follows, but in this case with civilian peace-building as the largest area of expenditure. Here Sweden's priorities are aligned with those of the Netherlands and Germany. Moreover, Sweden makes substantial commitments in connection to both public sector policy, and democratic participation and civil society. These are focal points shared by Italy, and most notably Denmark. All in all, it seems that the specific circumstances of the Somalian context lead to comparably large allocations in different sub-areas of humanitarian aid, both for Sweden and the other primary donors.

**Table B3: Somalia – thematic priorities of top donors**

Country	Volume MUSD	% country allocable ODA	Top 5 sub-sectors, % of country total				
Sweden	107.3	5.7	Other multi-sector (40.4)	Government & civil society (23.3)	Emergency response (20.0)	Health (3.6)	Reconstruction, relief & rehabilitation (2.4)
Denmark	19.2	2.4	Government & Civil Society (58.1)	Agriculture-forestry & fishing (20.8)	Emergency response (20.6)	Reconstruction, relief & rehabilitation (0.4)	Other multi-sector (0.1)
Finland	14.6	5.6	Emergency response (25.0)	Government & civil society (22.5)	Health (18.2)	Population policies (15.6)	Unspecified (6.3)
Germany	190.4	1.5	Emergency response (30.6)	Other multi-sector (17.8)	Reconstruction, relief & rehabilitation (16.1)	Government & civil society (12.3)	Commodity aid (10.9)
Ireland	7.5	2.2	Emergency response (72.9)	Government & civil society (11.2)	Education (7.0)	Disaster prevention & preparedness (5.9)	Other multi-sector (3.0)
Italy	18.0	2.2	Government & civil society (26.3)	Education (20.4)	Population policies (17.7)	Water supply & sanitation (13.4)	Agriculture-forestry and fishing (10.3)
Netherlands	17.1	1.7	Government & civil society (58.6)	Emergency response (41.4)	-	-	-

Source: Own compilation. Data: OECD Creditor Reporting System (CRS).

## **B1.4 Ethiopia**

In Ethiopia Sweden is joined by a familiar set of large donors. While Germany has the largest ODA volume by far, Ireland, Czechia, and Finland present the largest shares. The thematic priorities of the donors show interesting differences. Whereas Denmark, for instance, focuses almost exclusively on “development food assistance,” the other donors distribute funds quite evenly across several sub-sectors.

Sweden directs almost 30 percent to “emergency response” within the sector “humanitarian aid,” followed by other thematic sectors. In terms of agriculture, it is interesting to note that Sweden, unlike most other donors, allocates the lion’s share to forestry development. Where “government & civil society” is concerned, the primary focal points are democratic participation, human rights, and women’s rights. Sweden’s focus on the former is shared by Ireland, whereas Italy is the other donor allocating the largest shares to women’s rights. Sweden is effectively the only donor allocating any substantial amounts of ODA to “general environment protection.”

**Table B4: Ethiopia - thematic priorities of top donors**

Country	Volume MUSD	% country allocable ODA	Top 5 sub-sectors, % of country total				
Sweden	80.0	4.3	Emergency response (29.8)	Agriculture – forestry & fishing (13.9)	Government & civil society (11.4)	General environment protection (9.1)	Business & other services (6.7)
Czechia	5.0	9.1	Agriculture – forestry & fishing (30.1)	Water supply & sanitation (29.9)	Education (17.5)	Emergency response (14.4)	Disaster prevention & preparedness (4.7)
Denmark	25.4	3.2	Development food assistance (81.1)	Emergency response (12.5)	Industry, mining, construction (1.7)	Government & civil society (1.6)	Energy (1.1)
Finland	24.0	9.1	Communications (21.3)	Education (19.0)	Water supply & sanitation (18.3)	Agriculture – forestry & fishing (13.4)	Emergency response (8.3)
Germany	175.1	1.3	Health (18.7)	Emergency response (17.6)	Agriculture – forestry & fishing (16.8)	Education (15.3)	Water supply & sanitation (7.8)
Ireland	44.0	13.1	Other social (28.8)	Emergency response (26.5)	Agriculture – forestry & fishing (11.8)	Health (11.6)	Government & civil society (7.9)

Country	Volume MUSD	% country allocable ODA	Top 5 sub-sectors, % of country total				
<b>Italy</b>	48.7	6.1	Government & civil society (30.8)	Health (19.2)	Emergency response (18.5)	Education (10.9)	Agriculture – forestry & fishing (5.0)
<b>Netherlands</b>	78.8	8.0	Population policies (33.2)	Agriculture – forestry & fishing (23.4)	Education (13.9)	Development food assistance (10.3)	Health (9.3)

Source: Own compilation. Data: OECD Creditor Reporting System (CRS).



## **B1.5 Democratic Republic of the Congo**

The Democratic Republic of the Congo is the fifth largest recipient of Swedish bilateral ODA. As is the case of all other recipient countries covered here, the member states with substantial activity in the country are exclusively large and ambitious donors. The highest share – by far – is presented by the former colonial power Belgium (19.2 percent), followed by Sweden. In terms of ODA volumes, Germany, Belgium, and Sweden dominate.

Five of the eight top donors direct the largest share of ODA to “emergency response,” and it is only France that does not place this sub-sector among the five most prioritized. With few exceptions, member states prioritize the same sub-sectors, although in varying orders. In terms of “government & civil society,” Sweden focuses primarily on areas connected to democratic participation, and civilian peace-building. In both areas, the most similar donor is the Netherlands. The focus on basic health care, however, is shared first and foremost by Belgium. In terms of agriculture, Sweden focuses exclusively on the general area of agricultural development, rather than forestry. This focus on agricultural development is shared by Ireland and Belgium, whereas Luxembourg allocates funds primarily to livestock and education/training, and France almost exclusively to forestry.

**Table B5: DRC - thematic priorities of top donors**

Country	Volume MUSD	% country allocable ODA	Top 5 sub-sectors, % of country total				
<b>Sweden</b>	79.4	4.3	Emergency response (49.1)	Government & civil society (27.5)	Health (7.2)	Agriculture – forestry & fishing (6.5)	Population policies (4.4)
<b>Belgium</b>	128.3	19.2	Emergency response (22.7)	Health (16.8)	Government & civil society (15.1)	Education (12.4)	Agriculture – forestry & fishing (12.3)
<b>France</b>	23.0	0.3	Education (41.1)	Development food assistance (11.8)	Administrative costs (11.4)	Agriculture – forestry & fishing (8.7)	Health (5.5)
<b>Germany</b>	142.7	1.1	Emergency response (36.8)	General environment protection (13.8)	Water supply & sanitation (12.1)	Development food assistance (10.0)	Government & civil society (6.3)
<b>Ireland</b>	8.9	2.6	Emergency response (63.5)	Government & civil society (9.9)	Agriculture – forestry & fishing (8.2)	Other multi-sector (6.4)	Water supply & sanitation (6.4)
<b>Italy</b>	15.9	2.0	Education (30.1)	Health (17.6)	Other social (15.9)	Emergency response (12.6)	Other multi-sector (6.0)

Country	Volume MUSD	% country allocable ODA	Top 5 sub-sectors, % of country total				
<b>Luxembourg</b>	4.2	1.6	Emergency response (31.4)	Agriculture – forestry & fishing (17.6)	Education (13.6)	Reconstruction, relief & rehabilitation (11.1)	Water supply & sanitation (8.8)
<b>Netherlands</b>	24.4	2.5	Government & civil society (59.6)	Emergency response (33.8)	Population policies (6.6)	-	-

Source: Own compilation. Data: OECD Creditor Reporting System (CRS).

## Appendix 3 Member state development policy profiles

The full appendix with policy profiles can be found at [www.eba.se](http://www.eba.se).