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EFFECTS OF SWEDISH AND INTERNATIONAL DEMOCRACY AID
APPENDIX III. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL AND SWEDISH DEMOCRACY SUPPORT

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Appendix III. Empirical Analysis of International and Swedish Democracy Support

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Empirical strategy

Since we suspect trend effects in democratic achievements, and the contemporaneous decisions by donors on the *levels* of democracy aid and its components to be correlated with time-varying errors at previous levels of democracy, we adopt a dynamic framework to model the three empirical strategies outlined above. Our baseline model takes the following form:

$$D_{it} = \alpha_{it} + \theta D_{it-1} + \beta X_{it} + \varphi A_{it} + \eta_i + \upsilon_t + \nu_{it}, \qquad (1)$$

$$E(\nu_{it}|D_i^{t-1}, A_i^t, \eta_i) = 0 (t = 1, \dots, T)(i = 1, \dots, N) \qquad (2)$$

where the subscripts i and t denote country and time period, respectively. We implement the model with five-year averages to reduce electoral-cycle effects and measurement error. D_{it} is the level of democracy proxied by V-Dem's index of electoral democracy; D_{it-1} captures the persistence of democracy in country i; A_{it} is the amount of developmental (total) aid, or democracy aid—the latter based on our limited or extensive definitions—that goes to country *i,* in period *t.* Our model assumes that aid is *predetermined*, meaning that equation (1) allows for feedback effects or reverse causality from lagged democracy levels to the contemporaneous level of aid allocations.

Note that when we adopt our third empirical approach to investigate the individual effects of core subcomponents of the limited definition of democracy aid, D_{it} measures these specific aid activities, while A_{it} measures now the corresponding lower-level indices of electoral democracy described in Table 5.

X_{it} is a vector of country-level covariates that capture key determinants of democratization as highlighted by structural and

institutional theories of democracy, and which are related to the level of economic development in country i.[1] This model (which we refer hereafter to as Model 1) includes the following controls: the rate of economic growth that measures the dynamism of the economy; the log of income per capita lagged one period to measure the stock of physical capital and capture the rate of economic convergence in these countries; the share of the urban population that captures the level of urbanization and is expected to positively impact democratization (as posited, for example, by modernization theory); population density, measured as the number of people per squared kilometre of land area, and which captures the level of conglomeration and the ability of countries to achieve economies of scale. Higher population density is expected to have a positive effect on democratization via economies of scale in the provision of public goods, and a reduction in the unit costs for civil society organizations (Newton, 1982).

We also include as controls the availability of natural resource endowments, measured as a percentage of GDP, and which are expected to support economic diversification but also potentially undermine democratization via state capture (see Caselli and Cunningham, 2009; Caselli and Michaels, 2009; Currie and Gahvari., 2008). In an extended model (Model 2), we include two additional controls: military spending measured as share of GDP, to capture the financial resources dedicated to defence and security, and which may have both positive or negative effects depending on the level of state fragility, conflict, and the regime type in control of spending (Brauner, 2015; Rota, 2016), and the average electoral democracy index of neighbouring countries, to control for the existence of regional diffusion effects of democratic capital that are expected to positively impact democratization (Huntington, 1991; Persson and Tabellini, 2009).

In alternative specifications, we include, as part of the robustness checks, additional controls that are highlighted by the literature. In what we refer to as Model 3, we include the level of fractionalization of parties in opposition, which captures the strength of political

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[1] For a comprehensive analysis of key determinants of democracy, see Alemán and Yang (2011).

competition and the balance of power in the legislative branch, and which is expected to negatively impact democratization; a measure of all current non-tax revenues as an indicator of state autonomy, which may influence state transition negatively (Aleman and Yang, 2011); a dummy for a regime in which the chief of the executive is a military officer, as military dictatorship types may have direct implications for the resilience of the regimes; a measure of internal conflict to capture the degree of state fragility, and which is expected to negatively impact democratization efforts; a measure of ethnic tensions, as ethnic fractionalization may influence the regime type in diverse ways, for instance, impeding substantially democratic transition (Dahl, 1971; Rustow, 1970), or narrowing the regime's support coalition in autocratic societies. Finally, in what we refer to as Model 4, we add the following controls to the vector of covariates in Model 3 - the Gini coefficient as a measure of inequality, in linear and quadratic version, which captures the negative concavities in the relationship between high income inequality and democracy, as highlighted by theoretical models of democracy and political regimes (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006; Boix, 2003), and a measure of political dissent in the form of anti-government movements, which may be a catalyst to liberalization.

η_i denotes unobserved country-specific and time-invariant effects; v_t is a vector of time dummies capturing universal time trends, whereas α_{it}, θ, β, φ, and v_{it} are the intercept, the parameter estimates, and the idiosyncratic error term, respectively.

The type of dynamic panel model that is derived in equation (1), with unobserved heterogeneity and a predetermined regressor, is usually estimated using generalized method of moments (GMM) estimators. The Arellano and Bond (1991) first-differenced GMM estimator yields consistent estimates in panels with limited times series, although it suffers from finite sample bias, especially when having panels with small samples in the cross-section dimension and persistent time series data. In such cases, the lagged levels of the time series are weakly correlated with the lagged first differences, thereby making the instruments for the first-differenced equations 'weak' (Hsiao *et al.*, 2002; Moral-Benito, 2013).

An alternative approach widely used in the literature is the system GMM estimator proposed by (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998). In particular, the system GMM estimator proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998) works around the weak instrument problem by solving a system of level and difference equations. Lagged differences of the endogenous variables are used as instruments in the level equations, while lagged levels of the endogenous variables are used as instruments in the first differenced equations. System GMM improves the accuracy of estimates by exploiting additional moment conditions that are informative even with persistent data (Blundell and Bond, 1998).

Nevertheless, this method relies on a stringent identifying assumption that requires that the variables in the model observe a mean stationary (or a long-term dynamic) process that is not easily satisfied in international comparative analysis, such as ours. Furthermore, recent analyses have shown that the instruments for the level equations of the system GMM estimators are valid as long as they are orthogonal to the country fixed-effects, and they may in fact suffer from the weak instrument problem (Bazzi and Clemens, 2013; Bun and Windmeijer, 2010).

We also experimented with a significant number of instruments that have been used in the literature to address the possible reverse causality between democracy aid and the levels and dynamics of democracy under an instrumental variable framework. We tested several instruments, including (i) the composition of cabinet or government according to its ideology in donor countries, using the Comparative Political Data Set (CPDS); (ii) gender composition of parliament in donor countries, also using data from the CPDS; and (iii) inflation in donor countries, using data from the World Development Indicators (WDI). All three instruments were weighted by recipient country using two different approaches: (i) weighting by the geographical distance between recipient and donor countries; and (ii) weighted by the trade volume between recipient and donor countries.

The first instrument was implemented under the assumption that more liberal parliaments are more likely to promote democratic values among aid recipient countries. The same logic is assumed for

the second instrument, with the assumption that women are more likely to promote democracy through aid in recipient countries. Lastly, the assumption behind the third instrument, inflation in the donor countries, is that in times when the domestic economy is going well, donor countries are more likely to spend more money on development cooperation, including democracy promotion. We estimated several models with different combinations of the instrument sets, but none of these potential instruments passed the instrument validity tests.

Therefore, we resort to a maximum likelihood estimation and structural equation modelling (ML-SEM) approach proposed by Moral-Benito (2013) and Moral-Benito *et al.* (2019), which is significantly more efficient than GMM methods, and suffers less from finite sample biases, especially when the number of units in the panel is small. The ML-SEM method relaxes several constraints that are symptomatic in dynamic panel models; and unlike most related fixed effects methods, it allows for the inclusion of time-invariant controls. ML-SEM models are very computationally demanding, so our choice inevitably came at the cost of convergence issues with variants of our models, which in the end limited our analytical options.

Under such circumstances, and in the absence of valid instrumental variables, we estimate alternative fixed effects (FE) models to mitigate the potential threat of omitted variables bias. The FE model takes the following form:

$$D_{it} = \alpha_{it} + \beta X_{it} + \varphi A_{it} + \eta_i + \upsilon_t + \epsilon_{it}, \qquad (3)$$

where the subscripts i and t denote country and year, respectively; D_{it} measures the indices of democracy discussed above; A_{it} measures the adopted definitions of democracy aid, as discussed above, while X_{it} is a vector of covariates included in Models 1 to 4. η_i denotes unobserved country-specific and time-invariant effects; υ_t is a vector of time dummies capturing universal time trends, whereas α_{it}, β_{it}, φ_{it}, and ϵ_{it} are the intercept, the parameter estimates, and the idiosyncratic error term, respectively.

We consider two alternative specifications to equation (3). One specification enters democracy aid lagged one period to capture possible delayed feedback effects of aid on contemporaneous levels of democracy, and also mitigate the possibility of an endogenous relationship of aid on democracy, since contemporaneous levels of democracy cannot determine aid allocations in t−1. The other specification enters aid in per capita terms to account for the effect of aid after accounting for the size of the recipient countries' populations.

We include models with interactions between aid and types of political regimes, following the typology proposed by Lührmann *et al.* (2018) to test for the effect of aid on democracy, conditional upon the strength of democratic institutions. Our theoretical prediction is that the parameter of interest, φ_{it}, takes a positive and statistically significant value, although contingent upon the contemporaneous status of democratic institutions. We expect a positive effect of democracy aid in countries with already operating democracies, and a negative or null effect in autocracies.

The presence of country fixed effects (FE) in (1) suggests that the preferred approach would be the FE model, which allows to mitigate heterogeneity-induced bias and control for fixed-effects-related endogeneity. In order to test whether equation (3) would be adequately modelled using random-effects (RE), we compute the Durbin–Wu–Hausman test. The results indicate that we can reject the null that the individual country-specific effects are uncorrelated with the independent variables, thus favouring the use of the FE model.

We estimated equation (3) using two functional forms: one adopts a linear-log specification, where D_{it} is linear and A_{it} is logarithmic, whereas the other adopts a log-log specification. The linear-log specification is preferable because it provides the absolute change in V-Dem's electoral democracy indices associated with a per cent change in democracy aid allocations. The log-log specification has the advantage of smoothing the data and allowing coefficients to be interpreted as elasticities. In order to make the logarithmic relationship more reasonable, we rescaled V-Dem's democracy indices to run from values close to zero to values close

to 100. We focus the discussion on the results from the linear-log functional form. The results based on the log-log specification point to similar positive effects.

Table A1: The impact of democracy aid on democracy – ML-SEM estimates

International democracy support	ML-SEM (linear-log)			ML-SEM (log-log)		
	Developmental aid	Democracy aid (extensive definition)	Democracy aid (limited definition)	Developmental aid	Democracy aid (extensive definition)	Democracy aid (limited definition)
Model 1	0.319	0.747	1.486*	0.030	0.037*	0.053**
Model 2	0.317	0.389	0.697	0.036***	0.035**	0.035**
Swedish Aid						
Model 1	0.961*	2.159***	2.282***	0.036***	0.065***	0.073***
Model 2	0.567	1.068**	1.670***	0.007	0.029**	0.058***
DAC-countries aid						
Model 1	0.517	0.960	1.273	0.031*	0.047**	0.043
Model 2	0.248	0.537	1.251*	0.038***	0.039**	0.048**
Multilateral aid						
Model 1	0.311	0.829	0.886*	0.028	0.008	0.026*
Model 2	0.583	0.790	1.108**	0.039***	0.047*	0.003
Bilateral aid						
Model 1	0.505	0.964	1.276	0.031*	0.047**	0.044
Model 2	0.265	0.543	1.258*	0.037***	0.039**	0.048**
Top 5 DAC donors[1]						
Model 1	0.587	1.527*	1.680**	0.042**	0.075***	0.060***
Model 2	0.248	0.504	1.019*	0.036**	0.044**	0.042***

Source: Authors

[1]Top 5 DAC donors are: United States, Germany, Japan, United Kingdom and France.

Table A2: The impact of democracy aid on democracy – Fixed-effects estimates

International democracy support	Aid			Aid lagged one period			Aid per capita		
	Developmental aid	Democracy aid (extensive definition)	Democracy aid (limited definition)	Developmental aid	Democracy aid (extensive definition)	Democracy aid (limited definition)	Developmental aid	Democracy aid (extensive definition)	Democracy aid (limited definition)
Model 1	0.163**	0.350***	0.142*	0.221***	0.439***	0.233***	1.615***	1.083***	0.683***
Model 2	0.126	0.295***	0.144	0.177**	0.392***	0.247***	1.921***	1.184***	0.715***
Model 3	0.263***	0.372***	0.302***	0.300***	0.456***	0.435***	1.748***	0.984***	0.589***
Model 4	0.284***	0.361***	0.272**	0.261**	0.368***	0.335***	1.998***	1.005***	0.625***
Swedish Aid									
Model 1	0.034	0.188***	0.084	0.076	0.227***	0.091*	0.480***	0.665***	0.196
Model 2	0.153**	0.215***	0.069	0.232***	0.261***	0.137**	0.584***	0.584***	-0.005
Model 3	0.201***	0.296***	0.131**	0.275***	0.316***	0.057	0.774***	0.712***	0.028
Model 4	0.230***	0.239***	0.116*	0.308***	0.289***	0.195***	0.838***	0.703***	0.094
DAC-countries aid									
Model 1	0.154*	0.378***	0.042	0.204***	0.461***	0.155**	1.514***	1.424***	0.486***
Model 2	0.132	0.344***	0.078	0.179**	0.424***	0.189**	1.750***	1.772***	0.503***
Model 3	0.290***	0.481***	0.234**	0.328***	0.529***	0.376***	1.904***	1.802***	0.408*
Model 4	0.325***	0.470***	0.210**	0.305***	0.438***	0.303***	2.288***	1.855***	0.462**
Multilateral aid									
Model 1	0.178***	0.250***	0.292***	0.233***	0.233***	0.275***	0.669***	0.445***	0.367***
Model 2	0.209***	0.244***	0.321***	0.245***	0.218***	0.326***	0.768***	0.358***	0.239**
Model 3	0.168**	0.220***	0.298***	0.215***	0.178***	0.316***	0.567***	0.226*	0.297**
Model 4	0.125	0.191***	0.228***	0.166**	0.162***	0.248***	0.633***	0.238**	0.290**
Bilateral aid									
Model 1	0.155**	0.378***	0.043	0.204***	0.461***	0.156**	1.506***	1.424***	0.490***
Model 2	0.135	0.344***	0.080	0.178**	0.426***	0.190**	1.758***	1.774***	0.509***
Model 3	0.293***	0.481***	0.236**	0.326***	0.531***	0.378***	1.919***	1.802***	0.419*
Model 4	0.328***	0.469***	0.213**	0.297***	0.440***	0.305***	2.339***	1.855***	0.474**
Top 5 DAC donors[1]									
Model 1	0.203**	0.249***	0.147**	0.270***	0.393***	0.272***	1.406***	0.951***	0.532***
Model 2	0.134	0.251***	0.122*	0.189**	0.310***	0.211***	1.436***	0.977***	0.581***
Model 3	0.290***	0.325***	0.182**	0.337***	0.356***	0.291***	1.204***	1.086***	0.691***
Model 4	0.349***	0.262***	0.155**	0.322***	0.229**	0.212***	1.485***	1.114***	0.778***

Source: Authors

[1]Top 5 DAC donors are: United States, Germany, Japan, United Kingdom and France.

Does democracy aid support democratization (upturns) or help avoid democratic backsliding (downturns)?

Looking at the countries in which Sweden has been most actively involved in democracy promotion over the past 25 years, electoral autocracies and fragile electoral democracies seem to figure most strongly in recent years (see Table 10 and Table 11). The type of political regimes among Sweden's top priority countries can certainly experience asymmetric democratic trajectories over time, which in turn can be influenced by democracy aid allocations.

In order to investigate the question of whether democracy aid enhances transitions to greater democracy (upturns) or mitigates political downturns, we follow Knutsen *et al.* (2019) and Teorell (2010) and adopt an equation that takes the form:

$$D_{it}^* = \alpha_{it} + \beta X_{it} + \varphi A_{it} + \eta_i + \upsilon_t + \epsilon_{it} \qquad (4)$$

Equation (4) is similar to (3), however, in this case, D_{it} takes the form of two indicators that capture instances of positive (or negative) changes in V-Dem's electoral democracy index by taking the first difference of the index, and setting all cases of no change or negative (or positive) values to zero. Thus, $D_{it} = D_{it}^*$ if $D_{it}^* > 0$, and $D_{it} = 0$ if $D_{it}^* \leq 0$, while the error term, ϵ_{it}, follows a left-censored at zero distribution, $N(0,\sigma_{u\lceil \upsilon}^2)$.

The parameter φ from equation (4) yields a fixed-effects estimate of the impact of democracy aid on *democratization* (upturns) or *democratic backsliding* (downturns).

Given the left-censored distribution of D_{it}, the use of OLS leads to biased and inconsistent estimates. Therefore, we resort to Honoré's (1992) semiparametric method to obtain fixed-effect Tobit estimators. We present the results of the FE and Tobit-FE estimators in Tables A46-A111.

The effect of democracy aid on regime type

In this section, we adopt an empirical strategy that addresses the question of whether democracy aid is more or less effective at supporting democracies or autocracies. We do so by following Baetschmann *et al.* (2015) and fitting fixed-effects ordered logit estimators. The model takes the following form:

$$R_{it}^* = \beta X_{it} + \varphi A_{it} + \eta_i + \epsilon_{it}. \tag{5}$$

where our measures of democracy aid, A_{it}, and the vector of covariates in X_{it} do not include an intercept because the time-invariant, country-specific part of the unobservables in η_i acts in this models as individual-specific intercepts (Baetschmann *et al.*, 2020).

We implement the FE ordered logit in equation (5) using the regime classification proposed by Lührmann *et al.*, (2018), which separates political regimes into four *k* categories: k=1 for closed autocracies, k=2 for electoral autocracies, k=3 for electoral democracies, and k=4 for liberal democracies.

In this sense, the latent variable R_{it}^* becomes the ordered regime indicator R_{it} via the thresholds τ_{ik}. Therefore,

$$R_{it} = k \quad \text{if} \quad \tau_{ik} < R_{it}^* \leq \tau_{ik+1} \quad k = 1, \dots, K$$

We estimate equation (5) by applying the conditional maximum likelihood (CML) estimator proposed by Chamberlain (1980). Since we are interest in the marginal probability effects of democracy aid, we present in Tables A112-A115 the full results of the models.

Table A3: Countries that experienced democratization or reversal since 1995

Country	Year	Change
Afghanistan	2004	Democratize
Albania	2002	Democratize
Albania	2004	Reverse

Country	Year	Change
Albania	2005	Democratize
Albania	2013	Democratize
Albania	2017	Reverse
Albania	2018	Reverse
Algeria	1995	Democratize
Angola	2010	Democratize
Armenia	1996	Reverse
Bangladesh	2002	Reverse
Bangladesh	2007	Reverse
Bangladesh	2008	Democratize
Bangladesh	2009	Democratize
Bangladesh	2011	Reverse
Bangladesh	2012	Democratize
Bangladesh	2013	Reverse
Barbados	2015	Democratize
Belarus	1997	Reverse
Benin	2013	Democratize
Benin	2015	Reverse
Bhutan	2008	Democratize
Bhutan	2009	Democratize
Bhutan	2013	Reverse
Bhutan	2016	Democratize
Bhutan	2017	Reverse
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1996	Democratize
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1997	Democratize

Country	Year	Change
Botswana	2010	Democratize
Botswana	2017	Reverse
Botswana	2018	Democratize
Burkina Faso	2000	Democratize
Burkina Faso	2015	Reverse
Burkina Faso	2016	Democratize
Burundi	1996	Reverse
Burundi	2005	Democratize
Cabo Verde	2010	Democratize
Cabo Verde	2018	Reverse
Central African Republic	2004	Reverse
Central African Republic	2005	Democratize
Chad	1997	Democratize
Chile	1996	Democratize
Comoros	2000	Reverse
Comoros	2002	Democratize
Comoros	2006	Democratize
Comoros	2015	Reverse
Congo, Dem. Rep.	2006	Democratize
Congo, Rep.	1997	Reverse
Congo, Rep.	2002	Democratize
Cote d'Ivoire	2013	Democratize
Croatia	2000	Democratize
Cyprus	2004	Democratize
Dominican Republic	1996	Democratize

Country	Year	Change
Egypt, Arab Rep.	2013	Reverse
Egypt, Arab Rep.	2014	Democratize
El Salvador	1995	Democratize
El Salvador	1996	Reverse
El Salvador	1999	Democratize
Equatorial Guinea	1996	Democratize
Estonia	1999	Democratize
Fiji	2000	Reverse
Fiji	2002	Democratize
Fiji	2007	Reverse
Fiji	2014	Democratize
Gambia, The	1995	Reverse
Gambia, The	1996	Democratize
Gambia, The	2018	Democratize
Georgia	2004	Democratize
Georgia	2010	Reverse
Georgia	2011	Democratize
Ghana	2003	Democratize
Ghana	2015	Reverse
Ghana	2017	Democratize
Greece	2018	Reverse
Guatemala	2000	Democratize
Guinea	2009	Reverse
Guinea	2010	Democratize
Guinea-Bissau	2013	Reverse

Country	Year	Change
Guinea-Bissau	2014	Democratize
Guinea-Bissau	2015	Democratize
Guyana	1998	Democratize
Haiti	1995	Democratize
Haiti	2005	Reverse
Haiti	2006	Democratize
Honduras	2006	Reverse
Honduras	2007	Democratize
Honduras	2008	Reverse
Hungary	2006	Reverse
Hungary	2007	Democratize
Hungary	2010	Reverse
Hungary	2018	Reverse
Indonesia	2000	Democratize
Iraq	1995	Democratize
Iraq	2000	Reverse
Iraq	2005	Democratize
Korea, Rep.	2018	Reverse
Kosovo	1999	Reverse
Kosovo	2002	Democratize
Kosovo	2003	Reverse
Kosovo	2005	Democratize
Kosovo	2008	Reverse
Kosovo	2009	Democratize
Kosovo	2011	Reverse

Country	Year	Change
Kosovo	2013	Democratize
Kyrgyz Republic	1995	Democratize
Latvia	2009	Democratize
Latvia	2016	Reverse
Latvia	2017	Democratize
Lebanon	2008	Democratize
Lebanon	2009	Reverse
Lebanon	2010	Democratize
Lebanon	2013	Reverse
Lebanon	2014	Democratize
Lebanon	2017	Reverse
Lesotho	1995	Reverse
Lesotho	1998	Democratize
Lesotho	1999	Reverse
Lesotho	2002	Democratize
Lesotho	2003	Democratize
Liberia	1997	Democratize
Liberia	2004	Reverse
Liberia	2005	Democratize
Liberia	2006	Democratize
Libya	2012	Democratize
Libya	2013	Democratize
Libya	2014	Reverse
Lithuania	2016	Reverse
Madagascar	2001	Reverse

Country	Year	Change
Madagascar	2006	Democratize
Madagascar	2009	Reverse
Madagascar	2010	Reverse
Madagascar	2013	Democratize
Malawi	1995	Democratize
Malawi	1999	Reverse
Malawi	2009	Democratize
Maldives	2008	Democratize
Maldives	2009	Democratize
Maldives	2014	Reverse
Mali	1998	Reverse
Mali	2002	Democratize
Mali	2012	Reverse
Mali	2014	Democratize
Mauritania	2006	Reverse
Mauritania	2007	Democratize
Mauritania	2008	Reverse
Mauritania	2009	Democratize
Mauritius	2017	Reverse
Mauritius	2018	Democratize
Mexico	1995	Democratize
Moldova	2005	Reverse
Moldova	2006	Democratize
Moldova	2007	Reverse
Moldova	2008	Democratize

Country	Year	Change
Moldova	2009	Reverse
Moldova	2010	Democratize
Montenegro	1998	Reverse
Montenegro	2003	Democratize
Montenegro	2008	Reverse
Mozambique	1997	Democratize
Mozambique	1998	Reverse
Mozambique	2005	Democratize
Mozambique	2009	Reverse
Myanmar	2011	Democratize
Namibia	1995	Democratize
Namibia	2000	Democratize
Namibia	2017	Reverse
Nepal	2002	Reverse
Nepal	2008	Democratize
Nepal	2012	Reverse
Nepal	2014	Democratize
Nicaragua	2007	Reverse
Niger	1996	Reverse
Niger	2000	Democratize
Niger	2009	Reverse
Niger	2010	Reverse
Niger	2011	Democratize
Nigeria	1999	Democratize
Nigeria	2013	Democratize

Country	Year	Change
North Macedonia	1999	Democratize
North Macedonia	2000	Reverse
North Macedonia	2002	Democratize
North Macedonia	2013	Reverse
North Macedonia	2017	Democratize
Pakistan	1999	Reverse
Pakistan	2002	Democratize
Palestine/Gaza	2007	Reverse
Papua New Guinea	2008	Reverse
Papua New Guinea	2010	Democratize
Papua New Guinea	2011	Reverse
Peru	1995	Democratize
Peru	2001	Democratize
Philippines	2004	Reverse
Philippines	2010	Democratize
Poland	2016	Reverse
Rwanda	2003	Democratize
Serbia	2001	Democratize
Serbia	2007	Democratize
Serbia	2010	Reverse
Serbia	2015	Reverse
Seychelles	2013	Democratize
Seychelles	2014	Reverse
Seychelles	2016	Democratize
Sierra Leone	1996	Democratize

Country	Year	Change
Sierra Leone	1998	Reverse
Sierra Leone	2002	Democratize
Sierra Leone	2003	Democratize
Sierra Leone	2012	Reverse
Sierra Leone	2013	Democratize
Sierra Leone	2014	Reverse
Sierra Leone	2016	Democratize
Slovak Republic	1995	Democratize
Slovak Republic	1999	Democratize
Slovak Republic	2013	Reverse
Solomon Islands	2000	Reverse
Solomon Islands	2004	Democratize
Solomon Islands	2005	Reverse
Solomon Islands	2007	Democratize
South Africa	1995	Democratize
South Africa	2000	Democratize
South Africa	2013	Reverse
South Sudan	2011	Reverse
Sri Lanka	2006	Reverse
Sri Lanka	2015	Democratize
Sudan	1996	Democratize
Syrian Arab Republic	2013	Reverse
Taiwan, China	1996	Democratize
Taiwan, China	2000	Democratize
Taiwan, China	2013	Reverse

Country	Year	Change
Taiwan, China	2016	Democratize
Tanzania	1996	Democratize
Tanzania	2001	Reverse
Tanzania	2007	Democratize
Tanzania	2013	Reverse
Tanzania	2014	Democratize
Tanzania	2016	Reverse
Thailand	1998	Democratize
Thailand	2006	Reverse
Thailand	2008	Democratize
Thailand	2012	Democratize
Thailand	2013	Reverse
Thailand	2014	Reverse
Timor-Leste	2001	Democratize
Timor-Leste	2003	Democratize
Togo	2008	Democratize
Togo	2010	Reverse
Togo	2014	Democratize
Togo	2017	Reverse
Trinidad and Tobago	2005	Democratize
Tunisia	2012	Democratize
Tunisia	2017	Democratize
Tunisia	2018	Reverse
Turkey	2014	Reverse
Turkmenistan	2013	Democratize

Country	Year	Change
Uganda	1996	Democratize
Ukraine	1998	Reverse
Ukraine	2006	Democratize
Ukraine	2012	Reverse
Uzbekistan	2000	Democratize
Uzbekistan	2009	Reverse
Uzbekistan	2010	Democratize
Uzbekistan	2014	Reverse
Vanuatu	2017	Democratize
Venezuela, RB	2003	Reverse
Vietnam	2011	Democratize
Vietnam	2016	Reverse
West Bank and Gaza	1996	Democratize
West Bank and Gaza	2004	Democratize
West Bank and Gaza	2007	Reverse
Yemen, Rep.	2016	Reverse
Zambia	2000	Democratize
Zambia	2002	Reverse
Zambia	2006	Democratize
Zambia	2014	Reverse