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EVALUATION OF THE SWEDISH CLIMATE CHANGE INITIATIVE, 2009–2012: FOREST INVESTMENT PROGRAM CASE STUDY

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Evaluation of Swedish Climate Change Initiative 2009 – 2012: Forest Investment Program Case Study

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Abbreviations

CCCD	Commission on Climate Change and Development
CCI	(Swedish) Climate Change Initiative
CIF	Climate Investment Funds
CIF AU	CIF Administrative Unit
COP	Conference of Parties (to the UNFCCC)
DGM	Dedicated Grant Mechanism
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EAI	Enabling to Asset Investment
EBA	Expert Group for Aid Studies
ELPFFRE	Evaluation and Learning Partnership on Financing Forest-Related Enterprises
EN	Emerald Network
ERG	Evaluation Reference Group
FCPF	Forest Carbon Partnership Facility
FIP	Forest Investment Program
FIP AU	FIP Administrative Unit
FIP-SC	FIP Sub-Committee
GCF	Green Climate Fund
GEA	Global Executing Agency (of DGM Global)
GEF	Global Environment Facility
ghg	greenhouse gas
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
IDA	International Development Association
IP	Investment Plan
IPLCs	Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities
LDC	Least Developed Country
LTS	Land and Timber Services
LULUCF	Land use land use change and forestry
M&E	Monitoring and evaluation
MDB	Multi-lateral Development Bank
MFA	Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs
NDC	Nationally Determined Contributions
NEA	National Executing Agency (of a DGM country project)
ODA	Official (sometimes *Overseas*) Development Assistance
ODI	Overseas Development Institute
PSSA	Private Sector Set Aside
REDD+	Reduction of emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, and the conservation of forests, sustainable forest management and enhancement of carbon forest stocks
SCF	Strategic Climate Fund

TCLP	Transformational Change Learning Partnership
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UN-REDD	United Nations Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation

Preface by the EBA

In 2009, the Swedish government decided to start using ODA to deal with climate change and its negative effects. With a primary focus on the poorest countries, and mainly on their adaptation to climate change, Sweden set aside 4 bn SEK to be used over a four-year period. Furthermore, this constituted a major part of Sweden's 7 bn SEK contribution to the internationally agreed 'fast-start' of climate finance.

Ten years later, this surge of climate finance, including the bilateral, regional and multilateral activities to which it was put to use, has been evaluated. This report contains a case study of the climate change initiative's (CCI) support to the multilateral Forest Investment Program has been evaluated. Together with ten other case study reports this study is published on-line and may be found at https://eba.se/en/ebarapport/. The synthesis report of the evaluation, together with a separate summary of the evaluation are available in print and on-line.

It is our hope that this evaluation may provide guidance for the future use of ODA in the efforts to curbe climate change. The intended users of the evaluation are primarily staff at the MFA and Sida who engage in this challenge on a daily basis.

The evaluation has been accompanied by a reference group. This group has taken active part in a particular learning process the evaulation has facilitated. The reference group has been chaired by Johan Schaar, vice chair of the EBA. The responsibility of the analysis and the recommendations rests entirely with the evaluators.

Helena Lindholm, EBA Chair

Introduction

The Expert Group of Aid Studies (EBA) has commissioned an impact evaluation of the Swedish Climate Change Initiative (CCI, 2009-2012). The CCI was a four-year Swedish Government programme in climate change adaptation and mitigation measures, totalling SEK 4 billion of ODA. Two thirds of this funding were allocated through multinational organisations via the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA) and one third to bilateral and regional efforts via Sida. The goal of the CCI was "to effectively contribute to long term adaptation efforts, especially in the poorest countries, and to developing countries' efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions."

Selection of the FIP as a case study

CCI multilateral funding totalling SEK 2.9 billion (USD 407 million) was allocated to 17 multinational funds, programmes and initiatives. Four of these programmes were selected as case studies within the evaluation – two case studies with an adaptation focus and two with a mitigation focus. The FIP was selected by the MFA as one of the two case studies within the mitigation group.

A single allocation of SEK 100 million (USD 15 million) was made by the CCI to the FIP in December 2011, to be reported on within the 2-year period 2012-13. In comparison with some of the other case studies in the evaluation, the FIP case study is relatively light touch, or 'shallow dive'. This means that the case study is based on a limited review of primary data and a limited number of interviews held remotely. Compared with two of the multilateral case studies (the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery, and the Adaptation Fund), which involve both global and country case study assessments, the FIP case study involves a global assessment only.

Evaluation framework and methodology

The two questions guiding the overall evaluation, of which this is a contributing case study, are:

Q1: Has the CCI contributed to sustainable climate change adaptation and mitigation in poor countries? If so in what way, and to what extent?

- what was the value of taking a principles-based approach to guide CCI investments & implementation?
- how did this translate into sustainable impacts over the longer term?

Q2: What lessons from the CCI can inform climate aid today?

To answer these questions, 10 telephonic interviews were held and a range of documentation reviewed. Interviews were held with officials from the Swedish MFA, the Climate Investment Funds (CIF), the FIP, the World Bank and with donor representatives on the FIP Steering Committee (FIP-SC). The number of interviewees affiliated with each organisation is included at the end of the case study. Reviewed documents included: FIP-SC co-chair summary reports, participants lists, operations and results reports; Evaluation and Learning reports commissioned by CIF; MFA overarching strategy & development policies; MFA internal evaluation of CIF and contractual documents relating to the FIP financial contribution; independent reviews and reports on climate change, REDD+ and climate finance.

The case study starts with the bigger picture of the FIP (section 2) and then digs down into Sweden's, and then specifically CCI's contribution, which is broken into two time periods (section 3). Section 4 reflects on what has been learnt through the FIP and on how and what Sweden and CCI contributed. The report concludes with some discussion points for further consideration.

This case study uses evaluations commissioned by the CIF Evaluation and Learning Unit in assessing the FIP's contribution and challenges to global progress on the conservation and enhancement of forest carbon stocks within a broader paradigm of sustainable development. Sweden's role – and the contribution of CCI – is seen in the light of these broader efforts.

Limitations

Given that this is a 'shallow dive' assessment at a global level only, certain biases are likely to be present. In particular, local impacts and subtle but potentially important nuances in how people are managing forests will be invisible at this scale. It is also difficult to evaluate how sustainability practices at different scales impact each other, and whether, for example, there are unintended local consequences of international and national policy that is considered 'good practice'.

The study is also limited by the number and timing of interviews we were able to conduct, as well as the fact that the CCI was "some time ago" and many interviewees from that time period don't remember the details well. Furthermore, it was not possible to interview anyone who remembers Sweden's participation in the early years of the FIP. Where possible, interview comments have been cross-checked with other interviews or against written documentation.

Contextualising the FIP story

The FIP was developed at a particular time in the history of climate change negotiations and climate finance. Although the climate science was clear, international mechanisms and commitments to address climate change were weak. The political economy of climate change remained contested, not only between developed and developing countries but within different blocs. The slowness of multilateral negotiations combined with continued denialism clashed with the necessary urgency that was becoming increasingly apparent through emerging climate change science. The FIP, developed outside the multilateral climate change negotiations, was a way to side-step some of these difficulties.

Forests, climate change and financing

Forests cover 4 billion hectares, or one third of land on earth. They are integral to maintaining healthy ecosystem services, including fresh water and soil. Tropical forests support the livelihoods of an estimated 1.6 billion people who depend on forest resources[1].

Over the past decade forests have been lost at a rate of seven million hectares per year[2]. Their destruction contributes significantly to climate change. For the period 2002–2011, average annual emissions from forestry and other land use were 3.3 ± 2.9 $GtCO_2$/yr. This is an increase of 40 percent since 1970[3]. Deforestation and forest degradation account for up to 20 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions[4]. One of the identified central challenges for improving forest management is that Official Development Assistance (ODA) represents only 1 per cent of the

1 Bird et al. (2017).

2 CIF. (2016).

3 IPCC. (2014).

4 Itad in assoc. with Ross Strategic & ICF. (2019a).

total investment in forests; the remainder comes from private sources and capital markets[5].

Since the late 1990s there have been ongoing efforts to give carbon stored in forests a financial value in order to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation. The logic was that if trees had more value alive than dead, they would not be cut. This was given international recognition through the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) thirteenth Conference of Parties (COP13) Bali Plan of Action in 2007, which called for 'policy approaches and positive incentives on issues relating to reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries (REDD) and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stock in developing countries'[6]. The addition of forest conservation, sustainable management and enhancement of carbon stock changed REDD to REDD+. However there was concern that turning forests, which are complex living systems, into carbon sinks could result in perverse behaviours. Thus in 2010, at COP16 in Cancun, Mexico, a set of seven safeguards was agreed. They include respect for the knowledge and rights of indigenous peoples and local communities, as well as their full and effective participation[7]. However these safeguards do not adequately address concerns around the inclusion of plantations as forests, leaving open the possibility that monoculture stands of trees could be used to off-set emissions resulting from fossil fuels.

REDD+ activities have three stages: readiness, implementation and results-based payment. Programmes and funding for REDD+ is channelled through the Global Environment Facility (GEF), UN-REDD and the FIP. The FIP focuses primarily on the middle stage, REDD+ implementation. Money for the third phase – results-based payment will come through carbon purchases via, for example, the

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[5] IIED / LTS. (2019a).

[6] IPCC. (2014).

[7] UNFCCC. (2010).

Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) carbon fund[8]. The Green Climate Fund (GCF) has recently announced a five-year pilot of USD 500 million for projects with quantifiable and verifiable forest emission reductions[9].

Overview of the FIP

"The good thing about the FIP is that while it provides essential investments in support of REDD+ it does not consider reduction of greenhouse gases as its only focus. We believe forests have value on their own and we finance projects that also contribute towards other important goals such as sustainable development, improved local livelihoods, increased biodiversity, and better governance" (Official, CIF, World Bank)

The Forest Investment Programme is a sub-fund of the Strategic Climate Fund (SCF), which is one of two funds under the Climate Investment Funds (CIF). The CIF was set up in 2008 as an interim measure to provide new and additional climate finance to pilot transformational actions in selected developing countries. It is administered by the World Bank. The CIF does not fall under the United National Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) but includes a 'sunset clause' which enables closure once a new financial architecture is agreed under the UNFCCC. The FIP donors are Australia, Denmark, Japan, Norway, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States of America.

The FIP supports developing countries' efforts on REDD+ and sustainable forest management through a two stage programming process. First, each recipient country develops an investment plan (IP) with assistance from its relevant Multilateral Development Bank (MDB). Secondly, individual projects within each IP are prepared, approved and implemented[10]. In addition, the FIP has two discrete funds, i) the Direct Grant Mechanism (DGM), valued at USD 80 million, which supports the inclusion of Indigenous People and Local Communities and ii) the Private Sector Set Aside (PSSA)

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[8] Parker et al. (2015)

[9] Bird et al, (2017).

[10] ICF International. (2014).

valued at USD 17 million, which was established to contribute to the financing of innovative programmes and projects that engage the private sector. Funds are channelled through MDBs that have national programmes.

Figure 1: The FIP as a fund within the CIF[11]



In 2009, eight pilot countries were selected for the FIP: Brazil, Burkina Faso, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Ghana, Indonesia, Lao People's Democratic Republic (Lao PDR), Mexico, and Peru – three of these are Least Developed Countries (LDCs)[12]. In 2015, an additional fifteen countries joined the FIP – Bangladesh, Cambodia, Cameroon, Congo Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Ivory Coast, Mozambique, Nepal, Rwanda, Tunisia, Uganda, and Zambia (eight of these LDCs)[13] – although only six were allocated funding beyond the development of their IP[14].

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[11] Numbers taken from CIF website, accessed 27 April 2019: https://www.climateinvestmentfunds.org/sites/cif_enc/files/knowledge-documents/cifat_a_glance_january_2019_0.pdf

[12] Burkina Faso, DRC, Lao PDR

[13] Bangladesh, Cambodia, Congo Republic, Mozambique, Nepal, Rwanda, Uganda, Zambia.

[14] These were: Congo Republic, Côte d'Ivoire, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mozambique, and Nepal.

The FIP is governed by a 12-member Sub-Committee which meets twice a year. It is comprised of an equal number of donor and recipient countries. Representatives from all recipient countries, MDBs, the World Bank (as Trustee), civil society, the private sector, indigenous people and selected multilateral climate change and forestry agencies may attend Sub-Committee meetings as Observers. An expert group of 8 people was established by the FIP-SC to make recommendations on the selection of pilot programmes for the FIP. Country IPs are presented and approved at FIP-SC meetings. The second stage of programming – development and approval of specific projects – usually happens between meetings. Once approved by the FIP, they are submitted to the MDBs for approval.

In May 2011, the FIP proposed a results framework (see Figure 2 overleaf). This was to be a living document that formed the basis of moving forward on investment plans, projects and programmes[15]. A revised version was proposed in September 2012 and the first actual results reported in 2014. The FIP was to supplement existing ODA flows to address *drivers* of deforestation and forest degradation. It would invest in i) activities *outside* the forest sector, ii) *sustainable management* of forests and iii) *institutional capacity*, forest governance and information. The outcome would be reduced pressure on forests and their ecosystems resulting in reduced ghg emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, and enhanced forest carbon stocks. The logic was that within 15 to 20 years, these interventions would lead to improved low carbon, climate resilient development.

The Evaluation and Learning Partnership on financing forest-related enterprises (ELPFFRE) report of 2019 articulates the four main objectives for the FIP support to developing countries as *(emphasis added)*:

1. Initiate and facilitate *transformational change* in developing countries' forest related policies and practices;

[15] CIF. (2011).

2. Facilitate the *leveraging of additional and sustained financial resources* for REDD+;
3. *Pilot replicable models* to generate understanding and learning of the links between the implementation of *forest-related investments, policies and measures and long-term emission reductions*; and,
4. Provide valuable experience and feedback in the context of the UNFCCC deliberations on REDD+[16].

Table 1: Logic model – Forest Investment Program (FIP), 2011

FIP Inputs	New & additional resources supplementing existing ODA flows
Project/ Program Activities (1 – 7 years)	Investments in sustainable mgmt of forests; institutional capacity, governance
Project/ Program Output & Outcomes (2 -7 years)	Sustainable forest mgmt. to address deforestation and degradation
Country FIP Catalytic Replication Outcomes (5 – 10 years)	Reduced deforestation and forest degradation, enhanced conservation
Country Transformative Impact (10 – 15 years)	Reduced GHG emissions from deforestation, enhanced forest carbon stocks; reduced poverty, reduced biodiversity loss
Global Final Outcome (15 – 20 years)	Improved low carbon, climate resilient development

Before looking at the FIP's achievements, it is helpful to remember where it fits into the three phases of REDD+. The FIP is working on activities in phase 2 to gear countries for the next phase of

[16] IIED/ LTS. (2019b). p.19

REDD+, thus there is a clear linkage between the FIP and REDD+ readiness (phase 1). It is not in the mission of the FIP to prepare FIP investments for carbon markets or direct payment schemes. The FIP aims to bridge the gap between REDD+ readiness and results-based payments activities (phase 3). In this regard, the FIP is often described as the "missing middle" in REDD+ finance[17].

FIP achievements and barriers encountered

"The overarching expected results for projects currently under implementation include an estimated reduction or avoidance of greenhouse gasses (GHG) emission of 11.71 MtCO2e, more than one million people receiving livelihoods co-benefits, and a coverage area of 31 million hectares." (FIP Operations & Results Report Dec 2017)

This section summarises areas in which the FIP has made progress and those where intended changes have not yet manifested.

The most recent FIP operational and results report (29 Dec 2018) indicates that there has been progress on biodiversity protection, forest governance, tenure issues and capacity development. Quantitative targets are presented in Table 2 below.

Table 2: Quantitative results against targets

	Targets	Results to date (2017)	Progress (%) towards target
Theme 1.1: GHG emission reductions/ enhancement of carbon stock (MtCO2e)	15.66	N/A	N/A
Theme 1.1: Area covered (ha)	36 058 540	9 437 831	26.17%
Theme 1.2: Livelihood co-benefits (people)	1 304 442	551 006	42.23%

Source: CIF (2018). Theme 1.1 results data is reported at projects' mid-term and completion

17 CIF. (2014).

It should be noted upfront that for many of the expected results, it is too soon to tell. Over half the projects are only one to two years old. Measurements on reduced emissions and carbon sequestration are not yet available. It is also too early to expect much in the way of observed transformational change. An evaluation of transformational change was published in 2019 as part of the Transformational Change Learning Partnership (TCLP) process under the CIF. The TCLP defines transformational change in climate action as strategic changes in targeted markets and other systems, with large-scale, sustainable impacts that shift and/or accelerate the trajectory toward low-carbon and climate-resilient development. Four dimensions – relevance, systemic change, scale, and sustainability – must be achieved to realise comprehensive transformation[18]. In the 2019 evaluation report, it was noted that signals for transformational change relating to the FIP were "advanced" in relation to relevance, "interim" in relation to systemic change and "early" in relation to scaling and sustainability[19].

There has been strong national ownership and partnership development within the FIP. Countries brought together stakeholders from different government departments, as well as from different civil society, indigenous communities and private sector organisations to develop their IPs. Each approved project is associated with at least one government ministry. The process of developing, implementing and reporting on the IPs and associated projects requires collaboration and national support. Where communication and collaboration has been strong, projects have been more successful. There are several examples of the FIP providing an opportunity for national government departments that don't ordinarily interact to work together. This has helped to broaden forestry from an issue within the environmental ministry (where it often sits) to a broader national development process. There have however also been challenges to national ownership. For example, telephonic meetings or on-line questions by FIP-SC members to recipient countries are often addressed by MDBs. It is

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[18] CIF. (2019).

[19] Itad in assoc. with Ross Strategic & ICF. (2019a.

assumed that the MDBs will consult with recipient countries but this does not always happen.

The inclusion of indigenous people and local communities (IPLC) at both national and international levels is seen as an important achievement by the FIP. The dedicated grant mechanism (DGM) means that money can be given directly to IPLC groups to augment their capacity to participate in FIP implementation. It has achieved both substantive and enabling outcomes. Annex 1 provides a map of these outcomes for different stakeholder groups. However the process of inclusion has not always been straightforward. For example in Peru it took a long time to reach agreement amongst national stakeholders and there was direct lobbying of the FIP-SC by IPLC groups.

Gender considerations have been included in the FIP. There is a FIP gender policy with its own indicators and tracking process. The FIP monitoring and reporting toolkit includes disaggregated indicators on gender in relation to livelihood benefits; and a place to put qualitative information on gender mainstreaming and lessons learnt about integrating gender considerations [20] . The DGM procurement guidelines also stipulate that women must be included in proposal design and as co-implementers. Peru has funded 26 women-led sub-projects (a third of the total number of productive sub-projects there); and in Burkina Faso, four out of fourteen sub-projects funded in the first call came from women's groups[21].

The breakdown of allocated FIP funds is 46 percent to the enabling environment and capacity building and 54 percent to site-specific solutions. Co-financing of approximately USD 900 million has been secured. WRI calculate this as a co-financing ratio of approximately 2.5[22]. The CIF Evaluation and Learning Partnership on Financing Forest-Related Enterprises (ELPFFRE), which is

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[20] CIF. (2018).

[21] Douthwaite, B. et al. (2019).

[22] The co-financing ratio is calculated as total expected co-financing divided by total approved funding, cumulative amounts since fund inception. Amerasinghe, N. et al. (2017). p. 30.

looking at ways of improving access to and leverage of finance from the private sector, has identified a 'missing middle' with respect to investments[23]. This gap lies between micro livelihood investments and large debt or equity investments.

The role of MDBs as sole implementation partners is an innovative way of channelling funds. The other climate funds work with MDBs but also with UN agencies and national institutions. The FIP's approach has made it easier to coordinate with institutions within a country. This, combined with the multi-stakeholder process of developing IPs, has allowed for a more strategic programme on forests, better coordination amongst partners and a bigger impact. Working with MDBs has also provided an opportunity to influence the banks in terms of their approach to forestry. For example, the DGM is implemented strictly by the World Bank. The whole process of coming up with a mechanism designed to give funds directly to IPLCs has been an interesting experience for the WB and influenced how they engage with indigenous people. MDB policies also inform FIP implementation. For example, there is no specific policy regarding safeguards within the FIP and so projects rely on the MDB's safeguard policy as well as national regulation.

There has been a strong focus on a results-based approach and learning within the FIP and the CIF more broadly. This in turn has fostered innovative monitoring and evaluation systems. There is an Evaluation and Learning Unit within CIF, which has commissioned important studies at key stages of the CIF, and to address specific issues within the funds. Another unique characteristic within the FIP has been the reliance on country data and alignment with national M&E systems. This has further strengthened national ownership of FIP programmes. Recipient countries must have an annual stakeholder workshop where different groups with an interest in the FIP analyse progress made and provide input data to be included in the country report. This country-led monitoring and reporting is unique to the FIP. It not only builds country level capacity but different actors from different ministries come together and talk about deforestation, which wouldn't otherwise happen.

[23] IIED / LTS. (2018).

This process works well in countries with more capacity and less well where there is less capacity. The World Bank team run in-country M&R capacity building workshops to put them on the right track and enable them to report back.

Sweden's role: contribution of CCI under FIP

This section covers two time-periods that can roughly be seen as two phases within the FIP. The first time-period, 2009-14, in which Sweden made a direct financial contribution, covers the inception of the FIP and development of its governance structures, disbursement systems, goal setting and monitoring and evaluation frameworks. It includes the selection of 8 pilot countries, approval of their investment plans and agreement of a number of processes and projects within those countries. The second time-period, 2015-19, in which Sweden continued to play a governance oversight role, covers the inclusion of an additional 15 countries, further roll out of processes and projects within the pilot countries and a more in-depth evaluation of results emerging from the FIP.

Sweden's direct contribution (2009 – 2014)

"The purpose of REDD + is to prevent deforestation of the tropical rainforests and to put a price tag on the huge amounts of carbon dioxide stored in forests." (Swedish MFA, 29 November 2011)[24]

Sweden's financial contribution

Sweden made two financial contributions to REDD+ through the CCI. The first was 100 MSEK (USD 15 million) to the Global Environment Facility (GEF) in 2010, earmarked for REDD+. The second was a non-conditional grant to the FIP of 100 MSEK (USD 15 million) in December 2011. At the time total commitments to the FIP were USD 612 million[25]. This is the only money that Sweden

[24] UF2011/72413/UD/MU

[25] USD equivalent, based on exchange rate at 31 March 2012. Trustee Report on the Financial Status of the Strategic Climate Fund, 19 April 2012, https://www.climateinvestmentfunds.org/sites/cif_enc/files/meeting-documents/scf_inf_2_trustee_report_for_may2012_meeting_0.pdf

has contributed to the FIP to date. Sweden also saw the FIP investment as contributing to the fulfilment of MDG7: Ensure environmental sustainability. Although it was only 2.5 percent of the total CCI fund and only 2 percent of the FIP's total fund of USD 750 million (2.5 percent at the time), it allowed Sweden a seat on the FIP's governing body. A breakdown by donor of contributions to the FIP from inception to 30 September 2018 is presented in Figure 3. Of the contributions, one third (USD 251 million) is capital and the remainder is grant funding.

Sweden first participated in the FIP Sub-Committee in May 2012 however, it was not then listed as a country representative. In 2013 and June 2014, Sweden shared a country seat with Australia. From November 2014 to date (April 2019), Sweden has been a full representative on one of the six seats allocated to donor countries on the FIP Sub-Committee[26].

Figure 3: USD contributions to the FIP by donor country



Sweden's choice to invest in FIP

Sweden's choice to support FIP was both political and pragmatic.

26 CIF. FIP-SC Lists of Participants, 2009-2019

"We had a certain amount of money for CCI and had to decide through which organisations we'd channel the funding." (Official, Swedish MFA)

This decision was made by the MFA in close consultation with the Ministries for Environment and Enterprise, which were in charge of forestry. At the time both of the Ministers were from the Centre Party and wanted some funding to go towards forestry projects.

"We had been presented to channel the funding through UN-REDD to which we had not contributed previously. And we made the counter proposal to channel some part of the total amount through the FIP." (Official, Swedish MFA)

Although Sweden had not at that time been part of the FIP either, they had already joined the Clean Technology Fund (CTF), were represented in the CTF Trust Fund Committee, and had good experience from the CIF at large. Results were a key priority for the then Minister for Development Cooperation and to be able to follow the money they invested, Sweden had to be represented on the governing board. There were also human resource considerations and they didn't want to use too many channels.

In these early years of the FIP, tension between countries that wanted to focus investments on forests with high carbon storage potential and those that wanted to focus on forest management to support livelihoods played out in the design process and in the selection of countries. For developing countries, carbon storage was not a priority and they argued their cases well on which projects to support. Sweden's voice was not strong in this debate, which perhaps indicates that their choice to invest in FIP was not clearly articulated within the climate forestry discourse of the time.

Sweden's oversight role

Sweden had no direct influence over how its financial contribution to the FIP was used. This was consistent with their foreign policy position not to earmark funds. However, it was important that the funds to which they contributed were well managed and in line with their principles. Follow up of results was ensured through their FIP-

SC seat, annual reports and information on the website[27]. Furthermore, financial risk was deemed low because the funds were being administered by an effective organisation, a well-functioning internal audit and there were clear rules against corruption. No conflict of interest was considered to exist[28].

An internal MFA document[29] confirms that Sweden was happy with how their financial contribution had been used based on the FIP semi-annual operational report of 10 October 2012, which covers the period 30 April 2012 to 15 September 2012. This was just ten months after the SEK100m grant had been deposited in the IBRD Trust Account.

"In summary the funds received by the program are assessed as having been used in a way that is consistent with the mandate agreed upon." (Government Offices Memo 18 Nov 2013)

By this time (15 September 2012), the FIP investment plans had been endorsed for four pilot countries (Brazil, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lao PDR and Mexico) and thirteen projects and programs being developed under these plans had been included in the FIP pipeline. Burkina Faso, Ghana and Indonesia had submitted their IPs for review and endorsement at the FIP-SC on 5 Nov 2012. Of the pilot countries, only Peru's IP was outstanding[30].

In November 2013, Linda Nilsson from the MFA compiled a report describing activities, results, conclusions and lessons learned from Sweden's climate change initiative, 2009-2012[31]. By that time 20 FIP projects awaited approval but no money had yet been paid out for these. It was too early to report on concrete results. Instead two forecast results were cited: emissions avoidance of 8.2m tonnes of carbon dioxide in Laos over the following 8 years and 90 750

27 Govt. of Sweden: MFA. (2011).

28 Ibid

29 Govt. of Sweden Government Offices Memorandum. (2013).

30 CIF. (2012).

31 Nilsson, L. (2013).

hectares of forest in Mexico to be sustainably managed over the next 10 years.

Although Sweden was (and remains) an active member of the FIP-SC during bi-annual meetings, they did not comment on specific country project proposals that were made between meetings[32]. This was not unusual – the primary countries to comment or raise questions were the main donors: UK, USA and Norway. Interdepartmental preparatory meetings were held in Sweden prior to FIP-SC meetings, but forestry specialists did not attend the FIP-SC meetings. Again, this was not unusual either within Sweden's foreign policy or as a donor country to the FIP and it reflects an efficient use of limited resources.

Sweden held no strong positions at the FIP. In the early years, they would have had to reach agreement with Australia, with whom they held a joint seat prior to the FIP meetings. There were no memorable controversies. In general Sweden was seen to play a constructive role in engaging with other donors as they explored issues that needed to be resolved. Sweden saw its contribution to the FIP as a minor part of its overall contribution to the CIF.

"We were more active in CTF and SREP – our contributions were bigger in these two and we continued supporting SREP for a number of years. When we went to Washington we attended board meetings on all three – maybe we wouldn't have been that active in going to meetings on the other side of the ocean just for FIP." (Official, Swedish MFA)

Sustainability of Sweden's contribution (2015 – 2019)

Although Sweden made no financial contributions in this time period, it retained its full seat on the FIP-SC and continued to participate and engage constructively during meetings. Thus, the continued implementation of projects within the pilot countries, and the expansion of the FIP to include additional countries, can be

[32] Two interviewees had no memory of Sweden commenting; and a search of the CIF website found no record of comments from Sweden.

seen as a longer-term impact of Sweden's earlier financial contribution. Financial contributions from the inception of the FIP continue to be reported on as part of the overall funds available for country programmes. Thus, Sweden is still considered a donor during this time period.

Annex 2 provides details on the state of project approvals and financial disbursements as of mid-2018. Of the USD 754 million total FIP donor contributions and pledges, USD 370 million had been approved by MDBs and USD 157 million disbursed[33]. The projects are still young – the oldest being in Mexico with six years since the first MDB-approved project and the youngest in Cote d'Ivoire of just half a year. Sixty-four percent of projects are two years or less from MDB approval, which represents 51 percent of total FIP funding of MDB-approved projects[34]. Many more projects are in the pipeline, having been approved by the FIP-SC but not yet by the MDBs. A shortfall of funding is anticipated for the yet unfunded IPs and, in February 2019, the FIP-SC invited the CIF AU to continue exploring additional funding options to cover the shortfall[35].

The detailed and collaborative planning, resourcing and implementation of country IPs and associated projects and programmes means that there is considerable momentum for them to continue and for results only to be visible in future years. It will take at least six or eight more years to implement the portfolio with the funds already committed. It is thus too early to assess the long term sustainability of Sweden's contribution to the broader goal of global progress on the conservation and enhancement of forest carbon stocks within a broader paradigm of sustainable development.

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33 Itad in assoc. with Ross Strategic & ICF. (2019a). p6. We note that different reports seem to have slightly different numbers, and that even the original SCF financial statements can be confusing.

34 Figures as of 31 Dec 2017. CIF. (2018).

35 FIP Co-chairs report 2 Feb CIF. (2019).

Another way to track the sustainability of Sweden's contribution is to ask how they are engaging with climate finance more broadly. The emerging new climate architecture is of deep importance to Sweden as they look to the sustainability of their investments and to ensuring that sufficient finance is available to address climate change. In 2017 the MFA commissioned the World Resources Institute to look at climate change funding. The resulting report *The Future of the Funds* provides recommendations for adjusting mandates and consolidating funds to improve efficiency. It outlines options for the CIF to focus on its comparative advantage, whilst recognising that the GCF could absorb most of the CIF work if the sunset clause is invoked[36]. Sweden has also played an active role in the World Bank process on how climate change is taken forward with respect to replenishment of the International Development Association (IDA), which is the part of the World Bank targeting the world's poorest countries. These efforts indicate that Sweden continues to learn from its experiences and to explore the most effective ways in which to contribute to addressing climate change within a changing international context. Regarding the sustainability of Sweden's contribution, an important question to consider here – although beyond the boundaries of this case study – is whether there has been any transfer of learning from Sweden's experience within the FIP to sustainable forest management and/or low carbon, climate resilient development practices within the GCF, IDA, or indeed other multilateral programmes. Similar questions could be asked regarding the transfer of learning from the FIP to other relevant activities within those of Sweden's priority countries, which are also funded through FIP, namely, Burkina Faso.

Lastly it is useful to look at whether forestry continues to be mentioned in Sweden's development strategies over the years, and how it has been framed. Unsurprisingly, the framing in the government proposition 2008-2009 is in line with the CCI and states that it is important to maximise the synergy effects of emissions reduction and adaptation measures related to forest activities[37]. It

[36] Amerasinghe, N. et al. (2017).

[37] Govt. of Sweden (2009).

talks of reducing deforestation, dealing with ownership and use rights problems, building democratic institutions and taking into account the rights of local and indigenous people.

The 2016 policy framework for Swedish development cooperation and humanitarian assistance notes that deforestation continues at alarmingly high rates, and again links this to greenhouse gas emissions and that recognition of sustainable use of forests plays an important role in climate change adaptation, poverty reduction and food security. It also mentions forestry in the long-term policy direction linked to free and fair trade and sustainable investment, arguing that responsible investment into the sustainable use of forests fights poverty, generates higher incomes and facilitates structural economic change. It reiterates the importance of local knowledge.

Giving effect to the 2016 policy framework is a 4-year strategy for Sweden's global development cooperation in the areas of environmental sustainability, sustainable climate and oceans, and sustainable use of natural resources 2018–2022[38]. This has a budget of SEK 6.5 billion. Forestry is included within the goal of "environmentally sustainable development and sustainable use of natural resources". Furthermore it states that Swedish cooperation "shall be founded on and characterised by a rights perspective and the perspective of poor people on development." This is an important consideration as Sweden makes decisions regarding the FIP in this transition time.

Alignment of CCI principles with the FIP

This FIP case study is one of two within the CCI evaluation with a climate change *mitigation* focus. Both the CCI and CCCD principles are biased towards adaptation, which is in keeping with Sweden's broader development policy to support people in the poorest countries.

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[38] Govt. of Sweden. (2018).

Of the seven CCI principles, three refer specifically to adaptation, one to the CCCD, which also focuses on adaptation, and three are relevant to both mitigation and adaptation (Table 3). This section focuses on the latter three, namely P2, P3 and P4. Central to the *multilateral contributions,* such as FIP, was to safeguard the Paris agenda on aid effectiveness (P3). Lastly, although not explicitly stated in CCI, Swedish participation was informed by a principle on gender equality.

Table 3: Goal and set of principles guiding CCI contributions

GOAL	To effectively contribute to long term adaptation efforts, especially in the poorest countries, and to developing countries efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.	
P1	The funds reserved for adaptation interventions should go primarily to the poorest countries.	Adaptation
P2	The Swedish contributions should have a tangible added value.	Adaption and Mitigation
P3	Contributions should work towards the implementation of the Paris agenda principles on aid effectiveness.	Adaption and Mitigation
P4	Consideration should be taken to the ongoing international climate negotiations regarding timing and choice of channels.	Adaption and Mitigation
P5	The allocation should reflect the ongoing work of the Commission on Climate Change and Development (CCCD).	Adaptation (and some mitigation)
P6	Sustainable adaptation to climate change requires that the climate perspective is integrated into the countries' own development strategies. Central areas are water-and land-use in urban as well as rural areas.	Adaptation
P7	A proportion of the Swedish contributions should focus on disaster risk reduction as an integral part of climate adaptation.	Adaptation

In practice, although FIP was established to reduce emissions (climate change mitigation), the protection of forests contributes also to adaptation and to climate resilience. In keeping with Sweden's principle that funds for adaptation interventions to go to the poorest countries (P1), it should be noted that 3 out of 8 of the pilot FIP countries and 8 out of 15 of the countries that joined FIP in 2015 were LDCs.

Sweden's 'tangible added value' (P2) can be seen in the light of being one of just eight countries to contribute to, and one of six donors to oversee, FIP funds. Even though its financial contribution was small relative to the overall fund, Sweden clearly played its part as a responsible and principled donor. Without the participation of the smaller contributors, FIP would have been dominated by just three countries and its effectiveness as a global multilateral fund could have been significantly weakened.

There is strong evidence that the FIP worked towards the implementation of the Paris agenda principles on aid effectiveness (P3; see also first part of P6). Table 4 provides details on how these principles were interpreted within FIP.

Table 4: Alignment with Paris aid effectiveness

Paris Agenda Principle	FIP operations
developing country ownership of adaptation and mitigation strategies	IPs are developed by recipient countries. Developing country governments provide co-financing and policy alignment. MDBs play a strong role, potentially reducing national ownership
alignment of priorities between donor and recipient country	FIP was established in part to meet donor country mitigation priorities; FIP IPs are in-line with recipient country priorities thus there is alignment between these two imperatives. FIP programmes and projects are also a meeting place of mitigation (priority for donor countries) and adaptation (priority for recipient countries).
donor agencies harmonise and coordinate development aid	FIP donor countries make their financial contributions to a single trust fund administered by the World Bank. Decisions on how this is spent are decided through multilateral consensus. Funding for country activities is made through a single MDB in a harmonised and coordinated way.

both donors and recipients manage for results	FIP-SC is the governing body of FIP and is comprised of equal number of donor and recipient members. A results matrix has been agreed and operation and results reports are prepared for FIP-SC on a regular basis.
mutual accountability	Recipient countries are responsible for monitoring and reporting on their progress, which is submitted to the FIP-SC, thus ensuring mutual accountability of implementation between donor and recipient countries.

The choice of the FIP as an investment channel was strongly aligned with the state of UNFCCC negotiations in the CCI years (P4). CIF was established *outside* the UN system with an understanding that climate finance would be brought under the convention at a later date. Yet REDD+, the object of FIP, had been newly agreed and negotiated under the UNFCCC. Thus, Sweden chose to invest through an expedient climate fund that offered to take forward multilaterally agreed priorities. The shift from REDD to REDD+ also demonstrated a direction in line with Sweden's broader development aims and a shift towards stronger social and environmental sustainability.

The CCCD's Closing the Gap Report (P5) argues that the ethics of climate change mitigation and adaptation includes a trust gap between industrial and developing nations[39]. It also recommended that climate change adaptation (CCA), disaster risk reduction, climate mitigation and sustainable development approaches are 'harmonised' as much as possible, and that integrated development approaches are aligned to their local context. FIP integrates a range of issues, both within the logic of its results matrix and in its operations. Without further research, it is difficult to assess whether there has been a shift in trust between developing and industrial nations (for example no interview was held with a developing country member). Nevertheless, the governance design is such that it could create an enabling environment for trust to be built.

Nilsson's 2013 report states that Sweden actively works for development and gender equality issues to be included in the FIP

39 CCCD. (2009).

results framework. More generally, CIF had been designed without gender considerations and Sweden was one of the countries urging the development of gender plans, which has happened. As outlined in section 2.3, gender considerations have been integrated into the FIP's operational and reporting processes.

Reflection and learning

A changed context

The context for international climate finance has changed significantly since the period of Sweden's Climate Change Initiative. Reports from the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) continue to confirm the science of climate change and project that it is happening – and will continue to happen – with greater speed and severity than previously projected. In 2015 at COP21 in Paris, countries agreed to limit warming to well below 2ºC above pre-industrial levels, and to pursue efforts to limit it to 1.5ºC. They asked the IPCC to produce a report on what this would mean. In 2018 the IPCC's special report *Global Warming of 1.5ºC* stated that climate models project "robust differences" in regional climate characteristics between global warming of 1.5°C and 2°C[40]. Yet current global commitments to mitigate climate change would lead to warming in the range of 2.7°C to 3.7°C[41]. Clearly, significantly more urgent action is needed.

The CIF, of which the FIP is a sub-fund, was planned to be of limited duration and to be replaced by the Green Climate Fund, which falls under the UNFCCC. However, there is currently debate as to whether or not (and when) to invoke the CIF's 'sunset clause'. In April 2019, Ministers from over 30 Developing Countries called for donors to top up the CIF[42]. Sweden has not yet taken a position regarding the future of FIP as this will depend on the GCF negotiations. Lastly there have been some significant changes in the REDD+ finance architecture[43]. The carbon markets, envisaged for the third phase of REDD+, have been slow to materialise but there

[40] IPCC *Global Warming of 1.5ºC: Summary for Policy Makers* 2018

[41] Fransen, T. and E. Northrop. (2017).

42 Rowling. (2019).

[43] Bird et al,. (2017).

is increasing effort to move beyond readiness to verifiable emissions reductions with payments.

There have also been changes in the private sector's interest and role in forestry investment, particularly as it relates to supply chains of forestry products; there is potential to shift from supply to demand-side management. For example, a large consortium of Chinese companies are responding to European, Japanese and Australian regulations by committing to supply only legal and green timber. Their biggest concern is the lack of capacity amongst tropical forest managers who don't understand the need for sustainability. In this, FIP has played a useful role (see section 4.2). The focus on supply chains is gaining momentum through global private sector exchange platforms where companies can trade, exchange information and get market intelligence.

Insights into FIP and Sweden's role

Regardless of whether the FIP continues or not, it is clear that sustainable forest management remains crucial as a climate change response strategy – for mitigation, adaptation and resilience reasons. And the decade of experience that the FIP provides is a vital resource that can help to inform future strategies.

For this section, Sweden's role is viewed as part of a 'collective contribution'. As one of six donor countries on a governing body that made decisions via consensus, Sweden was accountable. Their participation contributed to the relevance of design, success of outcomes and effective use of funds.

A clear insight from evaluation reports and interviewees active in the FIP is that these processes *take time*. The complexity of the interrelated drivers of deforestation combined with a wide range of interested and affected parties means that both framing the problem and building working relationships is fraught with tension. There is no easy way to speed up this important process. Developing common ground and a collective intention are necessary conditions to build an effective national programme to combat deforestation and forest degradation. In addition to socio-economic and political factors, trees are slow growing; rehabilitating a forest also takes time. For a forest to be harvested sustainably rather than mined requires a long term time-horizon. A four-year programme (CCI) and a ten-year fund (FIP's envisaged life-span) can do little more than catalyse change.

In its evaluation of transformational change, the 2019 evaluation study identifies two basic models of change within the CIF: scale-to-systems[44] and systems-to-scale. The FIP primarily works with the latter, which is structured around capacity building, awareness raising, strengthening the enabling environment, institutional strengthening and governance, and piloting smaller-scale interventions. It is hoped that scaling ensues as the enabling environment becomes more supportive of change, pilot projects prove successful, and other investors and project developers move in[45].

With this understanding, a great deal can be learnt from the FIP on: project design; drivers of deforestation and forest degradation; the importance of partnerships between government departments, as well as between the state, private sector and civil society; the integration of forestry within broader sustainable development objectives; the role and importance of IPLCs in natural resource management; national policy and enabling environments for sustainable investments; landscape approaches; participatory monitoring, evaluation and learning; gender mainstreaming; and political buy-in to reverse deforestation and forest degradation.

The 2019 FIP evaluation identifies the absence of large-scale financing to counteract existing economic incentives (and the challenges in removing them) as the key constraint to supporting scaling and sustainable change. It argues further that "the absence

[44] The logic of this model is that by 'spending big', programs aim to change perceptions of risk (among investors and policymakers), lower technology costs (through economies of scale), and lead to fundamental changes in supporting markets. ITAD (2019a), p.viii

[45] Itad in assoc. with Ross Strategic & ICF. (2019).

of functioning carbon markets has left the sector dependent on limited government and donor subsidies."[46]

It is beyond the scope of this case study to examine and critique the potential role of large-scale market-based carbon finance. Nevertheless, it is a critical area to understand as it speaks to the deeper logic of the REDD+ model. Although the FIP did not act directly in this space, the programmes and projects it supported had this end-view in mind. As (and if) REDD+ moves into the third phase – with associated institutions and logic models – there are two important questions to bear in mind. The first is whether sufficient finance *will* materialise to keep forests standing. The second is whether it will be possible to maintain the complex system of sustainable forest management needed to support livelihoods, biodiversity and ecosystem services once the carbon in trees has a price.

The Future of the Funds report notes that working with MDBs is one of CIF's comparative advantages[47]. There is an opportunity to use this relationship to mainstream climate change into MDB operations, helping them to move away from financing high-emission and maladaptation investments. This opportunity needs to be examined within broader global power dynamics – as much as there is an opportunity to influence the MDBs, there is also the influence that the MDBs have on climate finance. Anecdotal evidence suggests that both have been relevant within the FIP.

Reflection on Sweden's contribution

Sweden's contribution to the FIP could be said to be 'long term, light touch'. Their total financial contribution was small, both as a proportion of the total CCI funds and as a proportion of the total FIP fund. They took responsibility for the money they invested by sitting on the FIP governing body thereby ensuring that the funds were managed well and with the view to achieving results. And they

[46] Itad in assoc. with Ross Strategic & ICF. (2019a).

[47] Amerasinghe, N. et al. (2017)..

continued to play this role for many years after making their grant. However, interviews for this case study suggest that they played a very limited role in contributing to the *forestry* side of their investment, and indeed currently there are no multilateral investments by Sweden in forestry.

The principles underpinning the CCI can be seen reflected in the design and operation of the FIP. At a global level, there is no evidence of misalignment between the FIP and Sweden’s CCI principles. Furthermore, the principle of gender equality was promoted by Sweden during the CCI years, and continues to inform their participation in the FIP.

In addition, Sweden saw active participation in climate fund governing bodies, such as the FIP-SC, as contributing to their leadership on climate change issues internationally. Linda Nilsson’s 2013 report on the CCI states that the CCI can be considered to have strengthened Sweden's profile as a forerunner in environmental and climate issues, enabled active board work in the supported climate funds as well as contributed to increasing Sweden's visibility and impact opportunities in the international climate negotiations[48].

In summary, Sweden’s contribution to the FIP contributed to the CCI’s goal to “effectively contribute to long term adaptation efforts, especially in the poorest countries, and to developing countries efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.” And this contribution has been sustained for ten years.

48 Nilsson, L. (2013).

Discussion points, future investments

The following discussion points are briefly summarised to help inform Sweden's future climate investments.

- Keep REDD+ (forestry) in Sweden's portfolio of climate finance – the issue is complex and as one of few donors, Sweden's institutional memory will be helpful.
- Develop the MFA's internal learning and reflection process to deepen the institutional memory on REDD+ and climate finance in forestry and to strengthen ongoing participation.
- Consider greater investment by Sweden of forestry and other specialist expertise into these international financing processes (the complexity of REDD+ as a mitigation strategy combined with ensuring biodiversity, livelihood protection, social inclusion and enhancement of indigenous knowledge and rights means that a careful navigation of political, ecological and economic choices is needed; and this will become more critical in the move to "results-based payment", the 3rd phase of REDD+)
- Review and assess fund options for continued investment in REDD+
- (Co)-develop an exit strategy for the FIP if the fund closes (or if Sweden chooses to leave) to ensure that existing commitments to recipient countries are met, that oversight and learning take place, and that the wealth of experience gained through the FIP is available for related climate funds
- Be more explicit about integrating mitigation, adaptation and resilience approaches to forestry interventions within international efforts to address climate change.

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Appendix 1: Interviewees

Organisation	Number of people interviewed
Official, Climate Investment Funds	2
Donor representative, Climate Investment Funds sub-committees	2
Official, Forest Investment Program, Washington DC, USA	2
Current and former officials, Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs	3
Former official, World Bank, Washington DC, USA	1
Total	**10**

Appendix 2: Timeline

1992	UNFCCC signed
1997	UNFCCC COP3 produces the Kyoto Protocol and the seeds of REDD planted through LULUCF
2007	REDD+ emerges from UNFCCC COP13 in Bali, Indonesia
2008	CIF set up as an interim measure to provide new and additional climate finance to pilot transformational actions in selected developing countries.
2008-2012	Kyoto Protocol first commitment period (avg 5% emissions cut for Annex 1 countries against 1990 baseline)
2009	FIP design document approved
2009-2012	Sweden's Climate Change Initiative (CCI)
2009	Dedicated Grant Mechanism (DGM) established under FIP, managed by the World Bank
2009, *July to Dec*	Sweden as EU Presidency – *Important for COP15 ambitions*
2009	UNFCCC COP15 in Copenhagen, Denmark
2010	8 pilot countries join the FIP: Brazil, Burkina Faso, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ghana, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Mexico, Peru
2010	Global Climate Fund (GCF) established
2010, *Nov*	FIP Sub-Committee approve a FIP logic model as a basis to finalise the development of the results framework
2011	IPs endorsed for Mexico and DRC
2011, *May*	FIP results framework submitted to FIP-SC for approval
2011	Sweden's CCI allocates 100 MSEK (USD 15 m) to FIP
2012	IPs endorsed for Brazil, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Indonesia, Lao PDR,
2012	First 2 country projects approved for implementation by MDBs; DGM design document approved
2013	UNFCCC COP19 negotiates the Warsaw Framework on REDD+
2014	4 country projects MDB-approved for implementation; First actual results reported
2015	UNFCCC COP21 produces Paris Agreement on Climate Change
2015	MDG target date to halve world poverty
2015	15 new countries join FIP: Bangladesh, Cambodia, Cameroon, Congo Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Guyana,

	Honduras, Ivory Coast, Mozambique, Nepal, Rwanda, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia; 6 country projects MDB-approved for implementation; DGM global project and first DGM country projects approved: Brazil, Burkina Faso, Peru
2016	IPs endorsed for Mozambique, Cote d'Ivoire, and Tunisia; DGM DRC country project approved; 6 country projects MDB-approved for implementation
2017	IPs endorsed for Guatemala, Cambodia, Uganda, Ecuador, Congo Republic, Nepal, Zambia, Cameroon, Rwanda and Bangladesh; 7 country projects MDB-approved for implementation
2018, *June*	21 countries have had their FIP IPs endorsed by the FIP Sub-Committee; 30 MDB-approved projects are ongoing and disbursing FIP funds; 23 country projects are under development
2018, *Aug*	DGM includes 13 countries, eight of which have approved funding
2019, *2 Feb*	Most recent meeting of the FIP Sub-Committee

Previous EBA reports

2020:01 Mobilizing *Private Development Finance: Implications for Overall Aid Allocations*, Polly Meeks, Matthew Gouett and Samantha Attridge

2019:09 *Democracy in African Governance: Seeing and Doing it Differently,* Göran Hydén with assistance from Maria Buch Kristensen

2019:08 *Fishing Aid - Mapping and Synthesising Evidence in Support of SDG 14 Fisheries Targets,* Gonçalo Carneiro, Raphaëlle Bisiaux, Mary Frances Davidson, Tumi Tómasson with Jonas Bjärnstedt

2019:07 *Applying a Masculinities Lens to the Gendered Impacts of Social Safety Nets*, Meagan Dooley, Abby Fried, Ruti Levtov, Kate Doyle, Jeni Klugman and Gary Barker

2019:06 *Joint Nordic Organisational Assessment of the Nordic Development Fund (NDF)*, Stephen Spratt, Eilís Lawlor, Kris Prasada Rao and Mira Berger

2019:05 *Impact of Civil Society Anti-Discrimination Initiatives: A Rapid Review*, Rachel Marcus, Dhruva Mathur and Andrew Shepherd

2019:August *Migration and Development: the Role for Development Aid*, Robert E.B. Lucas (joint with the Migration Studies Delegation, Delmi, published as Delmi Research overview 2019:5)

2019:04 *Building on a Foundation Stone: the Long-Term Impacts of a Local Infrastructure and Governance Program in Cambodia*, Ariel BenYishay, Brad Parks, Rachel Trichler, Christian Baehr, Daniel Aboagye and Punwath Prum

2019:03 *Supporting State Building for Democratisation? A Study of 20 years of Swedish Democracy Aid to Cambodia,* Henny Andersen, Karl-Anders Larsson och Joakim Öjendal

2019:02 *Fit for Fragility? An Exploration of Risk Stakeholders and Systems Inside Sida*, Nilima Gulrajani and Linnea Mills

2019:01 *Skandaler, opinioner och anseende: Biståndet i ett medialiserat samhälle*, Maria Grafström och Karolina Windell

2018:10 *Nation Building in a Fractured Country: An Evaluation of Swedish Cooperation in Economic Development with Bosnia and Herzegovina 1995 – 2018*, Claes Lindahl, Julie Lindahl, Mikael Söderbäck and Tamara Ivankovic

2018:09 *Underfunded Appeals: Understanding the Consequences, Improving the System,* Sophia Swithern

2018:08 *Seeking Balanced Ownership in Changing Development Cooperation Relationships*, Nils Keizer, Stephan Klingebiel, Charlotte Örnemark, Fabian Scholtes

2018:07 *Putting Priority into Practice: Sida's Implementation of its Plan for Gender Integration*, Elin Bjarnegård, Fredrik Uggla

2018:06 *Swedish Aid in the Era of Shrinking Space – the Case of Turkey*, Åsa Eldén, Paul T. Levin

2018:05 *Who Makes the Decision on Swedish Aid Funding? An Overview*, Expertgruppen för Biståndsanalys

2018:04 *Budget Support, Poverty and Corruption: A Review of the Evidence*, Geske Dijkstra

2018:03 *How predictable is Swedish aid? A study of exchange rate volatility,* Númi Östlund

2018:02 *Building Bridges Between International Humanitarian and Development Responses to Forced Migration*, Alexander Kocks, Ruben Wedel, Hanne Roggemann, Helge Roxin (joint with the German Institute for Development Evaluation, DEval)

2018:01 *DFIs and Development Impact: an evaluation of Swedfund,* Stephen Spratt, Peter O'Flynn, Justin Flynn

2017:12 *Livslängd och livskraft: Vad säger utvärderingar om svenska biståndsinsatsers hållbarhet?* Expertgruppen för biståndsanalys

2017:11 *Sweden's Financing of UN Funds and Programmes: Analyzing the Past, Looking to the Future*, Stephen Browne, Nina Connelly, Thomas G. Weiss

2017:10 *Seven Steps to Evidence-Based Anticorruption: A Roadmap*, Alina Mungiu-Pippidi

2017:09 *Geospatial analysis of aid: A new approach to aid evaluation*, Ann-Sofie Isaksson

2017:08 *Research capacity in the new global development agenda*, Måns Fellesson

2017:07 *Research Aid Revisited – a historically grounded analysis of future prospects and policy options*, David Nilsson, Sverker Sörlin

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The Expert Group for Aid Studies (EBA) is a government committee with a mandate to independently analyse and evaluate Swedish international development aid.