EBA

SUBSTUDY 3

02

2020

EVALUATION OF THE SWEDISH CLIMATE CHANGE INITIATIVE, 2009–2012:
BILATERAL PORTFOLIO ANALYSIS

Mutizwa Mukute

Evaluation of the Swedish Climate Change Initiative 2009 – 2012: Bilateral Portfolio Analysis

Mutizwa Mukute

Delstudie 3 2020:02
till
Expertgruppen för biståndsanalys (EBA)

Mutizwa Mukute, Evaluator, Emerald Network Ltd

Please refer to the present report as: EBA Mutizwa Mukute, Evaluation of the Swedish Climate Change Initiative 2009 – 2012: Bilateral Portfolio Analysis, EBA Delstudie 3 2020:02, Expertgruppen för biståndsanalys.

This report can be downloaded free of charge at www.eba.se

ISBN 978-91-88143-57-0
Printed by Elanders Sverige AB
Stockholm 2020

Cover design by Julia Demchenko

Table of Contents

Accronyms and abbreviations **1**

Preface by the EBA **1**

Summary **3**

1. Introduction **7**

1.1 Background to bilateral portfolio analysis 7

1.2 Objectives of this report 7

1.3 Sida's categories of adaptation 9

1.4 Methodology: evaluation framing, process and participants 13

1.5 Limitations 14

2. CCI bilateral investments **15**

2.1 An overview of the bilateral investments 15

2.2 Bilateral investment expenditure patterns 16

2.3 Major sector investment per country 19

2.4 Trust funds in CCI partner countries 20

2.5 Summary of CCI outcomes 32

2.6 The making of investment decisions 35

2.7 Bilateral, regional and multilateral synergies 37

2.8 Main challenges encountered 39

2.9 Tracing the investments 2009-2019 43

3. Outcomes and key success factors **48**

4. Insights and conclusion **57**

4.1 Financing, programming and practice 57

4.2 Conclusion 61

References **71**

Appendix 1: CCI Principles.....76
Appendix 2: List of interviewed.....77
Previous EBA reports 78

Accronyms and abbreviations

AEDD	Environment and Sustainable Development Agency
AF	Adaptation Fund
ANICT	National Agency for Territorial Communities Investment
BCCRF	Bangladesh Climate Change Resilience Fund
CCA	Climate Change Adaptation
CCCA TF	Cambodia Climate Change Alliance Trust Fund
CCCA	Cambodia Climate Change Alliance
CCCD	Commission on Climate Change and Development
CCCP	Community Climate Change Project
CCCSP	Cambodia Climate Change Strategic Plan
CCD	Climate Change Department
CCI	Swedish Climate Change Initiative
CCTT	Climate Change Technical Team
CDM	Clean Development Mechanism
CDMP	Comprehensive Disaster Management Programme
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CIF	Climate Investment Funds
CNCC	National Climate Change Committee
CoP	Conference of Parties
CRPARP	Climate Resilient Participatory Afforestation and Reforestation Project
CSOs	Civil Society Organisations
CUE	Water Users Committee
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DFID	United Kingdom Department for International Development
DGIS	Directorate General for International Cooperation of The Netherlands
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
EBA	Expert Group for Aid Studies
ERD	Economic Relations Division
ERG	Evaluation Reference Group
EU	European Union
FCM	Mali Climate Fund
FIP	Forest Investment Programme
GCF	Green Climate Fund
GEDEFOR	Decentralised Forests Management Programme
GFDRR	Global Fund for Disaster Reduction and Recovery
GIZ	Germany Agency for International Development
GoB	Government of Bangladesh

IWRM	Integrated Water Resources Management
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
LDCF	Least Developed Countries Fund
MEADD	Ministry of Environment, Sanitation and Sustainable Development
MoEF	Ministry of Environment and Forests
MFA	Ministry for Foreign Affairs
MIE	Multilateral Implementing Partners
MMAyA	Ministry of Environment and Water
MPTF	Multi-Partner Trust Fund
NAPA	National Action Plan for Adaptation
NCCC	National Climate Change Committee
NCFs	National Climate Funds
NDA	National Designated Authority
NDC	Nationally Determined Contribution
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organisations
NIEs	National Implementing Entities
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PNCC	National Policy on Climate Change
PRVPB-CC	Reduce the Vulnerability of Small Dams to Climate Change project
PROAGRO	Sustainable Development Programme
RBM	Results Based Management
SDC	Swiss Agency for Development Cooperation
SEIE	Sustained, Emerging Impact Evaluation
Sida	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
SNCC	National Strategy on Climate Change
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Emergency Fund

Preface by the EBA

In 2009, the Swedish government decided to start using ODA to deal with climate change and its negative effects. With a primary focus on the poorest countries, and mainly on their adaptation to climate change, Sweden set aside 4 bn SEK to be used over a four-year period. Furthermore, this constituted a major part of Sweden's 7 bn SEK contribution to the internationally agreed 'fast-start' of climate finance.

Ten years later, this surge of climate finance, including the bilateral, regional and multilateral activities to which it was put to use, has been evaluated. This report contains a portfolio study in which the full bilateral cooperation part of the climate change initiative (CCI) has been evaluated. Together with ten other case study reports this study is published on-line and may be found at https://eba.se/en/ebarapport/. The synthesis report of the evaluation, together with a separate summary of the evaluation are available in print and on-line.

It is our hope that this evaluation may provide guidance for the future use of ODA in the efforts to curbe climate change. The intended users of the evaluation are primarily staff at the MFA and Sida who engage in this challenge on a daily basis.

The evaluation has been accompanied by a reference group. This group has taken active part in a particular learning process the evaulation has facilitated. The reference group has been chaired by Johan Schaar, vice chair of the EBA. The responsibility of the analysis and the recommendations rests entirely with the evaluators.

Helena Lindholm, EBA Chair

Summary

This report is part of the larger Evaluation of the Swedish Climate Change Initiative 2009 – 2012. Main findings, insights and recommendations of the evaluation, as well as a full list of the evaluation case studies, are found in the main report 'Evaluation of the Swedish Climate Change Initiative 2009 – 2012', EBA 2019:10. This bilateral portfolio analysis report is one of eleven case study reports. Together with the Cambodia and Mali bilateral case studies it treats the bilateral part of the initiative. Other case studies of the evaluation deal with regional and multilateral interventions.

The bilateral part of the initiative comprised the following expenditures in five countries:

Table: Bilateral annual expenditure figures (MSEK)

Partner country	Spent 2009	Spent 2010	Spent 2011	Spent 2012	Total spent 2009-2012
Bangladesh	50.0	80.0	10.0	40.0	180.0
Bolivia	11.5	41.3	74.8	64.3	191.9
Burkina Faso	10.6	15.1	50.6	4.7	81.0
Cambodia	15.0	8.0	12.3	24.7	60.0
Mali	18.4	23.5	27.7	27.6	97.2
TOTALS	105.5	167.9	175.4	161.3	610.1

A total of 22 interventions were financed, within the categories described in the following graph:

Figure 2: Categorisation of CCI bilateral interventions



The evaluation found that the main sectors into which CCI funds were invested varied between countries as follows: (i) DDR and the forestry sector in Bangladesh, (ii) water and rural land use in Burkina Faso, (iii) rural land use, forestry and urban water and sanitation in Bolivia, (iii) rural land use, forestry and water in Mali, and (v) rural land use, water and coastal areas in Cambodia.

The choice of countries was decided by the Swedish MFA and Sida in collaboration, whereas Sida in cooperation with partner countries decided upon which interventions to support. There was no specific mechanism for reporting on, checking and improving the generation of synergistic effects between the multilateral, the regional and the bilateral portfolios in the initiative. However, in practice several multi-level investment interlinkages and synergies were observed in the regions where investments were made.

Main challenges encountered in the bilateral climate financing may be summarised as follows: i) CCI was too fast-paced and its duration too short, (ii) lack of additional human resources, (iii) limited capacities and high expectations, (iv) lack of a performance monitoring framework, and (v) absence of a deliberate synergy-building mechanism between countries and across investment portfolios.

The categories of the chosen interventions also constituted strategies. Investments made in one category impacted others. For example, training impacted on enhancing resilience, coordination as well as policy and administration; and enhancing resilience activities produced insights that shaped training and awareness beyond the CCI focus sectors, into the education system.

CCI contributed to the development of community adaptive capacities related to land use (agriculture), water, forestry and DRR. The capacities were utilised towards developing community, ecosystem and environment resilience. The main ultimate beneficiaries of CCI interventions were climate vulnerable communities in rural and urban areas, especially farmers, pastoralists and fisher folk, women and indigenous communities. The CCI further contributed towards: (i) the raising of the climate agenda in partner countries, (ii) the development of better capacities to develop national and local government policies and plans, and CSOs programmes, (iii) capacity to integrate CCA with national development plans, DRR and mitigation, and (iv) adaptive capacity development at community level.

The main enabler of CCI achievements was Sweden's preparedness to try new ways of climate financing and programming and provide necessary technical support. In countries such as Mali, Burkina Faso and Cambodia, this was augmented by high level political will in the Swedish Embassies and in the partner countries. In seeking the sustained impact of CCI at bilateral level, the following generative mechanisms were identified: (i) community planning and action learning groups, (ii) knowledge networks formed by individuals trained by CCI, (iii) multi-stakeholder steering committees, (iv) inter-ministerial committees, and (v) donor coordination groups.

The impact of CCI was sustained largely because there was follow up technical and financing support from Sida. Swedish Embassies in the partner countries increased the alignment between their country strategies and the post CCI support.

1. Introduction

1.1 Background to bilateral portfolio analysis

Sweden launched the Climate Change Initiative (CCI, 2009-2012) during its Presidency of the European Union (EU) and just before CoP 2009 was held in Copenhagen. The initiative was part of its commitment and contribution towards the fast-start climate finance designed to fund the reduction of climate change and its negative impacts. The specific intention of Sweden's 4-year, 4 billion SEK CCI was to *"effectively contribute to long term adaptation efforts, especially in the poorest countries, and to developing countries' efforts to reduce greenhouse gas levels*[1]*."* Of the 4 billon SEK, (72 percent) was distributed by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA) through multilaterals, while Sida invested the remainder in bilateral (15 percent) and regional (13percent) investments. This portfolio analysis focuses on the CCI bilateral portfolio, which Sida was responsible for. Sweden's bilateral investments under CCI sought to effectively support long-term efforts to adapt to climate change in the poorest countries with high risk and high vulnerability to climate change. The investments were to be integrated into the partner countries' own development strategies and were intended to generate concrete added value. CCI's priority thematic areas for bilateral investments were water, land use, forestry, energy and disaster risk reduction (DRR). The countries that were selected were: Bangladesh and Cambodia in Asia, Burkina Faso and Mali in Africa and Bolivia in Latin America.

1.2 Objectives of this report

This portfolio analysis report, which is part of the impact evaluation of CCI, seeks to contribute to the two interrelated overall evaluation objectives, which are: (1) To gain in-depth understanding of the long-term effects and sustainability of the CCI, and (2) To generate insights to inform Swedish climate aid ahead. Underpinned by an interest to gain insights into how the seven CCI principles (Annex

[1] Nilsson, L. (2013)., p. 1.

1) may have sensitised bilateral climate financing, programming and implementation during and after CCI, this report seeks to illuminate:

1. The background to the Sida categories of climate investments,
2. The sizes and distribution of bilateral investments by country and category,
3. How investment decisions were made and countries selected for bilateral investments,
4. Whether and how bilateral, regional and multilateral investments produced synergistic effects,
5. National climate funds or multi-donor trust funds and Sida's contribution to them,
6. How Sweden's bilateral climate investments may have evolved since 2009,
7. Main challenges encountered,
8. The value of the bilateral portfolio as reflected by outcomes generated through CCI bilateral investments and explanations behind their achievement, and
9. The learning value in relation to climate investments, programming and practice insights.

Largely organised around the above-stated objectives, each subsequent section of this report provides an overview of what happened, based on quantitative and/or qualitative descriptions and comparisons. This is followed by analysis, which examines similarities, differences and/or interesting patterns using inductive analysis. Some sections of this report go further and offer explanations behind what happened, of similarities, differences and patterns, using retroductive analysis. More detailed investigation into CCI's bilateral cooperation investments (deep dive) will be conducted in two countries: one in Africa (Mali) and another in Asia (Cambodia). Separate and similar investigations are being made into CCI regional and multilateral portfolios and will be interconnected at a later stage.

1.3 Sida's categories of adaptation

The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) defines climate change adaptation (CCA) as "a process through which societies make themselves better able to cope with an uncertain future. Adaptation to climate change entails taking the right measures to reduce the negative effects of climate change (or exploit the positive ones) by making appropriate adjustments and changes [2]." The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Assistance Committee (DAC) views CCA as comprising activities that reduce human or natural systems to the impacts of climate change and climate change risks by maintaining or increasing adaptive capacity or resilience [3]. Similarly, for the Commission on Climate Change and Development (CCCD), CCA "is about forms of development in which the capacity to manage risks determines progress", includes and goes beyond climate-proofing development and official development assistance (ODA), addresses drivers of vulnerability, including poverty and ecosystem degradation, integrates adaptation, disaster risk reduction and mitigation and requires climate funding and cooperation between rich and poor nations and within nations[4].

We noted that Sida drew on two main sources – one *ex ante* and the other *ex post* - to shape its thinking about CCA and how to determine the distribution and impact of its CCI investments and programmes. The first, *ex ante* source was the CCCD, which was set up in 2007 by the then Swedish Prime Minister, Fredrik Reinfeldt, to establish how to: (i) design and support adaptation to climate change, (ii) reduce the risk of weather-related disasters, and (iii) strengthen resilience of the poorest and most vulnerable countries and communities[5]. The second, *ex post* source was the OECD, which sought to establish how to monitor and evaluate for adaptation through drawing insights from earlier OECD work (of 2010) that had developed ways of identifying funding flows related to CCA,[6]

[2] UNFCCC. (2007).
[3] OECD (2010).
[4] CCCD (2009). p. 4.
[5] Ibid.
[6] OECD (2010).

and by drawing on insights learnt from 106 CCA projects and programmes funded by six bilateral agencies that included Sida[7]. The other bilateral donors were: Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), Directorate General for International Cooperation of The Netherlands (DGIS), Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), Swiss Agency for Development Cooperation (SDC), and the United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID).[8] It appears that Sida drew on both sources to develop a set of six categories that it used *ex-post* to analyse its CCI investments, even though the latter study does not refer to the former.

CCCD underlined the need for CCA to:

- Focus on the poor who are dependent on climate-vulnerable resources while at the same time addressing vulnerabilities disasters, equity and development issues; and address water, natural resources, land, forests and energy, food security, health and migration challenges.
- Contribute towards adaptive capacity development, inclusive governance and ownership by the partner country.
- Establish mechanisms that bring together government's sectors and ensure national policy coordination for CCA, DRR, poverty alleviation and development led from the highest political and organisational level for coherence.
- Address governance challenges through vertical and horizontal coordination efforts between government, civil society and private sector.
- Build scientific knowledge and capacity for climate change research.
- Provide new and additional financial resources and ensure effective coordination of such funds with Principle 5.5 as being:

[7] Lamhauge, N., Lanzi, E., & Agrawala, S. (2011).
[8] Ibid.

Effective, demand-driven funding mechanisms for adaptation, including national funding hubs.[9]

Similarly, OECD developed the following five categories for monitoring and evaluating CCA: (i) climate risk reduction, (iii) policy and administrative management for climate change, education, training and awareness for climate change, (iv) climate scenario and impact research, and (v) coordination of climate change measures and activities across relevant actors[10]. The study established that very few of the 106 projects and programmes analysed focused on risk reduction (category 1), thereby indicating an area where future climate investment should give greater emphasis. It also identified the need for clear differentiation of results in the context of CCA[11]. CCCD on the other hand recommended the use of proxy indicators to determine desired resilience outcomes "that give meaningful answers to the effects of individual contributions when attribution is difficult[12]." In 2013 Sida commissioned a study, which specifically drew on and modified the five OECD categories by adding a category associated with what appears to be the sixth listed CCCD dimension of enabling CCA for the CCI bilateral and regional portfolios:

Enhanced resilience to climate change, linked to vulnerability reduction and resilience building. These investments have direct impact of people's abilities to adapt to climate change and include infrastructural investments that reduce damages to the physical environment.

Climate change policy and administrative management, linked to governance, making and implementing policies that address climate risks and improving administrative structures, systems and institutions for integrating climate change.

Education, training and awareness on climate change, linked to acquiring new knowledge and making behaviour and habits change aligned to current and projected climate conditions.

[9] CCCD (2009).
[10] Lamhauge, L., Lanzi, E., & Agrawala, S. (2011).
[11] Ibid.
[12] CCCD (2009). p. 41.

Climate studies, scenarios and impact research, covering the identification of training, policy and risk-reduction activity gaps, adaptation hot spots and options.

Coordination of climate change measures and activities across relevant actors, linked to collaborative engagement between stakeholders and the dissemination of research knowledge for strengthening practice.

Climate change funds for providing material and financial capacity to support the implementation of nationally determined climate agenda, programmes, strategies and action plans.[13]

An important insight that we drew from the OECD study is that CCA categories can be used for identifying and describing change processes across projects implemented in different continents, countries and contexts. In addition, the categories can be treated as interconnected arenas of intervention where multiple pathways of change in CCA and climate funding can be established to understand relationships between activities, outcomes and impact[14]'[15]. In terms of contribution to international thinking about how to monitor and evaluate adaptation, and to learn from it, we noted that all six of the Sida categories are included in the 10 arenas of intervention that have been used to evaluate the 10-year programmes that received funding under the Climate Investment Funds (CIF)[16]. This encouraged us to analyse not only how bilateral investments were distributed by category (Table 3) but also pathways of change across the five countries and all CCI-funded projects using Sida's six categories.

[13] Wingqvist, et al. (2013).
[14] World Bank. (2019).
[15] Itad, Ross Strategic & ICF. (2019).
[16] Ibid. The 10 arenas of intervention are: institutions, governance, policies, natural capital, knowledge and information, practices and mindsets, external risks, finance, markets and technology and infrastructure.

1.4 Methodology: evaluation framing, process and participants

The framing and process of this bilateral portfolio analysis is based on what may be called the 'logic of practice' of a development cooperation practitioner, which is reflected in the purpose of this report as outlined in section 1.1 above. The logic has been enriched by relevant evaluation theoretical frameworks aligned to Sida's evaluation policy. In particular it draws on utilisation-focused thinking which underlines the central value of the intended user, and of learning alongside accountability. The initiative's focus on complex matters such as CCA, mitigation, DDR, co-benefits and development inspired us to work with complexity and systems thinking. In addition, the evaluation's interest in the sustainability of CCI outcomes led us to work with Sustained and Emerging Impact Evaluation (SEIE). Its application is especially reflected in the subsection on national climate funds (NCFs) and in table 4 on intermediate and long-term outcomes. In response to Sida's interest in the performance of CCI, we also framed the bilateral portfolio analysis to address questions of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability, which are at the core of OECD' DAC criteria.

The process of developing a methodology for bilateral investments included the drafting of portfolio analysis tools, sharing them with the Evaluation Reference Group (ERG), and receiving and incorporating their feedback. The process of data generation involved:

- Preliminary document analysis and document review based on the evaluators' internet-based searches,
- Core document analysis based on documents provided by Sida and relevant Swedish embassies, and
- E-mail-based questionnaires and responses to and from Heads of Development Cooperation in the five CCI countries.

- Interviews with CCI stakeholders in Mali, where we conducted a deep-dive case study. We will conduct another one in Cambodia later this year.

We used inductive, abductive and retroductive analysis to make sense of the data generated. Abductive analysis is the use of theoretical and conceptual lenses to make sense of data, such as what constitutes good adaptation, while retroductive analysis refers to the establishment of explanation behind the way things are, leading to the drawing out of insights[17]. In line with our utilisation-focused approach, we intend to seek, obtain and incorporate the intended users' feedback on this draft, notably from the Swedish Embassies in the five countries, Sida HQ and EBA.

1.5 Limitations

The main limitation has been the limited number of people, (10, Annex 2) who directly contributed primary data drawn on in this report. This was in turn caused by budgetary constraints, which did not permit visiting all the countries; and our methodological approach which sought to achieve a 'shallow to medium dive' bilateral case study covering all the five partner countries. The methodological approach also excluded the contribution of CCI partner countries. We have tried to overcome this limitation by conducting more extensive document analysis and literature review to get a sense of the CCI bilateral systemic contributions to change, beyond the financial investments.

[17] Danermark, B., Ekstrom, M., Jakobsen, L., & Karlsson, J. C. (2002)..

2. CCI bilateral investments

2.1 An overview of the bilateral investments

The **1.15 billon** SEK channeled through Sida was allocated as follows: Bolivia, 200 MSEK; Bangladesh, 180 MSEK; Cambodia, 60 MSEK; Burkina Faso, 125 MSEK; and Mali, 125 MSEK. The African and Asian regions were allocated 350 MSEK and 110 MSEK respectively[18]. While total CCI bilateral allocations amounted to 690 MSEK (Table 1), the countries together spent 610.1 MSEK, or 88.4 percent of funds allocated; this constituted 15.2 percent of the total CCI investments between 2009 and 2012. The allocation of bilateral funds varied between countries largely as a function of their absorption capacity, with Bolivia and Bangladesh receiving the highest, which was at least three times higher than the lowest investment, which was made in Cambodia. Interestingly, the allocations of bilateral investments per region varied marginally as follows: Burkina Faso and Mali were allocated a total of 250 MSEK, Bangladesh and Cambodia 240 MSEK, and Bolivia 200 MSEK.

Table 1: Summary of funds allocated and spent (MSEK)

Partner country	Total spent 2009-2012	Total allocation 2009-2012	Unspent by Dec 2012	Unspent (%)
Bangladesh	180.0	180	0	0
Bolivia	191.9	200	8.1	4.05
Burkina Faso	81.0	125	44.0	35.2
Cambodia	60.0	60	0	0
Mali	97.2	125	27.8	22.2
Totals	610.1	690	79.9	11.6

Table 1 above shows that the total amount spent under bilateral investments within the stipulated period was 79.9 MSEK lower than

[18] Ahlfors, S. W. (2011).

the allocated amount, indicating that 11.58 percent of the budget was not absorbed within the four-year period. The two countries that could not spend a significant proportion of the allocations were Burkina Faso and Mali: for Burkina Faso just over a third was unspent because of an audit remark, and for Mali just over a fifth was unspent as a result the military coup in 2012. The main explanations behind capacity to spend allocated amounts were: limited human resources at Swedish Embassies, low partner country's absorption capacity and short history of cooperation on climate change between Sweden and the partner country.

2.2 Bilateral investment expenditure patterns

The expenditure levels varied in all the five partner countries across the years. The overall pattern of expenditure, which also resonated with that in Bolivia, Burkina Faso and Mali, showed a steady increase in the first three years (2009, 2010 and 2011) and a drop in the fourth and final year (Table 2). However, if all the five partner countries had spent their remaining allocations in 2012, the expenditure pattern would have been different, showing a steady increase over all the years. Interestingly, the cumulative expenditures of the first three years coincided with a shift from output-based reporting in the first two years to outcomes-based reporting[19].

Table 2: Bilateral annual expenditure figures (MSEK)

Partner country	Spent 2009	Spent 2010	Spent 2011	Spent 2012	Total spent 2009-2012
Bangladesh	50.0	80.0	10.0	40.0	180.0
Bolivia	11.5	41.3	74.8	64.3	191.9
Burkina Faso	10.6	15.1	50.6	4.7	81.0
Cambodia	15.0	8.0	12.3	24.7	60.0
Mali	18.4	23.5	27.7	27.6	97.2
TOTALS	105.5	167.9	175.4	161.3	610.1

We also analysed bilateral investments according to Sida's six categories outlined in the introductory chapter of this report (which

[19] Sida. (2013)..

were based on Sida's six categories outlined in Section 1.3). The following analysis is based on a breakdown of the five country CCI allocations into the 22 constituent projects (varying from 2 each in Bangladesh and Burkina Faso to 8 in Bolivia):

Table 3: 22 CCI bilateral projects and their primary focus

	Enh. resilience	Policy & admin	Training & awareness	Research	Coordination	CC funds	Resilience, training & awareness	Totals
Bangladesh	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	2
Bolivia	2	2	1	0	2	0	1	8
Burkina Faso	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Cambodia	0	2	0	0	0	0	220	4
Mali	2	0	3	0	0	1	0	6
Totals	6	5	4	0	2	2	3	22
Share (%)	27	23	18	0	9	9	14	100

Table 3 above reveals interesting differences and patterns regarding categories where climate funds were primarily invested across the five countries. Firstly, the total number of projects varied between two and eight but this had no bearing on the amounts invested, that is, fewer projects did not necessarily mean less funding. Secondly, most emphasis across the five countries was put on enhancing resilience (41 percent of total funds were allocated to this category), policy and administration and training and awareness. This analysis shows that CCI bilateral investments addressed the gap that had been identified in the 106 climate adaptation projects funded by six

[20] It is worth noting that the Cambodia's Small Grants Programme was classified as both Enhancing Resilience and Training and Awareness, and not as CC Funds.

donor agencies (including Sida), which had been identified in the OECD report.21 This was, however, not a deliberate Sida strategy.

Figure 2: Categorisation of CCI bilateral projects



The amounts spent per project varied considerably between and within countries. The CCI projects with the highest investment and spend were: 130 MSEK (Bangladesh Climate Change Resilience Fund – BCCRF), 70.8 MSEK (Bolivia's Sustainable Agriculture Development Programme), 63.5 MSEK (Burkina Faso water reservoirs). 52.3 MSEK (Bolivia's Baba Carapa), and 50 MSEK (Bangladesh's Comprehensive Disaster Management Programme – CDMP). The smallest investments were in Bolivia's Agua Tuya and Sumaj Huasi projects at 2 MSEK and 3 MSEK respectively. These variations in amounts spent per project seemed to be dependent on the total amount allocated and number of projects per country, the nature of the project, and the scale at which the project was implemented. Countries such as Bangladesh, which had fewer projects and larger allocations, spent more per project. Infrastructure projects such as dams in Burkina Faso required more

[21] Lamhauge, L., Lanzi, E., & Agrawala, S. (2011).

money while small-scale projects such as Tuya and Sumaj Huasi needed less.

2.3 Major sector investment per country

CCI's bilateral support to Bangladesh probably provides the most compelling case of investment in DRR – a country that had experienced a devastating tropical cyclone in 1991 and disastrous floods in 1987 and 1997. Consequently, in 2003 it initiated the Comprehensive Disaster Management Programme (CDMP), which moved away from a focus on relief and rehabilitation to proactive risk reduction by using a holistic and multi-hazard approach to risk and vulnerability to both human induced and natural hazards[22]. CDMP also integrates DRR and CCA into development planning at multiple scales. It is worth noting that when CCI started in 2009, CMDP was coming to an end, which means that the CCI investment prolonged the life of the programme in line with the need for long-term investments in dealing with complex problems. By contrast, CCI's investment into the new BCCRF primarily went into the forestry sector where both adaptation and mitigation were of interest.

The bulk of the CCI investments in Burkina Faso were made in the water resources sector – as an entry point, which also impacted on other sectors, especially agriculture (rural land use). In Mali, most of CCI funds were invested in the forestry (including flooded forests) and agriculture (rural land use) sectors. In Bolivia, the bulk of CCI funds were directed towards agriculture and forestry sectors, with a small proportion invested in water and sanitation in peri-urban areas. In Cambodia, the water and agriculture sectors appear to have received the larger chunk of CCI funding.

This analysis of the sectors into which most CCI bilateral investments were made suggests an observation of the following CCI principles:

[22] Luxbacher, K. (2011).

Principle 5.7: Context matters when considering climate risks, political economies, and solutions.

Principle 6: Sustainable adaptation to climate change requires that the climate perspective is integrated into the countries' own development strategies. Central areas are water and land-use in urban as well as rural areas, and

Principle 7: A proportion of the Swedish contributions should focus on disaster risk reduction as an integral part of climate adaptation.

2.4 Trust funds in CCI partner countries

Climate funds were a unique category for monitoring and evaluating CCA outcomes in that the funds could be invested in any of the other five categories. This, and the following reasons, made it an interesting category for further investment under bilateral portfolio analysis:

- Out of the five bilateral investments, Sida invested climate funds in three countries in the following three national climate funds (NFCs): (i) the Bangladesh Climate Change Resilience Fund (BCCRF), (ii) the Cambodia Climate Change Alliance Trust Fund (CCCA TF), and the Mali Climate Fund (FCM).
- The funds were also deliberately designed to benefit from multi donors and therefore enable a certain level of donor harmonisation. At the same time, they were intended to increase national capacity and ownership of the climate agenda.

Multi-donor climate trust funds are a special form of climate financing designed to depart from piecemeal and disconnected donor investment towards devolution of decision-making powers to national institutions in developing countries, which are more conversant with national contexts and priorities [23]. The main functions of multi-donor trust funds are: (i) collecting and blending climate funds from various sources (public, bilateral, multilateral, private etc) and disbursing them towards addressing climate change

23 Khan, S. M. M. H., Huq, S., & Shamsuddhoha, M.D. (2012).

response objectives, (ii) coordination of climate change-related activities nationally, and (iii) technical, financial and operational capacity development of national implementing entities and other agencies[24]. In order to be effective, NCFs should have: (i) a steering committee comprising several ministries, CSO, private sector, multilateral agencies and other partners to provide direction and oversight, (ii) a technical committee comprising a panel of experts that assesses project proposals, (iii) a secretariat that implements daily activities, (iv) a trustee that holds and disburses funds to implementers based on instruction from the steering committee, and (v) implementers whose proposals get selected and funded and who carry out projects and report on them[25].

In this subsection, we describe and subsequently analyse NCFs to which Sweden made a contribution during and after CCI in terms of: (i) policy foundation and institutional arrangements, (ii) Sweden's contribution to the funds, (iii) challenges faced by the fund, (iv) national ownership, given NCFs' explicit interest to promote country ownership, develop institutional capacities and ensure that the funds go to the right places, and (v) insights. We identified insights based on our interest in transformative learning, which involves the transformation of problematic frames of reference, making them more capable of reflexivity and emotional ability to change towards frames that are more appropriate for making decisions and taking action under specific social ecological contexts[26],[27]. We identified the insights of each NCF based on recent studies.

2.4.1 Bangladesh Climate Change Resilience Fund

Policy foundation: The Bangladesh Climate Change Resilience Find (BCCRF) supported the six pillars of Bangladesh's Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan (2009-2018), namely: (i) food security, social safety and health, (ii) comprehensive disaster management,

24 UNDP. (2011).
25 Ibid.
26 Mezirow, J. (2009).
27 Diduck, A., Sinclair, A. J., Hostetler, G., & Fitzpatrick, P. (2012).

(iii) climate-proof infrastructure, (iv) research and knowledge management, (v) mitigation and low carbon development, and (vi) capacity development[28]. The pillars are consistent with the six categories of CCI interventions that defined what constituted good CCA. BCCRF's intended benefits include high level coordination, donor harmonisation and the resultant elimination of overlaps, increased transparency and accountability[29]. Its objective was for BCCRF to become a government led, owned, managed collaborative sustainable climate change financing mechanism, which is transparent and accountable, aimed at developing capacity and resilience of the country to meet the challenges of climate change by 2020[30].

The Governing Council was the highest body with responsibility to provide advisory guidance and strategic matters and ensures that BCCRF is aligned to the climate change strategy and looks into high level concerns such as the transfer of fiduciary duties from the World Bank to the Government of Bangladesh. It was chaired by the Minister of Environment and Forests and includes the Ministries of Agriculture; Finance; Food and Disaster Management, Water Resources, Foreign Affairs, Women and Children Affairs, Planning, the Prime Minister's Office, two representatives from contributing donors, two representatives from CSOs, and the Country Director of the World Bank as an observer. Next was a Management Committee, which conducts the assessment of grant requests submitted by line Ministries and other eligible entities and ensures adherence to the implementation manual. It was chaired by the Ministry of Environment and Forests Secretary and comprises senior government officers from the Development and the Environment Divisions of the same Ministry; from the Economic Relations Division; from the Planning Commission; two representatives from the contributing donors and one representative from CSOs[31]. The Secretariat – in the Ministry of Environment and Forestry – provided support to the Governing Council and Management Committee and to implementing

28 Ibid.
29 Hedger, M. (2011).
30 Bangladesh Swedish Embassy. (2018).
31 Khan, S. M. M. H.& Huq, S. (2014).

agencies. The World Bank had the responsible for fiduciary management and accountability for a limited period of time[32].

Contributions to the fund: Sweden was the third country to sign a contribution to BCCRF, after the UK and Denmark, in November 2010[33]. The bilateral pledges made between 2010 and 2012 amounted to US$188.2 of which US$90 million had been deposited by the end of 2013. As indicated in the preceding chapter, Sweden's largest bilateral investment under CCI (of 130 MSEK/US$13.6 million) went into BCCRF. By the end of 2013, Sweden had deposited an additional US$5.7 million of non-CCI funds, bringing its total contribution (deposit) to BCCRF to U$$19.3 million (21.4 percent of the total), making Sweden the second biggest contributor. The contributions (deposits) made by other bilateral funders were as follows: United Kingdom, US$28.4 million towards the Community Climate Change Project (CCCP); EU, US$18.5 million towards agricultural adaptation in climate risk prone areas; USA, US$9 million towards food storage facility; Australia, US$7.1 million towards multi-purpose cyclone shelter construction; Switzerland, US$6 million towards a solar irrigation project; and Denmark, US$1.8 million towards the BCCRF Secretariat[34]. The total amount contributed had increased to US$130 million by the end of 2016, with the major change in contributions being made by the UK: US$66.448 million. Most of these BCCRF funds were invested in CCA (77 percent), followed by mitigation (15 percent), technology transfer and capacity building (4 percent each). Most (83 percent) of the activities were to be implemented through Government institutions, 10 percent by NGOs, 2.7 percent through the World Bank, which also received the remaining 4.3 percent for providing analytical work and technical assistance[35].

Significance of Sweden's contribution: Sweden's contribution went towards the afforestation and reforestation for climate risk reduction in coastal and hilly areas of Bangladesh[36], supported through the Climate Resilient Participatory Afforestation and

[32] BCCRF. (2017).
[33] BCCRF. (2017).
[34] Ibid.
[35] http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTBANGLADESH/Resources/AboutBCCRF.pdf
[36] Khan, S. M. M. H.& Huq, S. (2014).

Reforestation Project (CRPARP), which had received a total of approximately USD 30 million by 2016 under BCCRF. This shows that Sweden contributed 64 percent to the project during the period. It is worth noting that, by November 2016, the Sida-funded CRPARP was the only one rated as highly satisfactory among the five main projects funded through BCCRF – the rest were either satisfactory or moderately satisfactory after exceeding most of its targets[37].

Challenges faced by the fund: A key challenge that faced the BCCRF right at the beginning was to do with the allocation of fiduciary responsibility. On the one hand, the Government of Bangladesh and some NGOs opposed the proposal to have fiduciary responsibility given to the World Bank because they were concerned about its charges, the lengthy processing periods, stringent conditions and limited Government control of the funds. On the other hand, DFID and Denmark in particular were concerned about the Government of Bangladesh's relatively high fiduciary risk. In the end, it was agreed that the World Bank would assume the responsibility for three years while the capacity of the Government of Bangladesh was being developed[38]. But this failed to happen:

It had been hoped that the Fund would move from a World Bank supported programme to a Resilience Fund owned and fully managed by the GoB [Government of Bangladesh]. A Secretariat was created by the Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF) and this Secretariat was expected to propose capacity building of an institution (either inside or outside the government) that would subsequently be responsible for the administration of BCCRF. However, this did not happen and the closure of the BCCRF, the Secretariat was no longer operational… The premature closure of the BCCRF resulted in a substantial re-fund to all the donors of the Fund… Sweden was refunded 6,026,653 USD in 2017 and a final refund is expected in May 2018, of 1,138,985 USD. In conclusion, the Swedish contribution to the BCCRF was approximately 12.1 MUSD.[39]

[37] BCCRF. (2017).
[38] Hedger, M. (2011).
[39] Bangladesh Swedish Embassy. (2018). p. 3.

Impact on national ownership and access to GCF: The BCCRF's institutional implementation set-up, in which the Secretariat was in the Ministry of Environment and Forests, as opposed to the Economic Relations Division (ERD) in the Ministry of Finance, which is the National Designated Authority (NDA), ran parallel to that of government systems and undermined the development of its capacity to manage the funds, assume fiduciary responsibility and increase national ownership[40]. However, ERD on the other hand has played a significant role in developing national capacity and ownership with support from multilateral implementing entities (MIEs) such as the World Bank and United Nations Bodies and donor partners accredited by GCF. The premature closure of BCCRF in 2017 and absence of a sustainable BCCRF Secretariat[41], suggests that BCCRF did not significantly contribute to national ownership.

Emerging insights: The experience with the BCCRF in Bangladesh highlighted the need for: (i) predictable and reliable funding investments to sustain climate change response actions, (ii) strengthening national funding entities (NFEs) to access international climate finance as national implementing entities (NIEs), and (iii) allocating resources for community-based adaptation initiatives, which are important for local level adaptation activities to be sustainable[42]. BCCRF's low levels of contribution to capacity building and national ownership undermined its overall contribution towards the implementation of the Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan (BCCSAP)[43].

2.4.2 Cambodia Climate Change Alliance Trust Fund

Policy foundation and institutional arrangements: The Cambodia Climate Change Alliance Trust Fund (CCCA TF), which was launched in 2010, supports the implementation of the National Adaptation Plan of Action (NAPA, 2006), the Strategic National Action Plan for

[40] Christensen, P, F. & Morrilon, V. (2016).
[41] Bangladesh Swedish Embassy. (2018).
[42] Khan, S. M. M. H. & Huq, S. (2014).
[43] Bangladesh Swedish Embassy. (2018).

Disaster Risk Reduction (2008-2013), the National Strategic Development Plan (2009-2013; 2014-2018), and the Cambodia Climate Change Strategic Plan (CCCSP 2014-2023).[44] It is the funding mechanism of the Cambodia Climate Change Alliance (CCCA), a national programme that exists to strengthen institutional capacities to manage and mitigate climate change risks, focusing on building the resilience of ecosystems and vulnerable communities to climate change and other natural risks.[45] The institutional set-up comprises: (i) an inter-ministerial (20 ministries and 3 agencies) National Climate Change Committee (NCCC)[46], established in 2006, which has led the development of the CCCSP, is chaired by the Prime Minister and tasked with preparing, coordinating and monitoring the development and implementation of climate change policies, strategies and programmes; (ii) a Climate Change Technical Team (CCTT) that provides technical support to the NCCC; (iii) the Climate Change Department (CCD) in the Ministry of Environment[47]; and (iv) UNDP, which is the trustee with fiduciary responsibility.[48,49] Plans have always been that the Government of Cambodia will become the trustee. Implementers are government entities who may do so alone or in partnership with NGOs, UN agencies and/or universities.

Sweden's contribution to the fund: Sweden is one of the four donors that made the initial contributions to the CCCA TF Phase 1 (2010-2014), the others being UNDP, the EU and Denmark. By December 2012, Sweden had contributed the equivalent of USD 3,977,518 - of which approximately USD 2 million (130 MSEK), about two-thirds, came from CCI - which was the highest out of the total deposits (41.7 percent), which amounted to USD 9,546,369. UNDP, the EU and Denmark had contributed 31.4 percent, 21 percent and 5.9 percent respectively.[50] Sweden, UNDP and the EU are also funding CCA TF Phase 2 (2015-2019). The projects that were funded during Phase 1 covered water, crop and livestock

[44] Am, P., Caccillato, E., Nkem, J., & Chellivard, J. (2013).
[45] Smith, C. (2012).
[46] The other three key ministries are: (i) agriculture, forestry and fisheries, (ii) water resources and meteorology, and (iii) industry, mines and energy.
[47] National Climate Change Committee. (2013).
[48] CCCA. (2012).
[49] Salamanca, A. (2016).
[50] CCCA. (2012).

production, horticulture, aquaculture, post-harvest management, health and DRR.[51] We could not establish Sweden's contribution during CCCA TF Phase 2 (2014-2019), but we found out that, together with the EU and UNDP, they committed USD 12.9 million.[52] We intend to research this further in the third phase of this evaluation process.

Through its investment in the trust fund, Sweden contributed to Cambodia's increased capacity for analysis and managing the effects of climate change, the development of a national climate strategy and a framework for climate financing. Between 2014 and 2016, the CCCA TF had contributed to the development of climate action plans by 14 line ministries; a model for performance-based climate financing at local level; the establishment of a National Council for Sustainable Development; and to Cambodia's ratification of the Paris Agreement in 2016.

Challenges faced by the fund: In 2010 and early 2011, project implementation was slow because of unclear management arrangements, especially connection with UNDP's role and lack of staff that had not been hired (e.g. a Trust Fund Administrator).[53] At the same time, the capacity of the CCD to serve as the Secretariat was low, being a small agency with a large mandate.[54] These challenges delayed implementation then. However, they were subsequently resolved. The other challenge was that CSOs could not directly access the trust fund based on the grant criteria and this limited their meaningful participation. In addition, there was a parallel fund to the CCCA, in the form of the UNFCCC's Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF), which in Cambodia was administered by UNEP and chaired by the Ministry of Economy and Finance under different management and implementation systems and reporting to different bodies, thereby constraining CCCA TF's impact.[55]

[51] CCCA. (2014).
[52] Ministry of Environment. (2016).
[53] Am, P., Caccillato, E., Nkem, J., & Chellivard, J. (2013).
[54] Ferguson, A. & Sin, S. (2014).
[55] Ferguson, A. & Sin, S. (2014).

Impact on national level ownership and access to GCF: The CCCA Project Document (2009) provides for the capacity development of the NCCC and CCD towards enhancing national ownership. CCCA contributed to the enhancement of national ownership through developing a well-defined institutional framework for policy development (e.g. CCCSP) and programming (e.g. Climate Change Financing Framework) to ensure national ownership, policy alignment and well-coordinated climate change interventions. At implementation level, the Secretariat developed and refined administrative procedures for managing project grants. All these efforts are also part of preparations to access the AF and GCF.

Emerging insights: Mainstreaming climate change requires both horizontal and vertical coordination and alignment, between ministries and at different scales of operation. For the latter to succeed, Cambodia developed a Strategic Framework for Decentralisation and De-concentration and an associated Plan (2010-2019)[56]. The plans to transfer CCCA to a national fund had to be delayed following the realisation that the handover should only take place when Government's capacity was developed, and within a decade[57].

2.4.3 Mali Climate Fund

Policy foundation and institutional arrangements: Mali Climate Fund (FCM) is aligned to the National Climate Policy (PNCC) and the National Climate Change Strategy (SNCC) of 2011[58], the National Strategy for a Green and Climate Change Resilient Economy (EVRC, 2011) [59] and the Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC, 2016) [60]. It prioritises agriculture, forestry and energy sectors[61]. Established by the Government of Mali in February 2012 following the promulgation of the PNCC and SNCC, it is hosted by the Environment and Sustainable Development Agency (AEDD) as

[56] Am, P., Caccillato, E., Nkem, J., & Chellivard, J. (2013).
[57] CCCA. (2014).
[58] MEADD. (2014).
[59] MEADD. (2011).
[60] MEADD. (2016).
[61] AEDD & UNDP. (2019).

the Technical Secretariat with the United Nations Development Program Special Office Multi-Partner Trust Fund (UNDP-MPTF) having the fiduciary responsibility to ensure fiduciary and technical compliance with international standards and reassure climate fund investors[62]. The Steering Committee, which is chaired by Minister of the Ministry of Environment, Sanitation and Sustainable Development (MEADD), comprises 16 members from government, donors, civil society, the Resident Coordinator of UN System and the Executive Coordinator MPTF Office, provides leadership, strategic direction and oversight and selects proposals to fund at the recommendation of the Technical Secretariat.[63]

Contributions to the fund: CCI's main contribution to FCM resided in the laying of the foundation and mechanisms for FCM leading to the establishment of "the first public-private fund in Africa to strategically leverage funds for pilot and test interventions that can identify and scale resilience for the country at large[64]." It played a catalytic role in the development and materialisation of the Mali Climate Fund, starting from 2010[65] by, for example, supporting: the development of the SNCC, the development of governance mechanisms and terms of reference, and the establishment and operationalisation of the Mali Donor Coordination Group in Environment and Climate Change that it chaired for its first five years of existence. Sweden was the first country to contribute to FCM when it was operationalised by investing 16 MSEK in December 2013, plus a further 20 MSEK in 2014[66]. Norway, the only other bilateral partner to invest in the fund by January 2019, invested US$1,015,965 in 2014[67]. So far, Sweden and Norway have allocated virtually the same amount of investment to the FCM, which has reached US$30 million. With AEDD as the NDA for the GCF, Mali is preparing the National Agency for Territorial Communities Investment (ANICT), Reso Climat Mali (which Sida has been funding since CCI) and Mali Development Bank for GCF

[62] AEDD & UNDP. (2019).
[63] UNDP. (2013).
[64] UNICEF (2014).
[65] Boman, K. & Goita, M. (2016).
[66] Ibid.
[67] Ibid.

accreditation.[68] Sweden is playing a leading role in the capacity development of the NDA and two of the three selected country institutions to become capable of accessing GCF, which is important for funding in the long run.

Challenges faced by the fund: FCM's major challenge has been to do with whether, how and when UNDP should hand over the fiduciary responsibility to AEDD. The question of whether to do so is based on the knowledge that in countries such as Ethiopia, such funds can be managed separately both through government, and through another structure such as UNDP (as in Mali). Such an option allows donors who are concerned with fiduciary risks to invest their funds in FCM. The process of AEDD's assumption of the fund management role, which is envisaged to take four years from 2018, has already been supported through technical capacity development and negotiations towards this end. A second challenge is that only a small number of donors (only two) have invested in the fund.

Impact on national ownership and access to GCF: FCM has enhanced Mali's preparedness for multilateral climate funds such as GCF and AF, which provide larger climate investments, which have potential to generate impact at scale. The Swedish Embassy is encouraging the activation of a national mechanism that would foster national ownership and long-term sustainability of the fund and prepare Mali for GCF and Adaptation Fund (AF) accreditation[69]'[70].

Emerging insights: Fostering national ownership of the climate agenda in Mali required the anchoring of FCM on national policy, which had to be developed prior to the operationalisation of the plan. It also required the development of relevant institutional and technical capacities not only at the national level, but also at the level of municipalities, among CSOs and communities who should be the ultimate champions and beneficiaries. This defined a nuanced vertical and sectoral idea of ownership layers.

[68] Swedish Embassy in Bamako. (2018).
[69] Swedish Embassy in Bamako. (2018).
[70] Ministry of Environment and Sanitation & UNDP. (2018).

2.4.4 Analysis of supported national climate funds

Evidence from the three CCI supported NCFs in Bangladesh, Cambodia and Mali suggests that each country anchored the funds on a climate change policy and/or strategy. Where such a policy/strategy was initially absent, as in the cases of Cambodia and Mali, the approaches varied. In Mali the Government decided to develop the policy and strategy first while in Cambodia they utilised NAPA while they were simultaneously developing a climate change strategy, which then guided the CCCA TF later. The NDCs (which grew out of the Paris Agreement) and green growth strategies that were developed later were also aligned to the respective national climate funds. Each of the three countries met the criteria for institutional arrangements as outlined by UNDP: an inter-ministerial steering committee, management committee, secretariat, trustee and implementers, whose respective mandates were either identical or similar. In all cases, the Ministry of Environment is the chair but in Cambodia, the Prime Minister is allocated an honorary position as chair. The trustee, across the three countries, is either the UNDP MDTF (Cambodia and Mali) or the World Bank (Bangladesh), who administers the fund while the Government's capacity is being developed. Interestingly, UNDP is both a trustee and a donor in Cambodia. The preparedness to handover and takeover appears to have and to be taking longer than anticipated across the three countries. The development and implementation of the multi-donor trust fund in the three countries has helped two of the three countries (Cambodia and Mali), to own the climate agenda, develop capacities for inter-ministerial and multi-stakeholder collaboration, and develop capacities to design, implement and monitor CCA and mitigation projects and increase national preparedness to access GCF resources. Sweden's financial and technical support for the NCFs in Cambodia and Mali has been particularly significant.

By their nature, the NCFs, especially in Cambodia and Mali, resulted in the implementation of most of the CCI principles in their fullness, most notably the following:

Principle 2: The Swedish contributions should have a tangible added value.

Principle 3: Contributions should work towards the implementation of the Paris agenda principles on aid effectiveness:

3.1 Developing country ownership of adaptation and mitigation strategies.

3.2 Alignment of priorities between donor and recipient country.

3.3 Donor agencies harmonise and coordinate development aid.

3.4 Both donors and recipients manage for results.

Principle 4: Consideration should be taken to the ongoing international climate negotiations regarding timing and choice of channels.

Principle 5: The allocation should reflect the ongoing work of the Commission on Climate Change and Development (CCCD) covering:

- *Integration of climate change actions, development planning and DRR.*
- *Integration from the highest level.*

5.3 Coordination of institutions through effective governance.

5.4 Building adaptive capacity is a priority for the poorest countries.

5.6 Effective, demand-driven funding mechanisms for adaptation, including national funding hubs.

5.7 Context matters when considering climate risks, political economies, and solutions.

Principle 7: A proportion of the Swedish contributions should focus on disaster risk reduction as an integral part of climate adaptation.

2.5 Summary of CCI outcomes

The CCI-inspired outcomes described below were mostly derived from the Sida Final Report[71] while others were drawn from the specific end of CCI-funded projects, and the draft deep dive CCI case study report in the case of Mali. We established that through supporting facilitated learning on CCA on context-specific priority themes and sectors, learning by doing, and learning and doing, CCI

[71] Sida. (2013).

contributed to the development of national and local government and CSOs to meaningfully integrate CCA with national development plans and their implementation; and adaptive capacity development at community level. The insights that were generated fed into relevant policies and strategies, including national curricula in the case of Bangladesh and Cambodia.

CCI contributed to the development of community adaptive capacities, which contributed to community, ecosystem and built environment resilience, focusing on the most climate vulnerable communities and community members, especially women and indigenous communities; and areas of each partner country. For example, in Burkina Faso, CCI strengthened dams against flood risks. These areas included: (i) the Inner Niger River Delta of Mali that is critical for the country's crop, fish and livestock productions, forest areas on which communities depend on for energy and income, and Sahelian arid, drought and food insecure prone areas in Mali, (ii) the coastal regions of Cambodia, (iii) the forests areas and the under-irrigated and drought-prone agricultural land of Burkina Faso, (iv) the forests, food insecure and agrarian areas and watersheds, and urban areas where water and sanitation facilities were poor in Bolivia[72,73,74], and the (v) steep hills and cyclone-prone, water and sanitation insecure coastal areas of Bangladesh.

On the policy and governance front, CCI contributed to the development of a climate policy and strategy in Mali (2011), a Disaster Management Act in Bangladesh (2012), a climate change strategy in Cambodia (2014), and National Water and Sanitation policy in Bolivia. These helped guide climate investments and actions to be aligned to the national agenda. At the same time, CCI developed and/or implemented innovative ways of implement national climate, development, DRR, water and decentralisation policies and strategies. In terms of governance, CCI contributed to partner countries' ownership of the climate agenda through investing in institutional capacity development that included supporting the development and implementation of inclusive and

[72] PROAGRO Coordination Committee. (2014).
[73] Holmberg, A. & Dockweiler, M. (2016).
[74] Agua Tuya. (2013).

robust governance and management systems across the partner countries. Consequently, it fostered mutual accountability, gender-responsive financing and programming, transdisciplinary, cross-sectoral, multi-actor, donor-partner country collaborative planning, learning and action in responding to climate change related challenges. In Burkina Faso, CCI supported the establishment of effective and Water Users Committees through the Reduce the Vulnerability of Small Dams to Climate Change project (PRVPB-CC) [75] . In Mali's forestry sector, it contributed to the operationalisation of the country's decentralisation policy, linking government's vertical structures and enabling the active participation of CSOs in working with communities and local government to find new ways of dealing with climate change, through the establishment of Reso Climat Mali climate fund for CSOs[76]. The NCFs that were implemented in Bangladesh and Bolivia through significant CCI contributions resulted in greater strengthening of national ownership and built the countries' readiness to access international adaptation funds. CCI also contributed to the implementation other national development plans. For example, in Bolivia, it contributed to the implementation of the National Agenda 2025[77].

All in all, CCI generated useful working examples and approaches, which were indicative of good climate financing and programme, consistent with the Paris Agenda on Aid Effectiveness. At the same time the initiative enhanced the image of Sweden as one of the leading donors in the climate and environment sector, especially within the five CCI partner countries. It also appears to have informed Sweden's subsequent country programmes, which built on most of CCI's achievements and programmes as the post-CCI period suggests.

[75] Marlet, S., Sanogo, S., & Keita, F. (2016).
[76] Mukute, M. (2019).
[77] MMAyA. (2017).

2.6 The making of investment decisions

Sections 2.3 and 2.5 above described and analysed Sweden's bilateral investments during and as a result of CCI. This subsection seeks to explain how the bilateral investment decisions were made. We established that the decisions were made at three levels: (i) by the Swedish Government in terms of the allocation of fast-start climate funds between bilateral, regional and multilateral investments; (ii) by MFA and Sida working together to agree the bilateral portfolio, including which countries to target in the allocation of CCI funds; and (iii) by Sida at the partner country level in terms of where to invest the allocated amounts. At the bilateral portfolio level, the MFA and Sida made decisions jointly about the overall allocation of CCI bilateral funds, with MFA delegating decision-making over the details of bilateral investments at partner country level to Sida. The criteria that were used to select the countries included:

- Countries where there was already an ongoing cooperation with Sweden in climate-sensitive sectors such as environment, natural resources and water. Such countries already understood how Sweden's development cooperation worked and posed lower risks of failure in utilising the climate funds (Sida, personal communication, 2019).
- Countries highly vulnerable to climate change and its impacts (Sida, personal communication, 2019). This criterion reflects the application of CCI *Principle 5.4 Building adaptive capacity is a priority for the poorest countries.*

It was then the Heads of Development Cooperation at the Swedish Embassies in the five selected countries who made decisions on which projects to fund at the partner country level. The decisions were reached in liaison with the PO at Sida HQ and the Quality Assurance Committee (Sida, personal communication, January 2019). This decision-making process should be understood within the broader framework for the allocation of development assistance by Sweden. Basically, the Riksdag (parliament) decides on the amount of aid. The Government in turn decides on strategies

that guide annual allocations to humanitarian and development assistance under bilateral and multilateral arrangements. Then Government delegates the right to make decisions on bilateral investments to Sida, Swedish embassies and other state authorities within the respective strategic frameworks. The Sida Director of the relevant department delegates decision-making and authorization powers for the allocated funds to the Head of Development Cooperation or Head of an Embassy[78].

We also noted that the countries selected for bilateral investment belonged to Sweden's 12 'long-term partners' (MFA, 2007)[79], with four of the 5 countries (except Bolivia) being also in the category of Least Developed Countries (LDCs) both in 2009 and now, suggesting that the selection of bilateral countries was aligned to CCI *Principle 1: The funds reserved for adaptation interventions should go primarily to the poorest countries.* Three of these countries (Bolivia, Cambodia and Mali) were also visited during the preparation of Closing the Gaps report (i.e. to "to gain an understanding of the threats poor people face, how they can build their adaptive capacity, and what is needed in the form of institutions and resources to provide the most effective support and the best outcomes"[80]. CCCD, which helped frame CCI, intended to establish how to: (i) design and support adaptation to climate change, (ii) reduce the increasing risk of weather-related disasters, and (iii) strengthen the resilience of the poorest and most vulnerable countries and communities[81].

At partner country level, climate investment decisions appeared to have been guided by two main factors: context-specific issues and the history of cooperation with Sida. For example, in Cambodia, where CCA was not on the national agenda in 2008/09 and fell outside the Swedish Country Strategy, CCI investments went into building national capacity in the area of climate change and to strengthen the overall coordination of climate actions, and building capacity at local level for concrete climate adaptation activities (Sida, personal communication, January 2019). This illustrates observation

[78] EBA. (2018).
[79] MFA (2007).
[80] CCCD (2009).
[81] Ibid.

of *Principle 3.1 Developing country ownership of adaptation and mitigation strategies*, and *Principle 3.2: Alignment of priorities between donor and recipient country*. In Bangladesh, where CCA and DRR are closely linked because most disasters in the country are weather and climate-related, most of the CCI climate investments went into DRR capacity building at national and local levels, and policy making, planning and implementation[82]. Similarly, drought disasters in Burkina Faso, and floods and drought disasters in Mali have been integrated in resilience building interventions supported by CCI. This indicates an observation of *Principle 5.1: Integration of climate change actions, development planning and DRR.*

2.7 Bilateral, regional and multilateral synergies

Mindful that CCI investments were made bilaterally, regionally and multilaterally, we sought to establish whether they were designed to generate synergistic effects and get the most out of each krona invested by design or through practice. We established that CCI multilateral, regional and bilateral investments were not deliberately designed to ensure synergy between and among them (Sida, personal communication, January 2019). Consequently, there were no specific mechanisms for reporting on, checking and improving on the generation of synergetic effects between and across the three investment portfolios. An EBA study on who makes Sweden's development cooperation investment decisions, which went beyond CCI, concluded that there was insufficient strategic coordination of Sida and MFA and this had an anti-synergistic effect between bilateral and regional investments on one hand and multilateral investments and lobbying on the other[83]. By and large, MFA coordinated multilateral investments while Sida was responsible for regional and bilateral investments. However, Sida had dedicated funding going to GFDRR, separate from the humanitarian strategy[84]. This raises the question about whether the set of 7 CCI

[82] Sida. (2013).
[83] EBA. (2018).
[84] Colvin, J. (2019).

principles were not a deliberate means by which coherence and integration was to be achieved leading to the creation of synergistic effects. Specifically, it raises the question about the scope of *Principle 5.2: Integration from the highest level.*

In practice, several multi-level investment inter-linkages and synergies can be observed in the three regions where the investments were made. For example, some of the bilateral investments made in Bangladesh, Cambodia and Mali were deliberately aimed at increasing the respective partner country's capacities and track record to become ready for applying for the Global Climate Fund (GCF), in which Sweden invested[85]. In the case of Mali, one of the main objectives of the Mali Climate Fund, a concept and mechanism that Sweden's CCI supported financially and technically together with other bilateral donors, harmonised donor relations, efforts and approaches while at the same time enhancing donor-partner country collaboration and building the latter's capacity to access GCF (Swedish Embassy, Bamako, personal communication, January 2019). The same applied to BCCRF in Bangladesh[86].

There were also CCI investments, which enabled the development of synergies directed beyond GCF. In Cambodia, these included CCCA creating synergies: (i) with the Asian Development Bank through the Strategic Programme for Climate Resilience (SPCR) (Sida, personal communication, January 2019), and (ii) with the regional Climate Change Alliance supported by Sweden through the regional programme managed from Bangkok in areas such as climate financing and gender integration (Sida, personal communication, January 2019). In Africa, the bilateral CCI programmes in Burkina Faso and Mali have been actively engaged with the West African sub-region of the CCI regional Africa programme (Sida, personal communication, January 2019) as well as some multilateral programmes supported by CCI, such as

[85] Through the CCI, in 2012 Sweden made a small investment of 5 MSEK in the GCF, to fund administrative support in the early set up period.

[86] Khan, S. M. M. H., Huq, S., & Shamsuddhoha, M.D. (2012).

GFDRR and the Forest Investment Program (FIP)[87]. These synergy-building practices offer potentially interesting insights upon which Sweden can build in pursuit of producing coordinated efforts and results from its three kinds of investments.

2.8 Main challenges encountered

The **main challenges** encountered in bilateral climate financing and programming may be summarised as follows: (i) CCI was too fast-paced and its duration too short, (ii) lack of additional human resources, (iii) limited capacities and high expectations, (iv) lack of a performance monitoring framework, and (v) absence of a deliberate synergy-building mechanism between countries and across investment portfolios.

2.8.1 Pace of planning

The fast pace at which project plans for CCI-supported climate investments had to be made undermined adequate consultations in the partner countries. This created the risk of sub-optimal preparations and assessments. It was worsened by low partner country capacity to coordinate different actors and develop joint plans and proposals and resulted in *reduced adherence to the Paris Agenda on Aid Effectiveness* (Sida, February 2010 Bilateral meeting report). Internal Sida and MFA reports show that while the pace of planning was relatively fast in Bangladesh and Bolivia it was slower in Cambodia, Burkina Faso and Mali.

2.8.2 Lack of additional human resources

The fast pace of change and the additional workload for Sida in partner countries were not accompanied by timely additional human resources. This was worsened by the fact that CCI had separate

[87] The initial CCI investment of 35 MSEK to GFDRR in 2010 focused on cooperation with West Africa for strengthening the region's framework for disaster reduction and climate change for the period 2010-2012; Burkina Faso is a priority country of the FIP.

performance and reporting requirements, and needed additional expertise in the area of climate change. The hardest hit partner countries were the ones with smaller embassies and those who had no climate change in their partner country strategies [88] (e.g. Cambodia and Bangladesh). In some partner countries, low Sida human resources capacity was exacerbated by low project partners' capacities to absorb the funding in the given period, and in others, by high staff turnover, which undermined retention of institutional memory. Lack of additional human resources was also underlined as a major bilateral investment challenge during the evaluation feedback meeting with Sida, held in May 2019. The meeting particularly pointed out that the additional funds and work was not accompanied by the hiring of the right people with the 'the right competence and time'. This capacity gap was eventually resolved.

2.8.3 Low partner capacity and expertise

In addition to the above two challenges, CCI programmes were constrained by low partner capacities, which varied between countries but had the same net effect of slowing down progress of implementation and level of effectiveness. Bangladesh experienced "high level of corruption, institutional capacity constraints and a 'project' mentality [89] " while Burkina Faso had low financial management capacity and low technical capacity in climate proof small dam construction and of Water Users' Committees (CUEs)[90]. Similarly, Bolivia's capacity constraints in the Programme for the Reduction of Vulnerability of Livelihoods to the Effects of Climate Change (PRV) included lack of a clear theory of change, lack of an integrated, multi-sectoral approach, and inadequate attention to gender and human rights issues[91]. In Mali capacity constraints were related to how to effectively communicate climate change and its impact and integrated planning and implement the decentralisation policy[92], which were being constrained by lack of capacity and

[88] Sida. (2013). p. 67.
[89] Christensen, P, F. & Morrilon, V. (2016). p. 27.
[90] Marlet, S., SANONGO, S., Keita, M. (2016).
[91] Holmberg, A. & Dockweiler, M. (2016).
[92] Mukute, M. (2019).

recurrent changes in ministries and civil servants[93]. The common challenge across all countries in which NFCs were implemented was lack of experience in managing such funds, and the absence of the necessary governance and management tools, which had to be put in place (See section on NFCs). In Cambodia, the Ministry of Environment, the Climate Change Department (CCD) and the Climate Change Technical Team (CCTT) are understaffed in relation to their climate change mandate, the coordination, leadership and technical role they must play[94].

2.8.4 High expectations and short duration of CCI

Some partner countries had low capacity in terms of expertise and high staff turnover that eroded institutional memory, fragmented management of climate change, and ownership. This was worsened by donors who had unrealistic expectations of results in a short time or whose efforts were also fragmented and overlapping. For example, in 2012 the Cambodia Climate Change Department and Trust Fund Secretariat had low capacity to run the programme and support its implementation. The net effects of this were delays, lower levels of target and outcome fulfillment[95]. The large scale of finance investments that Sida made under CCI was likely not going to be continued beyond the end of the initiative. Consequently, there was a sustainability challenge regarding how well such special initiatives could work as a vehicle for mainstreaming new Sida strategic approaches in the climate sector[96]. However, it is worth noting that some of the programmes and projects initiated under CCI were subsequently continued.

2.8.6 Lack of a performance monitoring framework

CCI had no performance monitoring framework and this made it difficult for Sida and others to measure the contribution of the

[93] Zamudo, A. N. (2016).
[94] Ferguson, A. & Sin, S. (2014).
[95] Sida. (2013).
[96] Christoplos, I., Novaky, M., & Ayesan, Y. (2012).

initiative and to undertake performance reporting at portfolio level[97]. When MFA suggested that each country and regional team should plan for evaluations and follow-ups, Sida indicated that there would be a challenge because there were no targets, objectives, goals set by the Government for the overall CCI and to introduce the targets during the process of implementation was not reasonable ground for an evaluation[98]. In addition, there was insufficient baseline information against which the degree of change could be verified. However, there were subsequent efforts aimed at resolving the challenge when Sida informed MFA that it was working with DFID to develop appropriate evaluation criteria and methods for climate adaptation in development cooperation and that this would include cooperation with the OECD DAC Task Team Adaptation in a meeting that was to take place in October 2010.

2.8.7 Lack of synergy between levels

The evaluation established that the CCI funding and programming design had no deliberate strategy to generate synergy between and among its three different funding envelops (bilateral, regional and multilateral) and associated programmes. We saw this as a weakness from two perspectives: lack of coordinated impact generated, and lack of horizontal learning within and across funding envelops. This lack an internal synergy building strategy seemed to go against CCI's well known and highly valued approach of creating synergies between development, CCA, mitigation and DRR; and synergy generation in working with other bilateral donors. It also went against CCCD's advice to potential partner countries, "The Commission believes that national governments must strive to overcome the policy incoherence that exists between both nationally and internationally by systematically promoting mutually reinforcing policy actions across government departments and agencies, creating synergies that help achieve defined objectives[99]." In fact, one of the six CCI categories was essentially concerned with synergy building.

[97] Sida. (2013).
[98] Akesson, November 2009, p. 3
[99] CCCD (2009). p. 26.

2.9 Tracing the investments 2009-2019

In this section we look for patterns within Sweden's CCI bilateral climate investments across time, starting from 2009. We do this to see if there have been any shifts, and to find explanations for them so as to generate further insights that might inform Sweden's future climate funding. Our analysis revealed two major phases of Swedish climate funding, which are outlined below.

2.9.1 Investing in partner country's political, social and ecological capital

Roughly, during the 2009-2012 period, decentralisation and cross-sectoral collaboration were central to the capacity development process supported by CCI in the five bilateral countries (Sida, personal communication, January 2019). Swedish CCI investments set the stage and created conducive conditions for local actors to strengthen their adaptive capacity, local governance and social capital, including knowledge. Adaptive capacities were developed among targeted households and communities in the areas of natural resources, forestry, water and DRR[100,101,102,103,104,105,106]. This in turn resulted in concerted efforts to rebuild the agro-ecological foundations in selected communities across the five countries. Governance-related investments were made through operationalising national decentralisation policies and strategies, institutional capacity development of lead and line ministries and development of municipal and community plans on forestry management and conflict resolution, for example. Local and international NGOs involved in project implementation had their institutional capacities developed too. Communities organised themselves into planning, learning and action groups around

[100] Am, P., Caccillato, E., Nkem, J., & Chellivard, J. (2013).
[101] Ministry of Environment. (2014).
[102] Marlet, S., Sanogo, S., & Keita, F. (2016).
[103] Agua Tuya. (2013).
[104] UNDP. (2015).
[105] Khan, S.M.M.H., et.al. (2012).
[106] Mukute, M. (2019).

relevant themes such as water, gender and marketing as part of developing social capital[107,108]. Knowledge networks were also formed by people whose climate knowledge and skills had been developed under CCI projects, both within the five countries and between some of them and their neighbouring countries[109,110,111,112]. While these three forms of capital (ecological, political and social) were tapped into to improve livelihoods and economies through market gardening and related initiatives, it was not until after 2012 that focus on developing local green economies began in earnest or at a significant scale.

The emphasis of Phase 1 as described above underlines the relevance and application of the following principles 5.1 to 5.3 and 5.5, namely:

- Integration of climate change actions, development planning and DRR,
- Integration from the highest level,
- Coordination of institutions through effective governance; and
- Getting the mix of human and technical measures right.

It is worth noting that CCI also contributed to increased knowledge on climate change among Sida staff regarding how climate change is integrated and impacts on specific sectors (Sida, personal communication, January 2019).

2.9.2 Expanding towards green growth

This phase, which largely began during the post-CCI period, expanded the social, political and ecological capital foundation while at the same time improving livelihoods and economies within a green growth development paradigm. The political/governance thrust shifted towards enhancing national ownership. This included

[107] Köhlin et al. (2015).
[108] Marlet, S., Sanogo, S., & Keita, F. (2016).
[109] Sida. (2013).
[110] Mukute, M. (2019).
[111] See table 4 in this report, Bolivia and Cambodia.
[112] Holmberg, A. & Dockweiler, M. (2016)..

Swedish supported projects such as investing in the Mali Climate Fund, which increased the country's decision-making powers over where the funds should be invested. This phase has also been marked by the building of greater alignment between the Swedish country strategies and those of the partner countries. For example, the Swedish country strategy for the cooperation with Cambodia for the period 2012-2013 had the goal of increased national capacity to coordinate and implement climate adaptation activities, and its successor 2014-2018 had the twin goals of (i) increased resilience against climate change at local level, (ii) increased cooperation between citizens and local authorities to support sustainable use of natural resources (Sida, personal communication, January 2019). The latter goal is associated with green growth.

In Burkina Faso the streamlining of roles and responsibilities between the state, civil society and private sector emerged as a major thrust of governance. The state began playing more of its traditional role of developing and enforcing policies, making follow ups and spreading good practice while NGOs and the private sector began serving as supporters of local change based on an acknowledgement of the strengths of each group of actors. Here, the involvement of the private sector shows the embracing of the economic dimension at a structural level. Perhaps the strongest hint of a shift towards an inclusive green economy came from a respondent based in Burkina Faso who said:

My deep conviction is that working to develop and improve value chains of non-timber forest products bears a huge potential to alleviate poverty and improve resilience of the poor fringes of the rural communities. This will have a double effect on climate change mitigation and adaptation through massive multipurpose trees planting and sustainable forest management. If I could add, I would argue for support to inclusive green economy and green growth. (Swedish Embassy, Ouagadougou, personal communication, January 2019)

Similarly, in Mali, the recently developed GEDEFOR III will have a strong focus on specialised green value chain development[113].

[113] Mali National Directorate of Forestry. (2018).

The CCI principles that appear to stand out in Phase 2 as described above include: 2, 3.1, 3.2 and 5.7 namely:

- The Swedish contributions should have a tangible added value;
- Developing country ownership of adaptation and mitigation strategies;
- Alignment of priorities between donor and recipient country; and
- Effective, demand-driven funding mechanisms for adaptation, including national funding hubs.

2.9.3 Further reflections on the contribution of CCI

CCI made a strong contribution towards the raising of the climate agenda in partner countries through supporting CCA-related learning, climate policy/strategy development and implementation, and the integration of climate into national development agenda. This contributed systemically and led to the embedding of adaptation across sectors and levels. CCI also contributed to a culture of inter-ministerial, multi-level and multi-stakeholder planning, implementation, reporting and learning, which is critical for the development of a rich community of climate learning and action. This is necessary given the complexity and transdisciplinary nature of climate change challenges that are interconnected with other challenges such as climate change. A third area where CCI made a strong contribution is on social, gender and climate justice. CCI investments were made in the most climate vulnerable countries and communities within those countries; it had a strong gender equality thrust, which enabled the worst affected people to benefit. At international level, CCI demonstrated how donor countries could honour their commitment to assisting developing countries to deal with climate change in a manner that built partner country capacities and ownership for continuity.

2.9.4 Bilateral climate financing: looking ahead

After describing the emerging pattern and trajectory of Swedish bilateral climate financing since CCI, we look ahead and imagine where it ought to be directed. Having succeeded in supporting the creation of political, social, ecological (and to an extent, economic) capital/assets – in some parts of the partner countries – towards inclusive green economic development, one of the major climate investment priorities of the future lies in building synergies between and across these assets. Secondly, there will be a need to scale out promising practices into other parts of the partner countries' development trajectories to help generate systemic change. There are some pre-conditions for effective scaling out and in, which include: (i) effective documentation and sharing of good and emergent practice within each country, and between partner countries; (ii) continued collaboration with other donors working in the same countries; and (iii) deliberate building of synergies between Swedish bilateral, regional and multilateral portfolios. In this regard, it is worth noting that some of the planned post-2018 bilateral projects, such as GEDEFOR III in Mali, are already paying close attention to creating synergy with similar projects supported by Sweden. In conclusion, looking ahead from a CCI principles perspective, this would mean paying closer attention not only to Principles *3.4: Both donors and recipients manage for results;* and *3.5: Mutual accountability*, but also to multi-level generative learning. There could also be a case for reviewing and refining the CCI principles, based on findings in this evaluation and to guide future investments and support.

3. Outcomes and key success factors

Having described: (i) the purpose of bilateral (regional and multilateral) goal of CCI as to effectively contribute to long term adaptation efforts, especially in the poorest countries, and to developing countries' efforts to reduce greenhouse gas levels; and (ii) the aim of CCA as increasing adaptive capacity and reducing the impact of climate change in human and natural system through addressing drivers of climate vulnerability, poverty, ecosystem degradation, DRR and GHG emissions as well as through climate funding and cooperation between the poor and rich nations; and (iii) the six categories of good CCA in Chapter 1 and (iv) having described and analysed the CCI bilateral investment levels, destinations, processes and patterns in Chapter 2, and (v) inferred how the CCI principles may have been applied or relevant to the bilateral investments, we dedicate this chapter (Chapter 3) to summarising the intermediate and long-term outcomes of CCI bilateral investments by country according to the six categories that were developed from OECD DAC and CCCD documents (Table 4). The outcomes are not exhaustive but indicative. We treated each category as constituting a pathway of change.

This chapter on outcomes and impact is a special of this report because it is also a confluence of the theory-informed, principles-focused evaluation on the one hand, and evaluation centred around the DAC criteria on the other. Here, CCI's *Principle 2: The Swedish contributions should have a tangible added value*, converges with the DAC criteria of impact and sustainability while the CCI-adopted categories make change comparison across bilateral countries consistent. In addition, we reveal some of the explanations behind the achievements.

A close look at Figure 1 in Chapter 2 where the six CCI categories as investment and intervention areas on one hand and Table 4 below as areas of change suggests that investment in one category does not limit outcomes and impact to it. For example, training and awareness in Mali contributed to increased adaptive capacity among communities, and ownership of the national climate agenda. NCFs in Bangladesh, Burkina Faso and Mali impacted on virtually all the

other categories as well. This also suggests that while entry points for CCA and other complex areas of intervention may vary across temporal and spatial dimensions, the pathways of change, which are not easy to predict, may lead to similar or the same outcomes.

In seeking explanations behind the changes made through CCI bilateral investments, we established the following as the key success factors:

Governance and management of climate change funds: The NCFs, which were implemented in three of the five countries, enabled the establishment and implementation of robust fund governance and management systems. At the same time, they provided a dynamic space for multi-stakeholder and multi-level coordination and collaboration between government ministries, and between government bilateral donors and multilateral bodies in a manner that fostered accountability and transparency. This in turn helped develop the partner countries' track record and climate finance readiness.

Synergistic effects between donors and partner countries: Joint donor programmes across the five countries helped CCI funds to have a wider reach while at the same time enhancing donor effectiveness. Synergies with partner countries were partly associated with the linkages between the existing and/or new partner-relevant country policies and the Swedish Country Strategies for the period. In addition, the dynamism and responsiveness of the embassies coupled with the relevance of the interventions to the partner countries and communities, who were and had experienced the negative impact of climate change and variability, enabled collaborative partnerships. This point is illustrated by the following observation made in Burkina Faso: "The reason that the PRVPB project was at all formulated and then relatively successful is probably the dynamism of the programme officer at the time but also the understanding amongst both the local population and the authorities of the tangible benefits of functioning water dams," (Swedish Embassy, Ouagadougou, personal communication, Jan 2019). The other synergy arose from Sweden's support for decentralisation, which was consistent with partner country strategies, notably in Bolivia, Cambodia and Mali.

The diversity of CCI partners working together for effective delivery of planned results was a key success factor, especially but not only in Burkina Faso.

High-level political engagement, and national and sub-national ownership of the climate agenda: Participation of Government Ministers (including the Prime Minister in the case of Cambodia), and Permanent Secretaries on the partner country side and the Ambassador on the donor side enabled integration of CCA from the highest level. High level government participation has in turn been attributed to political will. High level engagement was also reflected in CCI's support for the development of climate change related policies and strategies. Strong ownership of the climate agenda by Ministries (e.g. of Environment, Forestry, Water, Agriculture), municipalities, local CSOs and communities made CCI relevant and its interventions meaningful across levels.

Recognising and tapping into the comparative advantages of different country partners: In all of the five countries CCI worked with the state because it has causal powers to bring about structural and policy change across the country and to influence international climate decisions (e.g. at COPs) as well as for long-term sustainability. CCI worked with NGOs for their nimbleness, ability to experience and generate insights and good practice for possible scaling out and influencing government policy based on evidence, and for their closeness to the communities they work with as well as for their relatively high absorption capacity. In many cases, CCI also worked with UN bodies and the World Bank in emergency, water and sanitation, and NCFs because of their thematic expertise as well as absorption capacity and good fund management track record. Tapping into the different comparative advantages afforded by each of these sectors enhanced CCI's chances of success.

Table 4: CCI partner countries outcomes, impact and key success factors

INTERMEDIATE AND LONG-TERM OUTCOMES OF CCI IN PARTNER COUNTRIES BY CATEGORY OR PATHWAY OF CHANGE						
Partner country	Enhancing resilience to CC	CC policy and administrative management	Training and awareness on CC	Climate studies and impact research	Coordination of CC interventions across actors	Climate change fund
Bangladesh	Better access to clean drinking water; cyclone protection shelters, increased preparedness to deal with sudden climate hazards (majority of beneficiarieswomen and other vulnerable groups).	Signific. contribut. to development of Bangladesh's Disaster, Mgmt Act and to the development of the NDC. Expanded role and capacity of disaster mgmt committees.	Institutionalisation of DRR in education system, through introduction in school and college curricula & production of primary school text books. Activity-based learning and practice improvement.	Improved national "early warning" systems for weather-related disasters to reach 50 m people.	Mutual learning and synergies among donors, government, UN agencies & NGOs. Strengthened line ministries and CSOs capacity to integrate and implement	Climate change high on agendas: Government, bilateral donors and international community. Enhanced readiness for GCF and other large adaptation funds.

					CCA & DRR.	
Bolivia	Agricultural water-efficient models enhanced smallholder productivity and food security, esp. among women and ind. peoples. Increased household income, diversified production in agriculture and forestry, value addition of wood, improved efficient use of water and soil conserv. Sustainabl & environment-friendly water & sew.	Decentralized water and sewage works adapted to climate change informed National Water and Sanitation policy. Integration of CCA in irrigation planning & investments. Strengthened institutional capacity of 40 organizations on CCA, gender and trad. knowl.	Increased community capacities for integrated forest mgmt & value chain, joint business mgmt and gender equality. Activity-based learning & practice improvem. New knowledge & experience on water and sanitation incorporated in national curricula, textbooks and national	Established an agro-climatic monitoring system for agriculture's 10 most important crops in Bolivian food security. Established a knowledge platform on sustainable sanitation in 2 urban communities.	Put climate change agenda 'on the lips' of different actors. Built collaborative partnerships between and among some donors (e.g. Sida and GIZ through joint support of projects)	

	treatment plants & dry toilets.		training program.			
Burkina Faso	Better adaptation to climate change of works constructed or rehabilitated, especially through increased dam storage capacities and dam strengthening against risks related to floods. Poverty reduction improved the quality of life in terms of food (quantity and quality), income and diversification of	Establishment of better governance structures and equitable use of water resources supported by the establishment of Water Users Committees in all project sites.	Increased capacity for analyzing and managing the effects of climate change. Published a booklet on 96 best adaptation practices. Activity-based learning and practice improvement.	Updating of the water reservoir inventory enabled Government to develop a national dam rehabilitation program.	Enhanced the capacities of (14) line ministries' action plans, and local plans and strengthened ownership at ministerial level.	

	activities largely in agriculture & forestry sectors.					
Cambodia	Increased government, local and international NGOs, and community capacity to understand and manage climate change effects mainly in human rights, agriculture, forestry, water resources, fisheries, coastal area planning, and DRR. National Council for Sustainabl	Contributed to the development of the Climate Change Strategy. Contributed to the development of the NDC. Development and implementation of Local Adaptation Plans by municipalities (96) and communities (628).	Increased national and local capacity in understanding and tackling impacts of CC at policy, programming and implementation levels. Enhanced capacity of local NGOs to integrate CC, DRR and human rights knowledge into their plans and practices.		Increased capacity of the local communities & authorities to identify priorities and co-finance investments for local adapt. projects. Mutual learning and synergies among	Increased national ownership of the climate change agenda Enhanced readiness for GCF and other large adaptation funds. Integration of climate considerations into a national strategy and financing

	e Development had been established (with support from CCCA) by December 2016. Increased household food security and incomes and reduction in community vulnerability to climate.	Development and implementation of a Gender Equality Strategy pilot projects of the Cambodia Community Based Adaptation Programme.	Activity-based learning and practice improvement. Integration of CC in formal and non-formal education, and in nat'l curricula. Functional NGO learning and knowledge platform on climate change.		donors, government, UN agencies and NGOs. By December 2016, 14 line-ministries had developed their own climate action plans (none in 2013).	frame works Performance-based climate financing model at local level
Mali	Improvements in adaptive capacities & livelihoods of forest communities through forestry, agro-forestry (non-timber	Contributed to dev't of National Climate Policy and Strategy & dev't of the NDC. IWRM experie	Strengthened technical capacity to plan and implement CCA among Government ministries, municipa	Initiated mapping of climate change projects, which has been adapted as a	Fostered inter-ministerial and inter-institutional coordination & collaboration.	Increased national ownership of the climate change agenda Enhanced readiness for GCF

	forest products), beekeeping, horticulture & animal fattening. Increased ecosystem resilience, natural resource base & capacity for carbon sinking in rehabilitated agricultural and forest areas. Improved community livelihoods, food security, incomes and adaptive capacities especially among women.	nces fed into review of Nat'l Water Policy. Dev't Strategy for better forests exploitation & rehabilitation. Strengt'd instit'l capacity of Nat'l Forestry Directorate and municipalities & improved decentralized forest governance. Mainstreaming of CCA in Mali's dev't and conflict transformation work.	lities and CSOs. Activity-based learning and practice improvement. Enhanced NGO policy influencing capacity and opportunities.	national decision-making tool. IWRM study findings study is a key reference document for as new national water programmes.	Mutual learning and synergies between and among donors, government, UN agencies and NGOs.	and other large adaptation funds.

4. Insights and conclusion

4.1 Financing, programming and practice

We investigated for three types of learning insights, relevant to climate financing, programming and practice. Each of these is briefly discussed below.

4.1.1 Climate financing insights

We established that when investing one-off fast start climate funds, such as CCI funds, it is more efficient to work with current partners than with new partners as it takes time for the latter to understand and master the planning and reporting requirements. Working with current and trusted partners also reduces risks while at the same time increasing the likelihood of successful completion. However, working with current partners may be restrictive and ineffective when dealing with new and complex climate projects that require a new combination of competences. When this situation arises, it helps to start with smaller projects that have lower risks while at the same time emphasizing learning by doing since the 'answers' to such complex problems cannot be known in advance.

We learnt that bilateral funding was most impactful at local level compared to regional and multilateral funding because it was invested close to the people as noted by one evaluation participant: "Although we swore a lot when CCI happened, in the end, it was a good initiative… Although it is easy to invest money in multilateral and regional mechanisms, bilateral investments are most impactful because they often have the shortest pathway to the ultimate intended beneficiaries," (Sida, personal communication, June 2019).

We also noted that having targeted funds available through a time-limited initiative with clear objectives, helps to leverage discussions with bilateral partners, including national governments, on the importance of addressing climate change adaptation as part

of the national development agenda (Sida, personal communication, January 2019). Having dedicated climate funds in support of climate change adaptation helped direct national and international attention on CCA. For example, in Cambodia and Mali CCI funding resulted in climate change being put high on the national development agenda. At the same time, the CCI strategies spelt out in the CCCD report, including an integrated approach had to be considered in all programme designs.

For short-term targeted funding to be impactful, it needs to be invested in potentially generative instruments such as climate change policies and strategies and in the development of institutional and technical capacities to implement such policy instruments. At the same time, follow up funding is essential for generating long term and sustained impact. Findings in this report show that the greatest impact was realised in the projects, programmes and areas where further funds were invested after the end of the four-year CCI.

We also observed that national capacity enables national ownership. When countries have the necessary technical, institutional and fiduciary capacities, they are better able to develop and own the national climate agenda (See section on the evolution of Sida's CCI bilateral climate investments). For example, in Mali, when the capacity of the Secretariat of the NFC was developed, and the Government began to contribute to some of the climate programmes funded by post-CCI Swedish support, a stronger sense of ownership developed. This inspired the Swedish Embassy in Mali to encourage the process by which UNDP would hand over the fiduciary management role to the Government of Mali, thus increasing ownership. Beyond this, we also established that stronger capacities at sub-national levels encouraged government to implement the decentralisation policy in Mali.

Finally, we observed that horizontal collaboration is a helpful practice not only across government departments but also between donors operating in the same country. We found joint donor funding mechanisms and programmes providing a significant opportunity for coordination of donor efforts and donor harmonisation, cross-learning and shared leadership among them,

and potentially contributes to aid effectiveness. This was particularly evident in Bangladesh, Cambodia and Mali where NFCs were implemented, and where Donor Coordination meetings were established to support climate finance governance and relations with the host partner country.

4.1.2 Climate programming insights

Firstly, we noted that it is important to carry out a mapping of ongoing programmes and projects in order to determine promising ones to support; and to conduct institutional capacity assessments ahead of making significant climate investments in order to identify risks and increase chances of success. For example, in Bolivia, where the Closing the Gap report had indicated need for programmes that build the resilience of the poor, a CCI projects mapping study identified the potential of PROAGRO, a GIZ-funded project, to contribute to the CCI goal by building on the technical capacity development work of GIZ (Sida, personal communication, June 2019). She added, "Building on the ongoing projects what more effective than starting from scratch given the short durations of CCI." In Bangladesh, Sida assessed the appropriateness of supporting BCCRF, the BCCSAP and draft governance documents for the Fund. It also assessed the World Bank as a fund manager, and the capacities of the Government of Bangladesh's ministries and departments involved in the governance and implementation of the Fund. So was the entire institutional set-up. Some of the risks it identified were not adequately addressed though and they led to the collapse of the Fund[114]. Similar institutional capacity assessments were conducted in other partner countries as part of due diligence and beyond assessing the quality of proposals submitted[115].

We observed that programmes that tended to be successful were well-designed, which entailed conducting situational analysis for climate change impacts and risks, making the link between risk and

[114] Bangladesh Swedish Embassy. (2018).
[115] Mukute, M. (2019).

resilience more explicit while at the same time linking climate investments, policies, practice in adaptive capacities and actual infrastructure, services and social protection mechanisms. Programming that integrates development, DRR, CCA, mitigation and national ownership are found to be more relevant and potentially more impactful as they address the livelihoods of climate vulnerable communities more holistically. Vertical and horizontal linkages are also essential to make in climate programming so as to generate synergistic effect. Such linkages can be made between disciplines; stakeholders; scales of operation; sectors and ministries; and government, NGOs, donors and multilateral partners. Mechanisms for dialogue, co-learning and collective decision-making are essential for generating synergy across actors, disciplines and sectors. At the same time, this calls for an integrated approach to CCA, DRR, mitigation and development/livelihoods improvement.

The composition of climate programme planning and implementation teams often requires a combination of three types of expertise; (i) technical capacity relevant to the intervention such as water, agriculture and forestry; (ii) knowledge and experience in socio-economic dimensions such as human rights, gender equality and poverty reduction; and (iii) process facilitation. Similarly, programming for local level CCA projects requires a minimum of the following three combinations: (i) participation and support of the local government, (ii) establishing and functioning of a local financial mechanism, and (iii) concrete adaptation activities that are responsive to the priority issues of the area.

4.1.3 Climate practice insights

Practice insights can be inferred from what tends to work well under climate financing and programming as discussed above. Here we highlight some of the practice insights arising from the evaluation findings. Firstly, we noted that the practice of involving Government has the advantage of fostering national ownership, which is important for sustainability of interventions and their impact. Secondly, such national ownership can be achieved when the leadership or coordination is done by a strong ministry that

possesses the necessary capacity, clout and respect. A third insight is that practising learning by doing in dealing with complex matters for which there is no known solution is imperative in CCA related interventions. But it also benefits from the good and innovative ideas and practices that are already in place and from combining knowledge and experience from other sectors such as development, disaster risk management, water and soil conservation, forest management and agriculture. Fourth, the integrated nature of livelihoods, adaptive capacity, gender and human rights makes it necessary for CCA related interventions to be integrated and holistic. Fifth, there is no adequate and common understanding of what constitutes resilience or good climate change adaptation. This is partly because developing such an understanding is a process and it is too soon to have clarity. Finally, "With the right people and resources, the chances of making a real difference on the ground are good" (Sida, personal communication, June 2019)

4.2 Conclusion

We conclude this evaluation report by summarising our findings against its stated objectives in the context of what CCI set out to achieve, and how. The CCI goal was to "effectively contribute to long term adaptation efforts, especially in the poorest countries, and to developing countries' efforts to reduce greenhouse gas levels. Without supportive objectives and outcomes, CCI was guided by seven principles.

4.2.1 Roots of the six Sida categories

The evaluation established that the six Sida climate investment categories were shaped by two main streams of thought, both arising from OECD. The first one, was the CCCD (2007-2009), which identified areas of intervention that would constitute good CCA, and the second was conducted later in 2010, through which 106 CCA projects implemented by six donors – CIDA, DFID, DGIS, JICA, SDC and Sida – were reviewed to determine appropriate categories for monitoring and evaluating CCA. A Sida study in 2013

eventually decided on the six categories to adopt. This finding indicates that the Sida categories had a strong foundation in the search for understanding, addressing, monitoring and evaluating good CCA. The six categories are:

- Enhanced resilience to climate change.
- Climate change policy and administrative management.
- Education, training and awareness on climate change.
- Climate studies, scenarios and impact research.
- Coordination of climate change measures and activities across relevant actors.
- Climate change funds.

4.2.2 CCI investment decisions, basis and results

After identifying the history and roots of the six categories, we shed light on who made decisions on bilateral investments as well the sizes and distribution of the investments by category. We established that CCI bilateral investment decisions were made at three levels: (i) the Swedish Government decided on the allocation of fast-start climate funds between bilateral, regional and multilateral investments; (ii) MFA and Sida jointly decided on the (five) partner countries in which to invest CCI funds; and (iii) Sida decided on how to invest CCI funds allocated in each country. Within Sida, the Heads of Development Cooperation at the Swedish Embassies in the five selected countries chose the projects to fund in liaison with the PO at Sida HQ and with the Quality Assurance Committee. These findings mean that out of the 4 billion SEK allocated to CCI by the Riksdag (parliament), the Swedish Government allocated 72percent, 13 percent, and 15 percent to multilateral, regional and bilateral cooperation respectively. The bilateral allocation was 1.15 billion SEK. MFA and Sida jointly selected the following partner countries and associated levels of CCI investments: Bolivia, 200 MSEK; Bangladesh, 180 MSEK; Cambodia, 60 MSEK; Burkina Faso, 125 MSEK; and Mali, 125 MSEK. Countries with higher climate finance absorption capacity received higher than those with less. While total CCI bilateral allocations amounted to 690 MSEK,

the countries together spent 610.1 MSEK, or 88.4 percent of funds allocated during the four-year period of CCI. When we examined to extent the which the allocated funds were actually spent, we observed that the countries that failed to spend a sizeable proportion of their funds in the given period had: (i) limited human resources at Swedish Embassies,(ii) low partner country's absorption capacity, and (iii) short history of cooperation on climate change between Sweden and the partner country.

4.2.3 Distribution of CCI funds by category

Sida's decisions on projects and interventions to fund in each country across the five partner countries are reflected in the distribution of funds across the six Sida categories outlined above. The primary focus of CCI bilateral investments by category were as follows: (a) enhancing resilience (27 percent), (b) policy and administration (23 percent), (c) training and awareness at 18 percent, (c) enhancing resilience and training and awareness combined (14 percent), (e) coordination (9 percent), and Climate Change Funds (9 percent). No funds were primarily invested into research studies but some funds were spent on it. The distribution of the investments suggest that Sida primarily invested CCI bilateral funds within the partner countries in downstream activities of enhancing resilience and upstream activities of policy making, translation and administration, as well as associated technical capacity development. In addition, we found out that the main sectors into which CCI funds were invested varied between countries as follows: (i) DDR and the forestry sector in Bangladesh, (ii) water and rural land use in Burkina Faso, (iii) rural land use, forestry and urban water and sanitation in Bolivia, (iii) rural land use, forestry and water in Mali, and (v) rural land use, water and coastal areas in Cambodia.

4.2.4 CCI pathways of change

In seeking to understand the strategies that bilateral countries adopted to bring about change, we concluded that the categories also constituted strategies. We also established that investments

made in one category had an impact in others. For example, training impacted on enhancing resilience, coordination as well as policy and administration; and enhancing resilience activities produced insights that shaped training and awareness beyond the CCI focus sectors, into the education system.

CCI contributed to the development of community adaptive capacities related to land use (agriculture), water, forestry and DRR. The capacities were utilised towards developing community, ecosystem and built environment resilience. The main ultimate beneficiaries of CCI interventions were climate vulnerable communities in rural and urban areas, especially farmers, pastoralists and fisher folk, women and indigenous communities. The ecosystems that were improved include the Inner Niger River Delta of Mali, the coastal regions of Cambodia, the forests and the under-irrigated and drought-prone agricultural land of Burkina Faso, (iv) the forests, food insecure and agrarian areas and watersheds of Bolivia, and (v) the steep hills and cyclone-prone, areas of Bangladesh. The built environments that were improved included water and sanitation infrastructure in Bolivia, small dams in Burkina Faso and flood control structures in Mali.

Through supporting facilitated learning on CCA on context-specific priority themes and sectors, learning by doing, and learning and doing, CCI contributed towards: (i) the raising of the climate agenda in partner countries, (ii) the development of better capacities to develop national and local government policies and plans, and CSOs programmes, (iii) capacity to integrate CCA with national development plans, DRR and mitigation, and (iv) adaptive capacity development at community level. The people who benefited from the training came from national government, local government, CSOs and participating communities. The insights that were generated from CCI-supported initiatives fed into relevant policies and strategies, including national curricula in the case of Bangladesh and Cambodia. This contributed to the embedding of adaptation across sectors and levels.

CCI contributed to the development and implementation of relevant policies and strategies in all the five partner countries. These include the development of the climate policy and strategy in

Mali (2011), a Disaster Management Act in Bangladesh (2012), a climate change strategy in Cambodia (2014), and National Water and Sanitation policy in Bolivia. CCI helped partner countries develop innovative and integrated ways of implementing the following policies and strategies: national climate, development, DRR, water and decentralisation.

Through investing in coordination, CCI also contributed to a culture of inter-ministerial, multi-level and multi-stakeholder planning, implementation, reporting and learning, which is critical for the development of a rich community of climate learning and action. CCI also contributed to partner countries' ownership of the climate agenda through investing in institutional capacity development that included supporting the development and implementation of inclusive and robust governance and management systems across the partner countries. This enhanced mutual accountability, gender-responsive financing and programming, transdisciplinary, cross-sectoral, multi-actor, donor-partner country collaborative planning, learning and action in responding to climate change related challenges.

The NCFs that were implemented in Mali and Cambodia through significant CCI contributions resulted in strengthening of national implementing entities and national ownership and built the countries' readiness to access international adaptation funds. In Cambodia, NCF required both horizontal and vertical coordination and alignment, between ministries and at different scales of operation and this culminated in the development of a Strategic Framework for Decentralisation and De-concentration. These outcomes illustrate the interconnected nature of the six climate investment categories as pathways of change.

Another important outcome of CCI bilateral investments and programmes was the enhancement of Sweden's leadership and coordination role in the environment and climate sector in the five partner countries. At the same time, CCI demonstrated how donor countries could honour their commitment to assisting developing countries to deal with climate change impact while at the same time strengthening their capacities and ownership of the climate agenda.

We concluded that the long-term outcomes or impact of CCI include the following: (i) increased knowledge on how to integrate climate change in climate programming among Sida and partner countries, (ii) establishment and operationalisation of governance and management structures and systems that support an integrated approach to CCA, (iii) the development and implementation of relevant policies, strategies and climate funds, (iv) the raising of the profile of the climate change agenda in partner countries, (v) increased national ownership of the climate change agenda and enhanced country readiness for GCF and Adaptation Fund, and (vi) improved community livelihoods, food security, incomes and adaptive capacities especially among the marginalised, climate vulnerable communities in project areas.

4.2.5 Relevance of CCI principles

In examining the extent to which CCI principles guided bilateral investments, we established that while Sida and/or the Swedish Embassies in the CCI partner countries did not deliberately implement the CCI principles, they were reflected at various stages in bilateral change processes. We concluded that this could have been because the principles resonated with Sida's development cooperation practice and culture. We highlighted their application by default below:

Principle 1: *The funds reserved for adaptation interventions should go primarily to the poorest countries:* The countries selected for bilateral investment belonged to Sweden's 12 'long-term partners', have low adaptive capacities but are highly vulnerable to climate change, with four of the five countries (except Bolivia) being LDCs (poor countries.

Principle 2: *The Swedish contributions should have a tangible added value*: The outcomes and sustained impact identified in this evaluation suggests that Sweden created a tangible added value. However, it does not indicate the extent to which the desired added value (not stated), was achieved.

Principle 3: *Contributions should work towards the implementation of the Paris agenda principles on aid effectiveness:* CCA, DRR and mitigation were integrated in CCI-supported interventions across the five partner countries, especially in the water, forestry and land use

sectors. Swedish priorities were aligned with those of partner countries through the CCCD consultation visit and through in-country CCI processes that included direct consultations between the Swedish Embassy and the national government. Harmonisation with other donors was achieved through the operationalisation of Donor Coordination meetings. Donor and partner countries appear to have managed for results through the adoption of the RBM approach.

Principle 4: *Consideration should be taken to the ongoing international climate negotiations regarding timing and choice of channels:* The major international climate negotiation was the Paris Agreement, which culminated in both developed and developing countries agreeing to reduce GHG emissions. CCI assisted Bangladesh, Cambodia and Mali to develop their respective nationally determined contributions (NDCs).

Principle 5: *The allocation should reflect the ongoing work of the Commission on Climate Change and Development (CCCD) covering:* We found evidence of programmes that integrated development, CCA and DRR, which covered both support for policy development and its implementation. CCI interventions were linked to national development plans, poverty reduction strategies, environment and climate change policies. Funds were also invested in adaptive capacity development and governance and in national climate funds. However, we found CCI interventions weak in supporting synergy creation between and within bilateral, regional and multilateral investments.

Principle 6: *Sustainable adaptation to climate change requires that the climate perspective is integrated into the countries' own development strategies. Central areas are water and land-use in urban as well as rural areas:* Our findings on outcomes and the thematic areas in which changes were made show that this principle was addressed.

Principle 7: *A proportion of the Swedish contributions should focus on disaster risk reduction as an integral part of climate adaptation:* Natural disasters such as droughts, floods and cyclones comprised a major area of intervention in the five partner countries.

4.2.6 Explanations behind CCI achievements

We concluded that the main enabler of CCI achievements was Sweden's preparedness to invest climate funding and try new ways of climate financing and programming and provide the necessary technical support. In countries such as Mali, Burkina Faso and Cambodia, this was augmented by high level political will in the Swedish Embassies and in partner countries. This level of commitment made integration from the highest level possible. This was accompanied by technical and financial support in coordination, governance, and management systems. Sida not only recognised but also tapped into the comparative advantages of different organisations towards the realisation of the CCI goal, including working synergistically with other bilateral donors in the partner countries. Finally, CCI cultivate a strong culture of learning by doing, drawing out lessons and using them to improve climate financing, programming and practice. This country level reflexivity and praxis appears to have underpinned the other enablers as well, making it generative.

In seeking to establish the sustained impact of CCI at bilateral level, we identified the following generative mechanisms developed during CCI: (i) community planning and action learning groups, (ii) knowledge networks formed by individuals trained by CCI, (iii) multi-stakeholder steering committees, (iv) inter-ministerial committees, and (v) donor coordination groups. The impact of CCI was sustained largely because there was follow up technical and climate financing support from Sida, which built on and expanded the social, political and ecological capital created through CCI. Swedish Embassies in the partner countries increased the alignment between their country strategies and the post CCI support. For example, the Swedish country strategy for the cooperation with Cambodia (2014-2018) had the twin goals of (i) increased resilience against climate change at local level, (ii) increased cooperation between citizens and local authorities to support sustainable use of natural resources. In Mali and Burkina Faso, there has been a deliberate expansion to include the private sector as key actors in the economic sphere in an inclusive green growth paradigm, with a view to increasing the incomes of participating communities.

4.2.7 Challenges encountered

CCI funding, programming and implementation faced a number of challenges, which slowed down the rate of progress and the levels of impact across the five countries. The main challenges and constraints of CCI were:

- The lack of additional human resources for Sida, needed to take care of the extra workload and additional expertise required.
- Limited partner country capacities in the area of CCA (technical) and low institutional capacities in climate finance management and inter-institutional collaboration.
- Fast pace of planning that did not factor in the above capacity constraints and the time needed to do thorough due diligence before engaging new partners.
- The short-term nature of CCI, which was inconsistent with the need for long-term financing and programming in complex interventions such as CCA.
- Lack of a performance monitoring framework to guide CCI implementation in a manner that Sida personnel were used to.
- Partial and erratic institutional capacity support in the case of BCCRF.
- Lack of a deliberate strategy to create synergistic effects within and between CCI bilateral, regional and multilateral investments, which could have created additional leverage.

4.2.8 Main insights

Through the bilateral portfolio analysis, we generated several insights, which have potential to benefit similar interventions. These include inferring that efficiency in investing in once-off fast start climate funds can be enhanced by working with old and trusted partners as they understand the cooperation culture and pose lower risks compared to new partners. However, when it comes to effectiveness, working with both old and new partners is more helpful, especially when dealing with new and complex climate projects that require new and additional competences. We also concluded that clear CCA intentions and funding timeframe help to

leverage discussions with bilateral partners and other donors and can stimulate (increased) focus on CCA, as was the case in Cambodia and Mali. Our third insight on climate financing was that sustaining impact benefits from continued, phased or long-term funding and investments. At the same time generative governance, management and learning structures at multiple levels increased the potential for impact sustainability. So do enhanced national capacity at national, district and community levels. Similarly, joint donor funding mechanisms (e.g. NFCs) and programmes provide a significant opportunity for coordination of donor efforts and donor harmonisation, cross-learning and shared leadership.

Good programming in the context of short-term initiatives has potential to benefit from the prior mapping of promising and relevant past or ongoing projects to invest in. At the same time robust institutional capacity assessments prior to investing in promising and new projects is essential to reduce risks of failure. Programming that integrates development, DRR, CCA, mitigation and national ownership is potentially more relevant and impactful as it addresses the livelihoods of climate vulnerable communities more holistically. At the same time programming for synergy creation entails vertical and horizontal linkages between and across disciplines; stakeholders; scales of operation; sectors and ministries; and government, NGOs, donors and multilateral partners. Mechanisms for dialogue, co-learning and collective decision-making are essential for generating synergy across actors, disciplines and sectors. The third main insight on programming was that programming for local level CCA projects requires the participation and support of the local government and communities, a local financial mechanism, and planning for context-specific concrete adaptation activities.

The two main insights that we drew from the evaluation are: (i) the practice of involving Government in CCA interventions fosters a sense of national ownership and the potential for programme and impact sustainability; and (ii) the practice of learning by doing in dealing with complex matters for which there is no known solution is imperative in CCA related interventions. However, learning by doing should draw on relevant existing knowledge, experience and innovations.

References

AEDD & UNDP. (2019). Mali Climate Fund: Draft investment plan (2019-2023). Bamako, Mali: UNDP-MPTF.

Agua Tuya. (2013). Sustainable drinking water and sanitation services for low income peri-urban areas in Cochabamba, Bolivia, Sida Projects 51070016 and 51070042. AMR-LA PAZ: Final report. Cochabamba, Bolivia: Agua Tuya.

Ahlfors, S. W. (2011). Adapting to a changing climate: The Swedish government's Special Climate Change Initiative 2009-2012. Stockholm, Sweden: Sida.

Akesson, November 2009, Sida/Policy (MILJÖSAM, ECOP), p. 3

Am, P., Caccillato, E., Nkem, J., & Chellivard, J. (2013). Mainstreaming climate resilience into development planning in Cambodia. London, UK: IIED.

BCCRF. (2017). BCCRF annual report 2016. Dhaka, Bangladesh: BCCRF.

Boman, K. & Goita, M. (2016). Mali Climate Fund final report. Stockholm, Sweden: ORGUT Consulting AB.

CCCA (2012). Cambodia Climate Change Alliance Annual Report 2012. Phnom Penh, Cambodia: Ministry of Environment.

CCCA (2014) Climate change practice note: The factors of change. Phnom Penh, Cambodia: CCCA.

CCCA (2014). Cambodia Climate Change Alliance Final Report. Phnom Penh, Cambodia: Ministry of Environment.

CCCD (2009). Closing the gaps: Disaster risk reduction and adaptation to climate change in developing countries. Stockholm, Sweden: CCCD.

Christensen, P, F. & Morrilon, V. (2016). Joint strategic country evaluation of the development cooperation of Denmark, Sweden and the European Union with Bangladesh 2007-2013: Final report, Brussels, Belgium: ADE & COWI.

Christoplos, I., Novaky, M., & Ayesan, Y. (2012). Resilience, risk and vulnerability at Sida: Final Report. Stockholm, Sida.

Colvin, J. (2019). Evaluation of the Swedish Climate Change Initiative 2009 – 2012: GFDRR Case Study Report. Unpublished draft report.

Danermark, B., Ekstrom, M., Jakobsen, L., & Karlsson, J. C. (2002). *Explaining society: Critical realism in social sciences*. London: Routledge.

Diduck, A., Sinclair, A. J., Hostetler, G., & Fitzpatrick, P. (2012). Transformative learning theory, public involvement, and natural resource and environmental management. Journal of Environmental Planning and Management, 55(10), 1311–1130.

EBA (2018). Who makes the decisions on Swedish aid funding? An overview, EBA Rapport 2018:05. Stockholm, Sweden: Expert Group for Aid Studies.

Ferguson, A. & Sin, S. (2014). The Cambodia Climate Change Alliance (CCCA) Final Report: Sida decentralised evaluation 2014:48. Stockholm, Sweden: Sida.

Hedger, M. (2011). Climate finance in Bangladesh: insights for development cooperation and climate finance and national level. IDS Working Paper.

Holmberg, A. & Dockweiler, M. (2016). An evaluation of the Programme for the Reduction of Vulnerability of Livelihoods to the Effects of Climate Change (PRV). Stockholm: NIRAS Indevelop Sweden AB.

Itad, Ross Strategic & ICF. (2019). Evalution of transformational change in the Climate Investment Funds: Final evaluation report. Washington DC, USA: World Bank.

Khan, S. M. M. H. & Huq, S. (2014). Climate change governance: National funding entities for local adaptation – Lessons learned from Bangladesh. *Policy Brief CCG-PB-14-002*.

Khan, S. M. M. H., Huq, S., & Shamsuddhoha, M.D. (2012). The Bangladesh National Climate Funds: A brief history and description of the Bangladesh Climate Change Trust Fund and the Bangladesh Climate Resilience Fund. London: IIED.

Köhlin, G., S. K., Pattanayak, S. K., Sills, E., Mattsson, E., Ostwald, M., Salas, A., & Ternald, D. (2015). In search of double dividends from climate change interventions: Evidence from forest conservation and household energy transitions. Stockholm, Sweden: EBA.

Lamhauge, N., Lanzi, E., & Agrawala, S. (2011). Monitoring and evaluation for adaptation: Lessons from development cooperation agencies – *OECD Working Paper ENV/WKP(2011)8*. Paris, France: OECD.

Luxbacher, K. (2011). Inside story on climate compatible development. London: CDKN.

Mali National Directorate of Forestry. (2018). Programme for the Decentralised Management of Forests (GEDEFOR) III. Bamako: Republic of Mali.

Marlet, S., Sanogo, S., & Keita, F. (2016). Reduce the Vulnerability of Small Dams to Climate Change project (PRVPB-CC): Final evaluation report. Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso: Sida.

MEADD. (2011). National Green Economy Strategy Resilient to Climate Change. Bamako, Mali, MEADD.

MEADD. (2014). National Policy and Climate Change Strategy. Bamako, Mali: MEADD.

MEADD. (2016). Mali Nationally Determined Contribution. Bamako, Mali: MEADD.

Mezirow, J. (2009). An overview on transformative learning (90-105). In Contemporary Theories of Learning. Learning theorists – in their own words. K. Illeris (ed.). Routledge, Milton Park and New York.

MFA (2007). Focused bilateral development cooperation. Retrieved at: http://www.regeringen.se/content/1/c6/08/65/95/c70b05d5.pdf

Ministry of Environment and Sanitation & UNDP. (2018). Joint Report of the Technical Secretariat and the Administrative Agent for the period from 1 January to 31 December 2017. Bamako, Mali

Ministry of Environment. (2014). Minutes of the eighth CCCA Programme Support Board meeting. Phnom Penh, Cambodia.

Ministry of Environment. (2016). Climate Change Action Plan (2016-2018). Phnom Penh, Cambodia: Ministry of Environment.

MMAyA. (2017). Water and Sanitation Programme in Peri-Urban Areas: Final narrative-financial report. La Paz, Bolivia.

Mukute, M. (2019). Evaluation of the Swedish Climate Change Initiative 2009 – 2012: Mali deep-dive case study report. Unpublished draft report.

National Climate Change Committee. (2013). Draft Cambodia Climate Change Response Strategic Plan 2014–2023. Phnom Penh, Cambodia. NCCC.

Nilsson, L. (2013). Synthesis report: Swedish Special Climate Change Initiative 2009-2012. Stockholm, Sweden: MFA, p. 1.

OECD (2010) Evaluating *Development Cooperation: Summary of Key Norms and Standards (2nd ed.).* Paris, France: OECD.

OECD (2010) Evaluating *Development Cooperation: Summary of Key Norms and Standards (2nd ed.)*. Paris, France: OECD.

PROAGRO Coordination Committee. (2014). Sustainable Development Programme (PROAGRO) II Final Report. La Paz, Bolivia: PROAGRO.

Salamanca, A. (2016). Climate change readiness in the ASEAN countries: Discussion Paper. Bangkok, Thailand: Stockholm Environment Institute – Asia.

Sida. (2013). Final report on the Swedish Government's Special Climate Change Initiative 2009-2012: Bilateral and regional interventions: Case number 2008-002362. Stockholm, Sweden: Sida.

Smith, C. (2012). Climate finance literature review: A DEW Point assessment. London, UK: DFID.

Swedish Embassy in Bangladesh (2018). Completion memo: Contribution ID 51060017. Dhaka, Bangladesh. Bangladesh Swedish Embassy.

Swedish Embassy in Mali (2018). Continued support for Mali Climate Fund: Contribution number 51130066. Bamako, Mali.

UNDP. (2011). Blending Climate Finance Through National Climate Funds: A Guidebook for the Design and Establishment of National Funds to Achieve Climate Change Priorities. Retrieved from: http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/Environment%20and%20Energy/Climate%20Change/Capacity%20Development/Blending_Climate_Finance_Through_National_Climate_Funds.pdf

UNDP. (2013). Mali Climate Fund factsheet. http://mptf.undp.org/document/download/12430

UNDP. (2015). Comprehensive Disaster Management Programme Phase II (2010-2014): Project fact sheet. Dhaka, Bangladesh.

UNFCCC. (2007). Climate change: Impacts, vulnerabilities and adaptation in developing countries. Bonn, Germany.

UNICEF (2014): Using Sustainable Energy to Protect and Provide Water for Children, Spotlight on Mali. Retrieved from: www.unicef.org/environment/files/Mali_Climate_Fund_2014.pdf

Wingqvist, G. Ö., César, E., & von Walter, S. (2013). Categorisation of bilateral and regional contributions in the Climate Change Initiative. Retrieved from: https://sidaenvironmenthelpdesk.gu.se/our-work-publications/reports

World Bank. (2019). Climate Investment Funds: Accomplishments, transformational impact and additionality in the climate finance architecture. Washington DC, USA.

Zamudo, A. N. (2016). Review of current and planned adaptation action in Mali. CARIAA Working Paper 11. Ottawa, Canada/London, United Kingdom: International Development Research Centre/UK Aid.

Appendix 1: CCI Principles

The funds reserved for adaptation interventions should go primarily to the poorest countries.

The Swedish contributions should have a tangible added value.

Contributions should work towards the implementation of the Paris agenda principles on aid effectiveness:

3.1 Developing country ownership of adaptation and mitigation strategies.

3.2 Alignment of priorities between donor and recipient country.

3.3 Donor agencies harmonise and coordinate development aid.

3.4 Both donors and recipients manage for results.

3.5 Mutual accountability.

Consideration should be taken to the ongoing international climate negotiations regarding timing and choice of channels.

The allocation should reflect the ongoing work of the Commission on Climate Change and Development (CCCD) covering:

Integration of climate change actions, development planning and DRR.

Integration from the highest level.

5.3 Coordination of institutions through effective governance.

5.4 Building adaptive capacity is a priority for the poorest countries.

5.5 Get the mix of human and technical measures right

5.6 Effective, demand-driven funding mechanisms for adaptation, including national funding hubs.

5.7 Context matters when considering climate risks, political economies, and solutions.

Sustainable adaptation to climate change requires that the climate perspective is integrated into the countries' own development strategies. Central areas are water and land-use in urban as well as rural areas.

A proportion of the Swedish contributions should focus on disaster risk reduction as an integral part of climate adaptation.

Appendix 2: List of interviewed

Organisation	Number of interviewees
Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida)	6
Swedish Embassy in Bamako	2
Swedish Embassy on Ouagadougou	2
Total	10

Previous EBA reports

2020:01 Mobilizing *Private Development Finance: Implications for Overall Aid Allocations*, Polly Meeks, Matthew Gouett and Samantha Attridge

2019:09 *Democracy in African Governance: Seeing and Doing it Differently,* Göran Hydén with assistance from Maria Buch Kristensen

2019:08 *Fishing Aid - Mapping and Synthesising Evidence in Support of SDG 14 Fisheries Targets,* Gonçalo Carneiro, Raphaëlle Bisiaux, Mary Frances Davidson, Tumi Tómasson with Jonas Bjärnstedt

2019:07 *Applying a Masculinities Lens to the Gendered Impacts of Social Safety Nets*, Meagan Dooley, Abby Fried, Ruti Levtov, Kate Doyle, Jeni Klugman and Gary Barker

2019:06 *Joint Nordic Organisational Assessment of the Nordic Development Fund (NDF)*, Stephen Spratt, Eilís Lawlor, Kris Prasada Rao and Mira Berger

2019:05 *Impact of Civil Society Anti-Discrimination Initiatives: A Rapid Review*, Rachel Marcus, Dhruva Mathur and Andrew Shepherd

2019:August *Migration and Development: the Role for Development Aid*, Robert E.B. Lucas (joint with the Migration Studies Delegation, Delmi, published as Delmi Research overview 2019:5)

2019:04 *Building on a Foundation Stone: the Long-Term Impacts of a Local Infrastructure and Governance Program in Cambodia*, Ariel BenYishay, Brad Parks, Rachel Trichler, Christian Baehr, Daniel Aboagye and Punwath Prum

2019:03 *Supporting State Building for Democratisation? A Study of 20 years of Swedish Democracy Aid to Cambodia,* Henny Andersen, Karl-Anders Larsson och Joakim Öjendal

2019:02 *Fit for Fragility? An Exploration of Risk Stakeholders and Systems Inside Sida*, Nilima Gulrajani and Linnea Mills

2019:01 *Skandaler, opinioner och anseende: Biståndet i ett medialiserat samhälle*, Maria Grafström och Karolina Windell

2018:10 *Nation Building in a Fractured Country: An Evaluation of Swedish Cooperation in Economic Development with Bosnia and Herzegovina 1995 – 2018*, Claes Lindahl, Julie Lindahl, Mikael Söderbäck and Tamara Ivankovic

2018:09 *Underfunded Appeals: Understanding the Consequences, Improving the System,* Sophia Swithern

2018:08 *Seeking Balanced Ownership in Changing Development Cooperation Relationships*, Nils Keizer, Stephan Klingebiel, Charlotte Örnemark, Fabian Scholtes

2018:07 *Putting Priority into Practice: Sida's Implementation of its Plan for Gender Integration*, Elin Bjarnegård, Fredrik Uggla

2018:06 *Swedish Aid in the Era of Shrinking Space – the Case of Turkey*, Åsa Eldén, Paul T. Levin

2018:05 *Who Makes the Decision on Swedish Aid Funding? An Overview*, Expertgruppen för Biståndsanalys

2018:04 *Budget Support, Poverty and Corruption: A Review of the Evidence*, Geske Dijkstra

2018:03 *How predictable is Swedish aid? A study of exchange rate volatility,* Númi Östlund

2018:02 *Building Bridges Between International Humanitarian and Development Responses to Forced Migration*, Alexander Kocks, Ruben Wedel, Hanne Roggemann, Helge Roxin (joint with the German Institute for Development Evaluation, DEval)

2018:01 *DFIs and Development Impact: an evaluation of Swedfund,* Stephen Spratt, Peter O'Flynn, Justin Flynn

2017:12 *Livslängd och livskraft: Vad säger utvärderingar om svenska biståndsinsatsers hållbarhet?* Expertgruppen för biståndsanalys

2017:11 *Sweden's Financing of UN Funds and Programmes: Analyzing the Past, Looking to the Future*, Stephen Browne, Nina Connelly, Thomas G. Weiss

2017:10 *Seven Steps to Evidence-Based Anticorruption: A Roadmap*, Alina Mungiu-Pippidi

2017:09 *Geospatial analysis of aid: A new approach to aid evaluation*, Ann-Sofie Isaksson

2017:08 *Research capacity in the new global development agenda*, Måns Fellesson

2017:07 *Research Aid Revisited – a historically grounded analysis of future prospects and policy options*, David Nilsson, Sverker Sörlin

2017:06 *Confronting the Contradiction – An exploration into the dual purpose of accountability and learning in aid evaluation*, Hilde Reinertsen, Kristian Bjørkdahl, Desmond McNeill

2017:05 *Local peacebuilding – challenges and opportunities*, Joakim Öjendal, Hanna Leonardsson, Martin Lundqvist

2017:04 *Enprocentmålet – en kritisk essä*, Lars Anell

2017:03 *Animal health in development – it's role for poverty reduction and human welfare,* Jonathan Rushton, Arvid Uggla, Ulf Magnusson

2017:02 *Do Anti-Discrimination Measures Reduce Poverty Among Marginalised Social Groups?* Rachel Marcus, Anna Mdee, Ella Page

2017:01 *Making Waves: Implications of the irregular migration and refugee situation on Official Development Assistance spending and practices in Europe*, Anna Knoll, Andrew Sherriff

2016:11 *Revitalising the policy for global development,* Per Molander

2016:10 *Swedish Development Cooperation with Tanzania – Has It Helped the Poor?,* Mark McGillivray, David Carpenter, Oliver Morrissey, Julie Thaarup

2016:09 *Exploring Donorship – Internal Factors in Swedish Aid to Uganda,* Stein-Erik Kruse

2016:08, *Sustaining a development policy: results and responsibility for the Swedish policy for global development* Måns Fellesson, Lisa Román

2016:07 *Towards an Alternative Development Management Paradigm?* Cathy Shutt

2016:06 *Vem beslutar om svenska biståndsmedel? En översikt,* Expertgruppen för biståndsanalys

2016:05 *Pathways to change: Evaluating development interventions with Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA),* Barbara Befani

2016:04 *Swedish responsibility and the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals,* Magdalena Bexell, Kristina Jönsson

2016:03 *Capturing complexity and context: evaluating aid to education,* Joel Samoff, Jane Leer, Michelle Reddy

2016:02 *Education in developing countries what policies and programmes affect learning and time in school?* Amy Damon, Paul Glewwe, Suzanne Wisniewski, Bixuan Sun

2016:01 *Support to regional cooperation and integration in Africa – what works and why?* Fredrik Söderbaum, Therese Brolin

2015:09 *In search of double dividends from climate change interventions evidence from forest conservation and household energy transitions,* G. Köhlin, S.K. Pattanayak, E. Sills, E. Mattsson, M. Ostwald, A. Salas, D. Ternald

2015:08 *Business and human rights in development cooperation – has Sweden incorporated the UN guiding principles?* Rasmus Klocker Larsen, Sandra Atler

2015:07 *Making development work: the quality of government approach,* Bo Rothstein and Marcus Tannenberg

2015:06 *Now open for business: joint development initiatives between the private and public sectors in development cooperation,* Sara Johansson de Silva, Ari Kokko and Hanna Norberg

2015:05 *Has Sweden injected realism into public financial management reforms in partner countries?* Matt Andrews

2015:04 *Youth, entrepreneurship and development*, Kjetil Bjorvatn

2015:03 *Concentration difficulties? An analysis of Swedish aid proliferation*, Rune Jansen Hagen

2015:02 *Utvärdering av svenskt bistånd – en kartläggning*, Expertgruppen för biståndsanalys

2015:01 *Rethinking Civil Society and Support for Democracy*, Richard Youngs

2014:05 *Svenskt statligt internationellt bistånd i Sverige: en översikt*, Expertgruppen för biståndsanalys

2014:04 *The African Development Bank: ready to face the challenges of a changing Africa?* Christopher Humphrey

2014:03 *International party assistance – what do we know about the effects?* Lars Svåsand

2014:02 *Sweden´s development assistance for health – policy options to support the global health 2035 goals,* Gavin Yamey, Helen Saxenian, Robert Hecht, Jesper Sundewall and Dean Jamison

2014:01 *Randomized controlled trials: strengths, weaknesses and policy relevance,* Anders Olofsgård

This is an analysis of the bilateral portfolio. Interventions within the climate change initiative were made in five Swedish bilateral partner countries. The largest categories of interventions concerned efforts to enhance community resilience and to strengthen policy and administration for adaptation purposes.

EBA
www.eba.se

Expertgruppen för biståndsanalys (EBA) är en statlig kommitté som oberoende analyserar och utvärderar svenskt internationellt bistånd.

The Expert Group for Aid Studies (EBA) is a government committee with a mandate to independently analyse and evaluate Swedish international development aid.