EBA

SUBSTUDY 1

02

2020

EVALUATION OF THE SWEDISH CLIMATE CHANGE INITIATIVE, 2009–2012:
MALI CASE STUDY REPORT

Mutizwa Mukute

Evaluation of the Swedish Climate Change Initiative 2009 – 2012
Mali Case Study Report

Mutizwa Mukute

Delstudie 1 till Rapport 2020:02
till
Expertgruppen för biståndsanalys (EBA)

Mutizwa Mukute, is a senior evaluation consultant with Emerald Network Ltd, based in Harare, Zimbabwe. He holds a PhD in Environmental Education from Rhodes University.

Please refer to the present report as: EBA, Mukute (2020), Evaluation of the Swedish Climate Change Initiative 2009 – 2012: Mali Case Study Report, EBA Delstudie 1 2020:02, Expertgruppen för biståndsanalys.

This report can be downloaded free of charge at www.eba.se

ISBN 978-91-88143-57-0
Printed by Elanders Sverige AB
Stockholm 2020

Cover design by Julia Demchenko

Table of Contents

Foreword by the EBA

In 2009, the Swedish government decided to start using ODA to deal with climate change and its negative effects. With a primary focus on the poorest countries, and mainly on their adaptation to climate change, Sweden set aside 4 bn SEK to be used over a four-year period. Furthermore, this constituted a major part of Sweden's 7 bn SEK contribution to the internationally agreed 'fast-start' of climate finance.

Ten years later, this surge of climate finance, including the bilateral, regional and multilateral activities to which it was put to use, has been evaluated. This report contains a case study in which the bilateral cooperation part of the climate change initiative (CCI) has been evaluated. Together with ten other case study reports this study is published on-line and may be found at https://eba.se/en/ebarapport/. The synthesis report of the evaluation, together with a separate summary of the evaluation are available in print and on-line.

It is our hope that this evaluation may provide guidance for the future use of ODA in the efforts to curbe climate change. The intended users of the evaluation are primarily staff at the MFA and Sida who engage in this challenge on a daily basis.

The evaluation has been accompanied by a reference group. This group has taken active part in a particular learning process the evaulation has facilitated. The reference group has been chaired by Johan Schaar, vice chair of the EBA. The responsibility of the analysis and the recommendations rests entirely with the evaluators.

Helena Lindholm, EBA Chair

Sammanfattning

Denna rapport är del av den större utvärderingen av Klimatinitiativet 2009 – 2012. Denna fallstudie av Mali är en av elva fallstudierapporter. Tillsammans med en fallstudie av Kambodja och en särskild analys av hela portföljen behandlar studien den bilaterala delen av initiativet. Andra fallstudier behandlar regionala och multilaterala insatser.

Under perioden 2009–2012 stödde klimatinitiativet följande verksamheter i Mali:

1. Decentraliserat skogsbruk (GEDEFOR), som syftar till hållbar skogsförvaltning och ökade intäkterna för de fattiga på landsbygden i Kayes- och Koulikoro-regionerna.

2. Hållbar utveckling i nio kommuner i provinserna Mopti och Youwarou i det inre Nigerdeltats avrinningsområde (REDDIN I och II). Genom att stärka samarbetet mellan jordbrukare, fiskare och herdar ska inkomster öka och hållbart utnyttjande av naturresurser förbättras. Programmet innehåller också insatser på policynivå för förbättrad skogsförvaltning och hantering av översvämningar.

3. Reso Climat Mali, ett nätverk av icke-statliga organisationer som arbetar med klimatförändring i Mali. Nätverket bildades 2008, som en reaktion på att civilsamhällsorganisationer hållits utanför nationellt, regionalt och internationellt klimatarbete.

4. Klimatanpassning i regionerna Kidal och Gao i norra Mali. Stöd till 12 500 familjer för att motstå klimatförändringarnas negativa effekter genom diversifiering av inkomstkällor, återskapande av traditionella odlingssystem med mera.

5. Internationella utbildningsprogram (ITP) integrerades med ovannämnda projekt.

6. Mali Climate Fund (FCM), där Sverige var första finansiär 2013.

7. En studie om integrerad förvaltning av vattenresurser (IWRM) som stöds gemensamt av Sverige och Nederländerna.

Relevans

Vi drar slutsatsen att klimatsatsningen (CCI) och det fortsatta klimatarbetet i Mali har varit relevant av skäl som hänger samman med två av de principer som initiativet utgår från: Princip 1: Medel för anpassningsåtgärder bör främst gå till de fattigaste länderna och Princip 5: Fördelningen av pengar bör återspegla CCCD: s arbete.

Mali var och är bland de fattigaste och mest klimatkänsliga länderna i Afrika och i världen. Merparten (67 procent) av CCI-projekten investerades i anpassningsåtgärder och riskhantering för att förbättra motståndskraft mot klimatförändringar, förbättrad försörjning för de fattigaste och mest utsatta: jordbrukare, pastoralister och fiskare, kvinnor och ungdomar. Alla målgrupperna är mycket beroende av klimatkänsliga naturresurser.

Effektivitet

Vi drar slutsatsen att CCI har varit effektivt i förhållande till initiativets mål, dess styrande principer och de projektspecifika målen. Huvudsyftet att "effektivt bidra till långsiktiga anpassningsåtgärder, särskilt i de fattigaste länderna, och att bidra till utvecklingsländernas ansträngningar att minska växthusgasnivåerna" uppnåddes till stor del i Mali genom: (i) stöd till uppbyggnad av relevant politik och institutionell kapacitet; (ii) ökad beredskap för klimatfinansiering hos regering och icke-statliga organisationer, (iii) stöd för dialog mellan givare, regering och civilsamhälls-organisationer, samt publicering av en första rapport klimatanpassning i Mali; och (iv) investeringar i skogsbrukssektorn, vilket leder både till anpassning och utsläppsminskningar.

Kostnadseffektivitet

Vi drar slutsatsen att CCI endast var måttligt kostnadseffektivt. Det beror till stor del på följande: (i) Brådskan med vilken CCI infördes; (ii) Den skyndsamma bedömningen av potentiella samarbetspartners, vilka visade sig vara dåligt förberedda för att genomföra anpassningsåtgärder; (iii) Bristande personella resurser

på Sida i förhållande till den ökande arbetsbelastning som CCI innebar; (iv) Otillräcklig tid för utvärdering av potentiella samarbetspartners, och (v) Finansiering utspridd på för många små projekt, vilket krävde mycket av administrativt arbete. Dessa faktorer undergrävde förverkligandet av CCI-princip 3 om biståndseffektivitet.

När projekt väl godkänts fanns emellertid både budget och överenskomna arbetsplaner för genomförande, med undantag för de förseningar som orsakades av osäkerhet i samband med statskuppen 2012. CCI var effektivt i termer av att huvuddelen av medlen (minst 70 procent) verkligen nådde fram till genomförandet av projektaktiviteter.

Hållbarhet

Resultaten av CCI har levt vidare efter att initiativet avslutat och dessutom inspirerat till nya aktiviteter, särskilt kring Malis klimatfond

- .CCI har väsentligt bidragit till att få upp klimatförändringar på agendan i Mali, främst genom ökad medvetenhet och utbildning. Dessutom har Reso Climat Mali varannat år genomför nationella miljöforum i syfte att underlätta samverkan mellan regering, CSO och privat sektor.
- CCI har bidragit till ökad kapacitet att integrera klimatanpassning i de nationella utvecklingsplanerna samt tillämpa principen om additionalitet.
- CCI har bidragit till viktiga beslutsmekanismer för bredare användning inom miljö- och klimatförändringsområdet, exempelvis en styrkommitté för Malis Klimatfond, och decentraliserad skogsförvaltning.
- CCI har bidragit till ett ökat nationellt ägande för klimatagendan på nationell, kommunal och lokal nivå.

- CCI har bidragit till bättre livsvillkor och anpassningskapacitet bland berörda samhällen. Förbättrad odling av grödor och boskapsskötsel har förbättrat livsmedelssäkerheten, genererat inkomster och samtidigt bidragit till klimatanpassning. Återskapande av jordbruksmark, trädplantering och konstruktion av små dammar för att motstå översvämningar har förbättrat anpassningsförmågan.

Lärdomar drogs även kring hur investeringar, planering och praktik för klimatförändringar bör utformas.

Slutsats: Omfattande klimatinvesteringar måste åtföljas av ett ömsesidigt lärande, beredskap för innovation och för att skala upp verksamheten.

Slutsats: Nya sätt att planera kräver noggrann introduktion och användning av flera kommunikationskanaler samt analys av hur nya och gamla ansatser förhåller sig till varandra.

Slutsats: Samordnad planering mellan olika aktörer ökar möjligheter till ömsesidigt lärande och synergi-effekter i hanteringen av komplexa utmaningar.

Slutsats: Nationellt ägande av klimatagendan kan kräva samarbete inte bara med statliga strukturer utan också CSO:er och lokalsamhällen.

Slutsats: För att spela en ledande roll i utvecklingssamarbetet krävs kontinuerligt kollektiv lärande, samarbete med flera intressent-grupper, stöd till nationellt ägande av klimat / utvecklingsagendan, stödjande interna strukturer och kompetent personal.

Utvärderingen belyste också hur Sveriges ledarroll upprätthölls, hur ambassaden främjade nationellt ägande och om vad som utgör goda exempel på lyckad anpassning till klimatförändringar. Kring den senare punkten finns det ännu ingen samsyn. Anpassning till klimatförändringar (CCA) är ett begrepp under utveckling. Det kan förstås utifrån från de sex kriterier som Sida ställt upp, med ett tillägg utifrån denna studie av Mali.

Klimatanpassning:

- Bygger motståndskraft mot klimatförändringar hos samhällen, ekosystem och landskap genom att minska deras sårbarhet för nuvarande och framtida klimatförändringar, klimatrisker, chocker och dess effekter. Detta förutsätter att man hanterar underliggande orsaker till fattigdom och sårbarhet, som för svag kunskap om klimat, bristande jämställdhet mellan kvinnor och män, konflikter om resurser och orättvis samhällsstyrning. Utvärderingen konstaterade att motståndskraft har byggts på individ- och systemnivåer i Mali.
- Kräver utbildning och medvetenhet, samt relevant kunskap och information om klimatförändringar. Detta möjliggör i sin tur förändrade tankesätt och skapar beredskap för förändringar. Ett illustrativt exempel från Mali var att vissa samhällen slutade se klimatförändringar som Guds verk, för att istället förstå att det mesta orsakas av människor och att något därför kunde göras åt klimatet.
- Främjas av stöd i klimatstudier och forskning som genererar relevant ny kunskap och ger underlag för informerade beslut. Den studie som finansierades om klimatförändringarnas påverkan på Niger-floden och kartor över klimatanpassningsåtgärder är bra exempel på sådana forskningsresultat.
- Förutsätter att det finns stödjande klimat-politik, samhällsstyrning, administrativa strukturer, system och kapacitet som möjliggör integrering av CCA och klimatrisker på nationell, kommunal och lokal nivå.
- Förutsätter samordning av klimatåtgärder och -aktörer för att generera synergier och minska risken för dubblering av insatser. Denna utvärdering visade på ett starkt behov av samordning mellan bilaterala och multilaterala givare för ökad biståndseffektivitet.

- Förutsätter särskilda klimatfonder som kan arbeta med viss flexibilitet, på kort- och lång sikt och till stöd för nationellt och lokalt bestämda klimat-insatser och -handlingsplaner.
- Den nya princip som fallstudien i Mali bidrog med är lärande genom handling och innovation i samarbete med andra och i syfte att skala upp innovationerna i policyer och strategier och sprida dem till andra samhällen och platser. Lärande genom handling bygger på redan befintlig kunskap, på ny kunskap som genereras av studier och på kunskap som genereras då man löser svåra utmaningar med klimatsårbarhet och -risker. Lärande genom handling är en pågående process där beslutsfattare, klimat- och CCA-forskare, utbildare, klimatfondförvaltare och -chefer, utövare och utvärderare alla deltar.

Summary

This report is part of the larger Evaluation of the Swedish Climate Change Initiative 2009 – 2012. This case study of Mali is one of eleven case study reports. Together with the Cambodia bilateral case study and the bilateral portfolio analysis, it treats the bilateral part of the initiative. Other case studies of the evaluation deal with regional and multilateral interventions. What follows is a summary of the Mali case study.

During the 2009 – 2012 period, the CCI invested in the following activities in Mali:

1. Decentralised Forest Management Programme (GEDEFOR), aiming at sustainable management of forest resources while increasing revenues for the rural poor in Kayes and Koulikoro regions.
2. Sustainable Development in nine municipalities of Mopti and Youwarou in the Inner Niger River Basin Resources (REDDIN I and II) through strengthen cooperation between farmers, fishermen and herders, increased income generation and restoration for sustainable use of natural resources. At policy level it sought to contribute towards good flooded forest governance and pro-poor development.
3. Reso Climat Mali, a network of NGOs working on climate change matters in Mali, which was formed in 2008, just before the CCI, in response to the exclusion of NGO participation in national, regional and international CC matters.
4. Climate Adaptation in the Regions of Kidal and Gao in Northern Mali. 12 500 families were equipped to resist negative effects of climate change by building and diversifying their income sources, rehabilitating traditional production systems and training them in DRR and new agro-pastoral systems.
5. International Training Programmes (ITPs) were integrated with the above projects.

6. Mali Climate Fund (FCM), in which Sweden was the first investor in 2013, a year after the end of CCI.
7. A study on Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) jointly supported by Sweden and The Netherlands within an overall IWRM support to the Ministry of Energy and Water.

Relevance

We conclude that the CCI and post-CCI work in Mali has been relevant for various reasons, which include alignment to the following two key relevance CCI principles: *Principle 1: The funds reserved for adaptation interventions should go primarily to the poorest countries*, and *Principle 5: The allocation should reflect the ongoing work of the CCCD: integration of environment, development, climate change adaptation (CCA), mitigation, disaster risk reduction, poverty alleviation and governance*. Mali was and is among the poorest and most climate-vulnerable countries in Africa and internationally. Most (67 percent) of the CCI projects were invested in CCA and risk reduction to enhance climate resilience and improve livelihoods for the poorest and most vulnerable community members: farmers, pastoralists and fishermen, women and youth. All the beneficiaries were and are highly dependent on climate-sensitive natural resources.

Effectiveness

We conclude that CCI has been effective based on an examination of effectiveness against the goal of the initiative, CCI results-oriented principles, and project-specific intentions. The goal, which was to "effectively contribute to long term adaptation efforts, especially in the poorest countries, and to developing countries' efforts to reduce greenhouse gas levels" was addressed to a large extent in Mali through: (i) support for the development of relevant policies and institutional capacities, especially those of government, (ii) preparing the climate finance readiness of government as well as NGOs, (iii) support for the establishment of donor dialogue and government-donor-NGO interactions and publishing the first

report on CCA projects in Mali, which aided effective planning and coordination of efforts, and (iv) investing in the forestry sector, which generates adaptation and mitigation benefits.

Efficiency

We conclude that CCI was only moderately efficient largely based on the following challenges: (i) the hurried pace of introducing the CCI, (ii) rushed planning by potential partners who were ill-prepared to conduct CCA work, (iii) inadequate Sida human resources for the additional workload that came with CCI, especially towards the end of CCI, which also coincided with the coup, (iv) insufficient time for assessing potential partners, and (v) the funding of too many small projects, which required a lot of administrative work. These challenges undermined the realisation of *Principle 3 on aid effectiveness*. However, once the projects were approved, implementation was within the budget and agreed work plans, except for delays caused by insecurity and the coup. On the other hand, CCI was particularly efficient in terms of ensuring that the bulk of the funds for funded projects (at least 70 percent) went towards project activities.

Sustainability

The impact of CCI has been sustained beyond the initiative and inspired the emergence of new activities, especially around FCM.

- CCI has contributed significantly to raising the climate change agenda in Mali, mainly through strong components of awareness raising and training. In addition, Reso Climat Mali has been holding National Environmental Forum biennially to facilitate interaction between government, CSOs and the private sector on climate change matters, with Sida support.
- CCI has contributed to capacity for integrating of CCA and development as well as the application of the principle of additionality.

- CCI has contributed to some important decision-making mechanisms and tools for wider use in the environment and climate change field, including the Donor Group, a multi-stakeholder FCM Steering Committee and the tripartite decentralised forestry management structures.
- CCI has contributed to enhanced national ownership of the climate agenda at national, municipal and community levels.
- CCI has contributed to improved livelihoods, adaptive capacities and ecological capital among beneficiary communities. Their crop and livestock production activities have improved food security and income generation while at the same time helping them to adapt to climate change. The rehabilitation of degraded lands, tree planting and construction of water harvesting, and flood control structures has improved adaptive capacities, ecological capital and carbon sequestration.

Lessons were also drawn concerning climate change investment, programming and practice.

Inferred principle: Pioneering climate **investments** need to be accompanied by a commitment to multi-level practice-based mutual learning, innovation and scaling up and out.

Inferred principle: The introduction of new ways **of programming** requires careful introduction and use of multiple communication avenues as well as an elaboration of how new and old ways are connected.

Inferred principle: Integrated programming between different actors increases the potential for mutual learning and the generation of synergistic effects for tackling complex interacting challenges.

Inferred principle: Fostering national ownership of the climate agenda may require going beyond working with government structures to include CSOs and communities.

Inferred principle: A phased approach to programming potentially offers a certain amount of predictability as well as flexibility.

Inferred principle: Playing a leadership role in development cooperation requires on-going collective learning and knowledge generation, working synergistically with multiple stakeholder groups, respect and support for national ownership of the climate/development agenda, supportive internal structures and systems, and adequate competent human resources.

The evaluation also produced insights into how Sweden's leadership role was upheld, how the Embassy was fostering country ownership and on what constitutes good responses to climate change impact. On the latter point there is yet no consensus. Climate Change Adaptation (CCA) is an evolving concept. It can be viewed from the six Sida categories of adaptation, with one addition made based on the Mali experience. Hence, CCA:

- Builds the climate resilience of communities, ecosystems and landscapes by reducing their vulnerability to current and future climate change, climate change risks, shocks and their impacts. This calls for addressing underlying causes of poverty, vulnerability, such as too little climate knowledge, gender inequality, resource conflicts and unjust governance systems. The evaluation noted resilience being built at individual and systems levels in Mali.
- Requires education, training and awareness to provide existing relevant knowledge and information on climate change towards enabling understanding, mindset change and preparedness to change the situation. An illustrative example from Mali was that some communities shifted from seeing climate change as the work of God, to understand that most of it was caused by people and something could be done about it.
- Benefits from being supported by climate studies and research that generates relevant new knowledge and information and helps informed decisions. The study on the impact of climate change on the Niger River Basin and the CCA projects maps are good examples of such research outputs.

- Requires supportive climate policies, governance, administrative and management structures, systems and capacities to integrate CCA and address climate risks at national, municipal and community levels.
- Demands coordination of climate change measures and actors to generate synergistic effects and minimize duplication of efforts across levels and sectors and over time. This evaluation suggested a strong need for coordinating climate financing between and among bilateral and multilateral donors towards aligning CCA processes and increasing aid effectiveness.
- Requires dedicated climate funds that can be implemented with some flexibility, in a phased but long-term context, in support of nationally and locally determined climate agenda, programmes, strategies and action plans.
- The new category that emerged from the Mali case study is learning by doing and innovating with others and scaling the innovations up into policies and strategies and out into other communities and places with potential to learn from the innovations. The learning by doing draws on the knowledge that is already in circulation through training and related approaches, from new knowledge that is generated by studies and from solving difficult challenges to do with climate vulnerability and risks. Learning by doing is an ongoing process done by policy makers, climate and CCA researchers, educators, climate fund administrators and managers, practitioners and evaluators.

1. Introduction

The Swedish Climate Change Initiative (CCI 2009-2012) discussed in this case study report, sought to "effectively contribute to long term adaptation efforts, especially in the poorest countries, and to developing countries' efforts to reduce greenhouse gas levels[1]." CCI was intended to be guided by a set of seven principles (Table 1), which constituted a principles-based approach to programme planning. This approach was informed by a growing understanding of the need for a more flexible approach in climate financing and programming under complex and dynamic conditions. CCI was implemented in five countries, namely, Mali, Cambodia, Burkina Faso, Bolivia and Bangladesh under Swedish bilateral cooperation, and in two regions, African and Asian, through Sweden's regional climate investments, and globally through multilateral investments. The reasons for selecting Mali as a case study are outlined under the section on evaluation framing and process.

1.1 Case study objectives and scope

The twin objectives of conducting the Mali case study were to:

- Gain in-depth understanding of the long-term sustainability and contribution of the CCI.
- Generate lessons to inform Swedish climate aid ahead.

As the case study is designed and written for utilisation, it seeks to shed light on the life and effect of an aid programme (accountability) as well as influence aid and the aid system through generating insights and lessons for the future[2]. Looking for long-term effects and sustainability entailed seeking out: (i) the elements of the

[1] Swedish Ministry of the Environment (2013). Sweden's first biennial report under the UNFCCC. Stockholm, Sweden: Swedish Ministry of the Environment.

[2] Reinertsen, H., Bjorkdahl, K., & McNeill, D. (2017). Confronting the contradiction: An exploration into the dual purpose of accountability and learning in aid evaluation. Stockholm, Sweden: EBA.

projects that were sustained after project closure, (ii) the practices that were spread or got diffused and replicated and how this happened, and (iii) identifying unexpected and emerging outcomes and establishing what caused them to happen[3].

To address these two objectives, this Mali CCI case study discusses:

- Contexts in which CCI was developed,
- Swedish climate investments made in Mali since CCI,
- CCI processes, challenges and outcomes and sustained impact,
- Explanations that underpin CCI outcomes and sustained impact,
- Insights into what constitutes good responses to climate change and governance,
- Summary of CCI relevance, effectiveness, impact and sustainability,
- Other contributors to sustained impact, and
- Major policy, programming and practice lessons.

In line with a principles-focused evaluation approach, which treats principles as the evaluand, this evaluation case study examines the extent to which the CCI processes and results were consistent with the CCI principles throughout the story. Table 1 below shows how we sequenced the CCI principles in a theory of change format. A summary of the extent to which CCI principles were implemented is discussed in the concluding chapter, alongside alignment with the DAC criteria.

[3] Zivetz et al. (2017).

Table 1: Inferred theory of change implied by CCI principles

Dimension of theory of change	CCI Principles (P)
Selection of regions, countries and channels of allocating funds	P1: The funds reserved for adaptation interventions should go primarily to the poorest countries.
	P5: The allocation should reflect the ongoing work of the Commission on Climate Change and Development (CCCD), which recommended the use of climate finance for context-specific issues; integration of environment, development, climate change adaptation (CCA), mitigation, disaster risk reduction, poverty alleviation and governance.
	P4: Consideration should be taken to the ongoing international climate negotiations regarding timing and choice of channels.
Areas of intervention and activities	P6. Sustainable adaptation to climate change requires that the climate perspective is integrated into the countries' own development strategies. Central areas are water-and land-use in urban as well as rural areas.
	P7: A proportion of the Swedish contributions should focus on disaster risk reduction as an integral part of climate adaptation.
	P5: The allocation should reflect the ongoing work of the Commission on Climate Change and Development (CCCD), which recommended the use of climate finance for context-specific issues, integration of environment, development, climate change adaptation (CCA), mitigation, disaster risk reduction, poverty alleviation and governance.
Engagement processes and power relations between partners and donors	P3. Contributions should work towards the implementation of the Paris agenda principles on aid effectiveness, which encourages aligning aid to national priorities and processes in developing countries and enhancing national ownership.
Outcomes and impact generation	P2: The Swedish contributions should have a tangible added value (+P1, P2, P5, P6 and P7)

1.2 Six dimensions of 'good adaptation'

The Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) developed categories as a way of defining the different dimensions of 'good adaptation' based on OECD categories and added climate change funds. The categories, which are important for subsequent analysis of the distribution of Sweden's bilateral climate investments in Mali, are:

- Improved resilience to climate change, linked to vulnerability reduction and resilience building. Investments have a direct impact of people's abilities to adapt to climate change and include infrastructural investments that reduce damages to the physical environment.
- Climate change policy and administrative management, linked to governance, making and implementing policies that address climate risks and improving administrative structures, systems and institutions for integrating climate change.
- Education, training and awareness concerning climate change, linked to acquiring new knowledge and making behaviour and habits change aligned to current and projected climate conditions.
- Climate studies, scenarios and research, covering the identification of training, policy and risk-reduction activity gaps, adaptation hot spots and options.
- Coordination of climate change measures and actors, linked to collaborative engagement between stakeholders and the dissemination of research knowledge for strengthening practice.
- Climate funds for providing material and financial capacity to support the implementation of climate change programmes, strategies and action plans[4].

[4] Wingqvist, et al. (2013).

1.3 Evaluation framing and process

The evaluation methodology adopted for the Mali case study was informed by the terms of reference and drew both on the DAC criteria and on principles-focused and utilisation-focused approaches. To a limited extent the evaluation also drew on Sustained, Emerging Impact Evaluation (SEIE) and contribution analysis. The DAC criteria address questions of relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact, sustainability and lessons learnt. Principles-focused evaluation treats principles as the evaluand and assesses whether they are being following and/or leading to desired results. It has a strong learning and utilisation focus [5]. Sida's evaluation guidelines promote a utilisation focused approach, which underlines the need to involve intended users throughout the research process and ensure that the evaluation product meet the needs of intended users[6]. Utilisation focused evaluations are based on the thinking that the merit of evaluations is dependent on their utility and actual use [7]. SEIE underlines the need to look for sustained impact of projects and programmes, that is, the continuation of benefits or durability of change of an intervention after its termination [8]. Contribution analysis is a theory-based evaluation approach whose main value lies in making credible causal claims between a particular intervention and observed results, as well as the roles played by other influencing factors[9]. This set of evaluation approaches guided us in carrying out and writing this impact evaluation case study. Among other things, they compelled us to try and strike a balance between learning and accountability interests of the evaluation[10].

[5] Patton, Q. P. (2018).

[6] Sida (2018).

[7] Patton, M. Q. (2012).

[8] Zivetz et al. (2017).

[9] Mayne, J. (2012).

[10] Reinertsen et al. (2017).

The Mali bilateral case study, alongside that of Cambodia, was selected based on the following criteria:

- Having direct linkages with one of the two regional portfolios funded by CCI to enable investigations into vertical linkages between portfolios,
- Developed a set of programmes that were implemented in and across multiple sectors of CCI focus: water, land use (agriculture), forestry, energy, and disaster risk reduction (DRR). Such breadth also increased the potential for generating insights into the multi-disciplinary nature of climate change issues and responses, and
- Included Sweden's collaboration with other donors to help us gain insights into whether and how Sweden influenced the climate financing thinking among donors.

Mali case study data were generated through document analysis, interviews and group meetings. Document analysis and preliminary discussions with input guided us in the selection of Mali-based interviewees using purposive and stratified sampling. Evaluation participants comprised 30 key informant interviewees (30 percent women) representing 13 CCI stakeholders: the Swedish Embassy in Bamako, three government directorates, four NGOs, two UN agencies, the World Bank and two other bilateral donors in Mali (Annex 8.1); and project visits and group meetings with about 60 beneficiaries and local key stakeholders (75 percent women) associated with two CCI-supported projects. All the organisations that led or coordinated CCI projects participated in the evaluation. In line with Sida's utilisation-focused approach to evaluations, we sought, obtained and incorporated Swedish Embassy in Bamako's feedback on the first draft case study report.

1.4 Limitations

The evaluation team is confident that the findings presented in this report are valid and evidence-based, drawing on a relevant and sufficient breadth of documents reviewed, and a relevant and sufficiently diverse cross-section of stakeholders interviewed. The main limitation to the evaluation lay in the time available for in-depth sustainability and contribution analysis (i.e. feasibility). As a result evaluation effort was focused on tracing direct post-CCI pathways through further phases of projects funded through CCI and on the emergence of the Mali Climate Fund (FCM) (chapter 4) by: (i) revealing the elements of CCI-supported projects that were sustained after closure, (ii) identifying emerging outcomes, and (iii) seeking out explanations behind change processes and results. Less effort was invested in analysis of whether and how CCI-supported practices were spread, diffused or replicated, of associated contribution to other key CCA pathways in Mali, or of others' contributions to the sustainability of CCI-supported projects after closure of CCI investments. Regarding the latter, however, it should be noted that 90 percent of funding for subsequent phases of projects initially supported by CCI – all of which were 100 percent funded by Sida – also came from Sida (Tables 2a and 2b).

2. Initial CCI context

This chapter describes the international and Swedish climate finance context in 2009, the process that preceded the selection of Mali for CCI bilateral cooperation, and the social, ecological and policy environment in Mali. This informs the evaluative discussions on relevance and the extent to which CCI country selection principles were observed.

2.1 International and Swedish climate finance context

Through the Bali Action Plan (2007), developed countries agreed to provide (additional) climate finance to developing countries to pursue CCA and low carbon development. Two years later in Copenhagen, at COP 15, developed countries pledged USD 30 billion to fast-start finance in support of climate for the period 2010-2012, focusing on CCA, mitigation, capacity building, technology development and forest conservation.[11] This provided the main international context in which Sweden developed and implemented its 'fast-start' CCI. CoP 16 of 2010 took a step further regarding fast-track finance, by formalizing pledges and establishing the Green Climate Fund (GCF) to manage climate funds[12]. Donor countries pledged to jointly mobilise USD 100 billion annually by 2020. Then in 2015, three years after the end of CCI, the Paris Agreement (2015), which entered into force in November 2016, made a landmark global climate governance breakthrough as developed and developing countries made commitments to reduce GHG emissions according to their level of development and capabilities, leading to the development of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs).[13]

[11] UNEP (2011).

[12] Ibid.

[13] NRDC (2017)..

Sweden is committed to allocating one percent of its gross national income to official development assistance (ODA).[14] ODA, including climate finance, falls under the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), with Sida as the main implementing agency. When CCI was launched, Sweden's ODA policy aimed at providing significant assistance to fewer countries, improving aid effectiveness, increasing coordination and cooperation among donors, and fostering partner countries' ownership of their climate and development agenda.[15] The other main policies that guided Sweden's ODA were its Policy on Global Development (2003), the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) and the Accra Agenda of 2008.[16] The Policy on Global Development, which provides a clear direction to Sweden, was used as a basis for identifying three government priorities in 2008, namely: (i) democracy and human rights, (ii) environment and climate change, and (iii) gender equality and the role of women.[17] Of Sweden's 33 partner countries of in 2009, twelve, including Mali, were long-term partners; twelve were conflict or post-conflict countries, and nine were Eastern European reform partners.[18]

Another contextual consideration highlighted during the evaluation was that Sweden assumed the European Union (EU) presidency from July to December 2009, a period that also coincided with the 2009 Conference of Parties (CoP) held in Copenhagen. Pressure on Sweden to immediately invest additional funding in climate change is reported to have contributed to MFA's relatively fast development of CCI, which some within Sida felt was non-inclusive and imposed. This pressure for rapid action is captured in the following statement:

---

[14] MFA (2008).

[15] MFA (2007).

[16] Swedish Ministry of the Environment (2013).

[17] Government of Sweden. (2008).

[18]MFA (2007).

"In its upcoming EU presidency, Sweden will also prioritise climate change and development. In preparation for this, the Swedish government established the International Commission on Climate Change and Development in 2007. The international community will now look to Sweden to lead on follow-up to the commission's call for immediate action, additional funding and deeper global coordination". [19]

2.2 Processes that may have informed the selection of Mali

Sweden's bilateral cooperation with Mali began in 2004, covering the 2004-2008 period and the following thematic areas: (i) poverty-oriented and sustainable development, (ii) democratic governance and social development, and (iii) sustainable development of natural resource sectors. [20] But the most important process was the assessment visit made by the Commission on Climate Change and Development (CCCD) in 2008 before CCI funds were allocated. CCCD sought to establish how to: (i) design and support adaptation to climate change, (ii) reduce the increasing risk of weather-related disasters, and (iii) strengthen the resilience of the poorest and most vulnerable countries and communities. Importantly, CCCD recommended the integration of environment, development and climate change considerations, and managing synergies between climate change adaptation and mitigation. One way of doing this was through investing in national policy coordination for adaptation, DRR, poverty alleviation and human development led from the highest level and involving multiple sectors[21]. Evaluation participants applauded CCCD for conducting country-level consultations and producing a quality report that has been widely distributed in Mali (1,000 copies).

[19] OECD. (2009). pp. 19-20.

[20] MFA. (2004).

[21] CCCD (2009).

2.3 Mali's social ecological conditions, institutional and policy context

Mali's population was about 14.5 million in 2009 and its annual growth rate was among the highest in the world, at 3.6 percent,[22] an average of seven children per woman. Globally, in 2007, Mali's HDI was 0.371, ranked 175 out of 182, meaning that it was among the poorest countries in terms of length and quality of life, access to education and standard of living.[23] The HDI has changed marginally since then to 176 out of 187 countries in 2013.[24] In terms of climate vulnerability and adaptive capacity, Mali ranked 7th and 128th out of 178 countries in 2010.[25] Mali's economy and its people's livelihoods are dependent on natural resources, with 40 percent of the GDP derived from agriculture.[26] Livestock production contributes 14 percent of the GDP but has been stigmatised since the colonial period, leading to ongoing tensions and conflicts between livestock keepers and crop producers. Although Mali's monetary poverty level fell from 47.4 percent in 2006 to 43.6 percent in 2010,[27] poverty levels were high with 66 percent of its population facing multi-dimensional poverty.[28] They are still high. Poverty worsens vulnerability to climate and is unevenly distributed among Mali's places and people, with the northern region being worst affected, especially the drier rural areas (Kayes, Koulikoro, north of Segou,

[22] ECO Consult, AGEG, APRI, Euronet, IRAM & NCG (2011).

[23] UNDP (2009).

[24] UNDP (2014):

[25] Netherlands Commission for Environmental Assessment, Dutch Sustainability Unit (2015).

[26] Zamudio, A. N. (2016).

[27] AfDB (2011).

[28] Zamudio, A. N. (2016).

Mopti and Timbuktu)[29], Gao and Menaka. The annual rainfall is below 200 mm in the north (Sahara Desert), where pastoralism is the main livelihoods source, ranges between 400-800 mm in the central region where rain-fed agriculture is practised, and exceeds 800 mm in the south where food crops are produced alongside cotton as a cash crop.[30] The deforestation rate is among the highest in West Africa,[31] and has been reported to be 0.8 percent per year, which means that at this rate, 80 percent of the forests will be gone within 100 years. Mali's main climate risks are: (i) more frequent droughts and desertification, (ii) temperature rise projected to reach 0.9 °C by 2035 and 2.1 °C by 2065, (iii) shortened length of growing period, and (iv) floods in the Niger River Basin.[32] The most vulnerable communities are small scale farmers, pastoralists and artisans.[33]

The significant political and governance challenges in Mali *were and continue to* revolve around access to land, institutional capacities and decentralisation. Resource conflicts, which have been worsened by climate change effects, impact on sedentary agriculture and pastoralism, natural resources and forestry and local government. For example, climate-change has been causing the relocation of fishing, agricultural and livestock keeping activities southwards where population density is already high, thus increasing conflicts among farmers, fishermen and pastoralists.[34] The conflicts, which are not always geographically contained, require conflict-sensitive approaches in all natural resource initiatives.[35] The tensions

[29] Netherlands Commission for Environmental Assessment, Dutch Sustainability Unit (2015).

[30] Giannini, A. P. K. et al. (2017).

[31] FAO (2006).

[32] Zamudio, A. N. (2016).

[33] Zamudio, A. N. (2016).

[34] Netherlands Commission for Environmental Assessment, Dutch Sustainability Unit (2015).

[35] Mitra, S. (2017).

associated with competing land and water claims have been between: (i) biodiversity conservation, (ii) large-scale irrigated agriculture and (iii) international/national investments in food or biofuels[36]. These climate change issues in Mali appeared to warrant the CCI climate investments and programmes that Sweden supported. The sectors CCI covered – flooded river basins, over-exploited forests, drought-prone communities, agriculture, livestock production and fisheries – were those identified as most exposed to climate risks.

2.4 Mali's climate change related policies and institutional arrangements

Although Mali had ratified all the three multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) [37] and already had a National Adaptation Programme of Action by 2009, it still lacked climate change and green growth policies and strategies at this point. The evaluation also established that the following were the main relevant policies and strategies in place by 2009: National Forestry Policy (1995), National Environment Protection Policy (PNPE, 1998), Strategic Investment Framework on Sustainable Land Management (SIF-SLM); National Water Policy (2002), Livestock Development Policy (2004), Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Framework (GPRSF, 2007-2011) and the National Decentralisation Policy (1992).[38] But Mali still lacked a climate change policy and strategy, and DRR related policy and strategy, and was further constrained by the absence of climate change-specific governance structures. These climate change-related policy gaps are reported to have created a challenge for CCI in terms of how and where to anchor its

[36] Ibid.

[37] These are the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD), and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).

[38] UN Economic Commission for Africa (2015).

work. Consequently, some of its climate investments were directed towards Mali's policy development.

However, Mali's environment, development and climate policies continued to evolve and improve during and after the CCI implementation period. Some of the most notable policies, which had a bearing on the performance and sustainability of CCI in Mali, include the:

- National Gender Policy (2010). (Ministry for the Promotion of Women, Children and the Family, 2010)
- National Climate Policy (PNCC) and the National Climate Change Strategy (SNCC) of 2011. (MEADD, 2014)
- Strategic Framework for a Green and Climate Resilient Economy (EVRCC) of 2011. (MEADD, 2011)
- Strategic Investment Framework for Sustainable Land Management (2011-2025). (Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries, 2011)
- Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (GPRSP, 2012-2017), which integrates sustainable development considerations, drawing on Mali 2025. (Government of Mali, 2011)
- Agricultural Development Policy (2013). (AEDD, 2015; UNEP, 2016)
- National Agriculture land tenure policy, 2014
- National Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction in Mali (2014-2018). (Zamudio, 2016)
- Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC). (MEADD, 2016)
- National Forestry Policy, 2017.
- Global Land /Use- Land development Scheme in the Inner Delta of River Niger in 2019.

The absence of national climate governance structures was key constraint when CCI began in 2009. However, during the 2009-2012 significant progress was also made in establishing climate change governance structures, the most notable one being the National

Climate Change Committee (CNCC) to provide oversight over the implementation of PNCC and CNCC; and its secretariat, the Agency for the Environment and Sustainable Development (AEDD). AEDD also serves as the National Designated Authority (NDA) of Mali for the GCF as well as the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM).[39] At the same time, although there was a decentralization policy in place, it was regarded as a controversial government-driven initiative to devolve control of natural resources as it sometimes clashed with customary laws.[40] It required a clear direction, and the factoring in of resource conflicts that were being worsened by climate change and pushing Malian populations to the southern regions which have more water, graze, arable land and forest resources.[41] '[42] All these developments required decentralization, institutional and technical capacity support, which CCI-funded projects provided at national and sub-national levels in certain regions and districts.

[39] AEDD. (2015).

[40] Mitra, S. (2017).

[41] Netherlands Commission for Environmental Assessment, Dutch Sustainability Unit (2015).

[42] Mitra, S. (2017).

3. Sweden's climate investments in Mali

Sweden has made bilateral climate investments in Mali during and after CCI, and in this chapter we discuss both, with stronger emphasis on the CCI period (2009-2012). Through Sida, Sweden allocated 125 MSEK to Mali under CCI and managed to spend 97.2 MSEK (78 percent) of this allocation in the four-year period (Table 2a). The projects that had the largest and most significant proportions of unspent allocated funds were implemented by Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) in Kidal and Gao where the security situation delayed project implementation; and the Flooded Ecosystem Restoration in the Inner Niger River Basin (REDDIN) implemented by IUCN. Details of the main projects are discussed in chapter 3. It is worth noting that the unspent funds were subsequently used to address project activities and goals during the 2013 and 2014 period.

The CCI funding was significant in amount and had to be utilized within a short and specific period of three years, which was extended to four years at Sida's request. In Mali, CCI funding was additional to the budget allocation in the natural resources sector. The challenge was that it had to be disbursed rather quickly, which meant finding the right partners and projects in a few months, a process which is normally given two years. The main driver was that this had to be done ahead of the CoP 2009 at which Sweden wanted to demonstrate that it was doing something innovative and potentially transformational. A senior manager at the Swedish Embassy in Mali noted:

"The challenge was that it had to be disbursed rather quickly, which meant finding the right partners and projects to fund as well as conducting the necessary assessments in limited time – a process that normally takes two years. It was difficult to know potential partners enough before approving their projects and giving them funds but we had to invest some of the money ahead of the CoP meeting. This proved difficult as staffing levels at the embassy remained the same. One of the effects of this was that we ended up investing in small projects, which was easier and quicker to assess, which contradicted the sector-wide approach."

Table 2a below shows the extent to which the budgets of the four-year projects were largely relatively small, especially when we consider that the 36 MSEK for Reso Climat Mali was disbursed to 14 projects. GEDEFOR, which built on an ongoing project and REDDIN, which was preceded by a preparatory project, received relatively high budgetary support. This contradicted Sweden's preferred sector-wide approach and was largely inefficient. At the same time, CCI has been described by several interviewees as a brave and bold decision, whose approach was to learn by doing, with a preparedness to learn from mistakes. CCI investments are reported to have produced the desired results. Evaluation participants commended Sweden's approach to climate financing in Mali then and now for being balanced through investing through both government and NGOs.

Table 2a: Summary of CCI funds during the project (MSEK)

Project identity	Period	2009	2010	2011	2012	Totals	CCI (Sida) contribution
REDDIN IUCN prep	2009	0,42	0	0	0	0,42	100 %
REDDIN IUCN	2009/11-2013/12	6.5	0	3.57	4.9	15,0	100 %
PUM Climate Change Initiative	2009/01-2012/06	0.62	0.77	0.08	0	1,47	100 %
GEDEFOR adaptation	2009/12-2013/03	4.0	4.5	5.5	6.0	20.0	100 %
Reso Climat Mali	2009/11-2014/06	6.85	16.4	8.2	5.0	36.5	100 %
ITP Climate Change West Africa	2011/07-2013/05	0	0	5.49	3.03	8.52	100 %
NCA project in Gao Kidal	2012/02-2014/06	0	0	0	6.0	6.0	100 %
ITP 262 Cert. Forestière MLI BF	2010/06-2013/06	0	0.16	2. 35	0.91	3.42	100 %
ITP 261WA Climate Change 10, 11	2010/06-2012/12		1.63	2.46	1.79	5. 88	100 %
TOTALS		184	23.5	27.6	27.6	97.2	

Three of the above projects (Table 2a) had successor or phase II projects (GEDEFOR II, Reso Climat II Mali, and PDD DIN Wetlands Programme). The first phase of all three projects began towards the end of 2009 and ended a year or two after CCI. By 2012 they also had utilized the highest amount of CCI funds compared to the other projects. Table 2b shows, firstly, the continuation of these three projects with Sida support into second (and third) phases

and secondly, a new Sida investment post-CCI in the Mali Climate Fund (FCM), in 2013. Sida's annual climate investments and expenditure in Mali increased significantly in the post CCI-period. This can be partly attributed to the investments into FCM and increased investments and use of funds under the projects that grew out of REDDIN and GEDEFOR. The main explanations behind these increases are: (i) Sweden's commitment to increase climate funding gradually, and (ii) the increased absorption capacity of Sida partners in Mali. An important feature of the post-CCI phase is that the Mali government is making contributions to the government projects funded by Sida, contributing 10-15 percent of the total budget. Evaluation participants from government treated this Mali contribution as an important step towards national ownership of the climate agenda.

Table 2b: Sida's post-CCI climate investments in Mali

Project identity	Sida climate investments in Mali post-CCI (MSEK)						Sida's contribution
Year	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	
GEDEFOR phase II*		18.0	10.82	22.30	7.08	5.59	85 % [43]
GEDEFOR III						60.0	90 % [44]
Reso Climat Phase II*			5.14	30.28	4.66	3.55	100 %
Wetlands program PDD DIN I*	15.0	13.96	19.39	8.74	0	-0.12	89 % [45]

[43] The Government of Mali provides the remaining 15 percent.

[44] The Government of Mali provides the remaining 10 percent.

[45] The Government of Mali provides the remaining 11 percent.

Mali Climate Fund*	16.0	20.16	0.31	1.33	40.0	40.0	50 % [46]	*
IWRM		2 300 000	5 647 455	2 317 590	5 740 544	3 595 689	15 %[47]	
TOTALS (annual)	31.1	54.4	41.3	65.0	57.5	112.6		

Project continuing from an early (CCI-supported) first phase.

Table 3 below uses the six categories developed by Sida to determine the weighted distribution of climate investments by project: **xxx** is a primary focus of the project, **xx** is a secondary focus, and **x** is an additional category, denoting 10 percent or less of the project budget.[48] Categories in which most projects invested were training and awareness (67 percent), research and studies (50 percent) and enhancing resilience (50 percent). Policy and administration, and coordination, both received an average of 33 percent investment. The logic that can be inferred is that it was essential for most projects (60 percent) to establish baseline information and build capacity, in order to help build climate resilience. It was also essential for some projects to invest in the establishment of an enabling policy and institutional environment in their efforts towards climate enhancing resilience. The merits of investing in national climate funds post-CCI are discussed in the next chapter.

Table 3: Categorisation of CCI bilateral investments in Mali

Project ID	Enhancing resilience	Policy & administration	Training and awareness	Research and studies	Coordination	Climate change fund

[46] Norway contributed the other 50 percent, which is not included in the table.

[47] The Netherlands has contributed with about 70 percent, the government of Mali about 10 percent and the Government of Guinea about 5 percent.

[48] Wingqvist, G. Ö., César, E., & von Walter, S. (2013). Categorisation of bilateral and regional contributions in the Climate Change Initiative. Retrieved from: https://sidaenvironmenthelpdesk.gu.se/our-work-publications/reports

REDDIN IUCN	XXX	XX	XX	X	X		
GEDEFOR	XX	XX	XXX	XX	X		
Reso Climat						XXX	
ITP Climate Change West Africa			XX				
ITP Forest			XXX				
Norwegian Church Aid	XXX			X			

4. CCI-supported projects activities, outcomes and impact

This chapter describes the CCI-supported projects that were designed and implemented in Mali covering project-based change processes, outcomes and sustained post-CCI project impact focusing on the following four projects: (i) Decentralised Forest Management Programme (GEDEFOR), (ii) Sustainable Development Programme of the Inner Niger River Basin Resources (PDD DIN I and II)), (iii) Reso Climat Mali, (iv) Climate Adaptation in the Regions of Kidal and Gao in Northern Mali. The outcomes and impact of the International Training Programmes (ITPs) are embedded in the four above projects and are therefore not discussed separately here. It is worth mentioning at this point that the ITPs produced a new generation of scientists with skills in CCA programming, capable of linking climate change to development and to the everyday challenges encountered by climate change vulnerable communities and systems. In addition to discussing these four projects, this chapter also examines the (v) Mali Climate Fund (FCM) as one of the major CCI-inspired interventions in Mali, in which Sweden was the first investor in 2013, a year after the end of CCI. This is followed by a brief discussion on the intentions and results of an (vi) Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) study jointly supported by Sweden and The Netherlands within the scope of an overall IWRM support to the Ministry of Energy and Water.

The chapter later discusses the challenges faced; main conclusions, which discusses CCI relevance, effectiveness, sustained impact synthesis, alignment with CCI principles, and policy and programming lessons learnt in Mali; and emerging evaluation themes.

4.1 Decentralised Forest Management Programme

4.1.1 Project implementers and activities

GEDEFOR is a 'country-owned initiative' that sought to contribute towards decentralized and sustainable management of forest resources while at the same time increasing revenues for the rural poor in Kayes and Koulikoro regions. The National Directorate for Water and Forestry (DNEF) was the leading national counterpart and cooperating partners included other line ministries, local government, cooperatives, NGOs and private sector service providers. It main activities, which were conducted in the areas of land resource and forest management, agro-pastoral systems and low and efficient cost irrigation, and gender mainstreaming, were:

- Recover degraded lands, seed and food grain banks for resilience building.
- Develop a methodology for integrating forest issues in NAPA towards institutional capacity development.
- Capacity development, knowledge raising and training for increased stakeholder capacities in climate resilience.
- Identify and describe the impacts of climate change to generate new knowledge.
- Exchange experience in other regions to coordinate and share knowledge with others.

GEDEFOR activities and intentions (see also Table 1) covered the following national policies and strategies: EVRCC, GPRSP and SNCC.

4.1.2 Programme outcomes

The main outcomes of GEDEFOR by 2013 may be summarized as:

- **Improved forest governance by decentralizing forestry administration in a number of municipalities** through strengthening institutional capacity of the National Forests Directorate and municipalities, as well as other partner agencies, fostering inter-ministerial and inter-institutional coordination to avoid overlaps and duplication, and drafting a National Strategy for Forest Adaptation, which was implemented in the post-2012 period[49'50].
- **Improvements in the adaptive capacities and livelihoods of communities in and around the forests under conditions of climate change and variability** through training and implementation of forestry, agro-forestry (non-timber forest products), beekeeping and honey production, horticultural production and animal fattening activities.
- **Development of Strategy for a better forest exploitation, rehabilitation of degraded forests and prevention of the over exploitation of forests**, through converting 252 ha of degraded land into productive land through tree-planting and improved land husbandry[51].

4.1.3 Sustained change processes and impact

GEDEFOR has been succeeded by two projects: GEDEFOR II (2015-2017) and the soon to start GEDEFOR III (2019-2023). Sweden's contribution to GEDEFOR II was approximately 63.8 MSEK while GEDEFOR III has been allocated 160 MSEK,

[49] Sida (2013).

[50] Embassy of Sweden. (2019) GEDEFOR 3/Agriculture value chains. Bamako, Mali: Embassy of Sweden.

[51] Sida (2013).

comprising 90 percent of the total project budget[52]. This shows a threefold increase in the Swedish contribution between GEDEFOR I and GEDEFOR II, and an eightfold increase between GEDEFOR I and GEDEFOR III.

During GEDEFOR Phase II, the following major shifts were made: (i) working in fewer regions to concentrate efforts and resources for increased impact, (ii) using borehole water for livestock production and for gardening instead of wells as the latter required less to make a difference, (iii) from establishing cooperatives to ensuring that they perform, and (iv) adding the development of Community Forestry Management Plans in anticipation of the legal transfer of forestry management powers from central government to municipalities. Perhaps one of the major outcomes of GEDEFOR II were the publishing a new Forestry Policy in 2017 (taking into account decentralization, climate change, private forestry and gender) and of the forestry management decentralisation decree in January 2018 because it provides the legal foundation on which forest management can be decentralized drawing on the good examples from GEDEFOR I and II. The Decree (2018-0079/P-RM DU) is entitled: "Setting out the details of the state's responsibilities transferred to the territorial collectivities in the management of forest and wildlife resources."

Phase III on the other hand: (i) covers a far larger number of regions and districts than its preceding phases because there is more capacity and experience from learning by doing and a critical mass of competent people, (ii) directly involves the ministries of Environment and Agriculture for the first time, thus adding a new dimension to cross-sectoral programming, and (iii) deliberately works with the private sector towards large scale green growth. GEDEFOR III brings together the forestry and agricultural sector actors through co-developing the cashew nut value chain project - the significance of the cashew nut is that it is an agricultural product that grows on trees! The value chain project in turn requires the building of synergies between participating government departments, investing in green growth and working more with the

[52] DNEF. (2018).

business community, and encouraging the adoption of tax incentives that encourage green economic development.

In summary, GEDEFOR I and II enabled community and municipality involvement in forestry management, encouraging responsible access and use of forestry resources. GEDEFOR serves as the only income generating initiative (as opposed to education or health) that has been decentralized by government, which means municipalities gain income-generating opportunities. A recent Sida report made the following observation on the impact of GEDEFOR:

"Through the long-term support to the Mali Forestry Sector, GEDEFOR, the Government of Mali elaborated and adopted a New Forestry Policy of Mali in September 2017. The policy takes into account both private forestry, gender and community resilience to the effects of climate change." [53]

Although the Government of Mali did not contribute funds to GEDEFOR I, it contributed 15 percent to GEDEFOR II and is contributing 10 percent to GEDEFOR III. However, we could not establish the relative contribution of Sweden to the sustainable development of the forestry sector as we did not interview other major projects and donors who invested climate funds in the sector. These include and are not limited to Global Climate Change Alliance's (GCCA) project, which invested 6 215 MEUR (2010-2017).[54]

4.2 Degraded Ecosystems Rehabilitation Project of the Inner Niger Delta

For Sweden, investment in the Inner Niger River Basin was both a national and sub-regional consideration as it planned to link bilateral and regional programming funding in the regulation and management of transboundary natural resources such as rivers,

[53] Sida. (2018).

[54] Netherlands Commission for Environmental Assessment, Dutch Sustainability Unit (2015).

water resources, coasts and shared ecosystems. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Interstate Committee on Drought and Desertification (CLISS) and the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) were expected to play important regional coordination roles in West Africa[55].

4.2.1 Project implementers and activities

The project (REDDIN) supported IUCN to strengthen cooperation between farmers, fishermen and herders, increase their opportunities for income generation while at the same time reinforce the restoration and sustainable use of natural resources in the ecologically and economically significant Niger River inland basin in Mali. At policy level it sought to contribute towards good flooded forest governance and pro-poor development. It was implemented in nine municipalities of Mopti and Youwarou through: (i) strengthening knowledge on environmental problems, (ii) rehabilitating degraded ecosystems, (iii) better management of fishing in the 9 municipalities, and (iv) increasing income generation opportunities. The intended results included capacity building, risk reduction and improvement of natural resources management in local governance. The project activities and intentions covered various aspects of Mali policies and strategies on poverty reduction, climate change and a green and climate resilient economy and SIF-SLM.

4.2.2 Project outcomes

Outcomes of REDDIN by 2013 included:

- **Increased ecosystem resilience in the Inner Delta of the Niger River** through reinforcing the restoration, sustainable management of natural resources, and group-based forestry

[55] MFA. (2004).

rehabilitation in 9 municipalities of the Inner Niger River Basin; indigenous and fruit tree planting; and reducing tree-cutting in response to livelihoods diversification.

- **Improved community livelihoods, food security, incomes and adaptive capacities** through increased rice yields on 300 ha, which benefited from the rehabilitation of silted water canals, use of improved seed and breed, supporting fodder production and market gardening, provision of micro-loans for income generating projects, provision of energy-efficient fish-drying stoves. By the end of CCI, at least by 48 village committees could effectively rehabilitate and restore pastures and forests, and natural resource users could implement forest development plans.
- **Increased institutional capacity to plan for and implement climate change adaptation** through the integration of climate change into five-year Municipal Development Plans, some of which were later funded by other donors; and the strengthening of the IUCN, its project partners, participating parliamentarians, counselors and local structures. REDDIN also produced a database on water quality and use in the Basin, which has been important for decision-making.

4.2.3 Sustained change processes and impact

REDDIN culminated in the development of a new four-year Programme for the Sustainable Development of the Inner Niger River Basin, known as PDD DIN. The first phase of PDD DIN I[56] - which finished in 2016 - has subsequently been extended to a second phase (PDD DIN II). PDD DIN seeks to improve the governance of diversity in flooded forests' while at the same time improving the incomes of poor households from natural resources,

[56] Note that in Table 3 this is also shown as REDDIN Phase II.

and strengthening their adaptive capacity.[57] It is being now implemented by the Ministry of Environment, Sanitation and Sustainable Development (MEADD) at policy level, with the National Directorate of Forestry and Water providing technical assistance after taking over from IUCN. This change was made to "ensure effective ownership of the State, the only entity capable of developing a common vision for the programme and ensuring overall coordination of the programme".[58] IUCN's role was reduced to participating in the Steering Committee, and later to monitoring. The Niger River Basin Authority, some NGOs and the private sector provide complementary support. PDD DIN II's (2017-2022) overall budget is 105 MSEK, to which Sida is contributing 94.3 MSEK, an increase of 69 percent from the previous investment, which was made in recognition of Phase I achievements.[59]

In summary, REDDIN and its subsequent PDD DIN phases improved the livelihoods of participating communities through income generating activities in agriculture and contributed to forest development through tree plantation. It fostered national ownership through PDD DIN and state responsibility of the project. It helped Sida to work at the policy-practice interface and resulted in the success of PDD DIN in a conflict-ridden area, which is also the most important cattle rearing and fishing region. This has been attributed to MEADD and DNEF (National Waters and Forests Directorate) working with locally-based organizations in implementing the project.

Through restoring degraded flooded forests, CCI contributed towards resilience in agriculture and natural resources management, sustainable food security and productive decent employment; and to the creation of potential study sites for insights into the relationship between flooded forests, fish production and water birds and where else to support forest restoration in the Delta to

[57] Embassy of Sweden in Bamako. (2019).

[58] MEADD & AEDD. (2017). p. 9.

[59] Ibid.

generate the most benefits.[60] However, it was difficult to determine the relative contribution of CCI to the improvement of Inner Niger Delta people's livelihoods and adaptive capacities and to ecosystem resilience because: (i) CCI was preceded by other projects in the Inner Niger Delta implemented by organisations such as IUCN and Wetlands International and on which contributions it built; (ii) there are other actors who made contributions during and after CCI whom we did not engage in the evaluation due to limited time and resources; and (iii) the Inner River Delta is dependent on how the water is managed and utilised in the catchment area, including in the Upper Niger Delta, which we did not assess.

4.3 Reso Climat Mali

4.3.1 Project implementers and activities

Reso Climat Mali is a network of NGOs working on climate change matters in Mali, which was formed in 2008, just before CCI, in response to the exclusion of NGO participation in national, regional and international CC matters, and in local CCA action. The network, which is hosted by Mali Folkecenter, envisaged that local action would help showcase how CCA, mitigation and DRR could be done in a way that would influence policy. CCI created a CCA fund to strengthen the capacities of Reso Climat Mali and support local adaptation projects by NGOs. The fund was administered by Reso Climat Mali under a programme called Local Sustainable Adaptation Initiatives to the Effects of Climate Change for Vulnerable Rural Communities in Mali. The projects were intended to focus on the following four main areas of CCA identified by Mali's NAPA: (i) sustainable agriculture, (ii) water supply, (iii) forestry, and (iv) renewable energy technologies for stimulating local economy. These covered 17 of the 19 (89 percent) of priority actions identified by the NAPA coinciding with those identified by the network.[61] The

[60] Wetlands International. (2014).

[61] Cissé, K. J. & Stenlund, R. (2009).

project intentions cover several aspects of poverty reduction, climate adaptation and greening the economy, which are covered by GPRSP, SNCC and EVRCC respectively. Synergies were intended to be created with donors such as GTZ, UNDP, and Christian Aid who were working in the area of climate change in Mali; and with research institution and Malian's Ministry in charge of agriculture issues.

Funding received from CCI was used for the implementation of 28 projects, which were implemented after carrying out EIAs for each. Project support was accompanied by institutional capacity development, to enhance capacities for CCA programming and resource mobilisation. The Reso Climat Mali policy influencing activity under CCI was the development of an Environmental Pact, which all the Presidential candidates (2013) signed as an undertaking to prioritise CCA, sustainable development and environmental management – as a moral contract between citizens and policy makers.[62]

4.3.2 Project outcomes

Reso Climat Mali outcomes by 2013 included:

Strengthened NGO institutional capacities: The improved capacities have enabled some Reso Climat Mali members to increased their funding base and financial sustainability as a result of becoming better at fundraising and accountability. Increased capacities also encouraged Sweden to continue investing in the fund beyond CCI.

Enhanced NGO policy influencing capacity and opportunities by inspiring NGO participation at strategic levels through Reso Climat Mali's membership to the National Climate Change Committee. Increased the network's credibility and visibility as a result of enhanced technical and institutional development capacities to work on CCA, conduct participatory planning and implementation of CCA activities, manage information, learn from

[62] Zamudio, A. N. (2016).

doing and jointly influence relevant policy at local and national levels.

Contribution to the mainstreaming of CCA in Mali's development and conflict transformation work: By supporting the integration of CCA in the development and implementation of projects at community levels through CCI funds that supported the development and implementation of CCA strategies in five municipalities and the signing of 4 local conventions between municipalities to prevent and manage natural resources-based conflicts.

Improved livelihoods, incomes and adaptive capacities of women and men farmers: By enhancing the adaptive capacities of participating communities largely through increasing livelihood options and building ecological capital. This was done through increasing access to health, water, improved and diverse seed varieties and animal breeds, energy-saving technologies, income-generating activities and improved community-level decision-making.

Increased national ownership of the climate change agenda: Municipalities have incorporated CC into their 5-year Annual Development Plans, with a requirement that there should be beneficiary participation in project planning, with evidence that they have participated in, and agreed to the proposed intervention.

4.3.3 Sustained change processes and impact

Sweden has continued to fund Reso Climat Mali through the phase II (2015-2019) programme, which was framed by RBM and a theory of change. Its investment increased to 44.8 MSEK to fund 20 projects. It drew lessons from Reso Climat Mali's first Sida-funded programme (2009-2014), and made the following changes: (i) members who could only access funds individually could form two-member partnerships and apply for double the amount as a way of encouraging synergy among them and the participation of more members, (ii) the thematic scope of funded projects was broadened to include livestock, fisheries and DRR. The strategies were

broadened to include scaling up of good practice/projects beyond target villages and in collaboration with municipalities, to influence government policies.[63] Value chain development component was also added, focusing on non-timber forest products and fish, green growth and value chain development, renewable energy, youth participation in developing local economies, experience capitalisation is intended to influence large scale programming and government policy as well as related practice on the ground. Some of the themes of focus for documenting good and emergent practice are: (i) water management in different agroecological regions, and (ii) creation of effective and sustainable livelihood options.

Through Reso Climat Mali, Mali Folkecenter's international climate finance readiness was built and subsequently enhanced, leading to its nomination, in 2015, for accreditation to GCF as a result of its experience in managing the Reso Climat Mali fund since 2009. In addition, the governance and funding mechanisms developed and used under the Reso Climat Mali fund have been adopted by the FCM. As a result, members have begun accessing significant levels of funding from other sources, notably GEF, DFID and Norway.

CCI's main contribution to Reso Climat Mali's inspired outcomes and impacts lies in the creation of the fund for NGOs, which has been sustained. The United Kingdom's (UK) Building Resilience and Adaptation to Extremes and Disasters (BRACED) programme has been implementing a Decentralising Climate Fund (DCF) programme in Mali through the Near East Foundation. Like the FCM and Reso Climat Mali, DCF has provided technical capacity development to ANICT so that it gets accredited as a national implementing entity of the GCF. It has also invested funds in climate adaptation projects, focusing on those identified and prioritised by local communities while at the same time helping communities to create institutions that can sustain the change processes beyond the life of projects[64]. The evaluation did not

[63] Embassy of Sweden in Mali. (2015).

[64] BRACED. (2017).

identify other initiatives that contributed to the outcomes of national climate funds, which enhance national ownership and control.

4.4 NCA Project

4.4.1 Implementing partner and activities

The Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) implemented a CCI-funded project that sought to equip poor communities (12 500 families) in the northern Malian regions of Kidal and Gao to resist negative effects of climate change by building and diversifying their income sources, rehabilitating traditional production systems and training them in DRR and new agro-pastoral systems. This was important given that community members saw climate change as the work of God, over which they had little or no agency to exercise. Project implementation started rather late, in February 2012, due to the difficult security situation in the project area. The project was therefore primarily aligned to Mali's GPRSP. The main activities implemented under the project were:

- Restoration of degraded lands covering croplands that could no longer be irrigated,
- Water harvesting for livestock and agriculture using food for work to get communities to construct small water harvesting dams, around which trees were planted to reduce erosion of siltation,
- Provision of equipment to abstract water from the river bed and irrigate land before the arrival of the floods, and
- Economic activities (income generation), which largely involved harvesting and selling some indigenous fruits, and latter processing them for value addition.

4.4.2 Project outcomes

We established the following outcomes as having been achieved by 2013:

Improved natural resources base and capacity for carbon sinking: Rehabilitation of 800 hectares of agriculture and pasture lands in different project intervention areas, 50 secured for agriculture and fodder production, and 14 square km set aside for forest conservation. Tree planting commenced in various sites.

Improved livelihoods of climate vulnerable households through provision of 188 tonnes of cereals to insecure and created temporary employment for vulnerable women who were able to market for their horticultural produce.

Enhanced adaptive capacities of communities through developing their abilities to construct effective and modern flood control structures, resulting in improved production and reduced exposure to flood-induced disasters.

4.4.3 Sustained change processes and impact

While there are no further phases to the NCA's CCI-funded project, the small dams that were constructed helped recharge the water table and provide water for localised agriculture and for livestock consumption. Increased local water availability reduced local conflict over water resources. More importantly, they resulted in neighbouring communities letting their cattle come to the targeted communities for the water, which benefited the targeted communities whose inferior cattle breed was improved through cross-breeding. These CCA experiences helped communities understand that they had the power to respond to climate change effects.

Many other donors have contributed to agriculture, livestock and water development in the context of climate change in Kidal and Gao during and after CCI. These include and are not limited to The Netherlands, International Fund for Agricultural Development

(IFAD)[65], Norway and Belgium[66]. The long-term contribution of CCI to the observed outcomes in Kidal and Gao is likely to have been constrained by the discontinuation of Sweden's support towards the same interventions when NCA's programme focus shifted.

4.5 Mali Climate Fund (FCM)

4.5.1 Main actors and activities

The Mali Climate Fund was established by the Government of Mali in February 2012 to support the achievement of Mali's climate change response goals. It was hosted by AEDD and co-managed by the United Nations Development Program through its Special Office Multi-Partner Trust Fund (UNDP-MPTF), which was intended to ensure fiduciary and technical compliance with international standards and reassure climate fund investors. [67] UNDP administers the Fund and exercises responsibility for the fiduciary component. AEDD serves as the Technical Secretariat, which launches annual calls for proposals, analyses them for adherence to criteria, provides written feedback on each submitted proposal, makes recommendation to the Steering Committee, and the implementation of funded projects. The Steering Committee, which according to its governance documents, meets quarterly but in reality, a bit less than that, provides leadership, strategic direction and oversight and selects proposals to fund. It is chaired by Minister of MEADD comprises 16 members from government, donors, civil society, the Resident Coordinator of UN System and the Executive

[65] IFAD. (2016).

[66] AEDD, PICP/ASNaCC (2017).

[67] AEDD & UNDP. (2019).

Coordinator MPTF Office.[68] FCM prioritises agriculture, forestry and energy sectors, in line with SNCC, EVRCC and NDC.[69]

CCI played a catalytic role in the development and materialisation of the Mali Climate Fund, starting from 2010.[70] It was through CCI that the Mali institution with legitimacy to host the fund was identified (AEDD), and initial governance mechanisms were proposed, terms of reference and due diligence processes were initiated. Through CCI, Sweden also played a leading role in the establishment and operationalisation of the Mali Donor Coordination Group in Environment and Climate Change. It was the first chair of the group from 2011 to 2013[71], and had this role renewed for a second and final term, before being asked to chair for an extra year. However, the establishment and operationalisation of the FCM was delayed due to the need for: (i) due diligence work had to be conducted (e.g. auditing AEDD, which was going to host it, and developing terms of reference), (ii) establishing of necessary governance mechanisms, (iii) securing government commitment to comply with the international standards (iv) waiting for the return of normal operations after the coup.

4.5.2 Main outcomes by 2013

The main outcomes were:

- The laying of a foundation for a nationally-owned climate change response funding mechanism through the support for establishment of FCM.
- The laying of the ground for mutual learning and synergies between and among donors, government, UN agencies and

[68] UNDP. (2013).

[69] AEDD & UNDP. (2019).

[70] Boman, K. & Goita, M. (2016).

[71] Sida (2013).

NGOs through the establishment of a Donor Coordination Group, and provision for a Steering Committee under FCM.

4.5.3 Sustained change processes

Mali was the first country in Africa to establish a Climate Fund[72], which was operationalised in 2013 through investments by Sweden of 16 MSEK in December 2013, plus a further 20 MSEK in 2014[73]. Norway, the only other bilateral partner to invest in the fund by January 2019, invested USD 1,015,965 in 2014.[74] So far, Sweden and Norway have allocated virtually the same amount of investment to the FCM, which has reached USD 30 million. However, Norway has disbursed only part of its allocation, while Sweden has disbursed its full contribution already.

So far, 14 projects have been funded under three calls: 2014, 2017 and 2018.[75] Most of the projects funded under the initial call were concentrated in the southern part of the country were the security situation was better and monetary poverty is high, but subsequent calls have gradually resulted in a more even distribution of projects across the country, partly as a result of the revised proposal evaluation criteria. The initial FCM call was made before governance systems were in place. This was a brave and bold decision, whose approach was to learn by doing, with a preparedness to learn from mistakes. In fact, some of the projects that were approved then did not cover all the project requirements. The governance systems were developed and approved in 2016.[76] The current set up is that both CSOs and government who want to apply for FCM funding have to do it through a UN body because they (CSOs and government) do not have mechanisms that would allow for the

[72] UNDP. (2013).

[73] Boman, K. & Goita, M. (2016).

[74] Ibid.

[75] AEDD & UNDP. (2019).

[76] Ibid.

recovery of funds if there was a problem of abuse. Efforts are being made to enable government to access the funds directly and reduce overhead costs.

There is also a growing interest by government, to take on the entire function of managing the MFC over the next four years, and this is supported by Sweden. This would be in line with national ownership. The Swedish Embassy is encouraging the activation of a national mechanism that would foster national ownership and long-term sustainability of the fund and prepare Mali for GCF and Adaptation Fund (AF) accreditation.[77]'[78] For this purpose, Sweden is contributing to institutional capacity development of AEDD through: (i) administrative funds; (ii) technical support; and (iii) the production of manuals on administrative, financial and accounting procedures, project monitoring and evaluation, and Steering Committee rules and procedures.[79] This funding has also enabled incorporation of GCF gender mainstreaming requirements into those of the FCM as part of supporting the stakeholders to become GCF ready. GCF seeks to ensure the integration of gender-responsive approaches into programmes and projects it funds because it recognises that climate change has significant impact on human rights and gender inequality.[80] With AEDD as the NDA for the GCF, Mali is preparing the National Agency for Territorial Communities Investment (ANICT), Reso Climat Mali (which Sida has been funding since CCI) and Mali Development Bank for GCF accreditation. [81] FCM has enhanced Mali's preparedness for multilateral climate funds such as GCF and AF, which provide larger climate investments, which have potential to generate impact at scale. Sweden played a leading role in the capacity development of the NDA, and two of the three selected country institutions to

[77] Swedish Embassy in Bamako. (2018).

[78] Ministry of Environment and Sanitation & UNDP. (2018).

[79] Ministry of Environment and Sanitation & UNDP. (2018).

[80] GCF. (2017).

[81] Swedish Embassy in Bamako. (2018)..

become capable of accessing GCF, which is important funding in the long run.

CCI's main contribution resided in the laying of the foundation and mechanisms for FCM leading to the establishment of "the first public-private fund in Africa to strategically leverage funds for pilot and test interventions that can identify and scale resilience for the country at large".[82] Consequently, Sweden and Norway have been lauded by Ms. Kéita Aïda M'Bo, the Minister of Environment, Sanitation and Sustainable Development for taking leadership in investing in the FCM.[83] The only other donor that has contributed to FCM is Norway. However, as the Reso Climat Mali project has already shown, DCF also made contributions to the outcomes realised through FCM.

4.6 Integrated Water Resources study

The Netherlands and Sweden jointly supported a project entitled PCA-IWRM, 2015-2019 that is being implemented by the National Directorate of Hydraulics (NDH). It had no predecessor project from CCI but is integrating water, climate change and other relevant matters in the Mali context. A main priority for Sweden is to ensure that water resources are raised higher on the national agenda to ensure that sectoral investment plans are decided upon while considering existing knowledge on the quantity and quality of water available, now and in the future. A study was therefore carried out in 2018 with the objective to take into account the impacts of climate change and human pressure on the quantity and quality of water resources and their different uses; create policy makers' awareness of the importance of cross-sectoral, watershed or aquifer-based approach when addressing climate change issues; and ensure

[82] UNICEF (2014).

[83] Mali Climate Fund: Mrs Kéita Aïda M'Bo welcomes the contributions of the Swedish and Norwegian partners. (29 January 2019). Retrieved: http://africazine.com/fonds-climat-mali-mme-keita-aida-mbo-salue-les-contributions-des-partenaires-suedois-et-norvegiens/

that concerned actors take ownership of the associated challenges. Its specific objectives were to:

- Develop a state of knowledge on climate change, its short, medium and long-term impacts on the quantity and quality of water resources, as well as on the different uses of these resources.
- Identify and analyse measures to prevent, mitigate and adapt to the negative impacts of climate change on the quantity and quality of water resources, as well as the different uses.
- Report in a synthesis report the state of knowledge on climate change, its impact on the quality and quantity of water resources and their different uses, as well as prevention and adaptation measures and mitigation. Formulate as an appendix to the summary report of proposals for action.[84]

The overall project objectives have been met, although implementation has been very challenging and slow due to mainly heavy administrative processes, weak capacity within the NDH and time that was spent on harmonising the support from the Swedish and Dutch Embassies.

The study that is mentioned above was seen by the NDH as one of the main achievements of the support. Its findings and proposals for action have become an important guiding tool on Inner Delta River Basin discussions between the government and other stakeholders. The findings are also feeding into a World Bank-supported review of the National Water Policy, which should also ensure alignment with Mali's Agenda 2030. At the same time, the study is a key reference document as new national programmes for the water sector are being developed. Finally, it is also worth noting that the study allowed for learning among key actors as it

[84] BRL Engineering & CIRA SAS. (2018). Impact assessment of climate change on the quantity and quality of water resources and their uses A1 - Summary report. Main document are made easily accessible. Bamako, Mali: DNH.

incorporated some educational activities aimed to ensure that the main conclusions on the water situation is clear to both decision makers and technicians. Sweden is currently exploring ways to build on this study.

Prior to 2014 and during the post 2008 period, the combined Sweden and Denmark's contribution to IWRM is about 4 MEUR, followed by the African Development Bank (AfDB) – 2 MEUR, and the Government of Mali – 465,000 EUR. From December 2014, Sweden invested about 1.9 MEUR in the continued development of the national water information system, with the Mali Government contributing about 260,000 EUR. The Netherlands contributed some 9 MEUR towards IWRM and food security, with the Mali Government contributing about 1.5 MEUR. This shows that Sweden's contribution has been strong in the area of national water information management and that The Netherlands has made higher investments in this sector. At the same time, it suggests that the Government of Mali has been making notable contributions to IWRM financing.[85]

[85] Global Water Partnership. (2015).

5. Challenges during and after CCI

We start by illuminating challenges encountered during CCI to highlight constraints to employment of CCI principles and achievement of CCI-supported initiatives in Mali; and how some of these challenges were addressed. This is followed by a description of new and emerging challenges to draw attention to what may need to be resolved in view of the forward-looking nature of the evaluation.

5.1 Working with the CCI principles

The Swedish Embassy in Mali found CCI's principles-based approach insufficiently structured to provide adequate guidance. In addition, there was no time to introduce it properly and no mechanism offered to articulate its (bridging) relationship with the more traditional results-based management (RBM) approach already in use in the Embassy. Consequently, the Swedish Embassy did not directly work with the CCI principles; rather, it has kept encouraging government and its other partners in the country to adopt RBM. For example, CSOs, especially Reso Climat Mali members and government personnel involved in GEDEFOR, received training on CCA principles and RBM programming. Consequently, the government of Mali adopted an RBM policy in 2016. It should however be noted that the two planning approaches are not necessarily contradictory, and in fact can be mutually reinforcing. For example, an effectiveness principle, such as "guidance for making choices and decisions is useful for setting priorities, [and] inspires and supports ongoing development and adaptation" [86] , can underpin RBM. Principles-based planning arguably adds another important and deeper layer of planning relevant to complex and dynamic situations.

[86] Patton, Q. P. (2018). p. 1.

5.2 Challenges beyond CCI principles

There were other challenges faced during CCI and these were concerned with the pace and duration of the initiative, capacity and the security situation in Mali. The difficult operating environment, which is the other main challenge, has persisted. These are described below.

5.2.1 Hurried pace of project proposal development and selection

The increase in funding that CCI added to the normal Sida budget in Mali was sizeable and yet it did not come with additional staff and needed to be implemented in a short space of time. One project partner noted, "Planning was also compromised by the very limited time to do it and the hurried pace was unsuitable for the complex planning process that involved a new way of doing development: integrating climate change and development." For the Swedish Embassy in Mali, there was too little time to assess potential partner organisations and the funds had to be disbursed rather too quickly. It was difficult to know potential partners well enough before approving their proposals. As a result, CCI ended up investing in several small projects, which were easier and quicker to assess, and had low risk. This contradicted the sector-wide approach that Sida preferred but also apparently resulted in good learning by the Embassy, which was applied in subsequent phases of funding.

5.2.2 Short duration and inappropriate timing of some project cycles

Sida's final report on CCI underlined that the short-term focus (four years) of CCI went against the Paris Principle of aid effectiveness (CCI principle 3), especially because there was inadequate time for follow up. A similar concern was highlighted by some partner organisations, especially those utilising Reso Climat Mali funds to implement two-three-year projects. In addition, they also highlighted the clash between the seasonality of most of the projects

funded and Sida's planning cycles. These clashes contributed to delays in disbursement between the first and second funding cycles. They were worsened by the wide distribution of the projects across the country, which made physical auditing (before funds can be disbursed) protracted. Sida extended projects that could not be completed by December 2012, and as a result has supported successor projects (GEDEFOR, REDDIN/PDD DIN and Reso Climat Mali) to ensure continuity of processes and impact to deal with some of the identified shortcomings. This is consistent with its cooperation strategy with long-term development partners.[87]

5.2.3 Low transformative effect at household level

Community-led action in the forestry and agriculture sectors were effective at building community cohesion but did not result in substantive changes in the income levels of participating individuals and households. This suggests that the distance moved away from poverty and vulnerability to climate change has in many cases not been sufficiently transformative. One of the main responses to this challenge has been the design of GEDEFOR, with a strong focus on pro-poor green value chain development.

5.2.4 Difficult security situation

The security situation disrupted funding and activities, especially in the northern region of the country, with the coup of March 2012 resulting in a suspension of climate and other forms of development assistance to Mali. This had a negative impact on starting some projects and disrupted most other CCI-supported projects, the field monitoring of projects by the Embassy, thus delaying the realisation of intended results. In some cases, the quality of processes and results were undermined due to low or no monitoring and follow-up support in the areas where the security situation had been difficult before the coup. One of the systemic effects of the prolonged security situation appears to have been the suspicion with

[87] OECD. (2009).

which foreign development actors are viewed. As one donor noted, "If a donor plans to make an impact in Mali, it has to stay long enough to be respected and trusted as a foreigner and friend of the country." Nevertheless, PDD DIN, one of the post-CCI projects, has made some inroads in working in a conflict-ridden area, through working with local community-based organisations that are trusted and have a good sense of place.

5.2.5 Persistent, new and emerging challenges

The main challenge that has persisted is the security situation and lack of coordinated planning and implementation between bilateral and multilateral partners emerged as a new challenge. The security situation has continued to be a challenge, resulting in a higher concentration of CCA projects in the southern region of the country, which is not the poorest or most climate-vulnerable. For example, the World Bank's support for the USD 27.8 million Environmental and Economic Rehabilitation of the Niger River (2018-2023) project, which is coordinated and led by the National Agency for the Niger River in partnership with the directorates of transport and of commerce, has had to be confined to the southern part of the Niger River Basin due to the security crisis upstream. A 2017 study on CCA projects in Mali made the following conclusion on their spatial distribution:

"The spatial distribution of identified climate change projects indicates a strong concentration of these projects in the southern regions (except the District of Bamako), including Koulikoro, Sikasso and Ségou which benefit respectively 32, 35 and 35 projects. Next come the regions of Kayes and Mopti, each home to 25 projects, followed by the northern regions where apart from the national projects (6 in number), the number of projects hardly exceeds a dozen. Hence the fact that the concentration of climate change projects follows the gradient of insecurity from north to south, resulting from the security crisis that the country has been suffering for several year".[88]

While CCI-inspired processes helped generate synergies between different actors in Mali and between FCM and GCF, new synergy

[88] AEDD, PICP/ASNaCC. (2017).

challenges have emerged on the horizon. For example, even though the Decree on forest and wildlife decentralisation was published in 2018, some stakeholders interviewed during the study indicated that its distribution, and therefore use, has been slow. Secondly, there are no deliberate synergy building strategies between bilateral and multilateral donors, which have greater convening power, despite the fact that the former invests in the latter. This suggests the need for a platform for the two actors, similar to the donor group. The evaluation also identified a site-specific synergy gap: the Niger River Basin, which is at the heart of the social and economic development of Mali as it serves as a critical ecological asset. Even though there has been a national action plan for the river basin, supported by a national programme, interventions in the basin have been and remain fragmented.

Finally, the evaluation established that, while FCM has made considerable progress since 2016, it has cost the Swedish Embassy a lot of time to provide the necessary support to the FCM Technical Secretariat. Consequently, the Embassy has contracted an expert on multi-donor trust funds to support the establishment of an investment plan, activate the national mechanism that would allow the Mali Government to exercise fiduciary responsibility that is currently in under UNDP MPTF, and improve the results matrix among other things.

6. CCI principles, DAC criteria and lessons learnt

In this concluding chapter we synthesize findings on the twin objectives of the Mali impact evaluation: accountability and learning for the future. We have combined DAC criteria, SEIE, contribution analysis and principles-focused evaluation to organise the discussion on accountability around relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustained impact, while also highlighting the extent and ways in which CCI principles were realised. While relevance and sustained impact cover the CCI and post-CCI work, effectiveness and efficiency primarily focus on CCI interventions between 2009 and 2012. The chapter also highlights lessons learnt.

6.1 Relevance of Sweden's support in Mali

We conclude that the CCI and post-CCI work in Mali has been relevant for various reasons, which include alignment to the following two key relevance CCI principles: *Principle 1: The funds reserved for adaptation interventions should go primarily to the poorest countries*, and *Principle 5: The allocation should reflect the ongoing work of the CCCD: integration of environment, development, climate change adaptation (CCA), mitigation, disaster risk reduction, poverty alleviation and governance*. Mali was and is among the poorest and most climate-vulnerable countries in Africa and internationally. Most (67 percent) of the CCI projects invested in CCA and risk reduction to enhance climate resilience and improve livelihoods while the project beneficiaries of CCA projects were the poorest and most vulnerable community members: farmers, pastoralists and fishermen, women and youth. All the beneficiaries were and are highly dependent on climate-sensitive natural resources.

At the same time, the priority sectors in which CCI and post-CCI interventions invested – agriculture (including livestock production and fisheries), water, forestry and renewable energy – were and are aligned to national policies and strategies on poverty reduction, gender, climate change, green growth and NDC. CCI-supported

projects integrated the priority themes, using a particular sector as an entry point. For example, GEDEFOR supported agricultural projects for women to increase food security, raise income and reduce deforestation for income generation, thus addressing both adaptation and mitigation. Water was harvested and renewable energy was used to pump water and reduce drudgery. NCA used food for work to directly reduce food insecurity and construct water harvesting structures and systems that made water available for livestock and crop production as well as control of floods, thus integrating DRR. It is worth noting that post-CCI projects that are aimed at increasing resilience in Mali have continued to be implemented in the northern and central regions as well, where the security situation is dire but also where the most vulnerable communities are found. The projects include PDD DIN in Mopti and Timbuktu, the Enhancing Climate Resilience and Food and Nutrition Security (ACF) project in Timbuktu and United Nations Children's Emergency Fund UNICEF in Gao and some FCM-funded projects projects.

Sweden's support for the NDC process and the alignment of post-CCI projects to it illustrates its observation of *Principle 4: Consideration should be taken to the ongoing international climate negotiations regarding timing and choice of channels.*

6.2 CCI effectiveness in Mali

We conclude that CCI has been effective based on an examination of effectiveness against the goal of the initiative, CCI results-oriented principles, and project-specific intentions. The goal, which was to "effectively contribute to long term adaptation efforts, especially in the poorest countries, and to developing countries' efforts to reduce greenhouse gas levels" was addressed to a large extent in Mali through: (i) support for the development of relevant policies and institutional capacities, especially those of government, (ii) preparing the climate finance readiness of government as well as NGOs, (iii) support for the establishment of donor dialogue and government-donor-NGO interactions and publishing the first report on CCA projects in Mali, which aided effective planning and

coordination of efforts, and (iv) investing in the forestry sector, which generates adaptation and mitigation benefits. Sweden also reflected long-term adaptation efforts through its successor country strategy and post-CCI projects, which built on the previous ones and generated conceptual tools, such as decentralisation mechanisms that have been incorporated in the Decree of forestry management decentralisation. From a principles perspective, we note that CCI effectively integrated climate change into the development agenda of Mali, partly through support for policy work, capitalisation and sharing of promising CCI and post CCI experiences, investing into the FCM, providing technical assistance to it and establishing a multi-stakeholder Steering Committee. These programming design efforts show strong alignment to *Principle 6: Sustainable adaptation to climate change requires that the climate perspective is integrated into the countries' own development strategies. Central areas are water- and land-use in urban as well as rural areas.* With the two main climate-related disasters in Mali being droughts and floods, and CCI and post-CCI having invested in water resources development and the flooded forests of the Inner Niger Delta, *Principle 7: A proportion of the Swedish contributions should focus on disaster risk reduction as an integral part of climate adaptation,* was also observed.

Through its investments in and institutional and technical capacity development for FCM and Reso Climat Mali, CCI and post-CCI support has enhanced processes of national ownership, which is consistent with *Principle 3: Contributions should work towards the implementation of the Paris agenda principles on aid effectiveness, which encourages aligning aid to national priorities and processes in developing countries and enhancing national ownership.* It is worth noting that the Paris Agenda principle is and was already embedded in Sida's development practice and programming when CCI was developed[89]. The outcomes show that there was tangible added value for the Government Ministries and Directorates that CCI supported, notably the Ministry of Environment and AEDD, DNEF, Mali Folkecenter, Reso Climat Mali partners and municipalities whose institutional and technical capacities, credibility and track records were developed. There was also tangible value added for women,

[89] OECD. (2009).

men and young farmers, pastoralists and fishermen whose adaptive capacities, livelihoods and ecological capital was developed. These outcomes speak to *Principle 2: The Swedish contributions should have a tangible added value.*

6.3 CCI efficiency

We conclude that CCI was moderately efficient largely based on the challenges highlighted in Section 4.6, namely, the: (i) hurried pace of introducing CCI, (ii) rushed planning by potential partners who were ill-prepared to conduct CCA work, (iii) inadequate Sida human resources for the additional workload that came with CCI, especially towards the end of CCI, which also coincided with the coup, (iv) insufficient time for assessing potential partners, and (v) the funding of too many small projects, which required a lot of administrative work, to reduce risk of sinking huge resources into organisations without the right ethical and technical capacities to spend them. These challenges undermined the realisation of *Principle 3 on aid effectiveness*. However, once the projects were approved, implementation was within the budget and agreed work plans, except for delays caused by insecurity and the coup. This contributed to the delays in the completion the six main projects (Table 2b). On the other hand, CCI was particularly efficient in terms of ensuring that the bulk of the funds for funded projects (at least 70 percent) went towards project activities. Most of the CCI efficiency challenges were overcome when post CCI-projects were implemented, largely through institutional and technical capacity development, learning by doing and cross-learning among project partners.

6.4 Sustained impact of CCI

The impact of CCI has been sustained beyond the initiative and inspired the emergence of new activities, especially around FCM. The sustained impact, which is outlined below, is consistent with, and at the heart of *Principle 2: The Swedish contributions should have a tangible added value.* The impact has been sustained through the

establishment of local and national structures and supportive guidelines, continuation of GEDEFOR, REDDIN, Reso Climat Mali, and the materialisation of FCM. The main sustained impacts to which CCI contributed are as follows:

CCI has contributed significantly to raising the climate change agenda in Mali: CCI was one of the largest and first multi-sectoral climate investments in Mali and had strong components of awareness raising and training (Table 2b). In addition, Reso Climat Mali has been holding National Environmental Forum biennially to facilitate interaction between government CSOs and the private sector on climate change matters, with Sida support. It has resulted in CCA being 'put on different tables', helping government, civil society and communities to effectively engage with climate change.

CCI has contributed to capacity for integrating of CCA and development: CCI has had an impact on climate programming in Mali, allowing for the effective integration of climate change responses and development and the application of the principle of additionality. The integrated approach has benefited from the ITP-trained scientists who became capable of linking climate change to development and everyday challenges encountered by climate change vulnerable communities and systems. One evaluation participant noted, "CCI has had the greatest impact on the comprehension of root causes, manifestations, consequences and adaptation and mitigation measures of climate change in Mali." Alongside the Swedish Embassy in Mali, GIZ has been another major actor in capacity development.

CCI has contributed to some important decision-making mechanisms and tools for wider use in the environment and climate change field: The mechanisms that have been developed include the Donor Group, multi-stakeholder FCM Steering Committee and the tripartite decentralised forestry management structures. The main decision-making tools developed include a map of climate change projects in Mali, which Sweden prepared in 2012, and UNDP and GIZ in 2014 and 2017 respectively), and the study and report on climate change and its impact on water

availability in the Inner River Delta Basin, which it co-funded with The Netherlands.

CCI has contributed to enhanced national ownership of the climate agenda at national, municipal and community levels: This has been achieved through provision of support for climate change policy support alongside other donors such as the European Union Delegation, GIZ and Norway. Secondly, Sweden has fostered national ownership at national level through investing in FCM together with Norway. In addition, CCI and post CCI processes have built AEDD's institutional capacity as FCM's technical secretariat and through supporting a process through which the State will have greater control over the funds in future. CCI and post CCI processes supported a similar process through the Reso Climat Mali fund and institutional capacity development of Mali Folkecenter, which manages the fund for NGO projects. FCM and Reso Climat Mali funding disbursement processes have in turn developed Mali's preparedness to access larger GCF funding over which Mali will have greater control. Sweden provided support for the development of the Decree on forestry decentralisation and helped municipalities to include CCA components in their five-year plans. GEDEFOR has enabled community and municipality involvement in forestry management encouraging responsible access and use of forestry resources. It has also fostered community level ownership through making community participation in project planning and approval of new projects a requirement.

CCI has contributed to improved livelihoods, adaptive capacities and ecological capital: CCI and post-CCI investments have contributed to improved livelihoods among beneficiary communities. Their crop and livestock production activities have improved food security and income generation while at the same time helping them to adapt to climate change. The rehabilitation of degraded lands, tree planting and construction of water harvesting, and flood control structures has improved adaptive capacities, ecological capital and carbon sequestration.

In summary, CCI stakeholders in Mali see Sweden as having: (i) played a significant leadership role on environment, climate change and gender; (ii) demonstrated long-term engagement in supporting

integrated climate change efforts; (iii) invested in both financial and technical contributions; and (iv) demonstrated capacity to work effectively with government, UN bodies and other international organizations, fellow donors and civil society.

Finally, we note with interest, that in spite of the lack of intentional application of CCI principles, their manifestation was nonetheless observed. Could it be that they were already embedded in and derived from Sida's logic of practice? This is definitely the case with the Paris Agenda principle (CCI Principle 3). The extensive dissemination and use of the CCCD report in Mali appears to have fostered direct engagement with the associated principle (CCI Principle 5).

6.5 Climate investment, programming and practice lessons

The forward-looking lessons articulated below are based on preceding chapters and closely tied to the evaluation themes discussed in the final chapter 7 below. We make an attempt to translate the lessons, which are specific to the Mali, into principles which have the potential to be applied in different contexts. They are organized into climate investment, programming and practice lessons and principles.

6.5.1 Climate investment lessons

A) Swedish fast start climate investments in Mali, which were made when there were no good or best examples to follow (not enough cognitive trails), required boldness, taking calculated risks and putting in place process and results guidelines that provide essential direction and flexibility. At the same time this required trusting the process and the people working on the frontiers, and allowing for the making of mistakes, and the emergence, application and capitalisation of multi-level learning. Such learning then guides subsequent investments. In the end, good fast start climate

investment should be followed by and help generate other and larger climate funds later.

Inferred principle: Pioneering climate investments need to be accompanied by a commitment to multi-level practice-based mutual learning, innovation and scaling up and out.

6.5.2 Programming lessons

B) Principles-based planning and RBM were used in a potentially compatible way, possibly because they occupy different places in the planning hierarchy. Drawing on the application of CCI Principles 3 and 5 in Mali, it looks like CCI principles were used to underpin the RBM approach, providing direction and guidance at a deeper level. For example, Principle 5 (arising from CCCD's recommendations) on integrating context-specific issues, integration of environment, development, CCA, mitigation, disaster risk reduction, poverty alleviation and governance suggested *the process* and *the priority* areas while recognising that context matters. It meant addressing resource conflicts – a context-specific issue – is necessary for development, CCA, peace and security. The application of both principles was aided by their extensive dissemination through Sida and MFA documents and using these to guide the Donor Group deliberations in the case of Principle 3 and through the distribution of 1,000 copies of the CCCD Closing the Gaps report. The report was also disseminated through high level workshops attended by senior government officials and Ministers and the head of the CILSS based in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso.

Inferred principle: The introduction of new ways of programming requires careful introduction and use of multiple communication avenues as well as an elaboration of how the new and the old ways are connected.

C) Integrated programming covered many dimensions, which included: (i) within a particular sector, such as integrated water resources management, (ii) between and across sectors, in which case it often helps to have an entry point sector under the leadership of an actor with the necessary convening power, (iii) involving two

or more actors from different sectors (e.g. agriculture and forestry), jointly planning and implementing a programme, sharing fiduciary and other powers and breaking a culture of single-sector planning in dealing with complex climate change driven challenges, and (iv) coordinated donor programming. At the same time Sweden's climate change programming for synergy started from within the organisation, through the integrated organisational structure. It was achieved through cooperation with key stakeholders such as government directorates and ministries, CSOs, UN bodies, or other donors. Beyond this, programming for synergy involved working with multi-stakeholders as illustrated by the FCM multi-stakeholder Steering Committee.

Inferred principle: Integrated programming between different actors across different sectors increases the potential for mutual learning and the generation of synergistic effects and is consistent with tackling complex interacting challenges.

D) The Swedish Embassy in Bamako planned for and invested in fostering national ownership. This was achieved through the development of relevant institutional and technical capacities not only at the national level, but also at the level of municipalities, among CSOs and communities who should be the ultimate champions and beneficiaries. This defined a nuanced vertical and sectoral idea of ownership layers.

Inferred principle: Fostering national ownership of the climate agenda may require going beyond working with government structures and systems at national and sub-national levels to include CSOs and communities.

E) The Swedish Embassy in Bamako used a phased approach to long-term programming, which appeared potentially appropriate when dealing with complex issues in a dynamic operating context. The approach enabled it to continue to align its programmes to the changing policies and priorities at home as well as those of the host country. It created periodic moments for meta-learning between project phases and as well as opportunities for radical changes when necessary. For example, the change in project lead partner when REDDIN became PDD DIN appears to have been radical and timely.

Inferred principle: A phased approach to programming potentially offers a certain amount of predictability as well as flexibility.

6.5.3 Practice lessons

F) The following practices appear to have enabled the Swedish Embassy in Bamako to make significant contributions towards the CCI goal:

- An integrated, coherent and coordinated approach between the foreign affairs and development cooperation wings of the Embassy, which was aided by the employment of human resources with appropriate levels of competencies and knowledge of the operating environment.
- Respect and support for national ownership, being a critical friend, and investing in the capacity development of government and CSOs to enhance the partner country's credibility and track record.
- Recognising and tapping into the comparative advantages of different stakeholder groups such as government, UN bodies and civil society, which enhanced dialogue, cooperation and created opportunities for mutual learning and influence.
- Multi-level learning by doing, experience capitalisation, risk-taking and learning from mistakes as well as from periodic learning-oriented evaluations, improving and sharing potentially generative tools such as governance mechanisms and protocols.

Inferred principle: Playing a leadership role in development cooperation requires on-going collective learning and knowledge generation, working synergistically with multiple stakeholder groups, respect and support for national ownership of the climate/development agenda, supportive internal structures and systems, and adequate competent human resources.

7. Emerging CCI insights

Following the main conclusions in chapter 6 concerning the extent and ways in which the CCI principles were implemented, in this chapter we dig deeper by exploring emerging insights into three key evaluation themes relevant to CCI-inspired achievements. The first concerns emerging insights into Sweden's leadership role; the second, emerging insights into how the Swedish Embassy in Mali is fostering country ownership; and the third, emerging insights into what constitutes good response to CC impact.

It is intended that such emerging insights may help to shape strategic learning and adaptive planning into the future.

7.1 Swedish leadership

A good number of evaluation participants indicated that Sweden has played a leadership role on environment, climate change and gender. This has been attributed to its: (i) experience and genuine concern for environment, climate and sustainable development as reflected in its practice at home and abroad, (ii) long-term engagement approach, (iii) provision of both technical and financial support, (iv) working in partnership with a mix of government, CSOs and UN bodies, (v) being one of the biggest donors in the environment and climate change sector in Mali, (vi) coherence and consistency of Swedish Country Strategies in Mali over the years, resulting in more coordinated efforts at policy engagement and programming, and (vii) the governance culture of Sweden in which Embassies work as 'Team Sweden', representing Sweden and not Sida or MFA. The synergy between MFA and Sida in partner countries arises from a policy decision as suggested below:

While in the headquarters the aim is to establish a clearer division of labour between MFA and Sida, in the field, the objective is to achieve and integrated team … The Sida Director General delegates authority to the MFA appointed ambassador who has overall responsibility for development cooperation and the embassy. The ambassador then usually delegates authority to the Sida appointed

country director who is normally also the deputy to the ambassador.[90]

Swedish leadership in climate financing and programming among donors in Mali is manifested through being selected as the Chair of the Donor Group in Mali for the maximum period of four years (two, 2-year terms) and an additional year (2010-2015). Its role included: (i) serving as the interface between donors and government, (ii) organising, coordinating and facilitating consultations and harmonisation of work between and among donors as well as between donors and government, (iii) preparing common donor positions, and synthesizing information from and to government in line with the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (vi) drafting annual reports and key messages on policy dialogue, and (vi) organised and coordinated donor participation in annual environment weeks around the World Environment Day and the World Anti-Desertification Day to raise awareness and stimulate ecologically-sound action. Swedish leadership on environment and climate change is also reflected in its making of significant contributions towards initiating the integration of climate change and development and increasing attention to climate change and CCA in through CCI. It also played a leading role in the establishment of FCM and is the only one which has a dedicated Fund for civil society organisations (CSOs) through the Mali Folkecenter.

7.1.1 Maintaining human competencies and effort

The Swedish Embassy in Mali was reported to be the only one with three senior officers dedicated to environment and climate change. In this regard one donor observed, "Unlike most donors, whose human resources in Mali are becoming less experienced and competent than in the past, since Mali has become a less attractive country to work in, Sweden has maintained a high quality and number of senior staff members." Each officer brought relevant and high quality technical and regional experience. Investing

[90] OECD. (2009). p. 55.

appropriate levels of effort is exemplified by the fact that when Sweden coordinated the Donor Group in Mali for five years, its senior officer who served as the focal point dedicated 50 percent of his time to playing this role. Another senior officer who is currently responsible for six projects from time to time spends 60 percent his time on FCM, because of its strategic importance.

7.1.2 Respect and support national ownership

By investing in FCM, which funds projects that are selected by Mali people, and aligning its support to national priorities articulated in relevant policies and strategies, including the NDC, the Swedish Embassy has been fostering national ownership of institutional and technical capacity development. The Swedish Embassy is currently supporting a process to build the institutional capacity of AEDD to take on the role of administering the FCM. ITP has been rated as one of the most effective training programmes, especially because it has enabled graduate students to relate scientific knowledge with people's matters of concern and develop individual and community agency to better respond to the impact of climate change. Sweden has played a significant role in developing Mali Folkecenter's climate finance readiness for GCF, which offers large climate funds that will support the implementation of nationally-determined climate agenda.

The Swedish Embassy has been fostering ownership at sub-national levels as well. GEDEFOR provides a strong example of how Sweden supported decentralisation, which culminated in the promulgation of the Decree entitled: "Setting out the details of the state's responsibilities transferred to the territorial collectives in the management of forest and wildlife resources." Implementation of this decree will promote stronger ownership at municipality and community levels. Through CCI and post CCI support, municipalities have also incorporated CC into their 5-year Annual Development Plans and beneficiary participation in project planning has become imperative. Supporting multi-level national ownership processes is consistent with the lesson learnt through EBA evaluations: supporting high level ownership of development cooperation initiatives (e.g. policy and strategy development) should

be complemented by developing lower level ownership as associated government implementation capacity[91].

7.1.3 Friendly, frank and principled when working with government

Swedish Embassy personnel have been described as both frank and friendly. They adopted this approach because it enables them to communicate their intentions and positions clearly, suggests that they have no hidden agenda and helps them push for the greatest returns on their climate and development investments. Being frank with government in Mali is a significant achievement, given the taboos around what to say, especially when one is a foreigner. The Swedish Embassy has also taken a principled approach in relation to adherence to governance procedures on the use of funds it invests. For example, it resisted the idea of AEDD wanting to be both a referee (National Designated Authority) and player (being eligible to apply for the funding as well) in FCM. This principled approach was extended to working with UNDP and FAO, who initially could apply for funding but were then also among the members involved in the FCM project selection committee. This approach explains why the Swedish Embassy is listened to and has been able to influence government policy and practice in some cases. This approach appears to be founded on the Sweden's partnership approach, which is based on the values of respect, trust and openness.[92]

7.1.4 Tapping into the comparative advantages of government, UN bodies and NGOs

The Swedish Embassy believes that working with government is imperative for impact sustainability. This is why GEDEFOR and PDD DIN are government-led, and the government is getting ready

[91] McGillivray, M., Carpernter D., Morrisey, O., & Thaarup, J. (2017).

[92] Larsson, K. A. (2018)..

to take on a greater role in FCM. Alongside working with government, the UN agents are seen as a low risk transitional strategy to invest funds, drawing on UN systems and capacity and accepting its rather high cost. This is why the UNDP-MPTF is acting as administrative agent for the FCM. CSOs in turn are seen as good at experimenting and innovating, and at championing human rights and gender equality, which are important for inspiring transformational change through feeding experiences into the public or private sectors.

7.1.5 Donor harmonization leadership

Sweden's leadership of the Donor Harmonisation Group built trust among donors and between donors and the government. This was enabled by a strong alignment between what Sweden does and says about responding to climate change at home and abroad. In addition, the Swedish Embassy dedicated adequate human resources for coordinating donor efforts and offered the necessary diplomatic and political support to the process of donor engagement with government at high levels. In practical terms, this meant the active involvement of the Ambassador at high level meetings, the appointment of a focal point, advance planning and communication of meetings, linking theoretical discussions in meetings with field visits to showcase relevant working examples, and rigorous documentation of proceedings. More detailed explanations behind Sweden's leadership role in Mali are discussed below.

7.1.6 Integrated approach to climate programming

CCI and post-CCI projects in Mali have integrated climate change responses into development, gender and conflict transformation, which has increased their relevance and traction. These projects also deliberately addressed vertical integration by linking and working at the interface of policy and practice, national and local levels. Since CCI, Swedish-supported projects in Mali have addressed cross-sectoral issues. For example, agriculture projects address water, gender and resource-conflict issues while at the same time

generating income that reduces deforestation (mitigation) and community vulnerability to climate risks at local level. GEDEFOR III goes beyond this level of inter-sectoral programming by bringing the Directorates of Forestry and Agriculture to joint programming, thus breaking a culture of single-sector planning in dealing with complex climate change driven challenges. Sweden also supports the Ministry of Energy and Water in implementing IWRM. Various contradictory development plans still exist and water is still not high enough on the climate change agenda in Mali. A main Swedish priority for further support is therefore the establishment of a functional institutional framework, including at strategic and political levels.

7.1.7 Gender-sensitive climate financing

"Power structures in Malian culture are particularly hard on women and girls … who are moreover consistently discriminated against in areas such as education, healthcare, right of ownership to land and credit grants … Given the same social status, power, security and opportunities as men, however, they would constitute a formidable force for change and development".[93]

The Swedish Embassy's CCI and post CCI support has had a strong gender equality thrust, which was informed by the disadvantages faced by women in accessing and controlling productive resources such as land. The interventions through NCA, GEDEFOR, REDDIN and PDD DIN, ACF, Reso Climat Mali and FCM-funded projects were designed to increase women's access to land, and to other productive assets, to produce more and access markets, improve their livelihoods and those of children and exercise leadership at multiple scales. One of the main explanations behind gender-related achievements by Swedish-supported projects is having started with initiatives that recognise the current obstacles faced by women and embarking on activities that require little land and low capital investment (e.g. poultry and market gardening). Such projects also navigated around cultural obstacles concerned with gender equality. Gender equality work was guided by the National

[93] MFA. (2004). p. 5.

Gender Policy (2010) into which the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) provided significant technical and financial assistance[94].

7.1.8 Continuous learning and improvement

CCI and post-CCI Swedish-supported interventions had an explicit commitment to 'learning by doing', also known as learning in and through activity. This was essential because some of the mechanisms, tools and processes for bringing about the required improvements in climate financing and programming were not previously in existence and needed to be created – learning what is not yet there[95]. More importantly, CCA requires a learning approach because adaptation initiatives are relatively recent and it is important to learn about the approaches that are important for reducing vulnerability to climate change[96]. Consequently, CCI and post-CCI supported projects have been able to produce generative tools such as the finance governance system developed and refined by Mali Folkecenter and adopted by FCM, and the GEDEFOR inter-institutional arrangements for managing forests, which informed the Decree on forest management decentralisation. Beyond this, learning by doing has been accompanied by regular and rigorous learning-oriented project monitoring and evaluation, which has been illustrated by major programming improvements between one phase and the next. Consequently, promising experiences have been capitalised and disseminated.

7.2 Emerging insights into country ownership

The evaluation had a particular interest in how CCI was addressing national ownership of the climate agenda in the context of the Paris Agenda on Aid Effectiveness (CCI principle 3). We established that

[94] UNDP. (2012).

[95] Engeström, Y. (2016).

[96] Lamhauge, N. (2013).

national ownership is about the partner country taking, assuming and exercising decision-making powers on what to put on the climate agenda, what to fund and what to implement, and how this power is distributed and shared between the national government, municipalities and communities; and to an extent with donors and project implementers as well. The CCI-inspired practices that were reported as important for fostering national ownership include:

Institutional and technical capacity building at national, municipal and community levels: This included technical and financial support for the development of climate change policies and strategies, development and implementation of governance systems (including role clarification), incorporating gender and conflict transformation considerations, provision of funding, conducting climate change impact studies to inform decision-making, training on CCA and related topics, and periodic joint reflections between the government and donors. The building of synergies between government directorates such those of Forestry and Agriculture has been viewed as contributing to national ownership through efficient coordination and synchronization of efforts.

Contributing to national climate funds: Sweden cultivated national ownership by investing into the Reso Climat Mali fund, accessible to NGOs, and into FCM, accessible to government departments and NGOs, over which the people of Mali have a greater say in terms of the projects that can be funded.

Supporting increased national ownership of FCM: The activation process is intended to enable the Government of Mali, through AEDD, to exercise greater control and power over the FCM, which has been and is currently administered by UNDP. A multilateral organisation which is supporting the hand-over put this as follows:

National ownership is critical for sustainability of the impact of climate change and development interventions. We should let partner countries take ownership of their climate change agenda not because they have all the capacities needed but because they will

become good at it through practice… We ought to continue to encourage them to observe the rules of the game.

Sweden is supporting the process by which the Government of Mali will assume **greater ownership** and control of FCM after developing AEDD's capacity to manage the fund. However, given that there will be some donors who would prefer to fund through the UN system, there is still an opportunity role for the UNDP MPTF to play a role in future.

Investing in decentralisation processes and mechanisms: At sub-national level, Sweden has contributed to national ownership through support for the transfer of forest management responsibility to municipalities. This has been done through: (i) supporting the development of the Decree on the decentralisation of forestry and wildlife management, (ii) funding CCI and post-CCI supported projects increase national ownership through helping municipalities to incorporate climate change considerations into their 5-year Annual Development Plans, (iii) making community participation in project planning and a condition for receiving Swedish funding and ensuring that the bulk of Swedish funds for community development directly benefit the communities.

Being a critical friend: The description of the Swedish Embassy's relationship with the Government of Mali as friendly and frank suggests that Sweden may be a critical friend. This is supported by the fact that the Embassy staff show contextual competence and empathy for the Government. They want to ensure that climate funds from Sweden get high returns, especially for the poor and climate vulnerable communities. To this end they try to influence government through providing feedback on policy and governance draft documents, pilot programmes and political dialogues, and respect the Government's decision. And by encouraging it to observe the rules of the game. A critical friend takes time to listen, observe, and understand the context of the work; is trustworthy, empathetic and supportive; may ask provocative questions, offering critique of someone's work,

sometimes in an intellectually subversive manner; and advocates for the success of that work. [97'98'99]

7.3 Good response to climate change impact

Finally, this evaluation had a key interest in establishing what constitutes good CCA and climate resilience in Mali in order to inform future programming. We established that as yet there is no consensus on this. Understandings are still forming and vary according to different actors, sectors and methodologies employed. Examples of sector and place-based understandings identified in the study are described below. Those working in the forestry sector underlined: (i) reducing direct dependence of climate-vulnerable resources and increasing biodiversity, forests and carbon sequestration capacity of the land; (ii) reducing women's workload, increasing community cohesion as well as collaboration between forestry agents and communities; and (iii) greening the economy and diversifying income sources for households. Those working in DRR underlined the need to adopt more proactive and long-term programming that embrace asset creation and social protection, risk management, early warning systems, preparedness and insurance. Organizations working with communities emphasized the need for (i) increasing livelihood options, increasing women's access to water and health facilities, and to productive assets; (ii) increasing community access to climate compatible seed, breed and technologies; (iii) building local ecological capital; and (iv) improving community participation in decision-making. One donor underscored technical and technological capacity development accompanied by continuous innovation across different places; and enabling governance, which develops and implements supportive government policies and strategies, and deals effectively with resource conflicts that have been exacerbated by climate change.

---

[97] Costa, A. & Kallick, B. (1993).

[98] Swaffield, S. & MacBeath, J. (2005).

[99] Storey, V. A. & Richard, B. (2015).

The multi-scale nature of capacity development and planning for CCA and climate resilience is reflected in the combined Donor Group's support for Mali's development and implementation of climate change related policies and strategies, including the NDC, using fast start climate funds. Context-specific solutions are implied in the Ministry of Agriculture's plans to document good practice and norms on resilience building in different regions of the country. The same Ministry is proposing the development of a national policy for agriculture. An example of a methodology is climate proofing used by GIZ in Mali and other countries to support municipalities to identify adaptation gaps and prioritize adaptation measures. It helps analysis of a climate trend, an associated unit of exposure, biophysical effects, socio-economic effects, relevance for planning and action options.[100]

During the evaluation two women's groups involved in market gardening, and who work with GEDEFOR, registered appreciation for the generative effect of GEDEFOR in combining group formation, literacy and numeracy training, sustainable agriculture and marketing skills development and the provision of boreholes and solar-powered pumps. These interventions enabled them to access land (as women cannot access land individually), manage finances, produce vegetables for domestic consumption, which improved their health and for an income, with which they bought assets such as bicycles and educated their children. They used group meetings to jointly solve their social challenges. In another example, a community that works with Mali Folkecenter linked the benefits they have been getting from their project to climate change as follows:

"Wood cutting for sale used to be our major income source. The diversified agricultural activities of the project have provided alternative livelihood options mainly by increasing local water availability beyond the rainy season. The dam has enabled us to farm fish and grow a range of crops never grown here before, especially some vegetables, rice and bananas. This, coupled with use of energy-saving stoves in our households and Shea nut process, has reduced tree cutting, which is good for reducing climate change. As for the clinic, floods are no longer

[100] GIZ. (2012).

an obstacle to accessing basic medical help as in the past and we often do not need to use fuel to get there".

An inference of the above reflections and some of the preceding discussions suggests CCA is an evolving concept that can be viewed from the six Sida categories of adaptation. These are briefly discussed below, which one addition made based on the Mali experience. The categories are interconnected as Figure 1 below suggests. This evaluation confirmed the value of each category and added one as follows:

Builds the climate resilience of communities, ecosystems and landscapes by reducing their vulnerability to current and future climate change, climate change risks, shocks and their impacts. More importantly building resilience calls for addressing underlying causes of poverty, vulnerability, such as too little climate knowledge, gender inequality, resource conflicts and unjust governance systems. The evaluation noted resilience at individual and systems levels. Examples include crop varieties and animal breeds and/or whole communities, ecosystems and landscapes, and built infrastructure such as dams, flood control structures and roads. The CCCA report and CCI principles underline the importance of linking resilience building with DRR and development in CCA processes.

Requires **education, training and awareness** to provide existing relevant knowledge and information on climate change towards enabling understanding, mindset change and preparedness to act so as to change the situation. An illustrative example from Mali was that some communities shifted from seeing climate change as the work of God, over which they had little or no agency to exercise to understanding that most of it was caused by people and something could be done about it.

Benefits from being supported by **climate studies and research** that generates new knowledge and information relevant to the concerned people and places and helps them make informed decisions. The study on the impact of climate change on the Niger River Basin and the CCA projects maps are good examples of such research outputs.

Requires supportive **climate policies, governance, administrative and management** structures, systems and capacities to integrate CCA and address climate risks at national, municipal and community levels. These in turn serve as frameworks and mechanisms for enabling CCA processes across scales.

Demands **coordination of climate change measures and actors** to generate synergistic effects and minimize duplication of efforts across levels and sectors and over time. The actors include communities, women groups and other climate-vulnerable groups, local and national government, different Ministries, UN bodies, NGOs, learning and research institutions, the private sector and donors. This evaluation suggested a strong need for coordinating climate financing between and among bilateral and multilateral donors towards aligning CCA processes and increasing aid effectiveness.

Requires dedicated **climate funds** that can be implemented with some flexibility, in a phased but long-term context, in support of nationally and locally determined climate agenda, programmes, strategies and action plans. Such funds can be channeled through a government body such as AEDD and/or a civil society organisation such as Mali Folkecenter.

The new category that emerged from the Mali case study is **learning by doing and innovating with others and scaling the innovations** up into policies and strategies and out into other communities and places with potential to learn from the innovations (Figure 1). The learning by doing draws on the knowledge that is already in circulation that is shared through training and related approaches, from new knowledge that is generated by studies and from solving difficult challenges to do with climate vulnerability and risks in a particular place. Learning by doing is an ongoing process that is done by policy makers, climate and CCA researchers, educators, climate fund administrators and managers, practitioners and evaluators.

Figure 1: Sida categories of CCA with one addition


Enhanced Resilience To Climate Change
Education, Training and Awareness on Climate Change
Climate Change Adaptation
Climate Change Funds
Learning by doing and Innovating
Coordination of Climate Change Measures
Climate Change Policy and Administrative Management
Climate Studies and Research

Appendix

List of interviewees

Organisation	Number of people interviewed
The Embassy of Sweden, Bamako	4
Germany Agency for International Development (GIZ)	1
The Netherlands Embassy, Bamako	2
Environment and Sustainable Development Agency (AEDD)	1
National Directorate for Water and Forestry, Decentralised Forests Management Programme (DNEF – GEDEFOR)	6
National Directorate of Hydraulics (NDH)	3
Reso Climat Mali	4
Mali Folkecenter	1
Norwegian Church Aid (NCA)	1
International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN)	1
World Food Programme (WFP)	4
World Bank	1
UNDP	1
Total evaluation participants	30

References

AEDD & UNDP (2019). Mali Climate Fund: *Draft investment plan (2019-2023*). Bamako, Mali: UNDP-MPTF.

AEDD, PICP/ASNaCC (2017). *Report of the cartography of the projects climate change of Mali* (2014-2017). Bamako, Mali: AEDD.

AEDD (2015). *Green Climate Fund Readiness and Preparatory Support Proposal*. Bamako, Mali: AEDD.

AfDB (2011). Second Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Support Programme (GPRSSP II): Appraisal Report: https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Project-and-Operations/Mali_-_Second_Growth_and_Poverty_Reduction_Strategy_Support_Programme__GPRSSP_II_-_Appraisal_Report_.pdf

Boman, K. & Goita, M. (2016). *Mali Climate Fund final report*. Stockholm, Sweden: ORGUT Consulting AB.

BRACED (2017). BRACED resilience exchange: What have we learnt so far? Retrieved: www.braced-rx.org

BRL Engineering & CIRA SAS (2018). Impact assessment of climate change on the quantity and quality of water resources and their uses A1 - Summary report. Bamako, Mali: DNH.

CCCD (2009). *Closing the gaps: Disaster risk reduction and adaptation to climate change in developing countries*. Stockholm, Sweden: CCCD.

Cissé, K. J. & Stenlund, R. (2009). Sida assessment memo: Support to Reso Climat Mali through Mali Folkecenter for the period 2009-2011. Stockholm, Sweden: Sida.

Costa, A. & Kallick, B. (1993). Through the lens of a critical friend. *Educational Leadership, 51*(2), 49-51.

DNEF (2018). Programme for the decentralised management of forests: Phase III. Bamako: DNEF.

ECO Consult, AGEG, APRI, Euronet, IRAM & NCG (2011). *Joint Evaluation of Budget Support Operation in Mali (2003-2009)*. Brussels, Belgium/Quebec, Canada.

Embassy of Sweden in Mali (2019a). Wetlands Programme Phase 2: Appraisal of Intervention Contribution ID 10738. Bamako, Mali.

Embassy of Sweden in Mali (2019b) GEDEFOR 3/Agriculture value chains. Bamako, Mali.

Embassy of Sweden in Mali (2018). Continued support for Mali Climate Fund: Contribution number 51130066. Bamako, Mali.

Embassy of Sweden in Mali (2015). Reso Climat Mali 2: Contribution ID: 51130078. Bamako, Mali.

Engeström, Y. (2016). *Learning by expanding: An activity theoretical approach to developmental research (2nd ed.)*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

FAO (2006). FAO global forest resource assessment 2005. Rome, Italy: FAO.

GCF (2017). *Mainstreaming gender in Green Climate Fund projects: A manual to support the integration of gender equality in climate change interventions and climate finance.* Incheon, Republic of Korea: GCF.

Giannini, A. P. K. et al. (2017). Climate risk and food security in Mali: A historical perspective on adaptation. *Earth's Future 5*, 144-157.

GIZ (2012). Incorporating the concept of climate change adaptation into municipal planning: Initial experiences in Mali. Retrieved: https://www.giz.de/fachexpertise/downloads/giz2013-en-climate-change-adaptation-municipal-planning-mali.pdf

Global Water Partnership (2015). Action Plan for Water Management in Mali. Stockholm, Sweden: Global Water Partnership. Retrieved from: https://www.gwp.org/globalassets/global/activities/impact-stories/an-action-plan-for-water-management-in-mali_full_story.pdf

Government of Mali (2011). Growth and poverty reduction strategy paper 2012-2017. Bamako, Mali: Government of Mali.

Government of Sweden (2008). Global Challenges – Our Responsibility: Communication on Sweden's Policy for Global Development, Government Communication 2007/08:89. Stockholm, Sweden: MFA.

IFAD (2016). Kidal integrated rural development programme: Project completion report validation. IFAD. Retrieved from: https://www.ifad.org/documents/38714182/39730404/Mali+Kidal+PCRV.pdf

Lamhauge, N. (2013). M & E of climate change adaptation. Lessons from OECD member and non-member countries. Paris, France: OECD.

Larsson, K. A. (2018). The rise and fall of budget support in Swedish development cooperation: Working paper. Stockholm, Sweden: EBA.

Mali Climate Fund: Mrs Kéita Aïda M'Bo welcomes the contributions of the Swedish and Norwegian partners. (29 January 2019). Retrieved: http://africazine.com/fonds-climat-mali-mme-keita-aida-mbo-salue-les-contributions-des-partenaires-suedois-et-norvegiens/

Mayne, J. (2012). Contribution analysis: Coming of age? *Evaluation (18)*3, 270-280.

McGillivray, M., Carpernter D., Morrisey, O., & Thaarup, J. (2017). *Swedish development cooperation with Tanzania: Has it heped the poor?* Stockholm, Sweden: EBA.

MEADD & AEDD (2017). The Sustainable Development Program of the Inner Niger Delta (PDD DIN). Bamako, Mali: MEADD & AEDD.

MEADD (2016). Mali Nationally Determined Contribution. Bamako, Mali: MEADD.

MEADD (2014). National Policy and Climate Change Strategy. Bamako, Mali: MEADD

MEADD (2011). National Green Economy Strategy Resilient to Climate Change. Bamako, Mali, MEADD.

Ministry for the Promotion of Women, Children and the Family. (2010). *National Gender Policy of Mali*. Bamako, Mali.

Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries. (2011). Strategic Investment Framework for Sustainable Land Management. Bamako, Mali.

Ministry of Environment and Sanitation & UNDP. (2018). Joint Report of the Technical Secretariat and the Administrative Agent for the period from 1 January to 31 December 2017. Bamako, Mali.

Mitra, S. (2017). *Mali's fertile grounds for conflict: Climate change and resource stress*. Planetary Security Initiative Policy Brief. Clingendael Institute, The Hague, Netherlands.

Netherlands Commission for Environmental Assessment, Dutch Sustainability Unit (2015). Climate change profile: Mali. The Hague, Netherlands.

NRDC (2017). The Paris Agreement on Climate Change. *Issue Brief 17*(2a).

OECD (2009). Sweden: Development Assistance Committee (DAC) peer review. Paris, France: OECD.

Patton, M. Q. (2012). A utilisation-focused approach to contribution analysis. *Evaluation 18*(3), 364-377.

Patton, M. Q. (2018). *Principles-focused evaluation: The guide*. London/New York, UK/US: The Guilford Press.

Reinertsen, H., Bjorkdahl, K., & McNeill, D. (2017). *Confronting the contradiction: An exploration into the dual purpose of accountability and learning in aid evaluation*. Stockholm, Sweden: EBA.

Sida (2018a). *Sida's evaluation handbook*. Stockholm, Sweden: Sida.

Sida (2018b). Strategy report 2017 for the strategy for Sweden's development cooperation with Mali 2016-2020: Stockholm, Sweden: Sida.

Sida (2013). Final report on the Swedish Government's Special Climate Change Initiative 2009-2012: Bilateral and regional interventions: Case number 2008-002362. Stockholm, Sweden: Sida.

Storey, V. A. & Richard, B. (2015). The role of critical friends in supporting institutional Change. *Journal of Applied Research in Higher Education, 7*(2), 412-428.

Swaffield, S. & MacBeath, J. (2005). School self-evaluation and the role of a critical friend. *Cambridge Journal of Education, 35*(2), 239-252.

Swedish MFA (2008). Budget 2009 Fact Sheet. Retrieved at: http://www.regeringen.se/content/1/c6/09/23/99/4e043cda.pdf

Swedish MFA (2007). Focused bilateral development cooperation. Retrieved at: http://www.regeringen.se/content/1/c6/08/65/95/c70b05d5.pdf

Swedish MFA (2004). Strategy for Swedish development cooperation: West Africa, Burkina Faso, Mali. Stockholm, Sweden: MFA.

Swedish MFA (2004). Strategy for Swedish development cooperation: West Africa, Burkina Faso, Mali. Stockholm, Sweden: MFA.

Swedish MFA (2004). Strategy for Swedish development cooperation: West Africa, Burkina Faso, Mali. Stockholm, Sweden: MFA.

Swedish Ministry of the Environment (2013). Sweden's first biennial report under the UNFCCC. Stockholm, Sweden: Swedish Ministry of the Environment.

UN Economic Commission for Africa (2015). Assessment report on mainstreaming and implementing disaster risk reduction in West Africa. Addis Ababa: Ethiopia: UNECA.

UNDP (2014): http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/table-4-gender-inequality-index

UNDP (2013). Mali Climate Fund factsheet. http://mptf.undp.org/document/download/12430

UNDP (2012). Gender equality and women's empowerment in public administration: Mali case study. New York, USA: UNDP.

UNDP (2009). Summary: Human development report 2009. New York, USA: UNDP.

UNEP (2011). Bilateral finance institutions and climate change: A mapping of public financial flows for mitigation and adaptation to developing countries in 2010. Paris, France: UNEP.

UNEP (2016). Scaling up and replicating successful land management (SLM) and agroforestry practices in the Koulikoro region of Mali: GEF project ID 01263. Retrieved: https://www.thegef.org/sites/default/files/project_documents/ID5746__GEF5_Mali_MFA_CEO_Approval_Request_Clean_13_06_2016_0.pdf

UNICEF (2014): Using Sustainable Energy to Protect and Provide Water for Children, Spotlight on Mali. Retrieved from: www.unicef.org/environment/files/Mali_Climate_Fund_2014.pdf

Wetlands International. (2014). Managing Mali's wetland wealth for people and nature. Bamako, Mali: Wetlands International.

Wingqvist, G. Ö., César, E., & von Walter, S. (2013). Categorisation of bilateral and regional contributions in the Climate Change Initiative. Retrieved from: https://sidaenvironmenthelpdesk.gu.se/our-work-publications/reports

Zamudio, A. N. (2016). *Review of current and planned adaptation action in Mali.* CARIAA Working Paper 11. Ottawa, Canada/London, United Kingdom: International Development Research Centre/UK Aid.

Zivetz, L., Cekan, J., & Robbins, K. (2017). *Building the evidence base for post project evaluation: Case study review and evaluability checklist.* Prague, Czech Republic: Faster Forward Fund & Valuing Voices.

Previous EBA reports

2020:01 Mobilizing *Private Development Finance: Implications for Overall Aid Allocations*, Polly Meeks, Matthew Gouett and Samantha Attridge

2019:09 *Democracy in African Governance: Seeing and Doing it Differently,* Göran Hydén with assistance from Maria Buch Kristensen

2019:08 *Fishing Aid - Mapping and Synthesising Evidence in Support of SDG 14 Fisheries Targets,* Gonçalo Carneiro, Raphaëlle Bisiaux, Mary Frances Davidson, Tumi Tómasson with Jonas Bjärnstedt

2019:07 *Applying a Masculinities Lens to the Gendered Impacts of Social Safety Nets*, Meagan Dooley, Abby Fried, Ruti Levtov, Kate Doyle, Jeni Klugman and Gary Barker

2019:06 *Joint Nordic Organisational Assessment of the Nordic Development Fund (NDF)*, Stephen Spratt, Eilís Lawlor, Kris Prasada Rao and Mira Berger

2019:05 *Impact of Civil Society Anti-Discrimination Initiatives: A Rapid Review*, Rachel Marcus, Dhruva Mathur and Andrew Shepherd

2019:August *Migration and Development: the Role for Development Aid*, Robert E.B. Lucas (joint with the Migration Studies Delegation, Delmi, published as Delmi Research overview 2019:5)

2019:04 *Building on a Foundation Stone: the Long-Term Impacts of a Local Infrastructure and Governance Program in Cambodia*, Ariel BenYishay, Brad Parks, Rachel Trichler, Christian Baehr, Daniel Aboagye and Punwath Prum

2019:03 *Supporting State Building for Democratisation? A Study of 20 years of Swedish Democracy Aid to Cambodia,* Henny Andersen, Karl-Anders Larsson och Joakim Öjendal

2019:02 *Fit for Fragility? An Exploration of Risk Stakeholders and Systems Inside Sida*, Nilima Gulrajani and Linnea Mills

2019:01 *Skandaler, opinioner och anseende: Biståndet i ett medialiserat samhälle*, Maria Grafström och Karolina Windell

2018:10 *Nation Building in a Fractured Country: An Evaluation of Swedish Cooperation in Economic Development with Bosnia and Herzegovina 1995 – 2018*, Claes Lindahl, Julie Lindahl, Mikael Söderbäck and Tamara Ivankovic

2018:09 *Underfunded Appeals: Understanding the Consequences, Improving the System,* Sophia Swithern

2018:08 *Seeking Balanced Ownership in Changing Development Cooperation Relationships*, Nils Keizer, Stephan Klingebiel, Charlotte Örnemark, Fabian Scholtes

2018:07 *Putting Priority into Practice: Sida's Implementation of its Plan for Gender Integration*, Elin Bjarnegård, Fredrik Uggla

2018:06 *Swedish Aid in the Era of Shrinking Space – the Case of Turkey*, Åsa Eldén, Paul T. Levin

2018:05 *Who Makes the Decision on Swedish Aid Funding? An Overview*, Expertgruppen för Biståndsanalys

2018:04 *Budget Support, Poverty and Corruption: A Review of the Evidence*, Geske Dijkstra

2018:03 *How predictable is Swedish aid? A study of exchange rate volatility,* Númi Östlund

2018:02 *Building Bridges Between International Humanitarian and Development Responses to Forced Migration*, Alexander Kocks, Ruben Wedel, Hanne Roggemann, Helge Roxin (joint with the German Institute for Development Evaluation, DEval)

2018:01 *DFIs and Development Impact: an evaluation of Swedfund,* Stephen Spratt, Peter O'Flynn, Justin Flynn

2017:12 *Livslängd och livskraft: Vad säger utvärderingar om svenska biståndsinsatsers hållbarhet?* Expertgruppen för biståndsanalys

2017:11 *Sweden's Financing of UN Funds and Programmes: Analyzing the Past, Looking to the Future*, Stephen Browne, Nina Connelly, Thomas G. Weiss

2017:10 *Seven Steps to Evidence-Based Anticorruption: A Roadmap*, Alina Mungiu-Pippidi

2017:09 *Geospatial analysis of aid: A new approach to aid evaluation*, Ann-Sofie Isaksson

2017:08 *Research capacity in the new global development agenda*, Måns Fellesson

2017:07 *Research Aid Revisited – a historically grounded analysis of future prospects and policy options*, David Nilsson, Sverker Sörlin

2017:06 *Confronting the Contradiction – An exploration into the dual purpose of accountability and learning in aid evaluation*, Hilde Reinertsen, Kristian Bjørkdahl, Desmond McNeill

2017:05 *Local peacebuilding – challenges and opportunities*, Joakim Öjendal, Hanna Leonardsson, Martin Lundqvist

2017:04 *Enprocentmålet – en kritisk essä*, Lars Anell

2017:03 *Animal health in development – it's role for poverty reduction and human welfare,* Jonathan Rushton, Arvid Uggla, Ulf Magnusson

2017:02 *Do Anti-Discrimination Measures Reduce Poverty Among Marginalised Social Groups?* Rachel Marcus, Anna Mdee, Ella Page

2017:01 *Making Waves: Implications of the irregular migration and refugee situation on Official Development Assistance spending and practices in Europe*, Anna Knoll, Andrew Sherriff

2016:11 *Revitalising the policy for global development,* Per Molander

2016:10 *Swedish Development Cooperation with Tanzania – Has It Helped the Poor?,* Mark McGillivray, David Carpenter, Oliver Morrissey, Julie Thaarup

2016:09 *Exploring Donorship – Internal Factors in Swedish Aid to Uganda,* Stein-Erik Kruse

2016:08, *Sustaining a development policy: results and responsibility for the Swedish policy for global development* Måns Fellesson, Lisa Román

2016:07 *Towards an Alternative Development Management Paradigm?* Cathy Shutt

2016:06 *Vem beslutar om svenska biståndsmedel? En översikt,* Expertgruppen för biståndsanalys

2016:05 *Pathways to change: Evaluating development interventions with Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA),* Barbara Befani

2016:04 *Swedish responsibility and the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals,* Magdalena Bexell, Kristina Jönsson

2016:03 *Capturing complexity and context: evaluating aid to education,* Joel Samoff, Jane Leer, Michelle Reddy

2016:02 *Education in developing countries what policies and programmes affect learning and time in school?* Amy Damon, Paul Glewwe, Suzanne Wisniewski, Bixuan Sun

2016:01 *Support to regional cooperation and integration in Africa – what works and why?* Fredrik Söderbaum, Therese Brolin

2015:09 *In search of double dividends from climate change interventions evidence from forest conservation and household energy transitions,* G. Köhlin, S.K. Pattanayak, E. Sills, E. Mattsson, M. Ostwald, A. Salas, D. Ternald

2015:08 *Business and human rights in development cooperation – has Sweden incorporated the UN guiding principles?* Rasmus Klocker Larsen, Sandra Atler

2015:07 *Making development work: the quality of government approach,* Bo Rothstein and Marcus Tannenberg

2015:06 *Now open for business: joint development initiatives between the private and public sectors in development cooperation,* Sara Johansson de Silva, Ari Kokko and Hanna Norberg

2015:05 *Has Sweden injected realism into public financial management reforms in partner countries?* Matt Andrews

2015:04 *Youth, entrepreneurship and development*, Kjetil Bjorvatn

2015:03 *Concentration difficulties? An analysis of Swedish aid proliferation*, Rune Jansen Hagen

2015:02 *Utvärdering av svenskt bistånd – en kartläggning*, Expertgruppen för biståndsanalys

2015:01 *Rethinking Civil Society and Support for Democracy*, Richard Youngs

2014:05 *Svenskt statligt internationellt bistånd i Sverige: en översikt*, Expertgruppen för biståndsanalys

2014:04 *The African Development Bank: ready to face the challenges of a changing Africa?* Christopher Humphrey

2014:03 *International party assistance – what do we know about the effects?* Lars Svåsand

2014:02 *Sweden´s development assistance for health – policy options to support the global health 2035 goals,* Gavin Yamey, Helen Saxenian, Robert Hecht, Jesper Sundewall and Dean Jamison

2014:01 *Randomized controlled trials: strengths, weaknesses and policy relevance,* Anders Olofsgård

In Mali, the climate change initiative financed interventions that turned out to be relevant, effective and with good sustainability. However, their efficiency turned out to be lower, primarily due to the rush with which the initiative was started and implemented.

EBA
www.eba.se

Expertgruppen för biståndsanalys (EBA) är en statlig kommitté som oberoende analyserar och utvärderar svenskt internationellt bistånd.

The Expert Group for Aid Studies (EBA) is a government committee with a mandate to independently analyse and evaluate Swedish international development aid.