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DEVELOPMENT DISSERTATION BRIEF

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# DEVELOPMENT GOALS AND GENDER EQUALITY CHANGE: SUPERFICIAL ADJUSTMENT OR CREDIBLE COMMITMENTS?



***Development Goals and Gender Equality Change:  
Superficial Adjustment or Credible Commitments?***

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**Helena Hede Skagerlind** disputerade i juni 2019 på avhandlingen "Governing Development: The Millennium Development Goals and Gender Policy Change in Sub-Saharan Africa" vid Statsvetenskapliga Institutionen på Stockholms universitet. Hennes primära forskningsintressen berör global styrning, Corporate Social Responsibility mänskliga rättigheter och jämställdhetspolitik. För avhandlingen har fältresor till Kenya och Etiopien gjorts. Avhandlingen finns här: <http://su.diva-portal.org/smash/record.jsf?pid=diva2%3A1304890&dswid=-2509> (tillgänglig fr. 2020-05-15) och Helena kan nås på [helena.skagerlind@statsvet.su.se](mailto:helena.skagerlind@statsvet.su.se).

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## ABSTRACT

Past decades have witnessed an upsurge in the use of global performance indicators (GPIs) to influence state behavior. Within international development, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) introduced an era of indicator-based governance, which now continues with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The dissertation summarized in this DDB provides a theoretical and empirical account of the workings and effectiveness of GPI-based development governance. Focusing on MDG 3, which concerned gender equality, the brief presents the results of 1) a mapping of GPI adjustment in 15 Sub-Saharan African countries from 2000 through 2015, and 2) a study of the causal mechanisms of gender policy change in Kenya and Ethiopia. The findings demonstrate that MDG 3 was effective in influencing domestic policy commitments but struggled to generate further behavioral change, highlighting the risks of superficial GPI adjustment. The case studies show that domestic change primarily was driven by the donors' economic conditionality and social influence strategies, leveraged through MDG performance assessments. The reason why material and social pressure was unable to close the gap between commitments and implementation efforts rests with its reliance on incentives as a source of change. These findings have implications for GPI-based governance, SDG implementation and gender equality change.

## Introduction

Increasing demands for accountability coupled with new information technology have produced a proliferation of global performance indicators (GPIs) in recent decades. GPIs are public, comparative, and regularized reporting practices that international organizations (IOs), states, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) or private actors use to bring attention to the relative performance of states and thereby influence norms, agendas or policies (Kelley & Simmons, 2014, p. 4). Within the area of international development, global goal-setting and performance monitoring have been increasingly used by the United Nations (UN) and the international community to dictate policy in developing countries (Fukuda-Parr, 2014, p. 118). With the adoption of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which comprised a global agenda for poverty eradication, performance monitoring through global indicators became “a central instrument defining the international development agenda” (Fukuda-Parr et al., 2014, p. 105). Thus, the MDGs constitute a prominent example of the GPI phenomenon.

The MDGs derived from the Millennium Declaration, which was unanimously adopted on 8 September 2000 by 189 state representatives at the UN Millennium Summit. Hence, state leaders committed their nations to a new global partnership aimed to end extreme poverty by the year 2015. In order to track progress related to this massive commitment, eight specific goals, with 18 associated quantitative and time-bound targets and 48 indicators, were specified in a “Road Map” one year later. The MDGs became one of the world’s biggest promises (Hulme, 2009) and entailed a significant shift from the structural adjustment development recipe of liberalization, privatization, and contractionary fiscal policy of the 1980s and 1990s. The MDG poverty eradication norm constituted a unified framework consisting of a number of specific and interrelated sub-norms related to particular dimensions of poverty, such as education, health and gender equality (Fukuda-Parr and Hulme, 2011). Over their 15 years of

implementation, the MDGs gained unprecedented levels of international consensus, coordination, and political commitment (Wilkinson and Hulme, 2012). In 2015, the SDGs introduced a significantly expanded framework of indicators – including a total of 230 individual indicators – reflecting a desire to measure an increasing number of development aspects. Thus, with SDG adoption, the willingness to quantify and monitor performance not only persisted but greatly expanded. The level of global attention and commitment that the SDGs have received thus far point to the mounting “power of numbers” (Fukuda-Parr et al., 2014) and role of indicators in development governance.

Undoubtedly, then, GPIs are increasingly deployed as an influence tool in international development – but with what effects? Curiously, indicator-based governance appears to spread within development and other policy fields even in the absence of systematic knowledge about its operation and effects. The MDGs became established as a global poverty eradication “supernorm” (Fukuda-Parr and Hulme, 2011) but ultimately aimed to have *domestic* impacts. Considering the fact that global indicators are set by international actors that have limited control over or responsibility for their implementation, the questions of the extent to which and how they achieve domestic influence is indeed puzzling and remains poorly understood (Lucci et al., 2015). The policy priorities that are generated by any development agenda are undeniably of great concern to the people living in deprivation, whose needs it strives to address. Hence, it is essential to explore if and how GPIs actually influence national development policy-making. Focusing on the MDGs as an instance of this increasingly pervasive form of governance in international politics, the study summarized in this development dissertation brief addresses the research problem of how GPIs influence domestic policy agendas, development cooperation and relations of power between political actors at different levels.



## **Aim, Research Questions and Contributions**

The aim of the dissertation is to explore the domestic policy effects and influence mechanisms generated by GPIs. The study thus takes a comprehensive approach to the study of GPI influence, addressing not only its effectiveness in dictating policy, but also how it may operate as a tool of political influence in international development cooperation. The aim is addressed through two specific research questions:

1. To what extent do development GPIs generate domestic policy adjustment?
2. Through what causal mechanisms do development GPIs lead to policy adjustment?

In answering these questions, the dissertation focuses on policy change in line with MDG 3 in Sub-Saharan Africa, a region that the MDG agenda particularly targeted due to its high levels of poverty and inequality. MDG 3 specifically concerned the gender equality dimensions of poverty and included the following goal, target and indicators:

Goal 3: Promote gender equality and empower women

3.A: Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education, preferably by 2005, and in all levels of education no later than 2015

3.1 Ratios of girls to boys in primary, secondary and tertiary education

3.2 Share of women in wage employment in the non-agricultural sector

3.3 Proportion of seats held by women in national parliament

The focus on gender equality change is motivated by the global spread and persistence of gender-based discrimination and the indications in previous research (e.g. Fukuda-Parr, 2008; Seyedsayamdost, 2017) of the relative failure to achieve MDG 3, the reasons for which demand exploration.

To address the first research question, the dissertation employs a quantitative approach and maps domestic policy adjustment to the three MDG 3 indicators in 15 countries<sup>1</sup> in Sub-Saharan Africa. The mapping runs from the time of the adoption of the Millennium Declaration until the deadline for MDG achievement, covering the period 2000-2015. I specifically explore the adoption of policy goals, programs, monitoring targets and budgets<sup>2</sup> related to the promotion of girls' education, women's wage employment and women's political representation in national development plans and Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers<sup>3</sup> (PRSPs). Through this mapping, the study establishes the degrees and patterns of national GPI-related gender policy adjustment – both in terms of the spread of policies across countries and the depth of change in each country – over time. This enables conclusions concerning the effectiveness of MDG 3 in dictating domestic development policy in the studied region.

After establishing the extent of MDG 3 adjustment, I address the second research question by using the qualitative within-case method of process-tracing to determine the causal mechanisms of gender policy adjustment in two different cases: Kenya and Ethiopia. The specification and competitive evaluation of the causal mechanisms of domestic change enable the assessment of the main categories of social explanation,

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<sup>1</sup> Table A1, Appendix I lists the studied countries and their characteristics with regard to income group, aid dependence, regime type and colonial background.

<sup>2</sup> See the list of coded variables in Table A2, Appendix I.

<sup>3</sup> The studied documents are listed in Appendix I.

including those based on material, institutional and normative factors, as determinants of GPI influence. The process-tracing analyses are predominantly based on primary data collected through semi-structured interviews carried out during field studies in Kenya and Ethiopia in 2014 and 2015. Altogether, 41 interviews were conducted with representatives of government ministries and agencies, bilateral donor agencies, the IMF, the World Bank, UN institutions, academia and international and domestic NGOs and CSOs operating in the two countries.<sup>4</sup> In addition to the interviews, policy documents and reports along with secondary sources were analysed in order to create a timeline of the national policy change processes and enable the triangulation of evidence (Bennett and Checkel 2015, p. 28). The study's two-step design allows me to assess the effectiveness of the MDGs in generating domestic policy change as well as to provide causal explanations for the observed change.

The dissertation makes four principal contributions. Theoretically, it develops and refines the theories of GPI influence through the careful specification and competitive evaluation of the causal mechanisms of domestic development governance. Methodologically, the study contributes to the international relations (IR) literature on global performance assessments by employing process-tracing to “peer into the box of causality” (Gerring, 2007, p. 45) of GPI influence. Conceptually, the dissertation makes a contribution to GPI research by disaggregating domestic policy effects into several dimensions of policy output (policy goals, programs, monitoring targets and budgets), enabling the assessment of the depth and breadth of domestic MDG 3 influence. Empirically, the study contributes to MDG as well as gender and development research by examining gender policy adjustment in 15 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa over 15 years, thus tracing policy

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<sup>4</sup> The interview respondents are listed in Appendix I.

developments in a substantial part of the region most targeted by the MDGs over the agenda's entire implementation period.

## Explaining GPI Influence

The processes through which international or regional institutions, policies or norms generate domestic change have been examined in a broad range of political science research fields, such as those exploring policy diffusion and convergence, European integration, socialization, compliance, naming and shaming, and – most recently – GPIs. Even though terminologies vary and most studies rely on vague or implicit causal accounts of domestic change, a multitude of causal mechanisms of international policy influence have been proposed (Gilardi 2013). The dissertation identifies three main bases for classification in existing research: 1) according to the manner in which domestic political change is stimulated (vertically/directly or horizontally/indirectly) (see Börzel and Risse 2012), 2) according to the groups of actors that drive the processes of change (political elites, domestic civil society and constituents or transnational actors) (see Kelley and Simmons 2014), and 3) based on the logics of individual action inspiring adjustment – *instrumental*, *normative*, *communicative* or *rhetorical/strategic* rationality (see Checkel 2005; Johnston 2001; Risse 1999, Schimmelfennig 2001). The latter classification is arguably of most *theoretical* significance and ongoing debates of the respective relevance of these four basic logics of individual action,<sup>5</sup> in combination with the lack of such theorization within the GPI literature, highlight the need to 1) explicitly theorize the mechanisms of social interaction that lead to behavioural change, and 2) employ analytical tools to unravel exactly how and when a certain logic

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
<sup>5</sup> Hopf (2010) proposes the logic of habit as a fifth model of individual action but this is considered less relevant in this study of the domestic translation of global policy goals given its scope conditions.

dominates or several logics interact – either sequentially or simultaneously – to guide actor behaviour and produce a certain outcome in the context of GPI influence.

### **Theorizing Four Causal Mechanisms of GPI Influence**

This dissertation assesses four possible causal explanations for MDG 3 policy influence, including economic conditionality, social influence, rational learning and persuasion. Table 1, below, summarizes and compares the main features of the studied mechanisms. This is followed by brief discussions of how each causal mechanism is expected to operate.

Table 1. Overview of Causal Mechanisms and Defining Features



	<b>Economic Conditionality</b>	<b>Social influence</b>	<b>Rational Learning</b>	<b>Persuasion</b>
Primary Logic(s) of Action	Instrumental	Rhetorical/strategic and instrumental	Instrumental	Communicative and normative
Character of Influence	Direct/vertical	Direct/vertical	Indirect/horizontal	Direct/vertical
What is Altered?	Material incentives/structures	Social incentives/structures	Causal beliefs	Normative beliefs
Principal Means of Influence	Aid, loans, trade	Shaming, praising, status devaluation	Rational, observational deduction	Argumentation
Degree of Depth/Stability of Change	Shallow/unstable	Shallow/unstable	Deep/stable	Deep/stable

### *Economic Conditionality*

When economic conditionality operates, the utility calculations of state actors are manipulated as economic benefits, such as aid or loans, are paid if target governments choose to comply with certain conditions and withheld if they do not (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004, p. 671). As a tool of political imposition, economic conditionality often serves to “[f]orce developing countries to implement an international norm which they presumably would not have adopted voluntarily” (Jörgens, 2004, p. 26). Conditionality-driven behavioural change is likely to be minimal, possibly only rhetorical, since it is driven by the incentive to collect a reward rather than a shift in preferences (Checkel 2005, pp. 808–809). Scope conditions for this mechanism include power asymmetries between GPI promoters and target states and some degree of aid dependence on the part of the target (Risse and Ropp 2013, p. 14). In the MDG context, the chief GPI promoters – the UN agencies – were also the major aid donors, which implies opportunities for MDG-related conditionality. Moreover, bilateral aid donors also had an interest in displaying their MDG commitment through aid allocations and could utilize MDG performance data to pressure recipient states by tying aid to conditions of MDG adjustment. Hence, economic conditionality, by means of transnational and third-party channels, may have incentivized developing countries to adopt MDG-aligned policies.

### *Social Influence*

Social influence generates behavioural change by means of social and psychological rewards and punishments, such as performance-based praising or shaming, from a reference group that the target state identifies with and craves respect from (Johnston, 2001, p. 499, 2008, p. 79; Schimmelfennig, 2003b, p. 214; Koliev, 2019). This mechanism rests on rhetorical action and a strategic conception of rules and can stimulate pro-norm behaviour without persuasion or full internalization (Johnston 2008, pp. 24–25). To evade social disapproval as a result of non-compliance, state actors “perform” by engaging in rhetorical manoeuvres without actually

conforming to community norms. This leads them to become “rhetorically entrapped” by their own use of arguments and feel pressured to act in violation of their current self-interest by living up to their prior commitments (Schimmelfennig, 2003b, p. 222). The comparative performance assessments associated with GPIs enable continuous opportunities for the exertion of social pressure by IOs as well as domestic actors. In the MDG case, domestic CSOs also wrote shadow progress reports, implying reputational effects for government actors. Thus, this causal mechanism also considers the influence of domestic supporters of change, or ‘moral entrepreneurs’ (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998), who can exert GPI-related accountability pressure on state actors, especially when supported by IOs. Social influence is expected to be facilitated by a clearly articulated GPI commitment, frequent interaction between GPI proponents and state actors, the active promotion of the GPI by community culture and practices and the possibility to introduce publicly articulated social (dis)incentives (Schimmelfennig, 2003b, p. 218).

### *Rational Learning*

Rational learning refers to a process whereby causal beliefs are altered as an actor is exposed to new theories, evidence or behaviours, leading to behavioural change (Simmons, Dobbin and Garrett, 2006, p. 795). In the context of international policy influence, learning typically occurs as policymakers search for information and prior experiences regarding a policy’s efficacy and compare outcomes in countries that have introduced a policy with those in countries that have not (Gilardi, 2013, p. 464). In addition, policymakers draw conclusions based on expert reports and assessments. Countries are thought to learn from neighbours as well as from IOs and “epistemic communities” as knowledge-based experts play important roles in aiding states in the identification of interests, the definition of the causes and effects of complex problems and the proposition of policy solutions (Haas, 1992, p. 3). When it comes to development GPIs like the MDGs, policy influence flows primarily from developed to developing countries and UN agencies often constitute



influential epistemic communities that inspire policy innovations through their established research functions (Simmons et al., 2006, p. 798). Generally, IOs have a significant influence on information flows and policy transmission as countries use IO data banks and policy recommendations as learning tools. GPIs facilitate learning through the opportunity to easily benchmark country performances, to collect information regarding how other countries approach similar challenges, or even to seek direct advice from GPI creators (Lafortune et al., 2018, p. 226). Rational learning is facilitated by the availability of data concerning the results of policy experiments; forums and opportunities for learning from other actors, such as UN agencies or neighbouring countries; and frequent and intense interaction in such forums.

### *Persuasion*

Persuasion occurs as actors successively internalize new ideas as a result of argumentation and reasoning. Persuasion relies on communicative action (Risse, 2000), which assumes that actors are prepared to change their views or interests in light of the better argument. Successful persuasion is here seen as closely related to the outcome of socialization, which, in turn, is inherently linked to the concept of internalization. Thus, persuasion is the most far-reaching among the mechanisms explored in the dissertation in terms of socializing and inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given community, resulting in internalization and sustained compliance. As agents are persuaded, they shift to a logic of appropriateness, implying that adjustment is independent of any form of incentives or sanctions (Checkel, 2005, p. 804). Scope conditions for persuasion include: 1) when an actor is motivated to analyse information (e.g. in a new environment); 2) when the persuader is perceived as authoritative; 3) when the target actor lacks ingrained attitudes in line with the counter-arguments; and 4) when the issue requires a high level of expertise, leading the actor to seek expert advice (Johnston, 2001, pp. 498–499). In the MDG case, states explicitly committed to the new agenda, which was instituted and advocated by respected and knowledgeable actors – most notably UN

agencies – who created multiple new forums for dialogue and argumentation regarding its salience. If persuasion has been at work, one should be able to observe an actor’s convergence with the beliefs and preferences of the persuader or in-group and conformist behaviour that would not have been expected earlier on.


## **Findings: The Extent and Causal Mechanisms of MDG 3 Adjustment**

The below sections present summaries of the dissertation’s findings. First, I summarize the results of the mapping of policy adjustment to MDG 3 across the 15 studied countries in Sub-Saharan Africa between 2000 and 2015. Then, I briefly account for the results of the two case studies of the causal mechanisms of MDG 3-related policy change in Kenya and Ethiopia. This is followed by a concluding section, which discusses the broader implications of the dissertation’s findings for GPI-based governance, gender equality change and different aspects of development cooperation. This discussion ends with a number of key policy recommendations in relation to Swedish development assistance.

### **The Patterns of MDG 3 Adjustment**

The mapping of MDG 3-related policy output revealed a considerable domestic adjustment to MDG 3. By the year 2013, 11 out of the 15 Sub-Saharan African countries included in the study had incorporated all seven MDG 3-related policy goals in their PRSPs (see Figure A1, Appendix II). Figure 1, below, shows the rate of adoption of each MDG 3-related policy goal in the group of countries between 2000 and 2015. While the adoption of the different policy goals follows a similar pattern, with incremental increases in the number of adopting countries and all except two policy goals reaching full adoption by 2013, the goals have highly differing initial adoption rates. This may reflect divergent degrees of fit with prior norms, e.g. that the commitment to increase women’s representation in national

parliaments faced more normative contestation than that of increasing girls' educational opportunities.




**Figure 1. MDG 3 Policy Goal Adoption 2000-2015, by Goal**

The figure moreover illustrates that the adoption of more general, or less ambitious, goals, such as increasing the share of girls in primary education, exceeds or precedes the adoption of more specific or ambitious goals, such as increasing the share of girls in secondary education. Comparing the adoption patterns of different countries (see Figure A2, Appendix II), Kenya stands out as an early adopter of MDG 3-related policy goals. Conversely, Zambia, followed by Benin, Ethiopia, Mali, Senegal and


Tanzania, experienced the greatest increases in policy goal adoption, starting at low levels while reaching high adoption rates by 2015.

Figure 2, below, compares the adoption rates across the different policy dimensions by showing the rate of adoption of a policy goal, a quantitative target, a timeframe and a budget within the area of women's political representation. The figure clearly demonstrates that the degree of adoption of the goal to increase the share of women in parliament is considerably higher than the rate of adoption of budgets, quantitative targets and timeframes for the implementation of this goal. The same pattern – a gap between articulated commitments and associated targets, timeframes and budgets – is also observed within the other two gender equality areas, girls' education and women's wage employment (figures A3-A4, Appendix II).



**Figure 2. Adoption of Implementation Plans 2000-2015, Women's Political Participation**

Figure 3, which summarizes and compares the average adoption rates of policy goals (aggregated) and monitoring targets and budgets (aggregated as implementation plans) across the countries, clearly illustrates this general discrepancy between MDG 3-related commitments and efforts to address them in PRSPs.



**Figure 3. Adoption of Policy Goals and Implementation Plans 2000-2015, mean for 15 countries**

Notwithstanding this divergence between commitments and implementation plans, it is clear that policy adoption increased across *all* policy dimensions during the study period. As a case in point, in 2000, only one country – Kenya – had adopted the quantitative target of achieving at

least 30 % female representation in parliament, while in 2015, nine (or 60 %) of the 15 countries had formulated such a target. Comparing the initial and final implementation plan adoption rates of the different countries (see Figure A5, Appendix II), we see that while all countries except Mozambique and Gambia adopted an increasing number of MDG 3-related monitoring targets and budgets, the *degree* of behavioural change varied considerably across countries. While some countries, notably Zambia, Malawi, Niger and Ethiopia, changed significantly between 2000 and 2015, others, particularly Benin, Tanzania, Rwanda and Guinea, progressed marginally. Kenya, again, stands out as an early adopter. In sum, the mapping reveals significant MDG 3-related policy adjustment in the studied region over the MDG period while also pointing to highly varied patterns and degrees of adjustment across the different policy dimensions – potentially indicating superficial adjustment – and countries. These findings actualize the fundamental question of what explains domestic MDG 3 adjustment.


### **Explaining MDG 3 Adjustment: Economic Conditionality and Social Influence**

Below, I summarize the findings of the two case studies of the causal mechanisms of domestic policy adjustment to the gender equality indicators of MDG 3. First, I present a synthesis of the analysis of the Kenyan policy process, followed by a summary of the Ethiopian policy process.

#### *The Process of MDG 3 Adjustment in Kenya*

As illustrated in Figure 4, Kenya started out at a comparatively high level of MDG 3-related policy adoption in relation to the group of 15 countries studied (see Figure 3). However, the discrepancy between gender policy goal-setting and further implementation efforts grew in Kenya during the first part of the MDG period. In other words, the number of MDG 3-related gender policy commitments lacking associated monitoring targets and budgets increased. As a consequence of the continued exertion of material and social pressure on policymakers by means of economic conditionality and social influence strategies, implementation progressed

during the second half of the MDG period. Yet, though gender equality implementation efforts clearly reached relatively high levels during the years leading up to the MDG deadline, domestic MDG 3 socialization remained limited, as reflected in the continued resistance to substantial behavioral change illustrated by the analysis presented in the dissertation.



**Figure 4. Adoption of Policy Goals, Monitoring Targets and Budgets, Kenya**

Through process-tracing of the causal mechanisms of behavioral change, the dissertation demonstrates that domestic GPI adjustment in Kenya primarily was driven by the international development partners' economic conditionality and social influence strategies. The evidence presented indicates that the different Kenyan governments in power during the 15 years of MDG implementation were guided mainly by instrumental and/or

strategic logics of action and individual goals, altering their behavior as material or social incentives were introduced. To the extent that MDG 3 adjustment was compatible with the development ambitions of the government, or associated with aid or performance-based shaming and the risks of reputational damage, MDG implementation proceeded (Interview 1-3, 6, 14-17). Hence, as these influence strategies were employed by donors and civil society actors, the Kenyan government adopted policy goals and programs aimed to address gender disparities in education, employment and decision-making quite early on compared to other countries.

Progress with regard to gender policy implementation was persistently slow and incremental, however, and as the national MDG 3-related policy framework became more comprehensive, the gap between policy adoption and further action initially grew as implementation lagged further behind the rhetoric. Moreover, the gender machineries set up to ensure implementation were effectively paralyzed due to inadequate support from the national leadership, indicating a lack of political will within this policy area (Interview 3, 12, 14, 16-17). This weak commitment to the gender equality norms of MDG 3, signaled by the persistent understaffing, inadequate financing and non-prioritization of gender institutions, was overwhelmingly confirmed by the government officials working with MDG 3 implementation at the Kenyan gender institutions. Though they may have had a strategic interest in portraying the status of gender equality issues as particularly dire and their work as thwarted by the leadership, their judgements of the weak status of gender equality norms among policymakers were confirmed by other groups of interview respondents and by previous research as well as by the actions of state actors.

Following the introduction of the new gender institutions, the 2010 gender-sensitive Constitution of Kenya, and progressive women's rights legislation and policies, important steps were taken toward the realization of the MDG 3 targets during the second half of the MDG period (Interview 11, 17; Kameri-Mbote 2016:60). Nevertheless, NGOs and donors were perceived




by interview respondents as continually carrying the main burden for gender equality program implementation, as previously concluded by development partners (African Development Bank, 2007, p. 8; HAC Donor Working Group, 2007, p. 10; Interview 12). As demonstrated, this decisive role and responsibility taken on by actors other than the Kenyan government facilitated, if not drove, MDG 3 adaptation as well as broader gender equality progress. Though some government officials are likely to have been persuaded of the new ideas during the policy process, evidence presented in dissertation points to a lack of norm internalization, reflected in the continued contestation, negotiations and set-backs characterizing the different stages of gender policy adoption and implementation processes.

Despite the suggested effectiveness of GPIs as tools of global governance within different policy domains (Grek, 2009; Aaron et al., 2012; Meyer and Benavot, 2013, 2013; Kelley and Simmons, 2015; Parks and Masaki, 2017), the Kenyan case study indicates that initial GPI adjustment does not automatically trigger further behavioral change. In line with the conclusions of previous research (e.g. Fukuda-Parr, 2008, p. 13, 2017, p. 216; Hulme & Scott, 2010, p. 304; Manning, 2010, p. 10; Seyedsayamdost, 2017, p. 34; Unterhalter & North, 2011, p. 508), the dissertation points to the limited translation of statements of MDG endorsement into concrete action. As highlighted in earlier studies, aid and reputational concerns became important tools for the alignment of national policies with the MDGs but did not necessarily lead to the allocation of resources for the implementation of goals and targets (Fukuda-Parr, 2008, 2017, p. 216; Seyedsayamdost, 2017, p. 34). This implementation gap points to “an inherent contradiction between adopting globally defined goals and the principle of ‘national ownership,’ which consensus opinion considers both desirable and necessary for effective implementation” (Fukuda-Parr, 2017, p. 225). Even in cases where countries were truly committed to the MDGs, prioritization was necessary due to the comprehensive nature of the agenda. It is not surprising, then, that the politically contentious MDG 3, established as among the most neglected of the MDGs in previous case studies (Sarwar,

2015) as well as in cross-country analyses (Fukuda-Parr, 2008; Seyedsayamdost, 2017), faced domestic resistance. By establishing the dominance of incentive-based drivers of domestic change, and the limited normative change, the Kenyan case study sheds light on the reasons for the faltering MDG 3 progress.

### *The Process of MDG 3 Adjustment in Ethiopia*

As seen in Figure 5, Ethiopia started out at a low level of MDG 3-related gender policy adoption – in comparison with Kenya (Figure 4) as well as with the group of 15 countries explored (Figure 3). However, policy output, particularly with regard to policy goals, increased quickly and considerably as the MDGs were introduced due to the intense and successful MDG-PRSP alignment efforts of Ethiopia’s development partners. Owing to the significant commitment and adjustment to the overarching MDG agenda, Ethiopia came to be viewed by the UN and other development partners as a successful case of MDG alignment. Yet, as in Kenya, the MDG 3 policy process was generally characterized by swift policy adjustment followed by slow and more modest implementation efforts, as illustrated in the below figure as well as in the analysis presented in the dissertation.



**Figure 5. Adoption of Policy Goals, Monitoring Targets and Budgets, Ethiopia**

Based on the evidence presented in the dissertation, I argue that the analysis of the Ethiopian MDG 3 policy process strengthens the confidence in the two incentive-based explanations for GPI adjustment – economic conditionality and social influence. As in Kenya, primarily two factors – the PRSP process and the increasing gender equality-focused aid – led MDG and MDG 3 alignment to be associated with substantial material gains, incentivizing domestic policy change through economic conditionality (Interview 27, 28, 36; OECD/DAC 2015; UNDP 2005). The analysis of the Ethiopian policy process demonstrates that the Ethiopian government’s MDG 3 adjustment with regard to goal-setting as well as associated programming and budgeting became increasingly ambitious with the release of each new PRSP framework. As expected by the incentive-based causal

mechanisms of GPI adjustment, the evidence indicates the decisive role played by the donors in this adjustment. In line with the pattern of the Kenyan MDG 3 policy process, however, there continued to be a wide gap between the articulation of gender equality policy goals and their translation into action (Demessie and Yitbark 2008, p. 100). Moreover, the gender equality institutions set up to ensure implementation and oversight were neither equipped nor entrusted to fulfill their mandates. This points to the Ethiopian government's neglect of and insufficient commitment to MDG 3, indicating the irrelevance of the causal mechanisms of GPI influence that rely on adjustment through shifting beliefs, i.e. rational learning and persuasion, during the early MDG period.

The dissertation clearly illustrates that Ethiopia was one of the most intensively targeted countries in Africa in terms of coordinated donor efforts for the creation of a policy and institutional environment conducive to MDG achievement. In consequence, and despite the country's historically strong position in relation to donors, the MDG period was characterized by tremendous efforts by development partners to influence Ethiopia's development policy by means of different strategies (Interview 28, 41; UNDP 2005, p. 9). Most notably, economic incentives for MDG and MDG 3 adjustment were introduced through increasing aid flows to the gender equality sector and the establishment of two new donor institutions – the Donor Assistance Group and the Donor Consortium on the PRSP (UNDP, 2005). Through the donors' common fund, debt relief and aid were conditioned on MDG adjustment, thus introducing direct material incentives for behavioral change and confirming the expectations of the economic conditionality mechanism.

The establishment of the MDGs as the overarching national policy agenda in Ethiopia, achieved in 2005, was additionally entrenched through the donors' massive technical and financial assistance for the set-up of national MDG alignment and performance monitoring mechanisms (UNDP, 2005). This further stimulated the instrumental motivations for policy adjustment,

demonstrating the facilitative role of domestic capacity-building, as proposed by material incentive-based theories of political influence (Börzel and Risse, 2012), as well as of social pressure to perform in line with community expectations, as emphasized by social influence theory (Johnston, 2001, p. 499). In addition to the donor pressure, Ethiopia's civil society pushed for the adoption of MDG- and MDG 3-focused policies through its women's rights CSOs and the NGO Task Force, transformed into the Poverty Action Network Ethiopia in 2004 (UNDP, 2005, p. 15). However, the severely restricted possibilities for domestic civil society to mobilize and conduct advocacy work following the 2009 law banning foreign-funded NGOs from working with human rights-related issues largely incapacitated social influence through domestic channels during the final years of the MDG period.

The 15-year period of MDG implementation witnessed the release of two generations of Ethiopian national gender equality action plans, the upgrading of the Women's Affairs Office into the Ministry of Women's Affairs in 2006, which became the Ministry of Women, Children and Youth Affairs in 2010 and, subsequently, the Ministry of Children and Women in 2015. In terms of legal developments, the new Criminal Code from 2005, the 2004 Family Code revision, and the criminalization of FGM all entailed progressive developments for women's rights. Nevertheless, the conformity to the new laws remained limited (Oxfam Canada, 2012, p. 6). Moreover, the MDG implementation process resulted in the stated achievement of all MDGs except the two relating to gender (MDG 3 and MDG 5), which strongly indicates the intentional neglect of gender equality-related issues and the failure of elite socialization.

In sum, while progress was achieved in Ethiopia, the incapacity of government gender institutions and the slow progress with regard to the implementation of adopted policies and legislation reflect faltering efforts within this policy area (Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 2006, p. 12; Interview 28, 33-34, 36, 39), much like in the Kenyan case. This further

strengthens the evidence of a cross-country pattern of disregard for MDG 3 (Fukuda-Parr, 2008; Seyedsayamdost, 2017) and a broader resistance to gender policy implementation within the government structure, as indicated by gender scholars (Goetz, 2003; Honculada and Ofroneo, 2003; Kabeer, 2003; Savery, 2007). Hence, depending on the gender equality commitment of the new government and the degree of repression of the domestic women's movement, sustained gender equality progress during the SDG period may hinge on the continued exertion of international pressure on state elites. With regard to the study's implications for the effectiveness of indicator-based governance more generally, it suggests that GPIs, i.e. overtly strategic indicator systems that assemble and use information in order to promote certain policies (Kelley and Simmons, 2019, p. 2), may generate equally strategic domestic responses when associated with considerable incentives.

## Summary and Conclusions

By examining the domestic policy responses generated by MDG 3, the dissertation summarized in this development dissertation brief strived to deepen the knowledge of the extent and mechanisms of MDG effects as well as GPI influence more broadly. The mapping of policy adjustment to MDG 3 led to three main findings. First, MDG 3 was generally effective in prompting domestic policy commitments in PRSPs. Second, such commitments were in many cases made without being associated with action plans or budgetary allocations, which is likely to have hampered their realization. Third, the mapping revealed significant variation with regard to the degrees and patterns of policy adoption, both across countries and gender policy areas, indicating varying levels of national responsiveness to GPI influence. Notwithstanding the gap between commitments and action plans, MDG 3 appears to have played a role for gender equality progress as policy output increased across all policy dimensions.

The dissertation's process-tracing analyses of the causal mechanisms of MDG adjustment demonstrated that GPI-related behavioural change was driven by the development partners' economic conditionality and social influence strategies, which were facilitated by the substantial MDG performance monitoring. Social influence was further activated through domestic politics as CSOs were able to utilize MDG performance data – and received economic support from donors – in order to exert adjustment pressure on policymakers. Although MDG 3 internalization may have occurred at the individual level, there was a lack of evidence of elite socialization both in Kenya and Ethiopia. This helps explain the limited association of MDG 3 commitments with targets, timeframes and budgets, as illustrated by the mapping, and the slow and incremental nature of the implementation processes, as revealed by the case studies.

### **Implications for Development Research and Practice**

The findings have implications for three broader and inter-related debates of relevance for international development cooperation and assistance. In relation to research and practice pertaining to the role and impacts of GPIs in global development governance, the dissertation sheds doubt on some scholars' exceeding confidence in the ability of global indicators to change behaviours in more profound ways. The discrepancy between MDG commitments and action suggests that initial adjustment, if incentive-driven, may not automatically lead to further behavioural change. In other words, while economic conditionality and social influence can be effective in promoting GPI-aligned policy goal-setting, the adjustment may ultimately be superficial and unsustainable as it is likely that implementation efforts are weak and that policies are re-altered as new targets or priorities are introduced. Thus, development GPIs, i.e. overtly strategic state assessment systems, might be destined to generate equally strategic domestic responses to the extent that they promote change through top-down influence strategies that primarily invoke targets' considerations of their strategic interest.

In relation to discussions of goal-based development governance, policy ownership and SDG implementation, the dissertation's findings point to aid donors' persistently strong influence on developing countries' policies. While the MDGs generated neither straight-out policy imposition nor the country-led policy translation processes that its advocates claimed to encourage, MDG promoters exploited existing relations and tools of influence to exert adjustment pressure on policymakers while emphasizing national ownership. By illustrating the conflicting approaches of donors, I have highlighted the intrinsic contradiction between global goals and national policy ownership, which is established as crucial for effective national policy implementation. Based on this, the two approaches to development appear difficult to reconcile and GPIs may do little to change global power structures despite stated ambitions to do so. However, if the SDGs' ambition to allow countries to choose among targets to accommodate national and local prioritizations, indicator-based development governance has the potential to contribute to policy ownership and the resulting dispersion of power. This could limit the recurrence of rhetorical GPI adjustment since it is more likely that adopted goals reflect nationally prioritized policy areas. However, it is also likely to limit the potential of social influence and "the pressure of comparison" to incite change.

With regard to gender equality progress, the dissertation's findings indicate that GPIs may be effective in generating gender equality commitments domestically. Dispiritingly, however, I have shown that MDG 3 gained comparatively little traction in relation to other goals. In line with previous research, the analysis has revealed that national gender equality policies face opposition during the implementation phase. By pointing to the incentive-based triggers of change and the limited MDG 3-related socialization, I have enhanced the understanding of the reasons behind the inertia characterizing MDG 3 implementation. Yet, though MDG 3 clearly led to an overwhelming focus on a few quantitative measures of parity, its narrow focus is likely to have played a role in the observed progress as it



concentrated efforts and resources to a limited set of policy areas. The current gender equality goal, SDG 5, aims to *achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls* and is rights-based and tremendously more comprehensive than MDG 3. In addition to its first target, to “end all forms of discrimination against all women and girls everywhere,”<sup>6</sup> it sets out to eliminate all forms of violence against women, address discrimination in the household, enhance women’s decision-making across all spheres, ensure access to reproductive health and rights as well as economic resources and technology, and to strengthen gender equality legislation. Its comprehensive nature could potentially generate greater domestic efforts and, thus, policy outcomes. However, given that SDG 5 implementation also is likely to face resistance, the risks of disappointment as regards goal achievement by 2030 are impending. Furthermore, the SDGs’ scope and immeasurability risk inhibiting progress by means of reductionism, quantification and comparability – for better or worse. The findings call for further research on GPI impacts on development cooperation as well as on the long-term effects, or “staying power”, of GPI-driven behavioural change. Regarding the SDG agenda, it will be essential to examine how it is received and put into practice by different countries and development actors.

Against the background of the dissertation’s findings and the discussions of their implications, this development dissertation brief ends with a number of key takeaways and policy recommendations for development practitioners and Swedish development assistance:

- National commitments to international development goals and policies do not necessarily translate into action plans and further implementation efforts, which implies that more attention should

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<sup>6</sup> <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdg5>

be paid to implementation frameworks than goal formulations when assessing national development plans and policy frameworks.

- Adjustment to international development goals is facilitated by the interaction of multiple influence mechanisms as well as well-coordinated development partners and the capacity-building of and cooperation with domestic CSOs promoting change.
- Donors should avoid the conflicting approaches to development cooperation inherent in the simultaneous promotion of 1) alignment with externally formulated goals and targets through conditionality, and; 2) “ownership” and “country-driven processes”. Instead, policy ownership may be facilitated by:
  - Assisting in the national and local “translation” of international goals/targets and in tying commitments to well-anchored and realistic action plans and sector policies, which build on nationally articulated priorities;
  - Building the capacities of national and local institutions to perform these tasks;
  - Insistently encouraging and facilitating civil society influence and participation in policy dialogues and processes to stimulate inclusive development, democratic governance, sustainability and bottom-up perspectives and influence.
- Development actors may use regularized performance monitoring, the “pressure of comparison” and social incentives to stimulate progressive domestic change in relation to international development goals and policies. However, this should be combined with dialogue and measures that stimulate learning and belief-based adjustment – particularly when it comes to politically contentious policy areas like gender equality and women’s rights – and that enable the exertion of accountability pressure by domestic

constituents and civil society. This increases the chances of effective implementation efforts and sustainable change.

- Regarding gender equality change in particular: given the established bureaucratic resistance to gender equality reform, SDG 5 as well as other international gender equality agendas are likely to face resistance in implementation processes. Since the breadth and imprecision of the SDGs also risk decreasing the possibilities of driving progress through reductionism, quantification and comparison (which the dissertation establishes as important in stimulating MDG adjustment), the global trends with regard to gender equality need to be closely monitored. Against this background, there is a need to:
  - Recognize the barriers to gender equality change and work strategically to achieve progress;
  - Support domestic forces for change at multiple levels;
  - Support and facilitate institutional strengthening – particularly target and empower gender institutions;
  - Give a larger share of support to and build capacities of domestic women's organizations;
  - Cooperate with other donors to maximize outcomes and avoid competing priorities.

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## Appendix I

**Table A1. List of countries and characteristics**

Country	Income group <sup>7</sup>	Regime type <sup>8</sup>	Aid dependence (2000) <sup>9</sup>	Aid dependence (2015)	Colonial background
<i>Benin</i>	Low	Free	10.4	5.2	French
<i>Ethiopia</i>	Low	Not free	8.4	5.0	-
<i>Gambia</i>	Low	Not free	6.6	12.3	British
<i>Ghana</i>	Lower-middle	Free	12.4	4.8	British
<i>Guinea</i>	Low	Partly free	5.2	6.4	French
<i>Kenya</i>	Lower-middle	Partly free	4.1	3.9	British
<i>Malawi</i>	Low	Partly free	26.1	17.0	British
<i>Mali</i>	Low	Partly free	12.0	9.4	French
<i>Mauritania</i>	Lower-middle	Not free	17.1	6.8	French
<i>Mozambique</i>	Low	Partly free	22.2	12.5	Portuguese
<i>Niger</i>	Low	Partly free	11.7	12.2	French
<i>Rwanda</i>	Low	Not free	18.7	13.4	German/ Belgian
<i>Senegal</i>	Lower-middle	Free	9.4	6.6	French
<i>Tanzania</i>	Low	Partly free	10.5	5.8	British
<i>Zambia</i>	Lower-middle	Partly free	23.1	3.8	British

<sup>7</sup> See: <http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-and-lending-groups#Low income>. Accessed 8 October 2018.

<sup>8</sup> Categorized according to Freedom House's 2015 *Freedom in the World* report (Freedom House, 2015).

<sup>9</sup> Aid-dependence is a measure of net official development assistance (ODA) received as a share of Gross National Income (GNI), see <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ODAT.GN.ZS>. Accessed 8 October 2018.

**Table A2. List of Coded Variables**

<b>Gender equality area</b>	<b>Policy</b>
Women's wage employment:	<p>Goal: Government commits to increasing women's employment and/or income (in general)</p> <p>Goal: Government commits to increasing women's employment and/or income in the non- agricultural sector</p> <p>Quantitative target: The PRSP includes a quantitative target (in numbers) in relation to the policy goal</p> <p>Timeframe: The PRSP includes a timeframe specifying when the goal should be achieved</p> <p>Budget: The PRSP includes a budget allocated to the implementation of the specific goal</p>
Girls' education:	<p>Goal: Government commits to increasing girls' enrolment/decreasing the gender disparity in primary education</p> <p>Goal: Government commits to increasing girls' enrolment/decreasing the gender disparity in secondary education</p> <p>Goal: Government commits to increasing girls' enrolment/decreasing the gender disparity in tertiary education</p> <p>Quantitative target: The PRSP includes a quantitative target (in numbers) in relation to the policy goal</p> <p>Timeframe: The PRSP includes a timeframe specifying when the goal should be achieved</p>

	Budget: The PRSP includes a budget allocated to the implementation of the specific goal
Women's political representation:	<p>Goal: Government commits to increasing women's participation in politics/decision-making (in general)</p> <p>Goal: Government commits to increasing women's proportion of seats in parliament</p> <p>Quantitative target: The PRSP includes a quantitative target (in numbers) in relation to the policy goal</p> <p>Timeframe: The PRSP includes a timeframe specifying when the goal should be achieved</p> <p>Budget: The PRSP includes a budget allocated to the implementation of the specific goal</p>

## List of PRSPs/National Development Plans

### Benin:

2000 Benin Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper  
<https://www.imf.org/external/NP/prsp/2000/ben/01/index.htm>

2002 Benin: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper  
<https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2003/cr0362.pdf>

2008 Benin: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper – Growth Strategy for Poverty Reduction (First published by the government in 2007 as “Growth strategy for Poverty Reduction”)  
<https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2008/cr08125.pdf>

2011 Benin: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (first published by the government as “Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy GPRS 2011-2011”)  
<https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2011/cr11307.pdf>

### Ethiopia:

2000 Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper  
<https://www.imf.org/external/NP/prsp/2000/eth/01/113000.pdf>

2002 Ethiopia: Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Program, published same date as PRSP  
<https://www.imf.org/External/NP/prsp/2002/eth/01/073102.pdf>

2006 Ethiopia: Building on Progress: A Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty (PASDEP) (2005/06-2009/10)  
[http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTETHIOPIA/Resources/PASDEP\\_Final\\_English.pdf](http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTETHIOPIA/Resources/PASDEP_Final_English.pdf)

2011 The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper Growth and Transformation Plan 2010/11–2014/15 – Volume II (first published by the government in 2010 as “Growth and Transformation Plan 2010/11–2014/15”)  
<https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2011/cr11305.pdf>

### **Gambia:**

2000 The Republic of The Gambia: Interim Strategy For Poverty Alleviation II  
<https://www.imf.org/external/NP/prsp/2000/gmb/01/100500.pdf>

2002 Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (first published by the government as “The Gambia: Strategy for Poverty Alleviation (SPAII)”) <https://www.imf.org/External/NP/prsp/2002/gmb/01/043002.pdf>

2007 The Gambia Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (published by the government in 2006 as “Republic of the Gambia: Poverty Reduction Strategy 2007-211)”) <https://www.imf.org/External/NP/prsp/2007/gmb/01/043002.pdf>

2011 The Republic of the Gambia: Programme for Accelerated Growth and Employment (PAGE) 2012-2015  
[http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/delegations/gambia/documents/about\\_us/page\\_2012\\_2015\\_en.pdf](http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/delegations/gambia/documents/about_us/page_2012_2015_en.pdf)

### **Ghana:**

2000 Republic of Ghana: Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy 2000-2002  
<https://www.imf.org/external/NP/prsp/2000/gha/01/063000.pdf>

2003 Ghana: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (first published by the government as “Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 2003-2005. An Agenda for Growth and Prosperity”)

<https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2003/cr0356.pdf>

2006 Ghana: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (first published by the government in 2005 as “Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS II) (2006-2009)”)

<https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2006/cr06225.pdf>

2010 Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda (GSGDA), 2010-2013

[http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/delegations/ghana/documents/eu\\_ghana/ghana\\_shared\\_growth\\_and\\_development\\_agenda\\_en.pdf](http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/delegations/ghana/documents/eu_ghana/ghana_shared_growth_and_development_agenda_en.pdf)

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## List of interview respondents

### Kenya

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#### Government:

1. Government official, National Gender and Equality Commission, Kenya. 11 November, 2014.
2. Government official, Ministry of Environment, Water and Natural Resources, Kenya. 13 November, 2014.
3. Government official, Gender Directorate, Ministry of Devolution and Planning, the Presidency, Kenya. 17 November, 2014.
4. Government official, MDG Office, Enablers Coordination Department, Ministry of Devolution and Planning, the Presidency, Kenya. 17 November, 2014.
5. Government official, Women Enterprise Fund, Kenya. 17 November, 2014.
6. Government official, Ministry of Health, Kenya. 20 November, 2014.
7. Senior government official, Ministry of Health, Kenya. 21 November, 2014.

#### IOs:

8. Economist, *IMF* representative office in Nairobi, Kenya. 19 November 2014.
9. Staff member, UN Women, Kenya Country Office. 24 November, 2014 (telephone interview).
10. Senior Economist, World Bank, Kenya. 10 November, 2014.

#### Bilateral donor agencies:

11. Staff member, Sida, Embassy of Sweden in Kenya. 10 November, 2014.
12. Staff member, DfID, British High Commission in Kenya. 19 November, 2014.
13. Staff member, USAID, Embassy of the United States of America in Kenya. 19 November, 2014.
14. Staff member, FINNIDA, Embassy of Finland in Kenya. 25 November, 2014.

#### CSOs:

15. Senior staff member, Federation of Women Lawyers (FIDA) Kenya. 26 November, 2014.
16. Staff member, Equality Now Kenya. 24 November, 2014.
17. Staff member, Collaborative Center for Gender and Development (CCGD), Kenya. 20 November, 2014.

Researchers:

18. Gender scholar, University of Nairobi. 19 November, 2014.

## Ethiopia

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IOs:

19. Staff member, UN Women, Ethiopia. 1 April, 2015.
20. Staff member, World Bank, Ethiopia. 23 March, 2015.
21. Staff member, African Center for Gender (ACG), United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), Ethiopia. 3 April, 2015.
22. Staff member, United Nations One (Coordination Office), Ethiopia. 25 March, 2015.
23. Staff member, Delegation of the European Union to Ethiopia. 25 March, 2015.
24. Senior staff member, The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), Ethiopia. 1 April, 2015.
25. Staff member, United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Ethiopia. 3 April, 2015.
26. Staff member, The Inter-African Committee on traditional practices (IAC), Ethiopia. 3 April, 2015.
27. Staff member, World Food Programme (WFP), Ethiopia. 16 April, 2015 (telephone interview).

Bilateral Donor Agencies:

28. Staff member, Embassy of France in Ethiopia. 13 April, 2015 (telephone interview).
29. Staff member, FINNIDA, Embassy of Finland in Ethiopia. 30 March, 2015.
30. Senior Governance Programme Manager, Irish Aid, Embassy of Ireland in Ethiopia. 30 March, 2015.



31. Staff member, Sida, Embassy of Sweden in Ethiopia in Ethiopia. 23 March, 2015.
32. Senior staff member, Sida, Embassy of Sweden in Ethiopia. 23 March, 2015.
33. Staff member, Embassy of Italy, Ethiopia. 24 March, 2015.
34. Staff member, Norad, Embassy of Norway, Ethiopia. 26 March, 2015.
35. Staff member, USAID, Embassy of the United States of America in Ethiopia. 27 March, 2015.
36. Staff member, Ethiopia-Canada Cooperation Office (ECCO), Embassy of Canada in Ethiopia. 2 April, 2015.


CSOs:

37. Senior staff member, Union of Ethiopian Women Charitable Associations (UEWCA), Ethiopia. 3 April, 2015.
38. Staff member, Norwegian Mission Society, Ethiopia. 26 March, 2015.
39. Senior staff member, New Millennium Hope Development Organization, Ethiopia. 31 March, 2015.
40. Staff member, Norwegian Church Aid, Ethiopia. 1 April, 2015.


Researchers:

41. Human rights scholar, Addis Ababa University. 31 March, 2015.


Appendix II




**Figure A1. MDG 3 policy goal adoption 2000-2015, mean for 15 countries**




**Figure A2. Adoption of MDG 3 policy goals, per country**



**Figure A3. Adoption of implementation plans 2000-2015, girls' education**



**Figure A4. Adoption of implementation plans 2000-2015,  
women's wage employment**



**Figure A5. Adoption of MDG 3 implementation planning features, per country**



Global performance indicators are now-common tools for global development governance. This DDB gives an account of the influences of such indicators, studying the mechanisms of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and their effects on gender policy change in Sub-Saharan Africa.

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Globala indikatorer såsom Agenda 2030 är en nu mycket utbredd form av global utvecklingsstyrning. Denna DDB beskriver vilket inflytande sådana indikatorer kan ha genom att studera mekanismerna hos FN:s millenniemål och deras eventuella effekter på förändringar i jämställdhetspolitik i Afrika söder om Sahara.

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