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DEMOCRACY IN AFRICAN GOVERNANCE: SEEING AND DOING IT DIFFERENTLY

Göran Hydén with assistance from Marina Buch Kristensen

Democracy in African Governance: Seeing and Doing it Differently

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till
Expertgruppen för biståndsanalys (EBA)

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The advisory reference group, chaired by Eva Lithman, Member of the Expert Group and former Director of Sida's Evaluation Unit, and joined by Professor Lise Rakner, University of Bergen, Professor Staffan Lindberg, University of Gothenburg, Professor Brian Levy, Johns Hopkins University, Ms Lynne Muthoni Wanyeki of the Open Society Foundation and Dr Per Nordlund of Sida, provided valuable professional counsel for which I am most grateful.

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Göran Hydén

Table of Contents

Foreword by the EBA

Democracy is since long a core value for Swedish development cooperation and democracy aid is a prime sector of Swedish aid. This report discusses the challenges for democracy aid in African countries against the background of their precolonial and colonial past and current geopolitical developments. The report suggests how democracy aid may be recast in a world where national sovereignty is on the rise and partners claim greater ownership. More specifically, the report addresses three questions: (1) why does democracy aid need to be re-examined at this point? (2) what is it in the African context that makes such aid so challenging? and (3) what can be done to make it more relevant and effective?

The report was commissioned by the Swedish government's Expert Group for Aid Studies (EBA) in 2018 to allow Professor Göran Hydén to share his current research and analyses related to democracy aid in Africa. Professor Hydén is particularly well placed to address the complex issue of democracy in a comparative, long-term perspective given his lifelong engagement with and research on political developments in Africa. In this essay, professor Hydén takes as points of departure the new global aid order with its emphasis on ownership, on the one hand, and the African governance context, on the other. Democracy aid, it is stated, differs from other development aid. As it deals with governance, democracy aid is not just a policy, it is political.

The study focusses on four countries in East Africa: Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda – countries with notable differences in governance. It is concluded that despite a common colonial past, democracy has taken various shapes in the governance of the respective countries today. Precolonial factors and postcolonial experiences seem to play a role for those varieties in democracy at present.

The study suggests several implications for democracy aid. Democracy aid needs to be set in its broad governance context considering local context, history and institutional factors and linked to ownership. This implies changes in the aid relationship and the role of the donor, management approach, the knowledge base and

the time horizon of intended support for democracy. Donor presence and knowledge about the local context needs to increase and more attention be given to independent situation analyses and scenarios. Professor Hydén suggests enhanced use of challenge funds allowing for competition between governmental and non-governmental bodies with the purpose to make a dent into the pervasive limited access order and open up a democratic space.

Overall, the structural challenges Africans face in governing their countries need to be well understood and taken into account for an efficient, relevant democracy support. Democracy is context-bound and building democracy takes time.

One of the tasks of the EBA is to stimulate debate on aid policies and to challenge established views and practices in relation to development aid on the basis of solid evaluations, research and other types of analysis. I hope that this report will find its intended audience among decision- and policy-makers at the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Sida with a stake in democracy aid in general, and in particular with regard to Africa.

We believe the analyses and proposals in this essay will solicit interest also with a broader set of actors in civil society, the research community and the general public engaged in democracy and developments in Africa.

The study has been conducted in dialogue with a reference group chaired by Eva Lithman, member of the EBA. However, the author is solely responsible for the contents of the report.

Gothenburg, December 20, 2019

Helena Lindholm

Sammanfattning

För trettio år sedan började den tredje globala demokratiseringsvågen, vilken snart följdes av demokratibistånd. Vågen svepte emellertid inte med samma styrka över världen. Effekten har varit som svagast på den afrikanska kontinenten, trots det internationella givarsamfundets samlade ansträngningar att ge kraft åt processen. Syftet med denna rapport är att undersöka varför demokratisering i Afrika är en särskild utmaning, och hur demokratibiståndet bör utformas i en värld där nationellt självbestämmande åter är på frammarsch, och där partnerländer gör anspråk på ett starkare ägarskap över de resurser de får utifrån. Mer specifikt tas tre frågor upp: 1) varför behöver demokratibiståndet omprövas just nu? 2) vad är det i den afrikanska kontexten som gör just detta bistånd så utmanande? och 3) vad kan göras för att det ska bli mer relevant och effektivt?

Den nya biståndsvärlden

Den amerikanske statsvetaren Samuel P. Huntington hävdade i en uppmärksammad bok (1991) att världen genomgick en tredje demokratiseringsvåg. Till skillnad från de två tidigare, som varit begränsade till Europa och Nord- och Sydamerika, var denna demokratiseringsvåg global i sin omfattning. Diskussion som följde på boken blev starten på en internationell givarkampanj till stöd för ökad demokratisering på platser som Afrika, där det i stor utsträckning saknades en inhemsk tradition av modern demokratisksamhällsstyrning. Utgångspunkten för biståndsarbetet var ett optimistiskt antagande om en global utveckling i riktning mot demokrati, som man framställde som den enda vägen framåt. Tre årtionden senare har demokratibiståndet att förhålla sig till en annan verklighet.

Givare från väst är i dag varken lika dominerande eller inflytelserika som de tidigare varit i regeringskretsar i Afrika. De partnerskapsformer som bekräftades i Parisdeklarationen 2005, har gradvis avlösts av en mer ägarskapsinriktad biståndsstruktur inom vilken det är allmänt accepterat att ansvaret ligger hos de lokala aktörerna, och att det lokala sammanhanget spelar en viktig roll.

Under de senaste årtiondena har även nya givare i form av både privata filantropiska och statliga aktörer trätt fram, de senare företräder ofta uppfattningar och tillvägagångssätt som strider mot västerländska normer och värderingar. Exempelvis har den östasiatiska utvecklingsstatsmodellen fått fäste som ett alternativ till liberalism. Även teokratiska idéer märks i den afrikanska diskussionen om samhällsstyrning. Givarmiljön i de flesta afrikanska länder präglas i dag definitivt av fler aktörer och mer konkurrens.

Biståndet har inte lika stor betydelse som tidigare för de afrikanska ländernas utveckling. Länderna tar i dag emot utländska investeringar i en tidigare aldrig skådad omfattning. Regeringarna i Afrika har i ökad utsträckning gjort investeringar och handel till den främsta samverkansformen med omvärlden. Regeringarna uppfattar det som enklare att förhandla med en investerare, som, i motsats till en biståndsgivare, tillhandahåller resurser utan krav på politiska motprestationer. Ekonomierna i Afrika har under senare år dessutom varit förhållandevis framgångsrika, vilket fått många regeringar att se utländskt bistånd som mindre angeläget, medan man ser skulder från omfattande infrastruktursatsningar som mindre betungande än de egentligen blir på längre sikt.

Följaktligen agerar afrikanska regeringar i dag i allmänhet mer självsäkert på den politiska arenan och i synnerhet i biståndssammanhang som arbetsgruppen för biståndseffektivitet inom OECD:s kommitté för utvecklingsbistånd.

Till detta kan också läggas givarnas erfarenheter av det egna demokratibiståndet. Studier och utvärderingar har visat att institutionella reformer är mycket mer komplexa än vad som tidigare antagits. Att ändra organisatoriska strukturer är inte svårt, men att förändra underliggande institutionella normer, djupt rotade i både historia och kultur, tar tid – om det alls kan lyckas. Undersökningar visar att afrikaner både är anhängare av och vill ha mer demokrati. Frågan är hur detta kan åstadkommas. Demokrati är endast en av flera konkurrerande faktorer inom samhällsstyrning i Afrika – långt ifrån att vara ett fungerande, befintligt system. Det är alltså tydligt att demokrati i Afrika inte kan analyseras utan att sättas i ett bredare sammanhang som kopplar till samhällsstyrning.

Afrikansk samhällsstyrning

Den afrikanska kontexten har i stort varit förbisedd i diskussionen om demokratisering och demokratibistånd under de senaste årtiondena. Fokus har i stället legat på att tillämpa institutionella modeller som visat sig framgångsrika i Europa, men inte i Afrika. Det har funnits få incitament för givarna att utveckla kunskaper om och skaffa sig en förståelse för den lokala kontexten för samhällsstyrning i afrikanska länder. En förändring verkar vara på gång i takt med att givarna inser att det lokala ägarskapet är nyckeln till effektivt bistånd.

I det perspektivet framstår tre frågor som särskilt viktiga: hur Afrika skiljer sig från Europa; hur förkoloniala särdrag återuppstår och omformas samt hur länder i Afrika skiljer sig sinsemellan med avseende på samhällsstyrning.

Demokratiseringen i Europa sammanföll med framväxten av nationalstater. Medborgarskap formades runt bestämda nationaliteter. På så vis blev staten ett instrument för medborgarnas intressen. Medborgarna hade rättigheter – staten hade skyldigheter. Västmakternas dominerande ställning vid andra världskrigets slut kom att påverka utformningen av Förenta nationerna och internationella deklarationer om mänskliga rättigheter. Den afrikanska statsnationen vilar på en helt annan moralisk grund. Utan de stater som skapades av kolonialmakterna och togs över av afrikanska nationalister vid självständigheten hade det inte funnits medborgare i Afrika.

Som undersåtar till lokala kungar, hövdingar eller åldermän saknade folk i Afrika i allmänhet helt den typ av rättigheter som vi förknippar med modern demokrati. Kolonialmakterna främjade i mycket liten utsträckning afrikanskt medborgarskap. Samtidigt kom kolonialstyret att leda till en afrikansk kamp för medborgerliga rättigheter. Vid självständigheten ärvde de nya politiska ledarna utmaningen att ena nationen, och den uppgiften föll på staten. Detta innebar att staten hade rätt att kräva medborgarnas lojalitet. I de afrikanska samhällena, vertikalt uppdelade efter etnisk tillhörighet, ras eller religion, blev staten innehavare av rättigheter och medborgarna skyldigheter. Det är i denna politiska verklighet som demokratin ska passa in.

Forskningen som ligger till grund för den här studien har inbegripit en närmare undersökning av Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania och Uganda, fyra närliggande länder som uppvisar stora skillnader vad gäller samhällsstyrning. Även om det finns stora likheter mellan länderna vad gäller det koloniala arvet, är det snarare förkoloniala faktorer som tillsammans med postkoloniala erfarenheter har format hur samhällena styrs i dag. Detta innebär att samtidigt som afrikanerna brottas med statsnationen som projekt, är man upptagen med att bygga en egen identitet som självständiga länder. I den meningen börjar afrikanska länder stå på egna ben, utan hjälp från västerländska givare och välgörare. Mot bakgrund av kraven på att anpassa sig till globala utvecklings- och samhällsstyrningsideal har man valt en egen väg och skapat nischade former för samhällsstyrning som återspeglar lokala värderingar och normer.

Samhällsstyrningen i Afrikas länder är således inte lika överallt. Genom att titta på demokrati ur ett samhällsstyrningsperspektiv har vi i denna studie identifierat fyra regimtyper i regionen: 1) klientelistisk styrelseform med politisk konkurrens om makten; 2) monopoliserad och rörelsebaserad makt med ett statsbärande parti; 3) neopatrimonialt (envåldshärskare), socialt splittrad regim och 4) auktoritär makthavare med moderniserande ambitioner. Dessa fyra regimtyper skiljer sig åt i två huvudsakliga avseenden. Dels huruvida tiden efter självständigheten har präglats av fred eller av våldsamheter, dels om det politiska systemet vid självständigheten förblev pluralistiskt eller kom att domineras av ett enda parti. Det har visat sig att modellen klientelistisk med konkurrens om makten är mest framgångsrik vad gäller att tillgodose medborgerliga och politiska rättigheter, med Botswana, Kenya och Sydafrika som tydliga exempel på detta. Det är även intressant att notera att statsapparaten i denna grupp länder är effektivare än i de andra tre grupperna.

Det koloniala arvet är inte en starkt avgörande faktor för den postkoloniala samhällsstyrningen, även om de engelsktalande länderna ligger steget före sina fransktalande grannar. Länderna i Västafrika uppvisar dåliga resultat vad gäller statsapparatens effektivitet, men är ihop med södra Afrika den underregion som varit mest framgångsrik i sin demokratiska utveckling. Det är dock talande att det inom respektive regimtyp finns de som lyckats bra

och de som lyckats dåligt, vilket tyder på att de senaste tre årtiondenas demokratisering i Afrika aldrig fick kraften av en våg, utan snarare inträffade här och där. Än i dag finns det grannländer med tydliga skillnader i samhällsstyrning. Enkla lösningar eller bästa praxis fungerar inte i ett sådant sammanhang. Det är nödvändigt att fundera över andra sätt att genomföra demokratibistånd.

Demokratibistånd på annat vis

Genom att beakta lokala sammanhang och ägarskap kan demokratibiståndet förmodligen förändras i flera viktiga avseenden: 1) biståndsrelationens karaktär, 2) givarens roll, 3) biståndets förvaltning, 4) kunskapsbasen och 5) tidshorisonten.

På senare år har givare från väst intagit en relativt fristående ställning gentemot partnerländerna. Givare har hållit sig i den diplomatiska sfären och främst undertecknat formella överenskommelser etc. Detta är mycket annorlunda mot hur det såg ut under de första årtiondena efter självständigheten, när givarna samverkade med regeringarna i Afrika och ett stort antal biståndsarbetare fanns på plats.

Sverige som biståndsgivare är närvarande i Afrika främst genom att man finansierar svenska civilsamhällesorganisationer. Det har tagits försiktiga steg mot att återuppta en närmare samverkan med staterna i Afrika genom exempelvis kortvariga systeravtal mellan svenska myndigheter och deras afrikanska motsvarigheter. Det finns skäl att se detta som en vägvisare för det framtida arbetet. Kina och andra nya givare är framgångsrika eftersom de har sina egna företrädare på plats och arbetar i Afrika. De ser sin närvaro ur ett investeringsperspektiv, snarare än ur ett förvaltningsperspektiv, och de för en personlig dialog med sina lokala motsvarigheter, vilket är så viktigt för att bygga upp institutioner.

Även om givarna behöver hitta mer konstruktiva samverkansformer med sina afrikanska partners, och komma ut mer i fält och sprida biståndsansvaret lokalt, så kan de åstadkomma mer genom att hålla en lägre profil och arbeta mer effektivt i rollen som inkubator. Snarare än att mäta framgång i projekttermer bör medel placeras i investeringsfonder med syfte att främja och stödja lokala initiativ. De s k ”challenge funds” som Sverige stöder som del av

biståndet till civilsamhället är ett steg i rätt riktning. Deras roll kan utökas till att inte bara civilsamhällesorganisationer, utan även myndigheter och icke-statliga aktörer tillåts konkurrera om ytterligare medel. En sådan konkurrens skulle utgöra ett viktigt nytänkande inom samhällsstyrning eftersom det, såsom rapporten visar, öppnar möjligheten för en framväxt av offentliga institutioner som inte befinner sig i ett politiskt beroendeförhållande.

Biståndets administration har på senare år varit fokuserad på resultat, i sig en följd av ett projekttänkande. Budgetstöd var ett försök att ändra detta synsätt och ge varje partner större ansvar. Det visade sig vara ett ganska klumpigt redskap som inte bidragit till göra att göra biståndet effektivare. Budgetstödet led framför allt av att vara för centraliserat och att sektorsansvariga ministerier lämnades utanför. Biståndsadministrationen behöver åstadkomma mer än att uppvisa direkta resultat inom godtyckligt satta tidsramar. Genom att investera i fonder som kan fungera som inkubatorer kan givarna öka möjligheten för lokalt ägarskap och bidra till meningsfulla resultat för partnerinstitutioner och lokala mottagare. De standardutvärderingskriterier som har varit gällande under OECD:s ursprungliga riktlinjer måste omprövas utifrån utgångspunkten att lokala resultat ska väga tyngst.

Givarnas kunskaper om länder i Afrika har varit begränsade till officiella uppgifter som tagits fram av nationella statistikorgan och rättfärdigats genom att de tagits med i internationella tabeller utgivna av Världsbanken och andra internationella institutioner. Datakällorna har inte bara varit av skiftande kvalitet, utan dessutom gett en tunn och ofullständig bild av mottagarländerna. Sådana uppgifter är med största säkerhet inte tillräckliga för en partner som vill ta hänsyn till lokalt ägarskap och lokala sammanhang. Officiella data kan bara användas som baslinje eller en utgångspunkt och måste kompletteras med en bättre förståelse av den lokala kultur och de lokala förhållanden där demokratin är tänkt att stärkas. Tonvikten hamnar då på att göra oberoende kontextanalyser som kan visa hur demokratibiståndet kan göras så relevant och verkningsfullt som möjligt. För att utforma strategier för hur demokratibistånd bäst kan ges kan det därför vara värdefullt att förlita sig på analyser av möjliga scenarier, snarare än att på förhand ta fram en enda förändringsteori för det fortsatta arbetet.

Den historiska erfarenheten är att demokratibyggande tar tid. Sverige och många andra västländer är exempel på att ju längre demokratiseringsprocessen har pågått, desto mer hållbar blir dess institutionella förankring. Länderna i Afrika har inte tiden på sin sida. Länderna pressas till genomgripande och omedelbar demokratisering. Detta kan dock undergräva det övergripande målet. Stöd till demokrati i Afrika måste beakta de strukturella utmaningar som afrikanerna ställs inför när de ska styra sina länder och ta hänsyn till variationer i självbestämmanderätt och lokal handlingsförmåga. Ödmjukhet och medkänsla inför de särskilda utmaningar som demokratisering innebär i Afrika behöver därför genomsyra reformambitionerna.

Summary

The Third Wave of Democratization began three decades ago, democracy aid soon thereafter. The wave has swept the world in an uneven fashion with the African continent manifesting the weakest impact despite a concerted effort by the international donor community to boost the process. The purpose of this report is to examine why democratization in Africa is a special challenge and how democracy aid may be recast in a world where national sovereignty is on the rise and partners claim greater ownership of the external resources they receive. More specifically, it addresses three questions: (1) why does democracy aid need to be re-examined at this point? (2) what is it in the African context that makes such aid so challenging? and (3) what can be done to make it more relevant and effective?

The new world

When Huntington (1991) argued that the world was witnessing its Third Wave of Democratization, in global scope exceeding the earlier two that had been confined to Europe and the Americas, it triggered an international donor campaign to support the transition to democracy in places like Africa where a domestic legacy of modern democratic governance was largely missing. This aid effort proceeded on the optimistic premise of a global democratic convergence portraying it as "the only game in town". Three decades later it is evident that democracy aid finds itself in a new world.

Western donors are no longer as dominant and influential in African government circles as they once were. The partnership arrangements that were confirmed in the 2005 Paris Principles have gradually given way to a more ownership-based aid architecture where it is generally accepted that local actors must be in charge and, therefore, local context matters. The last couple of decades have also seen the arrival of new actors – both private philanthropies and state actors – the latter often with a philosophy and practice that runs contrary to Western norms and values. For example, the East Asian developmental-state model has gained traction as an alternative to liberalism. Notions of theocracy also circulate in

African discourse on governance. The donor environment in most African countries is definitely more crowded and competitive.

Aid itself is no longer quite as significant in the development of African countries as it used to be. These countries have today become destinations of foreign investments on a scale never seen before. African governments have responded by making investment and trade their preferred mode of interacting with the outside world. Governments tend to find it easier to deal with an investor who unlike the donor sets no political condition for his contribution. Furthermore, the African economies have fared quite well in recent years, making many governments treat foreign aid as less urgent and debts incurred by large-scale infrastructural ventures not as burdensome as they really are in the longer run. The overall result is that African governments have become more assertive on the political scene in general and in aid circles such as the Working Group on Aid Effectiveness, an organ of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC), in particular.

To all this should be added the experience that donors have had with their democracy aid. Studies and evaluations have shown that institutional reforms are much more complex than has typically been assumed. It is not difficult to change organizational structures but altering underlying institutional norms that are deeply grounded in history and culture takes time and may run aground altogether. Surveys show that Africans like democracy and want more of it. The question is how this can be realized. Democracy is only one competing factor in African governance – far from a system already in place. It is clear, therefore, that democracy in Africa cannot be analysed without taking into consideration its wider governance context.

The African governance context

This context has been largely ignored in the past few decades as focus has been laid on transferring institutional models which have a proven record in Europe but not in Africa. Donors have had few incentives to learn and understand the local governance context in African countries. This seems to be changing more recently as donors realize that local ownership is the key to aid effectiveness. In such an emerging perspective, three issues become especially

important: (1) how Africa differs from Europe, (2) how precolonial features are resurrected and reinvented, and (3) how African countries differ among themselves in governance.

Democratization in Europe coincided with formation of the nation-state. Citizenship crystallized around nationalities. As a result, the state became an instrument of its citizens. It became the duty-bearer, citizens the legitimate rights-holders. Because of the dominance of the Western Powers at the end of the Second World War, this is also the formula that underpins the United Nations and its many declarations on human rights. The state-nation in Africa, however, rests on a very different moral foundation. Without the state that was created by the colonial powers and taken over by African nationalists at independence, there would have been no citizens in Africa. Being subjects paying their loyalty to parochial leaders – whether they were kings, chiefs, sheiks or just elders – they lacked the kind of rights that we associate with modern democracy. The colonial powers did not do much to promote African citizenship but did enough to set in motion a battle among Africans to earn civic rights. Still, at independence the new leaders inherited the challenge of national unification, a task that fell on the shoulders of the state. This meant that the state had the right to demand citizen loyalty. In Africa's vertically divided societies – by ethnicity, race or religion – the state became the rights-holder and citizens the duty-bearers. This is the political reality in which democracy is meant to fit in.

The research for this study included a closer look at Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda – four neighbours with notable differences in governance. Although they share much in common from their colonial past, it is rather precolonial factors that in addition to the post-colonial experience seem to have shaped the differences which exist in governance today. This suggests that as they grapple with the state-nation project Africans are preoccupied with reinventing their identity as independent countries. They are moving out from under the wings of their Western donors-cum-benefactors. In the light of pressures to conform with global development and governance ideals, they respond in their own way by creating "niches of governance" that reflect local values and norms.

Governance in African countries, therefore, is not the same everywhere. By looking at democracy through a governance glass, this study identifies four different regime types in the region: (1) clientelist-competitive, (2) movemental-monopolistic, (3) neopatrimonial-fractured, and (4) authoritarian-modernizing. They differ along two lines, the first being whether they have enjoyed peace after independence or they have suffered violence, the second, whether at the time of independence the political system remained pluralist, or it became dominated by an inclusivist mass party. It turns out that the competitive-clientelist model performs best in terms of accommodating civil and political rights with Botswana, Kenya and South Africa being cases in point. Interestingly, this group of countries also demonstrates a higher degree of state effectiveness than the other three groups. Colonial legacy is not a very powerful determinant of post-independence governance although anglophone countries have an edge over francophone ones. Countries in West Africa do not fare well on state effectiveness but together with Southern Africa are the best democratic performers by sub-region. It is significant, however, that each regime type has both top and bottom performers which suggests that African democratization in the last three decades never reached the strength of a wave but was rather spotty. To this day, countries that are neighbours display notable differences in governance. Single blueprints or best practices don't work in such a context. It is necessary to think of how democracy aid can be done differently.

Doing democracy aid differently

Taking local context and ownership into consideration potentially changes democracy aid in several important respects: (1) the nature of the aid relationship, (2) the role of the donor, (3) the management approach, (4) the knowledge base, and (5) the time horizon.

Western donors have so far preferred to adopt a detached position vis-à-vis their partners. They have met in diplomatic chambers and signed formal agreements. This stands in contrast to how it was in the first couple of decades after independence when donors engaged with African governments and had large numbers of field workers on the ground in Africa. Sweden's donor presence

in Africa is primarily through funding Swedish civil society organizations. A cautious step toward re-engagement with the African state has been taken for example with short-term sister arrangement between Swedish executive agencies and their counterparts in African countries. There is reason to think of this as a guide for how to proceed in the future. The Chinese and other new donors are successful because they have their own people working in Africa. Viewing their presence in investment rather than administration terms they engage with their local counterparts in a personal manner that is so important for building institutions.

While donors need to engage more constructively with their African counterparts and get out of their offices by deconcentrating responsibility for the aid package to as many persons as possible, they can productively lower their profile and work more effectively in an incubator role. Rather than measuring success in project terms, money should be placed in investment funds meant to foster and support local initiatives. The challenge funds are a step in the right direction, but their role could be extended to include competition for additional funds between not only civil society organizations but also between governmental and non-governmental bodies. Such competition would be an important governance innovation because, as this report shows, it opens the possibility for the emergence of public institutions that are not dependent on political patronage.

Aid management has been focused on results, a consequence of donors operating in a project mode. Budget support was an attempt to move beyond this and leave greater responsibility in partner hands. It proved to be a rather clumsy tool that in the end did not enhance effectiveness. It suffered above all from being too centralized leaving operational sector ministries outside the loop. Aid management needs to move beyond demonstration of immediate results confined to discretionary timelines. By investing in funds that may serve as incubators donors can expand the space for local ownership and help produce outcomes that are meaningful for partner institutions and their local beneficiaries. The standard evaluation criteria that have been valid under the original OECD guidelines need to be revisited with a view to ensuring that local outcomes matter first.

Donor knowledge of African countries has been confined to formal data produced by national statistics offices and legitimized by their inclusion in international data sets issued by the World Bank and other global institutions. These data sets have not only varied in quality but, what is more, they have produced a very thin and incomplete view of these countries. Such data clearly are not enough for a partner that respects local ownership and context. Formal data can only serve as a baseline or starting-point and should be complemented by a better understanding of local culture and conditions in which democracy is meant to grow. That places emphasis on conducting independent situation analyses that can guide how democracy aid may be most relevant and effective. Strategizing how democracy aid is best delivered may also fruitfully rely on analysing possible scenarios rather than identifying in advance a single "theory of change" for how to proceed.

Building democracy has historically been a long-term venture. As the case of Sweden and many other Western countries illustrate, the longer the time over which the process has stretched, the more solidly it is institutionalized. African countries do not have the privilege of time. They are being pressed to democratize in a comprehensive manner without delay. This is an approach that potentially undercuts its overall objective. Supporting democracy in Africa needs to consider the structural challenges that Africans face in governing their countries and respect the relative autonomy and variation of local agency. This involves building a dose of humility and a degree of empathy into the reform venture.

Purpose and Method

After thirty years of moving along without any serious challenges, democracy aid finds itself today in a new world. Western donors no longer occupy the same central position in partner countries as they used to do. They find themselves competing with other external actors that do not share the same values. Partner country governments have become more assertive and display their intention to reduce aid dependence. Trade and investment tend to become the preferred mode of interaction between rich and poor countries. Nowhere is this more evident than in Africa where donor efforts to support a democratic transition have been especially decisive yet not very successful. Sub-Saharan Africa together with the Middle East & North Africa remains in global comparison the least democratic region. Above all, democracy is far from being "the only game in town" in these countries.

The rich literature in recent years that has taken its starting-point in democratic theory has provided a better understanding of its various forms and manifestations. It has provided us with valuable answers to questions about what is happening to democracy and where. It has not, however, addressed the equally pertinent question of how democracy comes about and why this happens more easily in some countries than in others. These are policy-relevant concerns in need of a more elaborative answer.

The purpose of this report, therefore, is to provide a review of where democracy fits into African governance and provide what might be described as "contextual intelligence" for policy practitioners. Democracy aid, like democracy itself, can no longer be taken for granted but needs to be problematized in its broader governance context. Like all countries that have successfully become mature democracies, countries in Africa approach this challenge from their own historical legacies, not the least that the state as institution was created for them by the colonial powers and is not the outcome of territorial battles leading to nation-states as in Europe. In a global policy environment where ownership is increasingly trumping partnership as core principle it becomes more important to understand the local contexts in which support for

democracy is given. This report offers insights that are of value for how democracy aid may be best pursued in these new circumstances.

The report has been prepared during a span of fourteen months and is first and foremost based on a literature review that includes academic as well as more applied policy publications. It offers as appendix a list of all items that were consulted for the study. In pulling everything together into a single report, the study has relied on the author's familiarity with issues of comparative politics and his long personal affiliation with Africa and African studies. The exercise has also benefitted from interviews with Swedish aid officials both in Stockholm and in the diplomatic missions in four East African countries: Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda. A select number of African academics has been consulted to provide inputs and check the arguments advanced in the report. Finally, it is important to mention that a series of earlier drafts of the report has been reviewed and commented upon by members of the special Reference Group appointed by the EBA to help guide this study to fruition.

Democracy Aid: the Fresh Challenges

Close to thirty years ago two political scientists set the frame for how we have since interpreted democracy on a global scale. Samuel P. Huntington (1991) gave us the notion that the world was riding the crest of a Third Wave of democratization. Previous waves in the beginning and middle of the 20th Century had led to democratic transitions in Europe and the Americas, but the third wave that began in the 1980s also swept over the developing world, notably Africa, making it the most consequential. Francis Fukuyama (1992) took this thesis one step further by suggesting that the world had reached the "end of history", i.e. the end of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of the liberal democratic form of governance. This perceived convergence toward democracy as the ultimate form of human governance spurred a growth in democracy aid based on the premise that what has worked in developed countries will also be applicable in places like Africa. Hence, the efforts by the donor community to promote development of democracy by making Africans align their own institutions with the Western model of liberal democracy.

Lessons learned

There are at least three lessons that have been learned from the democracy aid to date. The *first* is that democracy in Africa is far from being the "only game in town". It competes for acceptance and legitimacy with other ways of organizing governance, notably the "developmental state" (Routley 2014). The latter has strong appeal in a region where poverty prevails, and leaders know that promising public goods that improve the livelihoods of people earns them legitimacy and power. The *second* lesson is that Africans have their own institutions that help them make sense of the world. Although efforts have been made ever since colonial days to shape Africa in the image of Europe, indigenous institutions have demonstrated a remarkable resilience. Andrews (2013) has shown how donor-initiated reforms have stranded because they have not gone deep enough to change the underlying value structure. A Sida evaluation of capacity-building has come to a similar conclusion: it

is relatively easy to change the way humans are organized to achieve a specific goal but much more difficult to make them change their behaviour (Carneiro et al. 2015). The *third* lesson is that democracy aid does not easily lend itself to the same kind of logical framework that may apply to assessing the results of projects dealing with tangible goods. Causation in politics is inevitably reciprocal (Bandura 1986). For example, as donors push their reform agenda, Africans respond by creating their own "niche" or platform of governance which is their attempt to align the agenda with local values and norms. Donors have been too readily inclined to approach capacity-building in a teaching mode ensuring their partners know the "text" or rule that is the institution while Africans, on their part, have engaged in a learning mode to adapt their understanding of the rule to the local environment. It is important in any analysis of politics to acknowledge that there is always, so to speak, action within action. Such counteraction is not a "spill-over effect" or externality, but a voluntary act based on human cognition.

Donors have gradually come to realize that they can only ignore partner country context at their own cost. Rather than just importing models based on their own experience, there is an emerging sense that they must "work with the grain", as one former World Bank analyst calls it (Levy 2013). They must acknowledge the reality on the ground in partner countries and build on that. They must help build democracy by producing democrats. This is a more difficult exercise than exporting institutional designs. How is democracy aid best provided in an environment where democracy is still merely an ideal competing for recognition in a complex governance space?

The new aid environment

This is the principal question that this report addresses. It strives to put democracy in its wider African governance context as a way of better understanding how democracy aid might be realigned with the new political realities on the continent. These realities are complex. Western donors are no longer the dominant force they

used to be. For decades, they have set the tone for African development, initially by modernizing society and strengthening the state apparatus, later by liberalizing the market and democratizing governance. Today they operate in a competitive environment where African governments can play one set of actors against another. Traditional donors now compete for influence with private charities like the Gates and Clinton foundations, and they encounter donors from other corners of the world with a different approach to both development and democracy. What is more, the 2030 Agenda gives each country the right to set its own target to reach the Sustainable Development Goals. All these factors boost the sense of national ownership in African government circles.

With the Chinese in the lead, direct foreign investment has increasingly become the preferred mode among Africans of interacting with the outside world. For example, in Tanzania, once a traditional donor favourite, China has leapfrogged Western countries as the largest investor (*The Citizen*, Dar es Salaam, May 16, 2019). While big infrastructural investments are needed across the region, they carry the threat of a rise in the debt burden of individual countries, an issue that may be easy for African policymakers to overlook at a time when their economies are doing reasonably well. Although the presence of autocratic rule in Africa is not linked to the growing presence of the Chinese, it is obvious that if Western donors withdraw their support for democracy, they leave behind a void that the Chinese can easily exploit for their own interest.

The argument of this report, therefore, is that Western support for democracy in Africa must continue, but it needs to be recast in ways that take into consideration the lessons learnt and the new political realities. Because democracy can no longer be taken for granted, it is necessary for donors to understand where their partners, culturally and intellectually, come from and how they view the world, including the role of democracy. This requires thinking beyond the parameters of individual projects and programmes. It needs transcending the limits of a results-oriented management approach. It calls for a contextualization of democracy in African governance; hence, the title – and sub-title – of this report.

With this in mind, it makes sense to conduct the analysis using an African rather than a global lens. The interesting policy question is no longer how high countries score on a global democracy scale, but rather how democracy might be best advanced in countries such as those in Africa where a democratic tradition is lacking, and political space is constrained not merely by autocratic leaders but also by structural factors such as the continent's preponderant vertical social cleavages. Democracy aid to be effective needs above all a more thorough "contextual intelligence".

How challenges in Africa differ

Like other regions of the world, global indices show that democracy in Africa has been backsliding (Rakner 2018) – even in countries like South Africa and Zambia with a solid record of democratization (Gyimah-Boadi 2015). This reversal, however, as indicated in Figure 1, has not been as dramatic as it has been in other parts of the world and especially in a few strategic countries like Thailand and Turkey. A major reason is that the democratic transition in Africa never reached very far in the first place. Still, democracy is an important part but not the whole story of African governance. Unlike the case in Western countries where public discourse breathes pessimism and calls are made to salvage democracy from increasingly bold autocratic moves by populist leaders and governments (Przeworski 2019), discourse in Africa takes place in a climate of relative optimism about the future. As discussed in this report, Africans want more of it, but its advancement is being constantly contested. This is the main challenge but also the silver lining in the global backsliding. Democracy in Africa is not threatened from within as in Europe. Instead, it is an ideal that Africans want to see more fully realized. Democracy aid, therefore, has its place in Africa, perhaps especially there.

Figure 1: Liberal democracy: Global and regional averages (right panel population-weigthed).



Source: Varieties of Democracy Annual Report 2018.

The new realities and challenges place democracy aid at a crossroads that calls for a closer look at what drives political change in African countries and how donors may best respond to trends in a region where their own agenda no longer prevails in the manner it used to do. In discussing this question, the report addresses the donor community at large with specific reference to Swedish aid where appropriate. A hallmark of Swedish foreign aid is its resilience. It rests on a strong normative foundation that dates back all the way to 1962 when the first foreign aid bill was approved by the Swedish Parliament.

Box 1: The core of Swedish foreign aid

Swedish aid contributes to strengthening economic and political development in partner countries. It treats support of democratic development as a means for these countries to tackle poverty reduction more effectively on their own while also maintaining that economic development reduces the risk of conflict and strengthens the prospect of democratization. A key aspect of how Swedish aid is delivered is that it is provided on the terms set by recipient institutions.

Source: "This is Swedish foreign aid", updated 18 September 2018.

This bill sets out the values and orientation that a strong majority of the country's political parties embrace. It is a consensus statement that has taken on an almost venerable status in Swedish political discourse on foreign aid (see Box 1). A statement by the coalition government that was formed after the 2018 parliamentary election is the most recent official confirmation of its significance in keeping development cooperation at the centre of Swedish foreign policy. It upholds the commitment to increase the total aid volume as well as to strengthen the support for democracy and human rights. This makes the question of how to best pursue it in the wider African governance context especially pertinent.

Why governance?

Governance, as used in this report, entails creating and managing systems that allow for the authoritative use of power to create social order and move society forward – and the responses that follow from such interventions. It accepts that causality is reciprocal: actors influence each other in a two-directional manner as they apply their cognitive skills. For example, as African governments react to pressures to comply with external influences, they fall back on their country's collective historical experience or what constitutes its fundamental cultural norms. The way reciprocal causality is used in this report is summarized in Figure 2 below. Thus, governance goes beyond policy and an emphasis on specific output measures. Likewise, it transcends the narrow parameters of project design. It

recognizes that democracy aid is political and constitutes one of several inputs into how countries in Africa are being governed.

The Swedish translation of governance – *samhällsstyrning* (steering of society) – leaves no doubt about what the concept means. It addresses how societies organize themselves to achieve crucial political objectives. Using governance, this study examines how democracy, state and development come together in different types of regimes in Africa. The governance issue has taken on fresh significance in the donor community following the publication of the 2017 World Development Report on "Governance and the Law" (World Bank 2017). It argues for an understanding of the social and political realities in which policy is being made and implemented. Technical solutions, however well and rationally designed they might be, easily become "shots in the dark" without a fuller understanding of their political context. Knowing how both formal and informal institutions work and how power is applied to getting things done is not only an increasingly interesting research issue but also a matter of growing importance to members of the donor community. If the days of the blueprint are gone, how do donors and researchers respond to what amounts to a widening variety of governance practices in Africa?

Figure 2: Reciprocal causality in analysing African governance.



This framework will inform the analysis in this report and serve as the basis for identifying relevant policy implications. Following a further elaboration of how research and policy come together in development cooperation, and specifically with reference to support for democracy and governance, the analysis makes a "first cut" by identifying the institutional context in African countries and how it varies from that of Europe and, equally important, how it varies among African countries. A "second cut" will be made to provide an even more detailed analysis of the institutional set-up in four East African countries – Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda – all of which have been of special interest to Western donors, not the least Sweden and its Nordic neighbours. The final chapter discusses the implications for future democracy aid.

The Policy-Research Nexus

The policy-research nexus has been important in the field of development cooperation. Research has served as a driving force behind the policy paradigms that have guided the donor community since the early days of international development assistance. As new states emerging from colonialism and embarking on modernization, African countries naturally attracted special interest. In the beginning therefore, Africa served as the prime experimental ground for the evolution of policy-relevant research on development.

The challenge for the first generation of such researchers was how to conduct their inquiries about societies for which a previously accumulated literature was lacking. They sought inspiration in the Western intellectual tradition of thinking about the nature of social change (Geertz 1963:11-12). At the same time, they were committed to using a theoretical framework that includes all types of political systems, be they primitive traditional forms or modern complex systems such as the democracies in Europe and America. This resulted in a functionalist approach where systems were identified in terms of structural differences. The approach served as justification for the first generation of development policy research which can be summarized in one word – modernization – or the

promotion of social change that would become structurally more differentiated and increasingly like those in the West.

While the early research focused on changing society at large, subsequent efforts have followed in the same tradition of taking on large-scale changes, initially in "getting the state right" by insisting on the importation of foreign management models, later on in "getting the economy right" through wide-ranging structural adjustments in the way African countries organize and conduct their business, and more recently in "getting politics right", i.e. making these countries adopt a democratic political order. These shifts in policy paradigm is summarized in Figure 3.

The political science community has been especially active in shaping policy in the past three decades. A main concern has been to produce data on democratic developments in Africa that for comparative purposes fit into global data sets. Although institutions like Freedom House and others in the United States have existed for some time, the most important addition has come from the Varieties of Democracy Institute at Gothenburg University, headed by Professor Staffan Lindberg. He and his collaborators have walked in the footsteps of another Swedish scientist, Carl von Linné, the father of biological taxonomy, by extending the number of types and sub-types of democratic forms. This data base has helped advance further research on democracy in Africa and elsewhere. The strength of this literature lies in enriching our understanding of democracy and how it manifests itself in a variety of forms. It informs us about what shape democracy takes, its degree, and where it is strong or weak. It is research that builds on the democratic convergence theory and the notion that it is a self-propelling system with its parts reinforcing the possibility of progression in a positive direction. If the democratic transition stalls or slides backwards, the answer, therefore, lies in revamping the democratic system, as for example Levitsky and Way (2009) and Waldner and Lust (2015) argue. This research has served the donor community well in past years when democracy looked like "the only game in town".

Figure 3: Changes in donor approaches to institution-building.



The challenge facing this type of research today is of course that the democratic convergence thesis does not hold up. It is no longer possible to assume that countries are marching in lockstep toward a single destination – liberal democracy. Nor does it look very likely that models borrowed from other countries will work. Instead, from a policy perspective it is much more valuable to have answers to the "how" and "why" questions. How is democracy fitting into the governance systems in African countries? Why are some countries doing better than others?

The issue facing researchers interested in policy relevant work, therefore, is whether to continue looking at governance through the global democracy lens or turn it around and look at democracy through a local governance lens? This study is breaking with the current mainstream by choosing the latter path. It blends insights from democratic theory with those of historical institutionalism, notably the concepts of "limited" and "open" access orders (North et al. 2009) to create a framework for analysing governance. Using such an approach provides a sense of the constraints and

opportunities for democratic development. Treating democracy in its governance context also allows for a more realistic interpretation of polling data provided through instruments like the Afrobarometer and the World Values Survey.

Bringing governance back in

Governance first became part of international discourse on development with the 1989 World Bank publication, From Crisis to Sustainable Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa. Before this time, the Bank, like the rest of the donor community, had treated development as an economic and technical issue. It was the realm of economists and other experts. With growing indications throughout the 1980s that development was driven by calls for democratic reform, it became necessary for the World Bank and other development banks to find a way of incorporating political issues into their analysis without indicating that they were taking politically partisan positions.

Box 2: What is PASGR?

PASGR is an independent, not-for-profit organization established in 2011 and headquartered in Nairobi. It works to enhance research excellence in governance and public policy. In partnership with individual academics and researchers, higher education institutions, research think tanks, civil society, and business and policy communities, both in the region and internationally, PASGR supports the production and dissemination of policy-relevant research, designs and delivers short-term professional development courses for researchers and policy actors, and facilitates the development of collaborative higher education programmes. Although PASGR receives funding from a variety of donors and philanthropic institutions, it also sustains its activities by contributions from participating universities and from charging fees for its courses.

Source: www.pasgr.org

"Governance" became the preferred term for doing so. Following a lengthy process of scrutiny by the World Bank's legal department, it

was eventually operationalized. A leading document became its publication on "Governance and Development" (World Bank 1992). Many scholars latched on to the concept, e.g. Barkan (1992), Chazan (1992), and Hyden (1992). Growing out of a broad literature on state-society relations, these authors had in common the idea that regime and state, as Kjaer (2004) notes in her overview of this literature, cannot be studied in isolation of each other. Governance is about organizing and steering society in a certain direction. The regime part of the analysis addresses how far this exercise is democratic. Use of a governance framework changes the research agenda in fundamental ways. It restores a balance between factors that have been out of sync in the recent democracy literature. Thus, it moves the emphasis from (1) institution to power, (2) regime to state, and (3) policy to politics. This does not mean interest in institutions and regime transition disappears, but it does imply subjecting them to analysis in a wider context than has been the case with democratic theory. The African research community is increasingly interested in this approach as a way of being more effective in communicating research to policymakers. A particularly relevant example is the Partnership for African Social and Governance Research (PASGR), which brings together researchers and policy practitioners from more than a dozen countries on the continent. Another initiative that strives in the same direction is the African Research Universities Alliance (ARUA). Both foster research on themes that are of critical importance for policy, for example, how demographic trends are likely to shape African governance in the near to mid-term future. The importance of these institutions is that they bring a much-needed local perspective on issues that hitherto has been dominated by theories with little grounding in African policy realities.

In a region of the world which has lived through several generations of colonialism, where governments are struggling to hold together artificially created territorial entities, a deep-rooted liberal democratic tradition is lacking, and improving life is the highest policy priority, power is at least as consequential a concept as institution. It has its definite place in any governance analysis. The task begins by recognizing that political institutions are not merely structures of voluntary cooperation that resolve collective action

problems and benefit all concerned, but also structures of power that are good for some people and bad for others, depending on who has the power to impose their will (Moe 2005). That is why there is growing interest in organization, and especially the "mother of all organizations" – the state. Understanding the role of the state in development calls for consultation of a different research pedigree. The search goes beyond the rather narrow and more specific analysis of the state that has dominated political science research in recent years. Like economists they have often misdiagnosed the problem that states in developing countries face. It is not the unproductive political intervention in markets that makes everyone worse off. Instead, as North et al. (2009) argue in their masterful historical overview of how the world has moved from systems with a limited access order to those with an open one, the issue is how to avoid violence and secure order. Limited access is a mechanism for doing so, resting on the premise that control of rents and privileges is imperative for upholding social order.

A major reason why market reforms offered by economists and aid agencies typically have fallen short of their objectives is that they have involved dismantling the policies and institutions that prevent violence. Faced with choosing between a limited access order guaranteeing peace and stability and an open variety with the prospect of economic improvement, rational actors would choose the former (North et al. 2012). Promoting democracy in these countries, therefore, is fraught with considerable structural obstacles. It is no coincidence that many political leaders have sided with the state rather than staying with the opposition without access to rents and privileges. Co-optation of opposition party members has been a standard strategy of governing African countries. Governance is primarily based on managing transactions among leading personalities rather than competition between parties grounded in policy positions. This is not a particularly favourable environment for democracy, but it is where the "local grain" is forced to grow – more easily in some African countries than in others. This is also where democracy aid must find its place.

With the realization that democratization needs to be viewed in its local context, it becomes more obvious that it is not only a matter of policy but also of politics. That is why the concept of "political

settlement" makes sense, especially in the analysis of governance in these countries (Khan 2012, 2017). While authors have defined the concept in different ways, there is increasing convergence around the idea that it is about understanding "the formal and informal processes, agreements, and practices that help consolidate politics, rather than violence, as a means for dealing with disagreements about interests, ideas and the distribution and use of power" (Laws and Leftwich 2014: 1). These will play out across two levels, involving both intra-elite and elite-non-elite relations (Laws 2012). In short, political settlement analysis combines the exercise of power with institutional practice in ways that define different governance regimes. How power and institutions interact constitutes the "grain" from which local progress can be made, as the case of Botswana illustrates. Members of the national elite in that country, who are deeply rooted in the traditional life of their respective home villages have employed their personal ties and reciprocities to unite into a governing class, build cross-ethnic coalitions, and maintain strong ties with different segments of society (Rotberg 2004). Botswana is a success story because it has allowed governance and development to evolve from local roots without the international community forcing it to do so. It suggests that examining how institutions and personal power together engender political settlements and how such arrangements differ from country to country is a necessary part of any governance study in Africa.

Conclusions

As donors begin to recognize that local context, local ownership and country systems determine policy outcomes, knowledge in the form of standardized data is not enough and needs to be complemented by a deeper understanding of African political systems and their governance. After decades of trying to "get things right" in Africa by introducing reforms mimicking their own institutions, donors are faced with the challenge that democratization in the region is not just about advancing a policy or project but also a problem to be solved. How does their aid fit into an environment with structures that do not necessarily support a democratic transition? Creating a

framework of analysis based on context rather than a preconceived model or theory is a challenge, but like historical institutionalists studying the evolution of democracy in Latin America (Collier & Collier 2002) and the Middle East and North Africa (Waldner 2018) have shown, critical junctures create institutional pathways that set the parameters of development. Political independence is the most obvious such juncture in Africa. It will serve as the starting point for the first analytical cut: how African countries differ from those in Europe and how they vary among themselves.

The Prime Governance Challenge

Forms of governance in Africa cannot be adequately understood without first addressing the issue of how they have come about. They are creations spurred by a limited access order. African countries, however, have followed pathways of their own. Their story is not just a replica of how the Western nation-state evolved into an open access order or modern state. The state, as we know it in Europe, derives its legitimacy from serving a group of people who share the determinants of a common culture, notably language, and can relate to an identical historical experience. It is commonly the result of battles between nationalities to gain control of their own destiny, a principle that obtained international legitimacy through the 1919 Peace Treaty in Versailles at the end of the First World War. The resolution of this issue coincided with the first wave of democratization, a significant factor in shaping the future of the nation-state. Although it was for some time hijacked by fascists, the notion that the state belongs to its citizens meant that there was a deep-rooted moral rationale for taking it back – hence the second wave of democratization at the end of the Second World War.

This process set in motion decolonization of the African continent. This time, it was more difficult to apply the principle of self-determination based on nationality. There were few, if any, self-evident claims based on a shared national heritage in Africa. Instead of putting nationality first, the decolonisation process was launched on the opposite principle – that the state must forge a nation. Territorial entities which had been politically and administratively organized by colonial powers, were turned into sovereign states. It was up to the leaders of these newly independent state entities to bring together under one flag people who were used to identify with their own ethnic group. This was no easy task. The colonial experience was virtually the only thing these ethnic groups shared as they moved toward political independence. The language of the colonial masters was typically spoken only by a small elite. While decolonization in the African context also involved a liberal democratic component, it was overshadowed by the prime governance challenge of bringing multiple ethnicities into a single nation (Zolberg 1966). It rendered legitimacy to the state as owner

of its citizens. It could claim the moral authority in ways that turned the European experience on its head. African countries after independence came to be engaged in building state-nations where the state was viewed as the right-holder and citizens as duty-bearers. The latter faced the obligation to abandon their parochial loyalties in favour of allegiance to the newly independent state.

The African state-nation

Although Africa has the largest number of state-nations in the world, the concept has hardly ever been applied to political analysis in these countries. As the most authoritative account of "crafting the state-nation" (Stepan, Linz & Yadav 2011) suggests, the concept has been used primarily to discuss the challenges of multiculturalism to the homogeneity of the nation-state. This chapter extends the use of this concept to the African governance scene and examines the specific challenges that stem from the dual threat of a state that is not an organic outgrowth of society and a population that is divided by ethnicity or religion.

A state-nation is a political system which manages diversity while also striving to build a sense of belonging with respect to the larger political community (Linz, Stepan & Yadav 2011). How it differs from the nation-state is illustrated in Table 1. It recognises both the centripetal and centrifugal nature of politics in societies that are characterised by ethnic diversity, often geographically concentrated. Countries like Canada, Belgium and Spain in the West and India, Pakistan, Philippines, and Indonesia in Asia are examples of what these authors view as state-nations. They are contrasted with countries like Japan, Thailand, Germany, France and the Scandinavian countries which have more organically over time grown into nation-states. France, for example, was for many centuries inhabited by groups of people with their own language and culture but since the days of Napoleon France has gradually become a country speaking one language and insisting on foreigners to submit to this view of the nation as a homogenous entity. Eugen Weber (1976) has shown how the French central state, using military conscription and compulsory public schooling, turned Catalans,

Corsicans, Gascons, Normans, Picards, Vendéens, Basques and Bretons, and a host of others, into Frenchmen. The diversities that once so deeply defined the population were flattened. Eric Hobsbawm (1992), for example, reports that at the time of the French Revolution more than half of all those living in France spoke no French at all, and "only 12–13 percent spoke it correctly." Thus, it can be said that France is also an example of how the state, much like it is doing in Africa today, has been used to forge homogeneity. The Bonapartist and Bastille sides of French history coexist to this day.

Table 1: Differences between nation-state and state-nation.

Pre-existing condition	**Awareness of and attachment to one dominant cultural tradition**	**Awareness of and attachment to more than one cultural tradition**
Development scenario	Organic homogenisation	Manufactured integration of consensus
Dominant form of politics	Competition between interest-based parties and organisations	Rivalry over state power among identity-based groups
State policy	Assimilation of new groups	Creation of a sense of belonging to the political community at large
Citizen orientation	Acceptance of a single national identity	Presence of multiple identities

Box 3: Whose flag is it?

Laws and conventions concerning the use of the national flag tell a lot about the difference between nation-states and state-nations. In the former, citizens are free to use the flag to celebrate private events like birthdays or just signal by raising the flag that they are at home, as is practice in Sweden. In the state-nations, use of the flag is limited to official ceremonies and buildings. Private use of the flag is an offense (other than possibly at sports events involving the national team). An even worse penalty would meet the person who raises the equivalent of the unofficial flag representing the Swedish province of Scania (Skåne) with its yellow cross on a red, not blue, background. In state-nations that would amount to treason.

Although there are examples of federal state-nations in Africa, notably Nigeria, Ethiopia and Sudan, federalism as a constitutional principle has not gained wide popularity on the continent. It has been associated with the emergence of irredentist sentiments and as the Biafra War in Nigeria and the violent break-up of Sudan indicate, state building under federalist auspices has been plagued by violence. The protection of minorities as articulated in the United Nations Convention on Cultural and Social Rights, has also had limited appeal among government leaders on the continent (Gilbert 2013) because it is difficult to argue that one ethnic group is more "indigenous" than another. Even devolution of power, as we will discuss later in this report, has been avoided in favour of a strong central state. Centralisation of governance has been the predominant mode.

Evolution of forms of governance

The evolution of African forms of governance can be explained by two principal factors. The first is what happened at independence. To deal with the challenge of managing the new state, political leaders tended to respond in two distinct ways. One was to insist on unity based on control by an inclusivist party monopoly. Another

was to allow for a degree of pluralism within the overall task of building the new nation. The second factor is how well governments have managed diversity since independence. Using data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) on conflicts where the state has been a party and violence has occurred as a result of its inability to pre-empt conflict, we make a distinction here between those countries that have had a largely peaceful governance experience since independence and those that during the same period have suffered disruptive violence due to state action. These data do not include changes in regime, e.g. through military coups, only those conflicts that directly threaten social and political order through violence.

Figure 4: African pathways to current forms governance regime.



These differences show up in four different forms of governance that stretch from being competitive to absolutist. All of them are creations associated with a limited access order. The *competitive* mode is associated with clientelism and tends to stay in equilibrium thanks to the successful management of transactions among leaders of roughly equal ethnic communities. The *fractured* mode is more unstable and involves bargaining between ethnic or religious groups that find it difficult to reach a durable accord. The result is the rise of a "big man" to serve as the ultimate authority. The *monopolist* mode is what might be called a party-state, a form that is a relic from the days of struggling for independence and primarily evident in countries which have had a European settler presence. The *absolutist* mode is characterized by absolute adherence to principles, be they political or technical. It is found in only two countries, both of which have reinvented themselves in the image of their pre-colonial past after a period of violence.

Figure 4 above summarizes the various pathways toward current forms of governance. The arrows accompanied by a number shows them in greater detail. There is quite a strong correlation between pluralist party legacy and peaceful postcolonial past leading to a competitive governance regime. The same applies, albeit less strongly, between a monolithic party legacy, violent postcolonial past and fractured governance regimes. These two types, both of which rely heavily on informal institutions, are dominant. This confirms the findings from the Afrobarometer which show that Africans prefer the informality when it comes to delivery of policy goods (Bratton & Houessou 2014). The more formalized versions – monopolist and absolutist – are in clear minority. The former is a remnant from the liberation struggle and examples of states where the party leading the liberation struggle successfully managed to take over and control the process of building the new state-nation. The absolutist mode is grown out of crisis and aimed at reinventing the past as a way of moving society forward in a peaceful and positive manner. Discipline and obedience are the hallmark of these societies.

The "governmentality" deficit

The African state-nation is a project still in the making. The politics of forging the nation and subjecting society to schemes, ideologies and systems that make it possible for the state to realize its objectives is still the prime governance challenge. In advanced societies like Sweden, individuals manage themselves in ways that agree with the state's notion of good conduct. That is much less so in African countries where "governmentality", as Foucault (1991) calls it, is still an issue because people are not yet organised according to shared economic interest but rather in communities with their own culture. Loyalty still tends to be extended first to religious or ethnic communities. Churches and mosques tend to have a firmer grip on individuals than the state ever manages to achieve. Although Africans are used to managing multiple identities in a cross-cutting manner, being a citizen aligning oneself with the canons of civic public institutions has never really been a priority. Ekeh (1975) showed with reference to Nigeria how communal loyalties trumped those of public institutions. Bratton and Logan (2006) confirm the weakness of civic consciousness by describing respondents in the Afrobarometer survey as "voters but not yet citizens".

Another challenge in the African context is that most people are not part of a formal system that compels them to comply with public law and regulations. For example, small farmers are still subsistence-oriented in their approach to tilling the land. Their reliance on the state for daily living is minimal. In most respects, they continue to be what the present author observed in Tanzania forty years ago – uncaptured by the state (Hyden 1980). Much the same applies to the growing number of informal sector entrepreneurs who conduct their business without being dependent on formal credit institutions and registered with the revenue authority. They may not always be able to escape the heavy hand of the police, but such encounters hardly make people more willing to comply with the dictates of state institutions.

Because the African state-nation lacks the institutional mechanisms that help align state and society in relations that are mutually productive, it is no surprise that state-based conflicts (i.e.

conflicts where the state is at least one of the actors) keep occurring. According to one report, there has in fact been an increase in the number of such conflicts in Africa over the past five years. In 2017, Africa experienced 18 state-based conflicts (Bakken & Rustad 2018). While this is a decrease from the all-time high of 21 conflicts in 2016, it is substantially higher than ten years ago. These conflicts tend to be confined to a smaller number of countries, the Horn of Africa, the Mano River region in West Africa and the Sahel being most afflicted. These are all places where the boundaries drawn by the colonial powers collide with those set by local entities – in the Horn by Ethiopia, in the Mano River region by Liberia, and in the Sahel by nomadic populations like the Tuaregs.

Most state-based conflicts in Africa stem from violations of the transactional nature of politics. Military coups have in several cases been a starting-point for a slide toward civil war and chaos whenever leaders have tried to impose a police-like state where not only freedom of association and speech is prohibited but so is the opportunity to bribe oneself out of trouble (Roessler 2015). Informal institutions are vital in African society as ways of overcoming hardship and getting out of dilemmas. Whenever these avenues are blocked, society tends to stall and opposition to the regime rise. The imposition of a Marxist-Leninist ideology aimed at totalitarian control of society has proved to be an especially grave threat to political stability and led to both coups and civil wars. Nkrumah's fall in Ghana, the forced departure of Modibo Keita in Mali and Mengistu Haile Mariam in Ethiopia are only among the most noted such cases of political "overreach". Although not necessarily contributing to state-based conflict, it is generally true across Africa that ideological regimes have been difficult to sustain. The best-known case is Tanzania where a home-grown ideology – *ujamaa* – was initially widely embraced locally and supported by many others – Africans as well as donors – but gradually gave way to a more instrumentalist and transactional form of politics that characterises the country to this day.

Conclusions

African governance rests on a moral foundation that in key respects is the opposite to what we take for granted in Europe based on our own historical experience. The state, not its citizens, owns the nation. The state is the rights holder, citizens the duty-bearers. Democracy is not the core of political settlements. In the limited access order that prevails, it is part of the opposition. The dilemma that African governments face is that while they rely on the state for security and development, they lack the institutional mechanisms for effective execution. Because society is not legible enough, policies are not targeted in a rational fashion but decided upon first and foremost on parochial grounds. Thus, while governments need a rational machinery for sustaining their operations, their adherence to the norms of a limited access order works in the opposite direction. Governments want to be able to "see like a state" (Scott 1999) but they take actions that hinder this from happening. Such is at present the nature of the state-nation project in most countries.

Variations in Governance

Despite the similarities African countries share by being a state-nation nested in a limited access order, there are variations in governance. Using the four modes identified in the previous chapter, this one will address the issue of how the different regimes affect the prospect for democratic development. This is an important part of understanding the local context and its dynamics. To further probe how the paradoxes in African governance play out, the chapter will also examine whether democracy bolsters or hinders the rationalization of the state and what difference governance regime makes for the delivery of public goods. To put it all in perspective, it may be helpful to reiterate the contextual differences between Europe and Africa that have shaped the modes of governance today.

The democratic transition in Sweden and other European countries grew out of struggles over production and distribution of scarce resources. This is how we got a democratic system centred on political parties anchored in distinct "right" and "left" positions (Lipset & Rokkan 1967). Such ideological parties existed in Africa before independence and were driving the push for independence during the second wave of democratization in the post-Second World War period. These struggles were significant at the time. They took the European idea of democracy to the African continent. For the political leadership of these organisations, however, it was freedom in the form of national sovereignty rather than human rights that was the priority. Ideology, therefore, soon gave way to pragmatism and principle to personality. Religious creed filled the normative void in politics. Together with ethnicity it became a principal factor dividing society.

Development in African countries has yet to crystallize society into social forces that produce the same cleavages and party system that determined the nature of the democratic transition in Europe a hundred years ago. The transition in Africa today takes place in institutional circumstances that are quite different. As part of the analysis we will discuss how far level of development is a factor in democratization. African countries are almost without exception

low-income countries where development is driven by foreign investments. The indigenous middle-class, therefore, has yet to evolve into a force of its own. Nonetheless, its role may still tell us something important about how countries in Africa can break out of the confines of a limited access order.

Governance regime and democracy

Being at the core of governance, we have shown that governments in Africa differ in terms of their inclusiveness. Some countries have settlements with a wide span, others have a narrower one. As Kelsall (2018) has demonstrated with reference to Tanzania the span within a given country may vary over time. The main difference seems to be between countries that are hierarchically organized with a dominant party or military in charge, on the one hand, and competitive and fractured regimes on the other, where compromise among politicians representing strong parochial groups, be they ethnic or religious, is the dominant pattern. This is especially the case where governance is characterized by clientelist competition but even where a "Big Man" dominates, he is dependent on being able to produce a viable coalition of supporters drawn from communities strong enough to strike a bargain with him. In contrast, hierarchically organized settlements tend to limit access to rents and privileges. Wherever inclusivist mass parties were able to hold on to a monopoly of power after independence, it became difficult to escape the autocratic inclination based on a perceived right to govern because they "delivered the new nation" (Doorenspleet & Nijzink 2014). The direction of Tanzania's governance today is a recent example of how this inclination manifests itself. The experience with inclusivist mass parties has not been as positive as initially expected (e.g. Reilly & Nordlund 2008). Rather than widening the span of the political settlement these parties have narrowed it.

Using V-Dem's Liberal Democracy Index, we examine how democracy fares in the different governance regimes. The scores are shown in Table 2. They tell a lot about African governance that a focus on democracy alone misses. First, clientelist forms of

competition prove to be twice as likely to provide space for democratic norms than any of the other three regimes. Thus, even though the competitive regime type relies on transactional alliances and tend to be volatile, in some instances leading to ethnic strife as in Kenya, they are at the same time generating the need for formal rules to underpin and legitimize competition. It is no coincidence that the only significant "constitutionalization" of democratic rights brought by domestic political experience has taken place in Kenya. It is a good example of how cognitive insights based on historical experience have guided a country's response to the external forces demanding reforms.

A second finding is that a peaceful development since independence has been a main factor in facilitating the response to demands for more democracy. Both competitive and monopolist regimes score higher than those that suffered from conflict and violence, albeit the latter less convincingly than the competitive type. A pluralist approach to party developments at independence seem to have helped the accommodation of democratic values in the early 1990s (Nordlund 2007; Boogards & Boucek 2010). For example, minority parties developed in places like South Africa and Kenya during the struggle for independence (or majority rule as in South Africa) and their legacy lived on to facilitate the transition to a multi-party system in the 1990s. In this respect, Africa is similar with Latin America and the Middle East & North Africa where democratization in recent decades, as discussed above, has been shaped at critical junctures back in the middle of the 20th century.

Countries that have lived through a period of conflict and violence after independence have had especially great problems to make democracy work on a sustainable basis. Some of them have bounced back from chaos by adopting a militarist approach justified with reference to the presence of extraordinary circumstances. Rwanda is an example of where a true national emergency produced such a drastic approach to governance but a similar rationale, albeit less dramatically, has been used also in other countries, e.g. Eritrea and Ethiopia. Others, however, have opted for a civilian approach. Getting back to civilian rule has often proceeded only with the permission of the army as in Nigeria or with the assistance of external bodies as in the cases of Liberia and Sierra Leone. The

memory and experience of the killings has no doubt played a role in pushing these countries toward democracy but given their fractured nature, salvation has been sought in a strong leader who can refer to a heroic act such as overthrowing a brutal leader or ending a civil war as justification for holding the state-nation together. These charismatic leaders, however, have themselves been tempted to remain in power for as long as possible e.g. by changing the constitutional principle that a president can only stay in office for two terms (of 4 or 5 years). President Museveni of Uganda and President Nkurunziza of Burundi are two recent examples of leaders acting in this fashion.

Table 2: Scores by regime type (LDI) 2018.

(Legend: 1.0 top; 0.0 bottom)

Type of regime or Country	**Score**	**Type of regime or country**	
Competitive (23)		***Fractured (20)***	
Mauritius	0.716	Ivory Coast	0.451
Cape Verde	0.702	Gambia	0.441
Botswana	0.586	Niger	0.439
South Africa	0.575	Mozambique	0.322
Namibia	0.574	Mali	0.316
Sao Tomé e Principe	0.561	Uganda	0.269
Senegal	0.558	Central African Republic	0.249
Benin	0.535	Gabon	0.238
Ghana	0.531	Comoros	0.222
Burkina Faso	0.499	Togo	0.199
Seychelles	0.475	Swaziland	0.156
Malawi	0.462	Cameroon	0.131
Nigeria	0.435	Dem Rep. Of Congo	0.116
Liberia	0.425	Somalia	0.109
Lesotho	0.421	Congo	0.105
Sierra Leone	0.385	Chad	0.096
Kenya	0.297	Sudan	0.088
Madagascar	0.293	South Sudan	0.052
Guinea Bissau	0.285	Burundi	0.050
Zambia	0.244	Equatorial Guinea	0.049
Guinea	0.176	**Average:**	**0.205**
Mauritania	0.165		
Djibouti	0.123		
Average:	0.409		

Absolutist (2)		*Monopolist (4)*	
Rwanda	0.164	Tanzania	0.382
Eritrea	0.016	Zimbabwe	0.205
Average:	**0.090**	Angola	0.197
		Ethiopia	0.154
		Average:	**0.236**

Source: Varieties of Democracy Liberal Democracy Index 2018

Yet another finding is that universalism is a troublesome concept to accommodate in any one of the four types of governance regime, but it tends to be especially so in countries where a Big Man arises amidst deep social fractures to claim the role of saviour. Governance in these countries eventually generates a "we-and-them" feeling that sets the strong man against an opposition that in the long run may gain strength and lead to his removal. Sudan 2019 is the most recent example of what might happen to such leaders if they overstay their time in power. Again, causation is reciprocal, delivering democracy by default rather than by design. The main reason why the notion of universal rights is not widely embraced in Africa is that it is not engrained in the political culture. For example, the concept of "freedom" sits loose in the average African definition of democracy. When asked to define the concept, only four out of ten Afro-barometer respondents mentioned "freedom" as part of its essence, leading Bratton (2010) to worry about the equivalences – and validity – of survey responses to questions that may take on a different meaning dependent on culture and history.

Last but not the least, the data suggest that regimes depending on informal institutions tend to be more accommodating of democracy than those that are more formalized. This indicates that local African values are compatible with democracy and the challenge is for actors to work out the appropriate modality on terms that fit the challenges of the state-nation project. Doing so is not a matter of change overnight but a process that takes time and involves social learning. Individual leaders, like most recently Prime Minister Abyi Ahmed of Ethiopia, may be capable of bringing about change in a democratic direction, but institutionalizing it takes time and could even backfire. For that reason, it is important to approach

democratization in Africa in terms of the glass being half-full rather than half-empty, i.e. seeing it as growing rather than falling short of an absolute ideal.

The spread of democracy

When democratization began in Latin America in the 1980s and quickly spread to Eastern Europe it took the form of a wave. Whole regions were swept in one and the same direction. It made a noticeable difference. Citizens celebrated when new leaders embraced civil and political rights for all and brought back competitive elections for government office. Whether this involved saying good-bye to military or communist rule, it was a historical watershed – a critical juncture for politics in those two regions. More recently, the Middle East and North Africa region experienced a similar wave – the Arab Spring. It was less successful, but it shook the region to the core and the democratic spirit it generated is not dead as evidence from Algeria more recently confirms.

Compared with these regions, democratization in Africa began in a less dramatic fashion. As Bratton and van de Walle (1997) show in their analysis of what happened, protests began in some countries but not in others. What happened in one country got little publicity in others, including those close by. This "bubbling-up-here-and-there" was not insignificant but it never turned into a real wave. The two authors wisely referred to the events as "democratic experiments". What helped turn this process into a more continent-wide phenomenon was the support given by Western donors. Where governments did not accept the coming of a new order, donors generously supported civil society organizations – some of which were genuine, others proving to be fake. This support has no doubt helped civil society organizations to become a voice in governance, but its close link to the donors might have carried the risk of being painted as serving "foreign interest". (Hearn 2000). As civil society has grown in strength in many countries, this point may be less applicable today but organizing collective action for democratic causes in a sustainable manner remains a challenge in societies divided along vertical lines. Shifting social cleavages from

vertical to horizontal lines and reordering society along class lines is an effort that is at best in a beginning stage. We do not share the view expressed in a book on recent protest waves in African countries 2011-16, that social class consciousness – among members of both the middle and working classes – is driving these countries in a democratic direction, much like they did in Europe a century ago (Mueller 2018). Overthrowing autocracy is easier than building democracy. Protest or rebellion is only a first step and not itself evidence of a democratic transition. What happened with the outcome of the struggle for independence bears witness to this. Without a historical perspective on institutions, it is easy to overdramatize the impact of single current events. The point is that democratization in African countries has benefitted from the tailwind that the Third Wave provided across the world, but it has also encountered headwinds – not really in the form of explicit right-wing opposition but rather the absence of strong domestic social forces to drive the project and the lure of aid without political conditions by countries in Asia and the Middle East.

The significance of history becomes even more evident when the analysis is brought down to sub-regional level. Although democratic values are somewhat more strongly rooted in Western and Southern African countries than they are in Central and East Africa, there is no concentration of democratic countries in the region except for Southern Africa where Botswana, Namibia and South Africa constitute a democratic core. Another notable feature of the African democracy scene is that the small island-states in the Atlantic and Indian oceans tend to outperform states on the African mainland. Mauritius and the Seychelles on the east side and Cape Verde and Sao Tomé e Principe on the west side are among the high scorers (but the larger island nation of Madagascar is not). This seems to confirm the observation that small islands with indigenous consensus cultures provide greater scope for democracy as noted with reference to the many small islands in the Caribbean and the Pacific (Anckar 2002). Not only history but also geography is important for understanding patterns of governance.

Because democratization in Africa has resulted from the burst of local bubbles rather than a transformative wave, there is no single model for how to sustain a transition to democracy. For example,

Botswana has for a long time been an exemplary case of democracy, but it has not inspired leaders from other countries. Instead, despite being built on local traditions, these leaders have often criticized the country for being "too Western". In the contemporary African context, there is no equivalent to Brazil or Poland to serve as beacon for the whole region. Democracy, at least so far, has lacked the contagion effect that it had in both Latin America, Eastern Europe and – to a lesser extent – in the MENA region during the Arab Spring.

The African region has also lacked robust institutional mechanisms for monitoring and enforcing democratic values. The African Union has been primarily concerned with continent-wide security issues and it is bodies at sub-regional level that have tried to step in to evaluate and respond to critical governance events. Although the relatively high democracy scores in West Africa cannot be attributed to the work of its regional body – ECOWAS – the latter has been actively intervening not only to stop the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone, but also to prevent member countries from turning to outright autocracy. The Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) has similarly been active in monitoring member states and in the case of Lesotho intervened to save the democratic system. Equivalent bodies in Central and East Africa have been much more hesitant to intervene in the affairs of member countries. For example, the leaders of the East African Community have failed to intervene in Burundi to stop President Nkurunziza from changing the country's constitution to enable him to continue in power beyond the stipulated two terms. The region lacks a superpower of its own like South Africa in the South and Nigeria in the West. Furthermore, the other East African leaders can easily be accused of lacking the moral authority for a credible intervention in another country's internal affairs.

Democracy and the state

Reconciling the competitive dynamics of a democracy with the controlling imperative of the state has not been easy in any African country but the response varies. Some leaders like Presidents

Kagame of Rwanda and Museveni of Uganda, have preferred to push the issue down the road arguing that democracy is something that Africans will enjoy one day – but not now. Others, like the Presidents of Gabon and Togo, have engaged in an exercise of picking only some features of democracy to make the state veneer more appealing. But what is the situation if analysed in the perspective of the four dominant governance regimes? Does democracy go together with the state more easily in some regimes? If so, which ones?

Table 3: Government effectiveness scores by regime 2018.

Competitive (23)		*Fractured (20)*	
Mauritius	+1.02	Burkina Faso	-0.55
Botswana	+.051	Swaziland	-0.59
Seychelles	+0.40	Uganda	-0.60
South Africa	+0.32	Niger	-0.62
Namibia	+0.20	Ivory Coast	-0.67
Cape Verde	+0.10	Gambia	-0.72
Ghana	-0.20	Cameroon	-0.80
Kenya	-0.30	Mauritania	-0.80
Senegal	-0.50	Mozambique	-0.90
Malawi	-0.70	Mali	-1.01
Sao Tome e Principe	-0.71	Congo Republic	-1.12
Benin	-0.71	Togo	-1.12
Zambia	-0.72	Burundi	-1.40
Gabon	-0.81	Equatorial Guinea	-1.42
Lesotho	-0.81	Chad	-1.51
Djibouti	-0.97	DR of Congo	-1.52
Guinea	-1.03	Comoros	-1.54
Nigeria	-1.12	Central African Republic	-1.77
Sierra Leone	-1.22	South Sudan	-2.12
Liberia	-1.28	Somalia	-2.22
Sudan	-1.41	**Average**	**-1.40**
Guinea Bissau	-1.62		
Average	**-0.63**		
Absolutist (2)		***Monopolist (4)***	
Rwanda	+0.12	Ethiopia	-0.59
Eritrea	-1.69	Tanzania	-0.63
Average:	**-0.91**	Angola	-1.04
		Zimbabwe	-1.62
		Average:	**-0.97**

Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators 2019.

Government effectiveness is a strong indicator of how well-formalized governmental capacity is to deliver public policy and goods. It measures stateness; it addresses the governmentality challenge African countries face. As the scores for all four regimes show, this capacity is generally low in Africa. The countries that have enjoyed a peaceful period since independence are largely doing better. Most striking is that the competitive and clientelist states are once again showing up as best performers. This is somewhat surprising since the conventional wisdom has been that clientelist politics tends to undermine state effectiveness. Its performance seems to suffer most in countries with fractured governance pattern because when the strongman acts at his own discretion to maintain national unity and political stability, the victim easily becomes the professional character of the public service. It is also evident that states with a monopolist party dominating the governance system don't have effective governments.

State capacity is generally higher in southern Africa where most countries score above average – Botswana, Mauritius, Namibia, Seychelles and South Africa. The pattern for this sub-region is similar with the democracy scores but the western region does not score as high on state effectiveness as they do on liberal democracy. Instead, Eastern Africa, albeit not by a big margin, comes in second. Scores for Control of Corruption (not tallied in detail here) correlate with those of government effectiveness. Thus, not surprisingly, countries like Botswana, Namibia and Rwanda come out on top of the control of corruption list of African countries.

The conclusion is that there is no evidence that democracy itself causes low government effectiveness. The quality of service, the independence of public institutions, and the capacity to implement policy, however, are generally low, as the scores for each regime suggests. Only seven out of the regions 48 countries perform above the global average. It is no surprise that with this poor record across the board, sub-Saharan Africa trails all the other regions in the world when it comes to government effectiveness. It confirms that the state in Africa is both weak and soft, i.e. not only lacking capacity but also operating on informal criteria that not always but often undermine the rule of law and the principle of impartiality.

One reason for the variation among countries in Table 3 is likely to be the degree to which the majority of people is integrated into the modern economy and thus potentially accessible for taxation. The notion that everyone should pay tax is not well understood in most African countries where a subsistence ethos still holds much ground and the state is experienced more as burden than enabler. This is especially true for smallholder peasants but applies equally to informal sector operators in urban areas for whom self-employment is the standard way of life. These people do their best to avoid the arm of the state. The less developed and formalized the economy is, the greater the probability that the state will be preoccupied with enhancing control rather than effectiveness.

Politics, policy and public goods

One of the hallmarks of Western democracy is that politics is driven by reasoned debates about policy. Content is as important as form. The idea that policy content matters has been more contested in African countries where building a state-nation is job number one and power considerations tend to overshadow public policy. Bratton et al. (2011) have shown that it is not necessarily one or the other but often a combination of both. Using aggregate and survey data from 16 African countries they showed that competitive elections are more than just ethnic censuses or simple economic referenda. As expected, people who belong to the ethnic group in power intend to support the ruling party, in contrast to those who feel a sense of discrimination against their cultural group. But would-be voters in Africa also consider policy performance, especially the government's perceived handling of unemployment, inflation, and income distribution. Moreover, as the authors argue, a full account of the intention to vote in Africa requires recognition that citizens are motivated—sincerely or strategically—by partisan considerations. They vote for established ruling parties because they expect that incumbents will win. Voters attempt to associate themselves with prospective winners because they wish to gain access to patronage benefits and to avoid retribution after the election. These dynamics are most evident in African countries where dominant parties restrict the range of electoral choice but can

be found elsewhere as well. Hoffman and Long (2013) show that partisan considerations tend to weigh heavier than ethnic ones in Ghana. Another one on the contested general election in Kenya 2007 (Bratton & Kimenyi 2008) shows that people vote defensively in ethnic blocs, but not exclusively because they also take policy issues into account.

The challenge in African countries, however, is that policy issues are not reasons for party formation or mobilization. As noted above, when nation-states in Europe democratized in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, political parties were formed around specific salient policy issues, notably regarding the role of the state in the economic sphere (Lipset & Rokkan 1967). This process endured over a relatively long time and it was possible to take on one issue at a time. Development was an incremental process that allowed for the institutionalization of political parties and a system based on well-anchored opinions. The African state-nations face a very different situation. As laggards, they are expected to accelerate their development by acting on a global agenda that has been set for them by the international community. There are no real ideological alternatives in African elections, only criticism of government – especially among ethnic groups that feel mistreated or alienated. Thus, while voters may consider policy at election time, they don't have the incentive to organize into political parties based on an alternative vision or ideology as happened in Europe. Pressed to conform with international accords like the Millennium Development Goals – or nowadays the Sustainable Development Goals – African countries are treated as if the world has indeed reached the "end of ideology", as Fukuyama (1992) maintained. The weakness, if not absence, of horizontal cleavages based on social class reinforces a form of politics where ideology gives way to instrumentalism. The result is that voting based on personality becomes prominent. Individual capacity to deliver policy to favored groups – so-called "club" goods – becomes the preferred reason for voter choice. Transactionalism, i.e. deal-making, rather than ideology prevails.

Delivering public goods is a challenge across Africa but does governance regime make a difference? To find out, we have chosen the Human Development Index, issued by the United Nations

Development Programme, as our source. Table 4 shows that countries in the competitive category score the highest also on delivery of public policy proving once more that clientelism is not a hindrance to scoring high, provided state capacity is not undermined. Transactionalism may be a threat to the long-term stability of a democratic order but it also has the advantage of providing flexibility at a time when countries struggle with taking steps toward an open access order. Wherever politics is the monopoly – or near-monopoly – of a single political party, it is much more difficult to find space for civil and political rights. There are some surprising outliers in the HDI table. Gabon, Congo Republic and Equatorial Guinea, which score low in governance, are in fact among countries with the highest levels of human development. This suggests that while governance quality matters, it is not the only factor that leads to improved human welfare, income from oil exports being an obvious one in the three cases above. With access to such large national incomes, there is little incentive to listen to others and, for example, develop forms of democratic governance.

Table 4: Human Development scores by type of governance regime, 2017. (Legend: 0=low level of human development; 1= high level)

Type of regime or Country	Score	Type of regime or country	Score
Competitive (23)		***Fractured (20)***	
Seychelles	0.782	Congo Republic	0.592
Mauritius	0.781	Equatorial Guinea	0.592
Botswana	0.706	Swaziland	0.541
Gabon	0.697	Cameroon	0.518
South Africa	0.666	Comoros	0.512
Cape Verde	0.648	Central African Republic	0.503
Ghana	0.579	Togo	0.503
Zambia	0.579	Uganda	0.495
Sao Tome e Principe	0.574	Ivory Coast	0.474
Kenya	0.555	Djibouti	0.473
Lesotho	0.527	Gambia	0.452
Mauritania	0.513	Mali	0.442
Madagascar	0.512	Democratic Republic of Congo	0.435
Senegal	0.494	Burkina Faso	0.434
Sudan	0.490	Mozambique	0.418
Benin	0.483	South Sudan	0.418
Malawi	0,477	Guinea	0.414
Djibouti	0.473	Burundi	0.404
Namibia	0.452	Chad	0.396
Nigeria	0.432	Niger	0.354
Guinea Bissau	0.424	Somalia	n/d
Liberia	0.420	**Average**	**0.492**
Sierra Leone	0.417		
Average	**0.541**		
Absolutist (2)		***Monopolist (4)***	
Rwanda	0.498	Angola	0.533
Eritrea	0.420	Tanzania	0.531
Average	**0.459**	Zimbabwe	0.516
		Ethiopia	0.448
		Average:	0.507

Source: Human Development Index 2018

The delivery of public goods in African countries is still a problem given the preference leaders and the public share for relying on informal institutions that produce benefits for specific groups (Bratton & Housseau 2014). The dilemma facing African state-nations in their pursuit of sustainable forms of governance is that their own low levels of development tend to encourage approaches that maintain politics-as-usual rather than promote a social transformation. It is a "Catch-22" situation which is hard to escape. One reason for the perpetuation of a limited access order is that trust in African politics is still very much personalized. It rests on informal as much as formal institutions. In fact, it is not uncommon that formal institutions are applied to punish actors who violate the informal codes by which politics is conducted. Laws are applied in a discretionary, not universalist manner to keep the limited access order going. For example, a critic of the president may find himself in detention accused of something that many others have also done, but for which they have never been punished.

The usual interpretation of how social trust develops is through iterative Prisoner's Dilemma games but in a context where informal rather than formal institutions prevail, there is reason to assume other explanations may also apply. Foremost of these tends to be the vertical cleavages that still shape relations among people. At the elite level, these cleavages inevitably create rivalry and competition for control of scarce resources. Building and maintaining social trust, therefore, is also influenced by cultural factors that reinforce the difficulty of making iterative transactional Prisoner's Dilemma games produce sustainable levels of trust. The result is that circles of social trust at political elite level in African countries tend to be narrow. Presidents typically rely on a small number of aids and advisors that are known to them on a personal basis. These appointments are not necessarily meritocratic and more often reputational. Some presidents for whom policy advice seems to matter little but security looms large may go as far as hiring elite soldiers from another country to protect their life.

Conclusions

This chapter has shown how governance varies among countries in Africa. Somewhat contrary to conventional wisdom, those that rely on a competitive, clientelist form of governance demonstrate the best opportunity for both democracy and state effectiveness. Those that are forced to depend on the political strength of a "Big Man" ruler or live in countries with a party-state or an autocratic, often militarist political set-up have much greater difficulty in providing space for democracy and the evolution of an open access order. Thus, a closer look at how democracy fits into governance in individual African countries provides further evidence that democratization in Africa has been more like a trickle than a wave that has transformed the continent in a democratic direction. The challenge remains how democracy can be developed from within in circumstances that are, if not hostile to such a process yet may not be immediately supportive. Such contextual information – or intelligence – is relevant not only for the researcher but also the policy practitioner. Next chapter will offer more detailed information about the variable conditions in four countries that have been of longtime interest to Western donors, not the least the Nordics.

Four Neighbours, Four Regimes

The closer the analytical lens is projected on the social and political realities in Africa, the more obvious it becomes that history and geography still matter for how countries are being governed. Despite all the efforts to modernize Africa, there has been little levelling of its natural conditions. There has been no agrarian, leave alone industrial revolution. Even urbanization has provided little impetus for social transformation. Africa's urban centres are yet to perform the progressive role that they played in Europe and other regions of the world. At least so far, cities in Africa have served as reservoirs of wealth that have benefitted rural as much as urban life. Rather than investing for the future, most urban residents have shared their wealth with brethren in the village and their lifestyle has continued to reflect values and habits specific to their respective home areas. Massive numbers of youth – both male and female – have flocked to the cities but with little chance of bringing about a change in social formations similar to what has happened in other regions in the world. Not only is the middle class weak, African countries also lack an organized working class. African cities continue to be the home of a diffuse under-class that occasionally bursts into violent protests but falls short of organizing to transform society. It is yet another reminder of the difficult conditions that face African governments in managing the state-nation. It is no surprise, therefore, that they tend to continue relying on institutional legacies that go back all the way to precolonial times.

Africans very much look forward – hoping for a better life – but they are also engaged in reinventing their past. They take pride in being Africans, not people just mimicking others. This becomes evident, for example, in a comparison of four East African countries - Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda – which in addition to having a common colonial experience are members of the same sub-regional organization – the East African Community[1]. Focusing on these four countries also makes sense given that they have for a long

[1] The East African Community also includes Burundi and South Sudan.

time been program countries for Western donors, including Sweden.

These countries are not individually representative of the full variation on the continent. The reason for choosing them for this study is rather that despite their shared colonial legacy and their choice to be members of the same sub-regional community, they not only differ but also disagree as often as they agree with each other. Spats between Rwanda and its neighbours, Uganda and Burundi, flare up on an almost regular basis. Relations between Kenya and Tanzania likewise show signs of continuous strain. The East African Community has been unable to do much about these conflicts because leaders are foremost driven by the imperatives on the ground in their respective countries rather than the benefits of regional cooperation. As we have argued in previous chapters, managing the state-nation project tends to side-line not only democracy but also the public goods that stem from economic cooperation on a larger scale. These are ideals that tend to be embraced by those who are locked out of the reigning political settlement. This chapter will discuss how the past and present encounter each other, how they shape governance in ways that differ from country to country, and what difference governance regime makes for development.

Precolonial legacies

When the colonial borders were drawn up, little attention was paid to how Africans lived and interacted with each other. The result was that each colonial territory brought together ethnic groups that in some cases had little in common and in others were long-time rivals or enemies keeping peace through local institutions such as horizontal joking relationships, i.e. the right to make fun of each other without taking offense (Radcliffe Brown 1940). How ethnic communities were constituted and how they were ruled also differed. In the savanna highlands of what today is Kenya, societies were ruled by clan elders and lacked a supreme leader, i.e. a chief or king. These were stateless or acephalous societies which meant that they also lacked fixed boundaries. The Kikuyu, Masai and other

groups that occupied this land were frontier people who moved freely in to new lands (Kopytoff 1989). They had to get along by using reciprocal exchanges to avoid conflict, including the right to take revenge in case of attack. Kenyan politics today is modelled on this precolonial principle. The British decision to alienate land to white settlers obviously limited their territory and this decision eventually led to the Mau Mau uprising. Although the Kikuyus have tried to claim supremacy based on their leading role in the struggle for independence, the political playing-field in Kenya is relatively even leading to intense competition between the various acephalous ethnic groups and the need for political actors to create alliances across ethnic lines. Leading figures in each group become the focus of clientelist networks. Being able to deliver goods to their followers becomes the key to success and a sustained political career. Once a leader has a strong following, he (or she) cannot be ignored in the national conversation about who should be in government. It is among these political "patrons" that national leaders emerge, and political settlements are reached. On surface, Kenyan politics appears volatile but the rules – whether formal or informal – are well known and respected by the politicians. Even though it has led to "collateral damages" like the ethnic clashes following the 2007 elections, Kenya is a perfect example of transactional politics where it becomes hard to restrict political freedoms because there is no single group or party strong enough to govern on its own. In fact, this dynamic tends to generate a demand for rules that apply equally to all.

Rwanda is the opposite to Kenya. Borders matter and they have remained pretty much the same as they were before 1884. It is a traditional kingdom that has modernized within its own shell. Although the monarchy was abolished at independence, its legacy never died. The Hutu leaders who took over the government soon after independence tried to eliminate it but never succeeded. When the Tutsi aristocracy returned from exile and seized power after the 1994 genocide against its members that had remained in the country, the cultural norms of the monarchical past have been restored in the form of "home-grown initiatives", policies that aim to build on indigenous institutions. These include, for example, *imihigo* – a form of performance contracts adapted from precolonial governance

practices, *gacaca* courts – local platforms for civil dispute resolution, and *umuganda* – an indigenous term for communal work that has been revived to organize local development work. Rwanda is one of few countries in Africa which have much in common with the nation-state: a confluence between nationality and state, a single language and a social cleavage based on caste, not tribe. Its transactional politics, therefore, is less apparent but exists in the form of hierarchical arrangements to perform common public duties. Rwanda's model is the East Asian developmental state. It has its own strategy of development – Vision 2050 – adopted after a broad consultation with Rwandans of all backgrounds. Participation in the Rwandan developmental state is compulsory. It is presented as a civic duty. While horizontal transactions are what keeps Kenya going, Rwanda relies almost exclusively on vertical transactions. As a result of the complete systemic breakdown following the 1994 Genocide, Rwandans are generally striving for consensus in matters of national interest. The aim is to recreate a sense of national identity and loyalty through the emphasis on one language, one culture, one history and one people. This takes precedence over freedom and democracy.

Uganda has much in common with Rwanda, but it is also different. Like so much of the land around the Great Lakes of Africa a big share of Ugandan territory is banana country – a perennial crop that led to sedentary living and the growth of more complex systems of government long before the colonial powers arrived. The British who were given Uganda at the Berlin Conference brought together into one territory no less than five kingdoms – Buganda, Ankole, Busoga, Bunyoro and Toro – for which borders mattered. Disputes between especially Bunyoro and Buganda became politically heated events during colonial time and occupied much of the attention of the British overlords. Although the British had relied on all kingdoms to participate in their administration under the system of indirect rule, Buganda became especially important to the administration because the country's capital, Kampala, is situated within its borders. As the British were withdrawing from Uganda and prepared for independence, they yielded to the demand from Buganda to give the kingdom a federal status within the Republic of Uganda. Furthermore, the Buganda king – the *Kabaka* – became the

republic's first President. Others saw these arrangements as the creation of a "state within the state" and once the pre-independence elections had been held, the majority political party, the Uganda People's Congress, felt hampered by the favoured status of Buganda. Milton Obote – the Prime Minister – representing the acephalous northern region of Uganda, went as far as asking the national army in 1966 to intervene by attacking the presidential palace – likewise the traditional residence of the King. The latter was forced into exile, but an equally important indirect consequence of this intervention was Field Marshal Idi Amin's coup in 1971. He had smelled the sweetness of power and five years later, he did not hesitate to overthrow Obote when he attended a British Commonwealth meeting in Singapore. Uganda has remained a socially and politically fractured country in which the powers of the traditional kingdoms have remained despite attempts to lessen their influence by breaking them down into administrative districts. The country had seven different presidents during its first twenty-five years of independence, none of whom managed to successfully hold the country together. Since 1986 it has had the same "Big Man", Yoweri Museveni, as president. He has been one of Africa's most resilient rulers but to stay in power he has, among other things, had to change the country's constitution which specifies that no one can be elected president once he has reached the age of 75 years, a limit he has already passed. As we show with specific reference to the social media in Appendix One, opposition against President Museveni has been growing in recent years but he has shown no sign of stepping down. Like monarchs in pre-democratic Europe he continues to see himself as indispensable for guaranteeing political stability and security in Uganda. As he applies his ways of managing the diversity of the Ugandan state-nation, he also feeds on it to stay in power, the mark of a relentless neo-patrimonial ruler.

Tanzania, finally, also has a pre-colonial past that matters to this day. The country is a complex mixture of sedentary and nomadic peoples, none of which was really a dominant force prior to 1884 when the Germans were given the go-ahead to occupy Tanganyika, the mainland portion of what is today Tanzania (the island of Zanzibar under British protection at the time being the other). What has really brought the many ethnic groups in the country together is

the legacy of the Arab slave trade and its help in spreading Kiswahili, a language made up of influences from Arabic and various Bantu languages. The country's first president, Julius Nyerere, saw the potential for national unification by making Kiswahili not only a lingua franca but also an official language to be used in government. Kiswahili is today a lingua franca and official language in Kenya too, and it is being used both officially and unofficially in the other East African countries, notably Burundi. It is also used in deliberations in the East African legislature, the legislative body of the East African Community. It is only in Tanzania, however, where the language represents a distinct culture that embraces the population at large. Kiswahili has served the Tanzanian state-nation project well. Ethnic identities have been largely abandoned and the precolonial governance systems of each ethnic group erased in favour of a nation-wide local government system. In this respect, Tanzania differs from Rwanda where the precolonial institutions of the indigenous kingdom have been reinvented for contemporary use. By giving so much emphasis to Kiswahili as a distinct culture, Tanzania has created an image of itself inspired by a Pan-African ideal of continental self-reliance and pride.

The different precolonial circumstances of each country have helped shape them as state-nations. The colonial tutelage never fully erased the precolonial legacies. Thus, in unfolding the complexity of governance in Africa, these legacies must be added as relevant institutional factors.

How they govern

With these distinguishing features in mind, the question is how they affect the way countries are governed. To get a sense of it, the study focuses on four areas for which statistical measures are available: (1) integrity of public office, (2) local governance, (3) business climate, and (4) freedom of expression. They cover key dimensions of how the state functions as well as how it relates to society. At the same time, as shown in Figure 5, it involves both economy and society.

Figure 5: The four governance areas.



Each one of these four areas will reveal something important about governance in these countries. The integrity of public office will indicate the strength of formal institutions but also how informal ones operate inside the state. This is crucial for understanding how the state-nation is managed and what its challenges are in moving from a limited to an open access order. Local governance is significant because it indicates the trust and confidence government leaders have in sharing power with locally elected politicians. Decentralization is a challenge that African leaders find difficult to handle in the context of managing their state-nation. Today there is a wide consensus across Africa that the private sector has an important role in developing the continent. How government approaches business, however, differs from country to country. Some embrace it while others are more suspicious. This has implications for both pace and direction of development. Finally, freedom of expression is an indicator of how government treats its citizens. Most African governments have viewed this freedom as a privilege rather than a right given their state-nation status. In their opinion, criticism of the government is much more than just a different opinion on a specific issue. It is a potential threat to the whole state-nation project and thus also to national unity and security. This is an indication that wherever

politics is based on identity rather than economic interest, there are constant fears of a zero-sum game with all the risks it carries for political stability and the security of people. It is the "Achilles heel" of governance in Africa. Too many governments have already fallen because of their inability to reconcile and manage national unity and individual freedom in a positive and constructive manner, President al-Bashir of Sudan being the most recent victim.

Public integrity

Violation of the principle of integrity of public office is one of the most common features of African governance. It is part of the DNA of a limited access order. Most evident in various forms of corruption, it engenders widespread suspicion and criticism from citizens across the continent. For example, in its Round 6 (2014-15), the Afrobarometer found that 72 per cent of Africans see at least "some" officials in their country's presidency as corrupt, including 31 per cent who say that all officials in that office are corrupt. Perceptions of corruption are even higher when it comes to Members of Parliament, local government councillors, tax officials, judges and police (Frinjuah & Appiah-Nyamekye, 2018). Two things tend to spark this outrage among Africans. One is the enormous cost to the continent's development. The size of illicit outflows from African countries is hard to know, but according to one report compiled by U.K. and African development activists, in 2015 it may have amounted to US40 billion, more than what the continent received in aid, loans and personal remittances (*The Guardian*, London). The other thing that arouses hostility toward corruption is unfairness. This, however, is a more controversial issue, because it does not necessarily imply a universal condemnation of the practice – only an observation that "others benefit, but not we". It is necessary, therefore, to be circumspect when interpreting the meaning of anti-corruption campaigns, leave alone perceptions of corruption. In societies, where identity is still contested and the solidarity with the political community at large is fragile, being against corruption may often be an expression of lament that it does not benefit one's own group. Again, the Ghanaian saying that "it is our time to chop" reminds us about the extent to which public

office is a source of extracting resources rather than protecting public goods. Against this background, the question is how well the four East African countries are handling this issue.

There is no Afrobarometer data for Rwanda, but in 2014/15, the other three East African countries fell in the medium range of perceived corruption, South Africa, Gabon, Nigeria and Liberia being viewed as the most corrupt. When asked about the perceived corruption in the Office of the President, 29 per cent of Ugandans answered that all or most of the officials are corrupt, while 43 per cent answered, "some of them". The equivalent figures for Kenya was 27 and 54 per cent respectively while for Tanzania they were 15 and 50 percent respectively.

Things are likely to have changed since 2015, especially in Tanzania where the new President, John Pombe Magufuli, has made fighting corruption the hallmark of his presidency. Another paper using Afrobarometer data shows that compared to 2014, Tanzanians see a marked decrease in corruption in public office in their country (Olan'g & Msami 2018). Magufuli's fight against corruption earned him widespread popularity among ordinary citizens because it has been directed against officials who used to be able to gain financial advantages from their public office.

There was an unusual sharing of joy among citizens also in neighbouring countries when President Magufuli first launched his anti-corruption campaign in 2015. This enthusiasm has gradually vanished as collecting revenue has become a means of harassing people, not just the already wealthy but above all, the small- or medium-size entities that operate in the informal sector. For many of these enterprises and individuals, whatever little they earn is being subjected to taxation at a level that limits not only the scope for saving and investment but also for subsistence and sharing with kin, an especially sensitive matter in African society. The situation has been further aggravated by the fact that the campaign in Tanzania has come to involve other moral issues such as homosexuality, pornography and drugs. Parochialism is still widespread in Tanzania and is often used by politicians to punish their opponents.

Corruption remains an issue in Kenya. The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) issued by Transparency International

places Kenya last among the four East African countries. It is an interesting test case because despite being listed as highly corrupt, its middle class and business community is strong and interested in the rule of law and certainty when interacting with public authority. There are also strong moral voices in church circles that keep a watch on corruption in the country. Because many of those who are critical of the country's high level of corruption come from President Kenyatta's own ethnic group, he has recently initiated his own campaign to deal with the issue. Invoking God when making his announcement at a church ceremony in Nairobi on August 12, 2018 (*Daily Nation*, Nairobi, August 13), he took it on himself to lead the campaign arguing that he wants his anti-corruption campaign to be part of his presidential legacy. This tremendously complex task goes beyond what one person – even a president – can achieve and he needs the full involvement by the country's anti-corruption bodies. There is some evidence that this has been happening. In response to Kenyatta's call for action, Kenya's Public Prosecutor has initiated cases against some well-heeled individuals, notably those who have constructed private buildings on public land (*The Standard* (Nairobi, 14 August 2018).

Uganda is not Kenya, but its experience confirms the challenges that Presidents Magufuli and Kenyatta face in putting so much personal stake in fighting corruption. President Museveni did the same already 2006 and his campaign has been followed up with a solid administrative and legal framework for fighting corruption that was widely praised by the international donor community. Corruption, however, has persisted and the country's ranking on the CPI has fallen. Widespread complaints among Ugandans led Museveni to an admission in 2018 that he must start all over again (*Africa News*, 18 September 2018). Very much in line with how presidents in Africa operate, he provided the Ugandan public with a local "800" number which he claimed he had set up in his office so members of the public can call him directly if they encounter cases of corruption.

One can only conclude from what has been happening to public integrity in these three East African countries that corruption is so deeply rooted in the way transactional politics is being conducted in a limited access order that neither high-profile campaigns nor

institutional reforms easily change the situation in a significant manner. It is a condition that these countries seem to have to endure in the absence of social forces strong enough to nip it in its bud. As suggested, with a strong middle class and a cosmopolitan orientation, Kenya probably stands the best chance of reaching such a point in the foreseeable future. It is of course not possible to rule out unexpected events that can radically change the situation. Rwanda is a case in point where the 1994 genocide turned the conditions of governance around and opened up for fresh initiatives, including rooting out corruption.

There is no Afrobarometer data available for Rwanda but according to the CPI, in 2014 the country scored considerably higher than all its East African neighbours (49 on a scale of 100 with Tanzania scoring 31, Uganda 26 and Kenya 25). Although these figures refer to perceptions of corruption – not levels of actual corruption (which by nature of this activity is impossible to obtain) – the East African countries, regardless of regime, have a long way to root it out, even to reach the "cleaner" countries in Africa: Botswana, Mauritius and Namibia. Only the highly disciplinary but also autocratic regime of President Kagame in Rwanda – whom *The Economist* (15 July, 2017) referred to as "the hard man of the hills", can compete at that level.

Local governance

Local governance was a cornerstone in the British scheme to prepare their colonies for independence. They saw local governments as schools of governance where officials could be tutored to adopt good practices. They believed involving Africans at the local level was an essential step toward building a system of democratic governance. Many post-independence leaders benefitted from this training. The French and the Belgians paid less attention to this aspect of the decolonization process and elected local government structures have never played as prominent a role in their former colonies as it has where the British served as overlords.

What the British did as they planned their departure in the 1950s was to accelerate the move toward self-government and

independence. Even though the main stage was the colonial capital where the top nationalist leaders learned and played the game of democracy in order to obtain freedom, what took place at local levels in the colonies was still a significant part of the same process. After independence, however, local governments were downgraded in importance by the new government leaders. Tanzania went furthest by abolishing its local government system and replace it with a centrally controlled administrative system justified as a means of making development efforts more effective. A similar but less drastic approach was adopted in Kenya where a Rural Development Strategy became justification for rendering the country's county councils less independent. Decentralisation was eventually also curbed in the post-independence period in Uganda, but it was a more complicated and contentious process because of the power of the Buganda Kingdom and its own local governance structure. Gradually, however, the autonomy of local government institutions was curtailed, and power concentrated in the central government, a process that was formalized in the 1967 constitution and culminated during Amin's rule in the 1970s. In Rwanda, elite vulnerability played a large part in keeping power centralized in the early post-colonial period.

Decentralization in the form of devolution of power to local government authorities has proved difficult for African government leaders to accommodate within the frame of a limited access order, but a bold and concerted effort has been made in Kenya where devolution to local county governments is now a reality. Not only are these entities able to raise their own revenue, they are also guaranteed a specified minimum share of the national budget. This has proved to be a game changer because political power is now more evenly distributed between centre and periphery. Elected political positions such as Governor and Senator have acquired higher levels of prestige and are conceived as attractive as becoming a high-level official such as Cabinet or Permanent Secretary. The Kenyan devolution project is still in a settling-in phase but there are no signs that political leaders want to abandon it. On the contrary, their minds are set to improve and institutionalize it. Such was the mood at the Fifth Annual Devolution Conference in April 2018 which brought together stakeholders at all levels for a joint

assessment. As the Opposition Leader, Raila Odinga, stressed, graft poses the most serious threat to devolution, but there was also unanimity in the decision to work toward eliminating corruption and strengthening the rule of law (*Daily Nation*, Nairobi, 28 April 2018).

Its neighbours have followed different paths. The Tanzanian Government has concentrated revenue collection in the hands of the Tanzania Revenue Authority. Municipal and district councils which previously could collect their own revenue and thus be assured of recurrent income to provide services, notably maintenance of roads and other infrastructure, now must beg on their knees to get a share, generally much less than what they need, from central government. Local government authorities in Tanzania also fall short of their objectives because they cannot afford to hire enough employees, as reported by the National Audit Office in May 2018 (*The Citizen*, Dar es Salaam, 3 May 2018).

Decentralization became a buzzword in Uganda after the National Resistance Movement had taken over power in 1986. The Resistance Councils that had been set up by Museveni and his lieutenants as they liberated the country from the grip of Idi Amin were advertised as the foundation for a new system of bottom-up governance. While this system has strengthened public accountability at grassroots level, it has fallen short of devolving real power. The local level organs have not been given the revenue collection power that would make devolution a reality in the country (Francis & James 2003).

Rwanda adopted its own decentralization in 2000 but focusing on results rather than process. Its policy is explicitly to ensure equitable social, political and economic development. It refers also to strengthening citizen participation but the way it has been implemented, this feature has become secondary to demonstrating results in delivery of services (Hasselskog & Schierenbeck 2015). This means that citizen participation amounts to following orders from above, often conveyed in technical language (Huggins 2017). In view of the generally positive outcomes of the government's development strategy, citizen complaints about its "top-down" approach may be tempered by the improved living conditions it brings to much of the country. For the population at large,

development results matter most, and the Government is fully aware of how it can use this state of mind to legitimize its hard-line approach.

The story of local governance in the region, therefore, is varied. The four regimes have followed their own distinct paths with Kenya clearly having gone the furthest in devolution while the other three have held on to various degrees of centralized rule. It may be tightest in Rwanda, but it can also display positive results from its "mobilization-of-citizens" strategy. The discrepancy between promise and practice is apparent in Tanzania and Uganda. Both have local-level institutions, but none possesses the right to collect and retain revenue of its own. The dominance of the ruling party in Tanzania means that resources tend to be allocated according to party loyalty while a fairer, albeit discretionary, distribution takes place in Uganda where buying loyalty is still a necessary part of handling the country's fractured social and political structure.

Business climate

The role of the private sector in national development has become increasingly important, fostered to a large extent by globalization. After having been ignored by foreign investors for a long time, African countries have more recently become popular destinations of foreign investment. Many of these investments have been made with the objective of extracting resources from the continent, but whatever the motive countries cannot escape the new interest that outside investors show. The question is how African countries relate to this interest and how it handles business. Do they provide a hospitable or hostile climate for business? The four East African countries, once again, display their differences.

In 2019, Rwanda and Kenya are responding with a welcoming hand, while Tanzania, and to a lesser extent Uganda, are, if not outright hostile, more hesitant in welcoming foreign investors. Because both countries sit on oil and gas resources, they know that they can strike a better bargain by making it harder for business to earn profit. This is especially true for Tanzania where the revival of the spectre of a state-led development has led to uneasiness among

Tanzanian as well as foreign members of the business community. President Magufuli's populist rhetoric is portraying ordinary Tanzanians as victims of exploitation by private companies. It is not clear what its effects are on investment in the country but in combination with other measures, notably human rights violations, it may encourage investors to look elsewhere.

The situation in Uganda is different in the sense that much of it centres on the role of Asian business owners whose parents or grandparents were forced to leave in 1972 when Idi Amin launched his campaign against the Asian-Ugandan community. Since President Museveni came to power in the mid-1980s, members of this community have been able to reclaim their lost property and many of them are now among the biggest investors in Uganda. The controversy over repossessed properties, however, keeps simmering and as recent as September 2019 calls were made in Parliament for investigation of alleged corruption in allocation and management of these properties (*Daily Monitor,* Kampala, September 20).

Kenya has always been open for business and it is still the main destination for outside investors in the region. In addition, the indigenous private sector has had time to establish itself as a force of its own offering the prospect of attractive partnerships for foreign investors. Rwanda is not following Kenya in all respects but does so in encouraging business. The government realises the value of combining a state-led strategy with carrots for both local and foreign investors. This sets it aside from Tanzania which is the other country in the region where the state is placed in the position of principal driver of change.

These differences show up in statistics about how easy it is to establish a business in the region. The table below indicates the position that the four countries occupy in the global ranking of easiness to do business as well as their position on specific aspects of doing so.

Table 5: Easiness of doing business in East Africa, by country 2018.

Country	Global Rank	Start Business	Get permits	Get electricity	Register property	Get credit	Protection of minority investors
Rwanda	29	51	106	68	2	3	14
Kenya	51	126	128	75	122	8	11
Uganda	127	163	145	175	126	73	110
Tanzania	144	164	150	83	146	60	131

Source: Ease of Doing Business Index, the World Bank 2018.

The four countries score generally highest on the banking side. Getting credit is especially easy in Kenya and Rwanda. The latter two also score significantly higher on the protection of minority investors, suggesting that both countries value partnership with foreigners. Rwanda is alone at the top when it comes to registering property, a process that is time-consuming and often involves paying bribes in the other three countries. Corruption also features in getting permits for construction. Out of the total 190 countries included in the Ease of Doing Business survey, none of the East African countries reach a position in the upper half of the list. Nor does any one of them register a top score on getting electricity with Uganda trailing the other three by a wide margin. In a wider comparative perspective, the four East African countries are not very competitive in enabling the process of starting a business. Yet, within the region there is variation that reflects the different modes by which they are being governed.

Freedom of expression

Freedom of Expression is a cornerstone principle of the open access order and as such it becomes especially controversial in the African context where governments operate along the lines of a limited access order. Two opposite perspectives on the concept collide in African governance, one stressing the rights of the individual, the other the rights of the state to demand obedience of its citizens because, as argued above, without the state they would be without rights of their own. In this perspective, public criticism of the

government takes on a much greater significance than it would in societies with an open access order. It amounts to breaking the local moral code that the state is the right-holder, citizens the duty-bearers. Freedom of expression, therefore, cannot be taken for granted in Africa, even if it may be enshrined in the constitution of individual countries in order to gain legitimacy as members of the United Nations. This membership commits these countries to principles that take time to realize. The result is that there always tends to be a gap between promise and practice. As a proxy for democracy at large, freedom of expression is the area where the principles of limited and open access orders clash most openly – governments upholding the former, civil society, boosted by support from the donor community, advocating the blessings of the latter.

Democracy is alive in Africa and, as noted above, there is demand for more of it. Democratic rights, however, tend to be embraced largely by those who are not members of the reigning political settlement. Unlike Europe where democracy is the mainstream and populism the opposition, defendants of democratic rights like freedom of expression in Africa are the opposition. More specifically, these rights are most strongly rooted in civil society organizations with ties to the international community. They constitute the democratic lifeline in African countries.

Because these organizations do not play by the rules of a limited access order and instead expose the gap between the country's constitutional principles, on the one hand, and governance practice, on the other, their loyalty to the state-nation is constantly being questioned by governments. As we discuss in Appendix One, this suspicion has grown with the spread of social media and the subsequent intensification of this criticism. As one respected African observer noted already long ago (Ake 1993), as long as African countries remain divided vertically – by ethnic group or religion – democratic space will be hard to carve out. Unlocking the gate to an open access order will take time and making it sustainable requires most likely the evolution of a form of governance based on economic interest rather than cultural identity.

This suggests that if there is any difference between the four countries in East Africa, level of development might show up as a distinguishing variable. The Participation component of the V-Dem data set, which measures participation by society at large and more specifically civil society participation may serve as a first step to assess this proposition.

Table 6: Civil society participation in East Africa, by country 2018.

(Legend: 0=low; 1= high)

Country	Global Rank	Civil Society Participation
Kenya	65	0.789
Tanzania	73	0.780
Uganda	76	0.767
Rwanda	104	0.702

Source: V-Dem Annual Report 2019.

The table provides evidence that the proposition holds in part but not fully. Competitive Kenya has the highest per capita income and is also ranked above the others in terms of civil society participation. The distance between high and low, however, is not very great and income per capita does not show up as a clear-cut determinant. The only other outstanding feature is the lower figures for Rwanda – not surprisingly given its reliance on state-organized participation in development. The issue that tends to get lost in these tables, however, is the variety that exists in terms of who is participating and with what intensity and durability. We have shown in previous chapters that without the strength and power of civil society, African countries would never have reached political independence during the Second Wave of Democratization. It was a groundswell that these countries have not witnessed again. Social movements centred on a specific policy issue have been few and far apart. They have arisen in countries like Kenya and South Africa which are more integrated into the global economy and whose citizens, especially the middle class, have a cosmopolitan outlook. Unlike Latin America and South Asia where social movements have had a significant influence on governance, they have not been a

dominant feature of civil society in Africa. These countries still lack the social forces that can turn civil society into a decisive and transformative agent. Instead, civil society has been made up of faith-based and professional organizations which act as the moral conscience of society but fall short of mobilizing people to directly and manifestly protest government policy or action. Nor do these organizations have enough power to hold governments accountable.

This does not mean that civil society is quiet or not sufficiently engaged in promoting the values of an open access order. The rise of social media has intensified the calls for such an order and these media have helped raise social consciousness that should not be underestimated. As we discuss in greater detail in Appendix One, while governments tend to be driven by local, often parochial values, civil society through the social media, in particular, is connected to the outside world. Web users allow local issues to transcend national borders and help broaden the consciousness of what is going on in the rest of the sub-region and the world at large. As the account in Appendix Two also shows, governments certainly take them seriously and have acted to suppress their freedom.

Conclusions

So, how does governance in these countries relate to development? It is an important question because development is not only a dependent variable, i.e. the outcome of policy and other forms of human agency, but also an independent variable. Level of development is known to determine the probability of democratic consolidation, as discussed above. Political scientists with an interest in how institutions shape political regimes have shown that the emergence of a bourgeoisie or middle class is a facilitator of democracy and its sustainability (Lipset 1959; Moore Jr 1966; Przeworski et al. 2000). Apart from training civil servants to become the elite of the new states, the colonial powers did little to foster an indigenous middle class. To this day, the middle class is only at an incipient stage in African countries and lack the autonomy that allows it to serve as a positive force for democratic governance.

There are differences, however, in terms of level of development. Kenya has reached further than the other East African countries and is now labelled a "middle-income" country[2] while the others are still striving to be one. According to World Development data, Kenya is not only the already richest per capita income, it also records a faster pace of growth than its neighbours as shown in below.

Table 7: Macroeconomic data per country 2017

Country	GDP per capita (current PPP)	Growth per capita (current PPP)
Kenya	$ 3,364	5.9%
Tanzania	$ 3,090	5.4%
Uganda	$ 2,280	4.0%

Economic growth data for a longer period dating back to independence are not available but figures for the past quarter century confirm that there has been no change in the positions of the four counties – even if their individual growth rates have varied up and down over the years. Kenya has continued to occupy the top position and the distance between them has shifted only marginally. Per capita growth is of course not the only important economic indicator. As suggested above, if history is any guide, an indigenous middle class is perhaps the most important driver of demand for an open access order. The problem in Africa is that it still is too small to really make a marked impact on policy performance.

This closer analysis of the four neighbouring countries confirms the evolution of variable patterns of governance based on how in a local perspective governments approach the issues of managing the state-nation. Despite the variations, it is evident that the imperatives of a limited access order drive government action. The integrity of public office is being compromised; centralization of power leaves local governance an empty shell; business is being forced to operate in an environment of political favouritism; and, independent voices are either marginalized or outright suppressed for fear of

[2] This occurred in 2014 after the Kenya Government revised its statistics and added 25 percent to its GDP. It followed the initiative of other countries around the world that conducted a similar "rebasing "of their GDP.

undercutting state legitimacy. Thus, the path to an open access order still seems to be quite long and complicated.

Freedom of expression may be the most critical area of governance. All four governments have instituted legal measures to restrict freedom of speech, including laws that make it risky for web activists to continue without engaging in self-censorship. At the same time, it is clear that curbing the freedom of expression and other democratic rights carries its own risks for government. Trying to silence the voice of the people in situations where the gap between promise and practice is as high as it is in most African countries can easily backfire as the case of Sudan most recently illustrates. Most government leaders seem not to take this into consideration. Prime Minister Abyi Ahmed of Ethiopia looks like an exception in 2019 as he tried to stem public criticism by democratizing his country's monopolist, developmental-state oriented regime (Temin & Badaza 2019).

Implications for Democracy Aid

This report has addressed the issue of how democracy aid may be affected by the new situation that has evolved in recent years with (1) national sovereignty and country ownership of foreign aid becoming politically more significant, (2) other actors with their own agenda competing with traditional donors, (3) investment replacing foreign aid in African government circles as preferred mechanism of interacting with the rest of the world, and (4) the democratic convergence thesis losing much of its validity. By analysing the questions of *how* democracy fits into modes of governance in Africa and *why* some countries find it easier to accommodate liberal democratic norms and values the report provides more nuanced and relevant policy information than a mere focus on the "state of democracy" in a global perspective offers. The latter is relevant but it is only a baseline from which further independent analysis is needed to understand how African actors create their own niches of policy action. That is why democracy is best examined through a local governance lens – one that avoids taking democracy for granted and instead treat democratization for what it really is in Africa: a political battle between forces that wish to hang on to a limited access order to secure stability and avoid violence, on the one hand, and their opposites, on the other, who believe in guaranteed open economic and political competition as the way forward. Both have strong and legitimate reasons for their respective position. Three decades of experience with trying to ensure transition to an open access order suggests that this battle of the minds is still very much alive. It constitutes the prime governance challenge; hence the question how democracy fits into African governance and how democracy aid may best respond to it. More specifically, what are the factors that need to be taken into consideration in doing so? Secondly, what does it mean for policy and strategizing? This final chapter will take up these two questions for further discussion.

Factors to consider

By operating on the basis of a global democratic convergence thesis, Western donors have for three decades been able to approach democracy aid as not only morally justified but also practically straightforward. The main objective has been to facilitate the transfer of institutional models from already democratic countries because what works there has been expected to flourish also in African soil. There has been no urgency to search for African governance practices. Instead the intellectual energy has been devoted primarily to identify best practices associated with transferring Western institutions. This approach has not required investment in new knowledge. Nor has it been necessary to see democracy in its local context, including an examination of what happened to democracy in Africa after its first encounter with the concept during the Second Wave of Democratization in the mid-20th Century. At that time the liberal democratic flame died out almost as fast as it had been lighted in the struggle for independence, an experience that political science research has largely failed to incorporate into the analysis of the more recent attempts at a democratic transition.

Policy practitioners, however, have more recently come to the conclusion on their own that local ownership and local context matter for democracy aid. With this realization spreading more widely, it is important to lay down a few markers that could guide such aid in the future. Based on the findings of this study, five factors seem to be of special importance to consider.

Governance is local

Perhaps the most serious omission in the way Western donors have approached democracy aid in the past thirty years is the autonomy of African agency. By assuming that Africans are already on board the democratic bandwagon, the principal task has been to teach them how to drive it on their own. Using an approach to better understand the place of democracy in African governance, this study has shown that this assumption may be mistaken and instead highlight an approach that is relevant for what to expect and what

can be done to advance democracy in Africa. It begins by recognizing that in any scientific or policy research that involves human action, the premise of a linear causality is mistaken. People have their own cognitive capabilities that they apply to make sense of environmental challenges or opportunities. More specifically, in the case of responding to pressures to democratize, African government leaders take their own history into account and try to find an approach that makes sense in the local context of their country. Even if it may be a complication and render less precision, localization of the analysis enhances relevance and helps the policy practitioner to steer the aid in more fruitful directions than what can be accomplished by taking democracy for granted and relying on a linear causation. Learning how to "read" the local governance scene in each country where democracy aid is provided becomes a priority. This means learning about the country without seeing it only through a donor lens. There is a need to look for things that are not immediately related to fulfilling specific policy objectives. Setting democracy aid in its wider context is necessary to find out what works when the premise is that Africans themselves have a say in how they want to govern their countries.

Democracy is under threat

Because academic and policy discourse has been based on a theoretical framework which presents democracy as a self-enforcing system with little need for attention to contextual variables, it has lacked a genuine grounding in countries like those in Africa, where it is far from the only game in town. Democracy aid has been influenced by the euphoria that the Third Wave of Democratization generated in the 1990s. It helped provide a justification for extending development cooperation to such governance issues as democracy and human rights. It also helps explain the concern in recent years when it has become increasingly clear that the democratic frontier is retreating. The backsliding thesis may look accurate when glancing at global data but it would be a mistake to assume it occurs in the same way everywhere. There is certainly a big difference between those countries, on the one hand, that have a long-established democratic system and those, on the other, that

are still struggling through a democratic transition. In Europe, for example, the threat comes from within the system as populist and fascist groups and parties challenge the legitimacy of established liberal norms and values. In Africa, in contrast, there is no democratic system in place. Because it is still under construction, the threat instead comes from external sources, notably in the form of other models of governance, e.g. those sponsored by donors from East Asia and the Middle East. Whether it is the "developmental state" or "theocracy" model, these alternatives are part of political discourse in African countries and pose potential threats to the institutionalization of liberal democratic values and norms.

Democracy is in demand

Another reason for interpreting the backsliding in African countries differently is that the demand for it is still holding up. In Europe – and the United States – the backsliding is viewed as the result of intentional attacks on core democratic institutions and discourse on the issue, therefore, tends to centre on how democracy can be salvaged. There are increasingly frequent calls in those countries that "we cannot take democracy for granted". This applies equally much, if not more, to countries in Africa but not because citizens are getting lethargic but because they have not yet had enough of democracy. This is in part because even after thirty years of trying, the level of democracy in the region is in a global perspective quite low. There is no real sense of alarm in the way it sounds in Europe. The governance cycle in Europe may be in a downward trend but in Africa it is much less obvious. In fact, as this study has shown, judging from such sources as the Afrobarometer, democracy is much in demand but not extended to citizens by governments acting on what they perceive as their priorities. That is why civil society has become the most hospitable venue for democratic values. Donors have adjusted accordingly and many of them, like Sweden, prefer to direct their democracy aid to non-state actors. In the short run, this seems to be the right approach because the opportunities for result are more promising by supporting these organizations. In the long run, however, supporting what amounts to be the opposition is not likely enough to help build a stronger democratic component in

African governance. How to generate changes in public institutions that are crucial for the sustainability of democracy may be the greatest challenge democracy aid faces. Even though African countries differ in how they are governed, they are all relying on the principles of a limited access order. How can donors steer a course that at the same time strengthens the voice of the citizens and helps making the state more attuned to the benefits of an open access order? There is no easy answer, but it brings to the fore the issue of how donors deal with situations where governments may function effectively but do so without adhering to a democratic form. It is important, therefore, to see the linkage between support for state institutions and democracy and reflect upon how a balance can be struck that promotes a greater dose of democracy in governance.

Democracy is a problem

The conventional donor approach to democracy aid has been to treat it like any other project. This means that donors have been more inclined to look at the outputs of specific interventions than to consider the broader impact of their aid. This "projectization" of democracy aid also means that they have looked at their role in managerial terms – as a matter of implementing it according to design. As this study has demonstrated, however, aiding democracy in Africa is a problem that needs to be solved rather than just a project to be carried out. The donor take on democracy makes it look like an engine that can be fixed with the right expertise. This rather imperious approach to institutions may be handy in arguing for reform but it is less helpful if the ambition is to understand and encourage a locally driven change process. As donors are increasingly confronted with "working with the grain", there is virtue, as this study has shown, in seeing institutions in their wider setting. By recognizing institutional complexity, it becomes easier to accept that what donors face in pursuit of democratic development is better compared to an organism than an engine. Humans are not driven only by their internal dynamics but also by what happens around them. Furthermore, systems are nested in each other so there are no easily defined temporal or spatial boundaries of analysis. Finally, they are never in equilibrium, as branches of the natural

sciences, like evolutionary biology nowadays recognize (Mayr 1987). Acknowledging the relevance of this change in metaphor makes it easier to accept that democracy support is more complex than projects in the various development sectors where assessing tangible outcomes is feasible.

Democracy aid is political

Another leftover from the way donors have approached democracy aid is the notion that it is just policy, ignoring the political role they play in promoting a specific form of government. This contradiction was masked during the years when the Paris Principles still guided the aid relationship but following the weakening, if not demise, of that arrangement, the political nature of democracy aid has become increasingly evident. As African governments have become more assertive in their interaction with the OECD donors, they have often adopted policies that clash with donor preferences. With these donors channelling large amounts of their aid to civil society – or the opposition, as most African governments view it – the political nature of democracy aid is hard to hide. Support for those groups in society that are committed to democratic values is important to keep the liberal flame burning but the challenge that donors face is how they can engage governments, caught in a limited access order, to open up for more free competition not only in the marketplace but also in the political arena. In taking on this challenge it becomes necessary, as this report has illustrated, to think beyond the notion of a standard approach – or blueprint – because African countries vary in how they are governed. The key issue will be to find ways of providing democracy aid that help African countries make strides on their own. Rather than merely evaluating their performance against key indicators set by individual donor countries to justify providing foreign aid they could more meaningfully be assessed against the Agenda 2030 targets, notably Number 16. In the current context where democracy aid is undeniably political, it is useful to cast the narrative in terms of a glass half-full rather than one half-empty.

Towards a new approach

If local ownership and context become truly parts of how donors strategize and carry out their democracy aid, it will turn out to be a rather different exercise than what they have been used to in the past. Above all, such an approach means acknowledging up-front that democracy aid takes place in circumstances that cannot be taken for granted. As we noted at the outset of this report, administering aid is not just any public administration because it is carried out in a foreign country where society is organized differently and politics conducted along lines that may collide with those that donors embrace. Because donors, as we have learnt and illustrated in this report, do not have much control over the final use of their own aid, the question inevitably arises whether in conditions of local ownership, it would be more appropriate to think of democracy aid as an investment rather than as conventional aid. This might be a challenge to the guidelines of Official Development Assistance (ODA) as agreed upon over half a century ago but when it comes to support for democracy, the case can be made that these guidelines are not really a good fit today. Democracy aid differs from development aid. It does not deliver tangible goods leading to, for example, poverty reduction. Furthermore, because it is political, it is not only a matter of policy implementation but indeed also a call for regime change. Not only may this amount to donor "overreach" but it is also a process that does not lend itself to assessment using standard project timelines and conventional evaluation criteria.

An investment approach to democracy aid implies a less direct form of intervention in the governance of African countries. It would entail indirect forms of support in which African institutions have a freer hand and donors serve as enablers rather than enforcers. For example, Swedish aid has already taken a step in this direction by supporting "challenge funds" as a mechanism for empowering groups in civil society that lack a voice. More can be done, however, to strengthen governance using this approach. The challenge that donors should – and could – take on is to help government and civil society engage in developing public institutions that would allow African countries to take the necessary steps from a limited to an open access order. This issue was extensively discussed a quarter

century ago at a seminar organized by the Hammarskjold Foundation in Kampala, Uganda and attended by representatives for African governments, donors, civil society, and academia (Hammarskjold Foundation 1995). It concluded that the key in such an endeavour is the design of institutions in which the ultimate decisions at board level are shared in a three-person rather than a two-person game. Autonomous public funds could serve as providers of additional finance that governmental and non-governmental institutions can apply for in open competition with a view to boosting their development capacity. In their role as resource providers, donors (or their chosen representatives) would become the "third person" that increases the likelihood that decisions can be reached with a positive-sum outcome. Such an engagement would also allow donors to lower their profile and more effectively make their contribution to governance at several points in the system.

Adopting an investment approach to democracy aid would also mean that the donor will "bank" on a specific country to deliver on whatever support is provided. In a partnership arrangement where ownership is the key guiding principle it would become easier to develop the mutual trust and accountability that were attempted under the Paris Principles but which have since slipped away, at least in part because donors have taken too much for granted especially in their support for democracy development. The investment approach is a way of reviving core principles of partnership such as mutual trust and accountability albeit this time in a relationship where the donor influence is contained and balanced by the greater emphasis on ownership.

This approach also means that donors, like any investor, would increase their knowledge and understanding of the country which they support so they are better equipped to evaluate performance. Country agreements would have to be written such that there are exit options tied to specific faults or violations. With less serious shortcomings, donors could still use their voice to register complaints and threaten with withdrawal. Donors, therefore, would not lose their right to exercise accountability of governments – or their institutions – but it would be carried out in contexts that are less high profile and thus stand the chance of being more effective.

The heyday of budget support raised the ante of ownership by concentrating all the attention to public finance institutions. This centralization of the partnership relation gradually proved to generate more controversy than meaningful results and it is in the light of this experience that deconcentrating the opportunities for donors to exercise their accountability would be a step in the right direction. The full implications of a new approach that is based on respect for local context and ownership is summarized in the table below.

Table 8: Seeing and Doing Democracy Differently.

Category	Current mainstream	New Approach
Mode of operation	Administration	Investment
Partner relationship	Centralized	Decentralised
Donor orientation	Detachment	Engagement
Role in policymaking	Enforcer	Incubator
Management approach	Results	Process
Knowledge base	Formal data	Local understanding
Time horizon	Short	Long

The two approaches are not necessarily in a binary opposition. The table should be read as indicating a direction along which donor thinking is at least partially already on the way. What the table does, therefore, is to crystallize in a disaggregated manner the issues that donors face and may wish to address further as they consider what it means to adjust their aid enterprise to a partnership anchored in local ownership.

Strategizing under uncertainty

Accepting that African agency is in the driving seat and the best way of boosting governance in the direction of an open access order also means that strategizing democracy aid will have to account for levels of uncertainty. This has not really been the case in the projectization of democracy aid that has been dominant so far. Instead, the

assumption has been that the future is fully predictable through rational design. Facing levels of uncertainty, however, does not make strategizing impossible, only more demanding in especially two respects. The first is the need for a comprehensive situation analysis that puts democracy in its local partner country context. It must go beyond describing the role that formal institutions play and incorporate the dynamics of managing the state-nation, typically involving both formal and informal institutions. The second respect is the importance that such a situation analysis is carried out independently. Its terms of reference must ensure that the study is not just a matter of looking at governance in the partner country through an already polished donor lens. It will be up to officials in the relevant donor institutions to assess what this broader governance overview means for their own readiness to bank on the country's prospect for becoming an open access order (or at least acquiring more of it). The implications for donors by recognizing uncertainty as factor in strategizing their democracy aid is summarized in the figure below.

Figure 6: Strategizing under uncertainty.

This process can be divided into more detailed components and put together as a more encompassing matrix. It can also be applied to the model of governance used in this study. The systematic situation analysis may be the most critical part of this process because if it is not done right, the rest of the process will go awry. It should ideally be initiated as a joint venture of all the key stakeholders to ensure that they have a sense of ownership and likewise ensure its legitimacy, yet be carried out by an independent agency. For the donors, it would serve as a tool for minimizing uncertainty to a level where it is possible to identify scenarios that will inform strategy and policy. Creating scenarios is an additional way of stimulating a closer analysis of the governance conditions in a partner country. Country strategies have so far been composed

largely in relation to donor policy goals as if they operate independently in partner country conditions. With the help of a systematic situation analysis and creative scenario building, strategizing becomes more effectively grounded in real governance conditions. The whole process brings to the decision-making table a variety of perspectives that are best integrated into a final policy through collaboration of officials from every branch of government that is relevant. In the Swedish case, for example, it would be primarily the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Sida officials focusing on Africa and on democracy and human rights as well as possibly other entities for whom this strategizing exercise may matter.

Democracy aid and policy coherence

In recognition of the global nature of many development challenges, members of the donor community, especially in the European Union, have adopted a policy coherence approach, which implies that what one branch of government does must be in line with what others are doing. In the European Union this is called Policy Coherence for Development (PCD). Sweden has its own national version of it – *Politik för Global Utveckling* (PGU) – which was adopted in 2003. The underlying assumption is that all policy sectors contribute to the global development goals and their role, therefore, should be adjusted accordingly. In the Swedish case, this manifests itself in incorporating the assistance of Swedish executive agencies in fields such as statistics and land use into the country's development cooperation. There is also a program that involves "sister-type" arrangements between Swedish municipal entities and their equivalents in developing countries. The result is that professionals in this field serve on a short- or long-term contract to complement local capacity in partner countries. This is a form of engagement that cements partnership along the lines of the formula described in the section just above.

Conclusions

During the time this report has been prepared and produced, Sweden, like some other countries in Europe, has celebrated the centennial anniversary of the birth of its democracy. The event is cause for a final reflection. It took several decades for democracy to become reality in Sweden. It was a step-by-step process marked by key events such as the extension of voting rights, initially only to men and later to women as well. Each such step produced its own heroes and left behind a powerful legacy. Democratization in Sweden was at the same time a process that could not have happened were it not for the socio-economic circumstances that produced a social stratification based on economic interests. Human agency and social structure interacted in ways that produced an unusual form of consensual democracy – an outlier rather than a mainstream case when considered in a global perspective.

Yet, it is precisely this model that has been prescribed for African countries and become the measuring rod that donors apply to judge their progress towards democracy. Even if the conditions around the world today may be more favourable for democracy than they were a hundred years ago, they are not enough to trigger a regime transition. Like it was in Sweden and Europe a century ago, democracy has to be owned by local stakeholders who, despite ideological differences, are ready to compromise in the interest of a common public good.

In facing this challenge, African countries begin with a double handicap. First, they are not yet economically developed enough to produce collective action based on economic interest. With the exception of Nelson Mandela, Africa lacks its own democratic heroes. Society is still organized along parochial lines causing vertical cleavages that in turn produce the need for a state preoccupied with maintaining peace and stability rather than state effectiveness. As this report has tried to demonstrate, democracy, state and development come together in a very different institutional mix in African countries. Although they do differ among themselves, they are all caught in a limited access order that relies on control of the political allocation of rents and privileges. The real challenge in these countries, therefore, is how the structural

conditions can be made more congenial for the development of social divisions that do not threaten political order but produce compromises and positive-sum outcomes. The second handicap is the absence of political parties grounded in specific policy positions. There is no competition between "right" and "left" forces in society. Instead, African countries are expected to follow a global development agenda – the 2030 Agenda agreed upon under the auspices of the United Nations – which means that there is no domestic policy debate. Instead, politics becomes an often acrimonious debate about how well government is implementing the global agenda. It is more about politics than policy.

Against the background of the conflictual yet largely peaceful process of democratization in Sweden, aiding democracy in Africa is not quite as straightforward as it has been assumed in donor circles to date. It requires a dose of humility. Rather than falling into the trap of overreaching, donors need to reach out – both politically and intellectually. They need to engage their partners in many different ways to better understand the structural conditions in which democracy can flourish. Democracy in Africa is still a young plant ready to bloom, not like in Europe where it tends to be treated as old enough to require life support. Democracy aid needs to adjust to these differences. This means greater nuances as well as a better overview of the local opportunities that such a broader perspective may lay open.

Democracy is an important component of African governance but in a local perspective it is not the only one that actors must consider. The transition from a limited to an open access order, as this report has argued, involves much more with implications for how the donor governance agenda is organized and pursued.

Appendix: The Social Media Landscape in East Africa

Social media are becoming a political platform of its own in East Africa, especially for young people. This development deserves attention as an integral part of how governance modes change in Africa. Studying the social media in East Africa, however, is fraught with its own challenges. There is relatively little published peer-reviewed research on the subject despite its growing popularity and potential in shaping public opinion. By examining what is being written on Twitter, blogs or open forums such as *Jamii Forum* in Tanzania and open groups on Facebook, we find that there is a lively and open debate on social media especially in Kenya and Uganda and to some extent in Tanzania. The debate in Tanzania is more inaccessible to international audiences because it is in Kiswahili and not as straight to the point as in Uganda and Kenya. Reviewing the discussions and debates takes time for the external observer including understanding the unwritten "twitter rules and codes" in a country. The first problem is identifying who the participants are. Are they genuine or writing under fake profiles? Whom do they represent? Some people while being NGO staff members or employed by media houses often emphasize that tweets are their own. Another question is what matters most: number of followers or an enduring presence on the social media? For the purpose of this study we have decided to include the names and voices of people (1) who are residents in the region and (2) whose voice appears regularly on various media platforms, and (3) who are academics, journalists, or civil society activists. We have excluded all active politicians. We discuss each country by first providing a short analysis of the situation with respect to internet freedom and regulation of social media followed by an analysis of who the participants are and what they talk or write about.

Kenya

Kenya, according to the Freedom House Index, which focuses on civil liberties and political rights, is "partly free" because these

freedoms are extensively undermined by pervasive corruption and the brutality by the country's security apparatus. Kenya's media and civil society sector are vibrant, but journalists and civil society workers remain exposed to restrictive laws and intimidation. Pressure on local and international journalists and media outlets in Kenya has increased since President Uhuru Kenyatta assumed office in 2013. The Government has attempted to obstruct critical journalists with legal, administrative, and informal measures, including threats, intimidation, harassment, online and phone surveillance, and in some cases, physical assaults. Meanwhile, no state actor has in the past five years been held accountable for threatening, intimidating, or physically attacking a journalist or blogger in Kenya.

Kenya, however, is recorded by the same institution as "free" with specific respect to internet freedom. Political and social content is not generally subject to blocking in Kenya and social networking platforms and communication applications such as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and LinkedIn are also fully accessible. [3] Nonetheless, the Government at times search the internet for content that is perceived to be morally objectionable and it has sought to remove content from the internet.[4]

Kenya's online information landscape is diverse and vibrant, representing a wide range of issues and viewpoints. Social media have become an influential platform for journalists to source and share news. Traditional broadcast news programs increasingly interact with viewers in real time on Twitter or Facebook. Bloggers and social media personalities have become highly influential opinion-makers over the past few years. Fast and affordable internet in major cities and towns has enabled Kenya's growing class of digitally skilled citizens to become content creators and alternative sources of news and information. According to the Bloggers Association of Kenya (BAKE)—formed in 2011 to support Kenya's

[3] Xynou, M., "Kenya: Free Censorship Internet?" OONI, accessed 21 May 2017, https://ooni.torproject.org/post/kenya-study/

[4] In June 2017, the Kenya Film Classification Board (KFCB) banned six children's television programs for ostensibly promoting homosexuality "against our Kenya's moral values and culture

blogging community— the 36 most active blogs hosted on their servers experienced a 46 percent increase in monthly readership between October 2015 and September 2016. The exponential growth in blogs has created an economically viable industry for bloggers who are increasingly sought by Kenyan businesses as a platform for advertising.[5] The social media landscape in Kenya is an interesting mix of people who are interested in the nexus between political activism, art, poetry and culture, and a whole host of subjects are discussed. The issue of corruption and poor governance features prominently in the debate led by people such as Boniface Mwangi (the hashtag #teamCOURAGE) and John Githongo who have a huge number of followers on Twitter. Other subjects that are covered include post-election violence, lack of respect for rule of law, gender equality and minority rights including LGBT rights. Human Rights Watch documented 17 separate incidents between 2013 and 2017 in which 23 journalists and bloggers, including individuals suspected of being affiliates, were physically assaulted by government officials. At least two have died in circumstances that remain unclear. The HRW documented 16 direct death threats against journalists and bloggers across the country during the same period.[6]

The ghost of censorship continues to be real in Kenya and still poses a threat to social media operators and activists. In June 2017 the Communications Authority of Kenya gazetted new guidelines to curb online abuse in partnership with the National Cohesion and Integrated Commission (NCIC), a statutory body which seeks to reduce inter-ethnic conflict. The guidelines include broad wordings as the basis for penalties aimed at prohibiting political messages that "contain offensive, abusive, insulting, misleading, confusing, obscene or profane language," which could be used to limit legitimate online expression. The guidelines also require administrators of social media pages to "moderate and control the content and discussions generated on their platform," and give mobile network operators the power to refuse at their discretion the transmission of political messages that do not comply with the guidelines. In addition, under these new rules bulk political messages

[5] Freedom House, *Kenya Country Report 2017*

[6] Freedom House, *Kenya Country Report 2017*

require prior approval from the NCIC. The result of the new guidelines is that during 2018 numerous Kenyan bloggers and social media users were arrested or summoned for questioning.

Rwanda

While Rwanda continued to make remarkable progress in terms of economic development, the country's tight restrictions on freedom of expression and political activity have continued to be applied with reference to the need for maintaining stability in the aftermath of the 1994 genocide. Not surprisingly, therefore, Rwanda is rated by Freedom House as "not free" with respect to political rights and civil liberties but "partly free" with respect to internet freedom. According to this source, elections in Rwanda routinely feature unfair barriers to registration, campaigning, poll monitoring, and media access for opposition parties and their candidates. Self-censorship is very common in the media profession and many previously outspoken journalists such as Robert Mugabe, Shyaka Kanuma, Violette Uwamahoro, and Joseph Nkusi have simply retired or at least abstained from being critical of government.

Access to information and communication technologies (ICTs) in Rwanda has improved notably over the past few years, supported by the Government's strategy to transform the country into an information economy. However only 11 percent of Rwandans are ICT literate, and over 70 percent of the population speaks only Kinyarwanda, making internet content in English (or French) inaccessible to most Rwandans. That is why by far the largest number of conversations on the internet takes place in Kinyarwanda. Access to electricity is another constraining factor: only 17 percent of Rwandan households have regular access to electricity. [7] Censorship of online content remains high, with a considerable number of independent online media outlets still being blocked. In the lead-up to the August 2017 elections, pro-government commentators attacking opposition candidates on social media increased notably. The Electoral Commission attempted to restrict the expression of political speech on social

[7] Freedom House, *Rwanda Country Report 2017*

media during the election period but was forced to reverse its decision after widespread criticism. Freedom House reports that critical journalists frequently face violence and harassment when attempting to cover news stories, leading some to flee the country. Pro-government trolls regularly harrow journalists and ordinary users on social media for their posts about the government or public issues that may be deemed critical.

Internet freedom deteriorated especially after a new ICT law was passed in 2016. This law codifies prohibitions on the dissemination of "grossly offensive" or "indecent" messages as well as the use of social media to cause "annoyance, inconvenience, or needless anxiety." It was followed in 2017 by another new media law that seeks to increase penalties for criminal defamation from two to three years and introduces a specific restriction on insulting or defaming the President of the Republic. In the last few years numerous independent news outlets and opposition blogs have been blocked. Government's blocking decisions are not explained and there is no avenue for appeal.

While Rwandans are active on Facebook and Twitter, which have become popular with the rise of internet-enabled mobile phone use, self-censorship has become more pervasive among both online journalists and ordinary users due to increasing government repression, social pressure to toe the government line, and fear of reprisals. National security is frequently the basis on which the authorities censor the media. Internet users, according to Freedom House, tend to avoid topics that can be construed as critical of the government or disruptive to national unity and reconciliation. Voices that have been outspokenly critical of the Government or have taken the side of the political opposition have found themselves detained by the Government. This include former presidential candidates Diane Rwigara and Victoire Ingabire. There have been consistent calls on social media to free these women under hashtags such as #FreeDianeRwigara and #FreeVictoireIngabire.

It is no surprise that there is generally very limited debate on social media of democracy, governance and rule of law. Those who are most influential, e.g. Shyaka Kanuma, are critical of Western

democracy. The latter, for example, has tweeted: "The failures of Western model of democracy we see today should spur the rest of us to take a good look at home-made solutions!" and "Orderly, consensus-based governance is feeling so welcome the more one looks at the confrontational circus of Brexit, the US under Donald Trump and so on". If Rwandans wish to tune in to voices that may be critical of their government, they must rely on international media such as BBC and CNN or newspapers like *The Guardian* (UK) and *The New York Times*, which are all available for purchase in Rwanda.

Tanzania

Freedom House rates Tanzania as "partly free" with respect to the status of political rights and civil liberties in the country.[8] Tanzania has held regular multiparty elections since its transition from a one-party state in the early 1990s, but the opposition remains relatively weak, and the ruling party, *Chama Cha Mapinduzi* (CCM), has been in power ever since independence 1961. Following the 2015 election of the increasingly authoritarian president, John Magufuli, the government has cracked down with growing severity on its critics in the political opposition, the media, and civil society.

This is illustrated, for example by the implementation of the 2016 Media Services Act, which has created statutory regulators with broad authority over media content and the licensing of outlets and journalists. It also prescribes harsh penalties, including prison terms, for publication of defamatory, seditious, or other illegal content. According to Freedom House, officials repeatedly invoked the new law during 2017 to punish alleged violations by critical media outlets. Tanzania has also signed into law a new regulation that governs social media and blogging. The regulation, known as the Electronic and Postal Communications (Online Content) Regulations 2017, came into effect during March 2018. It stipulates, among other things, that a *license fee* be charged to Tanzanians

[8] See Freedom House, Tanzania 2018- Freedom House is not currently rating Tanzania specifically with respect to freedom on the internet (as they do for Rwanda, Uganda and Kenya)

operating online radio stations and video (TV) websites. Bloggers are also included and must apply and pay for a license. This means that if you live in Tanzania to run something as simple as a personal blog, you will have to spend a start-up $900 license fee. Tanzania's new online content regulations have caused extensive damage to the social media landscape. Several prominent bloggers in Tanzania have been forced to close their independent blogs and social media pages, or at least, because of cost, limit their presence. This applies to Tanzania's most popular independent news and user comment site: *Jamii Forum*. Being the largest in the country, it has had as many as 460,000 members and over one million visitors each day. By August 2018, however, the platform had to retrench 90 per cent of its staff because it could not afford the licenses imposed by the new legislation. The owners were considering shutting down their offices. Those who have fewer postings suffer even more and it has become a habit among participants not to leave comments that can be construed as criticism of government or its officials, notably the President. Together with the Cyber Crime Act, which can be used to arrest dissenting journalists and citizens and the Statistics Act, which limits the publication of data to the government's Bureau of Statistics, these new regulations have created a climate of fear of participating in public debates that involve government or the ruling party.

Civil society organizations and religious institutions have voiced criticism of the anti-democratic ways of the current government. During 2018, bishops from the influential Catholic and Evangelical Lutheran churches issued letters heavily critical of President Magufuli's leadership, listing his authoritarian tendencies in restricting media, political opposition, and judiciary. Furthermore, 108 Tanzanian civil society organizations co-signed an open letter airing their fears. One of the critical voices from civil society , Aidan Eyakuze, who is the director of the East African think tank, *Twaweza*, claims that "Democracy, which had never taken firm roots in Tanzania, is more vulnerable now than at any time in the last 25 years".[9] His views have also been echoed by one of the country's

[9] Citizens' voices: defending democracy in Tanzania: Open submission by Aidan Eyakuze, Executive Director of Twaweza East Africa on the Website of Civicus.

most notable publisher, Jenerali Ulimwengu, who has said that "Tanzania has steadfastly slid back into tyranny and the worst type of the Big Man syndrome we have ever experienced"[10]. A prominent environmental lawyer, Rugemeleza Nshala, has added his voice by writing that "freedom of expression is facing the biggest challenge in recent times"[11].

There is also evidence that ordinary Tanzanians have become more critical. The honeymoon period that President Magufuli enjoyed in 2016 when his anti-corruption campaign earned him praise both at home and abroad seems to be coming to an end. By centralizing power rather than empowering independent institutions such as the media, and by suggesting that democracy or human rights are a luxury that Tanzania can only afford when it has already developed, people have become increasingly worried about the direction of the country. Nshala argues based on the Twaweza survey of citizen opinions in East Africa[12], that Tanzanians believe in democracy[13], they understand democracy to mean more than just elections[14], they also believe strongly in transparency[15], and value the freedom of expression[16].

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[10] Jenerali Ulimwengu is chairman of the board of the *Raia Mwema* newspaper and an advocate of the High Court in Dar es Salaam (quote from *The East African*, where he is a regular columnist).

[11] Inter Press Service, August 24, 2018.

[12] Data for 2016 and 2017 from the "*Sauti za Wananchi*" mobile phone panel survey from Twaweza.

[13] Ninety-two per cent say democracy and rights are an important factor in whether or not development happens, and 96 per cent say it is important to them to live in a country that is governed democratically (2016).

[14] 86 per cent say having active opposition parties is a very important characteristic of democracy, and 82 per cent say the same about having strong independent institutions that monitor the government (2017).

[15] Nine out of 10 citizens (92 per cent) say it is important for parliamentary sessions to be broadcast live, and almost as many (88 per cent) say they should be broadcast even if that means there is less money to spend on development (2016). Seven out of eight (86 per cent) believe giving citizens better access to information would cut down on corruption (2017).

[16] Eight out of 10 (81 per cent) say that criticism of leaders is a good thing as it helps stop them from making big mistakes, rather than a bad thing

Uganda

The National Resistance Movement (NRM) headed by President Museveni dominates all levels of the state while established opposition forces lack the organization, money and political space to win at the ballot box. Few Ugandans believe that political change will take place via the ballot box, a popular uprising or a credible National Dialogue.[17] But, the recent emergence of new political actors – notably Robert Kyagulanyi Ssentamu, alias Bobi Wine, the musician-turned-populist Member of Parliament – has restored hope for a change. It has crystallized on social media under the hashtag #PeoplePower.

Freedom House rates Uganda as "partly free" with respect to internet freedom. In 2016 the Government restricted access to social media platforms and communications tools for the first time, ordering the shutdown of Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp, and mobile money services for four days during the February general elections 2016. Platforms were blocked again in the lead-up to President Museveni's inauguration on May 11, 2016. The President has declared these steps to be a necessary measure to stop people from using the platforms to "tell lies". Uganda has gone as far as introducing a daily fee of 200 shilling (50 cents) for anyone accessing social media. Resulting from this new regulation Facebook usage went down by 75 percent in the first weeks.[18] Although it is unclear how this law will be enforced, it has already changed the media landscape. Freedom House reports that politically motivated content has been removed from social media platforms. Ordinary users are censoring themselves online. Social media users reported setting up pseudonymous accounts to protect their anonymity and avoid harassment. According to 2016 research by the Africa Media Barometer, Ugandans "practice their freedom of expression, but not without fear." Despite these obstacles, blogging continues to be

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that undermines respect and unity (2017). Similarly, eight out of 10 (80 per cent) say citizens should be free to criticize the president. However, they don't think this right is respected in practice, as a majority (60 per cent) don't feel free to do so (2017).

[17] The Crisis Group, *Uganda's Slow Slide into Crisis*, 2017.

[18] Inter Press Service, August 24, 2018

popular among young Ugandans who have boldly taken to the internet to push the boundaries on controversial issues such as good governance and corruption. Younger voters who tend to be most affected by economic decline are growing more active and gaining political significance. Many express themselves freely on social media, particularly regarding the presidential age-limit bill, ignoring crackdowns on government critics and shrinking political space.

Generally, there is a very active and open debate on social media in Uganda where people from different professions and with different opinions debate governance-related issues. They include internationally renowned human right activists and attorneys such as Nicholas Opiyo, who are speaking out against harsh treatment of opposition figures and citizens more generally. There are also several critical voices on social media belonging to the business community, for example, Godber Tumushabe and Silver Kayondo, who have written extensively on Twitter about the social media tax, human rights abuses and the lack of respect for rule of law by the Government. Vibrant digital activism raised awareness and mobilized, for instance, on November 27, 2016 around the hashtag #FreeJoyDoreen to demand the release of journalist Joy Doreen Biira who had been arrested by security agencies on terrorism charges for social media posts about a deadly military raid. Another prominent digital activism campaign involved the use of hashtag #FreeStellaNyanzi calling for the release of Dr. Stella Nyanzi, a Makerere University Research Fellow and activist, who in April 2017 had been arrested over two counts of cyber harassment under the 2011 Computer Misuse Act. The #FreeStellaNyanzi campaign also successfully raised a target of US $5,000 to help with her legal fees. Nyanzi separately initiated a fund-raising campaign using hashtag #PadsforUganda to provide free sanitary pads to school girls. By October 2017, over US $5,000 had been raised for this cause.

Social media debates often spill over into mainstream media where opinions differ, and debates extend beyond their original source. Some broadcasters such as Joel Ssenyonyi are strong advocates of the rule of law and generally supportive of the activists. Others, however, are more critical. These include editors, Charles

Onyango-Obbo and Andrew Mwenda, who are speaking out against the #PeoplePower movement.

Social media significance

Three things stand out from this examination of the social media landscape in East Africa. The first is that the climate has deteriorated in all four countries in the last couple of years. There are several possible explanations. One is that social media activism has raised such a level of strength that government leaders have seen the need to enact new restrictive laws as they did in 2016 and 2017. A second explanation is that governments in the region have read what is happening on a global level and concluded that they can get away with repression at little or no political cost because the liberal international order is losing out to nationalists who give priority to the right of state sovereignty. The shadow of Trump reaches as far as Africa. A third explanation is that the social media participants have crossed some imaginary "red lines" that have caused a genuine concern about national security. In a political context where governance rests on managing transactions that respect power based as much on informal as formal institutions, all three factors are likely to have contributed to the deterioration of the social media climate. Governments have reasoned that they can take no chances or that prevention is better than cure. The way that they have acted, however, increases the risk that these laws could backfire. To be sure, governments may have temporarily silenced popular voices. They emerge winners of the battle, but each such short-term victory may undermine their chance of winning the war. As we argue in this report, freedom of expression is something that cannot be suppressed forever. Every time it is quashed, sooner or later it bubbles up again, usually with greater strength. This is a lesson that governments all over the world have learned, and African governments, experiencing the challenges of managing the state-nation, must also make. It is a difficult and painful lesson to learn where power is personalized and the scope for compromise is viewed as limited. Presidents and government leaders usually "overreach" their power to secure their policy objectives. By insisting too strongly on compliance with government directives,

these leaders generally lose much of their legitimacy. President Bashir of Sudan is a recent case in point. Presidential overreach is a common fault wherever the state is perceived to be such a dominant actor in governing the country, but President Abiy Ahmed of Ethiopia has demonstrated that it is possible to avoid the trap of silencing citizen voices from which so many of his contemporary counterparts have trouble to escape.

Another thing that stands out is the courage that so many social media participants show. They are standing up for principles in which they dearly believe. They treat democracy as an end-it-itself. Many of these heroes are women as the stories from Rwanda and Uganda show. Although self-censorship has increasingly become a necessary option to continue being active, it is impressive how many others brush aside all threats in order to say what they believe and contribute to a debate of issues that affect all citizens. Nobody can deny the contribution these people make to building or maintaining a governance regime based on respect for civil liberties and political rights and, thus by extension to human welfare at large.

The third thing is how the social media reach across national boundaries. While governments show little interest in learning from each other, influential names in the social media business tend to have followers in neighboring countries. For example, the detention of opposition leaders and activists such as Bobi Wine in Uganda as well as Diane and Adeline Rwigara in Rwanda has received attention on social media in all countries. Judging from the comments on social media, Bobi Wine represents a new generation of progressive leaders across Africa. When he was arrested in mid-August 2018, demonstrations spread online and in the streets in cross-border solidarity. "These are young countries for long held onto by dictators," says Rosebell Kagumire, a blogger and activist based in Kampala. Dennis Owino, a Kenyan analyst, says on Twitter that the protests have awakened "the sleeping giant that is the youth. The fire is beyond Uganda. Everyone is fired up. That is why across East Africa, and, to a lesser extent, in parts of central, west and southern Africa, as well as the diaspora in the U.S., Canada, Japan, Denmark and Norway, among many countries, virtual and then physical boots hit the ground in solidarity when Wine was arrested". Carol Ndosi, a Tanzanian activist, added: "Since we can't speak out on our own

atrocities, we are using Bobi Wine to tell the rest of the world just how wrong things are here," In Rwanda with its extremely restrictive political environment, citizens spoke out on social media, changing their avatars to pictures of Wine after he was detained and making statements about the arrests and attacks on younger politicians in countries of the region. Likewise, in Kenya Abraham Mutai, a social justice activist encouraged East Africans to speak out: "If you shouted #FreeBobiWine it is time you do the same for #FreeDianeRwigara". When Bobi Wine visited Kenya in October 2018, he was greeted by both civil society and young MPs. The visit was referenced on social media with broad support for the #PeoplePower movement in Uganda. At the same time, there are some, though not many, pro-government voices especially in Rwanda and Uganda, who debate whether Western style democracy is delivering or whether it may be more appropriate for Africa to have the types of regime associated with presidents Kagame and Museveni. These voices help nuancing the debate and forcing supporters of the #PeoplePower movement and opposition figures to sharpen their argumentation. Their involvement in the debates also renders legitimacy to the social media which is important in the political climate that characterizes a limited access order.

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This list of references includes all the items that have been consulted for this study. In the interest of keeping the report at a manageable length it has not been possible to cite and discuss all of them. They are included here, however, for the benefit of the reader interested in knowing the wide range of literature that is relevant for this study.

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17 October Sandra Diesel, Head of Development Cooperation, Swedish Embassy, Nairobi.

17 October Michael Chege, Professor and Governance Advisor, NEPAD Regional Secretariat, Nairobi.

17 October Professor Tade Aina, Executive Director, Partnership for African Social and Governance Research (PASGR), Nairobi.

18 October Ola Hällgren, Head, Development Cooperation, Swedish Embassy, Kampala.

18 October Johan Bergqvist, Counsellor, Democratic Governance, Swedish Embassy, Kampala.

19 October Johan Cauwenbergh, Head of Development Cooperation, EU Commission Office, Kigali, Rwanda.

19 October Emmanuel Gasana, Evaluation and Monitoring Officer, USAID Office, Kigali, Rwanda.

22 October Walter Bgoya, Publisher, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.

23 October Benson Bana, Professor of Political Science, University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.

23 October Samuel Maghimbi, Professor of Sociology, University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.

24 October True Schedvin, Lead Economist, Swedish Embassy, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.

24 October Claire Henneville-Wedholm , Counsellor, Democratic Governance, Swedish Embassy, Dar es Salaam.

November 27 Mikael Boström, Governance and Human Rights, Sida, Stockholm.

November 27 Per Nordlund, Africa Section, Sida, Stockholm

November 27 Lennart Peck, Counsellor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Stockholm.

November 27 Martin Mossberg, Coordinator, African Issues, MoF, Stockholm.

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Dr Lena Johansson de Chateau of the EBA Secretariat has served as the Coordinator and Secretary of the Group.

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