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**BUILDING BRIDGES BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN  
AND DEVELOPMENT RESPONSES TO FORCED MIGRATION**

Alexander Kocks, Ruben Wedel, Hanne Roggemann, Helge Roxin



# Building Bridges Between International Humanitarian and Development Responses to Forced Migration

A Review of Conceptual and Empirical  
Literature with a Case Study on the  
Response to the Syria Crisis

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*till*

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# Foreword by DEval and the EBA

The importance of bridging humanitarian aid and long-term development cooperation is a recurrent theme in the global debate on development aid. The gaps between the two are becoming more troubling as the complexity of conflicts intensifies. The many large-scale humanitarian crises related to war and violence; their increased duration and the growing number of internal, regional and international actors with different agendas have made closer cooperation between humanitarian assistance and long-term development cooperation crucial.

How could emergency and relief assistance to refugees, internally displaced and other populations and long-term development aid and post-war reconstruction be better coordinated? How to bring long-term improvements for refugees and host populations in low or middle-income countries alike? How to improve conditions for coordination between crisis relief and long-term aid working in the same contexts and countries, but along divergent logics and with different aims? These are all burning questions.

The 2016 World Humanitarian Summit reached a consensus on the need to better link humanitarian assistance and development cooperation. But the agreement leaves open the question how this can best be done in practice. Moreover, there is not much robust evidence and knowledge about the extent to which effective linkages have already been established in practice. The present joint literature review of the German Institute for Development Evaluation (DEval) and the Swedish Expert Group for Aid Studies (EBA) presents an overview of knowledge on the humanitarian-development gap and how it could be closed.

Based on a review of previous work and literature, the report develops an analytical framework which divides the humanitarian-development gap into seven dimensions, called sub-gaps, related to: (1) vision and strategy, (2) planning, (3) funding, (4) institutions, (5) ownership, (6) geographic/spatial, and lastly concerning (7) sequence.

This framework is utilized to analyse empirical studies on the international response to the horrendous Syria crisis. Syria may be an exceptional and unique case, but also reveals important information on the shortcomings that are the result of lack of coordination between humanitarian and development actors. The review, however, suggests some achievements in linking the two after the early years of the Syria emergency, when all focus was placed on response to crisis management. Yet, findings expose a lack of coordination, and there is an urgent need to develop strategies on how best to address remaining sub-gaps.

The authors' work has been conducted in dialogue with a reference group chaired jointly by Stefan Leiderer at DEval and Kim Forss, member of the EBA. However, the authors are solely responsible for the content of the report.

Bonn and Stockholm, March 2018

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'Jörg Faust'.

Jörg Faust  
(Director of DEval)

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'Helena Lindholm'.

Helena Lindholm  
(Chair of the EBA)

# Summary

Forced migration has increased enormously worldwide, and a pressing political debate has emerged on how to deal effectively with underlying crises. Until a few years ago, climate change was considered the future main driver of forced migration. Today, violent conflict has taken its place in the public limelight, mainly due to the crisis in Syria. This crisis entered the European public arena only when a significant number of refugees started to reach Europe. It suddenly became tangible that the number of refugees is at its all-time high in the history of mankind, and not a mere figure anymore.<sup>1</sup>

Which international actors are competent, and which approach is most appropriate to manage forced migration crises? This is a long-standing bone of contention. But since crises are becoming increasingly protracted today, frequently giving stakeholders of the humanitarian and the development sector a good reason to work simultaneously, it seems even more imperative to establish linkages between sectors.

The call for changes – mostly as a consequence of the Syria crisis – became louder with the first World Humanitarian Summit in Istanbul, 2016. Almost all summit documents, such as the Report of the United Nations Secretary-General for the World Humanitarian Summit, are stressing the need to (better) link humanitarian assistance with development cooperation: *“Humanitarian and development actors need to work collaboratively across silos and mandates to implement plans with a clear and measurable collective outcome that reduces the vulnerability of internally displaced persons over the long term”* (UN Doc. A/70/709, 2016: 23 f.) This applies for internally displaced persons and refugees alike.

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<sup>1</sup> According to UNHCR, more than 65 million people worldwide are forced to leave their homes. Roughly 13.9 million people in 2014 and 12.4 million people in 2015 were forced to flee because of conflict. Due to registration issues and other problems, these figures should be treated with caution. They nevertheless show a worrying general trend. For the latest figures, see: <http://www.unhcr.org/figures-at-a-glance.html> (latest access 01.08.2017).

There seems to be a growing consensus among key stakeholders that the two silos have to be linked and aligned under collective outcomes. This is substantiated by global initiatives after the Istanbul summit, making policy commitments on the nexus and outlining ways to transform them into action.<sup>2</sup> However, it is still not clear whether they will materialize, and how exactly pledges will be transferred to the ground in specific environments.

Against this background, we:

- filter out recommendations/normative claims from the conceptual literature on the humanitarian-development nexus and organize them in an analytical framework, allowing for a structured perspective on individual forced migration crises;
- find a systematic disconnect between conceptual claims and empirical findings, exemplified by the Syria case;
- suggest what needs to be done in order to bridge the gap between the humanitarian and the development sector when dealing with forced migration crises.

This literature review contributes to answer how humanitarian and development responses to forced migration crises can be linked effectively. It does so by addressing two sub-questions:

1. What is needed to effectively link humanitarian and development responses to forced migration crises?
2. To what extent, and why (or why not), are effective linkages established in practice?

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<sup>2</sup> See 2016 New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, and the 2017 UNHCR Standing Committee 69th meeting: Strengthening humanitarian-development cooperation in forced displacement situations.

To answer the questions above, we proceed in two steps:<sup>3</sup>

1. We analyse a comprehensive sample of the conceptual literature on the nexus between humanitarian assistance and development cooperation. From a fragmented discourse we systematically extract recommendations on how to bridge the gap. This enables us to develop an analytical framework allowing for a structured linkage perspective on empirical literature that deals with individual forced migration crises.
2. We connect the framework to a body of evaluative literature on one of the most recent forced migration crises, in Syria and its neighbouring countries.

We connect findings from the empirical case study with the conceptual analysis, and identify in which areas, and to what extent, linkages have been established in the response to the Syria crisis. This creates opportunities to discover challenges, and opens a way forward for policy makers, practitioners as well as researchers in the humanitarian and the development field.

### ***Main conceptual findings on the humanitarian-development linkage***

In a first step, 30 selected conceptual studies on the nexus will be reviewed. They represent the five most relevant and distinguishable concepts in the discourse on linking humanitarian aid and development cooperation: Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and

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<sup>3</sup> The review uses transparent procedures to find and synthesize conceptual and empirical findings on the humanitarian-development linkage. It is based on an explicit search strategy and applies inclusion/exclusion criteria. The review also uses a systematic coding and analysis of studies. Our methodological approach is inspired by the DEval evaluation synthesis on budget support (Orth et al., 2017), and follows basic features of the Campbell approach to systematic reviews (see [Campbellcollaboration.org](http://Campbellcollaboration.org)). However, our review applies qualitative methods (qualitative content analysis), in contrast to the Campbell approach.

Development (LRRD), Resilience, Whole of Government (WoG), Early Recovery, and Connectedness.

From this literature, we filter out seven sub-gaps of the main gap and nineteen recommendations (i.e. normative claims) on how to bridge gaps. Findings, sub-gaps and recommendations are then arranged in a unified analytical framework, which brings more clarity to the debate. The framework also forms a basis for our second step: a review of empirical literature on the response to Syria. Table S1 represents a short version of our framework.

**Table S1: Analytical framework (short version)**

<b>Sub-Gaps</b>	<b>Recommendation</b>
<i>Vision and Strategy</i>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Working principles of humanitarian assistance and development cooperation should be balanced.</li> <li>2. Humanitarian and development actors should commit themselves to common goals to increase the coherence of interventions.</li> <li>3. Humanitarian and development actors should develop joint country strategies.</li> <li>4. Donors should seek to align their country strategies with host countries' strategies.</li> <li>5. Humanitarian and development responses should both be committed to longer-term engagement in protracted crises.</li> </ol>
<i>Funding</i>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>6. Humanitarian and development responses should be adequately funded in protracted crises.</li> <li>7. Funding mechanisms should be more flexible, enable actors to react to unforeseen circumstances, and allow for rapid responses to emergencies.</li> </ol>
<i>Planning</i>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>8. A joint planning process should be initiated, including a wide variety of relevant stakeholders, to develop a coherent and needs-based response to crises.</li> <li>9. Planning processes must be based on assessments that collect information on short-term and longer-term needs, and should identify opportunities to link humanitarian and development interventions.</li> <li>10. Interventions should address needs in a holistic way, including multiple stakeholders across the humanitarian and development realm.</li> </ol>

<i>Institutional</i>	<p>11. Donor countries should strive for a high degree of interdepartmental cooperation in order to reduce redundancies and contradictions in overseas operations.</p> <p>12. Cooperation between institutions with differing mandates should be a common modus operandi in order to link humanitarian assistance and development cooperation.</p> <p>13. Clear leadership should be ensured for jointly coordinating humanitarian and development actors.</p> <p>14. An institutional structure with decision-making power closely linked to the area of programme implementation should be put in place.</p> <p>15. Staffs of stakeholders should have interdisciplinary (humanitarian and development) skills needed to promote effective linkages.</p>
<i>Geographic</i>	<p>16. Humanitarian assistance and development cooperation should be conducted in geographical proximity in order to reach the same target groups when the context permits.</p>
<i>Ownership</i>	<p>17. International humanitarian assistance should work with national and local stakeholders when the context permits.</p> <p>18. International humanitarian assistance should seek to develop capacities of national and local stakeholders.</p>
<i>Sequence</i>	<p>19. Programme designs should ensure an adequate sequencing (including timing) of humanitarian and development phases.</p>

Source: Authors' own

## *Main empirical findings*

Progress has been made in linking humanitarian assistance and development cooperation compared to the early years of mainly humanitarian crisis response. This basic finding holds especially true for the strategy and planning gap. For other sub-gaps we have found mixed evidence.

### **Improvements on bridging the strategy and the planning gap**

The Syrian example demonstrates a shift in strategies and planning that today reflect the need to simultaneously cater for emergency

responses and long-term development. In the meantime, resilience serves as a common denominator for actors.

Resilience is a key to long-term development. It is epitomized by the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plans (3RPs) and by new compact agreements. The 3RPs also underline how important it is to include host countries in a prominent position. They pay tribute to a strong ownership component, which is seen as a prerequisite for long-term development.

There has also been progress regarding more comprehensive planning that takes into account various sectors (joint sector working groups) and beneficiaries.

### **Mixed evidence on the funding gap**

An ambivalent picture emerges of the funding gap. Progress has been made in applying innovative funding modalities that allow for joint humanitarian-development financing and flexible funding arrangements, thus enabling actors to react quickly to new circumstances.

But this positive trend is at stake. Dramatic funding shortfalls in recent years, and a continued emphasis on humanitarian assistance rather than development-oriented programmes in Syria and other humanitarian crises have become severe burdens on the international community. A general scarcity of funds has emerged. This has had one distinct consequence: emergency measures have to be prioritized over development-oriented interventions.<sup>4</sup>

### **Mixed evidence on the institutional, geographic, ownership and sequence gap**

The institutional, geographic, ownership and sequence gaps show another mixed picture. On the one hand, there is no proof that humanitarian assistance and development cooperation are linked effectively across space and time (geographic gap, sequence gap).

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<sup>4</sup> This holds true despite rising ODA figures in Europe in recent years. For conditions to be subsumed as ODA, compare <http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/officialdevelopmentassistedefinitionandcoverage.htm#Definition> (last access 14.08.2017). For an in-depth study, compare with Knoll and Sheriff, 2017: 17ff.



On the other hand, progress has been made in linking institutions. The empirical literature provides several positive examples in the Syrian context of linkages on different levels – from individual organizations linking their humanitarian and development branches, and up to humanitarian actors – that show sensitivity to long-term perspectives and local organizations.

Despite challenges and hindering factors to ownership, international actors working with and building capacities of national and local stakeholders is becoming a common *modus operandi*. This generates positive effects mostly: increased assistance to vulnerable people in “no access” areas, higher capacity among local authorities, and economic benefits to local private sectors.

However, building capacities is often a top-down process, directed by international organizations. National and local actors have little influence on what kind of capacities should be developed. Cooperation of this kind is still often born out of necessity rather than after considering needs to strengthen local structures. More recent concepts of capacity development – as opposed to capacity building – are seemingly not implemented on a larger scale.<sup>5</sup>

Table S2 summarizes the main findings derived from our review of the empirical literature on the Syria crisis response. Progress in linking humanitarian and development responses is viewed in contrast to remaining problems.

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<sup>5</sup> Compare with [http://www.undp.org/content/dam/aplaws/publication/en/publications/capacity-development/capacity-development-a-undp-primer/CDG\\_PrimerReport\\_final\\_web.pdf](http://www.undp.org/content/dam/aplaws/publication/en/publications/capacity-development/capacity-development-a-undp-primer/CDG_PrimerReport_final_web.pdf) (last access 14.08.2017).

**Table S2: Achievements and challenges in linking humanitarian and development responses to the Syria crisis**

<b>Sub-Gaps</b>	<b>Achievements</b>	<b>Remaining Challenges</b>
<i>Vision and Strategy</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- shift towards resilience agenda</li> <li>- joint international strategies (e.g. 3RPs) are in place that align the humanitarian-development response</li> <li>- donor countries are committed to longer-term engagement in Syria's neighbouring countries</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- resilience component of 3RPs/NRPs does not focus on refugees to the same extent as on host communities</li> <li>- unified (interdepartmental) donor country strategies are exceptions rather than the rule</li> <li>- balancing of competing working principles is still a challenge</li> </ul>
<i>Funding</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- innovative funding modalities allowing for joint humanitarian-development financing</li> <li>- flexible funding modalities to react quickly to unforeseen circumstances</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- the shift towards resilience strengthening as a common goal of the humanitarian-development response is not reflected in actual allocation patterns</li> <li>- strong emphasis on emergency assistance regarding costs of resilience programs</li> <li>- at donor country level, bureaucratic factors and short funding cycles are still hindering a more development-oriented funding</li> </ul>
<i>Planning</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- close collaboration between host countries and international organizations (IOs) in response planning</li> <li>- joint sector working groups in host countries</li> <li>- evidence of joint planning among humanitarian and development actors at donor country level</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- strict bureaucratic rules in host countries are impeding fast and flexible project approval</li> <li>- local actors are only partially involved in planning processes</li> </ul>

<i>Institutional</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- evidence of development agencies (e.g. Sida) linking both forms of assistance internally</li> <li>- evidence of humanitarian actors working closely with civil society and the private sector to create longer-term perspectives</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- evidence of IOs separating emergency response from development response (such as UNICEF in Turkey)</li> <li>- staffs with mixed (humanitarian-development) skill sets are still in short supply among bilateral and multilateral agencies</li> <li>- high staff turnover often inhibits improved humanitarian-development linkages</li> </ul>
<i>Geographic</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>no evidence in the sample</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- development actors have not equally good access to IDPs and host communities within the Syrian territory as humanitarian actors</li> <li>- geographical distance between humanitarian and development offices impedes joint planning</li> <li>- spatial mobility of refugees makes it difficult to reach them with both forms of assistance</li> </ul>
<i>Ownership</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- many international actors are working with national and local stakeholders and building their capacity</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- capacity building of national and local stakeholders is often a top-down process, with little influence for local actors</li> </ul>
<i>Sequence</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- many implementers are aware of the need to adequately plan transition and sequences in programme designs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- finding an appropriate timing of interventions remains a challenge for implementers (e.g. due to re-allocations of funds or lengthy approval processes)</li> </ul>

Source: Authors' own

## **Connecting empirical findings with the conceptual debate**

Our findings give us a better understanding of remaining challenges and opportunities for humanitarian-development linkage. However, at times, further reflections are needed to put things into perspective. We will subsequently connect findings drawn from the empirical sample with further conceptual considerations.

## **Bridging the gap or creating new divides?**

An analysis of the empirical literature reveals several cases of successfully bridging gaps between the humanitarian and the development world. But doubts do remain as to whether reconstructing a hardly existing link between conceptual and empirical debates by means of a literature review is sufficient to fully comprehend those bridges.

A systematic disconnect remains between conceptual claims and evaluative findings – no evaluative study refers directly to any concept of the linkage debate. This can only be healed by evaluations that measure the outcomes of shifts in linkage. Evaluations of that kind are hardly available today.

There is also a persistent lack of conceptual clarity. Many frequently used terms have a catch-all meaning. The risk of jumping to premature conclusions can be illustrated by two examples that at a first glance might appear to close the ownership gap during the Syria crisis. In reality they are leaving many questions unanswered:

First, humanitarian and development actors are embedded in the political context of neighbouring countries equipped with comparatively strong capacities. A strong host government arguably represents the development side of the nexus; it is able to firmly pursue (and at least partially implement) its own perspectives on long-term development.<sup>6</sup> This marks a major difference compared to past crises in failed states (e.g. Haiti, Sierra Leone and Somalia), where the UN and other relief organizations substituted state

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<sup>6</sup> Following the same logic of representation, multilateral UN organizations (UNHCR first and foremost) take the lead in representing refugees as the humanitarian part of a crisis.

structures to a great extent, leaving the question how to achieve long-term development widely open.

The ownership gap will, probably, be bridged if relevant stakeholders dealing with the forced migration crisis – implementers of humanitarian assistance in the first place – recognize a neighbouring host country's interests. But are long-term development perspectives mainly created for host populations, or do they include refugees as well? This question is not fully answered.

In the Syria crisis, host-governments are pushing the resilience agenda heavily towards benefits for their own populations, while the status of refugees (as temporary guests or people with residence permits) remains unsettled.<sup>7</sup> To avoid premature conclusions as to the ownership gap, one last question needs to be addressed more carefully: Who represents whose interests, who owns what?

Secondly, the need for more precision on what closing the ownership gap means in practice can also be illustrated on a micro-level: by implementers of humanitarian aid who attempt to involve civil society organizations and other local actors on the ground. We notice a positive trend towards a more demand-driven, people-centred approach among humanitarian actors. This enhances the likelihood of long-term outcomes.

But we cannot validate to what extent working through local institutions is based on the following aspects: a) equally taking into account the needs of local populations and refugees; and b) the inclusion of local solutions in national plans and strategies. On the contrary, a rather well known mechanism seems to be at work in the Syria crisis, just as in previous crises. Large international relief organizations overwhelm local actors with prescriptions on how to deal with matters.

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<sup>7</sup> One way to give refugees greater priority in the resilience agenda is to create incentives for host countries, as manifested in recent compact agreements with the European Union. The Jordan Compact, for example, tells us that donor countries will provide Jordan with incentives to generate sustainable outcomes for refugees by offering trade concessions and non-concessional World Bank loans to the national government.

Since the empirical literature does not provide more information on the nature of ownership, the Syrian example possibly demonstrates one thing: humanitarian aid becomes adapted to protracted crises, without using the ownership ‘seed’ for building up long-term development.

Both examples point to a missing discussion on consequences of current adjustments to the overall linkage discourse. Here, we can only state that the initial gap between international humanitarian and development actors in an actual and protracted forced migration crisis takes different forms and calls for testing overall assumptions of effective linkages between humanitarian assistance and development cooperation. The latter can only be achieved with evaluations focusing on outcomes.

### *Suggestions on a way forward*

The next steps outlined below are directed towards policy-makers and practitioners alike. Both national and international actors are invited to pick them up and use them as a guidance for their own practice. We have not identified specific stakeholders to lead this process, since the literature review serves to provide conceptual clarity rather than analysing the political landscape. However, the identified steps are geared towards preventing stakeholders to hide behind allegedly telling idioms, such as ‘common goals’, without eventually coming to terms with practical progress in linking (or reasoning why linking should not take place).

Further research and evaluative work is urgently needed in order to find adequate answers to an overall question of urging practical relevance. Our literature review makes this clear. Subsequently, we will explain some conceptual and empirical shortcomings, and provide suggestions on how to overcome them:

1. There is an obvious missing link between conceptual knowledge and empirical findings. A consistent logic must be developed of the linkage between humanitarian assistance and development cooperation (Theory of Change, ToC). It should be based on further conceptual clarity – and our analytical framework is a

first step. Additionally, it needs to take empirical findings into account in a systematic way. What can different stakeholders' experiences tell us on effective linkages? What are the positive or negative consequences of linking efforts?

2. Our empirical case study (the Syria crisis) is the best one at hand currently, in our opinion. But one single case study has obvious limitations: it leads to a lack of external validity. We have to contrast Syria to other cases before more general statements can be put forward on the humanitarian-development linkage.
3. The reviewed empirical studies provide almost no evidence at all on intended, and unintended, outcomes of linkages between the two forms of assistance in relation to the Syria crisis. Studies do not explain whether these bridges have generated any substantial effects for end beneficiaries. In order to validate a Theory of Change on linkage, evaluations and/or impact assessments focused on outcomes are necessary. New empirical knowledge must spell out exactly how to connect to what on different levels. It must clarify intended outputs, outcomes and impacts, and how to get there (causal paths, mechanisms, etc.). This can also be seen as a prerequisite for giving priority to individual sub-gaps and closing them.
4. The general debate on linking humanitarian assistance and development cooperation is fragmented and partially inconsistent. The outlined way forward – and its projected results – must be fed into a broader discussion among researchers and practitioners who are open to new information. Ultimately, we need a unified debate, with conceptual consistency based on empirical evidence.

# Abbreviations

ALNAP	Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action
BMZ	German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development
CALL	Coordinated Accountability and Lessons Learning
CSO	Civil Society Organization
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
Danida	Danish International Development Agency
DEMAC	Diaspora Emergency Action & Coordination
DEval	German Institute for Development Evaluation
DFAT	Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Australia)
DIE	German Development Institute
EBA	Expert Group for Aid Studies
EC	European Commission
ECHO	European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations
EU	European Union
GPPI	Global Public Policy Institute
HPG	Humanitarian Policy Group
IASC	International Accounting Standards Committee
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
ILO	International Labour Organization
INGO	International Nongovernmental Organization
IO	International Organizations
IOB	Policy and Operations Evaluation Department
IRC	International Rescue Committee
KfW	Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau
LRRD	Linking Relief Rehabilitation and Development
MoE	Ministry of Education
NGO	Nongovernmental Organization
Norad	Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
NRP	National Resilience Plan



OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODA	Official Development Assistance
ODI	Overseas Development Institute
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
SDG	Sustainably Development Goals
Sida	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
SRC	Swiss Red Cross
ToC	Theory of Change
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEG	United Nations Evaluation Group
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund (formerly: UN Fund for Population Activities)
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
URD	Urgency rehabilitation development
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WFP	World Food Programme
WoG	Whole of Government
3RP	Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan



# 1. Introduction

Forced migration triggered by crises has increased enormously in the world (Figure 1), and we are facing a pressing political debate on how to deal with this drama. Until a few years ago, climate change was considered the future main driver of forced migration. Since then, the long-lasting crises in Syria and elsewhere have pushed violent conflict into the limelight. The Syrian crisis entered the European public arena only when a significant number of refugees started to reach Europe. It became tangible that the number of refugees is at its all-time high historically, and not a mere figure anymore.<sup>8</sup>

Recent experiences from Syria, Afghanistan and other places show that violent conflicts are increasingly protracted and difficult to mitigate. Consequently, the number of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) seeking protection in safe areas in neighbouring countries, and inside a conflict-ridden country, has risen drastically. Eighty per cent of today's refugees come to lower and middle-income countries who themselves often face fragile socioeconomic and political situations – and who for this reason are struggling to cope with the flow of refugees.<sup>9</sup>

One common denominator in the current political debate is that protracted crises in refugee- and IDP-receiving countries can be dealt with by creating conditions that lead to long-term improvements for all affected groups: refugees, IDPs and host


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<sup>8</sup> According to UNHCR, more than 65 million people in the world are forced to leave their homes. Roughly 13.9 million people in 2014 and 12.4 million in 2015 were forced to flee because of conflict. Due to a number of problems such as registration issues, these figures have to be treated with caution. They nevertheless show a worrying general trend. For latest figures, see <http://www.unhcr.org/figures-at-a-glance.html> (latest access 01.08.2017).

<sup>9</sup> See <http://www.unric.org/en/world-refugee-day/26978-new-report-developing-countries-host-80-of-refugees-> (latest access 02.08.2017). However, the largest host country, hosting 2.9 million refugees, is Turkey – arguably also increasingly confronted with fragility. Compare with <http://www.unhcr.org/figures-at-a-glance.html> (latest access 01.08.2017).

populations, which in turn is allegedly suited to prevent a mass exodus from troubled areas.

**Figure 1: Forcibly and newly displaced population due to conflict or persecution worldwide**



Note: Forcibly displaced population: Refugees, IDPs, Asylum-seekers (blue series) and Newly displaced due to conflict or persecution (red series). Figures in millions. Source: UNHCR, A Year of Crises, Global Trends 2011; UNHCR. Global Trends, Forced Displacement in 2016.

Which international actors are competent, and what is the most appropriate approach to deal with and manage forced migration crises? That is a long-standing bone of contention.<sup>10</sup> The fact that both humanitarian and development actors are involved in responses to protracted forced migration crises calls for clarifying which actors should do what, and when, in order to achieve certain outcomes.

<sup>10</sup> Even though UNHCR is the leading organization mandated to protect refugees, there is an abundance of other implementers of humanitarian assistance. They work “in collaboration, complementarity or competition” (Davey et al., 2013: 1) with each other, and vis-à-vis implementing organizations responsible for development cooperation.

## **1.1 Humanitarian assistance and development cooperation – two worlds, one problem**

The perception of international humanitarian assistance and development cooperation as separate worlds has a long history.

Western humanitarian assistance appeared for the first time in an organized form during the Battle of Solferino during the Second Italian War of Independence (1859) – where volunteers helped injured soldiers of both war parties. This triggered the foundation of the International Committee of the Red Cross as a neutral and impartial institution. Further wars in Europe induced the Hague Conventions (1899 and 1907) and the Geneva Conventions (1864–1949) to stipulate rights of victims of war, including civilians. Both conventions show that humanitarian assistance originally is closely linked to wars in Europe. Saving lives and alleviating suffering was, and is today, the prime purpose. But modern humanitarian assistance carries out a broader range of activities, including responding to natural and man-made disasters, supporting displaced people in acute and protracted crises, livelihoods support, conflict resolution and peace-building (Davey et al., 2013: 1).

In contrast to humanitarian assistance, support to countries affected by conflict and fragility is a relatively new field for development cooperation. Originally, development assistance primarily focused on partner countries seeking economic growth during the postcolonial era after World War II. The journey from early nation-building efforts unto today has brought many changes. Most relevant here is the emphasis on aid effectiveness as a guiding principle, including a strong ownership component attributed to partner countries.

Expanding violent, especially intrastate, conflicts in recent years (cf. Gates et al., 2016: 2) has forced traditional development cooperation to deal more frequently with fragility. Twenty-two of the world's 34 poorest countries were either conflict-ridden or In tormented by post-conflict traumas in 2010 (BMZ, 2013: 7). By supporting them as well as countries affected by forced migration

crises, today’s development cooperation focuses on longer-term perspectives for people in need.

**Figure 2: Two worlds: international humanitarian assistance and development cooperation**

	International Humanitarian Assistance		International Development Cooperation
Objectives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- save lives</li><li>- alleviate human suffering</li></ul>	Humanitarian – Development Gap	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- alleviate poverty</li><li>- long-term social and economic development</li><li>- good governance/rule of law</li></ul>
Modus operandi	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- short-term<sup>a</sup></li><li>- individual &amp; immediate</li><li>- unconditional</li><li>- implemented by IOs, NGOs, local contractors</li></ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- long-term</li><li>- structural</li><li>- selective/conditional</li></ul>
Principles	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- humanitarian principles (e.g. humanity, independence, impartiality, neutrality)</li></ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- principles for aid effectiveness (e.g. national ownership, alignment with partner’s strategies, harmonization among donors)</li></ul>
Legal basis	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- international humanitarian law (e.g. Geneva Conventions)</li></ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- agreements with partner countries, binding under international law</li></ul>
Actors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- multilateral (e.g. UNHCR, WFP)</li><li>- bilateral (e.g. Sida)</li><li>- non-governmental (e.g. Oxfam, Care, Red Cross, Red Crescent Moon)</li></ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- multilateral (e.g. UNDP, UNICEF)</li><li>- bilateral (Danida, Sida, USAID)</li><li>- non-governmental (e.g. Action Aid, Christian Aid)</li></ul>

Note: Note that this figure is an ideal-type juxtaposition reflecting the respective mandates of organizations, not their de facto work. <sup>a</sup> The ideal-typical characterization of international humanitarian assistance as “short-term” refers to its level of objectives. Even though humanitarian assistance is engaged continuously in protracted crises, traditionally it concentrates on short-term objectives (such as emergency life-saving). Source: Authors’ own

In sum, modern conflicts and crises – in terms of quantity and length of time – has brought two originally separated worlds closer together: they have to deal with one common problem. This is reflected in current refugee crises. Both forms of assistance often operate simultaneously, but they follow different – historically grown – logics of action (Figure 2).<sup>11</sup>

Thus, the appropriate division of labour between humanitarian and development actors during forced migration crises is a relevant issue for two main reasons. First, protracted crises highlight the need to systematically link what hitherto merely overlapped. Secondly, a plethora of divergent answers still seem to exist, despite the fact that effective linkages between the two worlds has been a frequently discussed topic since the early 1990s – also in other contexts such as natural disasters.

Unfortunately, the discourse is quite fragmented. This challenge has motivated the present literature review to a considerable degree.

The changes confronting international humanitarian assistance have not only triggered actors to stay on for longer periods of time and to engage on a larger scale (see ALNAP, 2015).<sup>12</sup> These changes also evoke a need for more interdisciplinary expertise to mitigate recent crises, involving natural and social sciences, private sectors, the military, social networks, and local communities (Bennett et al., 2017: 6). This expertise reaches far beyond humanitarian action of the past, and leads actors to a more holistic and structural view on conflicts and future perspectives. The intertwined nature of today's conflicts is making the picture even more complex.

The fact that countries affected by forced migration are exhibiting fragility gives us a logical connection to the development sphere. Traditionally, development cooperation operates in non-conflict-driven environments, but the spread of fragility and crises has created many points of contact with forced migration in

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<sup>11</sup> In some crises, humanitarian assistance and development cooperation have started simultaneously. In others one of the two appeared first.

<sup>12</sup> Protracted crises usually last for decades. For example, 80 per cent of all refugee crises go on for ten years or more (Crawford et al. 2015: 1).

emergency situations.<sup>13</sup> Formerly stable countries are turning volatile, creating additional needs for investments in systemic development measures. Devastating downward spirals have seized countries hitherto not needing measures of that kind. A new start is called for in a difficult working environment from the very beginning of international engagement.

Finally, this globalization of conflicts demonstrates that two separate logics – humanitarian assistance and development cooperation – acting one after the other, or neatly segregated next to each other – is not adequate anymore. The lack of clear-cut divisions is further exacerbated by frequently changing conflicts. Hence, it is necessary to adapt continuously to new situations. Sometimes you have to find flexible answers and act quickly for the sake of affected groups of people. In other situations it calls for longer-term approaches and perspectives addressing, for example, institutional structures.

Whether the two general approaches really are capable of adapting to frequent changes is a contested issue. But there is an emerging consensus on one assessment: linking cannot happen in a linear continuum, leading from humanitarian emergency assistance to structural development cooperation. It has to take place in a contiguuum (simultaneously).

Against this background, it seems imperative to establish effective linkages. The call for changes, especially as a consequence of the Syria crisis, became louder during the first World Humanitarian Summit in Istanbul, 2016. Almost all summit documents (such as the Report of the United Nations Secretary-General for the World Humanitarian Summit) stress how important it is to interconnect humanitarian assistance and development cooperation:

“Humanitarian and development actors need to work collaboratively across silos and mandates to implement plans with a

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<sup>13</sup> It is noticeable that long-term rehabilitation and development of formerly war-stricken countries worldwide is a relatively new factor; it did not cover countries of the Middle East during previous conflicts (e.g. the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s).



clear and measurable collective outcome that reduces the vulnerability of internally displaced persons over the long term”(UN Doc. A/70/709, 2016: 23 f.). This applies for internally displaced and refugees alike.

However, while there is a general consensus that the two silos have to be linked and aligned under collective outcomes, it is not at all clear how this can be done in practice in specific environments.

## 1.2 Scope and research question

The multitude of different actors with diverging perspectives on the ‘contiguum’ is the backdrop of the question how humanitarian assistance and development cooperation can be effectively linked. The present review sheds light on current conceptual knowledge on linkages, and juxtaposes this with the Syrian example.<sup>14</sup> We explore whether there are constructive examples of interconnecting the two worlds.

So how can responses to conflict-induced migration crises be linked effectively?<sup>15</sup> We start by investigating two sub-questions:

1. What is needed to effectively link humanitarian and development responses to forced migration crises?
2. To what extent, and why (or why not), are effective linkages established in practice?

We apply a two-stage procedure of literature analysis. In a first step, we are reviewing 30 conceptual studies on the humanitarian-development nexus. They represent the five most prominent (i.e. most often referred to) and distinguishable concepts in the discourse on linking humanitarian aid and development cooperation: Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development, Resilience, Whole of Government, Early Recovery, and

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<sup>14</sup> On the rationale behind choosing the Syria crisis, see Section 1.3, and Sections 2.1 and 2.3 for further details.

<sup>15</sup> In this review we use “conflict-induced migration crises” and “forced migration crises” as synonymous terms.

Connectedness. This serves to systematically analyse and structure the humanitarian-development gap at the conceptual level. It also filters out recommendations on how to close the gap.

Our aim of this cross-conceptual analysis is to find all relevant recommendations. From this starting point we proceed and develop an analytical framework allowing us to scrutinize empirical studies through the linkage lens.

For reasons of clarity, the analytical framework organizes our findings along seven dimensions of the main gap: the vision and strategy gap, the funding gap, the planning gap, the institutional gap, the geographic gap, the ownership gap and the sequence gap. They help us to capture all disputed ramifications relevant to the first sub-question above.

In a second step, we apply the framework to 30 evaluations and evaluative studies on the international response to the Syria migration crisis. This addresses the second sub-question.

Our overarching purpose is to provide guidance for policy makers and practitioners on how to link humanitarian and development responses to conflict-induced migration crises. In addition, the review provides guidance on how to evaluate various linkage dimensions by applying the analytical framework (Chapter 4).

Future research and evaluative work, finally, can build upon our preparatory work and develop a proper theory of linkage (a Theory of Change, ToC), one which spells out (1) exactly how to link what at various levels, (2) what the intended effects of these linkages are, and (3) exactly how to reach these effects (considering causal mechanisms).

### **1.3 Limitations**

The literature review has certain limitations. We acknowledge the merits of a political economy perspective on organizations and their vested interests, but the conceptual literature does not devote much

attention to their role. Accordingly, our analytical framework reflects only partially on political economy.

Second, we do not deny that building bridges may be irrelevant sometimes. There are probably cases where bridging a gap (or individual sub-gaps) is simply not necessary for reaching certain outcomes – or cases where bridges are only needed at a certain stage.<sup>16</sup> However, irrelevant or not, a comprehensive answer requires more impact-oriented research.

Third, we explore what is needed to effectively link responses to forced migration crises exclusively from a current discourse perspective, based mainly on conceptual studies. An accurate answer will depend on how accurate these studies are. Our review summarizes and synthesizes information on the humanitarian-development gap, and how to close the gap. We also reflect on conceptual clarity. Here, we shall apply the main analytical steps of a standard literature review in social sciences (Fink 2005; Hart 1998; Ridley 2012).<sup>17</sup>

However, we have not systematically assessed whether some recommendations are more “correct” than other ones.<sup>18</sup> Such endeavours require impact-oriented research that explores whether recommended linkages generate positive effects for end beneficiaries of flesh and blood. This is an important task for future

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<sup>16</sup> There are also cases where a linkage is not appropriate. For example, if humanitarian actors protect refugees or IDPs against state violence, it would not be appropriate to develop a joint crisis response strategy with a state resorting to violence. In other words, conflicting goals can constitute a good reason for reflecting on when, to link and when to avoid it.

<sup>17</sup> This literature review uses transparent procedures to find, summarize, and synthesize conceptual and empirical findings on the humanitarian-development linkage. In doing so, it also applies essential criteria of a systematic review, as defined by the Campbell Collaboration. It is based on (a) an explicit search strategy by (b) applying inclusion/exclusion criteria, and uses a systematic coding and analysis of studies (see [Campbellcollaboration.org](http://Campbellcollaboration.org)). However, unlike the Campbell approach, this review is based on the application of qualitative methods – it does not apply a meta-analysis.

<sup>18</sup> As a consequence, we integrated only those recommendations into the analytical framework, which are presented in at least two of the reviewed conceptual studies, and/or which intuitively appeared plausible.

research. Our reviewed conceptual literature and empirical studies on the Syria crisis response remain largely silent on outcomes related to shifts in linkages.

Fourth, one discovery is that conceptual studies envisage a humanitarian-development gap consisting of various sub-gaps (e.g. a funding gap or an institutional gap). Which sub-gaps are most important? Based on recommendations filtered out from this literature, we are unable to find specific conclusions.

Fifth, in order to find out to what extent effective linkages are established in practice, we will focus on one single case: Syria.<sup>19</sup> This means that our findings can be generalized only to a limited extent. Further research and evaluative work is needed to increase external validity.

We believe, though, that we have chosen the best possible case. If there is any evidence of successful linkages, it will most likely be found in a drama of utmost relevance in terms of political pressure, funding levels, applied aid modalities, and current transformation of the humanitarian system.<sup>20</sup> After all, there is no such thing as a typical refugee crisis, representative of all the other ones. Contexts always vary.

## **1.4 Structure of review**

Chapter 2 will explain our methodology. Chapter 3 presents the five central concepts of the humanitarian-development nexus. It also draws general conclusions, and prepares the field for an analysis of empirical literature on the Syria crisis.

In Chapter 4, we will develop an analytical framework based on the conceptual findings, including recommendations on how to close various dimensions of the main gap. In a next step, we explore to what extent the recommended linkages have actually been

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<sup>19</sup> This in-depth, single case study approach allows us to review the empirical literature in greater detail, and to capture the linkage of humanitarian and development response to this forced migration crisis in its full complexity.

<sup>20</sup> For a more detailed rationale of the case selection, see Sections 2.1 and 2.3.

established in response to the migration crisis. Additionally, we identify factors that are blocking or facilitating linkages between the two logics of action in each sub-gap.

Chapter 5 draws conclusions, highlights residual questions, and suggests a way forward to further evaluative work based on our conceptual and empirical findings.

## 2. Methodology

### 2.1 A systematic literature review in two steps

This literature review explores how humanitarian and development responses to forced migration crises can be linked more effectively. We will proceed in two steps guided by the following sub-questions:

1. What is needed to effectively link humanitarian and development responses to forced migration crises?
2. To what extent, and why (or why not), are effective linkages established in practice?

In order to address the first sub-question, it is necessary to understand what various stakeholders actually mean when they are calling for bridging the humanitarian-development divide more effectively. Unfortunately, there is no clear-cut answer, and no unified conceptual framework as to what this divide contains in concrete terms. Instead, there are various strands of discussion on the humanitarian-development nexus that each touch upon different aspects of bringing together humanitarian and development responses to crises and that make different suggestions on how to do this in practice.

In a first step, we therefore identify the most prominent concepts on the humanitarian-development nexus. We systematically analyse these concepts with regard to how they characterize the

humanitarian-development gap from their individual perspective, and how they propose to bridge it. Grouping these characterizations and recommendations according to analytical categories, then allows us to describe the abstract concept of the humanitarian-development gap in a more structured and concrete manner along thematic “sub-gaps” that describe different dimensions of the main gap.

This analytical structure provides a basis for the second step of our analysis (regarding the second-sub-question), exploring to what extent and why the individual sub-gaps are bridged in practice, i.e. to what extent (and why or why not) the conceptual recommendations are translated into actual deeds. We do so by contrasting the recommendations on how to close the identified sub-gaps of the overall humanitarian-development gap to empirical evidence on the international response to the Syria crisis.

The Syria crisis promises to be the most salient case. It forms the background to persistent calls by international stakeholders to eventually come to terms with the promise of coherence and coordination between humanitarian and development responses. Due to this political pressure and relevance, it can be assumed that (conceptual and empirical) lessons learned by national and international actors are – if at all - more likely to be implemented in the response to the Syria crisis. In extension, this implies that the findings of our case study do not necessarily extend to previous crisis responses. They are probably more relevant as guides into the future. The individual analytical steps of our two-stage (conceptual and empirical) approach are briefly described below. Full details of our methodology are provided in Annex B.

## **2.2 Conceptual approach**

Our review of the conceptual literature has two purposes: to gain a thorough understanding of what characterizes the humanitarian-development gap, and to find relevant recommendations on how to bring together the two realms. This gives us an answer to the first sub-question. Below, we briefly describe the procedure for selecting the conceptual literature, and our methodological approach to

analysis. Later on, we will present the empirical approach by focussing on the same aspects.

### **2.2.1 Identification of the conceptual sample**

In order to identify literature that potentially tells us most on what the humanitarian-development gap consists of and how to close this gap we applied a specific sampling procedure. In a first step, we identified the most prominent concepts on the humanitarian-development nexus by assuming that they will provide us with the most relevant information for answering these questions. Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD) is by far the most prominent concept in terms of available literature on the topic. However, studies on LRRD also refer to other concepts related to the nexus (e.g. Mosel and Levine, 2014; Otto and Weingärtner, 2013; Steets, 2011). Most frequently mentioned are: Early Recovery, Resilience, Connectedness and Whole of Government.

Analyses of different concepts give us an opportunity to capture different analytical approaches to the humanitarian-development gap and potentially different suggestions on how to bridge this gap. Consequently, we decided to review studies from all of these five concepts.<sup>21</sup>

In a second step, we identified studies for each of these concepts. A keyword search ("LRRD", "Early Recovery", "Whole of Government", "Connectedness", and "Resilience") was conducted in publicly available databases of international, governmental, and non-governmental organizations, active in development cooperation or humanitarian assistance, and in databases of networks and research institutes.<sup>22</sup> In order to identify documents most relevant for addressing the first sub-question, we established as a necessary condition that documents to be included in the final sample must contain detailed information on a certain concept. In

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<sup>21</sup> Another concept – disaster risk reduction – is also mentioned in various overview studies. However, we did not include it because of its narrow focus on natural disasters, which makes it irrelevant for the context of forced migration crises in the second step (empirical approach) of our analysis.

<sup>22</sup> See Table 7 in Annex B for a complete list of the databases.

doing so, they must provide a characterization of the humanitarian-development gap and recommendations on how to bridge it. Empirical studies were included only if they fulfilled this condition.<sup>23</sup>

As a result, a total of 30 studies were found that deal with the humanitarian-development nexus from different conceptual perspectives.<sup>24</sup> Most belong to the so-called grey literature, published by institutions, including governmental and non-governmental institutions, international organizations, as well as research institutions (see table 9 in Annex B). We did not impose any restriction on publication dates since we wanted to capture the discourse in its full depth. Our 30 studies are ranging from 1994 to 2016. Half of them base their conceptual considerations on their own empirical work, or on that of others, yet this rarely involves more than anecdotal evidence.

## **2.2.2 Content analysis of the conceptual sample**

To extract how the conceptual studies characterise the humanitarian-development gap from their respective perspective and how they recommend building bridges, we conducted a qualitative content analysis of these studies. Four questions were posed, hopefully bringing vital information and a well-founded answer to the first sub-question (presented in section 2.1).

The four questions are:

1. What are the specific characteristics of the humanitarian-development gap highlighted in a study?
2. What are the specific recommendations on how to bridge the gap?
3. What justification is given regarding the need to link humanitarian assistance with development cooperation?

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<sup>23</sup> Other selection criteria for the conceptual sample are: synthesis study (either overview of different strands within the concept, or empirical findings on more than one actor/country); focus on fragile states; focus on protracted crises; focus on forced migration (see Figure 3 in Annex B).

<sup>24</sup> For the distribution of our 30 documents across the five concepts, see Table 8 in Annex B.



4. What is the empirical foundation of the concepts and the recommendations?

The first and the second question are focused on essentials related to our first sub-question. Once we know what the humanitarian-development gap consists of, and find specific recommendations on how to bridge the gap at different levels, we will be able to describe what is needed to effectively link the two realms. The third and fourth questions give us a more complete picture. The third one pays particular attention to explanations on why linkages are vital. The fourth question sheds light on the empirical foundation of conceptual claims.

The content analysis was based on a code scheme: codes (words or short phrases) were assigned to corresponding text segments in order to extract and systematize the information of interest from the conceptual studies. Since we don't have a clear-cut theory on the linkage between humanitarian assistance and development cooperation, we applied an inductive coding approach, in which the codes stem from the material to be coded itself. This required an iterative coding process in a couple of steps:

1. We developed a basic framework of the coding scheme deduced from the four questions above. Regarding the first one, for example, we created the main code "description of the humanitarian development gap".
2. By identifying specific information provided in the studies related to one of the main codes (and, thus, to one of the four questions), we added new (sub-)codes – capturing the essence of this information – to the respective main code. For example, if we found a text segment, which stated that the humanitarian-development gap is characterized by a lack of joint planning among actors from the two realms, we added the new sub-code "planning gap" (as one dimension of the humanitarian-development gap) to the main code "description of the humanitarian development gap". A specific recommendation on how to bridge the gap with regard to the planning dimension received a corresponding code: "planning gap" => "recommendation xy".

3. Once a new code was created, it was assigned to relevant text segments in all sample sources.

This systematic approach – simultaneously assigning existing codes and supplementing the code scheme with new codes to be assigned to relevant text segments – resulted in 3,491 codings (text segments) across all codes. To distil a common message for each code, we listed all text segment per code. Depending of the respective code, this could be a definition of a certain dimension of the humanitarian-development gap (a planning dimension for instance) or one or several core recommendations on how to close the gap with respect to this dimension.

Overall, we identified seven different dimensions of the humanitarian-development gap and nineteen recommendations filtered out of the conceptual sample studies on how to close the gap with respect to these dimensions. In other words, the studies conceptualize the humanitarian-development gap as a multi-dimensional problem. It appears on different levels (or certain areas of activities respectively), such as on a strategic level or on an implementation level. In this interpretation, the humanitarian-development gap is the sum of the following sub-gaps: (1) a vision and strategy gap, (2) a planning gap, (3) a funding gap, (4) an institutional gap, (5) an ownership gap, (6) a geographic gap, and (7) a sequence gap. Definitions of these sub-gaps and recommendations on how to close these gaps, are integrated into the analytical framework presented in Chapter 4.

The framework represents a leap forward to conceptual clarity. It captures the state-of-the-art knowledge on the linkage discourse by synthesizing the most relevant concepts into a single analytical framework. In the empirical part of our review, the framework allows us to analyse empirical studies on the international response to a forced migration crisis through the linkage lens. This addresses the second sub-question guiding our review.

## 2.3 Empirical approach

To answer the question to what extent and why (or why not) the recommended humanitarian-development linkages have been established in practice of a pertinent forced migration crisis, we applied the analytical framework to analyse empirical studies on the international response to the Syria crisis. The rationale for selecting this case is simple: If there is evidence of successful linking, it will most likely be found in the most relevant case in terms of political pressure, funding levels, and applied aid modalities. In addition, the global humanitarian system is under transformation, largely triggered by protracted recent crises (Humanitarian Policy Group et al., 2016). Thus, it is plausible to investigate the international response to the Syria crisis in which the humanitarian-development nexus should be apparent.

In the following sections, we briefly describe the procedure of selecting the empirical literature, and our methodological approach to analysis. Both are described in more detail in Annex B.

### 2.3.1 Identification of the empirical sample

In order to identify literature that potentially tells us most on the extent to which the recommended humanitarian-development linkages have been established in the international response to the Syria crisis, we applied the following sampling procedure:

In a first step, we selected empirical literature on the international response to the forced migration crisis of Syria in the Syria Evaluation Portal for Coordinated Accountability and Lessons Learning (CALL) ([syrialearning.org](http://syrialearning.org)). For this purpose, we focused on evaluations, evaluative studies, and other documents providing empirically based assessments on the response inside Syria and in neighbouring countries that host Syrian refugees (Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, and Turkey).<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>25</sup> To identify documents that provide an assessment based on empirical investigations, we restricted the sample to evaluations, reports, (case) studies,

In a second step, we then restricted the selected empirical literature to those documents that address the sub-gaps of the humanitarian-development gap identified in the conceptual studies. For this purpose, we searched in the empirical literature for keywords extracted from our analytical framework (see Chapter 4), which contains definitions of the sub-gaps and recommendations on how to bridge them.

Two criteria were considered: the spread of sub-gaps (How many sub-gaps are addressed in an actual empirical study based on the keywords found?) and the intensity of investigation (How intensively is a certain sub-gap addressed in an empirical study based on the number of keywords found for this sub-gap?<sup>26</sup> In combining both criteria, we selected those empirical studies that address more sub-gaps than other studies and/or that investigate these sub-gaps more intensively.

This sampling procedure led to an empirical sample of 30 evaluations and evaluative studies, conducted or funded by international organizations, bilateral donors, research institutions or civil society organizations, and published between 2013 and 2017. Almost half of them investigate more than one country. Most studies focus on Jordan and Lebanon, while there is only one case study on Turkey.

To assess the methodological quality of the sampled studies, and, thus, the validity of their findings, we applied eight quality criteria commonly used in meta-evaluations to investigate the quality of evaluations (Alton-Lee, 2004; DeGEval, 2008; Glock and Karliczek,

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collections of lessons learnt/learned, impact assessments, reviews, research papers, surveys, assessments, regional analysis, articles, and briefs containing information on the applied methodological approach. To verify that no relevant documents are missed when selecting on the Syria Learning Portal, we additionally crosschecked other international and supranational databases (see Annex B). This procedure supplied us with 34 new documents. We added them to the sample, which then contained 466 documents published between 01/2011 (the beginning of the crisis response) and 04/2017.

<sup>26</sup> To “secure” this selection procedure, a necessary condition was established: to restrict the sample to those documents in which the words “humanitarian” and “development” are found together in a sentence at least five times in one document. This procedure reduced the sample from 466 to 61 documents.

2014; Stufflebeam, 1999). These criteria focus on: independence, transparency of evaluation questions and criteria, methodological approach, data collection and analysis (see Table 11 in Annex B).<sup>27</sup>

Based on these criteria, we assessed the overall methodological quality of our empirical sample as “sufficient” (with a median of 5 points out of 8, reaching a pre-defined threshold of more than half of the points).<sup>28</sup> Almost all studies in the empirical sample pose evaluation questions, and answer them with triangulated methods and data sources. They dedicate a whole section to procedures on data collection and analysis, and to actually used data.

### **2.3.2 Content analysis of the empirical sample**

To extract evidence on the extent to which and why effective humanitarian-development linkages have been established in the international response to the Syria crisis, we conducted a content analysis of the 30 selected empirical studies. For this purpose, we applied a coding scheme that is derived from the analytical framework (deductive coding approach). For each sub-gap and each recommendation on how to close a sub-gap, the code scheme entails a corresponding code assigned to relevant text segments in order to extract and systematize the information of interest from the texts. To distil a main message for each recommendation, we listed all text segments per code and synthesized our findings (presented in Chapter 4).

Since the second sub-question focuses on not only the extent to which the recommended linkages have been established in the international response to the Syria crisis, but also on reasons for implementation (or non-implementation), we also extracted

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<sup>27</sup> One limitation is that this approach is based only on explicit information in evaluation reports; it cannot consider conceivable unpublished background information.

<sup>28</sup> Since there is no theoretical criterion for determining such a threshold, we decided to grade the quality of those studies as “sufficient” that reach more than 50% of points.

information on hindering and conducive factors for bridging each one of the seven sub-gaps.

It is impossible to find comprehensive answers to our overall question (how responses to forced migration crises can be linked effectively) without considering the effects of linkages on people affected by the crisis situation. Consequently, we captured all available empirical information on outputs, outcomes or impacts of bridging specific sub-gaps.

The content analysis of the empirical sample studies was guided by five questions:

1. What is the positive evidence on bridging the respective sub-gap?<sup>29</sup>
2. What is the negative evidence on bridging the respective specific sub-gap, referring to the formulated recommendations?<sup>30</sup>
3. What are hindering factors to bridging the respective sub-gap?
4. What are conducive factors to bridging the respective sub-gap?
5. What are the outputs, outcomes or impacts of bridging the respective sub-gap?

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<sup>29</sup> In this review, we use the term “evidence” for all empirical findings provided by the sampled studies – irrespective of whether they have been generated on the basis of rigorous methods or not. We define evidence as positive when studies are describing measures aimed at closing a sub-gap of the humanitarian-development gap. For example, positive evidence is registered when we find a clear lead for coordination between humanitarian and development actors.

<sup>30</sup> We define evidence as negative when the empirical studies provide evidence on the existence of a sub-gap of the humanitarian-development gap. It is negative, for instance, when there is no clear lead in coordination between humanitarian and development actors, which hinders linkage.

### 3. Conceptual foundation and implications for the case study on Syria

This chapter describes the foundation of our conceptual findings on 'what needs to be done' – how to draw connections between humanitarian assistance and development cooperation. It also makes comparisons to what is being done in practice (see Chapter 4).

We begin with an overview of the mentioned five concepts. We will focus on their origin, development and definitions, and shed light on main similarities and differences.<sup>31</sup> As a first analytical step, we identify seven sub-gaps of the main gap (see Chapter 2). Gaps are assigned to different levels of action – ranging from a strategic to an implementation level. This helps us to understand typical, frequently occurring linkage problems (i.e. sub-gaps). Furthermore, it becomes easier to discover actors who are able to design better linkages (according to the conceptual sample studies).

Finally, we provide a brief overview of the migration crisis related to Syria. Our aim is to illustrate contextual factors that influence stakeholders' efforts to find linkages. Neighbouring countries and Syria are compared with the help of macro indicators.

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<sup>31</sup> However, the main objective of our review is not to compare the concepts, and to analyse how they conceptualize the humanitarian-development gap in different ways. Our aim is to gain as much relevant information as possible on the linkage issue across all concepts. To provide orientation, we introduce their origin, development and definitions, and main similarities and differences. We do not compare concepts in detail.

## **3.1 The five most prominent concepts on the humanitarian-development nexus**

### **3.1.1 Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD)**

The LRRD concept links short-term relief with long-term development cooperation. LRRD represents an attempt to increase coherence and complementarity, and create synergies between actors on both sides – resulting in better overall performance and improved outcomes for beneficiaries. The European Commission (EC) coined the term in 1996, and described the rationale: “Better development can reduce the need for emergency relief; better relief can contribute to development; and better rehabilitation can ease the transition between the two” (Commission of the European Communities, 1996: iii).

In order to make this rather simplistic model operative, the EC provided recommendations on how to mainstream it into certain areas: such as global policy frameworks, sectorial programmes and internal coordination. Experts claim that these efforts were not very successful. LRRD failed to play “a significant role in shaping the way assistance is planned, managed or administered” (Mosel and Levine, 2014: 18).

However, three key achievements can be attributed to LRRD. The concept has formalized a decades-old discussion on linkage.<sup>32</sup> It has helped us to understand that crises are characterized by simultaneity rather than linearity, by contiguum rather than continuum.<sup>33</sup> Finally, it has alerted international stakeholders to the

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<sup>32</sup> The need to link relief and development was initially mentioned – by practitioners – in analyses of food crises affecting African countries in the 1980s (Buchanan-Smith and Maxwell, 1996, p. 3).

<sup>33</sup> Discussions on the understanding of crisis as a continuum or contiguum are, however, still going on (see Section 4.7).



debate on linkage, as can be seen by the inclusion of essential elements of LRRD into good humanitarian donorship principles.<sup>34</sup>

### **3.1.2 Resilience**

Resilience is interpreted differently across various fields (Béné et al., 2012; de Weijer, 2013). A definition by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is one good example of what resilience signifies in the humanitarian and development sector: “the ability of households, communities and nations to absorb and recover from shocks, whilst positively adapting and transforming their structures and means for living in the face of long-term stresses, change and uncertainty” (OECD, 2014). Shocks are not seen in isolation from their wider causes and consequences. Hence, strengthening resilience is a conceivable goal for actors on both sides. Humanitarian assistance deals with shocks, development cooperation tackles underlying causes of shocks.

Resilience is a widely accepted concept among international stakeholders. For example, the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP) guiding the response to the Syria crisis refers to it quite frequently (see Chapter 4.1).

### **3.1.3 The Whole of Government approach (WoG)**

The Whole-of-Government (WoG) perspective has its origin in the 1990s. At the time, international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) and others were reflecting on experiences from states

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<sup>34</sup> In 2003, the Government of Sweden convened a meeting to discuss good humanitarian donorship. A set of Principles-and-Good-Practice-of-Humanitarian-Donorship was agreed. Representatives from 16 donor governments as well as from the European Commission, the OECD, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, NGOs, and academics participated. Principle 9 of the meeting states: Provide humanitarian assistance in ways that are supportive of recovery and long-term development, striving to ensure support, where appropriate, to the maintenance and return of sustainable livelihoods and transitions from humanitarian relief to recovery and development activities.

struggling with insecurity, poverty and bad governance. International governmental institutions involved in humanitarian assistance and development cooperation during conflict – including security services and other actors – called for new outlooks that gave momentum to the WoG outlook (Stepputat and Greenwood, 2013: 15).

OECD defines WoG as “an approach where a government actively uses formal and/or informal networks across the different agencies within that government to coordinate the design and implementation of the range of interventions that government’s agencies will be making in order to increase the effectiveness of those interventions in achieving the desired objectives” (2006: 14).

WoG is based on the assumption that a more meaningful impact can be achieved only when all concerned parties agree on a common *modus operandi*. This includes joint contextual analyses and strategies as well as joint planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. The concept embraces a complete management cycle, in which all concerned government departments participate. WoG aims at making interventions more effective, at reduced fiscal costs, and tries to enhance the legitimacy of donor policies in recipient countries (OECD, 2006: 18). The concept also promotes cooperation between humanitarian and development departments within individual governments.

### **3.1.4 Early Recovery**

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) defines Early Recovery as “the application of development principles to humanitarian situations” (UNDP, 2008: 5). The concept emphasizes two important elements: to build on local capacities, and to act through partner countries and their capacities. Early Recovery promotes development thinking in humanitarian crisis settings. It advocates people-centred action, which makes humanitarian assistance more accountable to affected populations, and it tries to enhance ownership among those groups (GCER, 2016).

Early Recovery is used mainly within the UN system, and UNDP is promoting the concept among other UN agencies. It is a result of the humanitarian reform process in 2005 to increase the effectiveness of humanitarian assistance, and to heal shortcomings of the humanitarian system as deliverer of aid.<sup>35</sup>

### **3.1.5 Connectedness**

Connectedness is referred to as a relevant concept in the literature on LRRD (Mosel and Levine, 2014; Steets, 2011). Most of all, though, this concept is an evaluation criterion. It is developed by the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP), based on the OECD-DAC criteria of sustainability, and adapted to evaluations of humanitarian assistance. Connectedness can, in other words, be seen as the adaptation of the ‘sustainability’- evaluation criterion by humanitarian actors. It is valuable when reflecting on links between humanitarian assistance and development cooperation. Connectedness provides specific information especially for users of evaluations.

“Connectedness refers to the need to ensure that activities of a short-term emergency nature are carried out in a context that takes longer-term and interconnected problems into account,” according to ALNAP (Beck, 2006). It instructs actors on how to prevent undermining of local structures through relief operations. Connectedness also gives recommendations on how to administer a handover from international to national and local stakeholders, and on capacity building among national and local actors. Furthermore, it helps evaluators to detect linkages in humanitarian programmes. This makes the concept, all told, particularly useful to our review.

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<sup>35</sup> The humanitarian reform process was initiated in 2005 by the emergency relief coordinator in cooperation with the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC). The aim is to improve the effectiveness of humanitarian response through greater predictability, accountability, responsibility and partnership. Implementation of the ‘cluster approach’ in order to build capacities in gap areas was one major outcome of the reform.

### 3.1.6 Similarities and differences among concepts

The aim of our content analysis is to gain relevant information on linkage across all concepts. It does not appraise the ability of individual concepts to conceptualize the humanitarian-development gap in different ways. To reach a better understanding, some similarities and differences might be helpful to readers.

The most noticeable similarity is that all five concepts presented above focus on increased coherence between humanitarian and development stakeholders. They also seek to improve the design and implementation of programmes in terms of sustainability and outcomes (Table 1).

**Table 1: Concepts of the humanitarian-development nexus**

<b>Concept</b>	<b>Main driver, initiator of the concept</b>	<b>Focus of the concept</b>
<i>Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development</i>	European Commission	Fostering institutional changes to promote linkages between humanitarian assistance and development cooperation
<i>Resilience</i>	Multiple stakeholders of humanitarian assistance and development cooperation	Increasing the resilience of individuals and communities struggling to recover from shocks, by addressing their short-term and long-term needs holistically
<i>Whole of Government</i>	Donor, governments	Creating coherence between those parts of a government that are active in a partner country
<i>Early Recovery</i>	UNDP	Addressing recovery needs during the humanitarian phase of an emergency
<i>Connectedness</i>	ALNAP, OECD/DAC	Planning and providing humanitarian assistance in a way that enables connection to longer-term development efforts

Source: Authors' own

As to differences, concepts adopt various views on how to achieve more coherence, and on who should take the lead. Connectedness and Early Recovery imply that actors of humanitarian assistance and development cooperation should be aware of each other's specific *modus operandi*, and that they should intensify their coordination efforts. The concepts do not suggest a full integration, though. Other concepts – such as Resilience and WoG – propose that humanitarian and development needs and interventions should be handled in a more integrated way, providing a route to joint strategies and joint planning.

Concepts diverge on other issues as well, for instance on where coherence should be strengthened, and who should be or is involved. Early Recovery is largely concerned with linkages between local/national actors and international assistance actors. WoG is more focused on the intra-governmental coherence of donor countries.

The common notion is that humanitarian assistance is not sufficient *per se*. Crisis responses are comprehended as a continuum, where humanitarian and development needs, rights and interventions exist simultaneously.<sup>36</sup> Actors from both worlds should be involved. But there are occasions when only one form is the realistic alternative (i.e. when a state is one of the conflicting parties, or in war zones where the security situation makes large-scale development assistance unlikely).

This highlights two crucial factors: crises do not follow a common pattern, and the continuum perspective might be challenged in some cases. Ultimately, contexts and specific patterns of forced migration must determine how to act adequately in each case.

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<sup>36</sup> Connectedness, however, rather relates to crises as a continuum, as it addresses the link from relief to longer-term structures and approaches.

## 3.2 Identification of sub-gaps

A majority of the studies view the humanitarian-development gap as a multidimensional problem. The gap can be structured into different sub-gaps – each representing a specific dimension of the main gap.

Many conceptual studies refer in general terms to this main gap when addressing shortages of cooperation, coherence and coordination. Other studies are more precise, and describe areas of humanitarian and development work where the gap appears, in funding modalities, when strategic goals are formulated, and so on (see e.g. Hinds, 2015: 5; Mosel and Levine, 2014: 7; Steets, 2011: 3). As outlined in Chapter 2, we have found seven sub-gaps: (1) a vision and strategy gap (2) a planning gap, (3) a funding gap, (4) an institutional gap, (5) a geographic gap, (6) an ownership gap, and (7) a sequence gap. Distinctions between them are not always clear-cut, but our typology provides an analytical structure that defines more precisely these components of the main humanitarian-development gap.

To gain further clarity, each sub-gap can be assigned to different levels of a policy sequence. We have identified one strategic and planning level and one implementation level. Both are characterized by specific activities. Groups of actors are responsible for linking the two forms of assistance more closely at the relevant level. Table 2 presents these levels in relation to specific activities and groups of actors, and assigns the sub-gaps of the main divide to the two identified levels.

The location of sub-gaps (Table 2) is derived from recommendations found in the conceptual sample studies (see Chapter 4). Each recommendation addresses certain activities and groups of actors in order to close a sub-gap. From there, one can make extrapolations. The advice to develop joint strategies of crisis management among international humanitarian and development organizations, donors and partner refers to a strategic level. Furthermore, as shown in Table 2, the vision and strategy, planning and funding gaps are assigned to the strategic level. The ownership

gap, the geographic gap and the sequence gap are related to the implementation level.

Most sub-gaps might be categorized into multiple levels. But to capture the humanitarian-development gap analytically (in an ideal-typical manner), we assigned them according to the level they refer to most frequently. The institutional gap is an exception. It refers to institutional structures that are not conducive to linking humanitarian assistance and development cooperation effectively, and appears on both levels.

**Table 2: Different levels of the humanitarian-development sphere**

Level	Sub-Gaps	Recommendation	Group of actors addressed <sup>a</sup>			
			H	D	L	I
Strategic and planning <sup>b</sup>	Vision and Strategy	1. Working principles of humanitarian assistance and development cooperation should be balanced.	x	x		x
		2. Humanitarian and development actors should commit themselves to common goals to increase the coherence of interventions.	x	x		x
		3. Humanitarian and development actors should develop joint country strategies.	x	x		x
		4. Donors should seek to align their country strategies with host countries' strategies.	x	x	x	x
		5. Humanitarian and development responses should both be committed to longer-term engagement in protracted crises.	x	x		x
	Funding	6. Humanitarian and development responses should be adequately funded in protracted crises.	x	x		x
		7. Funding mechanisms should be more flexible, enable actors to react to unforeseen circumstances, and allow for rapid responses to emergencies.	x	x		x
	Planning	8. A joint planning process should be initiated, including a wide variety of relevant stakeholders, to develop a coherent and needs-based response to crises.	x	x	x	x
		9. Planning processes must be based on assessments that collect information on short-term and longer-term needs, and should identify opportunities to link humanitarian and development interventions.	x	x	x	x
		10. Interventions should address needs in a holistic way, including multiple stakeholders across the humanitarian and development realm.	x	x	x	x



Implementation <sup>c</sup>	Institutional	11. Donor countries should strive for a high degree of interdepartmental cooperation in order to reduce redundancies and contradictions in overseas operations.	x	x		x
		12. Cooperation between institutions with differing mandates should be a common <i>modus operandi</i> in order to link humanitarian assistance and development cooperation.	x	x	x	x
		13. Clear leadership should be ensured for jointly coordinating humanitarian and development actors.	x	x		x
		14. An institutional structure with decision-making power closely linked to the area of programme implementation should be put in place.	x	x		x
		15. Staffs of stakeholders should have interdisciplinary (humanitarian and development) skills needed to promote effective linkages.	x	x		x
	Geographic	16. Humanitarian assistance and development cooperation should be conducted in geographical proximity in order to reach the same target groups when the context permits.	x	x		x
	Ownership	17. International humanitarian assistance should work with national and local stakeholders when the context permits.	x		x	x
		18. International humanitarian assistance should seek to develop capacities of national and local stakeholders.	x		x	x
	Sequence	19. Programme designs should ensure an adequate sequencing (including timing) of humanitarian and development phases.	x	x	x	x

Notes: <sup>a</sup> H=Humanitarian; D=Development; L=Local/national; I=International. Activities by humanitarian and development stakeholders include: <sup>b</sup> Development of working principles, strategies, strategic partnerships, policies, funding modalities, funding strategies. New plans to operationalize strategies, programmes and interventions. <sup>c</sup> Development of working relationships with national and local stakeholders, identification of opportunities for programme adjustments, data collection for assessments. Source: Authors' own.

### 3.3 The Syria case

To find an answer to the second sub-question (to what extent, and why (or why not), are effective linkages established in practice?), we chose the Syria crisis as our example. The humanitarian system is currently under transformation, which makes it appropriate to use a recent case for investigations of the humanitarian-development nexus. Furthermore, funding volumes, applied aid modalities, and consequences for Europe and the northern hemisphere are vital elements of a practical crisis response. All in all, we are able to observe a wide range of international efforts in response to the Syria crisis.

We apply our analytical framework (see Chapter 4), based on analyses of the conceptual studies. The framework brings together recommendations on how to close the seven sub-gaps. It also allows us to review the empirical literature on crisis responses through the conceptual lens.

Events in Syria are radically influencing Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey and Iraq as well. Only Turkey has signed the 1951 Convention on the status of refugees, and therefore has a legal basis for receiving refugees, but all neighbouring countries have de facto accepted Syrian migrants. The largest Syrian refugee population since 2011 is found in this multi-faceted neighbourhood. A host of internal and external factors are influencing the ability of Turkey and the others to deal with the crisis.

*Internal factors:* Comparisons of state capacities – measured by governance indicators of political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption – show a cleavage between war-torn Iraq and Syria and the relatively stable Jordan and Turkey. Lebanon forms a middle ground. The Human Development Index indicates a “high human development” for Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan, while Iraq and especially Syria are lagging behind (Box 1).<sup>37</sup>

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<sup>37</sup> In Box 1, the shortcomings of funding are labelled as external from the perspective of recipient countries, as the source of funds is external to the recipient. The total population figure compared to the number of registered

*External factors:* The external pressure is very high in Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey, which receive most of the regional refugees. Iraq has fewer numbers coming from Syria, but lots of IDPs. Turkey hosts the highest refugee population (2.9 million) in absolute terms, and Lebanon has the highest in relative terms. Donors' shortcomings in providing funds demonstrate a chasm between financial needs and actual disbursements to individual countries.


The effects on Syria itself are far more severe of course: 13.5 million people need assistance, and 6.3 million are internally displaced by June 2017. These urgent needs are reflected in estimates of how much money is required to manage the crisis. Efforts are severely underfunded, both here and in Syria's neighbouring countries.<sup>38</sup>

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Syrian refugees per country is also registered as external. Registered Syrian refugees constitute one of many effects of the Syrian crisis on neighbouring countries – so refugees are considered external from a Turkish perspective, and so on.

<sup>38</sup> The outlined criteria give us a rough overview of constitutive factors that may influence efforts to bridge humanitarian and development responses in Syria. We render this sufficient for our purposes in the present literature review. But it does not substitute a thorough context analysis for each country.

Box 1. Facts on the Syria crisis



## 4. Conceptual recommendations and empirical findings

This chapter juxtaposes our conceptual findings with empirical evidence on linkages between humanitarian and development logics of action in response to Syria and forced migration. It contrasts 'what needs to be done' (according to conceptual studies) with 'what is being done in practice', based on 30 analysed evaluations and evaluative studies.

The analysis is organized along the seven sub-gaps. For each one, we present recommendations extracted from the conceptual literature on how to bridge the sub-gap, and then contrast the recommendations to empirical findings in the form of short narratives. The narratives explore whether a recommendation is heeded in practice – and thus whether linkages actually have been established. Narratives also try to explain why, or why not, a linkage has happened in a certain context. Along this road, we will be able to distinguish hindering and conducive factors to bridging the humanitarian-development gap.

The analytical framework provides a foundation for our investigation of the Syria crisis. We filter out conceptual claims and rephrase them into recommendations on how to close sub-gaps. The empirical literature is viewed through conceptual lenses. Before we turn to the narratives, it's time to present the analytical framework (Table 3). It entails the recommendations which are contextualized in the subsequent narratives.

**Table 3: The analytical framework**

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**1. A vision and strategy gap exists, where (i) no common strategic framework is in place among actors responding to a particular crisis, and (ii) little or no progress is made towards integrating and aligning humanitarian and development responses. The aim is to deliver collective outcomes.**

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*1.1 Balancing of working principles of humanitarian assistance and development cooperation:* A good balance between working principles is necessary in order to improve linkages. Humanitarian assistance and development cooperation adhere to different working principles. This may prevent linkage between the two, since collaboration with the other side could signify a neglect of one's own principles. In what form balancing is viable, depends highly on external circumstances that, furthermore, may vary over time.

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*1.2 Commitment to common goals:* Bridging humanitarian and development responses by committing to collective outcomes – such as resilience or Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) – can be a first step towards closing the divide.

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*1.3 Joint country strategies:* Donors who formulate a joint crisis response strategy that integrates and aligns their humanitarian and development efforts are more likely to bridge the divide between humanitarian and development silos.

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*1.4 Alignment of donor and partner country strategies:* Donor strategies should be aligned with strategies formed by partner countries. A lack of coherence between partners will inhibit long-term development.

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*1.5 Commitment to longer-term engagement in protracted crises:* Response strategies are bound to fail if not supported by donor's political will for longer-term engagement in a crisis at hand. Since protracted crises, by definition, are stretched out in time, humanitarian-development responses also require time. Only actors willing to stay enduringly are able to achieve long-term effects, especially in protracted crises.

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**2. A funding gap is caused by insufficient, fragmented, unbalanced and inflexible funding for relief and longer-term development responses. It impedes adequately scaled and well-coordinated responses to protracted crisis.**

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*2.1 Adequate level of funding for all forms of assistance:* Unequal distribution of funds across different forms of assistance is blocking linkages between humanitarian aid and development cooperation. Adequate responses to protracted crises are within reach only if both aid forms have sufficient financial resources.

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*2.2 Funding modalities:* Funding modalities have to be adequate to promote linkages between humanitarian assistance and development

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cooperation. Adjusting to unforeseen circumstances, e.g. with flexibility and multi-year commitments, fosters linkage.

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**3. Planning gap: A planning gap is at hand when humanitarian assistance and development cooperation are planned independently and with insufficient consideration of one another. As a consequence, there is no coherent integration of all forms of assistance to ensure sustainable collective outcomes.**

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*3.1 Joint planning:* Joint planning provides opportunities to harmonize individual perspectives, values, principles, and work procedures. The aim is to create a holistic response approach.

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*3.2 Joint assessments to inform planning:* Joint assessments facilitate a common understanding of situations, and necessary responses, as prerequisites for joint planning. In the absence of joint assessments, chances are that humanitarian actors and development actors will retain different perceptions. That may prevent a coherent implementation.

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*3.3 Planning for holistic and flexible programming:* Fragile contexts signify multiple needs, and new opportunities and challenges may arise quickly. Holistic and flexible programmes should address short-term and long-term needs simultaneously.

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**4. Institutional gap: An institutional gap exists when the internal coordination structure, the skill set of human resources, and external cooperation strategy of institutions – donors, national governments, INGOs, international organizations, civil society organizations and national and local stakeholders – are harming effective links between humanitarian assistance and development cooperation.**

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*4.1 Cooperation within institutions:* A high degree of cooperation within ministries and institutions will reduce redundancies and contradictions, and enhance coherent interventions. This is also valid for different ministries within a national government.

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*4.2 Cooperation between institutions:* To achieve long-term goals there should be a willingness to work with actors beyond traditional mandates. This may include different government levels in partner countries (from the national to the local); informal institutions (traditional authorities, clan structures); local civil society (beyond national NGOs); the private sector.

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*4.3 Clear leadership and coordinating role:* In order to enhance coordination within institutions, responsibilities have to be assigned with clarity. A lead coordinating body equipped with sufficient decision-making and sanctioning power may create structures capable of interweaving humanitarian and development assistance.

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*4.4 A decentralized institutional structure:* A decentralized structure is more conducive to incorporating local realities, and identifying short-term and long-term opportunities of rehabilitation.

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*4.5 Interdisciplinary staffing and training:* Staff at headquarters, on country and field levels, should be equipped with skill sets of humanitarian assistance and development cooperation. Institutions can hire experienced staff, they can also build expertise via secondments, joint evaluations, inter-departmental working groups, training opportunities...

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**5. Geographic gap: A geographic gap is present if humanitarian and development programmes or projects are not conducted in the same region and are not sufficiently linked with each other.**

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To create development perspectives for those most in need, the whole spectrum of support should target the same vulnerable groups. Thus, humanitarian assistance and development cooperation should operate in geographical proximity to these groups as long as the context permits.

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**6. Ownership gap: An ownership gap occurs when national and local stakeholders are not sufficiently involved in international humanitarian responses. This concerns multiple levels such as planning and implementation of international interventions. It implies the need for an outcome-oriented approach that builds on and strengthens existing national and local capacities.**

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*6.1 Working with national and local stakeholders:* In order to gain efficiency, reach and sustainability, humanitarian assistance and development cooperation should be implemented, if possible, in close collaboration with local, regional or national expertise and structures.

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*6.2 National and local capacity development:* International assistance (humanitarian or development) should strengthen capacities of national and local stakeholders within a host country to enhance planning, administrative, response and preparedness. An approach of this kind can create long-term effects through short-term interventions.

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**7. Sequence gap: A sequence gap exists when relief, rehabilitation and development activities are not combined in an appropriate time frame. Sequencing is essential in chronological planning of activities. When phases and transitions are adequately designed, aid intervention remains free from delays or negative path dependencies that puts target groups at a disadvantage. Sequencing facilitates handovers and exit actions, it promotes collaboration de facto between all actors and creates continuity. Adequate sequencing is necessary to create transitions in both directions: from relief to development and from development to relief.**

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Well-balanced phasing of stages, including exit and takeover strategies, is vital to avoid unexpected negative side effects, delays and harm caused by phases that last indefinitely, too long or end too soon.

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Source: Authors' own



## 4.1 Vision and strategy gap

A gap between the humanitarian and the development logic of action predominantly arises from a lack of common vision and joint strategy, according to conceptual studies (see e.g. Hinds, 2015: 2 ff.; Otto and Weingärtner, 2013: 36 ff.; Patrick and Brown, 2007: 79). Common visions and joint strategies could guide the overall direction of a crisis response. Based on our analysis of the conceptual literature, we identify a vision and strategy gap, and define it as follows:

*A vision and strategy gap exists where no common strategic framework is in place among actors responding to a particular crisis, and where little or no progress is made towards integrating and aligning humanitarian and development responses based on a common vision and strategy aimed at delivering collective outcomes.*

Humanitarian and development approaches to crisis management tend to stay in their traditional silos when joint strategic frameworks are in short supply. This undermines the ability to address underlying causes of vulnerability. Consequently, actors become less able to enhance resilience among affected people and institutions.

Various recommendations are put forward on how to bridge the humanitarian-development gap referring to this vision and strategy dimension. Several aspects of the sub-gap are explored. We have found a couple of recommendations: to strike a balance between (partly) incompatible working principles of the two approaches; to define and commit to common goals; to formulate joint country strategies; to align donor strategies to host countries' own strategies; and to commit to long-term engagement in protracted crises.

These proposals, and our corresponding empirical findings on how to handle the Syria crisis, will be discussed in the following paragraphs.

### **4.1.1 Balancing of working principles of two forms of assistance**

#### **Recommendations from the conceptual literature**

Several studies are discussing the “principles challenge” (Otto and Weingärtner, 2013: 17), the (at least partially) incompatible working principles of humanitarian assistance and development assistance. Humanitarian assistance adheres to fundamental humanitarian principles: humanity, neutrality, impartiality, and independence. These principles should ensure that providers of humanitarian assistance are accepted as neutral actors by all sides, e.g. in the case of armed conflict, and that humanitarian actors will gain access to affected groups even in complex emergencies.<sup>39</sup>

Principles for effective cooperation have been formulated as part of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness within the ‘development community’. They strongly reflect a requirement to work with, and through, partner governments to achieve objectives such as ownership, alignment, harmonization, managing for results, and mutual accountability.

At first glance, there is a seemingly obvious conflict between these principles, disagreements regarding whether actors (external ones in particular) should engage with governments at all in pursuit of humanitarian or development objectives – and how they should do it. The conceptual literature displays no discernible consensus on how to resolve the dilemma. Studies give very different, and contradicting, recommendations.

Some say that humanitarian actors should adhere to development principles (e.g. by working with the government of a crisis-affected country) in order to create development opportunities (e.g. GCER, 2016: 8; OECD, 2006: 36). Others argue that diluting a humanitarian mandate in this way – especially when working with state institutions – can compromise core humanitarian principles such as neutrality, independence and impartiality (Macrae

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<sup>39</sup> These humanitarian principles are derived from the core guiding principles of the Red Cross: humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, voluntary service, unity, and universality (OCHA, 2010).

et al., 1997: 16 ff.). Adhering to development principles and working with state actors who are often parties to the conflict, can do more harm than good (Macrae et al., 1997: 18 f.).

A third group of studies takes a more moderate position, and argues that a balance can be struck between working principles (cf. Otto and Weingärtner, 2013: 72). Humanitarian actors should collaborate with state actors “in a pragmatic and context-specific way” (Hinds, 2015: 6) and try to support vulnerable groups.

To back up the viewpoint that a balancing act of this kind is within reach, studies refer to allegedly successful programmes in Somalia, Darfur, Northern Uganda, Colombia and the Gaza Strip, which managed to adhere to humanitarian principles and, simultaneously, take development goals into account (Bailey et al., 2009: 13; White and Cliffe, 2000: 23). Studies do concede, though, that attempts to reconcile seemingly incompatible principles can lead to quite different results, depending on the country and crisis context (White and Cliffe, 2000: 23). Opportunities to reconcile humanitarian and development principles are highly dependent on the actual context (Mosel and Levine, 2014: 11; White and Cliffe, 2000: 24).

So far, little attention has been directed at success factors for reconciling competing working principles (Taylor et al., 2015: 109). Some analyses claim empirical support for such balancing acts. In reality, no article has managed to provide clear, specific recommendations on how to succeed in practice.

### **Findings from the empirical literature**

Competing working principles is an issue in almost a third of the empirical studies. The studies reveal mixed evidence on whether a balancing of humanitarian and development principles does take place in reality. Another controversial topic is whether attempts to keep a balance have positive or negative effects. A number of studies notice negative repercussions. However, discussions mostly focus on humanitarian actors inside Syria who are compromising on humanitarian principles to be able to provide at least some help. Not very much is said about actual balancing acts in refugee-receiving neighbouring countries.

The World Food Programme (WFP) is one example. WFP has decided to collaborate with the Syrian government in order to maximize access to the most vulnerable groups of people, even though this choice may compromise its impartiality (Darcy, 2016: 42). It had to choose cooperating partners inside Syria from a list supplied by the regime (Drummond et al. 2015: 15). While being the only feasible way of reaching those most in need, this had negative implications for the organization's reputation as an independent actor (Darcy, 2016: 42; Drummond et al. 2015: 16).

It may be difficult for international organizations and International NGOs (INGOs) to strictly adhere to humanitarian working principles in conflict settings, but it is even more complicated for those who are directly affected by (and emotionally closer to) an actual conflict.

One evaluation illustrates this dilemma. Syrian diaspora organizations engaged inside Syria “appear to strive for impartiality and focus their engagement on the implementation of humanitarian activities away from politics”, but their “engagement was motivated by solidarity rather than humanity or neutrality” (DEMAC, 2016: 33). This judgement, and the fact that some refrain from providing aid to pro-government communities (DEMAC 2016: 36), lead to recommendations to “engage in constructive discussions on humanitarian principles and to find pragmatic ways to work together to provide effective assistance” (DEMAC, 2016: 33). Exactly how this should be done is, however, not clarified.

Another evaluation of cooperation with Syrian civil society organizations finds that even though these organizations usually position themselves with respect to the conflict, they “generally do abide by the principle of neutrality in their work” (Crawford, 2015: 13).

Only a few studies reflect directly on the “principle challenge” when dealing with the international response to the crisis in Syria's neighbouring countries. In Jordan, for example, the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has taken a position similar to that of the WFP in Syria. UNHCR has a longstanding “near exclusive bilateral relationship” (Darcy, 2016: 39) with the government, which is judged as “instrumental” in

ensuring Jordan's continued support of refugees (Hidalgo et al., 2015: 25).

While this strong bilateral relationship – in accordance with development principles of ownership and partnership – has long been considered a precondition for creating longer-term perspectives for Syrian refugees, it has also become a bone of contention. Concerns are raised regarding UNHCR's mandate and core principles amidst growing difficulties to protect refugees in Jordan, and due to risks of a Jordanian-Syrian border closure to minimize the influx of refugees (Hidalgo et al., 2015: 7).

This illustrates how difficult it can be to keep the delicate balance between humanitarian and development principles. It also highlights what international actors will face when they collaborate with a sovereign government that has declined to sign international accords (such as the Geneva Refugee Conventions). The work of international actors is based on these accords.

Nonetheless, Bailey and Barbelet (2014) view a growing internal recognition that “UN agencies need to think and act beyond traditional mandates, to connect humanitarian and development responses, and ensure the strongest relevance and value of [their] work in addressing emergency, fragility, resilience and recovery” (Bailey and Barbelet, 2014: 5). Some bilateral actors, however, have stronger reservations against attempts to reconcile conflicting principles.

An evaluation of Norwegian assistance related to the Syria regional crisis emphasizes that “Norway strongly protects its hard-won stance as a principled and impartial actor, as ITS Humanitarian Policy reflects. It therefore needs to be especially aware of (...) how (and arising from what choices) the International Humanitarian Principles are being upheld” (Betts et al., 2016: 32). Ensuring that Norway's local implementing partners will adhere strictly to international humanitarian principles is another vital issue (Betts et al., 2016: 33). The Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) reaches similar conclusions: the agency “adds value to humanitarian response at a country level by being a neutral and principled donor”, and this has been appreciated by partners in the

“highly politicised environment of the Syria crisis” (Mowjee et al., 2015b: 23).

#### **4.1.2 Commitment to common goals**

##### **Recommendations from the conceptual literature**

A second set of recommendations related to the vision and strategy gap touches on common objectives of the humanitarian and development responses to protracted crises. Linking humanitarian and development responses by committing to resilience, Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and other collective outcomes was a central credo of the World Humanitarian Summit in Istanbul, 2016. In his report to the summit, the UN Secretary-General urged humanitarian and development actors "to transcend their traditional silos" and work together "towards agreed collective outcomes over a multi-year time horizon" (UN Doc. A/70/709, 2016: 33).

Many studies in our conceptual sample agree that commitments to common goals should be the point of departure of any crisis response. A more coherent and coordinated humanitarian-development approach is the ambition. All strategies, including regional and national response plans as well as single donor strategies, should commit to common objectives (e.g. van Cooten et al., 2014: 17; GCER, 2016: 40; Mowjee et al., 2015a: 9; USAID, 2012: 20).

Once committed to collective outcomes, humanitarian assistance and development cooperation can no longer act in isolation but serve as building blocks of a unified approach that makes the overall response more effective (cf. OECD, 2006: 9).

Several studies make this causal assumption (at least implicitly). But they do not spell out clearly what these common objectives should be, and how conflicting goals should be handled. Should common objectives merely form a sub-set of larger humanitarian and development objectives? Or should they be the exclusive goal of all humanitarian-development activities? This remains uncertain, and the studies deliver different opinions. A majority advocates resilience as the common outcome of crises responses (e.g. Levine

and Mosel, 2014a; Mowjee et al., 2015a: 45; USAID, 2012: 16). Others argue in favour of SDGs (e.g. OCHA et al., 2015: 7).<sup>40</sup> Bailey and Barbelet (2014: 8) find disagreements among donors.

## **Findings from the empirical literature**

Strengthening resilience has emerged as the overarching goal in the Syria crisis. Political actors from both the humanitarian realm and the development realm are committed to resilience under the scope of the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plans, 3RPs (see Box 2).<sup>41</sup> This is confirmed almost unanimously by empirical studies that discuss common objectives (around one third of our sample).

In the early years of the Syria crisis, mostly humanitarian assistance was provided. This proved inadequate, as the conflict in Syria became more and more protracted. The protracted crisis posed economic, social and political challenges to host countries and local communities as well as to Syrian refugees and IDPs. Thus, calls became louder for a more long-term, development-oriented approach, building on the capacities of affected people and institutions to cope with the crisis in the longer-term (cf. REACH Initiative, 2014: 28).

There is today a widespread recognition among political decision-makers, according to empirical studies, that a resilience-based approach is the best way forward, aligning humanitarian aid

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<sup>40</sup> There is, however, no fundamental contradiction between the two goals as long as resilience is not interpreted as a goal on the same level as the SDGs. Since resilience is acknowledged in most SDGs, and considered as vital to achievement (cf. Bahadur et al., 2015), the main difference lies in the range of these goals. Here, resilience is a lower-outcome goal serving as an input into SDG achievements. This, in turn, makes resilience attractive as a common goal for both the humanitarian and the development sector.

<sup>41</sup> The 3RPs can be considered as both: strategy documents and planning documents (see e.g. <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/52586>). Some view the plans predominantly as a set-up of strategic objectives, with a lack of prioritization, while others stress the national planning components. In this review, we are focusing on the 3RPs through the lens of our analytical framework. We do it from a strategic as well as from a planning perspective. The aim is to assess whether the 3RPs potentially contribute to closing the humanitarian-development gap with regard to its strategic and planning dimension.

with longer-term development assistance and targeting both refugees and host-communities (cf. Cullbertson et al., 2015: xi; Guay, 2015: 22).

One evaluation talks about a current “paradigm shift” (Lee and Pearce, 2017: 5) towards resilience. It culminated in the adoption of a Resilience-Based Development Response to the Syria crisis, and the formulation of the 3RPs (see Box 2; see also Section 4.1.3). Sediakina-Rivière and Diaz-Varela (2016: 8) are praising the 3RP as a “resilience-based approach to development”. This is a new phenomenon, since in other crises contexts, there was “substantial disagreement about whether resilience is an appropriate frame for planning assistance” (Bailey and Barbelet, 2014: 8).

Even though the 3RPs can be considered an innovative step towards long-term development, they nevertheless differentiate between two elements: a refugee protection and humanitarian assistance component on the one hand, and a resilience and stabilization component focusing on host communities on the other hand (see Box 2). Refugees seem to remain in the compartment of short-term relief, while host communities benefit from longer-term measures.

Some studies adopt a generally positive view. Resilience is seen as a “cross-cutting theme” (Bellamy et al., 2017: 50) in the 3RPs, and in national resilience plans (NRPs) of neighbouring host countries. Bailey and Barbelet find “many entry points for a resilience based development approach” at the national level: safety net programmes, social protection mechanisms and systems for analysis and tracking risks (Bailey and Barbelet, 2014: 25).

Moreover, these studies highlight potential positive effects, and argue that the resilience agenda can constitute “a more progressive framework for hosting refugees, and the inclusion of the government in planning and fundraising for the response” (Bellamy et al., 2017: 50). Others regard resilience as a strategic basis for strengthening social cohesion (REACH 2014: 26); and as a vehicle to coherence between humanitarian and development approaches (Bailey and Barbelet, 2014: 25). In addition, Sweden and other donor countries have explicitly framed their response to Syria within the resilience agenda at the strategic level (cf. Betts et al., 2016: 36).



Some studies are more cautious in praising the resilience agenda. Lee and Pearce hint that strengthening of resilience is mostly political-strategic lip service. Jordan's and Lebanon's response plans make "ample use of language intended to 'improve', 'enhance', 'build' and 'promote' resilience", without presenting any "additional clarification" (Lee and Pearce, 2017: 28). Culbertson et al. are also critical. Despite efforts to integrate resilience into recent planning documents, "there has been no real transition yet" in the Jordanian education sector (Culbertson et al., 2015: 82).<sup>42</sup>

Almost all empirical studies treat resilience as a common goal guiding responses to the refugee crisis. A few are referring to other goals as well. The evaluation on UNESCO's Education Response to the Syria Crisis points at the No Lost Generation initiative. It also emphasizes the Sustainable Development Goal SDG 4, ensuring inclusive and qualitative education for all and promoting lifelong learning (cf. Sediakina-Rivière and Diaz-Varela, 2016: 6f.). However, there is no fundamental contradiction here. Resilience is acknowledged in most SDGs, and considered vital to achieving SDG goals (cf. Bahadur et al., 2015).

### **4.1.3 Joint country strategies**

#### **Recommendations from the conceptual literature**

Many studies are urging donors to formulate joint crisis response strategies that integrate and align humanitarian and development efforts. Donor countries and organizations, as well as individual donors, should draw up coherent country strategies covering both forms of assistance. Actors should be empowered to work towards agreed common goals (cf. Commission of the European Communities, 2001: 11; Mowjee et al., 2015a: 34; Patrick and Brown, 2007: 140; USAID, 2012: 19). Such strategies take into account short-term as well as long-term perspectives for people and institutions. Ideally, they provide guidance on how to integrate, sequence and complement humanitarian and development

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<sup>42</sup> This critical point also appears later in our study. See discussions of the findings on the planning gap (Section 4.3.1).

programmes (cf. JRPSC and UN, 2016; see also Section 4.3.1). Furthermore, strategies ensure that both forms of assistance mutually support one another in favour of common outcome achievement (OECD, 2006: 40; USAID, 2012: 5, 19). This recommendation is highly relevant to Germany and Denmark, for example, donor countries in which some government departments are responsible for humanitarian assistance while others take care of development cooperation; a consolidated joint strategy can be particularly vital in such cases (cf. Below and Belzile, 2013: 15; Mowjee et al., 2015a: 34; Otto and Weingärtner, 2013: 55; see also Chapter 4.4).

The conceptual literature also points out that that humanitarian and development actors should base their joint strategies on joint assessments (see Section 4.3.2) to develop a unified contextual understanding of short-term and long-term needs on the ground (see e.g. Koddenbrock and Büttner, 2009: 28f.; Mosel and Levine, 2014: 21; The Grand Bargain, 2016: 8f.).

### **Findings from the empirical literature**

More than half of the sampled empirical studies address the question whether joint international and individual donors' country strategies exist that provide frameworks for a coherent humanitarian-development response to the Syria crisis.

Most of them draw a positive conclusion, and refer to the 3RP (Box 2) as a regional strategic framework for integrating the two responses in order to achieve resilience as the stated common outcome (cf. e.g. Cullbertson et al., 2015; Guay, 2015; Sediakina-Rivière and Diaz-Varela, 2016).<sup>43</sup>

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<sup>43</sup> While most of the empirical studies refer to the 3RP as the central international joint crisis response strategy for the Syrian refugee crisis, Huang et al. (2017) also point to recent 'compact agreements' (see Section 4). The Jordan Compact, presented at the 2016 London conference, aims at improving the resilience of host communities and refugees by stimulating economic growth, inter alia, via improved access to the EU market (see e.g.: [data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=12008](http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=12008)).

## Box 2. Regional Refugee and Resilience Plans

The Regional Refugee and Resilience Plans (3RPs) epitomize international actors' commitment to building bridges between humanitarian assistance and development cooperation in the Middle East. They underline the necessity of profound changes when dealing with humanitarian crises, particularly in Syria. This box serves to shed some light on the background and genesis of the 3RPs.

When the crisis started in 2011, the regional response with regards to refugees was initially a UN-led process of setting up National Response Plans for Syrian Refugees in all neighbouring countries plus Egypt. In 2012, these plans were for the first time merged under a single umbrella: a Regional Response Plan (RRP). The humanitarian approach to refugees was still separated from the realm of development politics. Two coordinators worked in each neighbouring country of Syria (the Humanitarian Coordinator of OCHA and the Resident Coordinator, usually from UNDP if present). The crisis required complex coordination. Disputes evolved on the mandate of some UN organizations. As a consequence, coordination among Syria's neighbours was merged in 2014. A Joint Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator (RC/HC) in Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq was appointed.

Calls for the inclusion of a resilience component – catering for host communities and for refugees – were becoming louder inside the UN (UNDP, 2013). Exponentially growing refugee numbers in 2013–2015, and the subsequent strain on host countries, made it imperative to find national and local solutions. The Jordanian government developed a National Resilience Plan for 2014–2016, complementing the original National Response Plan and focusing specifically on crisis management in Jordan and its host communities. Efforts to merge the two sides led up to National Response Plans, which included a humanitarian component for refugees and a resilience component for host countries.

This was also reflected on a regional level. The first 3RP was made public in 2015 by UNHCR, highlighting longer-term commitments and objectives in neighbouring countries. The formal lead of National Response Plans belongs to nation states, though. These National Response Plans are only later fed into a Regional Plan. The emphasis on host communities, rather than on refugees, in today's 3RPs is based on strong individual national interests among Syria's neighbours, and on reconsidered UN policies to some extent. Resilience includes all kinds of stakeholders (from beneficiaries of humanitarian assistance to institutions in host countries), but the peculiar entry point to the Syria crisis led to a focus on host countries.

Insufficient donor funding for long-term development has, however, induced many host governments to call for direct budgetary support.

Several authors view the 3RP as an important milestone. The 3RP solidifies the shift in strategic thinking. It promotes an integrated

humanitarian and development realm for scaling up resilience, and formulates clear strategic objectives and indicators accompanied by sector plans – all in order to put the resilience agenda into practice (cf. Guay, 2015: 22; Lee and Pearce, 2017: 27). Most UN-related reports meanwhile use these targets and objectives as benchmarks for assessment of effectiveness (Darcy, 2016: 30).

However, some studies find critical aspects as well. Some argue that the 3RP approach has a too limited time horizon that prevents plans from effectively contributing to resilience on a more sustainable basis (cf. Bouché and Mohieddin, 2015: 88). An evaluation synthesis provided by CALL discovers a downside of Jordan’s strong ownership in the 3RP process: refugee concerns are not sufficiently integrated into Jordan’s National Resilience Plan (Darcy, 2016: 26; see also Hidalgo et al., 2015: 9ff.). Some donor countries have criticized the 3RP “as a wish list and not a strategy”; and the joint strategy-building efforts underlying the 3RP were not sufficiently inclusive since NGOs were not well integrated (Darcy, 2016: 25f.).

Some studies also mention donor countries with a unified – interdepartmental – country strategy that integrates humanitarian and development responses to the refugee crisis, and takes international strategies into account simultaneously: Sweden produced a five-year strategy covering its Syria crisis assistance (2016–2021). Denmark updated the strategic framework for stabilization work in Syria (2015–2016), and the UK collects humanitarian, development and stabilization assistance under a single strategic framework (Betts et al., 2016: 25; see also Mowjee et al., 2015b: 22). Contrary to this Betts et al. (2016: 25), in their evaluation of the Norwegian Assistance related to the Syria Regional Crisis, find no traces of any ‘whole-of-Norway’ strategy.

Finally, some studies criticize the absence of a unified strategy within international organizations. For example, the ‘evaluation of UNESCO’s role in education in emergencies and protracted crises’ reaches a sharp conclusion: “UNESCO does not have an organization-wide strategy to clearly guide and position its education work in crisis contexts, such as the Syria crisis” (Sediakina-Rivière and Diaz-Varela, 2016: 14).

## **4.1.4 Alignment of donor and partner country strategies**

### **Recommendations from the conceptual literature**

Donors should align their strategies with a host country's own strategy (e.g. national response plan). This recommendation, related to aspects of the vision and strategy sub-gap, is found in the conceptual literature as well.

Linking short-term and long-term crisis responses arguably requires a collective effort that includes national and local actors (cf. Otto and Weingärtner, 2013: 55ff.). There is widespread conviction that ownership – of host countries' governments and of sub-national actors – is a prerequisite for effective crisis response strategies (see e.g. Mowjee et al., 2015a: 45ff.; Otto and Weingärtner, 2013: 69). In this line of argument, strategies endorsed by all stakeholders are important keys to collaborative efforts. Government authorities, civil society and other actors should build a coherent strategy that promotes resilience among individuals, domestic and refugee households, communities, and national institutions (cf. GCER, 2016: 16). This also presupposes actors willing to collaborate on joint assessments in preparation for a clear-cut strategy, and actors who are ready to actively promote capacity development (cf. Mowjee et al., 2015a: 45; OCHA et al., 2015: 13; Otto and Weingärtner, 2013: 56).

### **Findings from the empirical literature**

The sampled empirical studies provide mixed evidence on the alignment of donor and partner country strategies in the Syrian context.

The Jordanian government and international actors have collaborated closely during the planning process before the incorporation of the Jordan Response Plan into the 3RP, according to a synthesis of evaluations (cf. e.g. Darcy, 2016: 18).<sup>44</sup> Several

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<sup>44</sup> In Jordan, for example, UNESCO has played a critical role, supporting the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation during preparations for an education strategy for refugees (Sediakina-Rivière and Diaz-Varela, 2016: 12).

studies emphasize the strong ownership of refugee-hosting countries, which generates strong coherence between the 3RP and national plans. Jordan's National Resilience Plan and Lebanon's Stabilization Roadmap are two good examples (cf. e.g. Darcy, 2016: 30; Lee and Pearce, 2017: 5f.).

However, strategy alignment has its limits where divergence of interests between host countries' governments and the international donor community (donor countries, UN-organizations, and NGOs) is significant. The case of Lebanon shows that alignment becomes almost impossible if a national government has policies in place that contravene donors' mandates and principles. In Lebanon, the Minister of Interior announced that refugees returning to Syria (after June 2014) would be stripped of refugee status if they returned to Lebanon once again. Statements of that kind contradict most donor policies of free movement for refugees, and make alignment difficult (OCHA and REACH, 2014: 38).

Even when there is (partial) alignment of donor and partner country strategies at the national level, this does not automatically mean that host communities' needs are met. Local authorities in Lebanon were not sufficiently represented in the national strategy process, evidence suggests. Priorities articulated by the Lebanon Roadmap differ significantly from those of municipalities and host communities. As a consequence, a certain disconnect has arisen regarding sectorial priorities set by UN agencies and by donors, in line with the national roadmap, and priorities by host communities and municipalities (Bouché and Mohieddin, 2015: 85; Ciacci, 2014: 27).

The situation looks slightly different in Jordan. Until recently, Syrians were not granted work permits in Jordan (REACH Initiative, 2014: 18)), as opposed to international provisions and in spite of lobbying by donor countries (a case of lacking alignment of donor and partner country strategies). This had obvious negative effects. Growing competition from Syrians, Jordanians and Egyptians in the informal labour market put many Jordanian households in a vulnerable position; it increased tensions between Jordanians and Syrian refugees (REACH Initiative, 2014: 18). The main concern of the government of Jordan with allowing Syrian to

work was the impact this would have on hosts (Bellamy et al., 2017: 56).

Recently, the Jordan Compact (see Section 4.1.5) opened opportunities for Syrians to find regular work (Bellamy et al., 2017: 4; Sediakina-Rivière and Diaz-Varela, 2016: 15). The Compact serves as a conducive factor to further alignment since it promises the Jordan Government more funding, more trade concessions and non-concessional World Bank loans (Bellamy et al., 2017: 50ff.).

Some empirical studies also provide positive evidence on subnational actors' involvement in the strategy-building process underlying the Jordan Response Plan. The Government of Jordan has, in collaboration with the UN, established a Host Community Support Platform (later renamed as Jordan Response Platform for the Syria Crisis) to coordinate the international response. The platform allows national NGOs and various subnational actors to participate in the elaboration of the Jordan Response Plans (cf. e.g. REACH Initiative, 2014: 2, 6).<sup>45</sup>

#### **4.1.5 Commitment to longer-term engagement in protracted crises**

##### **Recommendations from the conceptual literature**

Lack of commitment to longer-term engagement in protracted crises, is one further aspect of the vision and strategy gap. Many studies emphasize that response strategies are set to fail if not underpinned by donors' political will to engage in a crisis for longer periods of time.

Humanitarian-development responses to protracted crises require an investment of time (USAID, 2012: 16). This implies contingency planning, especially when it comes to addressing chronic vulnerability; it also signals a readiness to adapt to unpredictable developments – and a long-term focus that integrates

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<sup>45</sup> See also the Website of the Jordan Response Platform for the Syria Crisis: <http://www.jrpsc.org/new-page-4/>.

the entire spectrum of assistance in a coherent manner (cf. van Cooten et al., 2014: 13; de Weijer, 2013: 12).

Donors and partner governments must adopt long-term strategies that guide the different forms of assistance along the road towards common goals (see e.g. Mosel and Levine, 2014: 18; Otto and Weingärtner, 2013: 58f.).

### **Findings from the empirical literature**

Almost one third of the empirical studies addresses the question whether donor and partner countries really are committed to longer-term engagement in the Syrian refugee crisis. The evidence is somewhat mixed.

Some studies draw positive conclusions. After the early years of the crises response which was more or less restricted to humanitarian aid, there is today a growing recognition that the crisis cannot be managed without longer-term development responses (Bouché and Mohieddin, 2015: 81f.; cf. Darcy, 2016: 30; Sediakina-Rivière and Diaz-Varela, 2016: 8). For some authors, this perspective is already reflected in actors' adherence to resilience as a common outcome of the humanitarian-development response (see Section 4.1.2).

Huang et al. (2017) argue that the 'Grand Bargain' signed by more than 30 donors, multilateral agencies and NGOs, at the World Humanitarian Summit in Istanbul as well as the 'UN's Commitment to Action' (also launched at the summit), and especially new 'compact agreements' (such as those in Jordan and Lebanon) are recent developments that clearly reflect the political commitment of the humanitarian and the development realm to work over multiyear timeframes in protracted crises: "Compact agreements have emerged as a new approach, bringing together donors and development and humanitarian actors under host-country leadership for multiyear agreements to achieve defined, sustainable outcomes for refugees and host communities" (Huang and Ash, 2017: xi).

This new outlook is, however, the result of a long process. Negotiators had to overcome reservations from host countries – Lebanon and Jordan in particular – which abstained from



developing longer-term perspectives for refugees (cf. Darcy, 2016: 26). Until recently, the Jordanian government refused to accept that the crisis made it imperative to shift to long-term planning (Darcy, 2016: 26). Jordan's national resilience plans were primarily focused on host communities, and to a much smaller degree on refugees. Multilateral development organizations such as the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the World Bank pushed for a policy shift towards more enduring solutions that addressed the needs of Syrian refugees as well as those of their Jordanian hosts (Bellamy et al., 2017: 51). The Jordan Compact was a major output of this process.

Some reviewed empirical studies have doubts about the credibility of donors' lasting engagement in the Syria crisis. Signed commitments have not been translated into adequate levels of funding, they point out (for more details, see Section 4.2). Hidalgo et al. (2015: 7) note that UNHCR find it difficult to make long-term plans due to insufficient funding. Culbertson et al. register problems in the education sector in Jordan. They find a lack of explicit long-term commitment among donors, and see many who are reluctant to accept shared burdens for long-term improvements (Cullbertson et al., 2015: 13). Donors' short planning cycles are limiting their ability to invest in more enduring programmes, and this has visible negative effects on the efficiency and sustainability of the provided assistance (Cullbertson et al., 2015: 13).

*Overall, the empirical studies suggest that progress has been made on closing the vision and strategy gap, compared to the mainly humanitarian interventions at the beginning of the Syria crisis. This especially goes for the crisis response in Syria's neighbouring countries. Several recommendations on how to close this sub-gap we have derived from our analysis of the conceptual sample studies have already been implemented. Joint international strategies (e.g. 3RPs) are in place, aiming at aligning the humanitarian with the development response. Donor countries are willing to make longer-term efforts in neighbouring countries of Syria. Strengthening resilience has become a common goal of the joint crisis response.*

## 4.2 Funding gap

Inadequate and inflexible funding of humanitarian assistance and development cooperation during protracted crises is another problematic aspect of the humanitarian-development gap.

Various aspects of the funding gap are covered in almost all conceptual studies and in many empirical studies analysed for this review. Based on discussions and recommendations in the conceptual studies, we define this gap as follows:

*A funding gap is caused by insufficient, fragmented, unbalanced and inflexible funding for relief and longer-term development responses. It impedes adequately scaled and well-coordinated responses to protracted crisis.*

### 4.2.1 Adequate level of funding for all forms of assistance

#### Recommendations from the conceptual literature

A number of studies view inadequate distribution of funds across the different forms of assistance as a stumbling block to effective linkages between humanitarian assistance and development cooperation (Koddenbrock and Büttner, 2009: 142). However, carefully prepared responses to protracted crises require sufficient financial resources and long-term funding of both forms of assistance (OCHA et al. 2015: 4).

The conceptual studies provide little guidance, however, regarding what is “adequate” when it comes to funding under shifting circumstances. They disagree on what actual allocation patterns look like in practice. Some find evidence that the distribution of funds is strongly biased in favour of immediate (humanitarian) crisis responses (Koddenbrock and Büttner, 2009: 142; Otto and Weingärtner, 2013: 34), and claim that donors are unwilling to provide more long-lasting funding.<sup>46</sup> Beck (2006: 28),

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<sup>46</sup> This is particularly true of funding for capacity building/development activities (Koddenbrock and Büttner, 2009: 136). Capacity building, however, is a core issue of the linkage debate, and a key measure that enables crisis-affected

in contrast, notes that substantial sums are regularly allocated to rehabilitation/recovery, rather than to short-term relief.

Most studies agree, though, that there is a general shortfall in funding rehabilitation/recovery activities (Hinds, 2015: 2; Steets, 2011: 5).<sup>47</sup> This goes along with a general “donor fatigue” regarding countries recovering from conflict (Otto and Weingärtner, 2013: 34; Steets, 2011: 25), and a lack of dedicated funding for rehabilitation activities (Buchanan-Smith and Fabbri, 2005: 33; Otto and Weingärtner, 2013: 47; Steets, 2011: 55).<sup>48</sup>

Many studies urge donors (at least implicitly) to ensure sufficient funding not only for short-term interventions but also for longer-term assistance (rehabilitation and development activities) during protracted crises.

### **Findings from the empirical literature**

More than half of the empirical studies address the funding gap. Darcy (Darcy, 2016: 57f.) points out that even though the response to the Syria crisis generates large amounts of funding in absolute terms, resources are still insufficient compared to growing needs. Dramatic funding shortfalls, of around 40–50 per cent, have plagued the 3RP and Syria appeals since 2014 (Darcy, 2016: 57). Where resources are scarce, Ernst et al. argue, allocation patterns are crucial issues due to hardening competition between different approaches and objectives (Ernst et al., 2014: 4).

The donor community has acknowledged the need for longer-term financing of resilience programmes in the crisis region (Betts

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people and institutions to become more resilient (van Cooten et al., 2014: 10; Levine and Mosel, 2014a: 12).

<sup>47</sup> We use “recovery” and “rehabilitation” as synonyms.

<sup>48</sup> Two examples of dedicated funding lines for rehabilitation activities are the USAID’s Transition Initiatives, and Germany’s funding instrument for transitional development assistance “crisis management and reconstruction, infrastructure” (Mosel and Levine, 2014: 9; Otto and Weingärtner, 2013: 47). The German budget line was named “development-oriented emergency aid” until 2012, then “development-promoting transitional assistance” (Entwicklungsfördernde und strukturbildende Übergangshilfe), and, from 2016, “crisis management and reconstruction, infrastructure” (Krisenbewältigung und Wiederaufbau, Infrastruktur).

et al., 2016; Darcy, 2016). Nevertheless, many studies stress that this verbal commitment to resilience-oriented initiatives is not matched by actual financial support (Bellamy et al., 2017: 52; 2016: 52; Bouché and Mohieddin, 2015: 87, 2015: 97; Lawry-White and Schloffer, 2014: 19; Sediakina-Rivière and Diaz-Varela, 2016: 15). Instead, allocations patterns reveal that donors continue to give priority to emergency assistance at the expense of resilience-oriented spending (Bellamy et al., 2017: 52; Betts et al., 2016: 52; Bouché and Mohieddin, 2015: 87).<sup>49</sup>

Capacity development is, according to some studies, the only field where actual spending patterns are seemingly in line with recommendations to match funding of short-term relief with higher investments in resilience building.<sup>50</sup>

According to some empirical studies, narrowly defined rules of development funding are the main obstacles to adequate funding for all forms of assistance. Traditional humanitarian assistance institutions don't have access to development funding, which makes it difficult to link their short-term assistance to longer term development (Lawry-White and Schloffer, 2014: 22). In addition, middle-income countries, such as Lebanon and Jordan, are normally not on the priority list for development funding (Ernst et al., 2014: 19; Hidalgo et al., 2015: 7f.). Some studies point at other available financial resources, such as funding from the Gulf States and remittances (DEMAC, 2016: 19). Both are associated with longer-term and less formalized funding modalities.

Cullbertson et al. (2015: 54) show that a lack of resources can block the alignment of emergency activities with existing institutional structures in a partner country. One practical example is illuminating. Insufficient funding for emergency educational

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<sup>49</sup> Only Ernst et al. (2014: 23) show that the Australian Response to the Syria Crisis completed the shift towards resilience-oriented funding. The first two years of the response focused almost exclusively on humanitarian assistance, but since 2013 there has been a trend towards funding resilience programmes. Today, resilience programmes swallow more than 40 per cent of the funding allocation.

<sup>50</sup> Crawford (2015: 16) and Mowjee et al. (2015b: 20) report that all funding agreements between the UN and civil society organizations in Lebanon include capacity building components.

resources (e.g. human resources and equipment) in Syrian refugee camps in Jordan made it impossible to align camp education standards to those of the Jordan Ministry of Education (MoE) curriculum. Consequently, students in camp schools could not move on to institutions operated by the MoE or to higher education. This constitutes a practical example how inadequate funding for emergency interventions prevented the transition to existing institutional structures.

## **4.2.2 Funding modalities**

### **Recommendations from the conceptual literature**

A new financing architecture would allow for more adequate responses by the international community, many studies argue (GCER, 2016: 7; Steets, 2011: 36). Current funding modalities are often not flexible enough to match up to needs on the ground in protracted crises. Funds can sometimes be used only for narrowly defined purposes or for specific periods, which makes it harder to take a flexible and holistic approach in responding to crises (Buchanan-Smith and Fabbri, 2005: 33; Otto and Weingärtner, 2013: 34; Steets, 2011: 31).

Several reviewed studies make suggestions on more flexible funding mechanisms, capable of handling unforeseen circumstances and permitting rapid reactions to emergencies (Patrick and Brown, 2007: 143). Donors should be able to redirect funds for other purposes than originally planned, and to adapt to new situations more smoothly (Buchanan-Smith and Fabbri, 2005: 33; Levine and Mosel, 2014a: 13; Otto and Weingärtner, 2013: 48). Donors can increase flexibility by relaxing earmarking of funds that can be used for various purposes or by adapting of the eligibility criteria (The Grand Bargain, 2016: 12).

Pooled funding modalities by the EU, are a particularly good example of a flexible funding. The so-called B-envelope of the European Development Fund (EDF) permits a flexible allocation of funds in specific circumstances (Otto and Weingärtner, 2013: 48). The European Instrument for Stability and Peace provides funding

for short-term emergency needs and longer-term challenges (Mosel and Levine, 2014: 9), and so does the EU-funded joint humanitarian-development initiative SHARE (Supporting Horn of Africa Resilience) (Otto and Weingärtner, 2013: 110).

Steets (2011: 32) argues that flexible funding facilitates a more needs-based approach and hence fosters adequate budgetary allocation. This focus on needs can be achieved with a localized approach that involves government systems, the private sector, and/or civil society (OCHA et al., 2015: 10). It can also be handled through feedback mechanisms, involving affected populations (Steets et al., 2016: 35), that allow for more appropriate assistance. Apart from flexibility, pooled funding can create incentives for collaboration. Patrick and Brown (2007: 134) cite The United Kingdom's Conflict Pool as a positive example. It funds conflict prevention, stabilization and peacekeeping; and brings together three government departments designing joint conflict prevention and management programmes.<sup>51</sup> Some argue that pooled funds at partner country level are particularly suitable for intensified collaboration; they can lead to better linkages and alignment of different forms of assistance and policy coherence (OCHA et al., 2015: 4; Otto and Weingärtner, 2013: 57).

According to Otto and Weingärtner (2013: 15), longer-term funding can inject more flexibility into implementing organizations, and facilitate time perspectives that reach beyond standard annual project cycles. Better linkages between relief and development are substantial likely rewards.

### **Findings from the empirical literature**

Applied funding modalities and their suitability to the Syria crisis are discussed in almost half of the empirical studies. Sida and Norad, two Nordic donor organizations, are often seen as positive examples in this regard.

Some studies show that flexible funding is provided by un-earmarked, or lightly earmarked, arrangements via multilateral

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<sup>51</sup> Three government departments are involved in the United Kingdom's Conflict Pool: the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), the Department for International Development (DFID), and the Ministry of Defence (MoD).

organizations. The Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) is one of them (Ernst et al., 2014: 2), Sida is another one (Betts et al., 2016: 14 Syria Case Study).

Sida and Norad are also implementing specific instruments to prepare the financial system for changing environments. Betts et al. (2016: 25) describe the approach of Norad, Sida and Danida as a 'reserve' humanitarian budget approach. Roughly 25 per cent of their annual humanitarian assistance resources are retained for flexible use, including new and unanticipated priorities. Sida allocates half of its annual financial budget to sudden crises. The other half is distributed at the beginning of a budget year to ongoing crises. Furthermore, Sida has established a Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM) for kick-starting implementation that is disbursed at the beginning of each year (Mowjee et al., 2015b: 18 Syria Case Study).

Sida's flexible financing modalities mainly focus on allocation mechanisms of humanitarian aid. Unlike Danida for example, Sida's humanitarian budget is fixed. It's not ready to transfer unspent funds from other budget lines to the humanitarian unit (Mowjee et al., 2015b: 18 Syria Case Study).

Sida and Norad also follow a needs-based approach when allocating financial resources. Norad's responsive and opportunity-based model relies on assessments made by its partners (Betts et al., 2016: 5), and Sida permits partnering civil society organizations to alter project designs to respond to fluid contexts (Mowjee et al., 2015b: 14 Syria Case Study).

Studies stress two positive aspects of flexibility-enhancing mechanisms. First, they are appropriate to timely responses to fluctuating needs (Betts et al., 2016: 6; Ernst et al., 2014: 2,3; Mowjee et al., 2015b: 11 Syria Case Study). Second, they can fill potential funding gaps (Mowjee et al., 2015b: 12 Syria Case Study). On the negative side, flexibility comes at a predictability cost (Betts et al., 2016: 6; Ernst et al., 2014: 3). Flexibility can act as a disincentive to a more strategic approach that is required for current protracted crises (Betts et al., 2016: 6). Furthermore, pooled funding through multilateral organizations is slowing down the funding process,

some authors notice; hence local implementation organizations are unable to adapt projects rapidly to new circumstances (Crawford, 2015: 17; Hidalgo et al., 2015: 148).

Almost half of the studies find an increased awareness of the need for continuous funding (Betts et al., 2016: 39; Ciacci, 2014: 41; Drummond et al., 2015: 11; Mowjee et al., 2015b: 15 Syria Case Study; Sediakina-Rivière and Diaz-Varela, 2016: 7f.) Uninterrupted flows of money make assistance more predictable (Mowjee et al., 2015b: 12 Syria Case Study). Evidence on the implementation of continuous funding modalities, however, points in various directions.

The WFP's Forward Purchasing Facility provides one solution (Drummond et al., 2015: 11). Diversified financial strategies by Oxfam Italy is another one (Ciacci, 2014: 41). Sida guarantees its partners ten per cent of their budget for the subsequent year, thus stimulating a perception of continuous funding (Mowjee et al., 2015b: 15 Syria Case Study).

Some evidence tells us that funding cycles are rather short-term even today, mostly annual (Betts et al., 2016: 33; Cullbertson et al., 2015: 2; Ernst et al., 2014: 13). Short-term funds lead to high transaction costs for partners (Betts et al., 2016: 39), and to unpredictability (Ernst et al., 2014: 18; Mowjee et al., 2015b: 15 Syria Case Study). They are also hindering strategic and sustainable programming (Cullbertson et al., 2015: 98).

*Overall, the empirical studies paint an ambivalent picture with regard to closing the funding gap, as recommended by the conceptual studies. Progress has indeed been made. Some actors apply innovative funding modalities that allow for joint humanitarian-development financing and flexible funding. This enables them to react quickly to unforeseen circumstances. But dramatic funding shortfalls in recent years, and a persistent emphasis on humanitarian assistance rather than development-oriented programmes, are putting this positive trend at risk. A more unified strategic shift towards strengthening resilience is not reflected in actual allocation patterns.*



## 4.3 Planning gap

The humanitarian-development gap can also be caused by a lack of common planning. We address this aspect as a planning gap. It is closely associated with the vision and strategy gap, as it refers to problems in translating strategic goals and considerations into concrete measures. Based on the conceptual studies, the planning gap is defined as follows:

*A planning gap is given when humanitarian assistance and development cooperation are planned independently and with insufficient consideration of one another. As a consequence, there is no coherent integration of all forms of assistance to ensure effective and sustainable collective outcomes.*

### 4.3.1 Joint planning

#### **Recommendations from the conceptual literature**

Many authors in the conceptual sample emphasize that joint planning – bringing together and harmonizing perspectives, values, principles and work procedures – is an important prerequisite for sequencing and integrating humanitarian and development crisis response more effectively and sustainably (OECD, 2006: 24; Otto and Weingärtner, 2013: 16).

Joint planning includes joint selection and preferred objectives (or sub-goals) that are linked to a broader strategy. It integrates short-term and long-term perspectives as early as possible. The involvement of different perspectives (e.g. of humanitarian, development actors, and of local players) in the planning process is necessary to address potential misunderstandings and prejudices originating in different working cultures and beliefs (Bailey and Barbelet, 2014: 26; GCER, 2016: 7; Mosel and Levine, 2014: 17; Stepputat and Greenwood, 2013: 25).

Many authors recommend multi-disciplinary planning teams. Mosel and Levine (2014: 16) apply a governance perspective, and claim that not only individuals from different parts of government should join the planning group, but also academics and people more directly affected by a crisis. Government departments and aid

agencies should act as “facilitators and mobilizers rather than as decision makers and resource controllers” (Buchanan-Smith and Maxwell, 1996: 12).

Given that the humanitarian-development sphere is heavily fragmented, some authors claim that joint planning teams sitting inside an actual country, rather than somewhere on the outside, are in a better position to select and prioritise activities (Mosel and Levine, 2014: 10; Mowjee et al., 2015a: 47). Proximity to the level of implementation will yield more successful projects and programmes. Furthermore, within those teams the principle of “task cultures, not role cultures” (Buchanan-Smith and Maxwell, 1996: 12), should be followed, since task cultures address the need for new modes of organization in multi-disciplinary teams.

Two positive examples of joint planning teams are mentioned. Sida has implemented joint humanitarian and development teams in fragile states (Otto and Weingärtner, 2013: 36), and the USAID’s Joint Planning Cells are working in close coordination with partner countries’ governments (USAID, 2012).

The rationale behind joint teams is that the planning of humanitarian aid and development cooperation runs simultaneously (a contiguum approach). This does not always hold true, however.<sup>52</sup> If joint planning is not conducted simultaneously, actors from one strand of assistance should at least consider perspectives held by actors on the other side in their own planning (van Cooten et al., 2014: 13; Hinds, 2015: 2). The humanitarian-development linkage is in this case seen as a continuum that follows a sequencing approach (see Chapter 4.7). Humanitarian actors should, while planning, give thought to the objective of self-help strengthening and to adaptive capacity building/development with long time perspectives (van Cooten et al., 2014: 13). Development actors should be fully informed about prior and existing humanitarian projects and programmes, and should target the same groups, those most in need of humanitarian support (Levine and Mosel, 2014a: 6). Sensitivity to

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<sup>52</sup> This can, for instance, be the case due to a security situation that inhibits implementation of development cooperation activities.

risks among vulnerable groups, sudden shocks, and changing needs are also worth considering (GCER, 2016: 7).<sup>53</sup>

### **Findings from the empirical literature**

Joint planning is stressed by a majority of the empirical studies. Progress has been made lately as to bringing together and harmonizing different perspectives, values, principles and work procedures at the planning stage. Bailey and Barbelet (2014: 1) note that the response to the Syria crises has been primarily humanitarian so far, and don't see any early evidence of a development perspective. However, according to Betts et al. (2016: 24), planning organized at Norway's embassies includes sub-goals related to both humanitarian and development perspectives when reviewing the humanitarian situation, democratization and human rights (see also Section 4.3.3). In general, there is a growing recognition that the crisis also requires a resilience-oriented development response, especially in countries bordering to Syria.

The 3RPs and national resilience plans responding to the Syria crisis are referred to quite often (see Box 2). These Response plans are supposed to align projects and programmes and to foster coherence.<sup>54</sup> Bellamy et al. (2017: 53) state that all resilience-related funding and programming in Jordan must be aligned with the Jordan Response Plan. INGOs should ensure that projects are approved by individual ministries, prior to review by the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MOPIC), and by the Inter-Ministerial Coordination Committee (IMCC). But these procedures also lead to longer approval times and – due to centralization in Jordan – limited space for collaboration with host communities.

Some authors criticize that the resilience plans are too strategic, they don't discuss priorities and remain too vague (Cullbertson et al., 2015: 29; Darcy, 2016: 26; REACH Initiative, 2014: 29), and suffer from inconsistencies (Cullbertson et al., 2015: 62).

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<sup>53</sup> In this way, joint planning also involves holistic and flexible planning (discussed in detail in Section 4.3.3), and joint assessments to inform planning (discussed in detail in Section 4.3.2).

<sup>54</sup> For further discussion on the regional response plans, see also remarks on the vision and strategy gap in Section 4.1.3.

An example for successful joint planning at sector level comes from the education sector in Jordan. The Jordan Response Plan for the Syria crisis (2016–2018) constitutes the Kingdom’s current strategy, in which UNESCO acts as the Secretariat for Education (Sediakina-Rivière and Diaz-Varela, 2016: 6). The Jordan Education Sector Working Group (ESWG), established in 2008, coordinates the activities of partners implementing the national educational programme (Cullbertson et al., 2015: 22). The ESWG coordinates both the humanitarian response and the development education programming in Jordan (Cullbertson et al., 2015: 66). This working group is co-chaired by UNICEF and Save the Children, and supported by the Ministry of Education.

Sector-level coordination in Jordan is seen as relatively successful. Management and leadership has arguably worked well (Sediakina-Rivière and Diaz-Varela, 2016: 12). The involvement of Jordanian actors in the planning process, and the UN’s close relationship to the government and implementing partners, are probably important keys (Cullbertson et al., 2015: 96).

Nevertheless, Cullbertson et al. (2015: 32) also stress that international humanitarian organizations often make no use at all of national capacities: for instance that of Jordan’s functioning education system. This is a significant obstacle to joint efforts. Most international organizations are unfamiliar with working conditions in middle-income countries. They feel uncertain of how to adapt. Furthermore, the strong lead of international organizations questioned the sovereignty of the Jordanian government, and has, for instance, induced the government to block NGOs from getting involved in planning processes. Some authors point at negative experiences from Syria and Turkey. Mowjee et al. (2015b: 18 Syria Case Study) have not discovered any move to synchronize donor coordination meetings on humanitarian and development issues in Syria, despite apparent requirements. In Turkey, joint planning for the health sector by the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and the Ministry of Health has not materialized; the Ministry has declined to participate (Daoudi et al., 2014: 39).

## **4.3.2 Joint assessments to inform planning**

### **Recommendations from the conceptual literature**

Just as in the case of the formulation of joint strategies (see 4.1.3), planning is often only insufficiently informed by joint analyses and assessments. Humanitarian and development actors fail, at least partly, to address the root causes of crises, their dynamics, consequences and challenges to joint responses that interweave short-term and longer-term perspectives (see e.g. Koddenbrock and Büttner, 2009: 28f.; Mosel and Levine, 2014: 21; The Grand Bargain, 2016: 8f.).

Many studies of the conceptual sample argue that joint analyses and assessments such as context-, scenario- and need analyses help to better link humanitarian assistance and development cooperation as they help to get a common understanding and hence provide guidance for joint planning decisions regarding the division of tasks, timing and sequencing (Mowjee et al., 2015a: 28; Otto and Weingärtner, 2013: 55; Mosel and Levine, 2014: 14; USAID, 2012: 6). But “if perceptions differ, actions will hardly be brought together. [...] Without rapprochement of analyses, policies will not come closer” (Koddenbrock and Büttner, 2009: 134).

Joint analyses and assessments are still exceptions, but several studies recommend a better use of evidence in planning by applying tools of this kind (Hinds, 2015: 8; Mowjee et al., 2015a: 45; Schweizerisches Rotes Kreuz, 2010: 6).

### **Findings from the empirical literature**

Needs are not properly assessed in the Syrian context, most empirical studies claim (Bellamy et al., 2017: 3; Cullbertson et al., 2015: 64; Drummond et al., 2015: 13). Betts et al. (2016: 26) adds that projects funded by Norwegian assistance are based on needs assessments that focus solely on immediate needs of targets groups. The only positive evidence with respect to joint assessment to inform planning in the empirical sample is mentioned by Mowjee et al. (2015b: 23 Syria Case Study): Sida’s humanitarian staff member work particularly close with the staff working on the human rights and democracy programme to develop a shared context analysis.

The programme could utilize humanitarian maps and information on access, while Sida's staff member gained a better understanding of local actors in Syria.

Absence of joint assessments leads to tensions and to crisis responses that are not evidence-based, some authors argue. (Cullbertson et al., 2015: 64; REACH Initiative, 2014: 2). Drummond et al. (2015: 13) believe that the lack of more comprehensive analyses, particularly in Syria but also in refugee-hosting countries, has a clear-cut explanation: the enormous scale and rapid expansion of the crisis.

Others are stressing the role of governments. Syrian and Turkish governments have prevented a joint needs assessment (Darcy, 2016: 53; Mowjee et al., 2015b: 12), whereas Jordanian officials reason that comprehensive assessments are important (Bellamy et al., 2017: 46). This implies, once more, that (country) context matters.

### **4.3.3 Planning for holistic and flexible programming**

#### **Recommendations from the conceptual literature**

Needs of beneficiaries are often interlinked and cannot be addressed effectively in isolation. Interventions should be planned holistically, and include multiple needs (sectors) and multiple beneficiaries.

This rationale is central to the humanitarian-development nexus, as humanitarian needs such as the relief of human suffering and development needs in the form of longer-term development co-exist in protracted crises. To plan and operationalize holistic programmes, a number of scenarios are conceivable: a) cooperation between humanitarian and development actors, b) single planning and implementation by a dually mandated organization, and c) meaningful involvement of beneficiaries. The scenarios do not necessarily exclude one another.

An example for programming between actors from the humanitarian as well the development sector is given by OCHA et al. (OCHA et al. 2015: 16ff.): initiatives by UNDP (development)

and UNHCR (humanitarian) in a joint programme led to the implementation of the Transitional Solutions Initiative (2012–2014), which combined beneficiaries’ short-term and long-term goals. Programmes of this type must rest on a broad understanding of contexts, and should address needs holistically (Levine and Mosel, 2014a: 11–12).

Successful holistic programming in changing environments requires flexibility during design and implementation phases, many conceptual studies state (Bailey and Barbelet, 2014: 25; van Cooten et al., 2014: 9–13; EC, 2001: 7 ff. Mosel and Levine, 2014: 17 ff. Mowjee et al., 2015a: 27–46; UNDP, 2008: 7). Flexibility issues are also addressed in recent discussions on how to reform humanitarian action. New opportunities and challenges to linkage may develop quickly in conflict environments. International actors should be ready to alter programmes and country strategies accordingly. Flexibility should be promoted rather than penalized, as has often been the case.

### **Findings from the empirical literature**

Roughly half of the empirical studies call for holistic and flexible planning in order to react appropriately to the Syria crisis.

Some authors stress the lack of programmes tackling multiple sectors (Bouché and Mohieddin, 2015: 86; Guay, 2015: 20), while others find positive examples. UNICEF’s Emergency Education response is accompanied by Makani centres, which address violence and bullying (Cullbertson et al., 2015: 52).<sup>55</sup> The International Rescue Committee’s (IRC) Economic Recovery and Development Program connect cash assistance and livelihood programming to each other (IRC, 2016: 13).

Constructive initiatives, additionally, deliver assistance to multiple beneficiaries. The most vulnerable groups are targeted, irrespective of nationality. They also ensure that refugees as well as hosts are addressed by some programmes in Jordan and Lebanon.

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<sup>55</sup> Makani centres represent a comprehensive approach to service provision. Services cover informal education, skill-building programmes, and psychosocial support – all accessible to Jordanian and Syrian communities on the same site (Cullbertson et al., 2015: 51).

Instances where assistance was provided only to refugees are mainly reported from Lebanon (OCHA and REACH, 2014: 39; SDC, 2014: 28). Other studies show how actors fail to address local requirements. Poorly implemented assistance is unable to cope with the reality that parallel market structures are harmful to local communities (Bellamy et al., 2017: 43; Drummond et al., 2015: 28).

Addressing multiple needs and beneficiaries in a changing environment is feasible only with a flexible programme design. The mentioned positive examples show actors capable of handling such challenges (Daoudi et al., 2014: i; IRC, 2016: 19; Mowjee et al., 2015b: 23f.; SDC, 2014: 22), and actors willing to learn from earlier poorly implemented interventions (Cullbertson et al., 2015: 53).

Holistic and flexible programming mitigates (potential) social tensions, studies claim. Holistic perspectives may, in other words, promote social cohesion (Bouché and Mohieddin, 2015: 94f.; Cullbertson et al., 2015: 51; Guay, 2015: 11).

*In summary, the empirical sample suggests that progress has been made regarding a more comprehensive planning that embraces various sectors and beneficiaries – as reflected by the instalment of joint sector working groups in Jordan. These efforts foster a harmonization of different perspectives, values, and work procedures at the planning stage. Important challenges continue to exist, though. Local actors must be much more involved in planning processes.*

## 4.4 Institutional gap

Hindering factors to meaningful linkages between humanitarian and development institutions, is a recurring topic in the conceptual literature.<sup>56</sup> In some cases, obstacles are caused by internal deficiencies (e.g. lack of coordination mechanisms or unclear leadership). In other cases, a gap becomes visible when external stakeholders are interacting. An institution with insufficient expertise on both humanitarian and development issues has a palpable handicap. Its workforce may not be fully aware of how

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<sup>56</sup> We are referring to institutions connected to stakeholders of humanitarian assistance and development cooperation: donors, governments, INGOs, international organizations, and so on.



actors from both worlds usually behave, making it difficult for institutions to find common ground.

Competent institutional actors who are willing to work with external stakeholders equipped with different mandates are vitally important to linkage. We summarize these characteristics as an institutional gap and define it as follows:

*An institutional gap exists when the internal coordination structure, the skill set of human resources, and external cooperation strategy of institutions – donors, national governments, INGOs, international organizations, civil society organizations and national and local stakeholders – are harming effective links between humanitarian assistance and development cooperation.*

#### **4.4.1 Cooperation within institutions**

##### **Recommendations from the conceptual literature**

A high degree of coordination and cooperation within an institution is beneficial to linkage. This is a central recommendation in the conceptual literature. A donor government, for instance, which has managed to substantially improve internal cooperation within ministries and institutions, is capable of reducing redundancies and contradictions. This has further positive repercussions. It improves perceptions held by a partner country. The donor seemingly acts in a coherent manner, his standing is raised, and interventions become more effective (e.g. Levine and Mosel, 2014a: 21ff.; OECD, 2014: 18; Steets, 2011: 43ff.). Improved internal coordination makes it easier to create stronger platforms for cooperation with other institutions. Actors become more fully aware of humanitarian as well as development goals and working principles.

To achieve better relations between the two silos and more coherence, governments or institutions could use incentives of a certain kind: pooled funds for development and humanitarian departments.<sup>57</sup>

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<sup>57</sup> Pooled funds are, in this case, designed for humanitarian as well as development programmes. They give donors a better overview on needs in both fields, they create opportunities to identify various forms of linkage.

A single department, ministry or special unit for humanitarian and development concerns is better positioned to generate those linkages, the literature suggests. It becomes easier to reach beyond political interests, dynamics and competition for budgets. According to White et al. (2000: 318 ff.), donor governments building joint structures could be found already in the 1990s, for example, the Office for Transition Initiatives (OTT) introduced by USAID in 1994, and the Office of Military Affairs within USAID (Patrick and Brown, 2007: 141 ff.). Lack of cooperation within institutions, and ministries in particular, is today still considered a major obstacle to bridging the two main forms of assistance (Patrick and Brown, 2007; Steets, 2011: 43).

### **Findings from the empirical literature**

Most empirical information on internal cooperation comes from donor organizations such as Norad and Sida. It is complemented by details on how UNESCO and UNICEF are implementing education programmes. The Scandinavian agencies are taking positive steps towards effective internal cooperation, while UN organizations are confronting obstacles to linkage that have to be overcome.

An encouraging example from Norad highlights the importance of sharing information on Norway's assistance in the Syrian context. On the one hand, Norad has ensured a constant flow of information between the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, embassies and partnering organizations through a variety of channels.<sup>58</sup> This is Norad's platform for decision-making and advocacy; it indicates functioning internal cooperation on activities abroad. Entities that are more development-oriented, such as embassies, and crisis response-oriented entities are included (Betts et al., 2016: 27 ff.).<sup>59</sup> On the other hand, Norway's assistance in Syria faces criticism for promoting an organizational approach that does not foster linkage between different sections dealing with assistance, which indicates that issues are handled separately. Norway's assistance in Syria is

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<sup>58</sup> Filed visits and regular meetings with key stakeholders are channels of this kind.

<sup>59</sup> Partnering external organizations constitute a vital element of Norad's *modus operandi*, and are seen as internal to the system.

not, so far, managed by a joint office devoted to the Syria crisis response (Betts et al., 2016: 40). In sum, Norad and the other parts of Norway's assistance in Syria have definitely taken steps to ensure a smooth information flow between entities dealing with crisis assistance, but have declined to establish one single office in charge of the overall management.

The evaluation of Sida's humanitarian assistance demonstrates another good example (Mowjee et al., 2015b). Generally, and not specific to the Syria case, Sida has taken concrete measures to link its humanitarian assistance with longer-term resilience strengthening. It applies common context analyses, it sometimes makes use of humanitarian and development funding in one single programme, and some of its employees are handling both topics simultaneously. Mowjee et al. (2015b: 5) recommend the agency to institutionalize these measures internally. This is currently not always the case. Sida's Middle East and North Africa (MENA) department, which is in charge of development issues, also uses humanitarian assistance information as a base for long-term strategies in connection to the Syria crisis (Mowjee et al., 2015b: 23). Sida is actively stimulating cooperation, just like Norad, but has not yet institutionalized its efforts.

Internal cooperation does not only concern donors. Institutions often have to adjust, with little time for preparation, to the Syria crisis and its impact on their own programmes. Constant and rapidly appearing needs create internal difficulties for cooperation between development and humanitarian programmes. When the war in Syria affected its area of implementation, the UNICEF Programme in Turkey decided to separate emergency response from the regular development programme – the latter was operational before the crisis – and to manage it from now on with a minimum of interaction between staffs. This caused a lack of coherence on field level (Darcy, 2016: 24 ff.). It also curtailed cooperation within UNICEF in Turkey.

UNESCO, involved in the crisis response, encompasses long-term education as well as education in emergencies (Sediakina-Rivière and Diaz-Varela, 2016: 7). In Jordan, UNESCO began to put structures in place in 2015 in order to manage education in

emergencies together with resilience and development issues within one single unit. Despite these efforts, UNESCO still lacks relevant expertise on how to handle emergencies and development issues simultaneously. Its dedicated units are understaffed or not yet fully established. This is epitomised by the absence of Education in Emergencies expertise on Head Quarter Level (UNESCO, 2012: 14).

#### **4.4.2 Cooperation between institutions**

##### **Recommendations from the conceptual literature**

Cooperation efforts must be holistic in cases where sustainability and other long-term goals of international assistance are high priorities, Circumstances are always complex, and needs cannot be tackled successfully in isolation. Consequently, cooperation must include actors from both worlds: short-term humanitarian and long-term development interventions (e.g. GCER, 2016: 22 ff.). Ambitions to work beyond traditional mandates, is another requirement. Mosel and Levine (2014: 14) provide a list of stakeholders that should establish new links – state institutions (local, regional, mid-level bureaucrats) formal and informal institutions (traditional authorities, clan structures, etc.), local civil society groups (beyond national NGOs) and business entities.

Studies suggest that donor organizations, in particular, are capable of promoting cooperation between institutions in suitable contexts (Bailey et al., 2009: 11; Hinds, 2015: 7; OCHA et al., 2015: 16; Steets, 2011: 5). There are several ways to go. Donors may partner with organizations that already possess mandates and expertise in both fields, as suggested by Hinds (2015: 7). They could order funding applicants to identify opportunities of cooperation between humanitarian assistance and development cooperation as an integrated part of project and programme proposals. Other collaborative efforts are equally vital. Humanitarian assistance actors may team up with the private sector around mutually rewarding aid projects. Initiatives of this kind form a productive nucleus. They can contribute to economic development and potentially enduring development viewed through humanitarian lenses (UNDP: 2008).

## **Findings from the empirical literature**

Cooperation intensified between institutions with different mandates as the war in Syria became protracted, according to many empirical studies. Some mention that cooperation between the private and the humanitarian sector in Jordan was virtually non-existing at the onset; today it is regular *modus operandi* (Zyck and Armstrong, 2014: 9–10; DEMAC, 2016).

A Jordanian example is illustrative. UNHCR, a humanitarian actor in Jordan and Lebanon, made its first attempt to engage development and private sector actors roughly three years after the beginning of the crisis (Hidalgo et al., 2015: 7–9, 48) – with slow but increasing success. Today, cooperation between humanitarian institutions and local private sectors in regions with existing market structures seems quite natural, many studies state.

Collaboration can include a variety of stakeholders: a local bank and a humanitarian organization, for example. The Cairo–Amman Bank co-operates with UNHCR on cash-based assistance programmes, and distributes money to UNHCR-registered refugees via specialized ATMs. (DEMAC, 2016: 18; Huang and Ash, 2017: 33; Zyck and Armstrong, 2014: 13). Dually mandated organizations are involved at times. Some studies argue that UNICEF, certain diaspora organizations, and others with dual mandates are able to bring together humanitarian and development work. Experience and expertise are anchored in both fields. This is especially valuable when pre-crisis knowledge of a certain area already exists internally. Here, actors may set existing networks in motion with relative ease, and design responses that are sensitive to long-term perspectives and opportunities of collaboration (Darcy, 2016: 27; DEMAC, 2016: 6–7, 19).

There are also obstacles. Cooperation between international institutions and national or local institutions attached to the private sector or to civil society often seems to be hampered – on both sides – by a total lack of experience from long-standing working relationships. Mistrust, stereotypes, preconceived assumptions and bureaucratic procedures are some major stumbling blocks (DEMAC, 2016: 8, 24–30; Zyck and Armstrong, 2014: 14).

To overcome obstacles, the Global Compact Local Network and other initiatives can be valuable (Zyck and Armstrong, 2014: 9). This network is designed to familiarize the private sector in Jordan with the humanitarian system.

The effects of those forms of partnership are hardly discussed. The literature contain a few hints, though. In some cases, partnerships have had a seemingly positive impact on the sustainability and overall coherence of programmes (Darcy, 2016: 27). The most tangible effects come from collaboration between humanitarian institutions and the private sector: economic benefits for private businesses, new local employment opportunities, and increased acceptance of refugees in host countries (Darcy, 2016; Drummond et al., 2015: x; Zyck and Armstrong, 2014: 2).

Despite the sporadic evidence on general effects of joint initiatives, most studies recommend actors to work more closely together in Syria and its neighbourhood (Bouché and Mohieddin, 2015: 98; DEMAC, 2016: 45; Huang and Ash, 2017: 33; IRC, 2016: 21, 27; Zyck and Armstrong, 2014: 22). However, some caution is called for. Cooperation between international institutions and national and local partners can sometimes weaken general responsibilities or mandates (IRC, 2016: 20). International organizations should avoid structures that run parallel to national and local ones. It's probably better to support existing structures if you want to achieve shared goals.

#### **4.4.3 Clear leadership and coordinating role**

##### **Recommendations from the conceptual literature**

There is a need for distinct leadership and for coordinating roles to promote linkages, according to the conceptual literature. The rationale has two aspects: to bring stakeholders from development and humanitarian sectors closer together; and to strengthen cooperation *within* institutions and *between* institutions with differing mandates. Enhanced internal collaboration requires clearly assigned responsibilities. Some studies want to design a structure where responsibilities and tasks for linkage are specifically aimed at promoting the humanitarian-development nexus (e.g. van Cooten et

al., 2014: 17ff.; OECD, 2006: 10–23; Patrick and Brown, 2007: 57). A lead coordinating body is better equipped to create such linkages across a diverse field of stakeholders than a fragmented effort that lacks distinct responsibilities.<sup>60</sup> How this will materialize in practice, varies from country to country and has to be based on available capacity.

A clear leading body is particularly important within donor governments, where interdepartmental and inter-ministerial coordination is an important task. A paper (2006: 23) from OECD's Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) points out that this requires diplomatic skills, as negotiations have to take place between policy communities and various policy options. A leading coordination centre, equipped with sufficient decision and sanctioning power, can build bridges that stretch beyond contradicting budgetary and policy stakes among humanitarian and development units (Patrick and Brown, 2007: 21 ff.).

Coordination between humanitarian and development stakeholders is another vitally important aspect. Despite mutual institutional efforts to support improved coordination and collaboration, there is still a need for leadership that translates commitments into real action (Mowjee et al., 2015a: 9). This might entail substantial reforms focused on ways of working.

### **Findings from the empirical literature**

Our empirical sample contains ample individual cases of staff members working simultaneously on humanitarian and development issues and discovering opportunities for synergies (Mowjee et al., 2015b: 5). Unfortunately, this can be regarded as phenomenological evidence. Coordination appears to take place only erratically, without any observable clear institutional lead and without a transparent structure or structural incentives. This can be illustrated by an example from Norad. The agency used an external technical working group to improve coordination between

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<sup>60</sup> We acknowledge that the first responsibility for coordination efforts lies with the government of a partner country. However, in crisis situations, where a government is incapable of coping with a crisis on its own, international actors often assume leadership and coordinate efforts.

humanitarian and long-term aid in the Syria crisis. The efforts did not pay off. Exactly how the working group has influenced Norad's work structurally, is still unclear (Betts et al., 2016: 46).

Clear leadership, capable of coordinating efforts to build bridges between institutions and across main divides, is not an extensively discussed issue. The UN-led Cluster Coordination system is active also in countries affected by the Syria crisis, and should (especially the early recovery cluster) assume a leading role. But UN showed no such tendencies for a long time (Darcy, 2016: 29ff.). Leadership was not clearly assigned between UNHCR, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), and the Regional Humanitarian Coordinator (RHC). After some difficult early years, UNHCR has eventually taken the lead in Jordan and Lebanon, and coordinates the work of development, humanitarian and government stakeholders (Darcy, 2016: 26ff.). This is an unusual role for a predominantly humanitarian organization, but UNHCR's working experience in the area and its relationship to regional governments are essential assets.

#### **4.4.4 A decentralized institutional structure**

##### **Recommendations from the conceptual literature**

Decentralized institutions, whose decision-making power stays close to the area of programme implementation, will probably promote good linkages between humanitarian assistance and development cooperation. Decentralized institutions are capable of finding opportunities in conflicts, disasters and other challenging environments. Hence, structures of that type can be distinctive bridge builders between short-term and long-term goals.

Otto and Weingärtner (2013: 57–59) view a decentralized approach, where decision-making power, including control over funding, is moved to a national level, as a potential way to overcome the humanitarian-development divide. According to White and Cliffe (2000: 332 ff.), centralized institutional structures are known to be ineffective – citing an example where key humanitarian staff were so detached from the operative area that it became impossible to even commence meaningful steps towards more development



oriented measures. They were unable to find long-term or medium-term opportunities. One study observes positive effects when donors locate both humanitarian assistance and development cooperation close to an implementation area (Steets, 2011: 40ff.).

Some organizations and governments have decentralized institutional structures. The UK's Department for International Development (DFID) and, in part, the Australian government, are two examples. They take care of humanitarian as well as development budgets at country level (Steets, 2011: 40ff.).

### **Findings from the empirical literature**

The empirical literature has not very much to say about decentralization. The donor perspective is predominant among the bits and bobs of information. Norad and Sida provide funds for programmes but do not handle implementation and rely on a regular information flow from implementation level to headquarter level ensures that field perspectives will be included in decisions. Field level information can be used for advocacy purposes. Donors may, for instance, want to increase funding for resilience programmes, respond to opportunities for linkage, or furnish additional funds. Accordingly, decision-making power on headquarter level is based on information from the field.

Norad has ensured that positive effects of decentralization – such as decision-making based on facts from the ground – will be taken into account without having a formal decentralized institutional structure of its own. In the Syria case this seems to have worked well. Norad's information-sharing system connects the headquarter to embassies and to implementing organizations (Betts et al., 2016: 26). Sida also finds various ways of collecting information from the field before making decisions. It collaborates closely with embassies and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), and promotes coordination on all levels (Mowjee et al., 2015b: 16–18, Annex 9).

Decentralization plays a role in existing multi-stakeholder coordination structures. In Jordan, there were plans to extend coordination efforts to affected urban areas in the context of RRP6 2014; and in Lebanon, field sector working groups were prepared in

the 2014 RRP6 (Bouché and Mohieddin, 2015: 89). This demonstrates that coordination structures, trying to stay close to implementation levels, are able to achieve some degree of decentralization. However, our empirical sample does not (yet) have any information on effects of these attempts.

One major hindering factor to decentralization in the Syria case (in 2015) is that international organizations active inside Syria cannot come close to the level of implementation for reasons of insecurity (compare with Chapter 4.5, geographic gap). Cross-border work from Turkey and cross-line work among opposing groups are their main options (Howe et al., 2015: 15). They have to act through local structures on the other side of the border, or frontline, with little control over the actual implementation. Remote management of this type is (in 2014) the predominant way of working for international organizations within Syria – an almost unique case, especially compared to her neighbouring countries (Howes, 2011: 6, 15).

#### **4.4.5 Interdisciplinary staffing and training**

##### **Recommendations from the conceptual literature**

Staffs with skill sets that cater for both humanitarian and development issues are valuable assets, as claimed by a number of conceptual studies (e.g. Beck, 2006: 29; Hinds, 2015: 9; Levine and Mosel, 2014a: 11–22; Steets, 2011: 46–48; Stepputat and Greenwood, 2013: 48; USAID, 2012: 6). Organizations and ministries involved in international assistance should ensure that their workforce have broad analytical skills, that they are acquainted with various working principles and frameworks, and are knowledgeable of management tools suitable to humanitarian and development settings. This is especially vital for dually mandated institutions, which also internally are confronted with other forms of assistance (Levine and Mosel, 2014a: 22). Hiring complementary staff and giving personnel relevant training opportunities, secondments across departments, etc., is of utmost importance.

Not all actors agree on the exact procedure required to close gaps. Most commentators acknowledge, though, that both

humanitarian and development skills should be represented in their own organization. USAID intends to keep humanitarian and development assistance as separate entities, and improve relationships between experts on both sides (USAID, 2012: 6). Other studies suggest that interdisciplinary teams, or individuals with mixed skill sets, should be deployed from the very beginning of a crisis (Below and Belzile, 2013: 18; EC, 2001: 3 ff. Mowjee et al., 2015a: 11 ff. UNDP, 2008: 25–26).

### **Findings from the empirical literature**

Our empirical sample contains some information on comprehensive skill sets in institutions. Increased focus on resilience in Sida's development interventions has resulted in staff taking care of both humanitarian and development issues and looking out for synergies (Mowjee et al., 2015b: 5). An evaluation of the UNFPA programme in Turkey finds another positive example. UNFPA had taken on an additional humanitarian programme next to their regular development work due to the Syria crisis. They began to provide humanitarian assistance based on their long-term programme expertise on gender-based violence prevention, mother and child health, and sexual and reproductive health. Its regular service was simply extended to arriving Syrian refugees (Daoudi et al., 2014: xii). UNFPA had staff available for highly relevant assistance in both settings.

No information is available on hindering factors to interdisciplinary staffing, but authors offer insights into more general staffing issues that might affect interdisciplinary options. High staff turnover is one tangible problem. It prevents meaningful connection between international staff and local and national organizations/authorities from taking root, and affects long-term relationships (Cullbertson et al., 2015: 94; Sediakina-Rivière and Diaz-Varela, 2016: 14). Staffs being overstretched when the magnitude of a crisis turns out to be greater than expected is another risk. This is documented among Norway's embassy staff in Syria's neighbouring countries. The crisis was handled by employees with primarily diplomatic and political skill sets, rather than technical humanitarian skills, which contributed to overstretching due to a lack of expertise (Betts et al., 2016: 6).

The literature remains silent regarding staff training provided by organizations, and says nothing about incentives to foster interdisciplinary skill sets. Since private sectors are increasingly engaged in the crisis, it is also important to include people who know how to communicate smoothly with this sector and with local civil society organizations (Ciacci, 2014: 42; Zyck and Armstrong, 2014: 22). The latter are potential long-time national partners.

*Overall, a mixed picture of institutional linkages in the Syrian context emerges from the empirical literature. Positive cases can be found on various levels. Sida and other individual organizations are linking their humanitarian and development wings, humanitarian actors with keen sensitive ears to long-term perspectives, and local organizations. Negative cases are at hand where institutional linkages are impeded by institutional path dependencies (e.g. certain bureaucratic procedures). Different working cultures create obstacles, as does competition among departments and offices, stereotypes and mistrust among actors from different backgrounds.*

## 4.5 Geographic gap

Some reviewed conceptual studies refer to one further aspect of the main divide, namely the geographic gap. Here is a definition:

*A geographic gap is present if humanitarian and development programmes or projects are not conducted in the same region and are not sufficiently linked with each other.*

### **Recommendations from the conceptual literature**

Hinds (2015: 6) draws attention to a quite common “geographical spread of targeted sites” in protracted crises, which poses serious challenges. Humanitarian and development programmes and projects are frequently carried out in different geographical areas. They target different groups with various approaches. One reason for this spread is that countries facing protracted crises and fragility may not be regular partners for bilateral development cooperation (Otto and Weingärtner, 2013: 37).

It is, moreover, difficult to mobilize resources for longer-term programmes and projects due to the “immense number of areas

affected by a crisis” – what first and foremost calls for humanitarian assistance (Hinds, 2015: 6). Our conceptual studies suggest that donors and implementers should conduct all forms of assistance in geographical proximity. Assistance should reach the same target groups as long as the context permits.

Otto and Weingärtner (2013: 57) are on the same track: “Geographic proximity and the possibility to meet in person” support “exchanges and collaboration between development and humanitarian aid actors.”

### **Findings from the empirical literature**

Limited geographic overlaps of humanitarian and development interventions are a real matter of concern in the Syrian context, as stated by empirical studies.

Unequal access to IDPs and host communities inside Syrian national territory is the most prominent case. There are hardly any development actors on Syrian territory, since donor countries have suspended their bilateral development cooperation with the regime, and because of security concerns. Humanitarian actors, though, are still working there – with limited access due to (temporarily relaxed) restrictions imposed by the Syrian government and by armed opposition groups (Benoit et al., 2015: v; Bouché and Mohieddin, 2015: 19).

This points at the general problem of limited geographic overlap of humanitarian and development responses due to security aspects. It more often than not entails that only one actor (either development or humanitarian) is present in the same area.

Letting in humanitarian actors is indispensable when development assistance is ruled out for security reasons. Humanitarian actors may “substitute” development actors by paving the way for longer-term perspectives. However, the empirical sample studies are not pointing out which humanitarian actors are supposed to do this. Potentially UNHCR and double mandated implementing agencies which have skills in both, humanitarian assistance and development cooperation are good candidates (see section 4.3.3.).

Another geographic gap is described in an evaluative report on Sida's Humanitarian Assistance. The physical distance between humanitarian and development offices are impeding joint planning in the Syria crisis. Weak coordination among actors in Turkey and Lebanon was caused by representatives sitting in different locations and having no regular meetings (Mowjee et al., 2015b: 17–18).

One fifth of the studies discuss factors hindering geographic proximity, and provide recommendations on how to solve problems. The overall view is confirmed: geographical considerations must be taken seriously in discussions on how to link humanitarian-development responses.

The spatial mobility of refugees – they are often on the move within host countries – is one pressing factor. Mechanisms that make it easier to track displacements of refugees are available to a limited extent (Bouché and Mohieddin, 2015: 42). It is often difficult to reach vulnerable people continuously with humanitarian aid and development assistance.

Another stumbling block is the inadequate level of funding for development work (see Section 4.2.1). Humanitarian aid and development assistance can often not be conducted in the same region, addressing the same vulnerable groups, simply due to lack of funding (cf. Hidalgo et al., 2015: 8).<sup>61</sup>

Humanitarian actors are restricting their technical and financial commitments to the most crisis-stricken areas, according to Oxfam's study on Partnership with Local Authorities in Lebanon (Ciacci, 2014: 33). Moreover, they focus on urban environments that provide "a greater depth and breadth of local actors with whom humanitarians might develop partnerships" (IRC, 2016: 21). This can lead to unfortunate situations, where development actors in rural and less stricken areas are unable to build upon humanitarian support to vulnerable groups in the vicinity.

Oxfam draws attention to another problem: "Huge amounts of emergency funds arrive and many international NGOs start working

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<sup>61</sup> This is an issue mainly in middle-income countries receiving lower proportions of Official Development Assistance (ODA) than developing countries, or none at all.

in the country. Sometimes local partners ‘get carried away’ by drivers of action established by donors, in spite of local development needs” (Ciacci, 2014: 33). In such cases, there are no local actors around anymore, through which development programmes can be implemented and vulnerable groups can be targeted.

An evaluation of UNICEF’s Emergency Education Response for Syrian Refugee Children and Host Communities in Jordan is critical to disproportionate targeting of refugees in camps and host communities. There is evidence of lower attendance at non-formal education in host communities than in camps – donors and implementing partners are actually paying more attention to camps (Cullbertson et al., 2015). There is a risk that development assistance continues to support better-educated refugees in camps, while out-of-camp refugees receive neither humanitarian aid nor development assistance.

Bearing these obstacles in mind, some studies come up with concrete recommendations on how to avoid a geographic gap. Stakeholders “should recognise that criteria can inform decision-making on where to provide support”, as emphasized by Bailey and Barbelet (2014: 26). Furthermore, they should list all criteria (such as poverty indicators and concentration of refugees), and build a platform for broad geographical targeting. One report describes the “conduct of local participatory and multi-sectorial needs assessments countrywide, as critical for a better prioritization of resilience programming efforts both geographically and sectorially” (Bouché and Mohieddin, 2015: 13).

*Overall, the empirical studies are unable to find positive examples of successful geographic linkages between humanitarian and development response to the Syria crisis. Conceptual studies, though, are advising actors to conduct all forms of assistance in geographical proximity. Limited geographical overlap is a real matter of concern in the Syrian context.*

## 4.6 Ownership gap

One suggestion in the conceptual literature is to involve stakeholders from micro, intermediate and macro levels of a crisis-affected country in order to generate constructive long-term effects of international humanitarian assistance (Anderson et al., 2012: 67; CHS Alliance, 2015: 12; van Cooten et al., 2014: 15 f.; Stoddard et al., 2015: 109). We define this as an ownership issue. It moves the focus away from a supply-driven perspective (linkage between international humanitarian and development aid providers) and towards a more outcome-oriented approach (how to reach longer-term targets through short-term interventions). Ownership contributes to bridging the humanitarian-development divide by linking international humanitarian stakeholders with national and local counterparts in an affected country. Hence our definition:

*An ownership gap occurs when national and local stakeholders are not sufficiently involved in international humanitarian responses. This concerns multiple levels such as planning and implementation of international interventions. It implies the need for an outcome-oriented approach that builds on and strengthens existing national and local capacities.*

We summarise what the conceptual and empirical literature has to say in two recommendations: ‘Working with national and local stakeholders’ and ‘Building the capacity of national and local stakeholders’.

### 4.6.1 Working with national and local stakeholders

#### **Recommendations from the conceptual literature**

New options for international humanitarian and development interventions are frequently mentioned in the conceptual literature (Buchanan-Smith and Maxwell, 1996: 8 ff. van Cooten et al., 2014: 15–16; Stoddard et al., 2015: 109; e.g. UNDP, 2008: 5 ff.). Activities can expand significantly in reach and sustainability where collaboration is already ongoing with national and local actors: civil society organizations, the private sector, and government structures.



Increased sustainability of humanitarian assistance is signalling longer-term effects, which also happens to be the aim of development cooperation

In addition to increasing the sustainability of humanitarian interventions, working with national and local stakeholders can enhance the capacity of local actors. Working with local and national stakeholders, rather than around them, allows them to increase their response capacity through experiential knowledge and thus creates a precondition to adequately respond to future emergencies. The conceptual sample states that even in the absence of functioning governments, international non-governmental organisations have in the past often worked with local actors, which propelled these stakeholders to levels exceeding their pre-emergency capacity (Buchanan-Smith and Maxwell, 1996: 6). Furthermore, cooperation with national and local stakeholders is sometimes possible despite conflict or other challenges (Mosel and Levine, 2014: 12–15).

International representatives of the development sector acting through, for instance, local government officials or civil society organizations, is a common phenomenon. Humanitarian sector cooperation of this kind is often limited, though. Differing principles among humanitarian and development actors is one explanation. Some states are, furthermore, unable or unwilling to provide services and protection to its citizens, sometimes due to structural weaknesses, sometimes due to partiality. This often has severe negative consequences for programmes in terms of ownership, sustainability of interventions and accountability to beneficiaries.

### **Findings from the empirical literature**

Many empirical documents provide examples of international actors collaborating with national or local stakeholders. On the international side, we find donor organizations, UN organizations, international non-governmental organizations and diaspora organizations. On the national and local side, there are community-based organizations, local non-governmental organizations, national and local private sectors, and national and local authorities. During the Syria crisis, partnerships are ranging from temporary

cooperation such as short-term contracting for specific tasks, to full collaboration. International stakeholders have a more limited role in cases of full collaboration. They function as funding agencies, while programme design and implementation is primarily in the hands of national and local stakeholders (Howe et al., 2015: 25).

The empirical literature provides positive examples mostly. Collaboration with national and local partners, without building parallel structures, is strongly recommended by UNDP and other actors (Bailey and Barbelet, 2014: 7). UNHCR in Jordan has stated that its main objective is “to support the government” (Hidalgo et al., 2015: 26), not to work without it. Furthermore, organizations such as the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) in Syria have chosen to effectively build on national and local ownership supplied by the local Red Crescent organization (Lawry-White and Schloffer, 2014: 5). An overall consensus seems to be in place: cooperation with local and national NGOs does create positive effects for both parties.

However, it raises a general question concerning the efficiency of the conventionally used cumbersome delivery model as a whole, where funds go from a donor organisation to a UN organisation to an INGO to national and local organisations and only eventually reach the end-beneficiaries (Darcy, 2016: 45).

Working with national and local stakeholders is not always the common *modus operandi*, though. Norad’s funding decisions rely on a trust-based model, where funds are disbursed relatively rapidly and pragmatically to trusted organizations. Local or national structures clearly do not fulfil the criteria for receiving funds directly. Hence implementation through local and national stakeholders (funding directly to local and national stakeholders) is not promoted particularly by Norad (Betts et al., 2016: 32).

Some factors are keeping international stakeholders away from national and local actors, for instance when governments prevent or restrict their access to local partners (Darcy, 2016: 17). Bureaucratic, time-consuming administrative procedures and domestic policies often result in international actors trying to work their way around locals, rather than with them. That was the case in 2013 in parts of Lebanon (OCHA and REACH, 2014: p. 19, 24). Other barriers are

easier to cope with; such as local organizations being neglected in local coordination meetings (Boustani et al., 2016: 23); local organizations lacking capacity to fulfil international administrative requirements (Darcy, 2016: 29; Mercy Corps et al., 2016: 22–28; OCHA and REACH, 2014: 12); and UN agencies that are unable formally to work with local unregistered community-based organizations (OCHA and REACH, 2014: 43).

National and local authorities and international stakeholders with differing objectives can also complicate things. In many cases local authorities have a long-term vision for development in their constituencies, while donor agendas sometimes prioritize short-term relief measures and address immediate needs, rather than longer-term visions, in critical situations (OCHA and REACH, 2014: 29).

Lack of access to affected people is, in the eyes of many international actors, a good reason to start cooperation with local partners who possess vital social contacts. When access becomes more difficult, it is normally better to include current local structures than to implement new alternatives. Capacity-building aspects of working relationships are often neglected (Crawford, 2015: 15; DEMAC, 2016: 39).

Our empirical sample emphasizes positive effects of close relationships on the whole. Local private sectors working with UN organizations gain significant economic benefits and create new local jobs, which helps to mitigate community tensions, as stated by a report on WFP's regional response to the Syrian crisis (Drummond et al., 2015: 19). International stakeholders collect contextual knowledge about local realities, and gain access to useful local networks for providing services to affected groups (Howe et al., 2015: 22). The Turkish example, finally, shows that including local organizations in the work of international stakeholders is, at times, a precondition for even starting operations on the ground (Darcy, 2016: 50).

Negative effects for local organizations teaming up with international stakeholders were reported in cases where local capacity was overstretched because of too many international

partners being around. This resulted in extensive and time consuming organizational rightsizing, staff burnout and other problems related to immense workloads (Howe et al., 2015: 30).

## **4.6.2 National and local capacity development**

### **Recommendations from the conceptual literature**

International humanitarian stakeholders should build and develop the capacity of national and local stakeholders within host countries, and strengthen abilities regarding planning, administration, response and preparedness. When a country is faced with situations requiring humanitarian assistance, national and local stakeholders are most often the first ones to react. But locals are also frequently incapable of matching the scale of the crisis. The conclusion is drawn in the conceptual literature (e.g. Beck, 2006: 28–30; van Cooten et al., 2014: 10; Koddenbrock and Büttner, 2009: 29). International humanitarian stakeholders should design programmes that enable national and local actors to deal with current and future crises. Building capacity can be seen as an investment, a means to achieve long-term impact within a host country (Otto and Weingärtner, 2013: 62ff.).

Examples of successful capacity building/development interventions come from the humanitarian as well as the development sector. When humanitarian interventions have a strong capacity-building component, such as the training of local nurses in emergency response, they are likely to enhance human capital as the increased knowledge of the nurses renders them more capable to respond to future crises (Koddenbrock and Büttner, 2009: 118). However, in a humanitarian context these activities often stop at the level of individual capacity building in the sense of enabling individuals to perform certain tasks needed. On the other hand, modern development projects and programmes on the other hand, try regularly to embed their capacity-development in systems guaranteeing a longer-term transformation of individuals and tapping on locally existing knowledge. Development cooperation is – due to its guiding principles – generally more focused on sustainability and participation, and is also better at facing impacts

of future crises.<sup>62</sup> Investments in civil protection and social cohesion measures of local organizations in non-crisis settings, for example, will probably reduce vulnerability among locals (Schweizerisches Rotes Kreuz, 2010: 5 ff.). Koddenbruck and Büttner (2009: 143) conclude that capacity development will yield the most valuable results in terms of linking and long-term development. Utilizing local capacity is also considered a sustainable investment into a country's future.

India and Botswana have dealt with large-scale emergencies without calling for external assistance, an indication of sufficient state capacities. They might serve as role models. Reaching India's and Botswana's level of self-reliance could be a concrete aim of international assistance (Buchanan-Smith and Maxwell, 1996: 11–14).

### **Findings from the empirical literature**

Capacity building/development among national and local stakeholders, mainly conducted by international actors, is common practice in the Syria crisis. The former are recipients and the international actors are providers. In this linear conception, a variety of stakeholders from different backgrounds are assigned specific roles. Among the recipients we find quite a few national and local actors: governments and their entities, from local to national level, civil society organizations and local non-governmental organizations. On the providers' side are international stakeholders: donor organizations, UN entities, diaspora organizations and international non-governmental actors.

The sectorial diversity matches the variety of stakeholders. In Jordan, for example, UNESCO is engaged in capacity development mainly due to its mandate in the education sector. UNESCO is partnering with the Queen Rania Teacher Academy (QRTA), and tries to develop the capacity of the Jordanian Ministry of Education to deal with educational needs among Syrian refugees (Sediakina-

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<sup>62</sup> Compare with

[http://www.undp.org/content/dam/aplaws/publication/en/publications/capacity-development/capacity-development-a-undp-primer/CDG\\_PrimerReport\\_final\\_web.pdf](http://www.undp.org/content/dam/aplaws/publication/en/publications/capacity-development/capacity-development-a-undp-primer/CDG_PrimerReport_final_web.pdf) (latest access 14.08.2017).

Rivière and Diaz-Varela, 2016: 9–10). The Water, Sanitation and Hygiene sector in Jordan is another case. UNICEF wants to develop the government's capacity regarding sanitation and hygiene in schools and gender-appropriate facilities, and in infrastructure (Cullbertson et al., 2015: 14, 70–77). International stakeholders tend to invest in national and local capacities in sectors where they have direct mandates. Usually, they abstain from investing in new perspectives and fields of work for local organizations.

The overall abilities of nation states to deal with forced migration are stretched beyond reasonable limits right now, beyond mandates of involved organizations and beyond what can be done in a short time span. In Lebanon (2014) the immense scale of needs became visible in some northern municipalities, which were mostly inexperienced, underfinanced and often lacked the organisational or human capacity to deal with the effects of the crisis (SDC, 2014: 19). The 2016 report on UNESCO's education response to the Syrian crisis emphasizes that national governments in Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq are concerned about the capacity of their basic social services to handle an enduring crisis of this magnitude; they ask for longer-term assistance from international actors (Sediakina-Rivière and Diaz-Varela, 2016: 6).

Other than this overall barrier (high magnitude and protracted nature of crisis) to long term capacity development, the empirical sample also provides some examples on specific hindering factors that prevent capacity development measures from being implemented or successful. First, they mention the high work load and the high stress environment in which local organisations had to develop organisational capacity trying to adjust their capacity to the growing needs (Howe et al., 2015: 32). The second hindering factor for capacity development initiatives are domestic politics, as the example of decentralisation in Jordan demonstrates. Efforts by USAID, the EU and the World Bank Group to strengthen local government structures in Jordan were impeded by old-fashioned centralized structures of government and political culture (Bellamy et al., 2017: 59). Finally, national and local stakeholders often have no say when decisions are taken. Since international stakeholders predominantly act as providers, they tend to build those capacities of national and local stakeholders that seem immediately useful to

foreign eyes. They try to make partners ready for an organizational and administrative level that allows for fruitful cooperation (Bouché and Mohieddin, 2015: 13, 94–97; DEMAC, 2016: 19; Howe et al., 2015: 33). They build capacity merely – they don’t develop capacity.

Some factors are actually facilitating capacity building. A document on education in Jordan emphasizes the need for consistent funding. Donors who have realized that investments in capacity development can reduce reoccurring costs – thanks to increased national and local capacity – are generally more open to consistent funding (Cullbertson et al., 2015: 64). In addition, capacity developers should not only address humanitarian issues and immediate needs; they should also focus on topics that could be relevant to long-term development (Ciacci, 2014: 43; Mercy Corps et al., 2016: 29).

Another important factor is human resources. A competent member of an organization in charge of capacity development among local authorities is also seen as a conducive factor (Howe et al., 2015: 33), while fluctuating staff can undermine efforts. An advantage lasts only if this valuable co-worker is staying long enough to build the needed working relationship and trust in relation to local authorities, as demonstrated in a report on the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies’ response to the Syria crisis (Lawry-White and Schloffer, 2014: 9–10).

A study on responses in Lebanon to the crisis, conducted by the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC, 2014), pushes host governments into the limelight. Host governments should be the first providers of capacity development to a country’s population, and they have to disburse earmarked funds accordingly. A report on social cohesion and resilience among Jordanian host communities points in the same direction. Confidence and trust will grow among locals when a municipality demonstrates its ability to develop citizens’ capacities (REACH Initiative, 2014: 28).

Only a few documents pay attention to effects on national and local stakeholders. The sustainability of diaspora organizations’ interventions was improved when new skills and know-how were transferred to locals (DEMAC, 2016: 19). A 2016 report on

UNESCO's investments in education during the Syria crisis views UNESCO as an effective builder of bridges across the humanitarian-development divide. UNESCO knows how to manage both development objectives and short-term humanitarian needs (Sediakina-Rivière and Diaz-Varela, 2016: 6).

*Overall, the empirical sample presents a mixed picture with regard to closing the ownership gap. On the one hand, challenges to ownership continue to exist, especially in building and developing capacities of national and local stakeholders. This is often a top-down process, where national and local actors have little influence on what capacity to build. On the other hand, international actors who collaborate with national and local stakeholders, and build their capacity, are becoming the common modus operandi in Syria's neighbourhood. The effects are mostly positive: improved assistance to vulnerable people in "no access" areas, augmented capacity of local authorities, and economic benefits to local private sectors.*

## **4.7 Sequence gap**

The sequence gap is another sub-gap of the humanitarian-development gap. Based on arguments and findings presented in the studies, we define this gap as follows:

*A sequence gap exists when relief, rehabilitation and development activities are not combined in an appropriate time frame. Sequencing is essential in chronological planning of activities. When phases and transitions are adequately designed, aid intervention remains free from delays or negative path dependencies that puts target groups at a disadvantage. Sequencing facilitates handovers and exit actions, it promotes collaboration de facto between all actors and creates continuity. Adequate sequencing is necessary to create transitions in both directions: from relief to development and from development to relief.*

### **Recommendations from the conceptual literature**

Many studies consider inadequate sequencing (including timing) a significant obstacle to linking humanitarian assistance and development cooperation (see e.g. Beck, 2006: 31; Schweizerisches Rotes Kreuz, 2010: 8 f. White and Cliffe, 2000: 336 f.). A "timing challenge" arises if "transition from relief to rehabilitation comes too early or too late (...)" – a consequence of a poorly designed



approach to coordinated and integrated responses (Otto and Weingärtner, 2013: 34). Poor sequencing might create twisted incentives. Relief measures that are kept going for too long might generate dependencies among vulnerable groups.<sup>63</sup> Adequate sequencing helps actors to avoid delays and harm caused by phases lasting indefinitely, for too long, or ending too soon. Thus, one of the main credos in the linkage-debate is to make relief phases as short-lived as possible (cf. Schweizerisches Rotes Kreuz, 2010: 8 f.). USAID is deploying integrated teams of humanitarian and development experts to avoid a sequencing gap. The teams are responsible for mutually informed project designs and procurements that enable sequencing of humanitarian and development assistance (USAID, 2012: 6).

Improved (ideally joint) planning is recommended by almost all studies focusing on this sub-gap. Long-term planning should ensure adequate phasing during all forms of intervention and programmes. Arrangements for exit and takeover strategies make it easier to collaborate, and create space for interconnectivity and long-term effects (cf. Beck, 2006: 31; Commission of the European Communities, 2001: 16; Schweizerisches Rotes Kreuz, 2010: 9).

### **Findings from the empirical literature**

Findings in the empirical sample can be summarized in three statements. First, a decline in programme funding makes it imperative to achieve transition into handovers. Second, the need to plan transition and sequences in programme design is still a challenge. International stakeholders generally agree, though, that planning is very important. Third, finding the appropriate timing is a demanding task for actors all the way from local to international levels.

A few studies note that declining programme funding can accelerate the need to plan sequences and transitions. An evaluation of UNICEF's Education Emergency Response in Jordan is making this point explicitly. UNICEF's current service delivery in the

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<sup>63</sup> An unconditional cash transfer programme that lasts for too long might, for example, contribute to a growing dependency-syndrome among people affected by a crisis.

Jordanian education sector must be reduced due to less generous funding, the report states, and handed over to the national government and to Jordanian civil society (Cullbertson et al., 2015: 14). Dwindling funds will, no doubt, influence how programmes are carried out. Sometimes, reductions will have drastic consequences for beneficiaries if not planned for, as emphasized in an evaluation of the WFP's Regional Response to the Syrian Crisis (Drummond et al., 2015: 20). The WFP had to cut down its food assistance, a fact that the organization had failed to communicate clearly beforehand despite warnings coming from donors.<sup>64</sup>

Most studies in our sample hint that the need to plan for transition is considered necessary by international actors involved in the Syria crisis response. The education sector in Jordan (2015) is working on a new delivery model for the education of Syrian refugees, which will eventually assign more responsibility to the Jordanian Ministry of Education (Cullbertson et al., 2015: 15). The mentioned evaluation of WFP's regional response (2011–2014) recommends the WFP to develop scenario-based, long-term transition plans that cover country-by-country exit strategies (Drummond et al., 2015: xiv).

Another challenge is the transition from existing development programmes to humanitarian assistance, due to acute, escalating needs during the Syria crisis. In Lebanon, certain funds for development projects were relocated to emergency response, which caused discontent among the original beneficiaries, Lebanese host communities and local authorities (Boustani et al., 2016: 37). This shifting attention away from local development needs towards humanitarian needs, is also highlighted by Ciacchi (2014: 33) in a report on partnerships with local authorities. Local actors received funds earmarked for humanitarian assistance, and often got so “carried away” by this funds that they neglected their initial development-oriented mandate.

Switching from development programming to humanitarian assistance programming is not altogether easy. It is important, for

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<sup>64</sup> Declining funds and their impact on programme duration, and the need to plan in advance in protracted refugee situations, is also highlighted in the report on UNHCR's mental health and psychosocial support (Meyer, 2013: 67).

instance, to plan for a continuation of current development programmes in order to avoid conflicts between hosts and refugees, and to avoid losing track of an initial mandate.

Some evaluations give hints on why a sequence gap seems to prevail in the Syria crisis response. Insufficient planning (contingency, exit and handover) and shortages of programme funding are two apparent obstacles. The timeliness of Jordanian education and health interventions was blocked by external, lengthy approval processes, as noticed in one evaluation (Darcy 2016: 32). So organizations are often unable to implement a required switch on time, and unable to decide on timing issues. They have to rely on governmental approval.

Timing was an issue also for UNESCO, which had implemented development-orientated programmes in Jordan already before the crisis, and then added humanitarian assistance as the crisis accelerated. A report describes how awkward it was to determine until what moment UNESCO should remain engaged in humanitarian work, before refocusing on education and other parts of its core, more development-orientated mandates (Sediakina-Rivière and Diaz-Varela, 2016: 15).

*Overall, the empirical studies on the Syria crisis response do not provide any evidence of progress in closing the sequence gap, as recommended by the conceptual studies. Many implementers are well aware of the need to adequately plan transition and sequences in programme designs. But appropriate timing continues to be a real challenge (e.g. due to re-allocations of funds or lengthy approval processes).*

## 5. Conclusions

The Syrian crisis and other protracted forced migration crises have pushed the debate on linking humanitarian assistance and development cooperation into the political limelight. There is a widespread conviction among policy makers that such crises can only be tackled if both forms of assistance are more closely interconnected. But exactly how should this be done in practice? So

far, we have only met vague answers. The debate started in the 1990s, at the latest, so today's missing conceptual clarity is a bit striking.

The call for intensified bridge building is directed towards humanitarian assistance first of all. Development cooperation has engaged in several protracted crises, and is less exposed to demands of this kind.

An analytical framework has been developed based on conceptual literature on the humanitarian-development nexus. Most reviewed studies view this main gap as a multi-dimensional problem and a challenge at different levels (a strategic one or an implementation level). The divide can be structured around seven sub-gaps: (1) a vision and strategy gap, (2) a planning gap, (3) a funding gap, (4) an institutional gap, (5) an ownership gap, (6) a geographic gap, and (7) a sequence gap.

Moreover, we have filtered out corresponding conceptual claims from the literature and rephrased them into nineteen recommendations on how to close sub-gaps.

Our analytical approach makes room for a structured perspective on individual forced migration crises. To begin with, we mapped the Syria crisis against our framework. This mapping reveals a number of findings:

- Demands to link humanitarian assistance with development cooperation effectively have gained traction recently. High-level conferences such as the first World Humanitarian 2016 and periodic donor conferences on Syria have placed the nexus in a prominent position on the policy agenda. At the same time, the 3RP and other regional strategies are trying to translate the postulated linkage into practical reality in the region.
- The Syria crisis has witnessed some progress in strategy building and planning, but challenges remain regarding the implementation of strategies (Chapter 5.1). Justice must be accorded to both emergency responses and long-term development. Innovative stakeholders are trying to close the funding gap. But resource allocation is still devoted largely to short-term relief, and is insufficient to match up to the

magnitude of crisis. The institutional gap is bridged in a number of organizations, which have managed to bring together their humanitarian and development wings. Different working cultures and mistrust among actors from various backgrounds are making it harder, though, to succeed. As to the ownership gap, international actors are cooperating more frequently with national and local stakeholders. But this is often a top-down process where locals have very little influence. Finally, neither the sequence nor the geography gap displays any positive results from linkage efforts, and the literature pinpoints significant challenges at the implementation level above all.

- There is a disconnect between conceptual and empirical literature (Chapter 5.2). Tacit reference is made to individual sub-gaps, but a deeper engagement is missing regarding questions set free by the analytical framework. We are mainly informed about activities and outputs related to efforts to bring together the humanitarian and the development sector, but we don't learn much about practical solutions – about experiential knowledge of stakeholders or outcomes for end beneficiaries.
- We identify a way forward that makes it easier for practitioners and researchers to link the two forms of assistance more effectively (Chapter 5.3). A consistent logic – a Theory of Change – of the linkage must be formulated, based on our analytical framework. The theory should reflect empirical findings systematically, feed them into the theoretical discourse and refine conceptual knowledge a step further. Ultimately, discussions among researchers and practitioners will be merged, and an urgently needed conceptual consistency will be reached.

## **5.1 Conceptual conclusions on the humanitarian-development linkage in the Syria crisis context**

Our conceptual analysis has made it easier to put some systematic structure on the linkage debate regarding what needs to be done. However, most studies have a vague character, at least partially, and

they fail to clarify the exact implications of key concepts related to the humanitarian-development gap.

They fail for two main reasons. First, the literature-based recommendations have a broad, rather sweeping character. They don't contain much practical information on what should be done to bridge a certain sub-gap. This reflects a shortage of conceptual depth. Secondly, the literature often uses jargon that lacks precision. The term "common goals" is one telling example. Should "common goals" merely form a common sub-set of two larger humanitarian and development goals? Or are they the exclusive goals of all humanitarian-development activities?

Nevertheless, the analytical framework is a necessary first step towards more clarity for future research. The only way to achieve coherence goes through a mapping of individual forced migration crises against the conceptual debate.

Progress has been made lately in linking humanitarian assistance and development cooperation in countries bordering to Syria. This is one distinct finding from the literature, and it should be compared to the mainly humanitarian-driven response at the beginning of the forced migration crisis.

This mostly positive discovery can be portrayed along sub-gaps: Shifts in strategies and planning have taken place in the Syria crisis in an attempt to do justice to both worlds, to emergency responses and long-term development. Resilience, epitomized by the 3RPs and the new compact agreements, serves as a common denominator today. The necessity of giving host countries a prominent role when dealing with the refugee crisis pays tribute to a strong national ownership component, which in turn is seen as a prerequisite for long-term development. The literature also discovers progress with respect to a more comprehensive planning that takes into account various sectors and beneficiaries – all in order to bring together and harmonize a host of perspectives, values, and work procedures.<sup>65</sup>

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<sup>65</sup> Our content analysis revealed that the total number of codings (text passages) indicating positive evidence on linkages is at its highest with regard to the vision and strategy gap (1), followed by the planning gap (2), the ownership gap (3), the institutional gap (4), and the funding gap (5). In contrast, we have found hardly

The instalment of joint sector working groups in Jordan is part of the picture.

An ambivalent picture emerges of the funding gap. Innovative funding modalities are becoming more frequent, allowing for joint humanitarian-development financing and flexible funding. They also enable actors to react quickly to unforeseen circumstances. However, this positive trend is at stake. Dramatic funding shortfalls in recent years, and a continuous emphasis on funding humanitarian assistance rather than development-oriented programmes, are causing many problems.<sup>66</sup>

Syria and other humanitarian crises put severe burdens on the financial capacities of all actors. The overall scarcity of funds forces the international community to make tough priorities every now and then, and it usually ends up in favour of emergency measures.

Resilience is focused on closing gaps by taking into account short-term and long-term objectives. But what happens when sufficient funds for long-term development are not available? Some may question the worth of it all.

Empirical studies offer several constructive examples of institutional linkages in the Syrian context. Progress appears on different levels: starting with Sida and other individual organizations linking their humanitarian and development wings, and on to humanitarian actors with sensitive ears to long-term perspectives, and local organizations.

There are also obstacles: institutional path dependencies (e.g. certain bureaucratic procedures), different working cultures, competition among departments and offices, stereotypes and mistrust among actors from different backgrounds.

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any positive evidence on linkages related to the sequence gap, and no positive evidence at all related to the geographic gap. A high figure does not necessarily reflect a diversity of empirical findings. It is equally possible that different studies refer to the same aspect more often. However, the fact that different studies pay attention to this aspect indicates, at least potentially, its importance.

<sup>66</sup> This comes with a peculiarity – donors are reluctant to finance anything beyond immediate help inside government-controlled areas in Syria.

Despite challenges to ownership, the empirical findings show that international actors collaborating with, and building the capacity of, national and local stakeholders is the customary *modus operandi* today in Syria's neighbouring countries. This has mostly positive effects such as an increase of assistance to vulnerable people in "no access" areas, augmented capacity of local authorities, and economic benefits for the local private sector.

However, building capacity among national and local stakeholders is often a top-down process, where national and local actors have little influence on what should be done. In addition, cooperation with national and local actors is still born of necessity (access to beneficiaries) rather than from a desire to strengthen implementing local structures long-term.

We have found hardly any positive evidence on linkages related to the sequence gap, and no positive evidence related to the geographic gap. This is a telling absence in our empirical sample; it indicates that implementers are facing serious challenges.

Table 4 summarizes our main empirical findings on the Syria crisis response. It contrasts achievements in linking humanitarian and development responses to challenges that continue to exist.



**Table 4: Achievements and challenges in linking humanitarian-development responses to the Syria crisis**

<b>Sub-Gaps</b>	<b>Achievements</b>	<b>Remaining Challenges</b>
<i>Vision and Strategy</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- shift towards resilience agenda</li> <li>- joint international strategies (e.g. 3RPs) are in place that align the humanitarian-development response</li> <li>- donor countries are committed to longer-term engagement in Syria's neighbouring countries</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- resilience component of 3RPs/NRPs does not focus on refugees to the same extent as on host communities</li> <li>- unified (interdepartmental) donor country strategies are exceptions rather than the rule</li> <li>- balancing of competing working principles is still a challenge</li> </ul>
<i>Funding</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- innovative funding modalities allowing for joint humanitarian-development financing</li> <li>- flexible funding modalities to react quickly to unforeseen circumstances</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- the shift towards resilience strengthening as a common goal of the humanitarian-development response is not reflected in actual allocation patterns</li> <li>- strong emphasis on emergency assistance regarding costs of resilience programs</li> <li>- at donor country level, bureaucratic factors and short funding cycles are still hindering a more development-oriented funding</li> </ul>
<i>Planning</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- close collaboration between host countries and international organizations (IOs) in response planning</li> <li>- joint sector working groups in host countries</li> <li>- evidence of joint planning among humanitarian and development actors at donor country level</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- strict bureaucratic rules in host countries are impeding fast and flexible project approval</li> <li>- local actors are only partially involved in planning processes</li> </ul>

<b>Sub-Gaps</b>	<b>Achievements</b>	<b>Remaining Challenges</b>
<i>Institutional</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- evidence of development agencies (e.g. Sida) linking both forms of assistance internally</li> <li>- evidence of humanitarian actors working closely with civil society and the private sector to create longer-term perspectives</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- evidence of IOs separating emergency response from development response (such as UNICEF in Turkey)</li> <li>- staffs with mixed (humanitarian-development) skill sets are still in short supply among bilateral and multilateral agencies</li> <li>- high staff turnover often inhibits improved humanitarian-development linkages</li> </ul>
<i>Geographic</i>	no evidence in the sample	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- development actors have not equally good access to IDPs and host communities within the Syrian territory as humanitarian actors</li> <li>- geographical distance between humanitarian and development offices impedes joint planning</li> <li>- spatial mobility of refugees makes it difficult to reach them with both forms of assistance</li> </ul>
<i>Ownership</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- many international actors are working with national and local stakeholders and building their capacity</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- capacity building of national and local stakeholders is often a top-down process, with little influence for local actors</li> </ul>
<i>Sequence</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- many implementers are aware of the need to adequately plan transition and sequences in programme designs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- finding an appropriate timing of interventions remains a challenge for implementers (e.g. due to re-allocations of funds or lengthy approval processes)</li> </ul>

Source: Authors' own

## **5.2 On connecting empirical findings with the conceptual debate**

Our mapping of the Syria crisis reveals a gulf between conceptual and empirical literature (no evaluative study refers directly to any concept in the linkage debate). Tacit references are made to individual sub-gaps, but studies show no attempts to explore in-depth questions found in the analytical framework. We mainly learn about certain linking activities regarding the humanitarian and the development sector, and their outputs. Experiences of stakeholders and outcomes bringing advantages to end beneficiaries are seldom discussed.

This is also one reason why the conceptual intricacies of linkage are largely absent in the empirical sample. A majority of the studies mention that, for instance, “joint” planning has taken place, but they don’t explain what this planning has changed or what the alternatives could be. Is it always necessary to base “joint planning” on an identified “joint strategy”? And what if not?

Another telling example is, that we do know that working principles of humanitarian actors (such as independence) happened to be at least weakened, but the literature does not tell us what the consequences and lessons learned of this were. Hence, our conceptual distinctions (regarding, for example, the balance between logics of action) are not mirrored in the empirical sample. There is room for further empirical studies.

Some caution is warranted in order to avoid premature conclusions. This can be illustrated by two efforts, which at a first glance appear to close the ownership gap during the Syria crisis. De facto, though, many questions are left unanswered.

Humanitarian and development actors are embedded in the political contexts of neighbouring countries of Syria. A strong, capable host country government may arguably represent the development world in a certain sense. It’s able to advocate firmly (and at least partially implement) its own interests of long-term

development.<sup>67</sup> Jordan and Turkey should be viewed as relatively strong governments in the Syria case. This constitutes a major difference compared to previous crises in Haiti, Sierra Leone and Somalia, failed states where the UN and other relief organizations substituted state structures to a great extent and left wide open how to achieve long-term development.

On the surface one could argue that the ownership gap is bridged when all stakeholders (especially implementers of humanitarian assistance) pay attention to a host country's interests in a migration crisis.

But even if the general question – how to transform short-term crisis management into long-term development – may be answered as far as host populations are concerned, long-term perspectives for refugees are not automatically included. This is clearly underlined in the Syria crisis. Host governments are pushing the resilience agenda heavily towards benefits for their own citizens, while the status of refugees (temporary guests or immigrants with residence permits) remains unsettled.<sup>68</sup>

Ultimately, to avoid premature conclusions with regard to the ownership gap, the question that needs to be addressed more precisely in the “linkage-discourse” is: who represents whose interests, or who owns what?

We need more precision on what closing the ownership gap means in practice. This can also be illustrated on a micro level where implementers of humanitarian aid try to involve, for instance, local civil society organizations.

We do recognize a positive trend towards a more demand-driven, people-centred approach among humanitarian actors in the Syria

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<sup>67</sup> In accordance with the same logic, multilateral UN organizations (UNHCR first and foremost) take the lead and represent refugees as the humanitarian part of the crisis.

<sup>68</sup> One way to assign greater priority to refugees in the resilience agenda is to create incentives for host countries, as manifested in the recent compact agreements with the European Union. For example, the Jordan Compact stipulates that donor countries shall provide incentives to generate sustainable outcomes for refugees and, at the same time, offer trade concessions and non-concessional World Bank loans to the Jordanian government.

crisis, enhancing the likelihood of long-term outcomes. But we cannot validate to what extent working through local institutions is based on certain aspects: a) equal care for the needs of local populations and refugees, and b) local solutions included in national plans and strategies.

On the contrary, it seems that the well-known mechanism of large international relief organisations overwhelming local organisations with their own prescriptions on how to deal with the crisis takes place in the Syria-crisis just as it did in past humanitarian crises. The reviewed empirical literature does not provide any in-depth information on the nature of ownership, so it's quite possible that the example shows how humanitarian aid becomes adapted to protracted crisis, without using the ownership 'seed' for building long-term solutions.

Both examples point to a missing discussion on consequences of adjustments in the field and in what way they are relevant to the overall linkage discourse. Here, we can only state that the initial gap between international humanitarian and development actors in an actual protracted forced migration crisis takes different forms. Assumptions on effective linkages between humanitarian assistance and development cooperation should be tested, and evaluations focusing on outcomes is the only way to achieve results.

The discourse on building bridges is seemingly, all in all, directed towards humanitarian actors in the first place, asking them to take long-term developments into account. However, the Syria crisis shows that bilateral development cooperation is also under pressure. If development cooperation has to tackle the root causes of forced migration, as some authors claim, then cooperation is potentially caught in the middle of two competing tasks: how to support host countries and how to care for refugees. Host countries may sometimes set priorities that are opposed to those of refugees. This dilemma can cause severe stress among international development cooperation decision-makers.

### 5.3 Suggestions on a way forward

The steps outlined below are directed towards policy-makers and practitioners alike. National and international actors are invited to use them as guidance. We have not identified specific stakeholders capable of leading this process. Our literature review attempts to provide conceptual clarity. Others may analyse the political landscape.

These four steps have a preventive purpose. Stakeholders should not dwell on ‘common goals’ or other allegedly telling idioms, without coming to terms with practical progress in linking (or why linking should be avoided).

We identify certain conceptual and empirical shortcomings, and make suggestions on how to overcome them:

1. There is an obvious missing link between conceptual knowledge and empirical findings. A consistent logic of the linkage of humanitarian assistance and development cooperation must be developed. This Theory of Change should be based on further conceptual clarity – our analytical framework is only a beginning. It should also take empirical findings into account in a systematic manner. What do experiences of different stakeholders tell us on effective linkages? What are the positive or negative consequences of efforts to build bridges?
2. This case study on the Syria crisis is the best one at hand, in our opinion. But one single study on a complicated topic has some limitations. There might, for example, be a lack of external validity. In order to reach the destination – generalizable findings on the humanitarian-development linkage – the Syria crisis must be contrasted to other case studies. The fundamental character of our analytical framework makes this all the more important.
3. The reviewed empirical studies provide almost no evidence on intended (and unintended) outcomes of humanitarian-development linkage in response to the Syria crisis. Studies do not explain whether established linkages have generated positive

effects for end beneficiaries. A valid Theory of Change can only be reached through evaluations and impact assessments focused on outcomes. Empirical, forward-looking knowledge may eventually enable researchers to spell out exactly how to link with whom at various levels. It could cast new light on how to achieve effects (causal paths, mechanisms, etc.). It highlights individual sub-gaps and the art of closing them.

4. The overall debate on linking humanitarian assistance and development cooperation is fragmented and partially inconsistent. The outlined way forward must be fed into a broader discussion among researchers and practitioners who are open to new information. Ultimately, we need a more unified debate, with conceptual consistency based on empirical evidence.

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# Annexes

## Annex A: Sampled literature

**Table 5: Selected studies on the humanitarian-development nexus: conceptual sample**

Study	E	S	F	P	R
<b>LRRD</b>					
1 Buchanan/Fabbri 2005: Links between relief, rehabilitation and development in the tsunami response – a review of the debate.		x			
2 Buchanan/Maxwell 1996: Linking Relief and Development. An Introduction and Overview.		x			
3 European Commission, 2001: Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development – An assessment.	x	x	x	x	x
4 Hinds 2015: Relationship between humanitarian and development aid.		x	x	x	x
5 Koddenbrock/Büttner 2009: The Will to Bridge? European Commission and U.S. Approaches to Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development.		x	x		
6 Longhurst 1994: Conceptual Frameworks for Linking Relief and Development.					
7 Macrae et al.1997: Conflict, the continuum and chronic emergencies: a critical analysis of the scope for linking relief, rehabilitation and development planning in Sudan.	x	x	x	x	
8 Mosel/Levine 2014: Remaking the Case for Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development. How LRRD can Become a Practically Useful Concept for Assistance in Difficult Places.		x	x	x	
9 Mowjee et al. 2015a: Coherence in Conflict: Bringing Humanitarian and Development Aid Streams Together.		x	x		
10 OCHA et al. 2015: Addressing Protracted Displacement: A Framework for Development-Humanitarian Cooperation.	x				x

Notes: E=Empirical foundation; S=Synthesis study (a synthesis study can either be an overview of different strands within a concept, or empirical findings on more than one actor or country); F=Focus on fragile states; P=Focus on protracted crises; R=Focus on refugees.

(Table ctd. on next page)



Study	E	S	F	P	R
11 Otto/Weingärtner 2013: Linking Relief and Development: More than Old Solutions for Old Problems?		x	x	x	x
12 Schweizerisches Rotes Kreuz 2010: Konzept LRRD. Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development.					
13 Steets 2011: Donor Strategies for Addressing the Transition Gap and Linking Humanitarian and Development Assistance. A Contribution to the International Debate.	x		x	x	
14 White/Cliffe 2000: Matching Response to Context in Complex Political Emergencies: "Relief", "Development", "Peace-building" or Something In-Between?	x	x	x	x	x
<b>Whole of Government</b>					
15 Below/Belzile 2013: Comparing Whole of Government Approaches to Fragile States.	x	x	x		
16 OECD-DAC 2006: Whole of Government Approaches to Fragile States.		x	x		
17 Patrick/Brown 2007: Greater than the sum of its parts? Assessing "whole of government" approaches to fragile states.	x	x	x	x	
18 Steputat/Greenwood 2013: Whole-of-Government Approaches to Fragile States and Situations.	x	x	x		
<b>Connectedness</b>					
19 Beck 2006: Evaluating humanitarian action using the OECD-DAC criteria: an ALNAP guide for humanitarian agencies.	x		x	x	
<b>Early Recovery</b>					
20 UNDP 2008: UNDP Policy on Early Recovery.					x
21 Bailey et al. 2009: Early recovery: an overview of policy debates and operational challenges.	x				
22 Global Cluster for Early Recovery 2016: Guidance on Early Recovery Coordination.	x		x	x	

Notes: E=Empirical foundation; S=Synthesis study (a synthesis study can either be an overview of different strands within a concept, or empirical findings on more than one actor or country); F=Focus on fragile states; P=Focus on protracted crises; R=Focus on refugees.

(Table ctd. on next page)

Study	E	S	F	P	R
<b>Resilience</b>					
23 Bahadur et al. 2016: Resilience scan.		x	x		
24 Bailey/ Barbelet 2014: Towards a Resilience-Based Response to the Syrian Refugee Crisis. A Critical Review of Vulnerability Criteria and Frameworks.	x		x	x	x
25 Béné et al. 2012: Resilience: new utopia or new tyranny? Reflection about the potentials and limits of the concept of resilience in relation to vulnerability reduction programmes	x				x
26 de Weijer 2013: Resilience: a Trojan horse for a new way of thinking?			x		
27 Levine/Mosel 2014: Supporting resilience in difficult places. A critical look at applying the “resilience” concept in countries where crises are the norm.			x	x	
28 Taylor et al. 2015: The state of the humanitarian system.	x	x	x	x	x
29 USAID 2012: Building Resilience to Recurrent Crisis. USAID Policy and Program Guidance.	x		x	x	
30 van Cooten et al. 2014: How to Avoid Lost Generations? Resilience as a Way to Improve the Adaptive Capacity of Affected Populations.				x	x

Notes: E=Empirical foundation; S=Synthesis study (a synthesis study can either be an overview of different strands within a concept, or empirical findings on more than one actor or country); F=Focus on fragile states; P=Focus on protracted crises; R=Focus on refugees. All studies contain a detailed review of respective concept except for study 28 (Taylor et al., 2015).

**Table 6: Selected studies on the response to the Syria crisis: empirical sample**

	Study	Sp	St	F	P	I	O	Se
1	Betts. J. et al. 2016: 'Striking the Balance'. Evaluation of the Planning, Organisation and Management of Norwegian Assistance related to the Syria Regional Crisis.	x	x			x		
2	Cullbertson. S. et al. 2015: Evaluation of Emergency Education Response for Syrian Refugee Children and Host Communities in Jordan.	x	x		x	x		
3	Tillinac. A. et al. 2015: Addressing Human Trafficking and Exploitation in Times of Crisis. Evidence and Recommendations for Further Action to Protect Vulnerable and Mobile Populations.	x	x					
4	Drummond. J. et al. 2015: An Evaluation of WFP's Regional Response to the Syrian Crisis, 2011–2014.	x	x		x	x	x	x
5	Ernst. S. et al. 2014: Australia's Humanitarian Response to the Syria Crisis.	x		x				
6	Howe. K. et al. 2015: Breaking the Hourglass: Partnerships in Remote Management Settings – The Cases of Syria and Iraqi Kurdistan.	x				x	x	
7	DEMAC 2016: Diaspora Humanitarianism: Transnational Ways of Working.	x				x	x	x
8	Crawford. N. 2015: Engaging with Syrian CSOs. How Can the International Community Engage Better with Syrian Civil Society Organizations during the Civil War?	x	x	x			x	
9	Mowjee. T. et al. 2015b: Evaluation of Sida's Humanitarian Assistance.	x	x	x		x	x	
10	Ababsa et al. 2014: Gulf Donors and NGOs Assistance to Syrian Refugees in Jordan.		x					
11	Zyck. S.A. and J. Armstrong 2014: Humanitarian Crises, Emergency Preparedness and Response: The Role of Business and the Private Sector. Jordan Case Study.	x				x		

Notes: Sp=Spread; St=Strategy gap; F=Funding gap; P=Planning gap; I=Institutional gap;

O=Ownership gap; Se=Sequence gap.

(Table ctd. on next page)

	Study	Sp	St	F	P	I	O	Se
12	Daoudi et al. 2014: Independent Country Programme Evaluation – Turkey 2011–2015.	x	x		x	x	x	
13	Hidalgo. S. et al. 2015: Independent Programme Evaluation (IPE) of UNHCR's Response to the Refugee Influx in Lebanon and Jordan.	x	x		x	x		
14	OCHA and REACH 2014: Informing Targeted Host Community Programming in Lebanon. Secondary Data Review.				x			
15	Huang et al. 2017: Refugee Compacts. Addressing the Crisis of Protracted Displacement.	x	x			x		
16	SDC 2014: Refugee Compacts. Addressing the Crisis of Protracted Displacement.	x	x					
17	Boustani. M. et al. 2016: Responding to the Syrian crisis in Lebanon. Collaboration between Aid Agencies and Local Governance Structures.	x	x			x		
18	Guay. J. 2015: Social Cohesion between Syrian Refugees and Urban Host Communities in Lebanon and Jordan.	x	x			x		
19	Darcy. J. 2016: Syria Coordinated Accountability and Lesson Learning (CALL). Evaluation Synthesis and Gap Analysis. A Synthesis and Analysis of 24 Publicly Available Evaluative Studies Concerning the International Response to the Syria Crisis Commissioned by the Steering Group for Inter-agency Humanitarian Evaluations.	x	x	x	x	x		
20	Mercy Corps et al. 2016: Technology-Based Learning Assessment. Findings Report.					x	x	
21	Ciacchi. S. 2014: The Partnership with Local Authorities in Responding to Humanitarian Crisis. The Case of Lebanon. Lessons Learned and Recommendations	x		x		x	x	
22	Bailey. S. and V. Barbelet 2014: Towards a Resilience-Based Response to the Syrian Refugee Crisis. A Critical Review of Vulnerability Criteria and Framework.		x					

Notes: Sp=Spread; St=Strategy gap; F=Funding gap; P=Planning gap; I=Institutional gap; O=Ownership gap; Se=Sequence gap. (Table ctd. on next page)

	Study	Sp	St	F	P	I	O	Se
23	Bouché. N. and M. Mohieddin 2014: The Syrian Crisis. Tracking and Tackling Impacts on Sustainable Human Development in Neighboring Countries. Insights from Lebanon and Jordan.	x	x	x		x	x	x
24	REACH 2014: Understanding Social Cohesion and Resilience in Jordanian Host Communities.		x				x	
25	Sediakina-Rivière and Diaz-Varela 2016: UNESCO's Education Response to the Syria Crisis: Towards Bridging the Humanitarian-Development Divide.						x	
26	Meyer. S. 2013: UNHCR's Mental Health and Psychosocial Support for Persons of Concern.	x	x			x		x
27	Lee. B. and E. Pearce 2017: Vulnerability- and Resilience-Based Approaches in Response to the Syrian Crisis: Implications for Women, Children and Youth with Disabilities.	x	x					x
28	Bellamy. C. et al. 2017: The Lives and Livelihoods of Syrian Refugees. A Study of Refugee Perspectives and their Institutional Environment in Turkey and Jordan.	x	x		x			
29	International Rescue Committee 2016: Finding Economic Opportunity in the City. Lessons from IRC's Cash and Livelihoods Programmes in Cities within Lebanon and Jordan.	x		x			x	
30	Lawry-White. S. and M. Schloffer 2014: Real Time Evaluation. IFRC Response to the Syria Crisis 2012–2014.						x	x

Notes: Sp=Spread; St=Strategy gap; F=Funding gap; P=Planning gap; I=Institutional gap; O=Ownership gap; Se=Sequence gap.

## **Annex B: Methodology**

To answer the question how humanitarian and development responses to forced migration crises can be linked more effectively, a two-stage approach was applied. In a first step, we identified the most prominent concepts on the humanitarian-development nexus. We systematically analysed these concepts with regard to how they characterize the humanitarian-development gap from their individual perspectives, and how they recommend to bridge the gap. This part of our analysis explored the first sub-question of the review: What is needed to effectively link humanitarian and development responses to forced migration crises? Our findings were then integrated into an analytical framework (as presented in Chapter 4).

In a second step, we used this framework to analyse empirical studies on the international response to the Syria crisis through the lens of relevant concepts. This part of our analysis explored the second sub-question of the review: To what extent, and why (or why not), are effective linkages established in practice?

Subsequently, and in line with our two-stage process, we describe the conceptual approach and (later) the empirical one. We always present information on a) the sampling procedure by which we identified and selected literature, b) the characteristics of the resulting sample, and c) methodological aspects of analysis.

### ***Conceptual analysis***

#### **Sampling procedure**

In order to identify literature that potentially tells us most on what the humanitarian-development gap consists of and how to close this gap we applied a specific sampling procedure (see also Figure 3):

In a first step, we identified the most prominent concepts on the humanitarian-development nexus by assuming that they will provide us with the most relevant information for answering these questions. Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LLRD) is by far the most prominent concept in terms of available literature

on the topic. However, studies on LRRD also refer to other concepts related to the nexus (e.g. Mosel and Levine, 2014; Otto and Weingärtner, 2013; Steets, 2011). Most frequently mentioned are: Early Recovery, Resilience, Connectedness and Whole of Government. Analyses of different concepts give us an opportunity to capture different analytical approaches to the humanitarian-development gap and potentially different suggestions on how to bridge this gap. Consequently, we decided to review studies from all of these five concepts.<sup>69</sup>

In a second step, we identified studies for each of these concepts. A keyword search ("LRRD", "Early Recovery", "Whole of Government", "Connectedness", and "Resilience") was conducted in publicly available databases of international, governmental, and non-governmental organizations, active in development cooperation or humanitarian assistance, and in databases of networks and research institutes. We carried out title searches, and otherwise full-text searches. Table 7 displays these databases. Due to search limitations of some databases, keywords yielded no less than 15,726 hits.

To identify those documents that cover most discussion on the linkage, and hence narrow down the sample, a set of pre-screening criteria was applied – referring to the type of document, document language, and contents related to one of the five concepts (see step 2b in Figure 3). This filtration procedure left us, temporarily, with 226 documents.

The aim of the third step was to identify documents most relevant for addressing the first sub-question of this review (What is needed to effectively link humanitarian and development responses to forced migration crises?). For this purpose, we established as a necessary condition that documents to be included in the final sample must contain detailed information on a certain concept. In doing so, they must provide a characterization of the humanitarian-

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<sup>69</sup> Another concept – disaster risk reduction – is also mentioned in various overview studies. However, we did not include it because of its narrow focus on natural disasters, which makes it irrelevant for the context of forced migration crises in the second step (empirical approach) of our analysis.

development gap and recommendations on how to bridge it. Empirical studies were included only if they fulfilled this condition. We also used other selection criteria: synthesis study (either overview of different strands within a concept, or empirical findings on more than one actor/country); focus on fragile states; focus on protracted crises; focus on forced migration (see step 3 in Figure 3).


As a result, a total of 30 studies were found that deal with the humanitarian-development nexus from different conceptual perspectives.<sup>70</sup> Hardly any study investigates the nexus in connection to forced migration (Table 5). In the end, studies that focus on fragile states and/or protracted crises turned out closest to our object of investigation.

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<sup>70</sup> Irrespective of the sampling procedure, we added seven studies suggested by consulted experts. Among them are documents, which were prepared for the World Humanitarian Summit 2016 in Istanbul. The seven additional documents were analysed without using the code system applied to the core sample studies (see below), as they do not constitute a new concept. We used them to enrich findings derived from the review, and to identify possible emerging aspects not covered in the sample studies.



**Figure 3: Sampling procedure to identify the conceptual sample**



Source: Authors' own

**Table 7: Database by type for the conceptual sample**

Database by Type	Website
United Nations (humanitarian, development and dual mandate)	UNDP ( <a href="http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/library.html">www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/library.html</a> ) UNICEF ( <a href="http://www.unicef.org/">www.unicef.org/</a> ) UNHCR ( <a href="http://www.unhcr.de/service/publikationen.html">www.unhcr.de/service/publikationen.html</a> ) WFP ( <a href="http://www.wfp.org/">www.wfp.org/</a> ) UNEG ( <a href="http://www.unevaluation.org/evaluation/reports">www.unevaluation.org/evaluation/reports</a> )
Network/Coalition	PreventionWeb ( <a href="http://www.preventionweb.net/english/professional/">www.preventionweb.net/english/professional/</a> ) ReliefWeb ( <a href="http://www.reliefweb.int/topics">www.reliefweb.int/topics</a> ) Provention Consortium ( <a href="http://www.proventionconsortium.net/">www.proventionconsortium.net/</a> ) ALNAP ( <a href="http://www.alnap.org/resources/">www.alnap.org/resources/</a> ) IASC ( <a href="http://www.interagencystandingcommittee.org/resources/iasc-products">www.interagencystandingcommittee.org/resources/iasc-products</a> )
Think Tank/Research Institution	DIE ( <a href="http://www.die-gdi.de/publikationen/">www.die-gdi.de/publikationen/</a> ) ODI/HPG ( <a href="http://www.odi.org/publications">www.odi.org/publications</a> ) GPPI ( <a href="http://www.gppi.net/publications/categories/innovation-in-development/#">www.gppi.net/publications/categories/innovation-in-development/#</a> ) URD ( <a href="http://www.urd.org/Publications">www.urd.org/Publications</a> ) 3IE ( <a href="http://www.3ieimpact.org/">www.3ieimpact.org/</a> )
International Organization	ICRC ( <a href="http://www.icrc.org/en/resource-centre">www.icrc.org/en/resource-centre</a> ) IFRC ( <a href="http://www.ifrc.org/en/publications-and-reports/general-publications/">www.ifrc.org/en/publications-and-reports/general-publications/</a> ) OECD ( <a href="http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/">www.oecd-ilibrary.org/</a> )
Non-Governmental Organization	Oxfam ( <a href="http://www.policy-practice.oxfam.org.uk/publications">www.policy-practice.oxfam.org.uk/publications</a> ) Welthungerhilfe ( <a href="http://www.welthungerhilfe.de/ueber-uns/mediathek.html">www.welthungerhilfe.de/ueber-uns/mediathek.html</a> )
Development Bank	World Bank ( <a href="http://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/reference">www.worldbank.org/en/publication/reference</a> ) KfW ( <a href="http://www.kfw-entwicklungsbank.de/Internationale-Finanzierung/KfW-Entwicklungsbank/Publikationen-Videos/Publikationen-thematisch/">www.kfw-entwicklungsbank.de/Internationale-Finanzierung/KfW-Entwicklungsbank/Publikationen-Videos/Publikationen-thematisch/</a> )
Donor/Part of Government	AA ( <a href="http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/Startseite_node.html">www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/Startseite_node.html</a> ) BMZ ( <a href="http://www.bmz.de/de/mediathek/publikationen/index.html">www.bmz.de/de/mediathek/publikationen/index.html</a> ) IOB ( <a href="http://www.iob-evaluatie.nl/en/topics">www.iob-evaluatie.nl/en/topics</a> ) Danida ( <a href="http://www.um.dk/en/danida-en/results/eval/">www.um.dk/en/danida-en/results/eval/</a> )

	Sida ( <a href="http://www.sida.se/English/publications/Publication_database/?epieditmode=true">www.sida.se/English/publications/Publication_database/?epieditmode=true</a> ) USAID ( <a href="http://www.usaid.gov/reports-and-data">www.usaid.gov/reports-and-data</a> ) ECHO ( <a href="http://www.ec.europa.eu/echo/">www.ec.europa.eu/echo/</a> ) European Commission ( <a href="http://www.ec.europa.eu/europeaid/home_en">www.ec.europa.eu/europeaid/home_en</a> )
Federal enterprise (provider of international cooperation services)	GIZ ( <a href="http://www.giz.de/de/mediathek/116.html">www.giz.de/de/mediathek/116.html</a> )
Academic/Evaluation Resource Centre	Wiley Online Library ( <a href="http://www.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/advanced/search">www.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/advanced/search</a> ) JSTOR ( <a href="http://www.jstor.org/action/showAdvancedSearch">www.jstor.org/action/showAdvancedSearch</a> ) Emerald Insight ( <a href="http://www.emeraldinsight.com/">www.emeraldinsight.com/</a> ) World Bank IEG ( <a href="http://www.ieg.worldbankgroup.org/evaluations">www.ieg.worldbankgroup.org/evaluations</a> ) OECD DEREK ( <a href="http://www.oecd.org/derec/?hf=5&amp;b=0&amp;s=score">www.oecd.org/derec/?hf=5&amp;b=0&amp;s=score</a> )

## Sample characteristics

Table 8 shows how the 30 studies from the conceptual sample are distributed across our five concepts. The LRRD concept is represented in almost half of the studies, followed by Resilience, Whole of Government, Early Recovery, and Connectedness.

**Table 8: Number of studies per concept**

Concept	Number of documents
Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development	14
Whole of Government	4
Resilience	8
Connectedness	1
Early Recovery	3
TOTAL	30

This distribution was stable throughout both sampling steps (see step 2 and 3 in Figure 3). As we did not aim to establish an equal number of documents for each concept, the unbalanced distribution was not a surprise. Among those deemed most relevant for addressing our first sub-question, many studies are dwelling on LRRD.

Table 9 shows that the conceptual sample includes different kinds of studies. More than two-thirds, 23 selections, belong to one single category: agency reports and other forms of grey literature. Seven are classified as academic literature, including peer-reviewed articles in academic journals or books.

The literature is published by a variety of institutions, including governmental and non-governmental institutions, international organizations, as well as research institutions. We wanted to capture the linkage discourse in full depth, so we avoided any search restriction on publication dates. They range from 1994 to 2016.

Consequently, our sample provides a “historical perspective”, old and new studies that have influenced the discourse on the humanitarian-development nexus. These studies may, potentially, capture all relevant aspects and possible changes of the five concepts.

**Table 9: Description of the conceptual sample by type of document**

Institution	Published	Concept
<b>Grey literature (23)</b>		
Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC)	2005	LRRD
European Commission (EC)	2001	LRRD
Governance and Social Dev.	2015	LRRD
Resource Centre (GSDRC)		
Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG)	2014	LRRD
Danish International Development Agency (Danida)	2015	LRRD
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)	2015	LRRD
Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB)	2013	LRRD

Swiss Red Cross (SRC)	2010	LRRD
Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi)	2011	LRRD
Brandenburg Institute for Society and Security (BIGS)	2013	Whole of Government
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)	2006	Whole of Government
International Peace Academy (IPA)	2007	Whole of Government
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development - Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC)	2006	Connectedness
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)	2008	Early Recovery
Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG)	2009	Early Recovery
Global Cluster for Early Recovery (GCER)	2016	Early Recovery
Overseas Development Institute (ODI)	2015	Resilience
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)	2014	Resilience
European Centre for Development Policy Management (ecdpm)	2013	Resilience
Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG)	2014	Resilience
Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in humanitarian action (ALNAP)	2015	Resilience
United States Agency for International Development (USAID)	2012	Resilience
HealthNet TPO, War Child, Save the Children	2014	Resilience
<b>Academic literature (7)</b>		
Center for Transatlantic Relations, The Johns Hopkins University/Global Public Policy Institute	2009	LRRD
Disasters Journal	1997	LRRD
Disasters Journal	2000	LRRD
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)	2013	Whole of Government
Institute of Dev. Studies (IDS)	1996	LRRD
Institute of Dev. Studies (IDS)	2012	Resilience
Institute of Dev. Studies (IDS)	1994	LRRD

To get a rough impression of the empirical foundation, we analysed whether the conceptual studies are building their considerations on empirical evidence.<sup>71</sup> Half of them, base their considerations on their own or others' empirical work, our analysis demonstrates. However, none of them derive their conceptual considerations from impact assessments. They build on anecdotal evidence.

### **Content analysis of the conceptual sample**

To extract how the conceptual studies characterise the humanitarian-development gap from their respective perspective and how they recommend building bridges, we conducted a qualitative content analysis of these studies (see Mayring, 2014; Schreier, 2012). Four questions helped us to a well-founded answer to the first sub-question:

1. What are the specific characteristics of the humanitarian-development gap highlighted in a study?
2. What are the specific recommendations on how to bridge the gap?
3. What justification is given regarding the need to link humanitarian assistance with development cooperation?
4. What is the empirical foundation of the concepts and the recommendations?

The first and the second question are focused on essentials related to our first sub-question. Once we know what the humanitarian-development gap consists of, and find specific recommendations on how to bridge the gap at different levels, we will be able to describe what is needed to effectively link the two realms. The third and fourth questions give us a more complete picture. The third one pays particular attention to explanations on why linkages are vital. The fourth question sheds light on the empirical foundation of conceptual claims.

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<sup>71</sup> For this purpose, we assigned an additional 'evidence-code' to all text segments identified in content analyses (see below). The code distinguishes between (1) own empirical evidence based on impact assessment, (2) own empirical evidence without impact assessment, (3) reference to empirical evidence based on impact assessment, (4) reference to empirical evidence without impact assessment, (5) no empirical evidence at all.

The content analysis was based on a code scheme: codes (words or short phrases) were assigned to corresponding text segments in order to extract and systematize the information of interest from the conceptual studies. Since we don't have a clear-cut theory on the linkage between humanitarian assistance and development cooperation, we applied an inductive coding approach, in which the codes stem from the material to be coded itself (Mayring, 2014: 79). This required an iterative coding process in a couple of steps:

1. We developed a basic framework of the coding scheme deduced from the four questions above. Regarding the first one, for example, we created the main code "description of the humanitarian development gap".
2. By identifying specific information provided in the studies related to one of the main codes (and, thus, to one of the four questions), we added new (sub-)codes – capturing the essence of this information – to the respective main code. For example, if we found a text segment, which stated that the humanitarian-development gap is characterized by a lack of joint planning among actors from the two realms, we added the new sub-code "planning gap" (as one dimension of the humanitarian-development gap) to the main code "description of the humanitarian development gap". A specific recommendation on how to bridge the gap with regard to the planning dimension received a corresponding code: "planning gap" => "recommendation xy".

In this second step, each member of the coding team reviewed the same five documents in order to formulate new codes and assign them to text segments. The team had three members. Decisions on new codes were taken after a close reading of texts. Codes and their corresponding codings (text segments) were then discussed in a joint feedback round.

This dialogic approach had several advantages. It helped us to reach a common understanding on the use of codes, and provided opportunities to supplement and refine our scheme. Moreover, it served to assess the inter-coder reliability as an indicator of measurement consistency. Inter-coder reliability can clarify whether different members of a team are working consistently (Neuendorf, 2002: 141). After some rounds of

feedback, we reached a consensus and could assign a certain code to a corresponding text segment.

3. We expanded the coding to our entire sample (30 documents). Each team member coded ten sources. Once a new code was created in order to capture additional aspects agreed upon within the team, it was assigned to respective text segments in the 30 studies – including segments that previously had been marked with other codes. This implies that the subset of our sampled literature had also been recoded.

This systematic approach – simultaneously assigning existing codes and supplementing the code scheme with new codes to be assigned to relevant text segments – resulted in 3,491 codings (text segments) across all codes. We used MAXQDA®, a software package for qualitative data analysis. To distil a common message for each code, we listed all text segment per code. Depending of the respective code, this could be a definition of a certain dimension of the humanitarian-development gap (a planning dimension for instance) or one or several core recommendations on how to close the gap with respect to this particular dimension.

Overall, we identified seven different dimensions of the humanitarian-development gap and nineteen recommendations filtered out of the conceptual sample studies on how to close the gap with respect to these dimensions. In other words, the studies conceptualize the humanitarian-development gap as a multi-dimensional problem. It appears on different levels (or certain areas of activities respectively), such as on a strategic level or on an implementation level. In this interpretation, the humanitarian-development gap is the sum of the following sub-gaps: (1) a vision and strategy gap, (2) a planning gap, (3) a funding gap, (4) an institutional gap, (5) an ownership gap, (6) a geographic gap, and (7) a sequence gap. Definitions of these sub-gaps and recommendations on how to close these gaps, are integrated into the analytical framework presented in Chapter 4.

The framework represents a leap forward to conceptual clarity. It captures the state-of-the-art knowledge on the linkage discourse by synthesizing the most relevant concepts into a single analytical framework. In the empirical part of our review, the framework



allowed us to analyse empirical studies on the international response to a forced migration crisis through the linkage lens. This addressed the second sub-question guiding our review.

### ***Empirical analysis***


To answer the question to what extent and why (or why not) the recommended humanitarian-development linkages have been established in practice of a pertinent forced migration crisis, we applied the analytical framework to analyse empirical studies on the international response to the Syria crisis. The rationale for selecting this case is simple: If there is evidence of successful linking, it will most likely be found in the most relevant case in terms of political pressure, funding levels, and applied aid modalities.

In addition, the global humanitarian system is under transformation, largely triggered by protracted recent crises (Humanitarian Policy Group et al., 2016). Thus, it is plausible to investigate the international response to the Syria crisis in which the humanitarian-development nexus should be apparent.

### **Sampling procedure**

In order to identify literature that potentially tells us most on the extent to which the recommended humanitarian-development linkages have been established in the international response to the Syria crisis, we applied a sampling procedure in two steps (see Figure 4).

Figure 4: Sampling procedure to identify the empirical sample



Source: Authors’ own

In a first step, we selected empirical literature on the international response to the forced migration crisis of Syria in the Syria Evaluation Portal for Coordinated Accountability and Lessons Learning (CALL) ([syrialearning.org](http://syrialearning.org)).<sup>72</sup> For this purpose, we focused

<sup>72</sup> The aim of the portal is to foster collective learning regarding the Syria crisis, and to improve the international emergency response. The portal brings together a broad range of information, data, discussions, and analyses. It is maintained by the ALNAP secretariat, in cooperation with the CALL initiative. CALL is a project developed by the Inter-Agency Steering Committee for

on evaluations, evaluative studies, and other documents providing empirically based assessments on the response inside Syria and in neighbouring countries that host Syrian refugees (Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, and Turkey).

To identify documents that provide an assessment based on empirical investigations, we restricted the sample to evaluations, reports, (case) studies, collections of lessons learnt/learned, impact assessments, reviews, research papers, surveys, assessments, regional analysis, articles, and briefs containing information on the applied methodological approach. To verify that no relevant documents are missed when selecting on the Syria Learning Portal, we additionally crosschecked other international and supranational databases. This procedure supplied us with 34 new documents. We added them to the sample, which then contained 466 documents published between 01/2011 (the beginning of the crisis response) and 04/2017. Only documents in English were selected.<sup>73</sup>

In a second step, we then restricted the selected empirical literature to those documents that address the sub-gaps of the humanitarian-development gap identified in the conceptual studies. For this purpose, we searched in the empirical literature for keywords extracted from our analytical framework (see Chapter 4), which contains definitions of the sub-gaps and recommendations on how to bridge them.

Two criteria were considered: the spread of sub-gaps (How many sub-gaps are addressed in an actual empirical study based on the keywords found?) and the intensity of investigation (How intensively is a certain sub-gap addressed in an empirical study based

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Humanitarian Evaluations (IAHE). It has quite a few members: FAO, ICVA (International Council of Voluntary Agencies), Oxfam, UNHCR, UNICEF, OCHA, the WFP, WHO, and World Vision. Given the variety of members and partners, we assumed that this platform would house the most comprehensive collection of information on responses to the Syria Crisis. Furthermore, we assumed that information from institutions that are members of CALL or ALNAP are included in the Syria Learning Platform.

<sup>73</sup> All documents on the Syria Learning Portal are in English (some have also been published in other languages). The restriction to documents in English caused no loss of possibly relevant documents. For the other databases, we also restricted our search to documents in English.

on the number of keywords found for this sub-gap?). To ‘secure’ this selection procedure, a necessary condition was established: to restrict the sample to those documents in which the words “humanitarian” and “development” are found together in a sentence at least five times in one document. This procedure reduced the sample massively: from 466 to 61 documents.

In combining both criteria, we selected those empirical studies that address more sub-gaps than other studies and/or that investigate these sub-gaps more intensively.

To challenge the resulting sample of 33 documents, we tested for ‘false positives’ by screening all of them. Three documents were deemed irrelevant and then removed. We also tested for ‘false negatives’. For this purpose, we randomly picked four documents previously identified as irrelevant, and could verify that they provide no information on humanitarian-development linkages.

In the end, we had an empirical sample of 30 evaluations and evaluative studies, published between 2013 and 2017 (Table 10).

### **Sample characteristics**

Table 10 provides an overview on the basic characteristics of our empirical sample (i.e. evaluations and evaluative studies on the international response to the Syria crisis): publication year, institution, and investigated country. The studies were conducted or funded by international organizations, bilateral donors, research institutions, and civil society organizations. Publication dates range from 2013 to 2017. About half the sample studies apply a cross-country approach; they investigate more than one country in the region. Most studies inspect Jordan and/or Lebanon closely. There is only one case study on Turkey.

**Table 10: Description of the empirical sample**

Author	Institution	Country	Publication year
Bailey and Barbelet	UNDP, ODI	Region	2014
Bellamy et al.	HPG, ODI	Turkey, Jordan	2017
Betts et al.	Norad	Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey	2016
Bouché and Mohieddin	UNDP	Lebanon Jordan	2014
Boustani. et al.	iiied	Lebanon	2016
Ciacchi	Oxfam Italia	Lebanon	2014
Crawford	-	Syria	2015
Cullbertson. et al.	UNICEF, RAND	Jordan	2015
Darcy	CALL	Region	2016
DEMAC	DEMAC	Syria	2016
Drummond et al.	WFP, ODI	Region	2015
Ernst et al.	DFAT	Region	2014
Forced Displacement and Dev. Study Group	CGD; IRC	Region	2017
Guay	World Vision	Lebanon, Jordan	2015
Hidalgo et al.	UNHCR	Jordan Lebanon	
Howe et al.	Feinstein International Center	Syria	2015
Int. Rescue Committee	IRC	Lebanon, Jordan	2016
Lawry-White and Schloffer	IFRC	Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, Syria	2014
Lee and Pearce	WRC	Region	2017
Mercy Corps et al.	M.C., IRC	Syria	2016
Meyer. S.	UNHCR	Syria, Jordan, Lebanon	2013
Mowjee. T. et al.	Sida	Region	2015
OCHA and REACH	OCHA, REACH	Lebanon	2014
REACH	REACH	Jordan	2014
SDC	SDC	Lebanon	2014
Tillinac. A. et al.	IOM	Iraq, Syria	2015
UNESCO	UNESCO	Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq	2016
UNFPA	UNFPA	Turkey	2014
UNHCR	UNHCR	Jordan	2014
Zyck and Armstrong	HPG	Jordan	2014

To assess the methodological quality of the empirical studies, and thus the validity of their findings, we applied eight quality criteria commonly used in meta-evaluations to investigate the quality of evaluations (Alton-Lee, 2004; DeGEval, 2008; Glock and Karliczek, 2014; Stufflebeam, 1999) and that focus on: independence, transparency of evaluation questions and criteria, methodological approach, data collection and analysis (Table 11).<sup>74</sup> Based on the application of these criteria, we judged the overall methodological quality as “sufficient” (with a median of 5 points out of 8, reaching a pre-defined threshold of more than half of the points).<sup>75</sup> Almost all studies in the empirical sample formulated evaluation questions, answered them by triangulated methods and data sources, and dedicated a whole section to procedures for data collection and analysis as well as data used.

**Table 11: Methodological quality of the empirical sample**

Category	Quality Criterion (QC) (1/0)	N
Independence	QC 1: External evaluation.	19
Formulation and application of evaluation questions	QC 2: Evaluation questions are formulated, and findings are organized along these questions (0.5 if only one of both applied).	28
Formulation and application of evaluation criteria	QC 3: Evaluation criteria are applied, and findings are presented in relation to these criteria (0.5 if only one of both applied).	10
Methodology/ plausibility of findings and conclusions	QC 4: The evaluation spells out a theory of change.	10
	QC 5: The evaluation triangulates methods and sources.	25
	QC 6: The evaluation makes methodological and other limitations transparent.	22

<sup>74</sup> This approach is based exclusively on information spelled out explicitly in evaluation reports. Unpublished background information remains a non-explored field.

<sup>75</sup> Since there is no theoretical criterion for determining such a threshold, we decided to grade the quality of those studies as “sufficient” that reach more than 50% of points.

QC 7: The evaluation includes a methodological section or annex that describes procedures for data collection and analysis (0.5 if only one of both applied).	17
QC 8: The evaluation includes a section or annex that describes the data used.	27

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## **Content analysis of the empirical sample**

To extract evidence on the extent to which and why effective humanitarian-development linkages have been established in the international response to the Syria crisis, we conducted a content analysis of the 30 selected empirical studies. For this purpose, we applied a coding scheme that is derived from the analytical framework (deductive coding approach). For each of the seven sub-gaps and nineteen recommendations formulated in the analytical framework on how to close the sub-gaps, the code scheme entails a corresponding code, which was assigned to relevant text segments. Our aim was to extract relevant information and systematize it.

To distil a main message for each recommendation, we listed all text segments per code and synthesized our findings. They are presented in Chapter 4.

Since the second sub-question focuses on not only the extent to which the recommended linkages have been established in the international response to the Syria crisis, but also on reasons for implementation (or non-implementation), we also extracted information on hindering and conducive factors for bridging each one of the seven sub-gaps.

It is impossible to find comprehensive answers to our overall question (how responses to forced migration crises can be linked effectively) without considering the effects of linkages on people affected by the crisis situation. Consequently, we captured all available empirical information on outputs, outcomes or impacts of bridging specific sub-gaps.

The content analysis of the empirical sample studies was guided by five questions:

1. What is the positive evidence on bridging the respective sub-gap?<sup>76</sup>
2. What is the negative evidence on bridging the respective specific sub-gap, referring to the formulated recommendations?<sup>77</sup>
3. What are hindering factors to bridging the respective sub-gap?
4. What are conducive factors to bridging the respective sub-gap?
5. What are the outputs, outcomes or impacts of bridging the respective sub-gap?

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<sup>76</sup> In this review, we use the term “evidence” for all empirical findings provided by the sampled studies – irrespective of whether they have been generated on the basis of rigorous methods or not. We define evidence as positive when studies are describing measures aimed at closing a sub-gap of the humanitarian-development gap. For example, positive evidence is registered when we find a clear lead for coordination between humanitarian and development actors.

<sup>77</sup> We define evidence as negative when the empirical studies provide evidence on the existence of a sub-gap of the humanitarian-development gap. It is negative, for instance, when there is no clear lead in coordination between humanitarian and development actors, which hinders linkage.



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