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RESEARCH AND AID REVISITED - A HISTORICALLY GROUNDED ANALYSIS OF FUTURE PROSPECTS AND POLICY OPTIONS

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Research Aid Revisited – a historically grounded analysis of future prospects and policy options

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Preface

Supporting increased research capacity by building institutional, individual and infrastructural research capability is probably more important today than ever. Knowledge is the power to change, get access, make decisions and identify problems as well as solutions. For more than 40 years, Sweden has supported research cooperation as a part of its international aid and development cooperation. The overall aim in the current strategy for research cooperation and research in development cooperation is to build capacity by "strengthen research of high quality and of relevance to poverty reduction and sustainable development, with a primary focus on low-income countries and regions". Sida and the Swedish research council are jointly responsible for implementing the strategy.

In this EBA report Sverker Sörlin and David Nilsson have made an historical analysis of the Swedish research aid policy, since its initial stages in the 1970s up until today. Along with the historical analysis of the policy development, they examine the relationship between development cooperation and research policy in order to find out to what extent and in what way they have been aligned. In order to look forward we need to understand the kind of assumptions and theories that has previously underpinned a policy, they argue. How did they change over the years? They note that actual funding and interventions have been stable while political commitment and attention appear to have become less pronounced.

They righty argue that it has, over the past decade, become clear that to meet the global challenges of humanity, there is need for more scientific knowledge including the social sciences and humanities certainly when it comes to for example tackling climate change. However, with the new global commitment to Agenda 2030 they ask whether our approach to research aid fits the widen spectra of global challenges as defined in the SDGs. Global common problems need common solutions, thus we need more collaboration between the policy areas, as the government's Policy for Global Development (PGU) stipulates. The main conclusion in the report is however that there is a notable contrast between the development of research aid as a policy area and research policy at large. They are not enough aligned to meet the needs of the global internationalisation and the constantly

changing prerequisites of the science policy regime according to the authors.

They do acknowledge the importance of capacity building, the first priority of Swedish research aid since SAREC was launched in the mid-1970s, but they also think there is time now for more cooperation in mutual interest between researchers in the north and south. Their conclusion is that there might be a need to reconsider Swedish research aid to better fit the challenges ahead. Among their eight propositions on ways forward they argue that the research aid agenda needs to be part of general research and innovation policies in a much more integrative and collaborative way than is the case today. They also point to the continued importance of building institutions and management rather than focusing on the science content.

It is my hope that this report will stimulate renewed interest in a policy area where Sweden has been a respected player and pioneer. The challenges in today's world and the visions for how they should be met in Agenda 2030 make a reinvention of a comprehensive research policy for development an urgent task.

The authors' work has been conducted in dialogue with a reference group chaired by me. The analysis, views and recommendations presented in the report are the sole responsibility of the authors.

Stockholm, May 2017

Gun-Britt Andersson

Sammanfattning

I den här rapporten undersöks den svenska regeringens tidigare och nuvarande inriktning för stöd till utvecklingsforskning och kapacitetsuppbyggnad för forskning i låginkomstländer, eller kort och gott ”forskningsbistånd”. Dessutom presenteras några förslag till framtida politiska alternativ.

På 1970-talet institutionaliserades forskningsbiståndet som en del av Sveriges allt större ambitioner inom det internationella utvecklingsbiståndet. Motiven var flera, bl.a. internationell solidaritet men det fanns även ekonomiska och utrikespolitiska motiv och ambitionen kan ses som ett led i en strävan att hitta och stärka Sveriges plats på den geopolitiska kartan under det kalla kriget. Den passade även in i långsiktiga globala politiska ansträngningar för att skapa en civiliserad värld, avkolonisering och utveckling, och för att forma internationella vetenskapliga diskurser om ekonomisk tillväxt, överbefolkning och miljövård. Processen ledde fram till att Styrelsen för u-landsforskning (SAREC, Swedish Agency for Research Cooperation with Developing Countries) inrättades 1975. Avstampet var olika internationella idéer och initiativ från 1960-talet, huvudsakligen inom ramen för Förenta nationerna, som betonade vetenskapens och teknikens betydelse för utveckling. Det stod klart att det södra halvklotet halkade efter när det gällde ekonomisk och social utveckling och det krävdes vetenskap och forskning för att möta dessa utmaningar.

Under 1970-talet och början av 1980-talet utvecklades en svensk ram för forskningsbistånd och den har i sina huvuddrag kvarstått sedan dess:

- Bilaterala samarbeten om kapacitetsuppbyggande baserade på partnerskap med svenska universitet, infrastrukturstöd och utbytesprogram inom doktor- och masterutbildningar.

- Stöd till globala och regionala forskningsorganisationer, med en handfull organisationer som tilldelas huvuddelen av finansieringen.

- Stöd till forskning i Sverige som är av betydelse för utvecklingsländer, via ett vetenskapligt råd, där ett fåtal universitet får den huvudsakliga delen av finansieringen.

- En relativt stabil finansieringsmodell där 3–4 procent av det statliga biståndet går till forskning, uppdelat i grupper om 25–30 procent till bilateralt stöd, 50–60 procent till globala och regionala organisationer och 10–15 procent till forskning vid svenska universitet. I relativa termer har det noterats en nedåtgående trend vad gäller finansiering under det senaste decenniet.

Den uttalade målsättningen var redan från början att utgå från utvecklingsländernas behov och krav, och att prioritera utvecklingen av forskningskapacitet. Att stödja en politisk och ekonomisk självständighet i det globala Syd hade kommit att bli ett av huvudmålen för det svenska biståndet och förstärkt forskningskapacitet låg väl i linje med detta. Ramen var till stora delar på plats 1985 då SAREC gick in i en tillväxtfas som tycks ha varat till långt in på 2000-talet. Den huvudsakliga ramen och tanken bakom den svenska modellen för forskningsbiståndet har till stora delar behållits sedan dess. Under åren har ramen anpassats och det har tillkommit initiativ för att förbättra resultatet. Det har skett flera organisatoriska förändringar. 1995 slogs SAREC och Sida samman och 2013 överfördes ansvaret för anslag till svenska universitet från Sida till Vetenskapsrådet. Forskningsbiståndet från både SAREC och Sida har haft ett gott rykte och det har förekommit många positiva utvärderingar.

Vår historiska analys pekar på vissa motsägelser i det tidiga svenska forskningsbiståndet. För det första fanns det under 1970-talet ingen efterfrågan på forskningsbistånd bland Sveriges partnerländer. Till följd av att politiken för den svenska biståndsplaneringen utformades land för land och att den fastställde att bistånd fick ges om det fanns ett uttalat förslag skapades SAREC som ett oberoende organ i syfte att kringgå denna politik. För det andra har mindre än 30 procent av medlen gått till de bilaterala program som utgör den viktigaste plattformen för kapacitetsuppbyggandet trots att det funnits ett starkt fokus på kapacitetsbyggnad på det södra halvklotet. Och för det tredje så förefaller effekterna inom den svenska forskningen ha varit små,

trots att en nyorientering av de svenska forskningsresurserna tidigt var ett uttalat mål. På politisk nivå har det under åren förekommit väldigt få försök att åstadkomma en närmare anpassning och samordning mellan Sveriges forskningsbistånd och den nationella forskningspolitiken. Den här tredje motsägelsen har fortsatt att vara noterbar även efter att politiken för global utveckling (PGU) antogs 2003. Det går dock att se vissa steg mot en ökad integration under de senaste åren, särskilt en ökad medverkan av Vetenskapsrådet och den senaste förnyelsen av PGU.

I den här rapporten tar vi upp flera viktiga frågor förutom varför och hur SAREC och Sida har arbetat fram till idag. Vi berör även den framtida utformningen av uppdraget för forskningsbistånd. I studien framgår det förhållandevis tydligt att den svenska forskningsbiståndsmodellen har utformats som svar på vissa mänskliga, utvecklingsmässiga, vetenskapliga och politiska behov under 1970-talet. Det är även tydligt att både den geopolitiska kartan och de globala utmaningarna har förändrats dramatiskt sedan dess. Idag är problemet inte längre, åtminstone inte enbart, att de fattiga länderna behöver ”hinna ikapp” de rika länderna. Vi menar att eftersom mänsklighetens utmaningar i allt högre grad är gemensamma och av internationell art (klimatförändringar, globala flyktingströmmar, säkerhet, gemensamma naturresurser osv.) så behöver vi en gemensam modell för kunskapsproduktion som inte förutsätter en enkelriktad överföring av kunskap eller akademiskt kunnande från svenska eller internationella forskningsorganisationer till de fattiga länderna.

Det behövs en ny modell för internationellt forskningssamarbete, som går långt utöver forskningsbiståndets nuvarande omfattning och volym. Vi har goda skäl att tro att sådana samarbeten kan gynna hela det södra halvklotet och den svenska forsknings- och innovationsarenan liksom samhället i stort, och att de dessutom kan bidra till att öka Sveriges konkurrenskraft i en mer hållbar framtid. Vi föreslår att en sådan ny och bredare samverkansmodell ska byggas på en världssyn där problem och utmaningar är gemensamma, även om de är ojämnt och slumpmässigt fördelade. I dagens värld har produktionen och fördelningen av välståndet och dess miljömässiga, hälsomässiga och sociala konsekvenser blivit ett allt viktigare och mer genomgripande problem än de kvarvarande, men ändå allvarliga, fallen av fattigdom.

Kapacitetsuppbyggnad på det södra halvklotet kommer fortsatt att vara en viktig uppgift under överskådlig framtid. Men i dagens värld bör forskningsagendan alltmer formas utifrån hur man ska hantera och ta itu med de risker som följer av att välstånd skapas och hur detta påverkar synen på utveckling på 2000-talet. Frågan om välstånd är ganska okonventionell inom utvecklingsbiståndet men den måste även ställas på allvar i en värld där den ekonomiska tillväxten förefaller spridas i oförminskad takt och vara teknikdriven. Hur kan vi skapa ett globalt välstånd som är hållbart och som samtidigt kan främjas och öka i låginkomstländer? Om vi ska ta den frågan på allvar och hitta ett ansvarsfullt sätt att gå vidare så måste vi fokusera på en helt ny problemuppsättning. Vi menar att det är hög tid att föra en förnyad och uppriktig diskussion om hur Sverige ska delta i kunskapsutvecklingen på det södra halvklotet. Diskussionen kan ta utgångspunkt i följande påståenden:

Utmaningar och problem är gemensamma. Det är dags att lämna uppfattningen att ”utveckling” är en fråga för det södra halvklotet. Dagens och morgondagens globala problem påverkar även det norra halvklotet. I dagens alltmer komplicerade värld måste idén om forskningsbistånd förändras.

Globala utmaningar är lokala. När breda och ofta globala utmaningar uppträder på lokal och regional nivå kan forskningsbiståndet behöva ta en annan form och förändras så att forskare och institutioner i utvecklingsländerna involveras i bredare konstellationer.

Välstånd är på väg att bli ett större problem än fattigdom. Även om arbetet med Agenda 2030 för att eliminera fattigdomen måste fortsätta öppnar frågor om överutnyttjandet av vår planet, miljörättvisa, välstånd och välfärdsfördelning för nya internationella undersökningsområden. Framtidens forskningsbistånd kan behöva utgå från utmaningar som uppstår i en värld med mycket mer välstånd och mindre fattigdom.

Forskningsagendor bör utformas i dialog. Gemensamma agendor måste åter övervägas inom ramen för dialogen mellan nord och syd med stöd av nya och förändringsbenägna aktörer inom universitet, finansieringsorgan, näringsliv, mottagarländer, internationella fora, det civila samhället och EU.

Kunskapsbasen bör breddas. Integrerade och utmaningsdrivna angreppssätt som spänner över flera discipliner, b.la. samhällsvetenskap och humaniora, och som hittills har spelat en

marginell roll i forskningsbiståndet, behövs för att ta itu med den nya världsordningens mycket komplicerade utmaningar.

Institutioner är fortsatt viktiga. Forskningskapaciteten bland institutioner, som till exempel universitet, kommer att spela en viktig roll för att få låginkomstländer att delta och dra nytta av den växande globala kunskapsproduktionen. Här kan Sverige bygga vidare på sina gedigna resultat när det gäller att stödja institutionsuppbyggnad på det södra halvklotet.

Skalan måste ändras. De stora utmaningar som vi står inför på global, regional och lokal nivå kräver åtgärder i en helt annan omfattning och av en helt annan art, bland annat genom internationella samarbeten, än vad som har kunnat åstadkommas med bistånd i den – övervägande nationsbaserade – modellen för utvecklingsstöd.

Forskningsbiståndet bör ges en närmare koppling till kunskaps- och forskningspolitiken i stort. Forskningsbiståndet kan vara en del av en bredare agenda för att hantera globala utmaningar, vilket skulle inbegripa en mycket närmare koppling mellan forskningspolitik och forskningsbistånd. Historiskt sett har denna koppling varit svår att åstadkomma. Av den anledningen krävs nya tänkesätt, en omstrukturering av finansieringen och dess källor samt nya politiska åtaganden.

Summary

This report examines the historical path as well as current tendencies of the Swedish government's support to development research and research capacity building in low-income countries, or simply "research aid". It also presents some ideas for future policy options.

Research aid was institutionalised in the 1970s as part of Sweden's growing ambitions on the international development aid scene. This ambition was driven by several motives, such as international solidarity but also economic and foreign policy motives, and can be understood as part of a movement to find, and strengthen, Sweden's geopolitical niche in the Cold War landscape. It also tapped into longer global political movements on civilisation, decolonisation and development, as well as international scientific discourses on economic growth, over-population and environmentalism. The process which led up to the establishment of SAREC (Swedish Agency for Research Cooperation with Developing Countries) in 1975 echoed many of the ideas and initiatives at international level in the 1960s, mainly within the sphere of the United Nations, that underscored the importance of science and technology for development. In short, science and research capacity was needed to meet challenges in the South, which was seen as lagging behind in terms economic and social development level.

A Swedish framework for research aid developed in the formative period of the 1970s and early 1980s, which after that has largely persisted:

- bilateral cooperation for capacity building based on partnerships with Swedish universities, PhD and Master education through sandwich-programmes, and infrastructure support;
- support to global and regional research organisations, with a handful of organisations getting the bulk of the funding;
- research in Sweden of relevance to developing countries through a science council function, where a handful of universities attract most of the funding;
- a relatively stable funding regime with 3-4 % of government aid allocations going to research, divided into streams of 25-30% to bilateral support, 50-60% to global and regional

organisations, and 10-15% to Swedish university research. In relative terms, a downward funding trend is noted over the past decade.

Right from the beginning, the outspoken aim was to take a point of departure in the needs and demands of developing countries, and to give priority to developing research capacity. Supporting political and economic independence in the South had become one of the key objectives of Swedish aid, and increasing the research capacity was well in line with this. From around 1985 the framework was largely in place, and SAREC entered a pragmatic growth phase which seems to have lasted well into the 2000s. The main framework, and the underlying thinking, in Sweden's research aid model have since then not been substantially altered. Within the framework certain changes, adaptations and initiatives have been made to improve performance over time. Several organisational changes have taken place, notably the merging of SAREC and SIDA in 1995 and the transfer of responsibility for grants to Swedish universities from Sida to Swedish Research Council VR in 2013. Both SAREC's and Sida's research aid activities have enjoyed a good reputation and from what we have seen, many evaluations have been positive.

Our historical analysis exposes some contradictions in the early Swedish research aid. First: research aid was not in demand from Sweden's partner countries in the 1970s. As Sweden's policy of country-programming dictated that aid should only be given where there was an expressed demand for it, SAREC was formed as an independent agency in order to bypass this policy. Second: while the focus on capacity building in the South has been strong, less than 30% of the spending has gone to the bilateral programmes which make up the main platform for capacity building. And third: the impact on the Swedish research arena at large appears to have been small despite the fact that a re-orientation of research capacity in Sweden was a stated objective early on. At policy level, over the years we have seen very few attempts for a closer alignment and coordination between Sweden's research aid and national research policy. This third contradiction has continued to be visible even after the adoption of the Policy for Global Development (PGU) in 2003, although we note some moves towards increased integration in the past few years, notably the closer involvement of VR and the recent revitalisation of the PGU.

The key questions we raise in this report are not just about why and how SAREC and Sida worked the way they did until now. They also concern how the mission of research aid can be conceived from now on. In our study, one can fairly easy discern that the Swedish model for research aid was formed to respond to certain human, developmental, scientific and political needs of the 1970s. It is also quite clear that since then, the geopolitical map as well as the global problem catalogue has changed dramatically. Essentially, the problem at hand is not any longer, at least not only, about poor countries "catching up" with the rich countries. We argue that as humankind's challenges have become increasingly of shared and international character (climate change, global flows of refugees, security, shared natural resources etc) we need a shared regime of knowledge production, one which does not presuppose a one-way transmission of knowledge or academic know-how from Swedish or international research organisations to the poor countries.

A new model for international research collaboration is needed which goes far beyond the current scope and volume of research aid. Such collaboration, we have good reasons to believe, will benefit the global South, the entire Swedish research and innovation arena as well as the wider society, and may hold potential for increasing Sweden's competitiveness in the - more sustainable - future. We propose that such a new and wider model for collaboration is built on the understanding of a world where problems and challenges are shared, although unevenly and unpredictably distributed. In this world, the production and distribution of wealth and its environmental, health and social consequences is rapidly becoming a more critical and pervasive concern than the remaining and clearly deeply distressing cases of poverty. Building capacity in the global South will for the foreseeable future continue to be an important task. But in this current world the research agenda should be increasingly shaped by managing and mitigating the risks following from wealth creation and how it affects the very idea of development in the twenty-first century. The question of wealth is rather unconventional for development aid, but it must be asked seriously in a world where economic growth is spreading on a pace that seems to continue unabated. How can global wealth become sustainable and at the same time be promoted and grow in low-income countries? Taking this question seriously and carving out a responsible way forward would imply an increased attention on a new set of issues. We suggest that it

is high time for a revitalised and bold discussion regarding Sweden's future role in knowledge development in the global South, which could take its point of departure in the following propositions:

Challenges and problems are shared. Moving away from the notion of 'development' as an issue for the global South, today's and tomorrow's global problems affect also the global North. As we now increasingly take stock of a supercomplex world, the idea of research aid will have to change.

Global challenges are local. In dealing with local and regional manifestations of the broader, often global challenges, it may be called for research aid to take a different form, engaging researchers and institutions in the developing world in broader constellations.

Wealth is becoming a greater problem than poverty. While the 2030 agenda to eliminate poverty must continue, the questions of transgression of planetary boundaries, environmental justice, wealth and welfare distribution open up vast new fields of global enquiry. Future research aid would take as its cue the challenges rising in a world with much less poverty and much more wealth.

Research agendas should be formed in dialogue. Common agendas need to be reconsidered in a South-North dialogue supported by new alliances of change agents in universities, funding agencies, the business community, recipient countries, international fora, in civil society, and the EU.

The knowledge base is widening. Integrative and challenge-driven approaches bridging multiple disciplines, including the social sciences and humanities, that have hitherto played marginal roles in research aid, are needed to deal with the supercomplexity challenges of the emerging world order.

Institutions remain essential. The research capacity of institutional actors such as universities is set to be a critical lever for low-income countries to participate in, and benefit from, the massively expanding global knowledge production. Sweden can here build upon its sustained track record of supporting institution building in the South.

Change of scale is required. The massive challenges we are facing at combined planetary, regional and local scales require responses of a completely different scale and character than what aid has been able to muster within the - predominantly nation-based – paradigm of development aid.

Research aid should be linked closer to knowledge and research policy at large. Research aid can just be one small part of a wider agenda to address global challenges, implying a much closer alignment between research policy and research aid. History demonstrates the difficulties of effecting this alignment, which now prompts an organized re-thinking, a re-structuring of funding streams, and a re-engagement within the domain of politics.

1 Introduction

Aims and background

This report is an attempt to analyse the historical development and the potential futures of research aid in Sweden. Since Swedish research aid was institutionalised in the 1970s through the formation of Swedish Agency for Research Cooperation with Developing Countries (SAREC), a whole new geopolitical landscape has emerged and with it, new ideologies and world-views. Some countries – notably in Asia and Latin America - that then were considered poor and "under-developed" today hold rapidly growing research environments, some even producing world class scientists and thinkers. Moreover, Swedish research policy has undergone times of debates and reorientation, and, in line with developments in several OECD countries, intensified its linkages to policy goals such as economic growth and competitiveness in the light of globalization, economic integration, and periods of crisis, not least in Sweden in the 1990s.

These developments could in themselves justify a review of Swedish research aid. But perhaps more than anything, we can today see that humanity faces challenges of a fundamentally new and global scale. Climate change, mass extinction of species, over-fishing, shared water resources, conflict and large-scale migration are but a few threats to a sustainable future on planet Earth that cannot be managed by states, regions or corporations in a piece-meal isolated fashion. The adoption in 2015 by the United Nations member states of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), as well as the signing of the Paris Agreement under the Framework Convention on Climate Change (UN-FCCC), were clear confessions that these problems must be met through a coordinated effort. This 'globalisation of problems' is likely to have serious ramifications also for our systems of knowledge production. In short, global challenges need global responses, and this goes also for the research community. Our study is an attempt to reflect on these global changes from a Swedish viewpoint.

In this study our chief aims are to:

- analyse Swedish research aid as an element of development cooperation, and as an element of research policy in a historical study from its initial stages in the 1970s and up until the present;
- use the findings of the historical study to undertake a review of the policy options that have become available given the comprehensive changes in world development and in the frameworks of research policy, in particular after the financial crisis in 2008;
- present a reflexive, open ended deliberation on possible redirections of Swedish research aid policies for the future in light of current tendencies in research policy and development cooperation.

The report is structured as follows:

In this introductory chapter section we offer an overview of what Swedish development research is and has been, and also say a few words about the methods and rationale of this study.

In chapter two we paint a broad-brush description of what happened after the end of the Second World War. Geopolitical conditions in that era prompted a new type of development interaction between richer and poorer countries, what we have since then been referring to as "international development aid" or "development cooperation". We stress that the idea of development in the South as such was not new in the industrialised world. But after 1945, a global political landscape took shape into which Sweden, as a small and alliance-free country, had to adjust to and find a particular niche.

With this landscape as a critical backdrop, we go on to study the formation of a model for research aid within Sweden's aid niche, which we describe in chapter three. Here, we outline trends in international thinking through the 1960s and early 70s with regards to the role of research for development, and analyse how these ideas were adopted - and confronted – to form a distinct model for research aid in Sweden centred around SAREC.

Chapter four outlines changes in the global political landscape from the early 1990s, which along with trends in public management ushered in crisis and renewal in the Swedish aid system. This, together with a transformation of research policy, had by the early 2000s significantly altered the landscape for the Swedish research aid. Following that, we discuss the new logic of international cooperation that is emerging out of globalisation of not just markets, but of people, ideas, and problems in recent years. In particular, we discuss the pre-eminence of shared global knowledge in this new context.

In the fifth and final chapter, we discuss the implications on research and research aid, of these long-term changes and the emerging logics of international cooperation. While we are keen to offer some lessons from our historical analysis to inform the future policy trajectory of Swedish research aid, our ambition is not to make precise recommendations for its organisational and institutional implementation. We hope, nevertheless, that our backward and forward gaze at the landscape of global human development and research will inspire future analyses which may result in more precise policy recommendations, and also generate discussions in the development and research arenas, as well as in the public sphere at large, about Sweden's role in global knowledge production for sustainable development.

We wish to remind our readers that this study has been performed by two historians. Using history for charting possible futures is a seldom trodden path in the development policy arena. Disciplines such as economics and political science have much stronger traditions in development policy, and understandably, some readers will be much more familiar with the style of writing and reasoning in those traditions. Nevertheless, we are convinced that history has much to offer also for the arena of development policy, and we hope that this report will prove us right. We return to a discussion of the value of history studies in the appendix to this report. Should we, like in the story about the man who lost his key at night, keep looking only underneath the same old lamppost? In the end, if we want new answers we also need to ask new questions, and we need to look in new places.

Research aid – what is it?

First of all, we wish to define and explain our use of the term "research aid". Throughout this report we will use "research aid" to describe activities aiming at generating, directing and spreading scientific knowledge which are financed under the official development aid budget. In the literature and in our source material, these activities may go under names such as "development research", "research collaboration" or "research in development cooperation". We have two motives for choosing the term research aid. First, we want to stress the historically strong coupling between the activities we study and the motives and ideas behind development aid in general and the build-up of aid (or "development cooperation") appropriations in the Swedish government budgets. Secondly, it provides a distinct delineation of our investigation, as the Swedish government made a special allocation in its development aid budget for research aid right from its inception in 1975. Rather than trying to define what would qualify as "research" or "scientific activity", let alone assessing how certain activities relate to the nebulous term "development", we will consider everything that has been financed under this allocation as "research aid". [1]

This approach has its shortcomings, which we are well aware of. The main argument against this delineation is that over the years there have been research activities, as well as research-related ones, financed from the regular aid budgets over and above what has been allocated under the research aid vote. For example, substantial activity at the Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences (SLU) and its predecessors were financed directly from SIDA in the 1960s-1980s, some which included building research capacity in developing countries such as Ethiopia.[2] There is hence a part of the research-related Swedish aid that is not included in our definition. It would however require an unreasonable amount of work to collect information about bilateral aid programmes and assessing to what extent activities financed under these programmes qualify as research-related. For the purposes of our study as outlined above, we believe that the simplifications that our more narrow definition implies can

[1] On "development" and its history and theory, see e.g. Hettne 1995; Norgaard 1994; Rist 1997
[2] Bruno 2016

easily be tolerated, and should not to any significant degree affect our main findings and conclusions.

What is the purpose of Sweden's research aid? The current government strategy; "Strategy for research cooperation and research in development cooperation 2015-2021", states that the objective is to enhance research "of high quality and relevance for poverty reduction and sustainable development". This should be done through four focus areas:

1. capacity-building for research primarily in low-income regions and countries:
2. financing global, regional and national research of relevance for low-income regions and countries;
3. promoting research-based innovations for poverty-reduction and sustainable development;
4. financing Swedish research of relevance for low-income regions and countries.[3]

While the focus area on innovations was introduced as late as in 2015, the other three have been intact since the 1970s.[4] The "U-forsk commission" in 1971-1973 (see chapter three) pointed out lack of research capacity in the South as a key development obstacle that Sweden ought to address.[5] Support to research through global organisations for example under the United Nations umbrella remained an important cornerstone as long as capacity in the South was weak. And it was also obvious in the early 1970s that the resource base in the Swedish research community was thin and needed strengthening.[6] Consequently, when SAREC received its formal government instructions as an independent agency in 1979, its task was to support research in developing countries, in global organisations and in Sweden "that can facilitate for developing countries to move towards increased self-governance and towards economic and social justice."[7]

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[3] Swedish government 2014
[4] The previous strategy for research aid, covering 2010-2014, did not include the innovation sub-objective. Innovation in a broad sense has however been part of the research aid agenda earlier, although in a more obscured position. See Brodén Gyberg 2013 and Kjellqvist 2013
[5] SOU 1973:41, page 130.
[6] SOU 1973:41, p 125-126
[7] SFS 1979:832

The three main objectives of Swedish research aid translated into three distinct areas of operation within SAREC and later with Sida. The *bilateral* operations aim at the building of research capacity through direct cooperation with research institutions in developing countries. The *global and regional* operations support the production and dissemination of scientific knowledge of relevance for developing countries. Some of these also contain elements of capacity building. Finally, the *Swedish* operations support universities in Sweden – basically in the form of competitive grant applications to a research council - to carry out relevant research and build a stronger domestic resource base in academia.[8]

Over the years, these three building blocks: bilateral capacity building; financing global research; and a research council function for Swedish universities, have made up a relatively stable framework. From time to time, they have been supplemented by other focus areas, such as promoting North-South networks, forging links with regular aid operations through "invitation areas", and the most recent one being the focus on innovation from 2015.[9] As will be further discussed below, certain changes can be noted within each compartment in the framework, but the main structure has largely been intact since around 1985. That same year, a ten-year evaluation pointed to some failures and some successes in the first decade of SAREC's work, and came with recommendations which to a significant degree would set the format for SAREC's work.

At the bilateral level, the focus on building up national research institutions like research councils in partner countries like Ethiopia, Tanzania and Sri Lanka during SAREC's first decade had failed. These structures – often modelled on the Swedish systems - had produced centralistic and inefficient bureaucracies, with little effect on the national research capacities.[10] The recommendation was therefore that SAREC should abandon them and concentrate the bilateral support directly to universities and groups of researchers. Ideally, this support should be complemented with collaboration with a Swedish university. Also the PhD training had shown promising results and should be given more emphasis, particularly using the so called "sandwich-model", where the PhD student spent time at the partner university in

[8] Eduards 2006
[9] Utrikesdepartementet 1985; Eduards 2006; Fellesson and Hårsmar 2013; Swedish Government 2014
[10] Utrikesdepartementet 1985, p 104-106

Sweden. Finally, SAREC should also finance basic infrastructure such as laboratories and libraries, which were sorely lacking in the wake of the oil and commodity price crises.[11] These elements have been key features of the Swedish bilateral research aid: support directly to universities; partner collaboration with Swedish universities; the sandwich model of PhD-training, and; support to infrastructure.[12] In SAREC's first decade, when cooperation with individual countries was being built up, the share of bilateral support rose from virtually zero to 23% between 1976 and 1984. From then on, the bilateral funding level has remained roughly at 25-30% of the total research aid envelope (see Table 1 below). Today, Sweden has direct bilateral cooperation with Ethiopia, Mozambique, Bolivia, Rwanda, Uganda and Tanzania. Expenditure for bilateral research aid to universities in these six countries amounted to 270 MSEK in 2015, or 28 % of total research aid spending.[13] It should also be noted that part of this funding - up to one third - goes to Swedish universities that participate in the bilateral collaboration.[14]

In the past decade, there has been an increasing emphasis on institutional strengthening at university level, enabling university leadership to chart their priorities and strategies. This has paved the way for a shift in how bilateral collaboration is established between Swedish universities and their counterparts in the South, where the latter takes a more decisive role. After 2010, collaborations are established through an open competitive process where collaboration proposals with Swedish institutions are vetted against the strategies of the partner university in the low-income country. Furthermore, the PhD-education is now slowly moving away from the sandwich model, so that the education can be made in the home country of the student.[15] In the early 2000's some first attempts were also made to look for models of how scientific knowledge produced in the bilateral programmes could be better put to use through supporting local

[11] Utrikesdepartementet 1985, p 235-238
[12] See e.g. Kihlberg 1995; Eduards 2006
[13] Data from Sida Research Unit, Lisa Roman, 20 feb 2017. This figure is however not reconciled with figures reported in OpenAid, where the figures for research aid spending in these countries total approximately 176 MSEK for 2015. It should also be noted that Sida does not report aggregated figures for research in bilateral, regional, global and Swedish programmes separately through OpenAid which makes data retrieval complicated for the financial analysis.
[14] Edqvist 2006, p 16
[15] Hannah Akuffo, interview 2016-11-01

innovation clusters.[16] This could hence be seen as a precursor to the new strategic objective of innovation.

Within global and regional collaboration, some partnerships have been of a very long-term nature. There are some organisations and programmes that have received sustained Swedish support since the 1970s: World Health Organisation (WHO); the Consultative Group for International Agriculture Research (CGIAR); International Foundation for Science (IFS); and International Science Programme (ISP). These programmes deserve mentioning not only because of their long-term character, but also since they make up a substantial part of the research aid portfolio. In 1984, the combined support to these four organisations made up 95% of the total funding to global operations within SAREC, or almost half of the entire research aid budget.[17] In 2015, Sida disbursed 256 million SEK to the same four organisations, or close to one third of Sida's total research aid disbursements of 793 million.[18] Also at the regional level some partnerships have been sustained over the decades. For example, the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA) has received continuous support since the early days of SAREC.[19] In 2015 the organisation received 20 million SEK from Sida.[20] The combined support to regional and global research, which made up 96% of all SAREC-funded activities in 1976, has stayed around 60% since the mid-1980s (see Table 1). The fact that a handful of global and regional programmes and organisations have received substantial support over three decades or more must not be taken as a proof of stagnation or complacency on the part of the financier. This long-term relationship and support also placed Sida and SAREC in a position to influence organisations like WHO and CGIAR to better respond to Swedish priority areas such as national capacity building.[21]

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[16] Tomas Kjellqvist, interview 2016-11-08

[17] WHO 46%, CGIAR 33%, IFS 9%, ISP 7%. Utrikesdepartementet 1985, p 155, 165, 182,185

[18] The disbursements figures for 2015 to WHO, CGIAR, ISP and IFS are taken from Open Aid,http://www.sida.se/English/partners/our-partners/research-cooperation/about-sida-research-cooperation/research-support/. The figure for total disbursement is from Sida 2016, p 77

[19] Utrikesdepartementet 1985

[20] http://openaid.se/sv/activity/SE-0-SE-6-5100003001-AFR-43082

[21] Rolf Carlman, interview 2016-11-03

Table 1. Key budget figures for Swedish research aid and its main operational areas.

	1975/76[22] MSEK % of total	1983/84[23] MSEK % of total	1993/94[24] MSEK % of total	2001[25] MSEK % of total	2005[26] MSEK % of total	2015 MSEK % of total
Swedish research (u-forsk)	2.2 3 %	13.9 9 %		76.1 10 %	98.9 12 %	130.7[27] 14 %
Bilateral	0.15 0 %	37.4 23 %	33 %	216.4 29 %	249.1 29 %	270[28] 28 %
Regional & Global	72.3 96 %	101.9 64 %	64 %	448.9 59 %	457.3 54 %	
Total research aid[29]	75	160	405	750	847	951
Aid frame[30]	2853	6395	12960	15695	22418	30009
Research aid – share of total aid frame	2.6 %	2.5 %	3.1 %	4.8 %	3.8 %	3.2 %

[22] Figures for bilateral, regional, global and Swedish allocations from Utrikesdepartementet 1985
[23] Figures for bilateral, regional, global and Swedish allocations from Utrikesdepartementet 1985
[24] Percentage shares of bilateral, regional, and global from SAREC 1994. No figures given, and support to Swedish universities not reported separately.
[25] Eduards 2006. Aid frame; see note 39
[26] Eduards 2006. Aid frame; see note 39
[27] Vetenskapsrådet 2016. Does not include Swedish Research Links, a North-South network collaboration programme funded by the aid budget, with disbursements of 33.1 MSEK in 2015.
[28] See footnote 13
[29] Figures include only SAREC allocations until 1994, from Utrikesdepartementet 1985; Prop 1992/93:100 (Utgiftsområde C). 2001 and 2005 figures from Eduards 2006; 2015 figure from Prop 2014/15:1 (Utgiftsområde 7).
[30] The aid budget frame for respective years are taken from Government Budget Bills: Prop 1975:1; Prop 1982/83:100; Prop 1992/93:100 (Utgiftsområde C); Prop 2000/01:1; Prop 2004/05:1; Prop 2014/15:1 (Utgiftsområde 7).

The funding of research in Sweden has been present all along but has also seen some changes in recent years. A series of evaluations in 2006 concluded that the support to the Swedish institutions were much too small to have any wider effect on the Swedish research arena, and the support was concentrated to eight large universities. Not least, it was pointed out that the collaboration with the different Swedish research councils was still insufficient.[31] But in 2013, the responsibility for supporting Swedish universities conducting research of relevance to low-income countries was transferred to the Swedish Research Council (Vetenskapsrådet, VR).[32] Also, funding levels have fluctuated. From 1976 to 1984 SAREC's support to Swedish universities for development-oriented research grew from 3% to 9% of the total research aid. The volumes then levelled off at around the 10% mark but an increase to 14% of Sweden's total research aid can be noted in 2015 (see table 1). Still the 165 MSEK earmarked for Swedish institutions from the aid allocation is small compared to the total budget of the government-funded research in Sweden, which was over 33 BSEK the same year.[33] There is also still a concentration to a few universities, with six universities receiving 131 MSEK or 80% of all research aid disbursed by Vetenskapsrådet in 2015.[34]

With regards to the overall funding level of research aid, it has fluctuated roughly between 3% and 4% of the total annual aid allocation (see table 1). In 1973 the u-forsk commission noted that 3% of the Swedish aid already was channelled towards research, through large international organisations (65%), Swedish universities (6%), bilateral support (14%) and other channels (15%).[35] The commission advocated an increase of research to 5% of the total aid envelope, but this fell on deaf ears in the government, which let research aid grow proportional to total aid allocations, thus remaining at around 3%.[36] In the year 2001, the share of research aid had actually soared to 4.7 %.[37]

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[31] Deiaco, Högberg and Svensson 2006; Edqvist 2006.
[32] Vetenskapsrådet 2014, p 19
[33] www.scb.se, online table "Beräknade FoU-medel i budgetpropositionen efter ändamål" http://www.scb.se/sv_/Hitta-statistik/Statistik-efter-amne/Utbildning-och-forskning/Forskning/Statliga-anslag-till-forskning-och-utveckling/25067/25074/126407/ <2016-11-30>
[34] These are: Lunds Universitet, Uppsala Universitet, Göteborgs Universitet, Stockholms Universitet, Karolinska Institutet, and Sveriges Lantbruksuniversitet. Vetenskapsrådet 2016, p 83-84
[35] SOU 1973:41, p 115
[36] Utrikesdepartementet 1985
[37] Disbursement in 2001 from Eduards 2006; aid allocation from Regeringens Budgetproposition Prop 2000/01:1, utgiftsområde 7, Internationellt Bistånd

This may have been an effect of a temporarily squeezed aid frame (which then stood at only 0.73% of GNI in the wake of the IT crisis).[38] But from then on, the allocation to research aid has slowly eroded as a share of total aid. By 2015, the total research aid allocation to Sida and VR represented 3.2 % of the aid budget frame.[39]

In a broad-brush picture such as this one, certainly there are many details, nuances and minor shifts that are lost. We have for instance refrained from a systematic analysis of the thematic foci of Swedish research aid. But it is obvious that a large share has been directed to agricultural sciences, public health, technology and basic sciences and that the humanities and social sciences have received comparatively little funding. For example, in 2013-2015, VR only awarded 1% of the total grants for research aid to the humanities.[40]

In any case, we believe it is fair to say that the following key characteristics and activity areas can be used to describe Swedish research aid:

- financing and promoting bilateral cooperation for capacity building based on institutional support in the South, collaboration with Swedish universities, PhD education, and infrastructure support;
- financing of global and regional research organisations, with a handful of organisations getting a large share of the funding through long-term partnerships;
- financing of research in Sweden of relevance to developing countries through a science council function, where a handful of universities attract most of the funding;
- a relatively stable funding regime with 3 to 4% of government aid allocations going to research, divided into streams of 25-30% to bilateral support, 50-60% to global and regional organisations, and 10-15% to Swedish university research.

[38] Another explanation could be that in our calculations, we have included only the SAREC budget in the research aid volumes until 1994. Research-related activities previously funded by SIDA outside the research aid budget may have affected the research aid statistics after the merger in 1995, leading to higher figures.
[39] Sida (2016); Vetenskapsrådet 2016; Prop 2014/15:1
[40] Vetenskapsrådet 2016

These salient features indicate a framework which has remained relatively stable over three decades. Nevertheless, we note that changes have taken place within the components of the research aid framework over the years to respond to internal shortcomings as well as to contextual changes. A pertinent question will thus be whether the framework itself has sufficient adaptive stretch to effectively meet the global challenges of today and tomorrow. We also note with some concern that research aid budget allocations have been on a sliding slope over the past fifteen years, both in relation to the growing aid allocation, possibly indicating a growing disinterest in research from aid policy makers in government, and in relation to the total growth of publicly funded research and development in Sweden. In chapter four, we will return to a more detailed discussion about continuity and change in Swedish research aid.

Our method

Against the outline of key trends and characteristics provided above, it becomes interesting to ask questions about the direction of Swedish research aid and the thinking that was behind it at different moments in time. What rationale has guided Swedish research aid? What kind of analysis has informed it? What strands of expertise or political ambitions have influenced research aid and how did decision-makers position research aid in the broader Swedish research and innovation agenda? Our historical analysis of these questions is not intended to be exhaustive; rather it will be selective and analytically predicated on the ambition to reconsider research aid as it has been conceived in Sweden over the past four decades, and today.

Over the past decade it has become increasingly clear, that to meet many of the large challenges of humanity, there is need for more scientific knowledge – but also, and perhaps even more importantly, that natural science, technology and medicine, the STEM fields, will not be enough. The 'hard sciences' have contributed significantly to the rise of material well-being for billions of people. Yet in some crucial areas, like climate change and global sustainable development, more and better scientific knowledge does not seem to alone hold the key to secure and sustained life on Earth for as many as possible of its inhabitants. As argued by global climate change expert Mike Hulme, the establishment and dissemination of robust scientific knowledge does not in itself pave the way for a change in how people – and their

politicians – act and behave.[41] The same argument has been made even more decisively within a growing community of transitions and transformations researchers that instead argue for state-led innovation and a broadening of the knowledge base for innovation and societal learning to include social sciences and humanities.[42]

Even in the face of overwhelming scientific facts, it still comes down to what we want to believe. This insight – that actions are guided by values, beliefs, sentiments and cultural factors and not just rational calculation – has enriched new and fruitful fields of inquiry, for example, institutional economics.[43] Rationality has been the guiding star for cultural and economic development in the Western world since the onset of the enlightenment era in the late 1600s. Stephen Toulmin and others have pointed out that maybe this era is moving towards an end. After three centuries of social and economic development in pursuit of universal knowledge and rationality, enlightenment ideals may be eroding. To a large extent for deplorable reasons when respect for knowledge is weakening, but probably to some interesting extent also because certain human qualities and social capabilities were overlooked, or rather not developed carefully enough, in the huge modernisation project of the West.[44] New work in a range of fields indicates that the relation between research and the growth of knowledge on the one hand and social progress on the other is fraught and complex. Even the very concept social progress has once again come on the agenda as it no longer could simply be related to easy to use indicators, often defined chiefly by economic growth.[45] This may serve as a reminder of classical debates on the very foundations and principles of Swedish research aid, where the 'SAREC idea' wanted to present an alternative to conventional growth centred definitions of development.[46] The human sciences are therefore increasingly becoming the object of analysis and policy interest as societal transformations rise on the agenda.[47]

History is one of the fields of the humanities that have been sorely under-utilised in development studies. By nature, development theory

[41] Hulme 2009; 2016
[42] Mazzucato 2015; 2016; Perez 2013; Rodrik 2013
[43] e.g. Ostrom 2005; North 1990
[44] Toulmin 1992
[45] See the web page of the organization International Panel for Social Progress, with some 300 social scientists, founded by Amartya Sen: https://www.ipsp.org/
[46] Interview with Björn Hettne 10 November 2016.
[47] Bate 2011; Small 2013; Hazelkorn 2015

is always looking forward; leaving the old and undesired present behind, towards more desirable futures. However, there is a lot to learn from looking back, not least from mistakes in past development policies. Historians try to provide meaningful narratives of what is happening. These are typically also good stories that make sense out of the world and bring clarity and insight – we could say a pattern – to what may have hitherto appeared complex and obscure. A good story, from a historian's point view, is also a story that builds on sources that can be checked, and that meet generic normative criteria of the discipline. Sources and historical evidence on which the story is built must be used with care, taking into consideration such things as relevance, visibility, bias, proximity and robustness of each source.[48]

Most of the primary sources for this study are found in open archives, many of them downloadable from government websites and digital archives. This promotes the principle of inter-subjectivity in any study; it is relatively easy for a reader with access to the internet to check many of the source documents we have used. It should be noted that the quotes from Swedish archival sources we use are our own translations.

Our primary sources mainly fall into several broad categories:

- publications of international organisations like UNESCO, OECD, IBRD etc.
- government communications such as letters of instructions and commission reports;
- documents of the Swedish parliament such as committee papers and parliamentary bills;
- agency publications such as Sida evaluations and annual reports from SAREC and Swedish Research Council, and; online database sources like Open Aid and World Development Indicators.

The literature we draw on originates from several genres, including multiple strands of history, political science, development theory, and science policy studies, to name a few. All sources and literature are listed at the end of the report, while short-hand references are used in the footnotes. We also indicate hypertext address where applicable.

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[48] Torstendahl 1988; Ågren 2005

In a few instances we have used personal communication as a source, which is indicated in the footnotes. To a limited extent we have used structured or semi-structured interviews and these are listed at the end. Throughout our work we have consulted with knowledgeable people, notably with the members of the EBA reference group[49]. Preliminary findings have been presented at the Development Research Conference in Stockholm in August 2016, and a draft version of this report was presented to the board of Sida's Research Council in October 2016. We are grateful for all comments and valuable input from all individuals we have met and any mistakes or faulty interpretations are entirely our responsibility.

[49] The reference group members were: Gun-Britt Andersson, Rolf Carlman, Lena Johansson de Château, Måns Lönnroth, and Sylvia Schwaag Serger. We are also grateful for valuable comments on the draft report received from Veronica Brodén Gyberg and Bertil Odén.

2 The post-war setting: development ideologies and practices

From a colonial world order to Cold War order

Almost without exceptions, narratives tracing the birth of development aid (and its namesake development cooperation) take their beginning at the end of the World War II. The Western allied victors had then learned a lesson from the turmoil that had erupted in the wake of the Versailles terms of surrender, 26 years earlier. This time, they saw it necessary to quickly rebuild a devastated Europe to stop it from plunging into chaos and radicalisation again, especially with Soviet influence and military power now at its gates. Hence, 1945 and the "Marshall plan" serves as a main starting point for the story about development aid in a great many accounts.[50] Development aid is typically portrayed as an extension of the Marshall-plan; a replication of a successful model into the rapidly decolonising South, as the wave of liberation swept through the colonised world from the 1950s.[51]

The idea of "development" in low-income countries in the global South was not something new in the industrialised world in 1945. Throughout the colonial era there had been a widespread sense of "duty to civilise" among colonisers, with an in-built narrative of bringing about "civilisation", modernity or "development" in the regions of the world then considered "backwards".[52] Thus, brutal domination of colonial areas could come wrapped in claims of a duty to civilise, sometimes hand in hand with the introduction of Christianity through mission stations in the 1800s, or wrapped in education, aesthetics, sports, or other forms of cultivation of the 'inferior' races.[53] The Dutch 'Ethical policy' of 1901 and the British Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940 are later examples of colonisers' agendas to promote western-style modernisation in the less

[50] See e.g. Hettne 1995; Knutsson 2011
[51] Odén 2006
[52] Rosenblum 1986; Pyenson 1993; Jerónimo 2015; Conklin 1998; Rist 1997
[53] Axelsson 1970; Pakenham 2002; Granqvist 2008; Mangan 1993

developed regions.[54] Earlier roots go deep down to Early Modern ideas of "the improvement of the world" through the spread of imperial institutions, including those for knowledge and economic utilization.[55]

The tendency to provide simplified narratives which overlook the pre-history of development aid put us at risk to define the aid arena too narrowly. As Uma Kothari, Professor of Development Studies at University of Manchester, puts it; the aid arena "...rarely acknowledges its full historical antecedents and in particular its roots in a colonial past, despite ample evidence that the post-war international development industry was built on colonial foundations and reworks relationships, perceptions and attitudes of empire."[56] Development policy could do well to be informed by its own history to acknowledge its roots, its aspects of geo-politics as well as their *Realpolitik* implications which stretch far back in history and into the future.[57]

Nevertheless, the Second World War was a major watershed in global politics and not least in the global South. The relationship between rich and poor countries changed, and so did the dominant ideas and intellectual thought around development.[58] The global power-relations as well as local structures and value systems of master-servant relationships had been undermined over a longer period of time, and WW2 precipitated a major change; a rupture in social, economical and political life of the relationship to such an extent that the old colonial order could no longer be upheld.[59] Former colonies became independent, but soon discovered that the previous master-servant relationships were (partly) replaced by centre-periphery global power imbalances.

Yet another force field had now arisen, into which the old North-South dichotomy was nested: that of national security. Just coming out of years of war against fascism in Europe and against Japanese imperialism in Asia, the United States took a lead in the War on Communism. It was fought at the home front ("the McCarthy era"); it was fought in the militarised fault lines of Europe; through the

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[54] Kooy and Bakker 2008; Nilsson 2006
[55] The literature on science and imperialism is vast. A few seminal works: Adas 1989; Crosby 1986; Miller and Reill 1996; Drayton 2000
[56] Kothari 2011, p.65
[57] Adebayo 2010
[58] Knutsson 2011
[59] Wilson 1994

military-industrial armaments race (Cold War); and it was fought as a proxy war on poverty in the South (Aid). Harry Truman's Four Point Plan of 1949 laid it out clearly: only through eradication of extreme poverty world-wide through development and "modernisation" would it be possible to win the War on Communism and ensure Western security. Poverty was the breeding ground for authoritarian rule and communism in particular.[60] Within a decade, the United States had been followed by a number of industrialised countries - including Sweden- that started up development aid programmes, all to combat poverty in low-income countries.

Typically, former European colonisers took on the quest of development aid primarily in their former colonies. But also the Soviet Union engaged in cold proxy war in distant territories of the South. Fighting poverty with Soviet aid was a way of showing the world the benefits of modernisation under socialism.[61] Post-war governments of the West and the East thus engaged in development from a realist-political point of view; it was in their long-term security interests that poor countries were relieved of abject poverty. As Odd Arne Westad has argued, the thrust for "development" in the South was not just a by-product of the Cold War. The developing world was the centre stage for a race between two political ideologies, both trying to win the South for their own version of "modernisation".[62]

How did Sweden enter the aid arena? Sweden did not hold any colonial possessions in the global South since 1878 and has recently defined itself as a "country without a colonial past".[63] Nevertheless, Sweden participated in the Berlin-conference of 1884-1885, infamous for being the occasion when European powers carved up the African continent. Sweden then expressed a strong support for the "civilising mission" undertaken by the other powers in Africa, and later hundreds of Swedes would seek employment with King Leopold's brutal regime in the Congo.[64] But instead of running formal colonial possessions, Swedish naval merchants, industries and entrepreneurs succeeded fairly well in plugging into the colonial machineries and profiting from

[60] Expectedly, there was a mounting suspicion in the developing world that 'the West' was imposing a false and exploitative regime on the world's poor; a stark example is Claude Ake 1979. See also Rist 1997; Robertson 2016; Engerman et al 2003
[61] Kochetkova, Sliusarchuk and Lajus 2015
[62] Westad 2005
[63] See e.g. the Swedish government Africa policies: Utrikesdepartementet 1997; Swedish Government 2008
[64] Nilsson 2013

colonial business in the Americas, Africa and Asia.[65] Swedish missionaries also took part in the European movement to "civilise" the global South, establishing themselves in far-away places like Congo and Ethiopia.[66] When development aid entered the scene after the war, there was thus Swedish presence in many of the newly independent countries through the missions, but also through the private sector and a network of trade consuls, which were part of Swedish Foreign Service.[67] In a few developing countries there had been bilateral cooperation prior to 1945, notably with Ethiopia, one of the few countries in Africa that were never colonised. Here, Sweden had a military cooperation with the Ethiopian state as early as 1934.[68]

If the clash of ideologies of the East and the West propelled development in the South, then Sweden found itself on the outside of these logics. Sweden was officially neither West nor East after the WW2, at least so it was said.[69] As a neutral country sandwiched in between the blocks, it tried to show that a third "middle way" was possible. The post-war social democratic governments would ensure a place for Sweden on the international development arena, aligning with the call for poverty reduction in the "under-developed" countries. But for Sweden the logic of either undermining or legitimising Communism could not be a valid framing; Sweden had meticulously defined itself outside of such a geopolitical dichotomy by enacting a third way policy or – as it was broadly understood on the domestic political scene; a Swedish model.[70] Discursively and politically Sweden thus emphasised that development aid should reduce poverty, but not for the promotion of the ideologies of the West or the East. The Swedish geopolitical strategy that came to frame development aid was to downplay the East-West axis and to create a logic of cooperation along a North-South axis instead. Political scientist Ulf Bjereld has argued that by engaging actively in global development, under the banner call for solidarity with developing

[65] Muller 2004; Rönnbäck 2008; Muller and Makko 2014; Avango, Högselius and Nilsson 2017
[66] Axelsson 1970; Baaz Eriksson 2003; Granqvist 2008
[67] Emanuelsson 1980; Makko 2014
[68] Lars Ericsson 1996
[69] There is now a substantial literature on the Swedish de facto alignment and military cooperation with NATO during the Cold War. See e.g. Weinberger 2003; Dalsjö 2006; Nilsson 2007; Gribbe 2011. The formal acceptance document of the Western orientation of Sweden during the Cold War was the report by the Neutrality policy commission, SOU 1994:11
[70] Odén 2006; Stråth 2004

countries, the Swedish government also sought legitimacy for its own policy of non-alliance and neutrality, and by and large, for the Swedish model based on democratic socialism.[71] In short, development aid did not only help people out of poverty, it produced a world-wide showroom for the Swedish model. As a bonus, there were clearly prospects to create business opportunities for industry as well as for knowledge agents. On the whole, international aid was something that seemed to hold a promise for everyone in the 1960s.

The rise of 'environment' and the global problem catalogue

The Swedish development aid, just like development aid in most countries, took shape against a background of a rapidly changing international outlook in the decades following the Second World War. As mentioned, the colonial empires crumbled and dissolved, mostly in a fairly orderly way but also following conflict, sometimes armed. The partition of India in 1947 was a major step and by the middle of the 1960s this process was by and large completed, with the Portuguese African colonies remaining where liberation struggle lingered for another decade.[72] This was a major geopolitical shift that in the first place brought the oriental and colonial 'other' out of his and her confines into a purely subordinate role of imperial non-citizen and instead made the 'wretched of the earth' in Frantz Fanon's famous phrase – and the title of his 1961 book with the equally famous foreword by Jean Paul Sartre – into an acting subject. In the process, the new independent states of these new subjects became an interesting category for the states that were not former colonial powers, among them Sweden. Decolonization opened up a geopolitical virgin space where new Western states (as well as the Soviet Union) could move in, clearly with some competition and division of labour between themselves.

The emerging post-colonial world was recasting some of the political patterns that were already established in the global North, although this was gradually changing with the formation of the G77

[71] Bjereld 2007. Ann-Sofie Nilsson 1991 has argued along similar lines; that aid was (partly) an activity that sought to create legitimacy of a distinct Swedish political and social system.
[72] The classic work is Franz Ansprenger 1989, also, Duara 2004. Literature on Indian partition is huge, see e.g. *Khan 2007*

movement of the Alliance Free States somewhat later. Another key feature of this early post war phase was the emergence of the geopolitics of energy and resources. The war had made it clear that science and technology played key roles and this awareness only increased during the Cold War. The Paley commission in the UK, and similar committees and research projects in other countries looked carefully into the global strategic situation of oil, coal and other energy resources, rare earth components and metals, and the possible global trends of their use and availability.

This in turn was only a part of the even wider set of issues that had to do with human-nature relations, especially against the background of a rapidly growing world population, conceptualized by the phrase "the demographic transition" coined by the American sociologist Warren S. Thompson in 1929. Two years earlier, the League of Nations had hosted the massive population conference in Geneva which drew enormous interest and for the first time in history really posed overpopulation and resources as a major global dilemma.[73] The work that had been started by Charles Galton and Karl Pearson on population statistics, and was continued by Alfred J. Lotka and Alexander Carr Saunders, author of *The population problem* of 1922, was now catapulted into one of the world's central issues. Attendees, including everyone from economist John Maynard Keynes to birth control campaigner Margaret Sanger, were at least as interested in resources as they were in demography.[74] This conference incorporated the Seventh International Neo-Malthusian and Birth Control Conference, and hence had a strong orientation towards managing limits of different kinds. The carrying capacities of the world's agricultural producers were contrasted with empirical predictions of population growth.[75] As census data improved, the Malthusian debate could increasingly employ *actual* numbers. However, statistics now presented methods to develop predictive models, albeit still controversial, as forerunners of the methods adopted by modellers in the second half of the century. The biologist Raymond Pearl, who was briefly a patron of Rachel Carson, promoted the logistic curve that they had worked on in the study of fruit fly populations as a standard

[73] Bashford 2007; 2014
[74] Bashford 2007; 2014, p 3
[75] Thompson 1929; Kirk 1996; Connelly 2008; Bashford 2014, p 82-87

and reliable means to predict future population developments within "definite limits" – including national ones.[76]

After the war this entire set of issues – population, energy, resources – were joined by other emerging matters that seemed to follow a similar logic of limits and constraints and were all in one way or the other strategic, or implied potential problems: ecology, conservation, threats to species, pollution, overfishing, disease, erosion (spurred by the American Dust Bowl in the 1930s). In a formative moment during the late 1940s these were subsumed under the concept 'environment', an old word that had circulated in geographical, biological and even psychological literature since the 19th century but now took on a new integrative meaning as, at the same time, an increasingly vulnerable nature transformed by human action and the domain where a set of crucial problems converge.[77] When development aid policies were shaped in the 1950s and 1960s, 'the environment', and its sense of lurking crisis and resource scarcity, was forming a foundational element of the modern world view, a kind of corrective or counter tendency that became the sinister twin of the more upbeat idea of economic growth and progress. The Environment was not about progress, but about decay and destruction, and it made its imprint on development aid policies at large, but even more so on development research thinking as it was quickly deemed necessary to make sure that whatever favours economic development might bring would not be undone by environmental problems rising in the future. This was an idea that was marginal at first but that gradually grew in urgency during the 1960s and with the UN 1972 conference on the environment in Stockholm was fully established on the level of world affairs, after several years of preparation. Global environmental governance, as it was later to be called, was now a reality and research aid was an integrative part of it.[78]

This created a somewhat schizophrenic situation for those preoccupied with development research and the aid programs related to it. What was the research to be focused on? Should it promote the

[76] Pearl and Reed used census data to try and fix growth to the logistic curves they developed in studying fruit fly populations. Putnam assessed their predictions in 1953, finding the error in regard to the USA very small (0.3%) but in regard to the Philippines, very big (122%), and found an underestimate of 27% for the whole world. Putnam 1953, p 40. See also Kingsland 1985; Bashford 2014, p 81, 88-89

[77] Warde and Sörlin 2015, pp. 38-62

[78] In the growing literature on the formation of global environmental governance, see e.g. Borowy 2013; Conca 2015; Macekura 2015

growth agenda, using ready-made concepts of progress and wealth, or should it focus on preparing developing nations for a more austere environmental future where resource constraints and possible climate disaster – a prospect that became increasingly likely to experts in the 1970s and has continued to gain ground since – were legitimate targets for research and capacity building? The very same year as the UN conference the MIT and Club of Rome report, appeared. *Limits to Growth* was published in 1972 and became the subject of heated debates precisely about the usefulness of constraints.[79] Nothing such was necessary, a wide array of economists and policy analysts suggested, with tacit support from many incredulous people who as yet would not readily buy the message that there was anything seriously wrong with the production of wealth and could hardly believe that 'the environment' – the buzzword of 1972 – was really all that important. The supporters of limits were depicted as neo-Malthusians and thus by implication not possible to trust. They also lost the debate, and economic theory would more and more become an arena for thinking around sustained economic growth.[80] But research aid had already started to take the implications of environment seriously, and that concern would not diminish in the years to come. For Sweden it was an early interest that would, with time, serve Swedish interests as well as those of the world.

The foundations of Swedish development aid 1960-1970

Against this wider background outlining issues and trends that influenced global development researchers during much of the 1900s, we will now turn to how the development aid arena was established in Sweden. It is not our aim to deliver a comprehensive account of the evolution of the Swedish government's international aid policies from its infancy in the 1950s to the mature stages of the 1970s. Nonetheless, it is important to point to some important features of the formative period in the 1960s, especially in the light of the larger geopolitical framing given above. The Swedish government had been directly involved in development aid through the "Centralkommittén", the central committee for development aid to

[79] Nörgård et al 2010, pp. 59-63
[80] Eastin et al. 2010

less developed areas; a public-private collaboration mechanism created in 1952.[81] A number of projects and collaborations were financed through Centralkommittén and the Swedish Institute in the 1950s. This included, for example, the training of veterinarians from India at the Veterinary College in Sweden, and creating a Swedish-Ethiopian Institute of Building Technology.[82] There was an increasing interest for development aid in the Swedish society at large, also fuelled by the large publicly-funded campaigns "Sverige Hjälper" (Sweden Helps) from 1955 onwards.[83] Despite this, Sweden's international engagement in development aid was at this time miniscule compared to most countries in the OECD. In 1960, Sweden's aid was a mere 7 Million USD, completely dwarfed by aid volumes of USA of almost 3 Billion USD. Also in comparison with former colonisers like France (877 MUSD) and UK (432 MUSD) Sweden's financial contribution was insignificant.[84] Sweden had just signed a UN declaration that called for an increase of aid flows to 1% of GDP of all the world's rich countries. But even in relation to the size of its economy, Sweden was way behind in 1960. Aid disbursements were only 0.1% of GDP as compared to the 0.6% average among all OECD countries.[85]

The government in 1961 put together an advisory board with the purpose of assessing how Sweden could ramp up its state-administered aid. Prime Minister Tage Erlander himself chaired the advisory board, which clearly points to the strategic importance of development aid for the political leadership.[86] An inter-departmental working group was put in place to prepare and facilitate the work of the advisory board, headed by Olof Palme.[87] Palme was already one of Erlander's closest aides and earlier had a key role in developing an action plan for Swedish aid, under the Sverige Hjälper umbrella, in 1959.[88]

Sweden now braced to show itself more prominently on the international scene and quickly increase its international aid. But what role should international aid play in the Swedish foreign policy? And what could a small and neutral country really expect to achieve? The working group produced over a dozen of reports and assessments,

[81] Öhman 2006, p97
[82] Bruno 2016
[83] Öhman 2006, p110 ff
[84] Prop 1962:100, p105
[85] Prop 1962:100, p 20-21
[86] Bruno 2016, p104
[87] SOU 1962:12
[88] Öhman 2006, p 103

some published as a governmental inquiry.[89] They all fed into the preparation process of the Government Bill 1962:100, popularly known as "Biståndsbibeln" (The Aid Bible). In the Parliament Bill – the Aid Bible - three reasons were presented for Sweden's increased international engagement: international solidarity and humanitarian grounds; foreign policy objectives, and; trade and global business opportunities. While "...Swedish aid will of course not be dictated by any strategical motives" the government stressed that "thanks to our policy of neutrality and lack of colonial burden, Sweden should enjoy the trust of developing nations, which increases both our responsibility and our ability to assist."[90]

Sweden's involvement in international aid is associated almost by definition with the first motive listed above; solidarity. The desire and willingness to help less fortunate humans can be a strong ethical code in society, one which the early campaigns of Sverige Hjälper alluded to in its public messages and imagery.[91] Solidarity was a core value within social democratic ideology, and calls for increased Swedish solidarity and increased aid to poor countries had been raised throughout the 1950s within the ruling social democrat party.[92] Other political parties across the left-right divide also contributed to the increased Swedish involvement in international aid. This strong Swedish support for aid, which included sustained support to liberation movements in Southern Africa, have typically been understood as, and presented as, acts of international solidarity. [93] It would be fair to say that in general, Swedish international aid is closely associated with solidarity as a key motive and central trope in Sweden's self-perception as a donor country. In the following, we will look more closely also at the other two motives – foreign policy and business – and how they were construed as part of an increased Swedish international aid.

To Palme's group it was clear that Sweden had small chances of making a huge impact on the global aid scene. In its summary report (annex to the Government Bill) they concluded that: "The Swedish aid will never offer anything but marginal value compared to the

[89] SOU 1962:12
[90] Prop 1962:100 p6
[91] Öhman 2006
[92] Berg, Lundberg and Tydén forthcoming 2017, pers comm Urban Lundberg June and Nov 2016
[93] Sellström 1999

contributions by the great powers, and in relation to the needs."[94] But they were also clear that aid offered an important opportunity for the second motive; that of using aid as a foreign policy vehicle. Aid was a new foreign policy tool through which the Swedish government could combine foreign policy objectives with trade and business interests, all in the name of global solidarity. In terms of foreign policy, the inter-departmental group advised that "The Swedish development aid is part of foreign policy and must be understood against the purposes and means of the latter". Obviously, the line of neutrality put Sweden in a special position not just in relation to the West-East dichotomy but also in relation to the developing countries of the global South. Sweden's stance of being neutral in wartime and alliance-free in peacetime, risked being construed as "a negative definition of the independent course we are charting in relation to the surrounding world". A more positive interpretation of Sweden's neutrality was called for. The report expressed that the great powers were beginning to see the benefits of having small and independent nations to carry out delicate missions on the international scene, and the Swedish military intervention in UN colours in Congo was explicitly referred to as a case in point. What was even more important was that the world witnessed the birth of a number of new and independent nations in the South when former colonial regimes fell, one after the other. "Among the peoples in Asia and Africa that have recently gained or shortly will gain their independence", the report argued, "there is a strong wish to avoid the influence of the great powers and to pursue what they themselves often call a policy of neutrality." The report maintains that the young independent countries "seek a model for the political economical and social development in our country. Their confidence in Sweden stems obviously partly from our lack of a colonial past, but may also be explained by the parallels in our foreign policy objectives."[95]

Decolonisation was quickly creating a new political world map, and Sweden saw an opportunity in aligning itself with the young and presumably independent and neutral nations of the South. "The new nations hold, together with the countries of Latin America, majority in the General Assembly of the United Nations." These new independent countries were assumed to be sceptical to "anything that

[94] Prop 1962:100 p134
[95] Prop 1962: 100 p130-131

resembles foreign dominance". Surely, developing countries realised they would require assistance from richer nations, but "they will not accept aid at the cost of economical or political dependence".[96]

Thus, Sweden had a special role to play in the international aid arena from a foreign policy point of view: "Due to the Swedish foreign policy of neutrality, which is regarded by most developing countries as a parallel to their own foreign policy stance, our activity on the international aid scene will be closely followed by the recipient countries".[97] Sweden was by this time giving substantial financial support to the United Nations. While the UN should remain a priority, Sweden ought not become a disproportionately large donor, avoiding that Sweden would come to assume "too prominent a position within the multilateral aid programmes".[98] The ambitious up-scaling of Swedish aid that was foreseen should thus be done through increases in bilateral cooperation.[99]

The third motive - business opportunities and trade - had been a natural part of Sweden's relations with the developing world. Up to this point, one government commission concluded, trade relations and private business had made up the bulk of Swedish relations with developing countries.[100] In this period the ambition to scale up development aid and simultaneously support Swedish business interests were not seen as conflicting goals.[101] The Aid Bible concluded that: "The bilateral aid may lead to benefits for Swedish business in those instances it will lead to an increased export. This should in itself not be met with any objection from the developing nations."[102] Several of the reports and assessments made in preparation of the Aid Bible dealt with commercial relations and the opportunities for Swedish business and the government was positively disposed towards reduced trade barriers as well as towards increasing Swedish export credits.[103] Sweden, whose economy largely depended on exports, saw increasing global trade under freest possible conditions as clearly in line with its foreign policy agenda.[104] Another advantage

[96] Prop 1962:100, p132
[97] Prop 1962:100, p134
[98] Prop 1962:100 p19
[99] Prop 1962:100, p135
[100] SOU 1961:22, p9
[101] Öhman 2006; Glover 2014
[102] Prop 1962:100, p135
[103] Prop 1962:100, p13
[104] Prop 1962:100, p132

from a Swedish economy viewpoint was that the increasing aid volumes could have a positive impact on domestic development. The government bill actually states that the increased public spending on aid flows could be used to stimulate the Swedish economy in times of economic downturn, much in line with the then dominant Keynesian model.[105] The commercial relationships and the interests of Swedish industry would however remain a controversial area for a long term, giving rise to several government inquiries, for example one in 1963 on commercial and trade relations and one on industry and aid, in 1972.[106] When a government commission in 1977-78 reviewed the organisation of Swedish aid, the business-related areas of international cooperation were given very little attention.[107] Our impression is that aid never became a strong platform for increased trade and Swedish business opportunities.

There have been several motives for the Swedish aid all along.[108] Bertil Odén and Lennart Wolgemuth, in a similar vein to Tor Sellström, have argued that the solidarity motives were paramount in Swedish aid.[109] However, we believe that the function of aid as a geopolitical vehicle – and as a way of constructing and securing a global niche for Sweden in the Cold War landscape – needs to be taken more into account when analysing how Swedish development aid, including research aid, was formed in the 1970s.

The take-home message from our short assessment of the formative moment of Swedish aid landscape in the early 1960s, is that foreign policy objectives significantly contributed to shaping Sweden's aid, the volumes of which grew rapidly after 1962. Supporting independence in the South was introduced as an outright policy objective in Swedish aid policy in 1968.[110] But its foundation as a doctrine Sweden's geopolitical strategy was laid already during the Government Bill preparations in 1961 and 1962, a work led in practice by Olof Palme. "Independence" would remain a key *Leitmotif* in Swedish aid policy well into the 1980s before it started withering away.[111] The idea of supporting the new nations of the South to

[105] Prop 1962:100 p23
[106] SOU 1963:37; SOU 1972:90. Öhman 2006 and Glover 2014 both discuss the conflicts of commercial and more "altruistic" interests in Swedish aid.
[107] SOU 1978:61, Biståndets organisation.
[108] Ehrenpreis 1997
[109] Odén and Wolgemuth 2011; Sellström 1999
[110] Odén and Wolgemuth 2011
[111] Kjellqvist 2013; Brodén Gyberg 2013

become independent was not simply a result of high moral and the spirit of solidarity. It appears to have been an important component of Sweden's strategy for securing its global position in the post-colonial world. Seeking alliances with other, small and presumably alliance-free, countries in the global South was construed as a mutual interest, and thus "independence" became the foreign policy flip side of "solidarity". This function of aid as a geopolitical vehicle needs to be taken into account when analysing how Swedish development research was formed in the 1970s.

3 Formation of Swedish development research

The Swedish formula for development research that emerged in the 1970s grew as an integrated part of the state's development aid machinery and policy, to a much larger extent than it was a part of Sweden's arena for science and innovation. While being integrated in Swedish aid development policy it still assumed a highly independent position in its implementation, through the establishment of a dedicated and autonomous state institution for its administration: SAREC. At a first glance this may look like a logical and uncontroversial outcome. But the formation of SAREC as an independent entity within aid policy was not, as we will argue, an outcome inscribed or even premeditated in the larger international aid arena during the formative period of the 1960s and 1970s. Some specific and controversial choices were made by key government actors so as to give the Swedish research its particular characteristics. These characteristics made it stand out as a distinct model in international comparison.[112] In this chapter we will look more in detail at what motives and objectives were at play during the formation of a Swedish model for development research. This includes taking a broader look at influential ideas and processes at the global scene regarding the role of knowledge for development, as well as a glance at Swedish research policy at the time.

Knowledge for development: early international trends

Around the same time the Swedish state prepared to catapult itself into the international aid arena, there was a growing recognition among the world's major aid actors that science had not been given sufficient attention. In 1961 the United Nations Scientific Advisory Committee launched an initiative for a more concerted effort on science and technology in global development efforts. This resulted in the UN Conference on the Application of Science and Technology for the Benefit of the Less Developed Areas (UNCSAT), held in Geneva in 1963. The UNCSAT took the form of a huge knowledge fair.

[112] Kihlberg in Schleebrugge; Brodén-Gyberg 2013; Frühling 1986.

Scientist from the North acted as experts who were supposed to come up with solutions to problems that were defined by participants from the South.[113] UNCSAT gathered an impressive 1600 scientists from 96 countries, including Sweden who sent a delegation of 16. The Conference was the first of its kind and the head of the US delegation Walsh McDermott enthusiastically reported that:

"...we may have found the way to realize what is yet largely the dream, that Science as the least culturally conditioned form of creativity can serve as an important practical base for increased international understanding."[114]

After the Geneva conference, the UN Council for economic and social affairs, ECOSOC, decided to create a committee on science and technology for development: the Advisory Committee on the Application of Science and Technology to Development, ACAST. The new Committee elaborated a World plan of Action for Science and Technology, which was to guide the global community in its quest for development and modernization. An important principle of the Plan of Action was to support the formation of independent knowledge in the South. Organisations like UNESCO, FAO and EPTA, the United Nations Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance had important roles for research and for building capacity in developing countries.[115] In the early 1960s, Sweden was a major financial supporter of both EPTA and FAO.[116]

When the ACAST World Plan of Action finally was launched in 1971 it emphasised the need to develop knowledge both through research in the North as well as and capacity building in the South. It was necessary to build up basic structures, policies, institutions and personnel in developing countries, and improving transfer of existing technical and other knowledge to developing countries. But it was also necessary to re-focus the scientific and technical efforts of the developed countries and the United Nations system "on problems of urgent importance to the developing countries." [117]

A hugely influential process in the UN family was the Pearson Commission, which published its report in 1969. The Pearson

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[113] Katz 1968
[114] US Department of State 1963, p vi
[115] Katz 1968; Rist 1997
[116] Prop 1962:100, p32-42
[117] UN 1971

Commission had been put together on request by the head of the World Bank, Robert McNamara, and was named after its chairman Lester B. Pearson, former prime minister of Canada and Nobel Peace Prize Laureate.[118] One of the experts on the commission was Göran Ohlin, professor in economics at Uppsala University, chief economist at the Svenska Industriförbundet (Confederation of Swedish Industry) and later Undersecretary-General at the United Nations.[119] The Pearson report, titled "Partners in Development", provided a blueprint for the global aid paradigm for the coming decade. The Pearson commission pointed to the key role of research and the huge lack of research capacity in developing countries. Where capacity did exist, due to a colonial legacy it was mainly directed towards solving problems of the industrialised world. The commissioners called for the creation of national and regional research centres, but also for strengthening research and innovation policy in the South.[120] The commission went on to criticise the industrialised North: "The wealthy countries have rarely attempted to focus the energies of their enormous scientific and research establishments to help solve specific problems affecting developing countries."[121] The rich countries were called upon to use much more of its own capacity to solve problems in the poor countries. A bold suggestion was put forth. All donor countries should increase their funding for development research and that "the target for 1972 should be 5 per cent of public expenditure for research and development, of which at least half should be spent in developing countries".[122]

The Pearson commission thus suggested – much like the ACAST - a two-pronged approach for development research: it was necessary both to build capacity in developing countries and to simultaneously redirect the research capacity of the rich nations towards the global problems of the South. Such a redirection of resources was not justified only on ethical grounds; it was in the self-interest of the advanced countries to do so. In Lester Pearson's own words:

"Certainly there will be more development and progress in the richer industrialized countries if the poorer countries with two-thirds of the world's population can develop. [...The] paramount, long-term

[118] Kjellqvist 2013; SOU 1973:41; Pearson 1970
[119] https://sv.wikipedia.org/wiki/G%C3%B6ran_Ohlin
[120] IBRD 1969, p202-203
[121] IBRD 1969, p.204
[122] IBRD 1969, p.205

interest of all nations, rich and poor, is in the creation of a world in which all the world's resources, human and physical, are put to the greatest possible use."[123]

Another, but also two-pronged, approach was proposed by OECD in 1971. While not an aid actor itself, OECD traces its roots back to the implementation of the Marshall Plan and has since then been concerned with stimulating development among its members.[124] The secretary general of OECD had commissioned an ad-hoc expert group to come up with a new strategy for science policy in the industrialised world, with a view to meet the emerging global challenges of the 1970s. Interestingly, development in the OECD countries was put into a wide perspective of global structural change. The group recommended that aid policies and science policies must become much more coordinated. Closing the knowledge gap in the South was not just a matter for development aid, also the existing research capacity of the rich countries needed to be mobilised. Unless the global problems were attacked from the South and the North, the expert groups argued, there were little chance for success:

"To be fully effective, it is obvious that the two kinds of research should be conducted in parallel and treated as fully complementary. But this is precisely what has not been done, or even attempted, in the 1960's. So long as this responsibility is not recognised as one of the essential functions of science policies of the advanced countries by linking aid policies with policies for scientific and technical action, both nationally and internationally, we are convinced that there is little chance of any great progress."[125]

The OECD report ended with recommendations on science in relation to global development:

"We recommend that problems relating to science, technology and underdevelopment be considered by Member countries as an integral part of their national science and technology policies. We furthermore believe that the developed countries ought, as a matter of conscious and explicit policy, to devote a certain fraction of their R&D activities to problems relevant to underdevelopment [...] Policies should be developed in two directions:

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[123] Pearson 1970, p 7
[124] http://www.oecd.org/about/history/
[125] OECD 1971, p 55

1) Fostering in the less developed countries the development of indigenous capability in science and technology relevant to the socio-economic situation of those countries, and

2) Formulating research programmes in favour of the developing countries in the laboratories of the advanced countries, as a part of science policy."[126]

Within the UN, the World Bank sphere as well as the OECD there was thus a clear vision. Development research and problems of the South had to become part of research policy in the developed countries, and not just be given more attention within the aid portfolios of these nations. But at least in Sweden, this would not happen.

A Swedish Model for development research

The importance of research in development was acknowledged in Sweden already in the early formative stages of the Swedish aid paradigm. In the Aid Bible, the Government stated that: "In order for the development aid to yield good results, its form and direction must be guided by knowledge about the receiving country's situation and needs [...] Favourable conditions for research and documentation are thus important for a successful development aid."[127] As mentioned, Swedish universities had been engaged already from the 1950s to build capacity in developing countries like India and Ethiopia, and also contributed to research done by UN organisations like FAO. But it took several more years before the Swedish government made a dedicated effort for strengthening research in the context of Swedish aid.

The Swedish International Development Authority (SIDA) had been formed in 1965, and some research was financed as part of the bilateral aid programmes. The Government in 1965 tasked a special expert group, chaired by the secretary of the Government's Research Commission Prof. Bror Rexed, to provide guidelines for how SIDA should work with bilateral research cooperation henceforth.[128] The expert group recommended in 1966 that development research, being

[126] OECD 1971, p.106-107
[127] Prop 1962:100, p8
[128] Brodén Gyberg 2013

an important ingredient for an effective Swedish aid, should follow the thematic and geographic priorities of bilateral aid programmes.[129] The priorities of Swedish bilateral aid were then to a large extent defined by the recipient countries themselves. The vesting of the agenda-setting function with the developing countries would become even more pronounced in the years to follow. After "independence" had become one of the explicit aid policy objectives in 1968, a procedure of "country programming" was introduced which meant that it was the recipient government that decided the focus areas of Sweden's support.[130] Country programming was thus the operational facet of the principle of "independence"; developing countries should independently express their preferences and Sweden should provide aid where there was an expressed demand for it.

In 1969 SIDA formed a group together with a number of state-funded research councils and the Government's research commission with the view to coordinate the funding of research in developing countries. However, this initiative bore little fruit. SIDA had to follow the priorities expressed by partner countries, and there simply was not too much demand from the receiving governments. Furthermore, SIDA expressed that it did not have enough resources for coordination with Swedish actors.[131]

Soon after the publication of the Pearson report, and as the ACAST process was settling towards finalising the World Plan of Action, the Swedish Parliament asked for an investigation into the nascent role of research within Swedish development aid.[132] In April 1971, the Government launched its commission "Forskning för Utveckling" ("Research for Development"). This commission – below referred to as the "U-forsk commission" – would set the form for Sweden's development research for two decades and leave a legacy on its direction that has lasted up to the present.

We will focus on two aspects of the U-forsk commission report. First we will look at how the commission managed to reconcile the international drive for increased research with the goal of independence in the South. Thereafter we analyse how the globally promoted two-pronged approach - strengthening of development

[129] SOU1973:41, p112
[130] Odén and Wolgemuth 2011
[131] SOU1973:41, p 111
[132] SOU1973:41, p 153

research in aid as well as in domestic research policy – was dealt with in the Swedish model.

The Ministry for Education was in charge of the commission. Five of the seven commissioners were prominent academia leaders, one was the executive director of SIDA, and one from the host Ministry.[133] A range of experts from universities and SIDA assisted the commission during its two years' existence, and a conference was organised in December 1972 to reach out to the research community.[134] There was no formal participation from researchers or policy-makers in developing countries, neither in the commission nor at the conference. At one occasion, consultations were held with researchers from India, Mexico, Tunisia, Chile and Indonesia.[135]

The Government's instruction was clear: the commission was to propose the thematic priorities of Swedish development research as well as the organisational structures for its administration. The instructions also reiterated the principles of the Pearson report and the ACAST World Plan of Action as a point of departure; that building capacity in the South needed to be accompanied with a redirection of research resources in the North. There were opportunities - the Ministry pointed out - to better integrate development problems in the Swedish research landscape at large:

"The question of the focus and volume of Swedish development research is thus a prominent one. It should not be seen in isolation, as a matter of highly specialised research on specific challenges in developing countries, but as a matter of a general widening of the research agenda in different disciplines to better consider the needs of developing countries."[136]

In terms of the organisation, the Ministry asked the commission to look at several options. These included:

- channelling of resources through existing national research councils;

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[133] SOU1973:41, p 3. Members were Nils Gustav Rosén (former University Chancellor), Sune Bergström (KI), Gunnar Hambraeus (IVA), Lennart Hjelm (SLU), Ernst Michanek (SIDA), Karl Eric Knutsson (SU), Manfred Ribbing (Ministry of Edu), Björn Hettne (secretary). In an expert group: Bo Bengtson SLU, Lars Leander SIDA, Bo Löfqvist LU, Bo Wickström GU, Gunnar Ågren UU.
[134] SOU 1973:41 p.258
[135] ibid, p14
[136] ibid, p156

- channelling of resources through SIDA but with a special advisory body attached to it;
- a select committee coordinating the existing institutions.

The point of departure for the government was that a separate and autonomous funding body, like a research council or a new research institute would not be deemed a suitable organisational form.[137] Curiously, this was more or less what came out of the process in the end, with the creation of SAREC as an autonomous funding body in 1978. A reason for this turn-around, we believe, can be traced from elsewhere in the instructions: "In principle, the [Swedish support] should be guided by the needs of the developing countries, as these are prioritised be the countries themselves."[138] As we will show below, the formation of SAREC as an independent entity despite the government's original intentions not to create one, was a way of going around the country programming, which, had it been fully adhered to, could have made Swedish research aid redundant.

But how did the U-forsk commission take on its task? In defining the problem, the commission started off from the ideas underlying the Pearson and ACAST reports: that the lagging development in poor countries was indeed global concerns and not just local problems. "The predicament of developing countries must be seen as a serious problem for the world as a whole."[139] Given the complexity of the real challenges ahead, it was in the nature of development research to be inter- or multidisciplinary. Another basic tenet was the dual need to produce more knowledge relevant to poor countries, and to increase the capacity in the South to produce this knowledge. Development, the commissioners stated, "...equals a growing ability [...] of controlling one's situation and to accomplish improvements of the same."[140] They went on to conclude: "Underdevelopment is ultimately linked to the lack of power to control one's situation".[141] What was clearly seen as the heart of the matter of development of the South was empowerment, or with another word; independence. This ontology clearly took a cue from the structural economical thinking then in vogue in more radical circles, much influenced by *dependistas*

[137] ibid p 156
[138] ibid, p155
[139] SOU 1973:41, p 11
[140] ibid p25
[141] ibid p 33

like Enrique Cardoso. Björn Hettne, who would become a leading scholar in this field, was assistant secretary to the commission and also wrote the background paper on economic theory.[142]

The objectives of the emerging Swedish development research were formulated in response to how the development problems had been defined. In broad terms, the goal was to promote inclusive growth and structural change leading to social equality through integrated approaches. This was basically in line with the UN resolution for the Second Development Decade 1971-1980. The U-forsk commission then goes on to define the more precise objectives of development research: to overcome of number of structural shortcomings and inabilities.

"[These inabilities] do not only stem from lack of political will, but also from a fundamental inability to understand the causes of underdevelopment. Such knowledge is necessary to identify and attack the most important problems of the individual countries. This means that development research is not just a matter of research. It is in fact a matter of highest priority for aid and development policy."[143]

By construing knowledge and research as power to control development, the commission thus placed development research firmly within the realm of aid and foreign policy.

With regards to the thematic priorities, the commission suggested – in line with the doctrine of country programming and recipient ownership - that Swedish development research should be aligned with priorities and needs in developing countries. But it would also take into account areas where Sweden was considered to have certain advantages and capacity, such as: family planning, nutrition, medicine, mining, forestry, ecology and agriculture. To a large extent this was simply a forward projection of the then ongoing research interventions financed through SIDA.

It was in the matter of organisation where the commission would propose a departure from the path indicated by the ministry. The U-forsk commission discussed the various organisational options as instructed but found that none of them were suitable. Channelling funds through the regular structures of the existing national research councils could not satisfy the need for multi-disciplinarity and would

[142] Brodén Gyberg 2013
[143] SOU 1973:41 p.124

be too passive, it was claimed. A coordinating panel would be incapable to manage the increasing volumes as projected. And a separate research council with its own funding stream had been ruled out already in the Government instructions. The organisational solution that the U-forsk commission proposed was a special select committee. Only that it proposed – contrary to the instructions – that it should have full autonomy to dispose of its own funds.[144] What the Government had had in mind was a select committee that could advise or decide on research projects within the allocation given to SIDA. What the U-forsk commission proposed was in fact a new state agency to work side by side with SIDA.

There was to be a close coordination between the new agency and SIDA, as well as with the existing research councils. Why was it then deemed so important to give new select committee its autonomy and a separate funding stream? Why not give it all to SIDA? And why was it so important to create a separate funding body? The U-forsk commissioners themselves provided a plausible explanation:

"When it comes to stimulating and financing research in developing countries, the Swedish development agency today faces great difficulties. Partly it depends on lack of insight in development countries about the need for research [...] Partly the problems stem from the adherence to so called country programming on the donor's side. These imply that aid is given in the form of a financial frame within which the government of the developing country has a decisive influence on its use. This lead in most cases to concrete and short-term interventions are given high priority, while long-term interventions such as research are regarded as less desirable. With reference to these circumstances we recommend that development research is not placed within the general aid-related country programming."[145]

Perhaps it was just as simple as that. SIDA was compelled by Parliament to ask the developing countries' governments about their priorities and then follow these priorities in the country programming. But the developing countries' governments did not want Sweden's research aid. There was simply too little demand. As noted above, previous attempts for cooperation between the science councils and

[144] SOU 1973:41 p 134
[145] SOU 1973:41 p. 143

SIDA had not been successful because the country programming restricted SIDA's areas of engagement.

The idea to create a new autonomous agency for development research as part of Swedish aid did not go down well with SIDA. In responding to the proposal of the U-forsk commission, SIDA claimed that creating a separate funding stream and a separate agency would be in conflict with the principle of country programming and of securing ownership in developing countries.[146] The proposal implied, SIDA complained, that there would be "two government organisations with the same authority but with different competencies which would both administer development research".[147] SIDA's stance against a separate agency was shared by many. Also The National Board of Health and Welfare, the Auditor General, National Board of Education, the National Food Agency, the Swedish FAO Committee, the Board of Trade, the State Council for Building Research, the Board for Technical Development among others, were of the opinion that a dedicated organisation for development research was needed but that it should belong to SIDA. A few were in favour, such as Council for Social Research, Swedish Association of Sociology and The Swedish Agency for Public Management.[148] Faced by this rift in opinions, the Swedish government decided to postpone the decision on organisation. As an interim solution the government created a research secretariat within SIDA, named "Beredningen för Utvecklingsforskning". The secretariat was mainly advisory to SIDA and to the Ministry, where funding decisions were still to be made.[149]

A long-term solution to the question of how to organise Swedish research aid was still to be found. As often happens when governments face complicated matters, the question was given to another commission. The development aid commission (Biståndspolitiska Utredningen) had already begun its work to re-assess the entire administration of Swedish aid and it was now tasked also to look into the organisation of research aid.[150]

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[146] Prop 1975:1, p.29
[147] SOU 1978:61, p.116
[148] Prop 1975:1, p.30-31. Negative: Socialstyrelsen, Riksrevisionsverket, Skolöverstyrelsen, Statens livsmedelsverk, Svenska FAO-kommittén, Kommerskollegium, Statens råd för byggnadsforskning, Styrelsen för teknisk utveckling. Positive: Statens råd för samhällsforskning, Svenska sociologförbundet and Statskontoret.
[149] Prop 1975:1, p34
[150] Prop 1975:1, p. 34

The development aid commission delivered its main report in 1977. The commission reiterated that the country programming should still be basis for all Swedish aid. But development research, although it was seen as part of the Swedish aid policy arena, was more loosely linked to the priorities of the recipient governments: "The selection of support areas in development research should *to a significant extent* depend on the interventions that developing countries ask for." (Italics added.) This could be seen as a half step back from the country programming doctrine; there could be exceptions to its principles and research aid could be one of those exceptions. But the aid commission again postponed the issue of organisation: "The question of the development research will be deferred to a later report."[151]

In 1977, the interim secretariat at SIDA was already up and running and had begun creating an identity of its own under the name Swedish Agency for Research Cooperation with Developing Countries, with the acronym SAREC. In the budget bill for 1977/78, the Government acknowledged that the unclear situation created problems. SIDA had expressed concerns that the delineation between SIDA and SAREC was difficult.[152] But within a year, the development aid commission presented their final report. This time, in 1978, it contained a proposal on the organisation of SAREC.

The commissioners confirmed the original proposal from the U-forsk commission. SAREC should be given its financial autonomy from SIDA and have access to a separate funding stream within the total aid envelope, but which would be outside the country programming. This was despite the resistance from SIDA for a separate administration. SIDA wanted to see aid and development research converge, not take separate paths, and stated in 1978 that "Research has become increasingly integrated in development interventions, at national and international level. It is difficult and questionable to separate the needs and application of research from the wider development work."[153] The commission nevertheless recommended a separation of the two. The justification for the separate structure is very clear:

"To stimulate research in developing countries, both the U-forsk commission and the state powers has deemed it necessary to create a

[151] SOU 1977:13, p.267
[152] Prop 1977/78:100, bilaga 6, p.37
[153] SOU1978:61, p.119

separate research funding. [... It] was deemed a prerequisite for the developing countries themselves to demand research aid and for their own research activity to develop. Within the frames of the country programs research could not prevail in competition with other interventions, particularly not if the supply-side lacked a research-oriented organisation with outreach."[154]

The commissioners suggested that SAREC and SIDA should continue to work together in a coordinated fashion, although several of the commissioners felt that "no measures should be enacted that can restrict the further development of SAREC as an independent organisation."[155]

SAREC was thus put in place to stimulate research and to develop capacity in the South without having to follow the policy of country programming. Funds specifically earmarked for development research would be made available to developing nations to avoid competition with other aid interventions that were considered only to bring "short-term gains". It had been made clear time and time again that without such earmarking there would not be much demand for research aid. SIDA was still adhering to the country programming and low demand from the receiving governments made development research within SIDA a weak business case. Sweden wanted to make a larger contribution to economic and political emancipation in the South in which research aid was a key. We find it striking and somewhat surprising that, despite the rhetoric of "independence" in the South, Swedish research aid was set up according to Swedish priorities, and as there was little demand for it; largely following the logics of supply-driven aid. While this may stand out as an over-simplification, it is a fact that the Swedish government experts were highly aware that research was not a priority for governments in developing countries in the early 1970s. SAREC also devoted a comparatively large share of its budget to the international programs, especially in the early years when the bilateral programmes were still being formed, programs that did not always share the far reaching and progressive ideas of Swedish research aid. Thus, there was from a fairly early stage a certain tension built into Swedish research aid, between on the one hand a set of SAREC core values –long term support for independence of the receiving country and a capacity to seek

[154] SOU 1978:61, p. 119
[155] SOU 1978:61, p.124

alternative futures free of constraints based on colonial bonds – and a more instrumental view of alignment with mainstream goals of development.[156]

Research aid and the Swedish research arena

In an earlier section we outlined some of the ideas promoted on the global arena by the World Bank, within United Nations and at OECD level around the start of the UN second development decade. They all urged the richer nations of the world not just to increase research aid, but to adopt a two-pronged approach of supporting capacity building in the South and to re-direct their national research capacity towards areas relevant for the poorer countries. What happened in Sweden to this approach?

There had been attempts for collaboration between the national research councils and SIDA in the 1960s but as mentioned with little success. To our knowledge, there were no other major initiatives on the part of the Swedish government in the 1960s, trying to re-orient the national research institutions towards global development issues. Some universities and institutes gradually built up a capacity base and included development aid as part of their development strategies. One case in point was the Agricultural College in Uppsala, later SLU, which strategically developed a new area of research and education in African contexts, thanks to a close collaboration with SIDA and its predecessor NIB already from 1964.[157] It however appears to us that these types of initiatives were not part of a larger coordinated attempt to redirect Swedish research capacity to the South, but were ad-hoc

[156] These tensions became manifest already in a debate in 1974 in a polemic between on the one hand economists Bo Södersten and Mats Lundahl, "Forskning för utveckling", Ekonomisk debatt 1974(2) and on the other hand two scholars central to the development of Swedish research aid thinking, economic historian Björn Hettne and anthropologist Karl Eric Knutsson, "Tvärvetenskap eller ämnesimperialism i u-landsforskningen?", Ekonomisk debatt 1974(6). Their disagreement was mainly about the content of "development" – did it necessarily mean a reproduction of the western story? The discussion could be translated on the universalist vs. localist dichotomy that Veronica Brodén-Gyberg has suggested to define the SAREC position arguing for more local autonomy and the use of knowledge as a potential tool to navigate possible futures differently than the rich countries. The economists disagreed completely. In retrospect Hettne dates the major abandonment of the previous SAREC idea to the 1990s with the arrival of new principles of public management and a more economistic rationale for distribution of funds, following the dismantling of Sarec as an independent agency. Björn Hettne, interview, 10 November 2016.

[157] Bruno 2016

projects resulting from entrepreneurial activity of individuals. In 1973, the U-forsk commission reported that only one single institution – the department for nutrition studies in Uppsala - had received an explicit instruction from the government to direct some of its research activity towards developing countries.[158]

One shall not be too quick to dismiss these ad-hoc initiatives as insignificant. In the early 1970s, development research was carried out at a surprisingly large number of Swedish institutions. In a survey carried out in 1971 as part of the U-forsk commission, no less than 138 research institutions responded that they were active in research related to developing countries.[159] We have also pointed to the fact that the government in its instruction to the U-forsk commission contextualised development research in a national research setting, and that one of options to be explored was an expanded mandate to the national research councils. Furthermore, the ownership of the commission was vested in the Ministry of Education and not with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. We therefore believe that when the commission took up its work in 1971, there was still much leeway that would allow an understanding of development issues as part of a re-orientation agenda for national research. The understanding of development research as something "special" and as defined almost exclusively as part of development aid, must not have been a predestined outcome, but something that precipitated as a result of a negotiated process over two years.

The U-forsk commission expressed itself as positively disposed towards wider collaboration with the research councils, and briefly outlined ways forward for integrating development issues in Swedish research policy at large. But the U-forsk commission did not want to put forward any concrete suggestion on how this could be done in practice. In 1973, yet another government commission was simultaneously at work reviewing the structure of the national research councils (Forskningsrådsberedningen). On the pretext of not interfering with the work of the research council commission, the U-forsk members proposed that the new research aid agency should come back to the issue later, and if possible, be represented in the commission reviewing the research council structure.[160]

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[158] SOU 1973:41, p 105
[159] SOU 1973:41, p 103
[160] SOU 1973:41 p142-143

Once again, an important decision was left hanging. The commission on research councils (Forskningsrådsberedningen) delivered its report in 1975. It did in fact take a look at development research in a national research context in its report. First of all, this commission concluded that there was already a proposal for how to organise development research (U-forskberedningen), the implementation of which was pending the work of the development aid commission. The research council commission suggested new models for increased national collaboration with the proposed new agency for development research. But since the matter of organisation had not reached a final solution it concluded that "a formal connection should be postponed."[161] This meant in practice that the research council commission did not see development research as part of its mandate, but as belonging to the aid sphere.

This opened up for placing also this ball in the court of the development aid commission. But the question of national research policy was never part of their mandate, and the development aid commission's report was understandably silent on issues pertaining to the national research policy of Sweden. The research council commission produced another report in 1977, on national research policy.[162] The report acknowledges the work of the U-forsk commission as well as SAREC. It also put forth some rather general recommendations on Swedish participation in international research collaboration, for example through the various UN agencies.[163] But nowhere does it provide an analysis of or recommendations vis-á-vis development research, nor the need for re-directing Swedish research capacity towards global development problems.

It is tempting to assume that the commissioners felt that development research was already taken care of. It was defined as part of the aid arena with a dedicated institution (SAREC) for its implementation. From the viewpoints of the council structure it belonged to a different government branch as it was financed under a completely different budget vote. There seems to have been nothing stopping Sweden from applying the two-pronged approach of building research capacity in developing countries and re-orientation of capacity at home. However, the latter fell between the two stools of

[161] SOU1975:26, p.269
[162] SOU 1977:52
[163] ibid, p 212-229

international aid and national research policy and no sincere effort was made from the government to prevent that from happening.

A highly influential factor for the outcome may also have been the government funding situation around the time of SAREC's formation. At this point in time, Sweden was rapidly increasing its aid budget to meet the target of 1% of GDP. The new research aid naturally gravitated to the growing aid funding stream, while it could have been regarded more as a competitor to regular activities in the budgets of research and higher education.[164] As we have observed above, between 1973 and 1978 there was a tug of war between SIDA, struggling to retain control over research aid, and the proponents of an autonomous SAREC. The latter were eventually victorious, rendering SAREC in control over the special dedicated funding stream. While this separate funding stream surely enabled SAREC to develop its unique model, in our view it also spurred an early separation of research aid from national research policy and the wider research arena in Sweden.

The Swedish model was thus found; a specialised autonomous agency, with funding earmarked for building research capacity in the South leaning outside the country-programmes, while the Swedish national research arena was left more or to business as usual. SAREC and its successors have channelled part – around 10 to 15% - of its funding to the Swedish universities to support development-oriented research, in addition to return flows from bilateral and global programmes. But this remains a tiny fraction of the total research and innovation budget of the Swedish government (around 0.5% in 2015). In the coming chapters we will discuss these long-term structural continuities, and the need and potential for change, more in detail.

[164] Gun-Britt Andersson, personal communication 2016-06-14. Andersson is chairperson of EBA reference group and former secretary of state for development cooperation, and who prepared the government bill for SAREC's establishment in the 1970s, has stressed this fact in discussions within the reference group. It was relatively easy to find funding for SAREC in the growing development aid budget, while it would have been more difficult under other policy area appropriations.

4 Research aid: growth and crisis, renewal or demise?

A stable framework

As hinted in the introduction, the 1980s could be seen as the decade when SAREC matured and when its key modes of operation crystallised. Cooperation was established on bilateral level with a number of countries, bilateral programmes were ramped up, and the priorities for the cooperation areas were set in a negotiated step-wise manner. SAREC at times came under criticism for too strongly influencing the priorities in a neo-colonial fashion.[165] The ten-year review in 1985 provided impetus for some changes in orientation of cooperation mode, especially at the bilateral level. There was to be less investment in national research councils in the cooperation countries – which was deemed as inefficient bureaucracies– and more and wider support directly to the researchers.[166] But on the whole, SAREC's main focus on building capacity for intellectual empowerment was not just retained, but deepened.[167]

The evaluation of 1985 further argued that SAREC's financial support to research in Sweden was fragmented and mostly was to the benefit of a few "marginalised researchers" at Swedish institutions. It also concluded that the Swedish grants needed to be used in a more catalytic way, since the other research councils had become complacent and had reduced their funding to development-oriented research after the creation of SAREC.[168]

Throughout the late 1980s, SAREC continued operations along the model established in the first decade and it also grew substantially. While a review in 1990 presented some serious criticism to SAREC's operational performance, its relevance was never called into question.[169] In 1995, the social democratic government decided to merge the four aid agencies SIDA, SAREC, BITS and SwedeCorp into

[165] Brodén Gyberg 2013
[166] Utrikesdepartementet 1985
[167] Kihlberg 1995
[168] Utrikesdepartementet 1985, p 197, 203
[169] See Brodén Gyberg 2013, p 178 ff, for a discussion of the 1990 external evaluation, carried out by Carl Widstrand and Jan Valdelin, and how SAREC responded to the criticism.

one large agency, Sida. The merger led to a streamlining of development research with all Sida operations, and a re-focus on national institution-building in the cooperation countries. Although there were some new interpretations of what this meant, the focus still lay on capacity building. [170] During the first years after the merger, SAREC saw a steady increase in the budget for research aid, and the operations under the Sida umbrella mostly went smoothly.[171]

Brodén Gyberg has argued that the 1995 merger was perceived by many – including the incumbent Director General Anders Wijkman – as coming out of the blue. The fusion was carried out after a minimum of analysis and debate, broadly pointing to the need to consolidate Swedish aid in the face of changes of the international aid context, Sweden's membership in the EU, and to improve efficiency.[172] We suggest that the merging of SAREC and SIDA must also be understood in the context of larger structural changes which eroded the political motives of keeping SAREC as an independent organisation.

Obviously, the geopolitical situation had changed markedly after 1989. The end of the Cold War altered the order of global security and also opened up for a re-interpretation of the dichotomy of developed and under-developed (nations), with some scholars seeing a "post-development" era dawning.[173] As the idea of global development as a linear, benevolent progression towards a similar goal was being re-forged, it also spurred a surge of criticism on the current international aid paradigm and aid came under closer scrutiny by the public.[174] This opened up aid agencies to the administrative austerity wave, which in Sweden was exacerbated by the early 1990s financial crisis. New Public Management (NPM) was increasingly en vogue, with ideals of control and measurability flourishing in organisational life.[175] There was, on the whole, a forward thrust towards slimmer aid organisations and a drive towards efficiency. As shown in a recent study by Cathy Schutt, the emergence of NPM in bureaucratic life in the 1980s influenced the arena of international development aid in a particular way as it

[170] Brodén Gyberg 2013
[171] Mårten Carlsson, pers comm 3 June 2016
[172] Brodén Gyberg 2013, p 182; Prop 1994/1995:100
[173] Escobar 1995; Hettne 2010
[174] Discussed by Brodén Gyberg 2013. Some of the best known pieces here include Hancock 1989; Karlström 1996
[175] Power 1999

contributed to the emergence of a new management style focussed on Results Based Management (RBM). The RBM approach of "managing for results" has been interpreted differently by different donors, but still represents a major trend in development circles.[176]

This trend was also closely related to the Aid Effectiveness Agenda, more popularly known as the Paris Agenda, after a donor conference in the same city in 2005. In short, the Aid Effectiveness Agenda was – and still is – a process coordinated within the OECD/DAC circles,[177] that on the one hand puts more emphasis on the responsibility of the recipient government, and on the other hand prompts the donors to coordinate and align with the plans and priorities of the recipients. The overarching idea was to increase ownership in developing countries, reduce transaction costs and make aid more cost-efficient and effective.[178] One could easily imagine that in the emerging structure – the so called New Aid Architecture – there was relatively little room for a pro-active agency like SAREC to stimulate demand for research.

Also the foreign policy objective of supporting independence had become obsolete in the 1990s. Kjellqvist (2013) has noted that already from 1981 the Swedish parliament began cautiously diluting its principle on independence in the South.[179] In 1988, the word "self-reliance" was removed from the government's instructions to SAREC and research aid was aligned more closely with foreign policy.[180] The global environmental debate that came out of the Brundtland commission on sustainable development in the late 1980s also began to undermine the idea of independence; all countries were – after all – interdependent in the face of global environmental challenges.[181] As we have shown above, a main motive for creating an independent SAREC in 1975 had been its ability to operate outside the country programming. As the independence-goal withered away, so did the principle of country-programming. By the mid1990s, this principle was more or less out of the picture, and with its demise disappeared also a key motive of having SAREC as a separate organisation.

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[176] Schutt 2016
[177] DAC is the acronym for Development Assistance Committee, under OECD, currently with 30 member states and originally set up in 1960 as the Development Assistance Group.
[178] Wood et al 2011; Lithman 2014
[179] Kjellqvist 2013, p104
[180] Brodén Gyberg 2013 p164
[181] Kjellqvist 2013 p118

A decade after the 1995 merger with SAREC, the Swedish government instructed Sida to undertake a series of evaluations to take stock of trends, activities and results in Swedish research aid. These evaluations proposed some rather minor adjustments with regards to the bilateral, regional and global programmes. On the whole, however, the programmes were seen to be relevant and offering reasonable goal fulfilment and cost-efficiency.[182] One strong recommendation that came out was that a more flexible and results-oriented organisation of the research aid would be needed. Sida should consider structuring the work process in "goal-oriented teams", research should have a more prominent role in country strategies, which also implied a closer collaboration with Swedish embassies, to which more and more decision-making power had been delegated as part of the Aid Effectiveness Agenda.[183] When Sida re-organised again in 2008, SAREC was abolished as a division and was considerably downsized to a secretariat function while its staff were posted to country teams and embassies, and instructed to work with research aid from there. In 2013, finally, the funding of development research in Sweden, which had remain a small funding stream of some 15 percent of the research aid budget, was outsourced to the Swedish Research Council, VR.[184]

Through these reforms – the merger in 1995, the reorganisation in 2008, and the relocation of the research council function in 2013 – research aid became less visible and with a much less pronounced identity. The number of staff working with administration of research aid has been reduced. The overall budget for research aid has also decreased, slowly but steadily. As pointed out by a former head of Sida's research unit , the reorganisations have made it more difficult for Sida to carry out policy dialogue, be innovative, and pro-actively develop its research aid.[185] In addition, the relocation of the support to Swedish universities to VR, and the re-assignment of SAREC staff to the country teams and embassies reportedly reduced the contacts and strategic dialogue between Sida and the Swedish academic community.[186]

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[182] Eduards 2006
[183] Sida 2006, Synthesis report, page 37-38
[184] Vetenskapsrådets Årsredovisning 2013
[185] Tomas Kjellqvist, interview 2016-11-08
[186] AnnaMaria Oltorp, interview 2016-11-11

In essence, from the mid-1980s up to now there has been a sustained focus on a three-tier framework: capacity-building in low-income countries through long-term bilateral cooperation; support to global and regional research programmes that produce relevant scientific knowledge and complementing the national research councils with funding for development-oriented research at Swedish universities. The research share of the development aid budget has been on a slow, gradual retreat over the past decade as indicated in table 1 in the introductory chapter, but this trend does not appear to us as the result of a conscious re-prioritisation by the Swedish government. The funding still remains above 3% of the total aid frame, which is higher than in the other Scandinavian countries (see below). Drawing the broad lines of Swedish research aid could hence be interpreted as a narrative of continuity, with a stable framework dating from the 1980s.

Re-orientation within the frames

While the broader framework appears to us as rather stable, there have been a number of changes over time within the frames. As we indicated in the introduction, one key long-term change can be noted in how the bilateral programmes are operated. After abandoning the support to national research councils in low-income countries, research aid initially targeted individuals and research groups. From the 1990s, this Swedish support was increasingly focussing on building institutional capacity at university level.[187] This long-term institutional support paved the way for a shift in cooperation modality where Sida wants universities in the South to be placed much more firmly "in the driver's seat".[188] With effect from around 2010, the universities in the partner countries in the South selected their Swedish counterpart universities through a competitive process.[189] Apart from trying to achieve a better ownership and high-quality research activities, this open selection process sought to stimulate interest and visibility of research cooperation with the South among the Swedish universities.

[187] Rolf Carlman, interview 2016-11-03; Brodén Gyberg 2013; Eduards 2006
[188] AnnaMaria Oltorp, interview
[189] Hannah Akuffo, interview 2016-11-01

To some extent these ambitions have also been successful.[190] The strengthening of the university environments in the South also paved the way for a re-orientation of the PhD education, where the "sandwich-model" is now gradually becoming less important as the doctoral students to a larger extent carry out their education at their home institutions.[191]

Certain changes within the frames have from time to time taken the form of special thematic initiatives, sometimes initiated by the government and sometimes by SAREC and Sida. A regional programme for Latin America started already in the 1970s to support the social sciences under a particularly difficult period of dictatorships in the region. In the late 1980s, a large programme for research on HIV/AIDS got off the ground. Around the same time a major research initiative around Forestry and Environment in developing countries was launched. The 1990s saw the birth of a new regional programme on Marine environments in Africa and the creation of a Global Forum for Health Research. These initiatives could perhaps be seen – one way or another – as early examples of 'challenge-driven' global research collaboration, long before that language entered research policy discourse in the new Millennium (see below, chapter five).[192]

In chapter three we argued that research aid fairly soon got detached from the much larger Swedish research arena, despite the fact that the need for a re-orientation of research capacity in the North had been stressed all along. Two of the 2006 evaluations looked into the support to Swedish researchers which was again heavily criticised. It was found to be much too small and insignificant on the wider national research arena. One evaluation concluded that the *u-forsk* program, as it was called, was "sub-critical" and did not reach many of the best research environments. It couldn't deliver on its potential to

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[190] AnnaMaria Oltorp, interview. Oltorp notes widened interest from universities Sweden for the bilateral programmes with new actors applying.

[191] Hannah Akuffo, interview. According to Akuffo, this tendency towards more local PhD education was also accompanied by changes in the doctoral graduation procedures, which meant that Swedish universities no longer would receive the full gratification sum for PhD graduation. The Swedish universities solved this in different ways where KI awarded "joint degrees" to share the gratification sum with the partner university, whereas KTH chose to award the licentiate degree while the partner university would award the final PhD degree. On the whole, as we understand it, the changes resulted in fewer direct economic incentives for Swedish universities to undertake a larger part of the PhD education.

[192] Rolf Carlman, interview

engage the entire Swedish research community and the Swedish research agenda, nor was it efficiently used to inform the overall Swedish development policy.[193] Another evaluation pointed out that eight universities received most of the funding and, in addition, that the same Swedish universities received 89% of the return flow from the bilateral programmes as collaboration partners. These return flows were estimated at almost one third of the bilateral budget. In none of these universities, however, did SAREC's contribution exceed 10% of the university's total government research funding.[194] All of the evaluations argued for increased funding to Swedish universities but underscored that it was necessary to tap into other funding streams through influence on, and collaboration with, the large research councils and foundations, such as VR, MISTRA and FORMAS.[195]

A wider pattern of doubt, or nagging question marks, around Swedish research starts to emerge. Over a period of three decades the insignificant impact of and the low catalytic effect from research aid on the wider Swedish research arena were constantly identified as a weak spot, first in the 1985 evaluation, then 2006, and again in 2013.[196] This overall pattern does not mean that there have been no attempts to improve collaboration between Sida and the research councils over the years. In 2002, Sida and FORMAS jointly financed a number of researcher positions linked to Sida's global programme in agricultural research. Soon thereafter, VINNOVA co-financed "innovation clusters" around some of Sida's partner universities in the global South with 3 million SEK per year from its own budget. VINNOVA's co-funding however ceased in 2010, leaving Sida to continue the initiative alone.[197] As recently as 2016, FORMAS, VR and Sida jointly funded a special call named "Sustainability and resilience – Tackling climate and environmental changes" directed at Swedish universities. Sida contributed most of the funding – 30 million SEK – while VR and FORMAS contributed 15 million SEK each. It should be noted that Sida's contribution was taken from a special allocation in Sida's global development aid budget vote, and did not come from Sida's research aid budget. Furthermore, VR used its development aid appropriation

[193] Edqvist 2006, p 3
[194] Deiaco, Högberg and Svensson 2006, p 13ff
[195] Eduards 2006
[196] Fellesson and Hårsmar 2013
[197] Tomas Kjellqvist, interview. According to Kjellqvist, the Swedish government instructed VINNOVA to focus strictly on growth and innovation in Sweden, which reduced their co-funding ability in other countries.

for the initiative meaning that the contribution from VR was in fact not an additional funding. FORMAS' contribution, on the other hand, came out of its regular national budget.[198]

The 2003 cluster initiative and the 2016 sustainability/resilience call were thus examples of how the development aid was able to leverage additional research funding – albeit small - from national sources. Over the years, this had been very difficult as the national research councils had not been keen to co-finance research focusing on low-income regions. Sida for its part did generally not have a direct dialogue with the research councils as the agency felt that an initiative for improved collaboration should come from the government. In the 1980s and 1990s, SAREC and Sida therefore repeatedly complained to the government about the absence of national collaboration around research aid.[199] Today, on the other hand, Sida staff reports that there is a much larger interest in some councils for collaboration with Sida.[200] The Policy for Global Development may have played a role in putting global issues on the agenda more widely.

However, even if the collaboration climate on the national research arena seems more favourable than before, and a few recent examples of co-funding can be pointed to, the scale is still modest and certainly too small to bring a more decisive change. The problem is, as a former head of Sida's research unit puts it, that national research funding is regarded as a zero-sum game, with each actor category zealously guarding its vested interests. The key to substantially scale up the support from other research councils to non-traditional research areas, is by making it a clear political priority at the highest level, for example in the government bill on research and innovation.[201] For Sida's funding to have a more catalytic effect funds must be readily available for co-financing purposes. This is not the case today. , An increased co-funding with other financiers may put a lot of stress on the regular research aid programmes unless additional funding is made available.[202] When it comes to impact on the national arena, just ike in the 1970s financing seems to be at the heart of the matter. Some tough choices will have to be made up ahead.

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[198] AnnaMaria Oltorp, interview
[199] Rolf Carlman, interview
[200] AnnaMaria Oltorp, interview; Hannah Akuffo, interview
[201] Tomas Kjellqvist, interview.
[202] AnnaMaria Oltorp, interview

On the whole, a mixed picture emerges. On a macro-level, the framework model of Swedish research aid which was formed in 1975-1985 has to a large extent prevailed, along with its overall objectives. On a micro-level, a number of adjustment and initiatives have been made, mainly by key actors within Sida, to continuously influence the performance of the model, but largely without attempting to change the framework itself. The question that emerges is how well the model responds to present and future global challenges? How far can the framework be stretched to fit the emerging issue landscape?

After SAREC – sliding gently down a slope

As we have already seen the decision to disintegrate SAREC as a division could be seen as a part of a new guiding policy for Swedish development aid with "efficiency" as a keyword. With strong repercussions in a broader international agenda, and with echoes from the OECD, this was a common framing of development and aid discussions in the first decade of the new century. Most of the effects came in other arenas: intensified assessments, incentive driven resource allocation, limiting the number of recipient countries, increased demands on human rights and good governance in recipient countries.

Not much thinking seems to have gone into research aid during these years.[203] It was an area not much articulated in the comprehensive changes that were taking place and to the extent there was any organized thinking, it followed the same efficiency logic. Quality was a keyword and, unsurprisingly, Sida was asked by the government to seek contacts with the leading research funding agency, the Swedish Research Council (VR), with funding the best and most competitive basic research as its central mission. Already in 2002, VR took charge over the Swedish Research Links programme, which had been handled by Sida itself in the initial build-up phase.[204] The government started a process with the object of also transferring project related funding to VR. The reasoning behind this was that competition and scientific quality were essential to achieve efficient use of public funds and to secure arms-length distance between the science decisions and the deliberations and desires within Sida as an

[203] See e.g. Swedish Government 2010
[204] Johansson de Chateau and Billfalk 2007

agency. That there might be a widening gap between the relevance of the research aid and the demands in the field was acknowledged but seems to have been considered less of a concern.[205] Within Sida itself the office of research aid, where the very name SAREC was now also formally eradicated, dwindled to a much smaller unit with essentially a halving of the number of staff and some of the remaining personnel transferred to embassies abroad.[206] Support to capacity building in the existing partner countries still continued much like before although, as mentioned above, selection procedure of Swedish universities has changed in the last few years.[207]

It is hard to fully trace the roots of the government's thinking about research aid in these years. One could, in the defence of the government's lack of articulation, say that the new internal Sida-SAREC had already for more than a decade largely continued on a well-trodden – albeit historically successful – path and not substantially transformed or questioned the logic of its operations. The framework in 2006 was there already in 1995 and as we have seen the same basic elements remained even after that, indeed up to this day. One could, however, observe a certain element of scepticism in the new centre-right government in relation to research with particular goals. The new government closed down the Institute for Work Life Research, *Arbetslivsinstitutet*, right after taking office in the fall of 2006, despite considerable evidence that the institute performed world class research.[208] Sida/SAREC research could also be considered a privileged funding stream, protecting a special culture, or mode of research. Hence, the strategy to not augment or renew it, but increase efficiency by relocating the Swedish "u-forsk" support to VR, introducing NPM style audit and evaluation schemes and, notably, to expose the selection of Swedish partners in the bilateral research programmes to open competition.

In doing this the government followed international trends, although with a considerable delay. As we already noted above, neoliberal tendencies had increasingly affected research policy, as it had also development aid, since a long time and it is hardly a surprise

[205] See e.g. Fellesson and Hårsmar 2013
[206] Kjellqvist 2013; Fellesson and Hårsmar 2013; Fellesson and Mählck 2013
[207]SIDA started around 2013 with a new process for soliciting partnerships between Swedish universities and partner universities in developing countries, building on joint expressions of interests.
[208] Sandberg 2016

that Swedish research aid was also influenced. The question was rather why it had taken so long. The answer may be that Sweden proved a special case, where models had been 'frozen', thanks first of all to their continued success and popularity, but also the fact that they were institutionally protected within the large Sida where it was, on the other hand, not considered terribly important. Hence, it was for a long time not on anybody's reform agenda. In 2006, when it finally did become an object of reform it was conserved once again in a form that was not much different from before and increasingly out of sync with the overall changes in research policy that were just around the corner but had not yet reached the inner circles of research aid planning in Sida. We will return to this issue below.

After a full decade since 2006 there is still not much discussion about the role and future direction of research aid, at least not outside of Sida and those concerned within VR. After the lively debates and discussions about the most effective and appropriate ways of conducting research aid three or four decades ago, there is now a fairly limited interest in finding things out about research aid. Its sliding significance, its slowly melting budget, its unclear policy significance, and its marginalization within the aid and development discourse in Sweden (as well as internationally, in fact) merits some reflection. Is research aid an atavism, gradually disappearing from the face of the Earth, or at least from the practices of foreign aid? Or, what else could explain its current state? Could, or should it be different? But, perhaps first and foremost, how have other donors dealt with some of these issues and questions?

Glancing at other donor countries

While it is beyond our scope to make a comparative study between research aid in Sweden and other high-income countries, a quick outlook at how research feature in the aid strategies and programme portfolios of other donor countries might be of relevance. In laying the groundwork for SAREC in the early 1970s, the Swedish U-forsk commission carefully looked at how other donors dealt with research aid, including Canada, United Kingdom and Denmark. Below we sketch how research aid is currently managed in these countries, and we also take a brief look at our closest neighbour Norway.

The Canadian research aid is mainly channelled through a dedicated and free-standing government institution known as the International Development Research Centre (IDRC). This centre, with an international Board with a Canadian majority, was formed by an Act of Parliament already in 1970 to:

"...initiate, encourage, support, and conduct research into the problems of the developing regions of the world and into the means for applying and adapting scientific, technical, and other knowledge to the economic and social advancement of those regions."[209]

IDRC thus predates SAREC with a few years but has retained its status as a separate institution. The strategic plan for 2015-2020 nevertheless indicates that changes in the international aid context have prompted a redirection of IDRC's operations. The strategic plan now outlines three main purposes of research aid:

- Invest in knowledge and innovation for large-scale positive change
- Build the leaders for today and tomorrow
- Be the partner of choice for greater impact

While the first purpose is about supporting broad coalitions of researchers and innovators in Canada and in developing countries that can come up with science-based solutions for a range of development problems, the second is selectively focussing on supporting change agents in the developing countries. In this area, IDRC aims at identifying and supporting at least 500 "emerging leaders, who can contribute in areas such as sustainable economic growth, and governance."[210] Here, Canada is also supporting an initiative around Think Tanks.[211] For the third purpose, IDRC reaches out to the private sector to create greater leverage for mobilising resources devoted to development solutions. The target is to mobilise at least an additional C$ 450 million over the five year period.

In the financial year 2015/2016, the total aid spending of the Canadian government was C$ 4.82 billion or approximately 32 BSEK.

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[209] IDRC *Strategic plan* 2015-2020, p.12
[210] IDRC, *Investing*, p 6
[211] http://www.thinktankinitiative.org/program/donors <2016-11-10>

Out of this, IDRC spent C$ 194 million which equals 4% of the total aid spending.[212]

In the United Kingdom, research features as an integrated part of overall aid policies and is aligned with the four priority areas of UK government's Aid Strategy from 2015:

- Global peace, security and governance
- Strengthening resilience and response to crises, including public health and climate change.
- Economic development and prosperity in the developing world.
- Tackling extreme poverty and ensuring that every person has access to basic needs.[213]

According to a Department for International Development (DFID) 2016 Research Review, the share of research aid of the total aid channelled through DFID will remain around 3 % in the coming four years. In addition, a special allocation is made for research on infectious diseases, which brings the total research aid to an annual £390 million GBP.[214] Research is largely presented as a vehicle to transform present challenges into future British opportunities: "As countries develop and leave aid dependency behind they will increasingly turn to the UK, not for financial resources, but for its intellectual leadership and scientific expertise."[215]

British research aid thus focuses on financing the production of scientific knowledge that responds to a number of global challenges in line with the UK Aid strategy. As an example, the government is planning to launch a "Global Challenges research fund" of £1.5 billion. This fund is intended to "ensure UK science takes a leading role in addressing the problems faced by developing countries."[216] DFID aims for "broad coalitions" between UK researchers and counterparts in developing countries, as well as other funders like Wellcome Trust, UK Research Councils, and UK government sector departments.[217] In

[212] Global Affairs Canada 2016
[213] DFID 2015
[214] DFID 2016 *Research Review*
[215] DFID 2016 *Research Review*, p.4
[216] DFID 2015, p 16
[217] DFID 2016 *Research Review*, p4

DFID's research strategy for the period 2008-2013, building research capacity in developing countries was one of the key result areas.[218] Interestingly, the objective of capacity building seems to have been largely replaced by, or at least re-coined as, the new concept of "research uptake", i.e. ensuring that investments in scientific knowledge have a good payoff. DFID now in fact requires all research projects to have a well elaborated strategy for "research uptake", which may include elements of capacity building in developing countries.[219] The Secretary of State for International Development Ms. Priti Patel recently summarized the new British research aid approach: "We will ruthlessly target our investment at high-quality, high-impact projects and partnerships that will help to address the great global challenges of the 21st century."[220]

In Denmark, research aid is guided by a new strategic framework, in place since 2014. Danish research aid has three objectives:

- Strengthened research capacity in priority countries
- Innovative and relevant development research results produced
- Research results used

The first objective includes national policies and institutional strengthening as well as the capacity of the individual researchers and the formation of broad collaborative partnership. These objectives are expected to be delivered through a range of modalities, including: "South-driven research cooperation"; "North-driven research cooperation"; institutional development; Masters- and PhD scholarships; core funding to regional initiatives; and more. In most of these modalities, a cornerstone is the sustained collaboration of Danish institutions with counterparts in developing countries. [221]

In line with the Paris Agenda, Denmark wishes to see a concentration to fewer collaboration countries, and an increased alignment with national priorities. Sweden's model of long-term collaboration with a limited number of countries in bilateral research aid is mentioned as a source of inspiration.[222] Sweden is also one of the

[218] DFID 2008
[219] DFID 2016, *Research Uptake*
[220] DFID 2016, *Research Review*, p.3
[221] DANIDA/Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014
[222] DANIDA 2014, Strengthening, p.10

countries that are mentioned for potential donor collaboration at the country level, along with Norway.

In 2014, Danish-supported development research amounted to 169 million DKK, out of which the lion's share (150 million) was channelled through a competitive funding mechanism (Consultative Research Committee). Of this sum 92 million were paid to North-driven cooperation, and the remaining 58 million to South-driven cooperation, where the initiative came from researchers in developing countries.[223] With a total aid allocation of 16.87 billion DKK in 2014, the Danish development research was a modest 1 % of the total aid.[224]

The research aid of Norway has three main objectives:

- The development of new knowledge
- Strengthening research capacity in low- and middle-income countries
- More systematic use of research-based knowledge in policy-making and practice.[225]

Out of a total aid allocation of 34.5 billion NOK in 2015, the Norwegian government allocated approx. 600 NOK to research aid, or 1.7% of the total envelope.[226] The allocation to research aid (including some higher education such as MSc-programmes) was around 600 NOK already in 2003,[227] when the total Norwegian aid was 14.5 billion NOK.[228] The proportion of research aid in Norway thus seems to have shrunk from a level of approx. 4% to below 2% over the last decade.

To support the development of new knowledge (the first objective), research in Norway is funded under a few large global programmes managed by the Norwegian research council, such as for example the Global Health and Vaccination Research (GLOBVAC)

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[223] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Report on support to development research 2014.* <2016-11-10>

[224] Denmark Open Aid, http://openaid.um.dk/da/oda/main-categories?Y=2014 <2016-11-10> <2016-11-10>. According to AnnaMaria Oltorp at Sida, interviewed 2016-11-11, the Danish government recently decided to even further reduce its support to research aid.

[225] https://www.norad.no/en/front/thematicareas/highereducationandresearch/research/ <2016-11-10>

[226] https://www.norad.no/tilskudd/ <2016-11-10>

[227] Norad 2005, *Making support to higher education and research more effective. Donor* policies *and modalities. The Norwegian case*, Norad report 1/05. <2016-11-10>

[228] https://www.norad.no/om-bistand/norsk-bistand-i-tall/

with an annual budget of NOK 122 million.[229] Norway also supports global research platforms like CGIAR.

The second area of engagement – capacity building – consists of support to a number of regional platforms such as Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA) and African Centre for Technology Studies (ACTS). A major mechanism for capacity building in low-income countries is the Norwegian Programme for Capacity Development in Higher Education and Research for Development (NORHED). This programme supports (in competition) collaborative partnerships between higher education institutions in Norway and higher education institutions in the South, with the aim to build capacity in low- and middle- income countries. The budget of NORHED is NOK 710 million over five years, or around 24% of the total research aid on an annual basis.[230]

Finally, to ensure that the investments in research and higher education are brought to bear on the overall aim of development aid, namely poverty reduction, Norway supports initiatives that facilitate the uptake of new knowledge. Among other things, Norway is supporting the Canadian "Think Tank Initiative" (see above).

This brief outlook to other donor countries paints a far from complete picture.[231] Nevertheless, some observations can be made of relevance for our study of the Swedish research aid. First, all of the other four donors emphasise the "uptake" aspect of research; i.e. they include support mechanisms to facilitate that the knowledge produced can be meaningfully used in the development context. Second, none of them place as much emphasis on developing research capacity at the institutional level as does Sweden. To the extent capacity is to be built, it is to be built around the research activity, in either producing or using the actual knowledge. Capacity is targeted toward specific and solution-oriented purposes rather than toward generic purposes and the formation of autonomous academic environments. Third, all countries draw heavily on their domestic universities and their national research councils in the implementation. Fourth and last, the

[229] http://www.forskningsradet.no/prognett-globvac/Om_Programmet/1224697869269 <2016-11-10>

[230] NORAD, *A presentation of NORHED*, https://www.norad.no/globalassets/filer-2015/tilskudd/norhed/a-presentation-of-norhed.pdf <2016-11-10>

[231] The most obvious thing to keep in mind is that here, just as elsewhere in this report, we do not include in our definition of research aid other kinds of studies and research that have been contracted under the development budgets of the respective countries.

level of funding varies considerably, from 4% to 1% of total aid, as well as the organisational structure. There seems to be no magic formula for research aid among these donors, and in that sense, each country has developed its own unique model, although we may observe also that expansion of research aid under the development aid budget does not seem to be the case anywhere.

Policy shifts: development aid, research & innovation

The development and aid contexts are not the only ones with which one can regard research aid. Since the very dawn of science for development in the global South some sixty years ago, there has also been the road that Sweden did not take: that of research policy. The last quarter century alone has seen dramatic shifts in all these contexts: development, aid, and research policy. Development aid has become more selective, directed to fewer countries and with a lessened focus on general development. Instead the interest has been on assisting the poorest countries, or even groups of people within countries.

The backdrop here is of course that compared to the early 1970s when SAREC and Swedish research aid found its form, many developing countries have had a remarkable economic growth and some have also built sizeable research capacities. This is true of countries such as Brazil, Mexico, China, India, Malaysia, South Korea, South Africa, Kenya, and many others. Clearly, internal variation between, and also within, these countries is considerable and not all may have been considered poor or developing even in the 1970s. Further, as development aid has come under tougher fiscal scrutiny it has become the subject of the same accountability regimes as most other sectors of public management. This has pushed aid policies towards measurable goals and a certain kind of mainstreaming of practices, reducing involvement or investment in activities which couldn't easily be defended as 'core business', linked to poverty reduction and efficiency. By and large, this has discouraged investment in research aid and also pushed the rationale for it towards returns for the donor country, as for example in the Canada and UK cases above.

Research policy more broadly has undergone changes in a similar direction, perhaps even more pronounced. Research has since the middle to late 1980s been increasingly affected by what we may call a globalization regime. The paradigmatic logic has been that with the

levelling of the international economic playing field, the massive spread of new communication technologies, the abundance of cheap air travel, deregulation of markets, and rapid growth of financial capital there has been a growing competition for capital of all kinds, from financial to industrial to human capital. The role of research in this context has been to secure that the individual nation, or at least its various competitive regions, can uphold 'competitiveness' and attract and keep all this capital and link research to 'innovation' which in turn can provide better business opportunities and lead the country in question to success in what was increasingly called the new 'knowledge society', if not 'audit society', to pinpoint the rise of accountability, evaluations and performance measurements.[232]

Research policy measures to cope with, or manage, this perceived logic has focused on efficient resource allocation through competitive and audit schemes for resource distribution and the broad introduction of league tables and other instruments for (quasi)marketization of higher education and research systems in most countries. On the mechanisms of this policy there is a vast literature to consult.[233] Suffice it to say here that although the critique of these policy shifts has been massive, not least from academics, much of the changes seem not to be reversed, partly because of the enormity of the growth of research and higher education and the sheer impossibility of returning to the more 'feudal' reign of the professoriate that prevailed in previous, much smaller and elite-oriented higher education systems.

These are broad structural changes in the policies of higher education and development and it is hard not to reflect that their long term effects have been to discourage rather than encourage involvement in research aid. A repeated theme in the evaluations of Swedish research aid, as we have seen above, has been the lack of wider traction among Swedish researchers and their academic departments, perhaps especially the difficulty in mobilizing the leading scholars. A similar observation is that development research has not spread much outside of a handful of long standing strongholds, a pattern that has been remarkably persistent over forty years, as the sequence of reviews

[232] Slaughter and Leslie 1997; Power 1999; *Strathern 2000*; Sörlin 2007, pp. 313-440

[233] A central, often cited contribution is Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011

have also pointed out (above).[234] The preservation of a concentrated funding regime was naturally in the interest of those universities already inside the regime. They welcomed research aid delegated on longer contracts, for example in the bilateral programme. A former Rector of Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences (SLU) told us that he favoured this idea: "give us a sister university [in some developing country] and give us five years". It would then be the responsibility of the Swedish university to build the necessary operational infrastructures and networks and this would do without cumbersome writing of annual applications.[235] SLU was one of few Swedish universities that also received designated chairs for development research.

While there is still a lack of research on the extent and fate of earlier involvement of Swedish universities in the South, Karl Bruno has recently added important new insights. In his 2016 doctoral thesis on the aid involvement of SLU and its predecessors, he shows how senior academic staff saw cooperation with the South as an important avenue for creating legitimacy for their own institutions. He also notes that the long-term "academisation" of these institutions (Colleges of Agriculture, Forestry and the Veterinary College) rendered such involvement less motivated over time. This lends strength to our general impression that as university life became influenced by the new metrics, there were fewer incentives to devote attention outside this core business. Instead, what we see is that those who started work on research aid early continued to do so, and few newcomers entered, underlining a pattern of path dependency, but perhaps also signalling that there has not been enough attraction, or funding available, to mobilize significant new groups of researchers to work in research aid, until (possibly) very recently.

[234] While this trend has persisted over time at the macro level, a countertendency in the last five years has been claimed by some of those that we have interviewed. A more open selection procedure of Swedish universities in the bilateral programmes has attracted a wider group of actors, although there is still dominance from a few traditional universities with a strong track record in research aid. The growing competition for funding in the research community, for any kind of funding, may also have pushed non-traditional researchers into development research

An outlook to foreign and global policies

Globalizing tendencies in the last few decades inadvertently affected research aid and with time relativized what one country could do on its own. Sweden became a member of the European Union, just as it was forming in 1995. This meant that Sweden became part of a much larger structure for research oriented towards broad goals with societal implications. The EU membership, and hence Sweden's growing involvement in the EU framework programs led to changes in research agenda setting, perhaps in particular it moved creative energies and funding initiatives away from arenas where they used to be and pushed them into new ones.

Another policy shift that affected research aid, or rather should have affected it, was the introduction of the so called PGD, Policy for Global Development (in Swedish "*politik för global utveckling*", PGU). The explicit purpose of PGD was to cut across all sectors and government departments, in order to change policies in a comprehensive way. However, many thought of it as primarily a policy for development aid and, since there was no designated PGD funding stream, there was also at least here and there in the state an expectation that PGD initiatives could or should be conducted with financial support from Sida. The PGD decision was taken by a unanimous parliament, in and of itself a rare thing, indicating some of the problems built into this new policy. Partly because of the lofty, broad and noncommitting approach very little action followed. In particular NGOs, who had been warm friends of the policy and its idealistic stance, started to sense the lack of urgency fairly early. Around 2010 it was already an established truth that very little effect could be seen and by 2014 an official evaluation confirmed what was already known as literally a failure of PGD. In the cool, diplomatic language of evaluation, the following quote from the summary cannot be misunderstood:

Like other cross-sectoral issues, the PGD depends on the penetration of the same approach or perspective among all the concerned actors. Our report however exposes the vagueness in both government policy and in the concept of alignment [samstämmighet]. The defined objectives of PGD are visionary and describe the world in the ideal situation. Neither do the government's objectives indicate the expected outcomes, nor who is responsible for achieving them. Moreover, there is lack of clarity on the role of development aid in

PGD, and a tendency to confuse the PGD with pure aid contributions.[236]

Everybody was responsible for PGD, hence nobody was responsible. The chief recommendation to the government was, consequently, to identify responsibilities and present action plans. Similar results can be derived from an extensive study of the Swedish PGD by two independent analysts.[237]

In the spirit of PGD one could have perhaps expected that the research funding agencies should have taken initiatives to promote global development in their daily practices. The same could be said for universities and public research institutes. It is not our impression that any of this has happened. The research sector of the state seems to have been just as passive as any other when it comes to taking PGD ambitions and goals seriously (although no clear goals were articulated…). This should come as no surprise in light of the policy shifts that affected the research sector and the universities, which rather served as counter-incentives to a deeper involvement with an agenda for global development. A case in point is the Internationalization Strategy for research that the Swedish government launched in September 2012. The idea had been presented already in the 2008 research bill. It would have seemed a natural occasion to foster and strengthen PGD goals but of the PGD there were no traces. A memo from the government's Department of Education and Research detailing the implications of the decision barely mentions research aid. The focus was on collaboration with excellent research environments around the world, opportunities for business and for improving the quality of Swedish research.[238]

The above presents the development until 2016. However, at long last, the Swedish government has recently decided to revive the PGD. Through a more forcefully coordinated effort all the ministries are instructed to report on their contribution to achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).[239] Simultaneously, around 80 government authorities were asked to report on their contribution to each one of the SDGs, including research councils such as

[236] Statskontoret 2014, p.7
[237] Fellesson and Román 2016
[238] Utbildningsdepartementet 2012
[239] Regeringens skrivelse 2015/16:182

Vetenskapsrådet.[240] This indeed looks like a step in the right direction - towards a more concerted effort to implement the PGD - although it is probably too early to assess its significance and effectiveness.

Worldwide growth of research, collaboration, and capacity

To sum up, the analysis above, although far from comprehensive, explains why it has been possible to diminish, at least in relative terms, Swedish research aid over the last quarter century. It is the result of a confluence of *several uncoordinated but mutually reinforcing major tendencies occurring in the same historical period*. Economic and technological globalization, rapid economic growth in several developing countries, transnational collaboration, ensuing policy shifts, comprehensive rethinking of the purpose and operational logic of foreign aid, and a change of purpose in the research sectors of donor countries all contributed to turning focus, funding and prestige away from research aid as conceived in the period from the 1960s to the 1980s.

This may all seem gloomy and bleak and it would be tempting to draw the conclusion that research aid is a dead horse no longer worth flogging, or to gear it harder to innovation and economic interests of donor countries, which indeed some have also done (e.g. UK and Canada). It is therefore necessary to also look at some counter-tendencies. Because it is true that during precisely the same period, ca 1990 to 2016, there has been a remarkable growth on international, indeed global, research collaboration. As we have already indicated there has been major growth in research conducted in several countries previously belonging to the development world (broadly construed).

But, perhaps more importantly, these countries have also increased their share of international scientific collaboration. Already in the 1990s these trends were visible, although the collaborative patterns were still predominantly within the three major hubs of science,

[240] http://www.vr.se/omvetenskapsradet/regeringsuppdrag/avrapporterade2016/avrapporterade2016/uppdragattbidramedunderlagforsverigesgenomforandeavagenda2030.5.7f7730451569afec1b57da61.html <2016-11-30>

North America, Europe, and Japan.[241] A decade later several countries, notably China and India, had started breaking this pattern, and this trend has continued, although the growth of publications and citations is still more pronounced than the growth of research collaboration.[242] An important observation is that these changes and trends are results of global structural changes over the previous decades that have little to do with research aid. It could certainly not be excluded that research aid has boosted the growth, and in individual countries or universities it may even have played a key role. But that this comprehensive change cannot be explained by research aid is perhaps best proved by the fact that countries that have had the most dramatic growth of research and research output are those which have received comparatively little research aid, like China and South Korea. This calls for a pluralistic approach to explaining the real world change of scientific development and performance in different nations and world regions, some clearly with deep historical roots in colonial times, and in belief systems, educational patters, social norms, etcetera that are hardly affected even by fairly long term research aid programs. Some of the most successful science nations in the developing world of the twentieth century had strong domestic science traditions and/or had been subject of Jesuit and other European science missionaries or colonial powers since Early Modern times (China, Malaysia, Mexico, India, Brazil, and others).[243] We do not wish to make an attempt to an impact evaluation of Sweden's research aid here. The global knowledge landscape has changed tremendously since the 1970s, a change that in some instances in part may be attributed to research aid and in many instances not. But the significance of this landscape change cannot be overstated, as it forms a fundamental backdrop to Sweden's future enrolment of research in international collaboration and aid.

In addition to these trends, which paint a more optimistic picture of the internationalization of recent science, we should note that several of the most interesting and expansive research areas have been explicitly focused on what might be called global development or even global change. The 1990s and early 2000s saw a massive growth of research on sustainability, vulnerability, biodiversity, poverty,

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[241] Mellin and Persson 1996
[242] Sörlin 2008; Kaare Aagard, Aarhus University, pers. comm. 29 Nov 2016
[243] This is however a complex history and generalizations should be avoided. In a vast literature, see e.g. Basalla 1967 Adas 1989, Pyenson 1993, Petitjean 1992, McLeod 1992, Crawford, Shinn and Sörlin 1993

resilience, urban development, and several other key areas of knowledge which have affected developing countries profoundly. Some of this research has been conducted under the umbrella of the UN Millennium Ecosystem Assessment and the ensuing Millennium Development Goals. Other major strands of what we may call 'globalizing research' have found their ways into the 'big four' major UN/ICSU/WMO programs that started in 1980 with the World Climate Research Program (WCRP), the International Geosphere Biosphere Program (IGBP), the International Human Dimensions Program (IHDP), and Diversitas (on biodiversity research), which since 2013, along with several UN institutions and other international programs, have been transformed into the unified Future Earth program. Clearly, the capacities going into these programs over the last 30 years and more have been mostly rooted in the Western world, but there has been a growing tendency towards the involvement of scientists from the developing world. Much of the research has also taken place in developing countries.

These and other trends of a gradually integrating world community of researchers and exponentially growing transnational collaborations indicate that both research capacity and research performance are being enhanced in many parts of the developing world. While this provides a counter image to the gloomy tendency of reduced interest in development aid for research and knowledge it interestingly serves to further reinforce the same overall tendency. If research collaborations and capacity building seem to grow even without, or at a low level of research aid – what is the rationale for it?

This may seem an overstated question, and we should haste to note here that while the overall pattern is the one we have described there are clearly many countries, and many regions within countries, where the status of research and higher education, and more generally scientific knowledge, is very low. PhD training for example is poor in many countries and rests on unidirectional mobility to foreign institutions, still largely European or North American. The same is true for undergraduate training if a student has the ambition to get a high quality and internationally acknowledged degree. A look at the league tables of universities demonstrates that universities in the developing world don't make it onto the list. On the Times Higher Education ranking 2016/2017 there is one university in Africa on the top 200, the University of Cape Town on position 148. The leading university in India is in the 250-300 bracket. Of the several hundred

universities in India only a handful ranks among the top 1000 in the world. The universities supported by Sida in countries like Tanzania, Mozambique or Uganda are still struggling in the lower echelons of such ranking lists.[244] As noted by one Sida official, there have been large improvements of capacity within some of Sweden's university partners, like Makerere University. [245] The basic insight, however, is that there is far from a linear relationship between research aid, research capacity and research performance, not to speak of its further effects on higher education and the training of PhDs.

This is of course only one way of looking at research capacity; indeed most universities and colleges in North America and Europe are also not in these league tables, but that is more a function of the differentiation of research and education systems in these parts of the world. Here, research universities make up a smaller share of the institutions, in the order of 5 to 10 percent of the institutions, whereas the other 90 percent pursue mostly education but very often with professors that have been trained in a research university for their PhD and sometimes postdoctoral staff. This structure varies between countries. In the United States it is a very well established hierarchy, laid down in the Carnegie Classification of Higher Education since 1973, but with earlier roots.

The question may be asked: are these empirical observations of any significance for research aid and how it should be conceived, and possibly reframed and rethought? One could certainly discuss the range and implications for research aid of the changes that have been described in the last several pages. But it is hard to avoid the conclusion that at least some of the logic of research aid and capacity building that prevailed before 2000 has crumbled and so far not much new has taken its place. Rather, what we see now is a comprehensive, haphazard, uncoordinated experimentation with multiple forms – from the establishing of branches of the world's most leading institutions – New York University, MIT, Carnegie Mellon, Oxford, and many others – in Asia, the Arab World, and elsewhere, to anarchic (and often very productive) researcher-to-researcher collaborations growing in any direction, and the slow but steady growth of organized international and global research programs. This seems to happen

[244]https://www.timeshighereducation.com/world-university-rankings/2017/world-ranking#!/page/0/length/25/sort_by/rank/sort_order/asc/cols/stats
[245] Hannah Akuffo, interview

despite, rather than because of a rather unarticulated, if not austere, policy climate where special funding streams and supportive policies to research aid rather shrink than grow.

Behind it all lies a dramatic growth of the overall capacity of research and higher education worldwide. Higher education institutions in the first half of the 21st century are expected to be at least twice as many as those inherited from past centuries and the total number reach beyond 20 000. Worldwide student numbers have already passed the hundred million mark. The numbers of scientists and journals have doubled in just the last decade, with over 25 million active scientists publishing more than two million articles annually in more than 25 000 journals.[246] Complexity has increased with the sheer volume hike. To add to the complexity, multi-author collaborations, often extending across organizational and national boundaries, are increasingly prevalent.[247]

This reflects a widened global scope of research. Beginning in the 1980s, the scientific system has been thoroughly globalized – especially with the growth of Asian research and the dismantling of the East-West divide following the fall of the Warsaw pact, and the subsequent growth and global integration of these, previously relatively closed, systems.[248] National governments increasingly expect research to be widely accepted in the international community – driven by the growing sophistication of techniques to monitor the international linkages and visibility of research.[249] Funding organizations in their turn target research that operates in fast growing fields, especially among new entrants to the global research systems such as China and other Asian countries (for example the meteoric rise of graphene research in China and South Korea).[250] An overall finding from this comprehensive work over the last few decades is that the enormous differences that always existed between countries and fields in anything from volumes, standards, quality and quality monitoring systems are, albeit still wide, diminishing. This seems to us important news for the thinking of the future of research aid. Certainly, not everyone wants these internationalizing trends to

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[246] Royal Society 2011
[247] Wuchty, Jones and Uzzi 2007
[248] Leydesdorff, Wagner and Bornmann 2014; Hollingsworth, Müller and Hollingsworth 2008
[249] Laredo and Mustar 2000; Oreskes and Krige 2014
[250] Piro et al. 2014

continue. There are concerns raised, isolationist impulses affect politics in many parts of the world and governments everywhere, and certainly the EU, seek to optimize domestic impacts of their R&D (Research and Development) investments. But, as far as we can see the overall pattern remains, and voices of dissent are relatively few; even those who look instrumentally for short term domestic gains also typically admit that it is not possible to avoid international collaboration to achieve their goals.[251]

These are sweeping changes that have already changed the entire logic of the circulation of knowledge and the spread of research and higher education across the developing world and the global South and is bound to continue to do so for the foreseeable future. But it is essential to remember that these changes happen at very different pace both between nations and regions, and even within countries and certainly if you compare social and ethnic groups in countries and cities. There are still pockets in some parts of the world, especially in Africa, where poor research conditions will prevail for years and decades to come. But, reasonably and increasingly, these pockets will shrink, and the areas and the social groups that are already affected by the change are so large, that the premises of research aid as a valid project are fundamentally different now from what they were only a couple of decades ago.

The question must therefore be asked: What do these changes imply for Swedish research aid? Many policy challenges arise from that question, propelled by this emerging state of affairs. What place should research aid occupy in future development aid? Should research aid be incrementally reinforced and reformed? Should it be more comprehensively rethought? Is there a case to be made for a renewed form of research aid and if so what might be its key features? And, if so, would such a strategy be viable for Sweden? We will spend the last chapter to reflect on these questions.

[251] cf. Fourcade 2009; Douglass 2015; Sarewitz 2016

5 The future of research aid in a world of supercomplexity

In previous chapters we have learned that Swedish research aid was formed in political agreement across large parts of the political spectrum. It was innovative and original in its early years; SAREC enjoyed a lot of goodwill and support and evaluations were largely positive, although elements of critique were voiced, often about the lack of institutional support in Sweden, where few research environments took a long term strategic position in development research. One key observation is the early detachment of research aid from the larger research policy arena; a separation that came about despite intentions globally and nationally for more domestic integration and collaboration, not less. We also learned that despite the success, including a good deal of inventiveness when it came to new support forms and initiatives, a certain sense of lack of direction was growing in the organization. SAREC could be terminated as an independent agency without much debate in 1995 and already then, and increasingly during the following decade, a sense of routine and a de facto marginalization of research aid could be noticed. Since 2006 research aid has been on a sliding slope, not because anyone has seriously questioned it, but rather because few have actively desired it or articulated demands for change, new directions, or a bigger budget. Instead, the budget for research aid has levelled off while other public research budgets have grown significantly, both in Sweden and in other countries, especially in East Asia.

From the point of view of institutional history, this trajectory of Swedish research aid is fairly easy to understand. There is a remarkable contrast between the development of research aid as a policy area and research policy at large. It seems like a classic example of decline by neglect. Perhaps this is the most essential outcome of the analysis in the first four chapters of this report. No evaluation has in fact delivered any devastating review of Swedish research aid. There have been criticisms, true, but by and large the story is one of success. The program has been popular, cost effective, well managed, and it has favoured principles and practices that have brought very little harm and has achieved relatively good results in relation to its goals and

preconditions as a contribution from a small country. The problem is that very few have seen research aid as a major concern of theirs. It started as an innovative initiative, but it was never central to Sida, and it was never central to research policy, where it had no articulation. It was not really central to foreign policy either, and its international status was also too small to motivate more major policy articulation, let alone sizeable budget hikes.

It remains unclear who would be willing to take an initiative on behalf of research aid and argue its case in a constructive way. Still today, a large part of the research aid budget is directed to the international programs, and they would probably not intervene if the Swedish contribution continues to slide. Research aid in Sida is no major area for VR; although it does its job with the disbursement of 165 MSEK to Swedish development research it is a mere 3% of the agency's annual spending and with a user community that is fragmented across many disciplines of which few, if any, have research aid as a central mission. In addition, the culture of favouring specialized research efforts is not widespread in VR. Sida itself has not signalled that research aid is an area in need of urgent and major reform. What might be the reason for this lack of initiative? The most obvious explanation is of course that it is a general perception that things are good as they are. From a certain point of view that may seem true. There is little complaint, few raise their voices. But perhaps more fundamentally: the distance between research as the instrument and development as the goal is too distant and no one has in earnest articulated any policy ideas to fill the gap over the years. The spokespersons, and experts, of research policy almost never talk about research for aid. The development aid experts almost never talk about research policy. As the funding streams for these two strands of policy and expertise remain separated, each of the two enjoys a certain level of financial security and thus independence rather than interdependence.

Indications exist that this may not be the best of worlds after all. Even the government is now suggesting a shift to more directed research programming for the research councils, as proposed in the 2016 research bill.[252] Sida and research aid are not explicitly mentioned

[252] Prop. 2016/17:50 *Kunskap i samverkan – för samhällets utmaningar och stärkt konkurrenskraft.*

in these programs, neither as funder nor as a major partner, but ideas about international collaborations are certainly present in the research bill, and the bill could be used in carving out a future direction for research aid. We will return to this idea shortly.

There are now many reasons to think differently. Our world faces multiple and interlinked crises while states, cultures and individuals across the globe have been knit together in a complex web of interdependency. With free trade under threat, large-scale migration feeding nationalism and xenophobia, and the lurking danger of climate-fuelled international tensions, new thinking seems needed. Although other OECD countries have embarked on new schemes seemingly in pursuit of larger benefit for the donor countries themselves, there can be no doubt that the need for capacity building in global South is still there, partly for reasons indicated in the previous chapter: despite massive growth of research and higher education globally quality, capacity and progress are very unevenly distributed. It will still be a meaningful task to assist developing countries in shaping their systems to optimize quality and direct their emerging higher education and research to solve problems of poverty and promote endogenous development, i.e. to align their knowledge sectors with the global – and by extension therefore Swedish – development goals.

It is not within the scope of this report to build in detail the arguments for why research aid is still a very interesting development project, nor is it part of our remit to elaborate on how a future Swedish niche in this respect would look like. Still, it is timely to contrast the image that has slowly emerged of research aid as an increasingly marginalised action arena. Albeit empirically not entirely untrue, it is not a development that is necessary or even warranted. Most of what we know speaks in favour of a continued growth of the demand for research and research training capacity in developing countries and hence for research collaborations of different forms, including research aid.

Departing from the assumption that research aid has a well-motivated place in Swedish development policy we will in the

following turn to some reflections on wider global tendencies of relevance for Swedish research aid and finally on what this might imply for Swedish aid policy.

Framing tomorrow's research aid – the emerging policy regime

Swedish research aid in the 1970s was built on a clear and compelling idea. Some core values from this idea are still valid, but our view is that it is crucial to develop a new core rationale that can direct research aid and that is relevant for today's and tomorrow's world. This rationale must be in line with a grounded understanding of what knowledge could and should achieve in and for the developing world in years to come. This is no longer the same as it was forty or fifty years ago when previous policies were formulated.

To approach such a grounded understanding for a new rationale, it may be helpful to take a brief look at the broader evolution of the dominant research policy regimes after World War Two.[253] It is, after all, within this wider framework of thinking about the role and function of research in societies that also the research of research aid must fit. These regimes are here presented in an admittedly stylized fashion. The *first regime*, dominating between 1945 and the 1960s, was characterised by the Cold War. It was dictated by security policy and economic conditions, with few and informal advisers and varying, sometimes sporadic scientific foundations. The *second regime*, from around 1965, carried the marks of political belief in planning and control and a more formal and open process of negotiation with the scientific community. It also absorbed emerging ideas of research planning as an instrument of industrial and economic policy along the lines of 'linear model'-thinking and with OECD as a defining institution.[254] The inception of this regime in the area of research policy was symbolically marked by the setting-up of the Swedish Government's Science Advisory Board in 1962. It was also a regime that was generally optimistic about the potential of directed efforts through government policies to export research capacity through aid.

[253] The following builds on Schot, Kanger and Foxon 2016, and Sörlin 2015, p 235-248
[254] Godin 2006; Pettersson 2012

The neoliberal order, whose effects on research aid we have described above, could be considered as a *third regime*, from the mid-1980s. It was marked by performance management, audits, efficiency and a radically increased focus on innovation, competitiveness and other instruments to gain national control over the rampant globalization following in the wake of deregulations in many parts of the world. In the neoliberal vision, the world was to become a level playing field and policy worked to optimize research and universities to become winners in the race and assist their nations to also lie ahead of the rest. The research policy framings of this period have been called by many names, Mode 2, Real Science, or post-normal science, and it is generally agreed that it has meant the increased influence of extra-scientific factors, chiefly economic, on science.[255] In this regime competition was more favoured than policy and planning.

This whole way of thinking was challenged by the financial crisis in 2008. After the demise of Lehman Brothers and the near-collapse of the world financial system a new way of thinking came to the surface, and it affected knowledge policies as well. The financial crisis came alongside with other *coupled crises* concerning climate change, environmental impacts, the Anthropocene understanding of the human-planetary relationship, surging international terrorism, and a growing distrust of politics, of globalization, elites, free trade, and of traditional politics. In many respects the sum total of these tendencies has turned into a serious questioning of several of the ideas and logics on which Western style social progress has rested after World War II, but also of the competitiveness logic of the previous regime. Already before the millennium Ronald Barnett had coined a new concept for the challenges universities needed to deal with: supercomplexity.[256]

This emerging *fourth regime* started as the multiple coupled crises became apparent in the first decade of the new century, and accelerated during and after the financial crisis when the EU adopted the Lund Declaration (July 2009) with its 'grand societal challenges' agenda, and has since continued. It is fair to say that challenge driven research has now become part of the international norm of science and of investment in R&D. Hence, we base our thinking on future knowledge and research aid on the assumption that such a shift of direction of research and innovation policies is to be taken as a point

[255] Gibbons et al 1994; Ziman 2000; Funtowicz and Ravetz 1993
[256] Barnett 1998

of departure. We also note, as a sign of this general development, that an alignment of policies, including knowledge policies, is increasingly demanded to cope with the challenges, perhaps most notably climate change.[257] The evidence is already compelling that there is now a shift towards so called "responsible research and innovation" (RRI) and, in addition, an increased recognition of the state as a key change agent and funder of the necessary investments. There is also an increased interest in involving civil society – citizens, organizations, businesses – and a balancing of national interests with universal needs, because clearly some of the needs that should be met will be more present somewhere else than in the country which makes the knowledge investment.[258] Key concepts in this emerging frame of thought are "transformation" and "transition", that have become emblematic of the demands and ambitions following in the wake of the United Nations' Sustainability Development Goals and the Paris COP 21 climate agreement, both from 2015. The call has already been out for a few years that research, across all science fields and conducted in an integrative fashion, should support and sustain such transitions.[259]

The basic rationale behind this shift is that *benefits of traditional innovation are not necessarily certain*. The negative impacts of innovation can, and often do, overtake the benefits. Creative destruction, Joseph Schumpeter's classical frame of entrepreneurial innovation, can become 'destructive creation', and not only threaten the long term foundations of economic growth and competiveness, but also disregard important challenges such as poverty reduction, environmental quality, climate change, and inequality. To address this in a major way, we assume will require a structural transformation in governance arrangements between the state, the market, civil society and science. It will also require more space for experimentation and societal learning, a constructive role for foresight helping to shape innovation processes in earlier phases and on a continuing basis, and the development of new types of knowledge fusing social science, humanities, engineering and sciences into an emerging historical era of directional transformative change.[260]

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[257] OECD 2015
[258] Mazzucato 2013; 2016; Mazzucato and Penna 2015
[259] International Social Science Council 2012; Stirling 2015
[260] Kivimaa 2014; Kivimaa and Kern 2016; Schot, Kanger and Foxon 2016

We suggest that a transformation frame will be particularly suitable for Swedish knowledge and research aid. Sustainability and the mitigation of climate change are key dimensions of Sweden's entire foreign policy including aid and development policy. These concepts are also possible to align with poverty reduction – a central goal of development aid – since climate change and environmental degradation will most severely affect the poor and constitute major obstacles to development. Not only does this imply changes in research and innovation policy in Sweden, which is now manifest in the government's research bill from November 2016. It also puts a shift in the thinking of knowledge and research aid back on the development aid agenda. We deliberately talk here of knowledge *and* research. The reason is that it is useful to emphasize that useful knowledge for development entails more than research. To build resilient and sustainable knowledge systems there needs to be an integrated build-up of capacity for research, higher education and innovation, hence the word knowledge.

These are not the only global trends in research and knowledge policies. Strong nationalist forces in many countries, a questioning of trade and global collaboration, and a questioning of the regional patterns of collaboration (EU, NAFTA, ASEAN) may constrain research and innovation policies as well and put stronger emphasis on domestic goals and gains in the OECD countries. Given the innately international character of science, we don't think these tendencies in and of themselves will undermine the case for a strong research aid. On the contrary, they may strengthen it, and knowledge and research aid itself may in fact be seen as an instrument that can be used to counter nationalist reactions and impulses to the open sharing and circulation of knowledge within and between societies.

Rationale for rethinking research aid

The list of arguments for a strong research aid could be made long. At the core are arguments about the building of institutions and intellectual infrastructures, following on the shifting knowledge landscape witnessed in the past two decades with new global powerhouses in the South. The higher education systems themselves will, as they grow, be in dire need of well-educated academic professionals and leaders. The tradition that postcolonial elites have been educated in Western universities has some virtues, but the level

of expansion requires domestic institutions to take a progressively bigger share of the postgraduate training which is still in a fledgling state and where research aid can play a crucial role. One could even make the argument that as developing countries grow richer, and smaller shares of their populations are defined as poor, and as they also grow more resourceful their need of conventional development aid shrinks, while their need for research aid might in fact grow. Qualified knowledge at a reasonable cost, i.e. produced domestically, will be a constraining resource in the development of most sectors of society, from welfare and schools to infrastructures, media, and democratic and civic structures.

It is hard - as always - to fully grasp the implications of ongoing developments, but if these tendencies are indicative of emerging research policy we may see good reason to reconfigure Swedish research aid in the coming years. What is characteristic of the world situation is that challenges and problems are no longer easily divisible as one set of challenges in the global North and another in the global South, or, even less, that the problems are in the former and the solutions in the latter. There are still differences, of course, but these differences are distributed in new, more uneven and less predictable ways. This general argument finds empirical support in vastly different geographical regions across the world. The impacts of climate change, resource depletion, and increased vulnerability hit cold and hot areas, wet and dry areas, north and south, east and west. It is true socially: people are rich and poor not just between countries, but increasingly within countries. Globalization creates losers, and winners, in all parts of the world. Wealth is distributed unevenly, but that is as true within the richest countries in the world such as the United States, as it is within the poorest African countries, and in the Arctic. Obesity and wealth related disease is rapidly growing in the formerly developing world, as well as in the poorer strata of rich countries.[261] It is also true scientifically and educationally: in formerly developing countries ground breaking science is performed in islands of creativity surrounded by vast regions that remain void of scientific presence. Rich countries see their basic educational levels slide while social elites in Asia and Latin America enjoy exceptional education. Those who are the frontrunners and those who are lagging behind are no longer as easy to define as they were in the past; the metaphor itself is perhaps

[261] Piketty 2013; Jamieson 2014; Harari 2016; Arctic Council 2016

not very useful any more. Countries with high levels of wealth and growth may no longer fulfil what we mean by 'progress' or even 'development'. Developing and developed countries can no longer be as readily identified as before; if New York City was a country it would be world leading in the number of millionaires per capita but close to South Africa in its share of population below the poverty line.[262]

In this final section we will sketch some elements – presented as a set of basic statements, or perhaps better: propositions – of a possible change in the thinking of research aid in the Swedish context. The propositions should be seen as general points of departure for continued thinking. We will make no attempts to discuss precisely how they could be translated into concrete policy recommendations – apart from the fundamental advice that it would be worthwhile to initiate a more detailed analysis, and open a broad, future-oriented conversation with the purpose of forging a new approach to research aid. To us this seems both reasonable and urgent.

Proposition 1: Challenges and problems are shared. The notion of a shared problem-set is not a new one, which our historical analysis above has shown. However, throughout the previous research policy regimes, up until the beginning decline of the neoliberal regime in 2008-09, the criticality of this common problem landscape has been obscured by other, more particularistic concerns. As we now increasingly take stock of this understanding of a supercomplex world, where 'development' is not just for the global South but also for the formerly 'rich' world of the North, the idea of research aid will have to be discussed seriously. For Sweden, where research aid essentially continues to be acted out according to a unique model shaped in the Cold War, such a discussion might not only be needed but may also prove highly re-invigorating. This also requires a rethinking of quality and success criteria for research.

Proposition 2: Global challenges are local. They manifest themselves in different ways in local settings. Rethinking research aid may need to look more carefully into this issue. Climate change, biodiversity loss, land rights issues, epidemic disease, or sustainable urban designs (to mention just a few common challenges) hold knowledge components that are both generic and specific. Research aid may be conceived as an

[262] Nixon 2014

effort to assist partner states to build generic knowledge as part of a long term ambition to carve out strategies to deal with internal manifestations of the broader challenges. In such thinking it may well be that research aid takes an entirely different form and engages researchers and institutions in the developing world in *broader constellations and not limited to bilateral cooperation nations*.

Proposition 3: Wealth is becoming a critical problem. Seemingly a paradox, the wealth which governments and individuals have always strived for, is increasingly becoming a problem. This is particularly true when the ways to produce wealth threaten other values such as social cohesion and sustainability. Poverty remains a grave problem, and an embarrassment to an ever materially richer humanity. Today it seems less likely that the world will in the near future deal successfully with the challenges following from its exploding wealth than it will eliminate poverty. Therefore a change of policy in this general direction is highly desirable, and it is already underway in global institutions and research organizations such as Future Earth, the United Nations, the above mentioned ISSC, the IPCC, UNEP, and many others. Their priorities include the so called 2030 agenda to eliminate poverty a work that surely must continue but may not be the central concern of research aid. Indeed, a reformed research aid would rather begin on the assumption that the poverty alleviation goal will be reached. Instead research aid would take as its cue *the challenges rising from a world with much less poverty and much more wealth*, i.e. a situation which drives new kinds of challenges to do with transgression of planetary boundaries, questions of economic and environmental justice, wealth and health distribution, vulnerabilities linked to new inequalities, and challenges to do with religious and ideological tension.[263] .

Proposition 4: Research agendas should be formed in dialogue. Reorienting research, not just in the South but in the North as well, may in this coming century be not so much about making the world richer but making it more secure and less vulnerable. Research is certainly no panacea, but since it is also the foundation of much of the training of societal elites, the power of scientific knowledge shouldn't

[263] We may note that this proposition harkens back to the debate between SAREC proponents and their adversaries in Ekonomisk debatt 1974 (footnote 156). The pro-SAREC position was to argue that economic growth was not the primary critieria of success for research aid: it was much more a concept of what "development" would mean, i.e. about what societal values it fostered.

be underestimated. To do such a reorientation *research agendas need to be reconsidered in a South-North dialogue and not restricted to research aid but part of general research and innovation policies* that in turn should be defined as partly international in scope. Alliances of change agents may be mobilized to develop thinking and enable new forms and start with experimentation. These change agents may be identified in universities, funding agencies, the business community, cooperation countries, international for a, and in civic society, and the EU. This may be a more informative and integrative process than the current one, but also a more demanding one.

Proposition 5: The knowledge base is widening. A rethinking of research aid would also imply asking questions about *the range of relevant knowledge*. A key element of the challenge driven research after the economic meltdown of 2008-2009 is, on the contrary, the remarkable rise of integrative approaches bridging multiple disciplines across fields, and also bringing in the social sciences and humanities and open up for collaborations between them and the natural sciences, medicine and technology. This goes beyond the quest for inter-disciplinarity in the last several decades and also follows a wider mission-oriented logic. Primarily, its focus is on the conception of tomorrow's institutional environments for research and education. The idea of working across disciplines is not new, but institutions that can successfully operationalise this idea are yet to form. If we are sincere about the need to transform our own institutions in the most advanced science nations to become better adapted to deal with the super-complexity challenges, we should possibly also consider similar changes to occur elsewhere. This might be especially true for the parts of the world where knowledge institutions are built for the first time on a scale and with a capacity to address the same issues.

Proposition 6: Institutions remain essential. Research capacity is important, but equally important is the building of universities and institutes that themselves are sustainable. These form a subset of organisational institutions in the wider, historical sense of the concept of institutions (norms, values, ethics, rights, freedoms, incentives, taxes, money, legal conditions, etcetera), that have proven so fundamental for the growth of wealth in the Western world.[264] But it is an important subset insofar as they are institutions that pursue research in the public interest and since the Enlightenment have been

[264] A standard reference is Birdzell & Rosenberg 1986

crucial in articulating and upholding some of these fundamental values, norms and freedoms. In our view, it seems reasonable that Sweden continues to support a limited number of countries in building capacity in remaining pockets of low levels of research and higher education institutions. This is a progressively shrinking undertaking as institution building continues and growth of universities and research capacity spreads. These efforts should therefore probably *focus on the management, building and circulation of knowledge* rather than on the science content. Research aid will thus become less of a builder of primary capacity and increasingly assist the global South in becoming a relevant partner in addressing global and local challenges and in that vein also deliver benefits and mutual development to the global North. Institutional research capacity is set to be a critical 'lever' for low-income countries to participate in, and benefit from, the massively expanding global knowledge production. Sweden, as one of the few rich countries with a sustained track record of supporting institution building in the South, may use this asset to create such levers and pioneer a new paradigm for research aid. To what extent future Swedish investment into scientific capacity in the global South will have to be justified by its relevance for poverty reduction needs, again, to be subject of careful analysis, and debate.

Proposition 7: Change of scale is required. So far, research aid has been an increasingly marginal part of a marginal area within research policy, and it has become even more marginal when it has been mainstreamed into a small sub field of research project funding. One could instead think about this as an interesting part of a much larger challenge driven research agenda. Indeed, the kinds of challenges that manifest themselves in the developing countries, including Sweden's cooperation partners, fit very well into an idea of research funding agencies taking a broader responsibility for challenge driven research. Hence the objectives for *research aid should rather become embedded in a broader research policy and become part of wider and larger funding schemes*. The rationale is that the collaborating research community of the developing world is already quite diverse, and grows more diverse for each year, and that its future nurturing is no longer just an 'aid' issue but a broader sustainability and research issue predicated on a shared issue agenda. Informed by our observations in this study and the available literature, we perceive that the challenges we are facing at the planetary level, as well as in countless local contexts, require responses on a decisively different scale than what has been able to

muster within the paradigm of development aid. This requires a discussion around what sources of funding could do what kind of job to achieve the synergies without compromising the roles and contexts of the funding sources. Research for development aid and basic research were once worlds apart. Now these worlds have come much closer, just as advanced northern research nations such as Sweden have come much closer to those in the global South.

Proposition 8: Research aid should be mainstreamed and linked closer to knowledge and research policy at large. If one assumes that challenge driven research (and broader development of relevant knowledge institutions) is a common interest for both research policy and development aid it would make sense to *integrate funding streams in a more comprehensive way* than has hitherto been the case. Integrative challenge driven research and development policy programs would probably require certain criteria for funding to secure collaboration between Swedish research institutions for purposes that align with research aid. In turn this would likely require the re-opening of very basic tenets of research aid, to make it more attractive and a more legitimate domain for scholars and scientists across all fields. A more integrated and consolidated funding stream may also correct the long-standing separation of research aid from the national research policy arena observed throughout the past forty years, despite repeatedly stated ambitions for increased alignment and coordination. In practical terms, this mainstreaming could take any form. Research funding has over the last half century or more developed a remarkable and productive variety of support forms, none of which could be excluded when it comes to funding – and co-funding between funders – the kind of research that can benefit development and addressing challenges. Forms used by Sida so far only represent a small part of the possible spectrum. The same goes for how future research aid is conducted and organized.

This development work could be conducted along similar lines as the Swedish government has presented in the 2016 research bill where a total of 15 large programs for research and innovation have been suggested, ten of them devised as national programs for research and five as collaborative programs for innovation. The programs will be managed through the research councils. Programs like these could be complemented and augmented with funding from the development aid budget and be partially designated for international collaborations including developing countries and with elements containing

knowledge and research aid. They could also take the form of joint programming with Future Earth, EU framework programs, and other international collaborative initiatives, in addition to the existing family of large programs that SIDA has collaborated with (CGIAR and others). As an example, efforts to connect research aid with mainstream national research initiatives may take form through the framework of responsible challenge driven funding, of Swedish research agencies such as Vinnova. We will not here go into any detail of how this could be carried out in practice. But we do believe that these opportunities, and the analysis and arguments foregrounded in this study, clearly points to the potential of a distinctly new approach for future research aid.

Appendix: Why history matters – a few notes on the rationale for historical thinking on complex policy issues

In the introduction, we asked "why would history matter?" While we by now, hopefully, have been able to convince the reader about some of the benefits of looking back using the Swedish research aid as a case study, some more general remarks could be re-iterated here. "International development" in its present form is indeed a product of the late modern society and the post-World War 2 belief in rationality and science. Economics, political science and the hard sciences have been the knowledge pillars for thinking and policy-making in the development arena, while experts from the humanities have rarely been consulted. Some of the challenges we are facing require us to rethink, and the humanities needs to be involved in this reconfiguration of knowledge and the changing understanding of our world.

In 2014, the British Council published a large study of the value of the humanities for the international development arena. It concluded that the skills that people with a background in the humanities are indeed very useful for most development activities, not least for being able to "recognize and appreciate the variations and universalities in human experience" and for understanding historical contexts. Everyone who has been active in the development arena knows that development takes time. And it takes much longer than the typical five-year aid planning cycles or the decades-spanning UN processes such as the Water Decade 1980-89 or the Millennium Declaration. Obviously, the time element is crucially embedded in the idea of development which in itself could merit the utility of history studies. A group of prominent historians in the UK established the organisation History and Policy almost fifteen years ago.[265] Its purpose is to connect the makers of public policy with the expertise of more than 500 historians. Although we are yet to see something

[265] www.historyandpolicy.org

similar in Sweden[266], this study commissioned by EBA is a step in the same direction.

But what is it then, more specifically, that history can bring to the development arena and to the formulation of development policy? Woolcock, Szreter and Rao outline three distinct contributions that history can make for development policy:[267]

- History insists on the centrality of context and process for development outcomes
- History offers different and necessary long-term perspectives on development
- History offers a reflexive and self-critical vantage point of development policy itself

Below, we will briefly discuss these possible contributions in the light of Sweden's development policy trajectories in the past and in the future.

History is contextual knowledge

As was pointed out in the British Council study, contextual knowledge is essential. Many developing countries have a rich and complex history, often including a colonial legacy, leaving many layers of institutions, cultural practices and social structures that set the scene for current change dynamics. Understanding the specific contextual and historical reality is vital for delivering effective and sustainable development cooperation. Elinor Ostrom has stressed that when making decisions, actors are heavily influenced not just by their present knowledge and the structure of incentives in their immediate environment, but also of their experience of past outcomes.[268] Simply put: people remember, and they make decisions based on real experience in the past. If a donor organisation and its partner organisations do not factor in history, they will only see a small part of the reality they are supposed to operate in.

[266] The idea has been discussed since several years among historians, and was recently presented in an effort to bring humanities knowledge to bear more on public discourse and policy in a changing media landscape. Östling et al 2016
[267] Woolcock, Szreter and Rao 2011
[268] Ostrom 2005

In the Swedish aid context, it is disturbing to note that the thorough "country analyses" that SIDA used to carry out in the 1980s and 1990s, as part of developing new country cooperation strategies, have been slimmed considerably. The Kenya Country Analysis of 1986 is a small book of 100 pages, while nowadays the context analysis is summarized in 5 pages.[269] In the new slimmed format there is no room for history, and long-term analyses are rarely carried out as part of strategy processes.[270] This becomes particularly troublesome when donor organisations also lack institutional memory.[271] A study of Swedish development cooperation practices and incentives in 2002 concluded that institutional memory was severely lacking, since desk officers normally rotate on a 3 to 5 year basis, and that the organisation itself had very poor mechanisms for "remembering".[272] The poor mechanisms for internal learning were again pointed out in 2011 by the Parliament's Bureau of investigations.[273] Interestingly, the only historically-oriented studies that have been undertaken by SIDA in recent years have been done after the cooperation has been closed down, e.g. in Vietnam, Laos and Sri Lanka.[274] These studies cannot contribute contextual knowledge for ongoing cooperation but serves more as input for methodological learning and - no doubt – also fills a commemorative function.

History would certainly benefit the contextual analysis done by Sida and MFA in e.g. country analysis but this would require allocating more time and resources for carrying out in-depth analytical and historical work.

History adds a different perspective

In numerous reports, presentations, and policy statements, it is said – albeit sometimes in different words - that the developing countries are 'lagging behind'. 'They' are 'lagging' meaning that they have a bit of catching up to do, and the idea is that they should eventually come up to 'our' standards in whatever aspect is in focus: material well-being,

[269] Anders Karlsson and Gunilla Hesselmark 1986, *Landanalys: Kenya,* SIDA
[270] Statskontoret 2011
[271] Hall-Matthews 2011
[272] Ostrom et al 2002
[273] Statskontoret, 2011:25
[274] See Sida Evaluations 2012:1 (Sri Lanka), 2012:2 (Vietnam) and 2012:3 (Laos)

health statistics, democratic principles, HBTQ-rights etc. Typically, these statements are accompanied with exclamations of urgency; that progress is too slow and that now is the time for action. Unfortunately, the high ambitions and utopian rhetoric embedded in the political speak of the development arena often come down in the face of the more harsh practical realities.

The historian's viewpoint is different. Many low-income countries are doing a journey in a few generations that took Europe and US centuries to traverse. While Africa to many development policy-makers still is a poor and rural continent, the African continent now goes from 5 to 50% urban population in 70 years, a social transformation which took Europe 300 years.[275] Much of the publicity that Hans Rosling's work has attracted is attributed to the fact that the "poor" countries of the South are improving child survival much faster than the richer countries did at the same GDP level throughout history. While many countries in the South have flaws in their systems of democratic governance and civil rights, from the historians viewpoint these same countries have made tremendous progress in a very short time, considering that most of them were colonies just fifty or sixty years ago. In many of these countries, particularly in Africa South of the Sahara, there were few states in place prior to colonisation. No democratic state has ever been built in sixty years in the richer countries. From a historian's viewpoint, it is thus not clear who is in front and who is lagging.

History also distances itself from simple causal explanations and deterministic approaches. In the late 1950s, few economists would have thought the wonder of the Asian Tiger economies to be possible in just a few decades. Instead, most pundits were betting that Africa would be the world's economic growth zone in the coming years. They would all be proved wrong, due to their blindness to historical factors.[276] Another example can be taken from the recent advancement to the global ICT-forefront of India. This cannot be explained by certain imported institutions per se, but by the local social order which predated the colonialism which favoured entrepreneurship, early and indigenous experience of the centralised

[275] Pieterse 2015
[276] Gunnarson and Rojas 1995

state, and a relatively open society hailing from religious life in pre-colonial India.[277]

A historical perspective opens up for a more sincere and realistic approach to development processes, which moves away from political expediency and placard-policies. History looks at longer, more structural process, and culturally and environmentally contextualised changes; the "longue duree" of development. It presumes a more humble attitude to progress, and encourages listening and understanding rather than lecturing and projecting.

History as a reflexive practice

Development aid is coming of age. As with all disciplines that have been around for some time, it becomes natural to start reflecting over the paths trodden. Even though "development" can hardly be called a science in its own, any epistemic group or community of practice may benefit from - and essentially requires –embedding a set of "reflexive practices" so as to constantly re-evaluate and re-interpret their own purpose.[278] Historians would have an important role to fill in the blanks in the lacking institutional memory in development organisations. What kind of assumptions and theories has previously underpinned policy, what were their outcomes and why did they fail or succeed? Why were certain policy prescriptions promoted at certain times by different actors? While policy-makers necessarily have to make assumptions, they cannot control all contingent and external factors, as well as they cannot foresee all possible consequences. The history of development policy itself enables intra-disciplinary learning so that, at least; "previously unintended consequences ought never to be unanticipated in the future."[279]

In Swedish development aid, this reflexive practice has been short in supply. Over the years, just a handful of long-term studies of Swedish aid have been carried out by SIDA/Sida.[280] There is a handful

[277] Bayly 2011
[278] Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992; Robbins 2007
[279] Hall-Matthews 2011
[280] Apart from those on Laos, Vietnam and Sri Lanka previously mentioned, long-term evaluations have been made on specific interventions such as HESAWA in Tanzania (Sida Evaluation 6/36), the Uganda water sector (Sida 2009) and long-term evaluation of research cooperation with Nicaragua (Sida 2011)

of academic studies and overviews that take a longer historic approach.[281]

However, much of the history studies that have been produced by actors on the development arena are not self-reflexive to any larger extent, and they seldom put development aid into its larger historical context. History is, according to Uma Kothari, frequently used to legitimise and explain current development policy approaches, rather than trying to be self-critical and reflexive. Development actors writing the history of development practice, she claims, tend to present over-simplified and linear narratives where history typically starts in 1945. She points to Björn Hettne's book from 1995 as an example of such over-simplified narratives.[282] Hettne was for decades one of Sweden's leading scholars in the field of development theory. He had a central role in the government commission that laid the foundation for Sweden's research aid in the early 1970s (SOU 1973:41), and later produced an array of publications for SAREC.

The historical descriptions present in Swedish development policy have so far been limited to stabilising the current paradigm. The standard narrative is one of colonial innocence. From the "Aid Bible" in 1962 to the Government's Africa policy in 2007, Sweden is without exceptions portrayed as a country without any colonial past: "Sweden's lack of a colonial past in Africa and the fact that the north European social model has served as an inspiration for many African countries mean that Sweden is well placed to influence, cooperate and act."[283] It is true that Sweden has not had any colonial possessions for over a century. But there is now a growing body of literature in colonial history pointing to the Swedish complicity in the larger powers' colonisation projects.[284] Historians in Scandinavia are beginning to piece together a fuller and more nuanced picture of Sweden's role in the imperial conquest of the South, a role which has been labelled "colonialism without colonies".[285]

Counter-narratives about Swedish aid, being far from an altruistic act of solidarity and instead driven by individual, geopolitical or

[281] See Bruno 2016 for an up to date literature overview
[282] Kothari 2011
[283] Government Communication 2007/08:67
[284] Avango, Högselius and Nilsson 2017; Fur 2013; Thomasson 2013; Evans and Rydén 2013; Nilsson 2013; Granqvist 2008
[285] Makko 2014; Naum and Nordin 2013

economic self-interest, are today found in adjacent academic fields, such as in anthropology, political science, history of technology and agrarian history.[286] These alternative paths trodden challenge the "standard narrative" - as portrayed e.g. by Lennart Wolgemuth and Bertil Odén – of a benevolent and alliance-free Sweden assisting poor countries purely on solidarity grounds.[287] A standard or dominant type of narrative may be useful for providing meaning and clarity and communication. The problem arises when this narrative is interpreted as there is no other path is available, at least not visible; and that the past to the future is construed as a single linear trajectory where the West (or better still: Sweden) represents the final destination. The simplified story of development as written from the vantage point of the rational West – the victors at the "end of history" as Francis Fukuyama put it – thus constitutes a normative story: a prescription for success. In this simplified tale of social transformation, the historical experience of the West becomes a formula for development that leaves little space for other historical trajectories. With Uma Kothari's words:

"Thus, a history of development is not simply about what events took place in the past, the charting of a trajectory of dominant ideas and approaches over time, but also how the past is imagined and mapped onto other places in the present."

In what may seem to be a leap of self-contradiction, history has the potential of exploring a new future for Sweden's development cooperation policy. The emerging counter-narratives of Sweden's role in the world over the past two centuries, and especially in the developing South, prepare the ground for a re-interpretation of Sweden's position, resources and abilities for the future. The re-routing of our past will have an effect on our policy trajectory far into the future. This, we believe, may be the most important contribution from history for Swedish development policy. By writing a more nuanced and far-sighted history, as well as a richer and more explorative history of Swedish development aid (in this study we focus on development research aid) we also create space and legitimacy for new policy directions up ahead. As the well-known Nordic historian

[286] Baaz Eriksson 2003; Bjereld 2007; Öhman 2006; Bruno 2016
[287] Wolgemuth and Odén 2011

Bo Stråth has said: the representation of the past is essentially a representation also of the future.[288]

[288] Stråth 2012

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