

Exploring donorship

Internal factors in Swedish aid to Uganda

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*Rapport 2016:09*

*till*

*Expertgruppen för biståndsanalys (EBA)*

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# Preface

This year marks the 30th anniversary of aid to Uganda. The period after 1986, when aid to the country was introduced, has been characterised by strong economic development and a political situation in which the government has taken an increasingly tighter grip on the reins of power. The political developments in Uganda combined with widespread corruption, has resulted in deteriorating relations between the government and donors in recent years. The question posed in this report is how to make Swedish aid more effective in such difficult environments.

The study proposes a model for how bilateral aid to a country can be evaluated so that more lessons can be drawn. The model focuses on how ‘internal factors’ affect the aid process. The report proceeds from the premise that these internal factors are controlled by Sweden and that they can be changed and improved by Sweden, which is why they should also be studied in evaluations. The author takes the view that Sweden’s current aid evaluations look at what Sweden’s partners and the recipient party have done, but not at what the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Sida are doing to make aid more effective. The overall conclusion of the study is that factors in Sweden as a donor – in particular management and follow-up – have an impact on aid effectiveness.

Sweden’s aid is managed through strategies. The study shows that the process of drawing up the current strategy for Uganda should have been more decentralised and supported at country level. In future strategy processes, there is a need to consult partners and other donors in the country to a greater extent. When the strategy was adopted, there was not enough systematically collected information and data to understand and analyse the nature of poverty and the situation in the country. The study shows that the objectives in the Uganda strategy are complex and perhaps too ambitious in relation to the resources available. Moreover, there is a need to base reporting more clearly on the aid interventions, instead of on national indicators that have a weak link to what is being done in the projects.

The study also discusses a number of issues concerning the application of the Paris Declaration principles in corrupt and non-democratic environments, relations and relation-building in aid, long-term thinking and predictability, fragmentation and upscaling, creativity and risk, results focus and complexity, and civil society’s potential – all of these are important challenges for future aid.

We believe that this study could be of interest to a broad public with an interest in aid. It is of particular interest to those who have worked or are currently working on aid to Africa or Uganda and on issues concerning aid effectiveness, aid management and evaluation, and who have an interest in Uganda or Africa in general. This report, together with the report that the Expert Group on Aid Studies (EBA) is publishing simultaneously on Sweden’s 50 years of cooperation with Tanzania (2016:10), contains important conclusions for future aid to Africa and the discussion on the effectiveness of Swedish aid.

The report was produced in dialogue with a reference group under the leadership of Eva Lithman, member of the EBA. The analysis and conclusions expressed in this report are exclusively those of the authors.

Stockholm, October 2016



Lars Heikensten

# Sammanfattning

## Bakgrund och syfte

Expertgruppen för biståndsanalys (EBA) har beställt en studie över Sveriges långsiktiga bilaterala utvecklingssamarbete med Uganda. Biståndsgivare har tidigare i flera landstudier försökt mäta och bedöma det externa stödets aggregerade långsiktiga effekter, men de resultat som presenterats har ofta haft en svag empirisk grund. De långsiktiga effekterna har i dessa studier en endast indirekt koppling till givarnas prestationer. Lärdomarna för biståndsgivare – om hur den egna biståndseffektiviteten ska kunna förbättras – har varit begränsade. EBA uppmanade i den utlysningen som låg till grund för denna rapport utvärderare och forskare att ”tänka utanför boxen” och presentera alternativa och innovativa modeller för en landutvärdering.

EBA och författaren enades om att den här studien skulle ha ett dubbelt mål – dels att utveckla en modell för utvärdering av biståndsgivarens prestationer på landnivå, dels att tillämpa modellen på Sveriges utvecklingssamarbete med Uganda. Det övergripande syftet blev att få fram analytiska verktyg och vägledning om hur Sveriges bistånd kan bli mer effektivt om det styrs och levereras på ett annat sätt. Studien är inte en fullskalig utvärdering av landprogrammet, utan mer en övning i modellbyggande, kombinerad med en studie av hur interna faktorer har påverkat biståndseffektiviteten i Uganda.

Sverige har en lång historia av utvecklingssamarbete med Uganda – samarbetet inleddes redan 1986. Den här studien omfattar perioden 2009–2015. Till följd av bristande mänskliga rättigheter, ett demokratiskt underskott och institutionaliserad korruption har det direkta samarbetet med regeringen minskat från och med 2012 och i stället har stödet via civilsamhället och den privata sektorn ökat. Det innebär också att Sveriges stöd till Uganda tydligt har förändrats under den studerade perioden, detta ger en intressant bakgrund för en studie av interna faktorer och av hanteringen av förändringsprocessen.

Studien strävar efter att:

- diskutera varför interna faktorer är viktiga och presentera en analytisk modell,
- identifiera de interna faktorerna och formulera en uppsättning ingångshypoteser eller antaganden för att stimulera och strukturera analysen,
- introducera relevanta teoretiska perspektiv för att förstå de interna faktorerna,
- ge en översikt över det svenska stödet till Uganda – politik, strategier och projekt,
- diskutera hypotesernas relevans och giltighet på grundval av tillgänglig evidens,
- dra preliminära slutsatser och presentera framtida utmaningar.

Biståndseffektiviteten påverkas av det sätt på vilket biståndet tillhandahålls. Detta är studiens grundläggande premiss. Det finns många externa avgörande faktorer, men biståndseffektiviteten är också beroende av hur relationerna ser ut mellan mottagare och biståndsgivare, av effektiva leveransförfaranden och leveransmekanismer, samt av hur man lyckas bygga upp kapacitet och institutioner som kan bidra till utvecklingen i mottagarländerna.

Det finns två huvudskäl till att fokusera på interna faktorer. För det första kan dessa faktorer påverkas och ändras av de nyckelaktörer som är involverade på den svenska sidan, för att bidra till bättre kollektivt beslutsfattande och ökad biståndseffektivitet. För det andra har det inte gjorts så många empiriska studier kring denna aspekt av biståndseffektivitet. Det finns få studier som ger en inblick i hur biståndet fungerar på fältet, genom att granska de komplexa kausala kedjor som kopplar samman externt bistånd med det slutliga utvecklingsresultatet.

## Interna faktorer

Studien har identifierat en uppsättning viktiga faktorer på biståndsgivarens sida, som påverkat (a) det sätt på vilket interaktionen med mottagarna skett, (b) som påverkat utformningen och genomförandet av projekt samt (c) hur utvecklingsresultatet har mätts och analyserats.

De interna faktorerna är kopplade till processerna i tre distinkta faser:

(a) **Policy- och programutveckling:** Fastställandet av tematiska prioriteringar och sektorsprioriteringar – att sätta agendan och välja ut partner – är viktiga förhandskrav och villkor för prestationerna. Variablerna är följande:

- Policyberedning
- Policyformulering
- Harmonisering och anpassning

(b) **Processer inom biståndsstyrning och biståndsgenomförande:** Påverkan på program/projekt genom förhandling, strategiskt stöd, bedömningar samt etablerade system och förfaranden för planering och genomförande. Variablerna är följande:

- På förhand tydligt styrda och planerade alternativt mer inkrementella ansatser
- Uppskalning och absorptionskapacitet
- Biståndsmodalitet – sektor, program och projekt
- Biståndskanaler – regering, civilsamhälle och privat sektor
- Biståndsrelationer
- Finansieringens förutsägbarhet
- Fokus och fragmentering

(c) **Lärande och återkopplingssystem genom analyser och utvärderingar:** Användning av rapporteringar, analyser och utvärderingar som grund för lärdomar och korrigeringar. Variablerna är följande:

- Fortlöpande justeringar
- Återkoppling från mottagarna
- Programteori
- Utvärderingar och resultatbaserad styrning

## Studiens metoder och tillvägagångsätt

De metoder som huvudsakligen använts i studien är intervjuer och systematiska analyser av dokument på grundval av flera standardiserade frågeformulär. En uppsättning hypoteser formulerades för att strukturera och underlätta analysen. Hypoteserna är antaganden, dvs. förväntningar som grundas på underförstådd kunskap och personlig erfarenhet, forskningslitteratur och analyser av dokument från Uganda.

## Studien består av följande delar:

- En analys av resultatstrategierna – processer och produkter – baserad på tillgängliga dokument och intervjuer i Stockholm (Sida och Utrikesdepartementet).
- En portföljanalys av projekt/insatser från strategiperioden 2009–2013.
- Fallstudier av ett urval program/projekt.

## Rapportens kapitel

I kapitel 2 redovisas den teoretiska bakgrunden till valet av hypoteser. Tanken är att kapitlet ska bidra till att förstå studiens resultat, men först och främst till att identifiera och förklara de interna faktorernas betydelse och relevans. Kapitel 3 är i huvudsak beskrivande – vi beskriver hur det svenska stödet till Uganda ser ut i fråga om profil, utveckling, programportfölj och landstrategier. Kapitel 4 innehåller studiens huvudsakliga analys och omfattar en diskussion om hypotesernas relevans och giltighet. I kapitel 5 har vi sammanfattat de lärdomar som dragits av den modellbyggande dimensionen tillsammans med de kommande utmaningarna för det svenska utvecklingssamarbetet. Sida, Utrikesdepartementet och den svenska ambassaden har kommenterat utkastet till rapport. Studiens resultat och slutsatser har också diskuterats direkt med ambassaden i Uganda.

## Lärdomar om modellen

- De interna faktorerna – faktorer som i hög grad formats av Sverige som biståndsgivare – har påverkat biståndseffektiviteten. Dessa faktorer representerar aspekter av biståndsstyrningen. De kontrolleras av Sverige, och kan därför ändras och förbättras av Sverige.
- Interna faktorer är inte bara ”interna”. De är också relationella och kommer i varierande grad att formas av landkontexten och motparten i Uganda. En biståndsgivare kan påverka de interna faktorerna, men inte kontrollera resultaten. Faktorerna formas i samspelet mellan två system – det svenska biståndssystemet och den ugandiska motpartens. Det som händer i dessa processer är intressant, särskilt balansen mellan biståndsgivarens och mottagarens inverkan på de interna faktorerna. Exempelvis styrs och kontrolleras den strategiska planeringen och utvärderingen till stor del av biståndsgivaren, medan program- och projektplanering i högre grad ägs av mottagarna. Det verkar som om Sverige gradvis har tagit mer kontroll över interaktionen mellan biståndsgivare och biståndsmottagare, och därmed över de interna faktorerna, skälen till detta diskuteras närmare i rapporten.
- I studien identifieras en rad interna faktorer med koppling till tre processer: policy- och programutveckling, biståndsstyrning och genomförande, samt lärdomar och återkopplingsystem. Den uppsättning interna faktorer som identifierats är inte uttömmande, men alla faktorerna har diskuterats och befunnits vara relevanta, på grundval av tillgänglig evidens.
- De interna faktorerna bidrar till biståndseffektiviteten, men de är inte direkta eller ”tillräckliga” orsaksfaktorer. Oftast spelar de en indirekt roll i ett komplext orsakssammanhang. Det går inte att exakt påvisa och mäta deras relativa betydelse för biståndseffektiviteten. Förändringsprocessen är ofta komplex och icke-linjär. Även små faktorer kan ändra processen och påverka slutresultatet. Resultaten påverkas oftare av det som präglar genomförandet än av planer och mål. Det vi gör i studien är att bygga argument om varför de interna faktorerna spelar roll, genom analys av relevant litteratur och evidens från Uganda i linje med principerna om teoribaserade utvärderingar.
- De interna faktorerna är inte specifika för Uganda, de är generiska variabler. Därför kan samma modell och ansats användas även i andra länder, även om den relativa betydelsen av varje enskild faktor kan variera. I framtida studier bör perspektivet breddas, ytterligare interna faktorer bör tas med, så att hela det svenska biståndssystemet kan omfattas – inte bara enskilda ambassader och



mottagarländer. Man bör man titta på alla system och undersystem mellan ambassaden och Sida/Utrikesdepartementet. Ansvarsfördelningen mellan Utrikesdepartementet och Sida nämns exempelvis bara kortfattat i denna rapport. Framtida studier bör också noga undersöka samspelet mellan genomförandepartnerna – eftersom de flesta interna faktorerna är relationella.

- En studie av interna faktorer är nödvändig, men den räcker inte för att förstå och bedöma vad biståndet åstadkommer. Den täcker inte alla OECD:s biståndskommittés utvärderingskriterier såsom kostnadseffektivitet och hållbarhet, och den är heller inte lämplig för att diskutera och bedöma dessa. När ett landprogram ska bedömas krävs även andra studier, bland annat en djupgående analys av resultatuppfyllelse och externa faktorer roll och betydelse. Olika typer av studier bör komplettera varandra.
- Denna studie fyller en lucka i utvärderingslitteraturen. Interna faktorer påverkan på biståndseffektivitet i Sveriges utvecklingssamarbete med Uganda har tidigare inte ägnats särskilt mycket uppmärksamhet eller analys. I årsrapporter och andra rapporter från ambassaden till Sida och Utrikesdepartementet har man främst fokuserat på yttre faktorer på mottagarens sida, som partnerkapacitet och politiska och socioekonomiska kontextuella faktorer. Det har saknats strategiska analyser och utvärderingar av hela landprogramsmekanismen som skulle ha kunnat användas för att identifiera och bedöma sådana faktorer. Inte heller har man i program- och projektutvärderingarna diskuterat biståndsgivarnas egna beteende.
- De mest kritiska interna faktorerna ligger i Policy- och programutvecklingsfasen – dvs. i hur man formulerar och väljer policy, program, partner – och i finansieringsnivån. Dessa faktorer är nödvändiga, men inte tillräckliga villkor för biståndseffektivitet.
- Faktorer som biståndsstyrning och modalitet är också viktiga – särskilt förändringen mot mer projektstöd, den ökande andelen stöd som kanaliseras via civilsamhället, byråkratiseringen av biståndsrelationerna och förhållandet mellan fokusering och fragmentering.
- Slutligen är lärande och återkopplingssystem viktiga faktorer som spelar en mer indirekt roll, men det är förståelsen för mätning och utvärdering, liksom metoderna för detta, som avgör hur resultaten blir – eller rättare sagt vilka resultat som blir mätta och dokumenterade. Den nuvarande resultatramen leder till en underreportering av program- och projektresultat på grund av fokuseringen på aggregerade resultat på hög nivå. Den har inte trängt undan de mindre påtagliga målen och det rättighetsbaserade perspektivet, men de har blivit svårare att fånga in i resultatrapporterna.
- Om liknande studier ska göras i framtiden bör ansatsen breddas i fråga om deltagande, resurser och fokus. För att göra studien mer induktiv och deltagande bör ambassaden redan från början involveras mer i arbetet med att identifiera frågor och hypoteser, samla in uppgifter och validera resultaten. Data och information från interaktiva processer bör samlas in över tid, som man gör i formativa forskningsprojekt. Även interaktion ”uppåt” (med Sidas huvudkontor och Utrikesdepartementet) och ”nedåt” (med partner och projekt) bör inkluderas. Vi menar samtidigt att externt deltagande är nödvändigt och användbart för att underlätta processen och garantera oberoende analys och utvärdering.

## Framtida utmaningar för det svenska biståndet

I slutet av rapporten presenteras ett antal kommande utmaningar och frågeställningar för de svenska biståndsmyndigheterna:

- Strategiberedning och ägarskap

Det finns ett behov av att diskutera processen för formulering av landstrategier och vilken typ av strategier som behövs för vilka syften. Det är legitimt för en biståndsgivare som Sverige att fastställa strategiska ”ingångsvärden” på högsta politiska nivå för att styra utvecklingssamarbetet med Uganda och i samband med detta genomgå en intern process för klargörande av strategier. Det är dock relevant

att diskutera hur strategiutvecklingsprocessen kan bli mer "bottenstyrd" och ägd av landet när det kommer till innehållet i en "resultatstrategi" som fastställer mätbara mål och delmål. Vad innebär landets ägarskap för en landstrategiprocess och för slutprodukten? Det verkar finnas behov av att mer aktivt involvera och samråda med landpartnerna och andra biståndsgivare. Det är också viktigt att diskutera hur en "bra" landstrategi bör se ut och hitta en lämplig jämvikt mellan tydlig styrning och förutsättningarna för flexibel anpassning.

- Strategiformulering och utvärdering

Nivån på och typen av bedömningar och analyser som föregår utarbetandet av strategin bör analyseras. Hur ser den rätta balansen ut mellan för mycket och för lite? Det har i fallet Uganda inte gjorts någon övergripande utvärdering av den föregående strategiperiodens relevans och resultat för att identifiera vilka lärdomar som kan dras och för att vägleda policyarbetet. En sådan utvärdering skulle ha kunnat omfatta interna faktorer. De flesta analyser och utvärderingar fokuserar på enskilda projekt och program, och de utelämnar därmed en bedömning av de strategiska målens relevans och resultat. Viktiga förberedelser har genomförts, men det saknas systematiskt sammanställda uppgifter och information för att kunna förstå och analysera fattigdomens karaktär och för att kartlägga politiska prioriteringar för fattigdomsreducering.

- Strategins realism

De strategiska målen ger en bred vägledning, och de är komplexa och ambitiösa i förhållande till de blygsamma resurser som funnits tillgängliga (i genomsnitt 308 miljoner SEK per år) och det begränsade urvalet samarbetspartner (främst civilsamhället och den privata sektorn). De små bidragen kan ha betydande katalytiska effekter, men sådana har än så länge inte mätts eller dokumenterats särskilt väl. Programmet för forskningssamarbete med Makerere University är ett exempel på framgångsrik långsiktig kapacitetsuppbyggnad, men många andra projekt har en kortare livstid (1–3 år). Den nuvarande resultatstrategin, med indikatorer och mål på nationell och/eller tematisk nivå, är inte optimal och leder till underrapportering av faktiska resultat. Resultaten framgår tydligast på projekt- och programnivå.

- Landprogrammets koherens

Det är viktigt att diskutera vad som kännetecknar ett landprogram. Resultatstrategin grundas på antagandet att alla interventioner bidrar till att uppnå ett fåtal strategiska mål och att projektdata kan samlas in och användas för att mäta aggregerade resultat på sektornivå och nationell nivå. Detta kan ifrågasättas av två skäl: Målen för varje projekt omfattar ett brett spektrum av insatser. Man kan hävda att landportföljen snarare är en samling insatser som sammanförs under en uppsättning strategiska mål, än ett sammanhängande landprogram. Strategin har tjänat till att legitimera denna praxis, i stället för att omorientera den. Den faktiska planeringen har skett på projekt- och programnivå. Programmen och projekten föregår själva strategin och förblir relativt opåverkade av den.

- Rapportera faktiska resultat

Årsrapporterna från ambassaden till Sida och Utrikesdepartementet i Stockholm grundas på resultatstrategin och vad som uppnåtts bedöms mot makroindikatorer. Därför är både resultatet och det som uppnåtts blygsamt – sett ur ett nationellt och tematiskt perspektiv. I utvärderingarna av program och projekt finns det dock mycket som tyder på betydande resultat, både på lång och kort sikt. Den nuvarande resultatramen styrs och begränsas alltså i viss mån av makronivåformatet. Resultatramen överensstämmer varken med programmets verklighet eller med hur ambassaden arbetar på fältet. En alternativ och mer induktiv ansats – som börjar i insatsen och strävar efter att spåra det svenska bidragets direkta och indirekta effekter – skulle kunna ge mer uppgifter och information om resultat på både mikro- och makronivå.

- Överensstämmelse med Parisdeklarationens principer

Parisdeklarationens principer behöver definieras på ett konsekvent sätt. Man behöver diskutera principernas begränsningar och hur de kan anpassas till olika landkontexter. Riktlinjerna och strategin grundas på Parisdeklarationens principer. Den svenska regeringen stödjer idén att politik och praxis

ska ägas av landet, men har i Ugandafallet avsiktligt valt att undvika statliga kanaler på grund av korruption och brist på mänskliga rättigheter. I stället prioriteras organisationer inom civilsamhället och den privata sektorn som avtals- och genomförandepartner. Detta kan motiveras som ett arrangemang på kort sikt och stämmer också överens med hur de flesta andra biståndsgivare arbetar samt med de mer övergripande Busanprinciperna (enligt vilka landets ägarskap säkras genom att civilsamhället och den privata sektorn involveras). Trots det värde som ligger i att stärka civilsamhällets och den privata sektorns ägarskap och delaktighet är frågan dock i vilken utsträckning detta är hållbart för en bilateral biståndsgivare som Sida – eftersom det påverkar graden av ägarskap från regeringen och förmågan att uppnå bredare långsiktiga mål. Alla program och projekt i den svenska portföljen styrs och finansieras för närvarande utanför regeringskanalerna. Det behövs en systematisk analys av nuvarande praxis och en diskussion om framtida alternativ för kanaliseringen av det svenska biståndet.

- Civilsamhällets potential

Andelen finansiering till civila organisationer förväntas öka till 77 % under 2018, medan den privata sektorns andel blir 12 %, de multilaterala organisationernas 8 % och den offentliga sektorns bara 3 %. Civilsamhället och den privata sektorn är viktiga aktörer i Uganda, men de förväntas samtidigt åstadkomma hållbara och effektiva resultat inom områden som demokratiska styrelse reformer och mänskliga rättigheter. Frågan är i vilken utsträckning det finns civilsamhällesorganisationer och företag som har tillräckligt med kapacitet och kompetens för att agera som förändringsagenter? Finns det några negativa effekter av den massiva ökningen av stöd till civilsamhället från flera olika biståndsgivare? Är det realistiskt att försöka nå den aktuella strategins mål och delmål utan, eller med minimalt, samarbete med regeringen?

- Fördelarna med inkrementella ansatser

Processen för planering och genomförande av program och projekt i Uganda kan beskrivas som inkrementell, kontextberoende och noggrann. Det finns inget som tyder på en förändring mot snabb uppskalning och acceptans för större finansieringsvolym till särskilda svenska prioriteringar. Däremot finns det mycket som tyder på att ambassaden successivt och försiktigt söker efter praktiska och genomförbara lösningar.

- Hantering av medel och vårdande av relationer

Frågan är i vilken omfattning biståndsgivarens personal måste lägga allt mer tid på att uppfylla interna byråkratiska krav, i förhållande till den tid som läggs på att skapa och vårda relationerna uppåt, nedåt och horisontellt genom biståndskedjorna. Det är en viktig fråga som kräver närmare granskning. Även om biståndspersonalen är noga med att uppfylla sitt ansvar nedåt, nätverka och främja delaktighet och egenmakt, kan de administrativa och ekonomiska frågorna komma att ta upp allt mer av tid och kapacitet. Denna typ av utveckling kan ses i studier av modern byråkratier och som ofta inverkat negativt på både kvalitet och kvantitet i det strategiska och tekniska samspelet med externa parter. Det skulle förvåna om samma utveckling inte kan märkas hos svenska biståndsmyndigheter.

- Befogenheter och experiment

Ambassadens beslutsbefogenheter och operativa oberoende bör analyseras på grundval av en möjligen minskade makt som begränsar personalens möjligheter att administrera politiken på ett flexibelt och kreativt sätt. Den minskande makten begränsar även personalens vilja att acceptera risker. Man kan hävda att den instabila politiska situationen i Uganda skapar en hög risknivå för ambassaden redan i utgångsläget, och att detta kräver att biståndsgivare måste acceptera risker, men konsekvenserna på givarsidan av omfattande korruption, kritiska revisioner och andra svårigheter är inte väl kända. Framtida studier bör analysera biståndsgivarnas beteende mer i detalj och diskutera hur de påverkas av erfarenheterna i mottagarlandet i kombination med en svagare strukturell självständighet för hela "biståndssystemet" i det svenska utvecklingsarbetet.

- Förutsägbarhet och fragmentering

Långsiktig, förutsägbar och fokuserad finansiering är viktiga faktorer för att åstadkomma resultat. Utvärderingar framhåller Sverige som ett trovärdigt och pålitligt givarland. Flera insatser har varit långvariga – forskningssamarbetet med Makerere University är ett gott exempel på detta. Det finns en inneboende svårighet i att räkna antalet insatser för att få en riktig bild av fragmentering och koncentration i landprogramportföljen. Sett ur ett perspektiv har dock det genomsnittliga antalet insatser varit högt. Stöd till stora program som leds av biståndsgivarna minskar antalet svenska avtalspartner, men ökar antalet genomförandeorganisationer och har fragmenteringseffekter. Det bästa alternativet vore att dels välja ut ett fåtal prioriterade programområden som kan finansieras på ett långsiktigt och förutsägbart sätt, dels att genomföra mindre insatser med katalysatoreffekter i samarbete med andra biståndsgivare.

- Responsivitet och anpassning

Den övergripande strategin och de tematiska prioriteringarna har förblivit anmärkningsvärt konstanta i Ugandafallet, samtidigt kan man hävda att Sverige har varit responsivt och anpassat sina program och projekt till den kontextuella utvecklingen på ett bra sätt. De fyra strategiska målen och områdena i strategin har med mindre variationer varit oförändrade, medan valet av partner och genomförandemetoder har ändrats markant. De strategiska områdena har också varit tillräckligt vida för att kunna innefatta ett brett spektrum av projekt. Det finns system och mekanismer för uppföljning och interna samråd, särskilt för projekten och programmen, men mindre för de strategiska målen.

- Redovisning nedåt och uppåt

Ambassaden är formellt redovisningsskyldig gentemot Utrikesdepartementet/Sidas huvudkontor. Personalen lägger en avsevärd tid på att uppfylla redovisningskraven uppåt, men frågan är i vilken omfattning ansvarigheten nedåt – mot partners och projekt – har försvagats. Detta behöver undersökas vidare. Det är också viktigt att uppmärksamma balansen mellan å ena sidan redovisningsansvaret uppåt och å andra sidan stöd till och vård av mekanismerna för en starkare ansvarighet nedåt.

- ”Logframes” och komplexitet

Det finns ett fortlöpande behov av att följa upp hur adekvata metoderna för resultatbaserad styrning är och vad de innebär. Det finns ingenting i Ugandanafallet som antyder att mer komplexa interventioner har trängts undan till förmån för mer av konkret ”service delivery”. Strategin har en uttrycklig rättighetsorienterad fokusering på mänskliga rättigheter, demokratiska styrelseformer och jämlikhet – områden som alla kräver erkännande av och förståelse för komplexa multipla orsakssammanhang och oförutsägbara lösningar. Detta har samtidigt beaktats tydligare i de enskilda interventionerna än i resultatstrategin. Ambassaden befinner sig i spänningsfältet mellan rättighets- och resultatagendan och försöker hantera denna spänning. Både rättighetsbaserat arbete och tjänster skapar resultat, men resultaten är olika och de bör mätas på olika sätt med kvalitativa och kvantitativa metoder.

# Summary

## Background and purpose

The Expert Group for Aid Studies (EBA) decided to commission a study of Swedish long-term bilateral development cooperation to Uganda. Several country studies have tried to measure and assess long-term aggregate impact of external support and end up presenting findings with weak empirical foundation. Long-term impact is also linked indirectly to donor performance. The learning for the donor – about how to improve its own aid effectiveness - is limited. EBA encouraged the researchers to “think out of the box” and present alternative and innovative models for doing a country evaluation.

Hence, the objective of this study was agreed to be twofold - the development of a model for evaluating country level donor performance and the application of that model to Sweden’s development cooperation with Uganda. The overall purpose is to provide analytical tools and guidance on how to make Swedish aid more effective if managed and delivered differently. This is not a complete country programme evaluation, but a model building exercise combined with an explorative study of how internal factors has influenced aid effectiveness in Uganda.

The Government of Sweden has a long history of cooperation with Uganda – starting already in 1986. This study covers the period from 2009 to 2015. Due to violation of human rights, weak democratic leadership and institutionalised corruption, direct cooperation with the government was reduced from 2012 and support through civil society and private sector increased. As such, Swedish support to Uganda has been in transition during the study period providing an interesting background for a study of internal factors and how the process of change has been managed.

The study sets out to:

- Argue why internal factors are important and present an analytical model.
- Identify the internal factors and formulate a set of initial assumptions or hypotheses to stimulate and organise the analysis.
- Introduce relevant theoretical perspectives for understanding internal factors.
- Provide an overview of Swedish support to Uganda – policies, strategies and projects.
- Discuss relevance and validity of the hypotheses based on available evidence.
- Draw preliminary conclusions and present emerging challenges.

It matters to aid effectiveness how aid is provided. This is the basic premise for the study. There is a broad range of external determining factors, but aid effectiveness rests also on the nature of recipient – donor relationships, efficient delivery procedures and mechanisms, as well as on the progress of building capacity and institutions conducive to development in recipient countries.

There are two main reasons for the focus on internal factors. Firstly, such factors can be influenced and changed by key actors involved on the Swedish side and contribute to better collective decision-making and improved aid effectiveness. Secondly, empirical studies on this aspect of aid effectiveness are still in its infancy. There are few studies bringing insight to how aid works on the ground by looking into the complex causality chain linking external aid to final development outcomes.

## Internal factors

The study identified a set of salient factors on the donor side that (a) shaped how the interaction with the recipients took place, (b) how these factors influenced the design and implementation of concrete projects, and (c) how development outcomes have been measured and analysed.

The internal factors are linked to processes within three distinct phases:

(a) **Policy and programme development:** Defining thematic and sector priorities – setting the agenda and selecting partners – are important prerequisites and conditions for performance. The variables are:

- Policy preparation
- Policy formulation
- Harmonisation and alignment

(b) **Processes in aid management and implementation:** Influencing programme/ project development through negotiation, strategic support, appraisals and established systems/procedures for planning and implementation. The variables are:

- Blueprint versus incremental approaches
- Upscaling versus absorption capacity
- Aid modalities – sector, programmes and projects
- Aid channels – government, civil society and private sector
- Aid relationships
- Predictability of funding
- Focus and fragmentation

(c) **Learning and feedback loops through reviews and evaluations:** Using progress reports, reviews and evaluations as a basis for learning and corrections. The variables are:

- Continuous adjustments
- Feedback from recipients
- Programme theories
- Evaluations and results based management

## Study methods and components

The main methods have been interviews and systematic review of documents based on standard formats and questionnaires. A set of hypotheses was formulated to structure and facilitate the analysis. They are assumptions – expectations based on tacit knowledge and personal experience, research literature and review of documents from Uganda.

### The study consists of:

- An analysis of the results strategies – processes (partially) and products based on available documents and interviews in Stockholm (Sida and MFA).
- A portfolio analysis of projects/interventions from the 2009-2013-strategy period.
- Case studies of a sample of programmes/projects.

## The chapters

Chapter 2 provides the theoretical background for the choice of hypotheses. It is meant to help understand the findings, but first of all to identify and explain the importance and relevance of internal factors. Chapter 3 is mainly descriptive – presenting the profile, evolution, programme portfolio and country strategies for Swedish support to Uganda. Chapter 4 is the main analytical chapter and contains a discussion of the relevance and validity of the hypotheses. Chapter 5 seeks to summarise the lessons from the model building exercise and what the emerging challenges for Swedish development cooperation are. Sida, MFA and the Swedish Embassy commented on the draft report. The findings and conclusions were also discussed directly with the Embassy in Uganda.

## Lessons from model building

- The internal factors – factors shaped to a large extent by Sweden as a donor - have influenced aid effectiveness. Those factors represent aspects of aid management. They are controlled and can consequently be changed and improved by Sweden.
- The internal factors are not only “internal”. They are also relational and will to a varying degree be shaped by country context and Ugandan counterparts. A donor can influence internal factors, but not control the results. The factors are formed in an interaction between two systems – the Swedish aid system and the Ugandan counterparts. What happens in these processes are the most interesting and in particular the balance between donor versus recipient influence of internal factors. Strategic planning and evaluations are for instance to a large extent managed and controlled by the donor, while programme and project planning are much more owned by the recipients. It seems that the Sweden has gradually taken more control of the donor - recipient interaction and hence the internal factors – for reasons discussed in the report.
- A set of internal factors linked to three processes was identified: Policy and programme development, aid management and implementation and learning and feedback loops. The number of internal factors is not exhaustive, but all the factors were discussed and found relevant – based on available evidence.
- The internal factors are contributory – not immediate causal factors determining aid effectiveness. In most cases, they play an indirect role in complex causal pathways. It is not possible to prove and measure precisely their relative importance for aid effectiveness. The process of change is often complex and non-linear where even small factors may change the process and affect the end results. Results are often much more influenced by the characteristics of implementation than the plans and objectives. What we do is building arguments why internal factors play a role through an analysis of relevant literature and evidence from Uganda in line with principles of theory based evaluations.
- The internal factors are not unique to Uganda, but are generic variables. As such, the same model and approach can be used in other countries as well even if the relative importance of each factor may vary. Future studies should broaden the perspective, include additional internal factors and cover the entire Swedish aid system – beyond the individual embassy and recipient country. In other words, to look at all systems and sub-systems between the Embassy and Sida/MFA. The division of responsibilities between MFA and Sida is for instance only mentioned briefly in this report. Future studies will also have to look carefully at interactions with implementing partners – since most of the internal factors are relational.
- A study of internal factors is necessary, but not sufficient for understanding and assessing performance. It does not cover and is not well suited to discuss and assess all OECD/DAC evaluation criteria such as cost-effectiveness and sustainability. When a country programme is evaluated other studies are also required including in depth assessment of achievements of results

and the role and importance of external factors. Different types of studies should complement each other.

- This study fills a gap in the evaluation literature. There has been little attention on and analysis of internal factors as determinants of aid effectiveness in Swedish development cooperation with Uganda. Annual reports and other reports from the Embassy to Sida/MFA in Stockholm have mostly focused on external factors on the recipient side such as partner capacities and political and socio-economic contextual factors. There have been no strategic review or evaluation of the entire country programme – mechanisms to identify and assess such factors. Neither have programme and project evaluations discussed donor behaviour.
- The most critical internal factors can be found in the policy preparation and design phase – in the formulation and selection of policies, programmes, partners – and level of funding. Such factors are necessary, but not sufficient prerequisites for aid effectiveness.
- The aid management and modalities factors are also important – in particular the move towards more project support, the increased support channelled through civil society, the bureaucratization of aid relationships and level of focus/fragmentation.
- Finally, the learning and feedback loop factors play a more indirect role, but the understanding and methods for measurement and evaluation, determine what the results are – or more correctly – what results get measured and documented. The current results framework leads to underreporting of programme and project results due to its aggregate and high-level focus. It has not “crowded out” less tangible objectives and rights based approaches, but it has become more difficult to capture and report on their results.
- If similar studies should be carried out in the future, the approach ought to be broadened in level of participation, time and scope. To make the study more inductive and participatory, the Embassy should be more closely involved from the beginning in the identification of issues and hypotheses, collection of data and validation of findings. Data and information from interactive processes should also be collected over time as in formative research projects. Interactions “upwards” (to Sida HQ and MFA) and “downwards” (to partners and projects) should be included. We believe that external participation is necessary and useful to facilitate the process and ensure independent analysis and assessment.

## Emerging challenges for Swedish aid

A number of emerging challenges and issues for Swedish aid authorities are presented at the end:

- Strategy preparation and ownership

There is a need to discuss the process of formulating the country strategy and what kind of strategy is required for what purpose. It is legitimate for a donor such as Sweden to define strategic “entry values” at the highest political level guiding the development cooperation with Uganda and as such go through an internal strategy/clarification process. However, it is pertinent to discuss how the strategy development process could be more “bottom up” and country owned when it comes to the substance of a “results strategy” defining measurable objectives and targets. What does country ownership mean for a country strategy process and product? There seems to be a need for a more active involvement of and consultation with country partners and other donors. It would also be important to discuss what a “good” country strategy should look like and find an appropriate balance between clear direction and flexible adaptation.

- Strategy formulation and evaluation

The level and type of assessment preceding the preparation of the strategy should be reviewed. What is the right balance between too much and too little? There was no overall evaluation of the relevance of and results from the previous strategy period in order to identify lessons learned and guide policy



formulation. Such evaluation could have covered internal factors. Most reviews and evaluations focus on individual projects and programmes – leaving out an assessment of relevance and results of strategic objectives. Important preparatory work was carried out, but systematic data and information for understanding and analysing the nature of poverty and identifying policy priorities for poverty reduction were missing.

- Realism of the strategy

The strategic objectives provide broad guidance, are complex, and ambitious given the modest level of resources available (average of 308 Mill SEK per year) and the limited selection of partners (mostly civil society and private sector entities). The relatively small contributions may have large catalytic effects, but such effects are so far not measured or well documented. The research cooperation programme with Makerere University is an example of successful long-term capacity building, while several other projects have a short time span (1-3 years). The current results strategy with indicators and targets at national and/or thematic levels is not optimal and lead to underreporting of actual results. The results are mostly found at the level of projects and programmes.

- Coherence of country programme

The nature of a country programme should be discussed. The results strategy is based on the assumption that all interventions contribute to the achievement of a few strategic objectives and that project data can be collected and used for measuring aggregate results at sector and national level. This is questionable for two reasons: The objectives for each project cover a broad spectrum of activities. It can also be argued that the country portfolio is more a collection of interventions clustered under a set of strategic objectives than a coherent country programme. The strategy has primarily served to legitimise rather than reorient practice. The real planning has happened at project and programme level. Programmes and project precede the strategy and remain relatively unaffected by the strategy.

- Report real results

The Annual reports from the Embassy to Sida/MFA in Stockholm are based on the results strategy and achievements are assessed against macro indicators. As such, the results and achievements are modest – seen from a national and thematic/sector perspective. There is considerable evidence of significant short- and long-term results from evaluations of programmes and projects. The current results framework is guided and to some extent limited by a macro – level format. The results framework is not in line with programme realities and how the Embassy works on the ground. An alternative more inductive approach – starting in the concrete interventions and trying to trace direct and indirect macro effects of Swedish contributions could provide more data and information on both micro- and macro results.

- Compliance with Paris Declaration principles

There is a need to define such principles consistently and explicitly discuss their adaptation and limitations in different country contexts. The guidelines and strategy are based on Paris Declaration principles. The Swedish Government supports country owned policies and practices, but has deliberately decided to avoid government channels because of corruption and human rights violation. Civil society and private sector organisations are prioritised as contractual and implementing partners. This is justified as a short-term arrangement and is also in line with what most other donors do and the broader Busan principles arguing that country ownership is secured through civil society and private sector involvement. The question is to what extent it is sustainable for a bilateral donor as Sida – because it affects the level of government ownership and the ability to achieve broader, long-term objectives – despite the value of strengthening ownership and participation of civil society and private sector. All the programmes and projects in the Swedish portfolio are currently managed and funded outside Government channels – as cash to the recipient country institutions. There is a need for a systematic assessment of current practice and discussion of future options for channelling Swedish aid.

- The potential of civil society

The share of funding to CSOs is expected to rise to 77% in 2018, while private sector will absorb 12%, multilaterals 8% and public sector only 3%. Civil society and private sector are significant actors in Uganda, but are expected to create sustainable and effective results on the ground and in areas of democratic governance and human rights. The questions are to what extent there are CSOs and private sector companies available with sufficient capacity and competence – acting as agents of change in society? Are there any negative effects in the massive increase of support to civil society from several donors? Is it realistic to reach the goals and objectives in the current strategy with no or minimal cooperation with the government?

- Virtues of incremental, small step approach

The planning and implementation of programmes and projects can be described as incremental, contextually sensitive and careful. There is no evidence of a push towards rapid up scaling and acceptance of large volumes of funding of particular Swedish priorities. There is considerable evidence of the Embassy practicing the virtues of “searchers” – looking for practical and implementable solutions.

- Managing funds versus nurturing relationships

The question is to what extent donor staff has to spend an increasing amount of time meeting internal bureaucratic requirements, as compared to creating and nurturing relationships up, down and across the aid chains. This is an important issue that requires further investigation. Even if donor staff are committed to downward accountability, networking, participation and empowerment, administrative and financial issues may increasingly absorb their time and capacity. Such developments are found in studies of modern bureaucracies reducing the quality and quantity of strategic and technical interaction with external partners. It would not be any surprise if the same developments were found in donor agencies.

- Discretionary power and experimentation

The remit of Embassy decision-making and operational independence should be reviewed based on the possible decreasing level of power restricting staff to administer policy flexibly and creatively – and willingness to accept risks. It could be argued that the volatile political situation in Uganda presents the Embassy at the outset with a high level of risk and requires acceptance of risk from all donors, but the consequences of widespread corruption, critical audits and other constraints are not well known. Future studies should assess donor behaviour in more detail and discuss how it is affected by experiences in the recipient country combined with weaker structural autonomy for the “aid system” within Swedish development cooperation.

- Predictability and fragmentation

Long-term predictable and focused funding are important factors for achieving results. Evaluations commend Sweden for being a trustworthy and reliable donor country. Several interventions have been of long duration - the research cooperation with Makerere University being a prominent example. It is inherently difficult to count the number of interventions and get a true picture of level of fragmentation/concentration in the country programme portfolio. From one perspective, the average number of actual interventions has been high. Support to large donor led programmes reduces the number of Swedish contractual partners, but increases the number of implementing organisations and impacts on the level of fragmentation. The preferable option would be to select a few priority programme areas providing predictable long-term funding and other smaller catalytic interventions in collaboration with other donors.

- Responsiveness and adjustment

The overall strategy and thematic priorities have remained remarkably constant, while it can be argued that Sweden has responded and adjusted its programmes and projects well to evolving contextual

circumstances. The four strategic objectives/areas have with small variations been the same, but choice of partners and methods of implementation have changed considerably. The strategic areas have also been sufficiently broad for including a broad range of projects. There are systems and mechanisms in place for regular monitoring and internal consultations in particular for programmes and projects, but less for the strategic objectives.

- Downward or upward accountability

The Embassy is formally accountable to MFA/Sida HQ. Staff spend considerable time meeting upward accountability requirements, but the question is to what extent downward accountability – to partners and projects has been weakened. This is an issue that requires further investigation. Attention should be paid to the balance between upward accountability and supporting and nurturing mechanisms for stronger downward accountability.

- Log frames and complexity

There is a continuous need to monitor the adequacy and implications of results-based management practices. There is no evidence that more complex interventions have been crowded out for tangible service delivery projects. The strategy has an explicit rights-orientation focusing on human rights, democratic governance and gender equality – all requiring an acknowledgement and understanding of complex multiple causes and effects and unpredictable solutions. This is better taken into account in the individual interventions than in the results strategy. The Embassy is placed in the tension between the rights- and the results agenda and tries to manage that tension. Rights-based work as well as service provision create results, but the results are different and should be measured differently using quantitative and qualitative methods.

# CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

## 1.1 Background and purpose

The Expert Group for Aid Studies (EBA) decided to commission a study of Swedish long-term bilateral development cooperation to a particular country. There are several ways of doing such a study. It depends on the choice of perspective and the questions to be addressed. The professional background and experience of the evaluators also make a difference. Several country studies of external aid have tried to measure and assess long-term aggregate impact and end up presenting findings with weak empirical foundation about results. The results and impact are also often linked indirectly to donor performance. The learning for the donor about how to improve its own aid effectiveness is limited. EBA encouraged the evaluators to “think out of the box” and present alternative and innovative models for doing a country evaluation.

Hence, the objective of this study was agreed in the Inception phase to be twofold - the development of a model for evaluating country level donor performance and the application of that model to Sweden’s development cooperation with Uganda. The purpose is to provide analytical tools and guidance on how to make Swedish aid more effective. This study is as such not a complete country programme evaluation, but a model building exercise combined with an explorative study of how internal factors in Swedish aid has influenced aid effectiveness in Uganda.

The Government of Sweden has a long history of development cooperation with Uganda – starting already in 1986. The thematic priorities for country strategies have been remarkably stable while the mode of support has changed. The study covers the period from 2009 to 2015 – starting with the previous strategy period 2009 to 2013 and including also the new strategy for 2014 to 2018. It should be emphasised that due to violation of human rights, weak democratic leadership and institutionalised corruption, direct cooperation with the government was reduced from 2012 and support through civil society and private sector increased. As such, Swedish support to Uganda has been in transition during the period under study providing an interesting background for a study of internal factors and how the process of change has been managed.

The study sets out to:

- Argue why internal factors are important to aid effectiveness and present an analytical model.
- Identify internal factors and formulate a set of initial assumptions or hypotheses to stimulate and organise the analysis.
- Introduce relevant theoretical perspectives for understanding internal factors.
- Provide an overview of Swedish support to Uganda – policies, strategies and projects.
- Discuss relevance and validity of the hypotheses based on available evidence.
- Draw preliminary conclusions and suggest lessons learned – first about the model and then internal processes in Swedish aid to Uganda.

## 1.2 Basic premise and approach

It matters to aid effectiveness how aid is provided. This is the basic premise for the study. There is a broad range of external determining factors, but aid effectiveness rests also on the nature of recipient – donor relationships, efficient delivery procedures and mechanisms, as well as on the progress of building capacity and institutions conducive to development in recipient countries. There are few studies bringing insight to how aid works on the ground by looking into the complex causality chain linking external aid to final development outcomes. In standard cross-country regression analysis

based on macro-level data, such as those examining the aid-growth relationships, the complex causal links are treated as a “black box”. These studies tend to look at aid as a single aggregate, despite the fact that aid is delivered in different modalities and forms of cooperation (Tarp in Mavrotas 2010).

The aid effectiveness debate has at times been dominated by a static and instrumental view of development processes. Aid becomes effective when the “right” policies and institutions are in place and donors can condition their funding on the existence or adoption of such “right” factors. In contrast, development could be seen as an iterative process where positive or “right” outcomes are the result of gradual and often unpredictable development of local institutions and socio-political conditions. Development management becomes as such more process – than output and outcome oriented (Eyben 2006).

In such a perspective, successful development depends on long-term processes of institutional development and interactions between internal and external factors – the Swedish aid system and the Ugandan counterparts. The effectiveness of aid as a contribution to national development processes hinges on its ability to stimulate such interactions. Many evaluation studies have been focusing on the initial conditions (recipient country policy, governance, capacity, etc.) and subsequently ex post impact studies – in other words in the beginning and end of the causal chain. Our argument is that what happens in the “black box” – in between inputs and outputs in terms of institutional changes and transformations determine to a large extent aid performance (Bourguignon 2007). In other words, there is a need for complementary studies when assessing various dimensions of aid effectiveness.

There are several reasons for the predominant focus on external factors in explaining aid effectiveness. The fact that Swedish aid achieves results through partners may be one reason. Externalising the causes for success and failure by focusing on partner capacities, high-level corruption or political mismanagement may also be easier for most donors than challenging internal factors.

## Approach

Aid cooperation involves a relationship between donors and recipients with partly diverging interests, beliefs and knowledge. One way of perceiving this relationship is as a principal-agent relation where one set of people (donors) seeks to get another set of people (recipients) to behave “better”. This study acknowledges that aid usually will be driven by some overriding goals at the donor side (e.g., poverty reduction, human rights and gender equality). However, the operationalisation of these overriding goals into concrete objectives and implementation strategies for specific aid projects take place through interactive processes characterised by varying degrees of negotiations, knowledge sharing and adaptation. In this process, a donor can be more or less aware of and responsive to the recipients’ interests, beliefs and knowledge.

Hence, in opening the ‘black box’, our analytical point of departure will not be recent calls for policy reforms to be based not on northern ‘best practises’, but on case-by-case diagnostics (Booth 2012). According to Booth, challenges of aid policies and implementation are not fundamentally about one set of people getting another set of people to behave better (the ‘principle-agent’ thinking), but about finding ways of being able to act collectively in the best interest of all actors involved.

There is no simple way to causally attribute individual donor behaviour to aid effectiveness, except in small project-related activities. Only qualitative analysis of donor dynamics can distil relationships by which donor organisational features plausibly influence the achievement of aid-effectiveness.


### 1.3. Analytical model

The following chart is a simplified representation of the causal pathways in development cooperation and as such a general theory of change<sup>1</sup>. The chart explains how the “black box” and internal factors are located between all the factors determining aid outcomes and impact on ultimate beneficiaries. The chapter explains further what the model consists of:

- Three phases in the programme cycle - from design through implementation to results and feedback.
- Hypotheses – how they are used and should be understood.
- Study components and methods for data collection.
- Strengths, weaknesses, limitations and potential future use of the model are discussed in chapter 5.

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<sup>1</sup> A model provides an economical description and summary of the essential features of complex relations from the real world.



The model infers that beyond just providing funds, aid is a vehicle with the potential to making a contribution to institutional change throughout the cycles of planning, implementation and feedback/learning. For this to happen, donors have to be involved as development partners and create an environment conducive to mutual learning. Aid could become a channel for new ideas, exchanges of experiences and the gradual building of competence and capacity in local/national institutions. Such potential beneficial effects of aid on the development process are critically contingent on the nature and quality of the donor-recipient relationship, e.g. to what extent the relationship is dominated by mutual trust and confidence.

## Principles and assumptions

The study has been guided by and based on the following principles and assumptions – explained in the subsequent chapters:

- The overall objective is to maximise learning for Swedish stakeholders – to provide new analytical tools and draw lessons for improving future Swedish development cooperation. The focus on internal factors and donor performance increases the opportunities for immediate learning.
- Effective learning requires first and foremost analysis and understanding of when and why aid works. The way in which aid is delivered influences aid effectiveness and justifies a focus on internal factors of existing aid chains as explained in chapter 1.3. There is a need to understand and unpack the concept of donor performance – not only its contribution to poverty reduction.
- There is an implicit theory of change in the chart above. The internal factors are contributory – not immediate causal factors determining aid effectiveness. In most cases, they play an indirect role in complex causal pathways. It is not possible to prove and measure precisely their relative importance for aid effectiveness – even if they play a role. The process of change is often complex and non-linear where even small factors may change the process and affect the end results. Results are often much more influenced by the characteristics of implementation than the sophistication of plans and objectives. What we do is building arguments why they play a role through an analysis of relevant literature and evidence from Uganda in line with principles of theory based evaluations.
- Swedish bilateral support to Uganda or an explicit country perspective is the entry point for the study. Hence, the “black box” contains mainly strategy and programme processes and products at country level. There are also other “black boxes” in the interaction between the Embassy, MFA and Sida, but they are not covered in this study.
- There is a need for complementary types of evaluations assessing various aspects of performance: policies and intentions, processes and implementation and short- and long-term results. This study seeks to identify and assess salient internal factors affecting aid effectiveness. Other studies are required to assess other aspects of aid effectiveness – including outcomes and impact and how external factors contribute to achieve results.

There are at least two reasons for the focus on internal factors influencing aid effectiveness. Firstly, such factors can be influenced and changed by the donor country and contribute to better collective decision-making and improved aid effectiveness. The underlying questions are: What is good donor performance and what are the factors influencing aid effectiveness? Secondly, empirical studies on this aspect of aid effectiveness are still in its infancy. There is much less systematic analysis and knowledge about those factors despite significant tacit assumptions and knowledge among aid policy makers and project managers. The ultimate aim is to provide a platform – a starting point for further and more comprehensive studies of internal processes and factors.



## Phases and processes

The study seeks to identify (a) salient factors on the donor side that shaped how the interaction with the recipients took place, (b) how these factors have influenced decisions about the objectives, design and implementation of concrete projects, and (c) how development outcomes have been measured and analysed, and what actions have been taken to enhance effectiveness.

A major challenge has been to define what those internal factors are and be able to describe and assess them. There was also a need to limit and find a focus for the study. Swedish support to Uganda is as mentioned the entry point. Hence, we are concentrating on internal factors and donor performance from a country perspective – to large extent from an Embassy perspective. Other “black boxes” should be opened in other studies, looking more closely at interactions between the Embassy, Sida and MFA in Stockholm. We are aware that the Embassy is part of a broader aid system and governed not only by policies, but global rules and regulations for how to manage Swedish aid. Several of the internal factors such as the preparation of the country strategy, refer to country processes, but are guided by global frameworks and guidelines. The long-term complex processes and interactions between the Embassy and their partner are also conditioned by and adapted to the country context.

A donor can influence the internal factors, but not always control the results. The internal factors are also relational and will be influenced by the country context. As such, the internal factors should be studied from both a donor and recipient perspective. The factors are shaped in an interaction between two systems – the Swedish aid system and the Ugandan counterparts.

The study is focusing on phases and processes in Swedish aid to Uganda – both the country strategy and the interventions. There are three major phases in any country programme: Preparation/planning, implementation/management and evaluation/follow up. The internal factors are to be found within each of those phases. Sweden operates through partners and is less involved in implementation. Following the Swedish partner strategy, we assume that the interaction between Sweden as a donor and the programme is more extensive during the preparatory phase and at the end – when the programme is evaluated and decisions are taken about future funding or not. The critical decisions are made at the initial stage – in the selection of priorities, partners, mode of support and level of funding. The Embassy is also involved during implementation in monitoring/supervision and reviews, but to a lesser extent than in the other two phases. The three phases and subsequent internal processes to be assessed are:

- (a) **Policy and programme development:** Defining thematic and sector priorities – setting the agenda and selecting partners – important prerequisites and conditions for performance. The variables are:
  - Policy preparation
  - Policy formulation
  - Harmonisation and alignment
  
- (b) **Processes in aid management and implementation:** Influencing programme/project development through negotiation, strategic support, appraisals and established systems/procedures for planning and implementation. The variables are:
  - Blueprint versus incremental approaches
  - Upscaling versus absorption capacity
  - Aid modalities – sector, programmes and projects
  - Aid channels – government, civil society and private sector
  - Aid relationships
  - Predictability of funding

- Focus and fragmentation

(c) **Learning and feedback loops through reviews and evaluations:** Using progress reports, reviews and evaluations as a basis for learning and corrections. The variables are:

- Continuous adjustments
- Feedback from recipients
- Programme theories
- Evaluations and results based management

It is not our ambition to cover and assess all possible internal factors and discuss them in depth. We fully accept that there are other relevant factors that should and could have been included. Within this limited study, we have selected a few and argued why we consider them relevant and important.

## Hypotheses

A set of hypotheses was formulated during the Inception period covering the three phases, to structure and facilitate the analysis. They are assumptions – expectations of what to find - based on tacit knowledge, our own experience, research literature (see next chapter) and review of documents from Uganda<sup>2</sup>. The hypotheses are not used for any formal or statistical testing, but to identify, open up and explore relevant internal factors. They are mainly pedagogical tools to stimulate and structure the analysis and could have been replaced by neutral questions. The identification and analysis of internal factors is the most important. The list of hypotheses may be expanded and reformulated in future studies.

We are aware that several of the hypotheses are broad, but they are deliberately broad in order to allow for different interpretations and responses. We don't have sufficient empirical evidence to discuss all the hypotheses adequately, which is explained later. However, we have decided to keep all the hypotheses since one purpose of the study is to build a model for conducting similar studies in the future. Hence, it has its own value to identify what the potential internal factors are – even if the empirical evidence to discuss them is inadequate. We will also later discuss how more data could be collected and what the limitations and constraints are.

## Policy preparation and design

- The formulation of the country strategy was primarily driven by Swedish aid policy and strategy rather than Uganda's own priorities and strategies and a systematic assessment of the needs of the poor.
- The objectives provide broad guidance, are complex, ambitious and do not allow the Swedish contribution to the strategic objectives to be measured.
- The strategy has mainly served to legitimise rather than reorient practice.
- The strategy and programme are in line with principles of the Paris Declaration (national ownership, harmonisation and alignment).

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<sup>2</sup> The original plan was to discuss and adjust the hypotheses in consultation with Embassy staff and partners. When this couldn't happen, another option would have been to use neutral questions, but we decided to keep the hypotheses.

## Aid management and modalities

- Sweden has not pursued “universal blueprint planning approaches”, but adopted more careful, contextually adapted approaches (incremental, small step approaches).
- There has been no push towards rapid up scaling and acceptance of large volumes of funding of particular Swedish priorities.
- There has been a development towards more off budget project aid and less on budget programme/sector support, more control/donor involvement and less national ownership and alignment.
- Embassy staff spends more time managing funds meeting internal bureaucratic requirements, than in strategic discussion with partners, creating and maintaining relationships up, down and across the aid chain.
- Level of funding (of the country programmes and programmes/projects) has been stable and predictable.
- The country programme portfolio has become more concentrated with fewer and larger contributions.

## Learning and feedback loops

- Sweden has responded and adjusted its country programme to evolving contextual circumstances.
- There is weak direct feedback from users/direct beneficiaries of aid for modifying practices.
- Most programme/project plans have a log-frame (and meta-theory) based on certainty, rationality, predictability and cause and effect linkages contrary to notions of complexity and ambiguity – multiple causes, multiple effects and multiple solutions.
- Results-based management has crowded out intangible results.
- There is insufficient data and information on outcomes and impact of strategic objectives – making it difficult to make informed strategic decisions.

### **1.4. Study components and methods**

#### Components

The analytical focus for the study has been defined as ‘aid chains’. An ‘aid chain’ is seen as a time bound series of interactions that constitute a long-term development cooperation, guided by consistent development objectives. The bilateral aid delivery process is often interpreted in analogy to a linear chain that links a donor government to recipient country beneficiaries via various intermediary organisations – including government ministries, other donors, civil society organisations and private companies (Ostrom 2002). An aid chain can be analysed as a system with its own dynamic driven by factors that emanate or proceed from within the system on both the donor and recipient side, as well as exogenous factors shaping the system and its effectiveness from the outside. Our focus has been on factors within the system that originate on the donor side and in particular from an Embassy perspective, but not excluding the broader Swedish aid system. A more comprehensive study should have included the links and interaction with Sida and MFA in Stockholm and also the processes and interactions with partners in the recipient country.

There are different types of “aid chains” in the cooperation between Uganda and Sweden. We have decided to look at two of them – the strategic and programmatic:

- (a) The *country strategy document* provides overall direction and is an articulation of what Sweden wants to achieve through its development cooperation with Uganda. It sets out the overall thematic objectives and two or three strategic objectives for each priority sector. The Annual reports from the Embassy assesses to what extent those objectives have been achieved. The strategy is a result of interactions between Sida/MFA Stockholm, the Embassy and national partners. The strategy and how it was developed provide important insights to factors influencing aid effectiveness.
- (b) Then each sector contains a number of *programmes and projects* supporting each of the strategic objectives. The Swedish Embassy decides on the selection of implementing partners, screens their proposals, monitors and evaluates progress and performance. All are managed and implemented by external partners (state, civil society, bi-/multilaterals). For each programme/project, there will be preparatory documents, a proposal, appraisals, progress reports and evaluations (depending on the size of the intervention). The programmes/projects and how they were developed will also influence aid effectiveness.

## Methods

The study covers the period between 2009 and 2015 – starting with the previous strategy period 2009 to 2014 and the new strategy for 2015 to 2018. This study builds primarily on data and information from documents and databases.<sup>3</sup> This is a limitation and constraint in the current study. A study of internal factors and processes should ideally have consisted of the following components:

- *An analysis of the strategy development process and product* (how the results strategy was prepared and the characteristics of its substance).
- *A portfolio analysis* of all programmes and projects covering sector, objectives and coverage, duration, budget, choice of partner, aid modality and type of interventions.
- A comprehensive organisational analysis carried out over time (in line with principles of formative research) consisting of:
  - (a) *A time and task study* looking at how Embassy staff spend their time.
  - (b) *A study of interactive processes with partners* – covering programme and project partners (government/civil society and private sector) and other donors.

However, this study was limited to:

- (a) Analysis of the last two results strategies – processes and products - based on available documents and interviews in Stockholm (Sida and MFA).
- (b) Analysis of projects/interventions from the 2009-2013-strategy period with the aim to better understand the characteristics of what has been supported.
- (c) Case studies of a sample of programmes/projects from three sectors<sup>4</sup>:
  - Health
  - Higher education and research
  - Democracy and human rights

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<sup>3</sup> Due to unforeseen circumstances at the Swedish Embassy in Uganda, they were at short notice not able to receive the evaluator. Hence, the nature and focus of the study had to change – focusing more on developing the evaluation approach and model using Uganda as an illustrative case.

<sup>4</sup> The three following sectors are central in the Swedish country strategy and were deemed sufficient for the purpose of this study. Due to time constraints, it was also necessary to limit the number of sectors and interventions. The findings from the review can be found in Annex 6.

Three thematic areas and “contributions”<sup>5</sup> were used as illustrative of what can be done also in other areas. The three sectors represent diversity with respect to thematic areas and type of institutional partners, as well as ways of channelling aid. The findings from the desk review are included in the analysis in Chapter 4.

The following programmes/projects are used as case studies (See presentation in Annex 3).

- **Health:** 1. Naguru Teenage Centre, 2. Maternal Health Voucher Programme, 3. Maternal and Newborn Care in Karamoja, 4. Voices for Health Rights Maternal Health Programme, 5. Civil Society Fund of Uganda.
- **Public management, democracy, human rights and gender equality:** 6. Public Financial Management, 7. Deepening Democracy Programme, 8. Child Rights Karamajoja, 9. Diakonia Uganda.
- **Research:** 10. Research Cooperation with Makerere University.

The main method of work has been systematic review of documents based on standard formats/questionnaires. Two formats were prepared: One for assessing the overall country strategy process and documents and another for the analysis of a sample of programmes/projects (See annexes 5&6).

## 1.5 Limitations

We are aware of the limitations in the study. Internal factors and in particular processes and interactions are seldom well documented and informal processes are often as important as the formal meetings when decisions are taken. <sup>6</sup> Hence, using documents to describe and assess internal factors is not sufficient. The original plan was also to interview Embassy staff and representatives from partners and projects in order to describe and assess interactions in planning, implementation and follow up/learning. The internal factors are also relational and will be influenced by the country context. As such, the internal factors should be studied from both a donor and recipient perspective.

When this was not feasible due to circumstances in Uganda, a draft report was prepared based on available data and information – explaining that the hypotheses or parts of the hypotheses could not be fully discussed. The draft report was discussed by the EBA Reference Group and then shared with the Swedish Embassy in Kampala, Sida and MFA in Stockholm. When completing the revised draft, all comments were reviewed, factual errors corrected and the analysis adjusted. The revised report was then shared with the Embassy. Finally, the author visited Uganda to collect more information from the Embassy and a sample of partners. The findings were discussed with Embassy staff and two long-term partners interviewed (Diakonia and Democratic Governance Facility). Based on their inputs, the report was finalised.

## 1.6 Guide to the reader

Chapter 2 provides the theoretical backdrop for the choice of hypotheses. It is meant to help contextualise and understand the analysis, but first of all to identify and explain the importance and relevance of internal factors. Chapter 3 is mainly descriptive – presenting the profile, evolution, programme portfolio and country results strategies, annual strategic plans and reports for Swedish support to Uganda. Chapter 4 is the main analytical chapter and contains a discussion of the relevance

<sup>5</sup> “Contributions” are official Sida terminology and used in this study interchangeably with intervention, project or programme.

<sup>6</sup> The Embassy was critical of the lack of interaction in implementing the study. They also emphasised that processes are often not well documented. A study of processes and internal factors should rely on more than documents and interviews. This is correct and other methods should be included in future studies.

and validity of the hypotheses while Chapter 5 seeks to summarise what the study has achieved and not achieved, what a complete study of internal factors should look like and what the important challenges and lessons are. There are several annexes: Overview of literature (1), Statistical overview of total Swedish support to Uganda (2), Presentation of country context and challenges (3), Overview of the programme and project portfolio (4) and questionnaires and formats for data collection (5&6).

# CHAPTER 2: AID EFFECTIVENESS AND AID RELATIONSHIPS

The purpose of this chapter is to introduce relevant theoretical perspectives on aid effectiveness and aid relationships. It is to some extent supplemented with personal experience and observations. The literature has been used to generate and inform the formulation of hypotheses and the final analysis of findings.

## 2.1. Aid effectiveness

Much has been done in recent years to document results. However, we note that findings on aid effectiveness are consistently the subject of academic and political controversy. People sceptical about development aid – often from academia – have found ample evidence that aid in its present forms does not work (Tvedt 2005, Easterly 2006, Moyo 2009). And people favouring development aid – often aid stakeholders – conclude equally strongly that it does, ‘although not well enough’ (World Bank 1998, Norad 2008-2013, Sachs 2005, Hydén 2010).

The World Bank defines aid effectiveness as the impact that aid has in reducing poverty and inequality, increasing growth, building capacity, and accelerating achievement of the Millennium Development Goals set by the international community (<http://data.worldbank.org/topic/aid-effectiveness>). As such, there are several levels and dimensions of aid effectiveness.

### Macroeconomic impact of aid

There is an on-going debate about the usefulness and design of foreign aid. Macro-level studies of aid effectiveness take aid as the independent variable and economic growth figures as the dependent variable. Cross-national data is collected from several countries and regression techniques, multivariate analysis and econometric models are used to determine the influence of aid on growth (Miller 2010).

Although the literature on the impact on aid remains far from conclusive, a substantial part of the new generation of studies suggest that aid has a positive impact on growth (Mavrotas 2010). It comes as no surprise that the empirical literature has resulted in unclear results in view of multiple aid motives, the limitations of the tools of the analysis, and the complex causality chain linking external aid to final outcomes. This has led to a situation, where the links between aid and development has been handled mostly as a “black box”. In macro-level studies, the specific purposes which aid is meant to serve including poverty reduction through better education and health, and institutional and participatory development – tend to escape analyses focusing on the aid – growth nexus.

On the other hand, there seems to be a widespread agreement in the research literature that aid has in many cases been highly successful at the microeconomic level (Riddell 2007), even if doubts about the overall impact of aid linger on. However, the question is regularly raised whether individual programmes and projects add up and have positive impact at the macro level. This is illustrated by the micro-macro paradox (Mosley 1986). Mosley suggested that while aid seems to be effective at the microeconomic level, identifying any positive impact of aid at the macroeconomic level is harder, or even impossible. At any rate, for our purpose it does not make much sense to assess the impact of Swedish aid on overall economic growth in Uganda. Some of the interventions contribute most likely directly and indirectly to economic growth in particular contexts, but a majority of the interventions have other objectives and/or are too small for making a measurable impact at national level.

## Assessing poverty reduction

Aid has many purposes, but from one perspective, the ultimate measure of success is how aid has affected sustainable development and the lives of poor people in developing countries. The voluminous literature on aid's macroeconomic impact has remarkably little to say on this topic, and even less on practical advice to government officials and aid administrators on how to improve the effectiveness of aid.

Calls for a stronger emphasis on actual results of development aid, rather than a focus on disbursement and processes of implementation, have grown stronger. This is a global trend, partly stemming from the need to respond to increasingly sceptical home constituencies, and partly from a realisation that much development aid simply has not reached the desired goals by leading to reduced poverty and improvements in human rights.

The World Bank made in 2013 the elimination of extreme poverty a central institutional focus and purpose and has recently carried out a study of the poverty focus of its country programmes (World Bank 2015). That evaluation examines how, and how well, the World Bank has focussed its support on poverty reduction over the past decade, and what lessons to draw. The evaluation assesses the Bank's engagement with countries to generate and share data, prepare poverty diagnostics, use those diagnostics to formulate and implement strategy, and to monitor and evaluate feedback loops to inform future strategies. Although poverty outcomes are noted, no efforts are made to attribute outcomes to the Bank due to the technical difficulty of attribution. Instead, it assesses how Bank programmes have been designed and positioned to support country efforts to reduce poverty.

The same is true for this study of Swedish aid to Uganda. It is impracticable to measure the aggregate national or sector poverty impact of an annual 300 Million budget. Several of the interventions have the potential to reduce poverty in particular geographic and thematic areas and they have most likely done so, but the more relevant questions to ask in a country study are to what extent Sida have the appropriate data to understand the nature of poverty and provide an information base for robust analytical work on poverty and if Sida's strategy development process adequately address poverty issues and identify policy priorities for poverty reduction. This is discussed in the analysis of the country strategy process and document.

## What aid does

The limits of aid as change maker or even catalyst of change has become more obvious. This is both a consequence of the declining role of aid relative to other capital flows in most developing countries, and diminishing political leverage of individual donors. The conclusion by Kharas et al. (2012:2) in a recent study of aid effectiveness is widely shared:

*“Development will not happen because of aid, but aid can make a difference. Developing countries are responsible for their own development. Aid is but one of many instruments of development, and the catalytic impact of aid is often seen when other forces like trade and private investment are unleashed because of better economic policies and institutions supported by aid programmes. Aid works, when done right”.*

This distinction is important and changes the perspective and inquiry from a simple question of attribution to one of contribution. An evaluation will have to assess when and how a donor contributes. The actual results are most often shared with others. It is not possible to compare the same country or community “with” and “without” aid – only “before” and “after”. The more complex and wide-ranging the aid project or programme and the longer it takes to implement, the greater are the number of factors, internal and external, which will influence the outcome (Riddell 2007). Randomised controlled trials (RCTs) can often only be carried out on relatively simple, discrete project interventions. Aid works and has the potential to make a difference when it interacts well and strengthens other supportive factors (Wohlgemuth 2012).



## 2.2. Donor performance

Most attention in the research on aid effectiveness has been on conditions at the recipient side, often blurring the distinction between the aid-factor per se and policy and institutional changes more broadly. Although bilateral donors can more easily reform themselves than reform recipient countries, to date they have often looked outwards rather than inwards to improve development effectiveness – despite the discussion of the Paris Declaration and Busan principles. The importance of conditions determined at the donor side and in the aid relationship is still less understood – i.e. how aid in its various forms, including how it is managed and delivered, constitute mediating factors.

The typical donor is heavily involved in the process of negotiating the objectives of aid cooperation and in decision processes on measures to achieve these objectives. At the negotiating table, they meet with recipients that often have other interests, other beliefs and a different knowledge base than the donors, and they meet with institutions with power- and incentive-structures that are hard to grasp for an outsider. Expatriate aid administrators may have limited experience and capacity to analyse and fully understand the local development context and be influenced by prevailing and often changing global and/or bilateral aid priorities.

Adapting aid management to such circumstances is an enormously challenging task. How well donors deal with these complexities is likely to be a key factor for how effectively aid contributes to development. Hypotheses listed under “Processes in aid management and implementation” seek to address such issues.

We have not found an extensive literature on donor performance, but there are important contributions.

### Inside Foreign Aid

An early study “Inside Foreign Aid” (Tendler 1973) wanted to broaden the discussion of development assistance “by looking at the organisation from inside its own walls, to show how the organisational environment had contributed to the outcomes described in the official and unofficial reports”. She argues that a certain type of organisational structure has been most conducive for development cooperation, where “problems and requirements for action arise which cannot be broken down and distributed among specialist roles within a clearly defined hierarchy”. “The newness of its task and the uncertainty of its environment are best handled by a decentralised organisation with less formal procedures, substantial points of contact with the environment, the possession of discretionary power by those having such contact, and an ability on their part to influence policy and improve their position in the organization”.

Quarles van Ufford moved the discussion further and published in 1988 a book called “The hidden crisis in development: Development bureaucracies” (Quarles van Ufford 1988). The title implied that donor organisations are part and parcel of the development problems. They are instruments to combat hunger, disease, malnutrition, economic exploitation and marginalisation, but they compound also these problems on their own.

The crisis is a hidden one. The problems are rarely debated outside of the bureaucratic corridors where they originate. The development organisations are not just neutral rational tools of policy makers. Development bureaucracies are to be found between intentions and outcomes. They are intermediary bodies through which the money flows. The following discussion has shaped the formulation of the hypotheses under “Policy and programme development”.

The approaches to the study of development policy have often been too mechanical with a rigid distinction between policy development and implementation (van Ufford 1988). Donor agencies such as Sida are consequently not engaged in, but separated from the process of political decision-making (Guljarani 2015). Donor agencies only translate political decisions into policy, programmes and projects. This is based on a Weberian model of modern bureaucracy, which regards the official policy

as the steering force in policy making. Official goals at the top determine the nature of decision-making. Such a model has become gradually more questionable. In each agency, there is a process of goal displacement – e.g. the actual goals and priorities differ from the original. Defining development goals does not stop at the top. Policymaking is a continuous process in which goals are reconstructed as the money reaches new levels, actors and interests. The goals are most visible and pertinent at the top – at the apex of the hierarchy, but those goals steer organisational decision making only if the top is able to exert control over the lower level processes.

Research has shown that the scope of control in professional organisations such as donor agencies is often limited, and even decreases as these become larger. Mintzberg’s early study of professional organisations is an example (Mintzberg 1989). He talks about the “directing top” and “implementers” and argues that the latter are increasingly segregated from the policy makers and have gained considerable autonomy. He presents a model of the professional bureaucracy consisting of rather autonomous and only loosely integrated parts. Development policy is thus constructed and reconstructed within the organisation. It exists only in the plural. You would expect to find more than one set of goals and priorities in Swedish aid to a country like Uganda. The top is responsible for securing inflow of funds. The bureaucrats or professionals are responsible for the formulation and implementation of programmes and projects in interaction with partner organisations in the Uganda.

Entering into a government-to-government relation is a political process and decision. Once a formal agreement is reached, embassies tend to acquire considerable autonomy in policy adaptation, executing standards, procedures and selection of projects. As a result, changes in overall policy can easily be absorbed at country level – also because the policy is quite general. Changes may also be introduced in country strategies while there are in practice few if any changes in the actual project portfolio. This is allowed to happen because the political apex is mainly concerned with the influx and disbursement of funds, while the donor agencies in a country deal with programmes and projects.

The question is to what extent original intentions and overall country strategies are relevant at all for understanding final outcomes? Or does policy become unrecognisable as it is passed through the different organisational levels and networks?<sup>7</sup> The policy maker and the “spending staff” become increasingly disconnected as the organisation grows and with the two living in two different countries. Previously embassies and donor country offices were probably more detached from HQ’s while improvement in electronic communication have improved and increased interactions and consultations.

Looking back on the history of development cooperation, its flexible and changing nature is a prominent feature. Development cooperation has been used to advocate conflicting and rapidly changing definitions of problems and solutions. Why have they changed? They have not necessarily changed because of new insights, but because they have to appeal to the western public and its governments (Mosse 2005). This inherent ambiguity in the development goals sets limits to “disinterested” analysis and policy development. Country donor strategies may end up reflecting more donor decrees than country needs. The speciality of the doctor shapes the nature of the disease.

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<sup>7</sup> See hypotheses under “Policy formulation and design”. The processes could be compared with the game “Chinese whispers” in which one person whispers a message to another, which is passed through a line of people until the last player announces the message to the entire group – a message differing significantly from the one uttered by the first.

## Donor performance determinants

Gulrajani presented recently a framework for assessing aid effectiveness focusing on donor performance (Gulrajani 2014). She claims that donors have lagged behind aid recipients in adhering to the principles of aid effectiveness. The evaluation of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness noted “donor unevenness” when meeting aid effectiveness targets and unmet “commitments” (Wood 2011). Donors lag behind “due to lack of policy structures, lack of compliance, decisions running contrary to alignment and disconnects between corporate strategies and their aid agenda. Nevertheless, the reasons for these donor deficiencies remain unspecified and unexamined in the evaluation report and for that matter in most discussion of aid effectiveness.

Her central idea is that explanations of aid ineffectiveness must begin within the donor agency itself. Organisational factors refer to design attributes relating people, things, knowledge and technologies within a formal framework intended to achieve specific goals. What seems to be missing is an understanding of how a donor agency mediates the implementation of aid and the way technical aid systems in turn influence organisational contexts.

Studies of donor performance are often built on a composite index of variables that include aid selectivity, harmonisation, alignment, transparency and overhead costs (Easterley 2008). This is not sufficient – it leaves out important organisational features such as:

- Political environments
- Donor governance structures
- Organisational goals
- Discretion incentives

Global norms and policies structure the behaviour of donor agencies shaped by domestic political concerns. Political environments are the first critical determinant of aid effectiveness. The broken feedback loops between donor agents and aid-recipient principals is another distinctive and important aspects of the aid delivery chain. This is because ‘the people for whose benefit aid agencies work are not the same as those from whom their revenues are obtained; they actually live in different countries and different political constituencies’. The ultimate principal for the donor agency remains its domestic audiences and these must ultimately be satisfied, even if they are worst placed to monitor geographically dispersed development work.

Thirdly, she claims that a high-level statement that is clear and unambiguous on the purpose of development can enhance aid effectiveness. Bilateral donor goals are often articulated in White Papers and later in country strategies. Donor policies are often broad and ambiguous as a result of contradictory pressures emerging from their environments. Donor agencies are structured by the need for legitimacy from multiple quarters. Policy documents, while somewhat durable features of organisational life, tend to be interpretable in multiple and contradictory ways. The more constituents there are, the greater the plurality of interpretations that exist and the wider the spectrum of actions that are made possible.

Finally, bounded professional discretion can influence aid effectiveness. There is evidence that the exercise of discretion by public-sector staff who are closest to problems can result in more appropriate policy, effective practical solutions and greater public accountability. It may also be a way to retain talented staff who value autonomy and room for creativity and experimentation.

Aid-workers at the country level often face contradictory policies and goals. They have to some extent the capability for autonomous behaviour from institutional instructions as they broker and translate policies, roles, relationships and representations into tangible and meaningful actions. This

autonomy is partly a product of the inherent opportunities for discretion in the complex, diffuse, global realm of development policy work.

Sweden has a dualist system of government, which rests on constitutional separation between policy setting and administrative/implementation functions. Government ministries communicate policy priorities to their implementing agencies in annual ordinances and appropriation letters. This difference has traditionally empowered their implementing agencies and been a source of their structural autonomy. Until recently, Sida benefited from such autonomy. Since 2009, however, it is argued that the structural autonomy of Sida has shrunk and correspondingly grown for MFA (Vähämäki 2011).<sup>8</sup> The MFA is now the unquestioned leader on development policy matters in government, while Sida's role is more narrowly defined in terms of implementation of policies and strategies in the remit of its responsibilities. The constitutional separation between functions has not changed, but the interpretation of what constitutes policy may have changed.

Sweden has traditionally been a flexible and innovative donor that has given leeway to programme officers to develop activities according to local needs. However, negative audits, critical evaluations and increasing public attention and pressure may have contributed to greater risk aversion. It has been argued (Guljarani 2015, Vähämäki 2011) that Sida's current lower level of financial and managerial autonomy restricts its capacity to administer policy flexibly and take into account changing circumstances. This means that Sida may not be so well placed any longer to support the achievement of timely and appropriate interventions, engage in entrepreneurial learning by doing, and broker relevant partnerships, but such assumptions have so far not been tested as far as we are aware.

## Planning processes and accountability

Easterly conveyed his view on aid effectiveness already in the title of his book: "The White Man's Burden: Why the west's efforts to aid the rest have done so much ill and so little good" (Easterly 2006). Despite his critical and to some extent one-sided conclusions, he is addressing two pertinent issues: Systems of planning and governance as determinants of aid effectiveness.

He objects to what he considers as grandiose utopian plans. In his opinion, the right plan is to have no plan. In foreign aid, planners announce good intentions, but don't motivate anyone to carry them out. Searchers are his favourite alternative to planners. Searchers find projects that work and reap the rewards. Planners raise expectations, but take no responsibility for meeting them. Searchers accept responsibility for their actions. Planners determine what to supply while searchers find out what is in demand. Planners apply global blueprints. Searchers adapt to local conditions. Planners at the top lack knowledge of the bottom while searchers find out what the reality is at the bottom. Planners never consult with the beneficiaries and ask if they get what they need. Searchers find out if the customer is satisfied. Such concerns are reflected in the hypotheses under "Policy formulation and design" and to some extent in the other two groups.

The basic problem in his view is that setting a prefixed and grandiose goal is irrational because there is no reason to assume that the goal is attainable at a reasonable cost with the available means. Hence, as you cannot do what you want, want what you can do. What he advocates for is small, incremental reform as opposed to "utopian" social engineering. The solution is to have fewer objectives. If the aid business were not so beguiled by utopian visions, it could address a set of more realistic problems for which it has evidence of a workable solution. Donors will perform better when they have tangible measurable goals with a clear link between efforts and results.

He argues also that the lack of feedback is one of the most critical flaws in existing aid. The poor themselves must tell what they want most and what they don't. Customer choice gives feedback to suppliers. The bureaucratic planners get little feedback from the poor. The problem is that the

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<sup>8</sup> Others argued that the structural autonomy is still there, but its expressions have been restricted as the principal (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) has engaged in more detailed steering. This has changed somewhat with the new government.

principal in a donor-recipient relationship is the rich country politician and not the “customers” - the poor in the poor countries. Domestic government bureaucracies in democratic countries have some incentive to deliver their services to the beneficiaries because the ultimate beneficiaries are also voters who can influence the budget and survival of the bureaucracy. One insight of principal agent theory is that incentives are weakened if the bureaucracy answers to too many different principals, or faces too many different objectives. Aid agencies face a particular accountability dilemma. They are not accountable to those receiving their services, but only to those providing the funds. The poor people have no political voice to influence the behaviour of the donor. In practice, the agencies are also not very accountable to those who fund them. This is because of the spatial and conceptual distance between the source of money and the scene of action.

## Relations between policy and practice

Mosse has analysed the relationship between policy and practice with an example from DFID in India (Mosse 2005). He asks what if development practice is not driven by policy? What if the things that make for good policy are quite different from those that make it implementable? What if the practices of development are in fact concealed rather than produced by policy? What if instead of policy producing practice, practices produce policy, in the sense that actors in development devote their energies to maintaining coherent representations regardless of events?<sup>9</sup>

He explains that understanding the relationship between policy discourses and field practices has been hampered by the dominance of two opposing views on development policy. On the one hand, there is an instrumental view of policy as rational problem solving – directly shaping the way in which development is done. On the other hand, there is a critical view that sees policy as a rationalising technical discourse concealing hidden purposes of bureaucratic power or dominance, which are the true political intent of development. He believes that neither of these views does justice to the complexity of policymaking and its relationship to project practice, or to the creativity and skill involved in negotiating development.

From an instrumental view, the concern is how to define the problem and realise the programme design in practice. International development is characterised by two trends: on the one hand a narrowing of the ends of development to quantified international development targets for the reduction of poverty, ill-health and illiteracy, but on the other, a widening of its means. Good government, prudent fiscal policy, political pluralism, a vibrant civil society and democracy have all become prerequisites for poverty reduction. Donors may have confidence in management through policy, while “people on the ground” are sceptical to the value of policies and disregard what they say and look for tangible results.

## Quality of relationships

From an anthropological perspective (Eyben 2006), it is the quality of relationships in and between organisations in the web of aid that is crucial for performance. She argues that unequal power relations – a fact largely remained unnamed and unchallenged in aid circles, limit the potential for aid relationships to support progressive social change. In order to be part of the solution, donors must recognise they are part of the problem. Processes and building relationships must not be seen as a transaction cost undermining efficiency, but as factors promoting learning and performance. Such concerns are reflected in one of the hypotheses.

Tendler explained the need for “bottom heaviness” in donor organisations (Tendler 1973). The task at hand for an Embassy is to encourage and support organisational learning among programme staff: “Because of the daily interaction between the recipient government and the donor agency occurred

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<sup>9</sup> See the first hypotheses under Policy formulation and design.

geographically distant from HQ and the inability to define problems in a standardised way – the donor becomes dependent on its lower ranks for adaptive and innovative behaviour – staff with sufficient discretionary power”.

Eyben argues that donors should invest as much or more time in their relationships up, down and across the aid chain as they currently spend in managing their money. Donor staff will have to learn to change their behaviour, both with their own colleagues and with those with whom they interact at global and local levels. Reflective practice can enhance that quality. Weak mutual accountability weakens the quality of relationships and hinders learning.

In the Paris Declaration, there has been little consideration as to how donors should change to live up to the new principles. Reflective practice is the ability to be aware of the dynamics of our social and professional environments, reflecting on how this shapes our behaviour and the impact that this has on other people. It means looking at its own practice with a view to understanding and then potentially transforming it, and thus learning to change and improve the quality of our relationship with others.

Eyben claims also that extensive use of “log frames” can lead to regressive learning which occurs when a recipient “learns the ropes” and changes its own values and ways of working so as to respond to the requirements of the donor. A small budget does not necessarily constitute a major constraint to making a difference. It is how the money is spent that matter. Relationship building rather than money management should be a major concern for donors.

While donor programme/policy staff may be committed to downward accountability, innovation and empowerment, financial management staff are bound by systems of regulating financial procedures that are applied with often increasing rigour as the money passes down the aid chain. Despite recent popularity of such terms as partnership, those responsible for aid policies and management take little interest in their staff being equipped with the skills, values and attitudes for positive relationship management.

In donor organisations, staff tend to be viewed as implementers of policy that has been decided by politicians. The technical role is reinforced by the bureaucratic ideal that requires seeing the people they serve as objects of attention. The ideal bureaucratic form of organisation is rational, basing decisions on objective evidence scrutinised by experts working in a hierarchical system where all follow the established procedures. The least time spent with someone coming to a contractual agreement, the more efficient is the performance.

Networks or partnerships reshape the understanding of decision-making. Policymaking has as mentioned often been regarded as a hierarchical process where those at the top of the pyramid make decisions and transmit them down for implementation. Today, the design and monitoring of autonomous projects have become less important than negotiating deals with colleagues from other aid agencies and with staff in recipient ministries of finance – creating a distance between embassy staff and project activities.

Successful aid is dependent on networking skills. A relational approach would expect donor staff to regularly test the quality of relationships through iterative feedback, reflection and change. This is often rare due to the strong goal orientation in aid. However, a relational approach does not imply that the donor-recipient relationship is harmonious. In most cases, it is probably characterised by conflict – where the recipients may accept, but would have preferred to be without any donor. Uganda is such an example with at times considerable tension between donors and the Government. A study from Zambia explained the aid relationship in a conflict scenario (Oliver&Jerker 1996). However, despite conflicts, the quality of the relationship and effectiveness of aid is still shaped by how tensions are managed.

## The politics of evidence and results

Since 2006, Vähämäki argues that the results agenda has been a top political priority in Sweden (Vähämäki 2015). Sida has introduced a stronger focus on results, which has resulted in a (re)-

introduction of a management technology based on a derivative of the logical framework. Such concerns are reflected in hypotheses listed under “Learning and feedback loops”.

Within such a framework, large aid agencies are bureaucratic organisations whose edifice of rules, procedures and systems is predicated on cause and effect thinking. The log frame is a tool consisting of a matrix, which allows users to map out how resources and activities will contribute to achieving objectives and results based on quantifiable indicators for measuring progress. It is argued that the log frame serves to encourage strategic, linear, rational thinking in change processes and to express, simplify and reproduce complex processes by using numbers for comparison. Since results management techniques most often imply an increased search for provable, quantitative evidence, in practice people may become occupied with measuring, weighing and counting results.

The evidence and results agenda has been contested from an opposite theoretical perspective (Eyben 2015). The environment in which development agencies are working is characterised by complexity and uncertainty. The development process itself is non-linear, unpredictable and poorly understood: A complex range of social, economic and political factors is at play over which donors has very little control. The problem with aid lies in the thinking processes – incompatible thought styles applied to the policy processes at different organisational levels – in particular when partners and projects seek to achieve complex outcomes from what is presented as simple and linear projects and programmes.

Why is this relevant for a discussion of aid effectiveness? Eyben argues that rights-based, transformational approaches to development (where “how” matters as much as “what”) and transactional results-based management may be in conflict. The number of agencies using rights language has continued to increase, but the contradiction between rights-based approaches and their political and process approach to intangible goals such as empowerment and the increasing popularity of results-based management has become apparent. It is harder to support transformational approaches when one is required to report tangible, easy-to-measure changes. Results, transparency and accountability may have become the primary reform objectives, prioritized above content themes such as gender and poverty reduction.

The results and evidence agenda is a battlefield between “accountability” and “learning”. Positive accountability pressure can stimulate organisational discussions on core values and what success looks like. Strategic accountability seeks to answer the question: Did we act as effectively as possible with the little means we had? Embassies are more than delivery agents – they are drivers of change. Rigid protocols for reporting back to donors may be choking the space to learn and adapt, aggravated by disbursement and budget pressure. When the results matrices become so complicated that they have to be filled in by Embassy staff, it is the deathblow to the original intention of participation and mutual learning.

There is in principle no contradiction between rights/empowerment and results, but the challenge is to define results correctly and broadly. The danger is that the results agenda can lead to the crowding out of less measurable activities. This in turn may lead to a greater emphasis on service delivery instead of capacity strengthening and policy reform as the predominant programmatic approach to development. Performance indicators do not measure performance itself. They may distort what is measured, influence practice towards what is being measured and cause unmeasured parts to be neglected.

Vähämäki has analysed the results agenda in Swedish development cooperation (Eyben 2015). She states that since 2006, the “results” agenda has been a top political priority, with large cultural and organisational changes within Sida. Her conclusion is “although there might be factors that support the success of the current effort, these changes may hamper the achievement of development results on the ground and be just another “tide of reform”.

She argues further that the results reform disrupted relations between Sida staff and the then minister, generating a harsh debate about the utility and feasibility of increased requirements to quantify precisely how Swedish funds had been spent and how to attribute results. In August 2013, a

new government decisions on “Guidelines for result strategies” came into effect, requiring ex ante identification of anticipated in country results. Project goals are expected to contribute to overall strategic goals. Future financing will increasingly be guided by whether results are achieved.

There has been a need for “commensuration” – that is to reduce disparate information from recipient organisations in diverse complex realities into numbers to be compiled by Embassy/Sida programme officers for easy comparison and aggregation. Sida as donor searched for the “perfect tool” that can transform qualities into quantities and difference into magnitude, in order to manage – or at least appear to manage – uncertainty. One danger is that “doing things right” became more important than “doing the right things”.

### **2.3. Concluding remarks**

This chapter covers the three phases and processes in the aid chain – from (a) policy and programme development, (b) aid management and implementation and (c) learning and feedback loops. The theoretical contributions are meant to inform and provide the justification for the list of hypotheses presented in section 1.3. The hypotheses seek to interpret and specify the implications of the theoretical perspectives presented in this chapter for policy formulation, aid management and learning processes.

The chapter started by explaining why aid effectiveness cannot easily be explained through macro-economic variables. Aid has most often multiple purposes and work together as a catalyst for change with a broad range of other external factors.

The next sub chapter looks inside the organisational environment of foreign aid or “the black box” for variables shaping effectiveness of aid. There is an intricate relationship between policy making and practice contrasting an instrumental view of policy as rational problem solving. The quality of aid relationships and the vertical donor accountability influence development outcomes. And finally, the prevailing reporting and evaluation systems and politics of evidence and results impact on what is measured and create a potential conflict between results based management and more transformational approaches to development.



## CHAPTER 3: SWEDEN IN UGANDA

This chapter is mainly a descriptive presentation of the background, profile and evolution of Swedish bilateral support to Uganda. It provides background for the subsequent analysis in Chapter 4. In order to reduce the length of the report, a lot of information can be found in the annexes. Annexes 2,3,4 and 7 are in particular relevant for understanding the level and characteristics of Swedish support to Uganda

### 3.1. Profile and evolution of country support

The Government of Sweden has a long history of development cooperation with Uganda. According to a country analysis from Sida (Landanalys 2010), Swedish assistance to Uganda started in 1986 as an emergency and rehabilitation programme. This was based on the so-called “Uganda model” in which funds were channelled through multilateral organisations such as UNICEF and the World Bank with only one in country Sida staff. An Embassy with an Ambassador and two staff was established in 1999. Uganda became a programme country already in 1991 in order to support economic reforms, democratic development and rehabilitation of social infrastructure. The first country strategy covered the period 1995/96 to 2000 with a total funding of 340,5 Mill SEK.

Sweden has pursued four key thematic priorities since the beginning: Democratic governance/peace/security, health, private sector development and research cooperation.<sup>10</sup> There has also been significant funding of social infrastructure and services, water and sanitation, banking services and general budget support, but most is now phased out. Sweden has also provided large amounts as humanitarian aid in particular from 2003 to 2010. The allocation of resources is explained in more detail later.

Sweden has placed great importance on continued democratic developments. The goal has been to support strengthened democracy, free and fair elections and increased respect for human rights. The support has mainly been channelled through civil society organisations working for democratic change, and through public channels aiming to create a broader political dialogue.

Sweden has also supported the development of the Ugandan health care sector, especially in neglected rural areas. Sweden has maintained a particular focus on improving maternal health, and sexual and reproductive health and rights. In the early 1990s, the AIDS epidemic was raging in Uganda and the country was among the worst affected countries in the world. Sida has been strongly involved in fighting the epidemic.

A strong and competitive private sector is seen as a prerequisite for creating job opportunities and improving incomes for poor people. The goal of increased trade has partly been achieved through the development of local businesses and their organisations, partly by developing and adapting institutions and regulations to meet international requirements and standards.

The research cooperation with Uganda, introduced in 2000, has aimed to improve the analytical capacity of the research on poverty reduction and democratic governance at public universities. Funding has mainly been directed to the Makerere University, but also to the other four public universities in Uganda. The support has focused on postgraduate education within medicine, technology, humanities and social sciences, agriculture and veterinary medicine. Sida also supports the improvement of the research environment at Makerere University, as well as an administrative reform process.

The following presentation is focusing on the previous strategy period and preparation of the most recent results strategy for 2014 to 2018.

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<sup>10</sup> The permanence of Swedish aid objectives should be noted. Wohlgemuth (2012) concludes that the overall objectives for Swedish development cooperation have more or less remained unchanged from its start (1962) despite changes in formulations. However, its organisation, methods of work and priorities have changed dramatically.

## 3.2. Programme portfolio and allocations

### Total portfolio

We have looked at the total Swedish support between 1998 and 2014 to get an overview of volume and allocations to various thematic areas<sup>11</sup>. Total funding for the seventeen years has been 5234 Mill SEK – starting with 78,9 Mill SEK in 1998, increasing to 462 in 2006 and ending with 243 Mill in 2014. The average annual amount for these years is 308 Mill SEK. Uganda has been an important recipient of Swedish aid. In 1998, it was only number 27 on the list of recipient countries, but in 2008 number 7 and in 2014 number 17 among the recipients of Swedish aid.




Table 1: Overview of volume of Swedish support to Uganda (in Mill SEK) from 1998 to 2014

### Themes and programmes

Total Swedish support to Uganda 1998 to 2014 is presented in Annex 5. Looking at the allocation of resources to various thematic areas, the following picture emerges:

Health	Rep-health	Democr	Priv sector	Educ	Peace	Trade pol	Agric	Multi-sector	Hum	Infra-struct	W&S	Energy	Bank ser	Bud sup
845	385,6	1094,5	331,7	39,8	47,3	64,6	40,9	363,7	761,7	69,8	462	234,4	58,6	288,5
16,1%	7,3%	20,9%	6,3%	0,7%	0,9%	1,2%	0,7%	6,9%	14,5%	1,3%	8,8%	4,4%	1,1%	7,4%
2	6	1	7					6	3		4	8		5

Table 2: Allocation of Swedish support to thematic priorities (in Mill SEK) between 1998 and 2014

<sup>11</sup> The figures are from [www.openaid.se](http://www.openaid.se) and include all types of support – including humanitarian assistance.

The categories used for thematic priorities are fairly broad and programmes/projects have sometimes moved between categories. The table provides a useful overview of overall trends and changes in priorities.

- The largest thematic area is public management, democracy, human rights and gender equality (21 %) – consisting of a broad range of interventions – mainly through civil society organisations. Health is number two (16 %), but has been radically reduced since 2010 with the cut in the health sector budget support. Humanitarian assistance comes as number three (14,5 %). Number four is the water and sanitation sector (9 %) and budget support number five (7 %) – both phased out. Number six is multi-sector support (7 %) and includes university cooperation, seven private sector development (6 %) and eight energy (4 %).
- Since 2012, reproductive health has been a major priority. General health sector budget support used to absorb most resources until 2010/2011, but was then phased out.
- Democracy, human rights and gender equality remain high on the agenda.
- Cooperation with Makerere University and the other regional universities have increased in significance from 2012.
- Sweden provided general budget support to Uganda from 1999 until 2005.
- There has been consistent funding of private sector development throughout, but in particular from 2005.
- There have been small, but consistent contributions to conflict resolution, peace and security efforts in particular from 2005 to 2008.
- Trade policy, trade related adjustment and tourism have gained more significance over the last four years, while support to social infrastructure and services have been reduced.

### **3.3. Platforms for cooperation**

The Swedish Government steers the development cooperation with Uganda and Sida through:

- The guidelines for results strategies.
- Four years country strategies based on Swedish overall development priorities and needs/opportunities in Uganda.
- The annual letter of appropriation to Sida.
- The Government's instruction to Sida.

There are also other important documents prepared by the Embassy providing a platform for cooperation:

- Annual plans for implementation of the strategy.
- Annual reports on the implementation of the strategy and achievement of results.
- A mid-term strategic review.

## Country results strategies

The four-year strategy period (2009-2013), focused on four areas each with two objectives<sup>12</sup>:

- **Democratic governance, peace and security**
  - Improved democratic governance, with increased respect for and enjoyment of human rights and greater regard for the rule of law.
  - Peaceful and sustainable resolution of violent and armed conflicts.
- **Health**
  - Improved access by poor people to health services.
  - Reduction in the spread of HIV/AIDS.
- **Private sector development including financial systems and international trade.**
  - The creation of a better business and investment climate.
  - Increased trade.
- **Research Cooperation**
  - Greater autonomy for the research system developed.
  - Improved analytical capacity in areas of importance to poverty reduction, democratic governance and peaceful resolution of internal armed conflicts.

A new results strategy for the period 2014 to 2018 was introduced in 2014 with earmarked SEK 1350 Million. The strategy has four key objectives and results areas:

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<sup>12</sup> The sub objectives are not listed in the strategies, but refer to the "Bistandsplattform".

- **Sub objective 1: Strengthened democracy and gender equality, greater respect for human rights and freedom from oppression.**
  - Greater capacity of civil society to improve respect for civil and political rights.
  - Greater capacity of civil society to promote the conditions for citizens to influence political processes and demand accountability.
  - Enhanced rule of law, with a focus on access to justice for people who live in poverty.
- **Sub-objective 2: Better opportunities for people living in poverty to contribute to and benefit from economic growth and obtain a good education.**
  - Strengthened competitiveness among producers and suppliers of goods and services.
  - Increased productive employment opportunities for women and young people.
  - Increased access to and control of productive resources for women.
  - Better access to social safety nets for vulnerable children.
- **Sub-objective 3: Improved basic health**
  - Improved access to high quality child and maternal care.
  - Improved access to sexual and reproductive health and rights for women and men, girls and boys.
- **Sub. Objective 4: Safeguarding human security and freedom from violence**
  - Enhanced capacity to prevent gender-based violence.

Research cooperation was included in the previous, but not the current country strategy. It is now governed by a separate global strategy (Strategy for research cooperation and research 2015-2021) and the implementation of both is delegated to the Embassy. Synergies between the two are emphasized to promote knowledge and innovation in all results areas.

## Guidelines for the result strategy

There is government guidelines for how to prepare a result strategy (Guidelines for results strategies 2013) prescribing that:

- The strategy should define the results to which Swedish aid is expected to contribute.
- The perspective of poor people on development and a rights perspective that places the individual's freedom and human rights at the center should be applied.
- Aid is to be managed in a results-based manner.
- It should be possible to evaluate aid and to learn more about the results of aid, what works and what does not work.
- Expected results are to be stated in quantitative terms wherever possible and appropriate.
- It should be possible to attribute the contributions that receive support within the framework of the strategy to one of the strategy's expected results.
- A number of indicators should be established with a corresponding baseline as a prerequisite for being able to measure and follow up the results of contributions.
- Swedish aid must be flexible enough to be adapted to various contexts and rapid changes.

- Differentiated forms of cooperation should be offered that are adapted to each country’s political and economic conditions.

The following are key steps in developing the results strategy:

- Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) hosts a start up meeting.
- MFA gives Sida “entry values” for the process of drawing up results proposals.
- Sida hosts an actors meeting in Sweden.
- Sida submits a results proposal to MFA.
- The strategy is drawn up and prepared by MFA.
- The government adopts the results strategy.

## Entry values

Ahead of its strategy work, the Government formulates what are known as entry values in the form of instructions to Sida. The entry values for the 2014-2018 strategy period for Uganda were (27 June 2013):

- Swedish aid can still play a role in Uganda through the support to democratic development and sustainable growth. Long-term and good connections between Sweden and Uganda provide a strong reason for continued support.
- The overall and target groups should be:
  - Improved child and maternal health.
  - Improved opportunities for women to start productive enterprises.
  - Improved competence building and access to productive work.
  - Increased innovation, productivity and trade.
  - Strengthened opportunities for claiming human rights and focus on human and political rights, especially rights for LGBTI people.
  - A strong sustainable and plural civil society, including actors for democracy.
  - The main target groups should be women, children, youth, civil society organisations and entrepreneurs.
- The proposal should be based on the premise that budget support is not feasible in the next strategy period. Sida may suggest projects with the Government as implementing partner in areas where good results are expected. To the largest extent, the proposal should focus on cooperation with change actors within civil society and private sector as well as multilateral partners.

Sida then draws up a result proposal (based on a document from the Embassy). From a review of Sida’s results proposals, MFA makes a selection of the expected results and is responsible for drafting the strategy. The Government adopts the results strategy that is addressed to Sida and, where appropriate, to other government agencies tasked with implementing all or parts of the strategy.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> This should in principle imply that there are parts of the strategy that are to be implemented by other Swedish actors and produce yearly reports of their own or contribute to one consolidated report produced by the Embassy. This is not the case for the Uganda strategy as far as we could establish.

## Preparatory work

The strategy was based on a 38 pages preparatory document – a proposal on how the development cooperation with Uganda could be designed based on:

- An overview and analysis of the political, social and economic challenges in Uganda in which Sida concludes that Sweden can still make a difference by adopting a broad approach and supporting agents of change.
- Suggested results areas with entry values and expected results, discussing risks, implementation costs and follow up. This constitutes the largest part of the preparatory document.
- A general assessment of trends and issues within each sector – mainly focusing on national level with not much focus on reviewing previous Swedish support and suggesting lessons learned.
- The report concludes that the expected changes will lead to a stronger focus on women and youth as target groups and change agents. The three sectors from the previous strategy period should remain, but be broadened and increased.
- It is recognised as a risk that the portfolio could be too broad in terms of the number of sectors and interventions.

Other studies were also carried out analysing conflicts, gender/equity, climate and environment, public financial management, corruption, the national development plan, change agents, donor mapping and innovation, etc.

A summary of the key findings and observations from the annual strategic plans and reports prepared by the Embassy can be found in Annex 7. The documents are more or less the same for all the years (2009-2015).

It is interesting to learn what the strategic annual reports from the Embassy conclude about results of Swedish aid to Uganda – in other words what the Embassy reports back to Sida and MFA. The main conclusions on achievement of results from the four priority areas are brief and relatively modest: The results in the area of democratic governance are found to be weak, contradictory and difficult to measure. The health sector faces major challenges and stagnation despite reduction in some health indicators. The results are deemed positive in the areas of peace and security, private sector development and research cooperation. This is based on an overall assessment of sector trends and developments and not programme/project performance.

On the other hand, a majority of reviews and evaluations of individual interventions are much more positive about short-term results – in other words – activities are completed, outputs are delivered and changes can be observed within the context of the interventions. Most of the evaluations are hesitant to draw any conclusions about long-term impact – as will be discussed later.

## CHAPTER 4: ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

This chapter discusses to what extent the hypotheses are valid and relevant and can be used to assess internal factors in policy development, aid management and modalities, feedback and learning. The hypotheses were informed by the discussion of theoretical contributions in Chapter 2 and primarily used to structure and instigate the analysis. The chapter explained why the hypotheses were selected and what the relevant issues are. The study seeks to develop a model for evaluating aid effectiveness and should thus identify as many internal factors as possible. Hence, we have kept all the hypotheses despite missing evidence to fully analyse all of them. The underlying issues and the discussion may be considered the most important in an explorative study such as this. The emerging issues and challenges are summarised in Chapter 5.

### 4.1. Policy development

Sida is governed mainly through two mechanisms – Government guidelines and the Government Annual Letter of Appropriation. The guidelines describe how Sida should perform its work and the letter of Appropriation sets out Sida’s objectives, total budget and allocations. Swedish development cooperation in specific countries is steered by strategies that are in turn governed by specific government guidelines. The previous and current strategy documents were presented in the previous chapter. This sub chapter seeks to analyse the development and formulation of the strategies and their characteristics.

*The preparation and formulation of the country strategy was driven by Swedish aid policy rather than Uganda’s own priorities and strategies and a systematic assessment of the needs of the poor.*

The hypothesis comes from the analysis of the role, functions and importance of overall policies and strategies in Chapter 2. How is policy developed? What if development practice is not driven by policy? What if instead of policy producing practice, practice produce policy, in the sense that actors in development devote their energies to maintaining coherent representations regardless of events (Mosse 2005)?

As explained in Chapter 2, the results strategy is by design a Swedish product and a MFA document. A major challenge is to understand the difference between the formal and informal processes because there is a considerable difference between what is documented and what actually happened. The Government guidelines for preparing the results strategy starts the process at the top (MFA) in Sweden and ends it there. The actual document is written by a desk officer in MFA Stockholm based on inputs and drafts from Sida and the Embassy. The Swedish Embassy appears indiscernible in the process as presented in formal documentation, although the Embassy prepared the background documents and drafted the strategy. The actual role of the Embassy is much more important than the formal process and written documents indicate. The strategic priorities converge with country needs and priorities, but they are based and phrased in Swedish aid policy terminology and appear as less grounded in the country context – partly because it is a high level political document.

There were consultations with Swedish stakeholders in Stockholm at an early stage. The Embassy also consulted formally and informally with government representatives, civil society, private sector, other donors, international and regional organisations. A partner meeting was organised in Uganda September 2013, but the processes for preparing the strategy was not explained in the document.

If the strategy was only Sweden’s effort to clarify its own priorities for providing support to Uganda, a predominantly internal process would be legitimate, but it is more. It is supposed to provide programmatic guidance. There is considerable evidence that the quality and importance of a strategy depend not only on its substance, but also on how it is developed and the level of interaction between “donor” and “recipients”. Hence, there is a certain mismatch between a high-level policy statement and a programmatic strategy.



From the government guidelines, the role of the Embassy and partners appear marginal possibly based on the notion that Sida should only implement a policy decided by Swedish politicians. In practice, the Embassy was heavily involved in the formulation, operationalisation and adaptation of the strategy. Chapter 2.2. discussed the considerable autonomy for professional bureaucracies such as Embassies and the importance of geographical distance between donor and recipient country for understanding donor policies. Headquarters are the “planners” and provides the broad guidance and funds while the Embassy staff are the “searchers” looking for practical solutions and ways to operationalize the strategic objectives (Easterley 2006 on planners and searchers). In practice, the distinction between policy and practice is blurred and the policy process more messy.

The strategy is based on Uganda’s development plans and priorities as they are found in national development and sector development plans as well as in plans from civil society and private sector organisations. The argument here is that the entry values are defined politically in Sweden, with weak reference to a systematic analysis and presentation of the country context. The development of the country strategy appears as a top-down process. The Embassy also had limited time to build an empirical and analytical basis for the strategy (information from Sida, Stockholm).

MFA adds political legitimacy, but less substance to the process and document. The discussion of the relations between policy and practice (Chapter 2.2.) illustrates how existing practices produce policy, in the sense that actors devote their energies to maintaining coherent global policies often regardless of country events or contexts. What characterise good policy is different from what makes it implementable. The current policy process is not “wrong”, but presents one set of policies not sufficiently grounded in country realities and in so general language that it is applicable in several contexts.

An alternative approach would be for the MFA to present “entry values” and then leave the process and substance to the Embassy in Uganda with support from Sida Sweden (in line with principles of decentralisation and delegation of authority). The end result (priority areas) may be the same, but the tone and approach would appear different – more based on country context and ownership. There is no doubt that Sweden wants to support Uganda, but less clear that “The perspective of poor people on development and a rights perspective that places the individual’s freedom and human rights at the center” (Guidelines for result strategies) has steered the formulation of the strategy.

To what extent was the strategy process informed by evaluations and studies? Several programme and project evaluations were carried out in the 2009-2013 period, but no overall evaluation of the relevance and effectiveness of the country strategy – assessing to what extent the strategic objectives were relevant and had been achieved.<sup>14</sup> This was a missed opportunity for identifying lessons learned and inform the new strategy. The aid agencies particular accountability dilemma (explained in chapter 2.2.) may illustrate the problem. The Embassies are first and foremost accountable to those providing the funds and not those receiving their services. They have no power to demand accountability and evaluations.

There is a description and analysis of sector/thematic trends in the background document, but it is relatively brief – since the document covers all sectors combining description/assessment and future plans. Several other studies were carried out of the political context, current conflicts, gender and equity, climate and environment, public financial managements, corruption, donor mapping, etc. However, the most detailed preparatory/analytical work was linked to the preparation of individual programmes and projects (e.g. appraisals). The strategy presents broad sector/thematic objectives while the projects set out to solve specific and more clearly defined problems.

How much preparatory work should be done with what level of details? The background document is relevant, but brief and broad. It is difficult to find data and information for understanding and analysing the nature of poverty, how the strategy could address poverty issues and identify policy

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<sup>14</sup> Sida questions the value of an external country evaluation. The Embassy is responsible for synthesising information from all evaluations – which they find sufficient. However, such evaluations focus on individual projects and programmes and not the relevance and achievement of the overall strategic objectives.

priorities for poverty reduction and that lessons from poverty reduction interventions were collected to strengthen feedback loops and improve the effectiveness of country strategies and programmes. The Embassy considered the level of preparatory work sufficient.

Starting with a Theory of Change workshop, there was a process for operationalising the strategy and an operational plan was developed by the Embassy. Significant efforts were devoted to preparing programmes and projects. The analysis of a sample of projects describes the needs and context analysis for nine out of eleven projects as “good” and only one “basic”. Six projects had either “good” or “strong” assessments of institutional capacity, which indicate that the projects are well prepared and grounded in country realities. We reviewed also a small sample of recent appraisals.<sup>15</sup> They all assess briefly strategic relevance, but discussed mainly other specific aspects of the interventions.

*The objectives provide broad guidance, are complex, ambitious and it is not possible to measure the Swedish contributions to the strategic objectives.*

The next hypothesis focuses on the content and characteristics of the strategy. The strategy provides deliberately broad guidance. The strategy has a rights- and poverty perspective. It contains selected thematic priorities, but without a strong overall objective. From one perspective, the strategy appears as an amalgamation of thematic priorities and objectives reflecting overall Swedish aid priorities. Maybe this is what it should be – leaving the Embassy with considerable flexibility to interpret and operationalise the strategy? This is also what the Embassy does. A workshop was organised for operationalising the strategy and more detailed planned took place within each thematic area. The country context is in rapid flux. Broad objectives provide the Embassy with opportunities to contextualise the strategy and adjust rapidly to changing contexts.

However, this is not the intention according to the government guidelines for results strategies. The guidelines provides the Embassy with clear directives. The strategy should state what strategic results Swedish aid is expected to contribute to within each thematic area during a certain period, while the main significance of the strategy is to define priority themes, the preferred modality of work and total budget. The strategy is also a basis for reporting. The Embassy is supposed to report on the achievement of strategic results.

The strategy is not complex in the sense that it is difficult to understand, but all the objectives and expected results are complex and difficult to achieve, such as strengthened democracy, greater respect for human rights, improved basic health, economic growth and freedom from violence. It is an ambitious plan with broad national objectives.

According to the government guidelines, the strategy should have performance indicators for each of the strategic objectives in order to assess and document progress and results at the strategic/thematic/sector level. This is based on two assumptions: That all interventions in a thematic area contribute to the same overall objective and that it is possible to find, collect and aggregate data for the same indicators for all projects. This is questionable on both counts.

There is a broad range of projects with different objectives in each sector programme. The strategic objective serves as headings (used by the Embassy) for a collection of more or less connected interventions. This is possibly also what it should or could be. It would be difficult for the Embassy to impose a set of shared indicators for all projects in order to “add up” and assess the achievement of the Swedish strategic objectives.<sup>16</sup> This is not what the Embassy does either. Partners and projects precede in most cases the strategy. Programme Officers at the Embassy search for projects that will be in line with the strategy. The programme/project portfolio is crafted to fit the strategy – not the other way around.

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<sup>15</sup> Appraisals of HIVOS Freedom of Expression in Uganda (2016), Diakonia Uganda 2015-2018 and aBi Trust 2015-2018.

<sup>16</sup> This is also true for most of the programmes such as for instance the Democratic Governance Facility. DGF provides financial support to more than 80 independent partners. There are certain common performance indicators for all partners and projects, but they don't adequately reflect actual results.

It is interesting to note the difference between the strategy and individual projects. The project analysis found that project objectives were clear and realistic (9 either to some and large extent) while 9 of the interventions were considered either complex or very complex.

The annual strategic reports provide a broad qualitative assessment of to what extent the Swedish contributions have been effective with reference to national level data. In line with the Results Matrix, the Embassy is supposed to assess to what extent the Swedish country programme is relevant and contribute to national sector objectives (e.g. maternal mortality, HIV infections, enrolment rates, economic growth, etc.). The reference to aggregate data is informative, but only in exceptional cases can changes in such indicators be attributed to Swedish contributions, because they are small and part of a broad web of external factors.

In other words, the discussion in chapter 2 of the politics of evidence and results is relevant (Eyben 2015). The government guidelines is largely predicated on a linear cause and effect thinking. Log frames should be used for mapping out how resources and activities will contribute to achieving strategic objectives based to a large extent on quantifiable indicators for measuring progress (see chapter 4.3).

The average annual Swedish contribution between 1998 and 2014 was 308 Mill SEK – with a top of 462 Mill SEK in 2006. This is the approximate cost for building a medium sized bridge in Scandinavia while in Uganda it is supposed to strengthen democracy, increase employment, improve basic health, safeguard human security and take into consideration cross cutting concerns such as discrimination of marginalised groups, gender equality, gender based violence, civil society, social safety nets, tax reform, vocational training and women enterprise, results based financing and institutional cooperation, etc. The Embassy argues that the Swedish contribution may be small, but that it has been strategic and catalytic – creating opportunities for wider results beyond the relatively small interventions. This is an interesting and relevant argument, but would require an evaluation and documentation of to what extent such catalytic effects can be found.

Easterly's (2006) critique of "utopian planning" is pertinent. He is challenging Swedish aid to "get real". Setting a prefixed and large goal may not be effective because there is no reason to assume that the goal is attainable at a reasonable cost with the available means. "As you cannot do what you want. Want what you can do". The alternative is to have fewer and simpler objectives. "If the aid business were not so beguiled by utopian visions, it could address a set of more realistic problems for which it has evidence of a workable solution". On the other hand, clear and specific objectives reduce flexibility and the opportunity to adjust wider objectives.

*The strategy has primarily served to legitimise rather than reorient practice.*

This hypothesis is zooming in on the links between policy intent and practice. Looking at the entire period of development cooperation between Sweden and Uganda, the prominent feature is the permanence of Swedish aid objectives. The objectives have more or less remained the same despite changing formulations and move from sector to thematic priorities. However, modalities and methods of work have changed. Agriculture, water and sanitation and banking services have been cut, but not as a result of a new strategy. The strategy has been used to legitimise rather than reorient practice. The objectives are also sufficiently broad to allow flexible use of resources. This is in line with the discussion in Chapter 2.2. explaining that donor policies tend to be interpretable in multiple and at times contradictory ways since they serve several purposes and constituencies with often conflicting interests and requirements.

The strategy provides clear guidance on selection of partners: Working with the state should be avoided as far as possible because of corruption and violation of human rights. However, the practice of not working with state partners does not originate from the strategy. The strategy legitimises the Swedish Government's decision and reinforces Embassy and other donor practices in Uganda. As such, it is useful in discussion with the Ugandan Government. It places the responsibility at a higher level – in Sweden.

Maybe a broad and flexible strategy is the optimal solution for the Embassy? The problems are twofold: The strategy is perceived and presented as something else by MFA – as a results strategy – providing direction, setting targets and serving as a basis for measuring and reporting on results. The Embassy has every year to report on “strategic results” achieved during the year.

A question is to what extent the results strategy represents a unified country programme with a set of mutually reinforcing projects and clear indicators against which to judge performance and impact for the individual interventions and the entire programme? As already discussed, it is probably better characterised as a package of interventions linked together and clustered around thematic priorities and objectives. It is possible to assess the relevance and efficiency of such a programme, but it is much more difficult to judge the wider or aggregate impact.

As discussed in Chapter 2.2., it is relevant to ask to what extent policy remains recognisable as it passes through the different organisational levels and networks. The policy maker and the spending staff become increasingly disconnected as the agency is growing and with the two living in different countries (Easterly 2006). However, the answer is yes. It is recognisable, but at a very high level.

*The strategy is in line with principles in the Paris Declaration (national ownership, harmonisation and alignment).*

Several donors have linked the aid effectiveness discussion to implementation of the Paris Declaration principles. This is in reality a discussion of internal factors to aid effectiveness. The Government guidelines for result strategies emphasises that the country strategies should be based on principles in the Paris Declaration and Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation. There is no reference to ownership in the results strategy, but to harmonisation: “Sweden’s aim is to work towards coherent and effective aid coordination, above all by means of active participation in the EU’s aid coordination and joint programming”. In the Annual Plan for 2015, it is stated “Busan principles with focus on results, ownership, accountability and innovation will steer the formulation of the implementation of the portfolio”. As such, the strategy is in line with principles of donor coordination and alignment with government systems and procedures.

In reality, the picture is more complex both in terms of harmonisation and alignment. The results strategy states that: “Sida can use cooperation partners and structures which most effectively contribute to attainment of sustainable results. Given that the human rights situation has deteriorated and corruption is still widespread, the possibilities for cooperation with the state are limited. Sida should identify agents for change who can contribute to a positive development in line with expected results. By supporting agents of change in civil society and business who are pushing for reform ... aid should be structured so as to support those working to promote political and civil rights”.

The share of funding to CSOs is expected to increase from 65% in 2015 to 77% in 2018. Private sector will change from 17% to 12%, multilaterals from 14% to 8% and public sector from 4% to 3%. Cooperation with the State is and will be even more reduced. In 2015 - except for research cooperation, the Embassy has no contractual agreements with government entities for implementation of projects. Most of Swedish funds are and will increasingly be channelled through Ugandan civil society organisations and private sector – expected to create the sustainable and effective results on the ground, but also in terms of democratic development and human rights.

Commitment to and ownership have been identified as centrally important for aid to be effective, at the project level and more widely. Ownership also includes control over and accountability for implementation. The principle of ownership has also been strongly supported in Swedish aid cooperation. The current strategy is in conflict with the principle of national ownership, when this is understood as government ownership and leadership of the development policies and processes. The Government of Sweden has decided to avoid working with and through the Ugandan government because of state corruption and human rights violations. The Embassy argues that the Busan principles used the term country ownership and included civil society and private sector. From that perspective, country ownership by the private and voluntary sectors remains high.

The move from public to civil/private implementing partners is in line with what other donors do. However, there are lingering questions – all requiring further analysis: Are the expectations to what can be achieved through civil society and private sector for that matter “inflated” and too ambitious? Will the results achieved through CSOs remain relatively small and localised (limited numerical and geographic coverage)? Can any impact on sector performance and thematic objectives be expected – in other words can civil society be the only instrument for achieving the results in the Swedish country strategy as it is now formulated? Is a high number of CSOs available with sufficient competence and capacity – acting as agents of change? What are the potential negative effects of the massive funding of civil society? Sweden has always funded civil society, but for how long can the main volume of bilateral funds from the Embassy be channelled to non-state actors?

It is interesting to note that in the new agreement for Bilateral Research Cooperation Uganda 2015-20 (Appraisal 2015), the Ministry of Finance is the contractual partner, while all funds go directly to the university – an exception to the restriction on state-to-state cooperation in the Swedish country strategy – which is specifically expressed and approved by the Swedish Government. When the Embassy works directly with the Universities, it is because of their perceived institutional capacity and ownership.

“Sweden shall sign a General Agreement with the Uganda Ministry of Finance which is an exchange of information regarding the sum and the scope of the program referring the Specific Agreement. This state-to-state agreement is in line with the exemption to research collaboration with Uganda made by the Swedish government. State-to-state collaboration in other areas is restricted, as per the Uganda Strategy for Bilateral Development Cooperation to Uganda 2014 -2018” (Appraisal 2015).

The project analysis showed a mixed picture on country ownership and participation indicating a relatively high level of donor involvement in project identification and formulation, but such findings would also need further study. The formulation of 6 projects were “donor led” while 4 “co-led”. 5 projects were built on no or limited demands from the partner institution while 5 were based on clear demands. The ownership to the plan from the partner institution was characterised as limited or absent in 6 projects and strong in 4. The alignment with local/partner reporting systems and procedures was found “weak” in 4 projects, “medium” in 5 and “strong” in 2. The alignment with social and cultural factors was considered “strong” in most projects as well as the alignment with the political context.

## 4.2. Aid management and modalities

*Sweden has not pursued “universal blueprint planning approaches”, but adopted more incremental, contextually adapted approaches.*

The hypothesis is based on the assumption that an incremental, small step approach is the most effective for achieving results in a country such as Uganda. We argued in the previous section that the strategy presented an ambitious and complex plan. It is presented as a coherent programme in which the different parts support and contribute to a set of overall objectives. Results should be identified and measured for each strategic objective according to the Government guidelines for result strategies. We argued that it is not such a plan or programme. The strategy provides a structure for organising and categorising a broad and diverse project portfolio and is not a “blue print plan” for Swedish support to Uganda. The strategy offers a framework for selecting partners in priority thematic areas and modalities of work. The operationalisation of the strategy takes place in consultations between the Embassy and Sida. Priorities and partners are selected on the basis of assessments of what results can be achieved, what areas are underserved and where there are potential for synergies.

The planning of programmes and projects can be described as incremental, contextually sensitive and careful. The Embassy through its Programme Officers has pragmatically searched for competent partners within the priority thematic areas including a process of consultation, planning and appraisal. The appraisal documents explain planning processes and provide a summary of the assessment of relevance, capacities, results and risks.

Chapter 2.2. argued that Sweden has used to be perceived as a flexible and innovative donor giving leeway to programme officers to develop activities according to local needs, but that both Sida and Embassies have changed and become more risk averse avoiding or at least reducing the level of innovation and experimentation due to extensive corruption and a constraining political environment. This is a complex issue requiring further investigation. An alternative interpretation is that the current difficult and volatile situation in Uganda in itself requires acceptance of a high level of risk and that achievement of results in such a context is inherently uncertain and unpredictable.

*There has been no push towards rapid up scaling and acceptance of large volumes of funding of particular Swedish priorities.*

This hypothesis looks at the links between funding and aid effectiveness. The total level of funding to Uganda has remained relatively stable even if certain thematic areas and projects have been phased out. Stability and predictability characterise the portfolio, more than large and sudden changes. Sweden has favoured a number of thematic priorities without rapid changes in line with Swedish priorities.

Donors have been criticised for being “money spending bureaucracies” – creating projects by departments and staff anxious to keep themselves in existence and show the ability to spend – or “move money”. Another study suggested that Sida Desk Officers feel strong pressure to disburse allocated budgets efficiently and that disbursement rates were carefully monitored by Heads of Department (Ostrom 2002). This may be true at Embassy level, but it is not the same as a push towards rapid upscaling of particular priorities. We did not find evidence of any push to spend money or upscaling, but this question would also require more in depth study.

Why is this relevant to discuss? It concerns the quality and relevance of contextual planning. A number of macroeconomic studies have shown that the more aid a country receives, the more likely it is that the additional amounts will be used less and less effectively. As the volume of aid increases, its marginal utility declines. Eventually the point will be reached – termed the absorptive capacity threshold – when providing more aid will be totally ineffective (Riddell 2007). The pattern of Swedish support to Uganda (Annex 5) does not reflect examples of such rapid upscaling, but there are examples of significant downscaling and phasing out.

*There has been a development towards more off budget project aid and less on budget programme/sector support, more control/donor involvement and less national ownership and alignment.*

This hypothesis follows on the discussion of the Paris Declaration principles focusing on alignment to systems and procedures. The Government of Uganda has ranked its preference for the various modalities of donor support as: General budget support, sector budget support and project aid (Government of Uganda 2010). Uganda used to be a showcase for general budget and sector support. For Sweden, previous non-earmarked budget support came to a halt already from 2005. Most of the support is now provided in the form of programmes and projects. Programmes are in principle of two kinds: (a) With pooled funding mechanisms managed by the government and (b) managed outside the government. All programmes in the current portfolio are managed outside the government – except for the research cooperation with Makerere University. According to OECD statistics (stats.oecd.org), Sweden has a government partner for research, scholarships and capacity development in the Office of the Auditor General.<sup>17</sup> The declining use of Government channels is also true for other bilateral donors, but countries such as Denmark, Japan and US provide more funds to the Government than Sweden (stats.oecd.org).

There are three principal ways of disbursing ODA: (a) Through the country treasury, (b) as cash to the recipient country institution and (c) managed by the donor itself or be disbursed to a contracted third party (CSO or consultancy firm). Sweden follows the second option. No funds are currently channelled through the Treasury and the Embassy does not practice any self-implementation. The Embassy channels funds to joint projects with other bilateral donors, to Swedish CSOs and multilateral agencies. This is seen as part of option 2, but could be defined as a separate channel.

A recent study of how donors use country systems (Cabri 2014), found there was a greater willingness and momentum towards increased use of country systems evidenced by data from the Paris Declaration Survey of 2005, while data from the 2014 Global Partnership Monitoring Report show a declining commitment in Africa. This is certainly true for Uganda - where general budget and sector support was significantly used ten years ago.

There are many potential benefits to using country systems, such as improved alignment with partner country policies, increased country ownership and domestic accountability, and strengthened systems, including a more stable macroeconomic framework and higher efficiency in public expenditure. It has also been argued that using country systems also leads to greater potential for overall impact, improved coordination, increased predictability and sustainability of donor programmes, as well as lower transaction costs for ODA. On the other hand, the Paris Declaration commitments largely focus on aid modalities that are assumed, but not proven to deliver better development outcomes in empirical studies (Stern 2008). Neither is application of the principles in high-risk countries (with high levels of corruption and human rights violation) sufficiently discussed and understood. The majority of donors in Uganda would argue that direct funding of government partners would reduce aid effectiveness and should be avoided.

*Embassy staff spend more time managing funds meeting internal bureaucratic requirements, than in strategic discussion with partners, creating and maintaining relationships up, down and across the aid chain. After partners and programmes are decided, the Embassy is less involved in implementation.*

This hypothesis is concerned with the quality and quantity of interrelationships between the donor and the recipient as they are supported and constrained by bureaucratic requirements. It is not about the motivation and interest of individual staff. We have no real basis for testing these two hypotheses. It would have required a longitudinal study of interactions and behaviour of donors and partners. Based on experience from other donors and modern bureaucracies in Scandinavia, it would be surprising if the hypotheses did not capture real and increasing challenges. The effects of public new

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<sup>17</sup> There could be other Swedish actors using aid allocations outside the country strategy, but we have not been able to trace those contributions.

management practices also affect donor agencies. The arguments are that staff have to spend an increasing amount of time filling in forms, preparing reports, checking funds – meeting internal bureaucratic requirements and upward accountability and less on professional dialogue, strategic discussions in regular interactions with clients, partners and projects.

As discussed in Chapter 2.2, bounded professional discretion influence aid effectiveness, i.e. when those staff closest to the problems have room for creativity and experimentation results are better. The question is to what extent Embassy staff is able to benefit from relative independence in the complex and often uncertain aid environment or if he/she is increasingly stripped for such professional discretion.

Chapter 3 argues that it is the quality of relationships in and between organisations in the web of aid that is crucial for determining donor performance. Processes and building relationships must not only be seen as a transaction cost undermining efficiency, but as factors promoting learning and performance. According to Eyben (2006), donors should invest more time in their relationships up, down and across the aid chain as they spend in managing their money. This does not imply that the relations will become harmonious, but tensions can be productive or at least not destructive, if they are managed well.

It is relevant to know more about how donor staff is managing the conflict between aid principles such as increased ownership and participation and demands for accountability. While donor programme/policy staff may be committed to downward accountability, networking, innovation and empowerment, their time and capacity are often absorbed by administrative and financial control. Financial management staff are more directly bound by systems of regulating financial procedures that are applied with increasing rigour as the money passes down the aid chain. In a relational approach, Embassy staff would need to test the quality of relationships through iterative feedback, reflection and change.

The feedback from the project analysis and selected interviews were mixed when it comes to level and quality of interactions between embassy and partners. The project analysis found that the involvement of Embassy staff had provided strategic and technical support in the majority of the projects in the preparation phase (in line with the assumption of stronger donor involvement during the preparation phase), but the involvement was less during implementation (8 minimal and 2 important). Swedish partners were involved in three projects and their technical contributions were considered “significant and continuous”. In all projects, Sweden was found to be a trustworthy and predictable donor.

A major NGO partner to the Embassy explained that altogether four evaluations/assessments and audits had been carried out during one year absorbing a lot of resources and leaving less time for strategic reflection and discussion. It is interesting to note that when the Embassy provides support to broader programmes managed by other agencies (e.g. DGF), they are relieved from extensive bureaucratic planning and reporting requirements and participate in strategic discussion and decisions in joint steering groups.

*Level of funding (of the country programmes and programmes/projects) has been stable and predictable.*

The premise for this hypothesis is that long-term predictable funding is an important factor for achievement of results. A number of studies have shown that the effectiveness of aid has been reduced as a consequence of its volatility. More specifically, it has been showed that aid inflows often fluctuate considerably year on year, and that the volatility of aid inflow is often marked in poor countries, which plan expenditures on the basis of aid commitments (Riddell 2007). Most of the Swedish aid objectives entail comprehensive long-term efforts. Partners with the ability to pursue a long-term plan with the help of predictable funding are more likely to achieve better results than organisations with short, one-off funding.

Several evaluations commend Sweden for being a trustworthy and predictable donor country. Several of the projects have been of long duration. The research cooperation with Makerere University



starting already in 2000 is a prominent example. The investment in human resources and building managerial capacity has to a large extent also been successful.

The suspension of general budget support, the health sector programme and other government projects are not examples of weak predictability, since there were special reasons for those changes.

*The country programme portfolio has been more concentrated with fewer and larger contributions.*

The hypothesis is concerned with the level of concentration versus fragmentation of the country programme portfolio. An Embassy Memo (April 2011) stated that the country portfolio had been more concentrated with “fewer and larger contributions, which in most cases are planned and implemented together with other donors”.

It is inherently difficult to count “interventions” partly because they are extremely heterogeneous. It would also require a clear definition of the “unit of analysis”. Looking at the total annual budgets and number of activities per year between 1998 and 2014 (data from [openaid.se](http://openaid.se))<sup>18</sup>, the average number of activities was 146 and disbursement per activity 2.2 Mill SEK. Number of activities have not changed dramatically and hovered around 146. The average amount available per activity increased from 2005, but has later (from 2013) been reduced. Those figures reflect a high level of fragmentation. However, those figures are misleading because they include all organisations and channels of support (public sector, multilateral organisations, civil society, private sector etc.) – not only support channelled through the Embassy and covered by the country strategy.

Looking at the number of projects supported in each sector directly by the Embassy (see Annex 3), the number of programmes and projects has been reduced from 30 in 2010 to 13 in 2015. These numbers are mainly linked to contractual arrangements and reflect how many partners the Embassy deals with.

Sectors	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Health	3	5	6	6	7	6	6
Public mgt., democracy, HR, gender	9	14	11	10	6	7	4
Research coop.	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Private sector	8	8	5	5	6	5	2
Peace and security	2	2	2	2	1	0	0
	23	30	25	24	21	19	13

*Table 3: Overview of number of interventions in each thematic area between 2009 and 2015*

However, those figures are also misleading when looking for how many contributions are included in the country programme portfolio and for assessing level of fragmentation. Budget and sector support has been cut leading to an increase in number of freestanding contributions. On the other hand, Sweden supports several new joint donor programmes – which are large programmes consisting of multiple projects and implementing partners. In other words, DGF is counted as one intervention, but consists of a large number of projects. Research cooperation is listed as one contribution while it consists of a large number of sub projects. If all contributions were counted, the number would be much higher. The major challenge is to define and agree on what constitutes and should be counted as a “contribution”. Then the level of fragmentation can be assessed.

Research cooperation is not included in the results strategy, since it is governed by another global strategy for research. There are logical internal reasons in Swedish aid for omitting a major component from the country strategy, but in our view it makes less sense and may contribute to fragmentation. It could be argued that the Embassy should be able to present and report on its entire portfolio for the

<sup>18</sup> Activities are the same as programmes/projects listed in [openaid.se](http://openaid.se) for each year.

sake of transparency and consistency (having one country plan and report), but also for supporting linkages and synergies within a country programme, e.g. between health research and other health interventions.

### 4.3. Learning and feedback loops

*Sweden has responded and adjusted its country programme to evolving contextual circumstances.*

The hypothesis is concerned with on-going adjustment of the country programme after the strategy was decided. The Embassy continuously monitors the country programme in Uganda including the political and socio-economic context. There are basically two types of reporting. At the strategic and programme/project level, the Embassy prepares annual strategic reports assessing to what extent the results meet agreed targets in the results strategy. There is a list of standard indicators and also other complementary indicators. At the level of projects, the Embassy prepares Annual Reports about results based on project specific indicators. This is part of Sida's project management system (TRAC). The annual reports are used to signal adjustments of the country portfolio – phase out sectors (e.g. water&sanitation and energy), general budget support and change of health sector to project based support. The level of humanitarian support has also varied according to needs. There have also been changes at the project level – projects have been phased out and others have been included. However, the striking feature is the stability and significant funding of the four thematic areas: health, democracy and human rights, private sector development and research cooperation.

At Headquarter level, one or two consultations are held each year between MFA and Sida. The aim of these consultations is to create a consensus between the MFA and Sida on the conditions for the strategy's implementation and results. As background material to one of the consultations, Sida draws up an overview report aimed at reporting on how efforts to achieve the desired results are progressing. Towards the end of the strategy period, Sida prepares an in-depth report to provide MFA with material for future political considerations. The report contains a description and an assessment of results in relation to expected results in the strategy (see chapter 3.3). The report also contains an analysis of the extent to which the expected results have been achieved. When the strategy has expired, a final report is drawn up. The final report builds on the in-depth report and concludes the reasoning and analyses. The last hypothesis in this sub chapter discusses the limitations and constraints in the current reporting system – the tension and to some extent mismatch between expected macro objectives and lower level project achievements.

In other words, the mechanisms are in place for monitoring and reporting, but another question is to what extent the mechanisms have been used to adjust the country programme to evolving contextual circumstances. As discussed already, there have not been any major changes in thematic/sector priorities, but more in the composition of projects and selection of implementing partners and methods. Whether this happened as a result of the formal monitoring and evaluation systems are difficult to determine. The changes are easier to trace for projects and the project analysis confirmed that all the projects had made small or major changes as result of reviews and evaluations.

*There is weak direct feedback from users/direct beneficiaries of aid for modifying practices.*

The hypothesis looks at the feedback and learning mechanisms and their importance for improving performance. This is based on the assumption that critical reflection and adjustment based on continuous feedback from users/beneficiaries are critical for improving aid effectiveness. The annual strategic report is an internal document prepared by Embassy staff. There is no reference to meetings and consultations with external partners, but other reports and interviews verify that they have taken place. Embassy staff goes on field visits to discuss with partners and supervise projects – one to three times a year. There is also feedback from users/direct beneficiaries in some of the mid-term reviews and evaluations, e.g. the participatory evaluation of the Diakonia Country Programme (Diakonia 2014), but this is project specific feedback – not on the strategy as such.

It will require further study, but since the Embassy is formally accountable to MFA/Sida HQ, feedback and interactive learning with partners and ultimate beneficiaries may suffer – due to constraints on time. The theoretical argument (chapter 2.2.) refers to the fact that the ultimate principal for a donor agency remains is domestic audiences, and these must be satisfied even if they often are the worst placed to monitor and understand geographically disbursed development work.

There is obviously no absolute standard for how much direct feedback that is adequate and sufficient. There is also a trade-off for programme staff between multiple and at times conflicting tasks. The interesting question is how those trade-offs are managed in order to increase level and quality of direct feedback.

*Most programme/project plans have a log-frame (and meta-theory) based on certainty, rationality, predictability and cause and effect linkages contrary to notions of complexity and ambiguity – multiple causes, multiple effects and multiple solutions.*

The underlying question is what results are counted as results and how. It is not a formal requirement that all programmes and projects should have a log-frame, but most of them do. There is no evidence to suggest that more complex objectives and interventions have been “crowded out” for tangible service-delivery projects – discussed in more detail later. Rather the opposite has happened. There is an explicit rights-orientation in the strategy and the objectives cover human rights, democracy, gender equality, poverty reduction, etc. – all long-term complex objectives. The same is reflected in the selection of partners and projects. On the other hand, it could be argued that the strategy is unrealistic – providing a simplified theory of change for complex challenges. The “big” question is to what extent the interventions lead to the expected outcomes and impact. There is an implicit theory of change (ToC) in the strategy document, while more detailed ones for each thematic area. The TOC for private sector (From Farm to Fork), presents a comprehensive picture with three overall outcomes: (a) Strengthened competitiveness among producers and suppliers of goods and services, (b) Increased productive employment opportunities for women and young people and (c) Increased access to and control of productive resources for women. The likely contribution and causal links between the projects and those outcomes are so far not tested through systematic evaluations.

The formal RBM tools can be found at project level. The project analysis found that 8 projects had a “basic” intervention logic, 2 a “good” logic and only 1 had no information. In 7 projects results were “specific” while in 4 it was “missing” or “limited. 7 projects had clear and measurable indicators while 4 projects had “limited” or “no” indicators.

*Results-based management crowds out intangible results.*

The backdrop for the hypothesis is the tension between rights-based strategies with intangible goals such as empowerment and results-based management focusing on tangible measurable results (Eyben 2015). The questions are: To what extent the focus on results has crowded out less measurable activities? Is it harder for Sweden to support transformational approaches when the Embassy is required to report quantifiable, easy-to-measure results? Is there any evidence that this has led to a greater emphasis on service delivery instead of capacity development and policy reform as the predominant programmatic approach to development? Has extensive use of “log frames” led to regressive learning, which occurs when a recipient “learns the ropes” and changes its own values and ways of working so as to respond to the requirements of the donor?

Another set of questions are to what extent increased demands for results has influenced the relations between development partners: from a development cooperation that should be owned and driven by partner countries, towards one where the results are to be measured against, and attributed to donors development objectives?

This explorative study has not been able answer all those questions. The results strategy is clearly founded on results based management principles. It states what Swedish aid is expected to achieve. Results are to be quantified wherever possible. The contributions should be attributed to one of the strategy’s expected results. A number of indicators and baselines should be prepared for measuring results (see chapter 2.2.) On the other hand, the strategy states that the perspective of poor people on

development and a rights perspective that places the individual's freedom and human rights at the center should be applied. Swedish aid must also be flexible enough to be adapted to various contexts and rapid changes. Two of the priority thematic areas are rights-based and the rights perspective is a cross cutting perspective to be included in all projects.

Hence, the Embassy is placed in a tension between the rights- and results agenda (Vähämäki 2015). There is also awareness around such tensions. The established results matrix has so far only quantitative indicators, but the need to set up a "qualitative framework for monitoring the progress at impact and outcome levels" was recognised (Report from ToC workshop 2014). The Embassy decided to elaborate qualitative outcomes, using the outcome mapping technique and design complementary monitoring systems. We have not seen and been able to review those systems.

*There is no systematic evaluation plan and evaluation of the country strategy.*

This hypothesis is also concerned with learning and feedback mechanisms. In the Annual Implementation Plan for Uganda 2015, one evaluation is referred to: Evaluation of Diakonia Uganda Programme 2008-2013. An internal mid-term review of the country strategy was planned and carried out in 2011, but it is a brief review. It is a short document concluding that the strategy is still relevant and should focus more on change agents and civil society with some minor changes in sector allocations. However, the Embassy has commented that this review is a summary of several other reports. An Embassy Memo (2011) is a more comprehensive report than the mid-term review on to what extent "we are moving in the right direction with our contribution portfolio". We have not been able to find an evaluation plan linked to the country strategy. Several reviews and evaluations have been carried out as part of programme/project requirements. The assessment and feedback (learning) have mainly focused on individual programmes and projects.

The project analysis confirmed that M&E systems are more elaborate at the project than the strategy level. The analysis found that most projects had a "clear M&E system" (7) while the other were found "limited". In 9 projects "several" reviews or evaluations were carried out. In other words, there has been a strong evaluation practice at programme and project level.

*There is little and to a large extent undocumented data and information on outcomes and impact of strategic objectives and programmes – making it difficult to make informed strategic decisions.*

This hypothesis is concerned with the relationship between expected results and what gets measured as results. A Results Matrix was prepared for the 2009-2013 strategy period with national and sector indicators and sources of information. The indicators are general indicators not specifically linked to Swedish contributions, such as: Percentage of population below national poverty line; Real GDP growth; Increased support for democracy among Ugandans; Government effectiveness; Decrease in number of human rights abuses; Reduced corruption; Infant mortality rate and Private sector investments as % of GDP.

The annual strategy reports provide brief and general overviews of national and sector trends, while the indicators from the Results Matrix is not systematically used. The democratisation process was in 2009 explained as: "Quantitatively, there is a multiparty system of governance in Uganda, but qualitatively, process and outcomes remain poor, making the net gain on this benchmark marginal". "The human rights situation remains poor, with indications of worsening conditions in some areas". "Child mortality rates are far from target". At the end of the report, the results from a selection of "Sida contributions" are presented, but mostly activities and outputs such as a regional conference completed, publication of a Parliamentary scorecard, young people counselled and tested, number of PhD students, etc. In an Embassy Memo (April 2011), the problems with measuring results at macro-level is recognised, but it is not clear whether such reporting is considered feasible and desirable.

The matrix indicators provide useful and necessary background information on sector situation and trends, but they don't measure Sida's or the project performance. What is missing is data and information on results from Sida supported projects (at outcome level) – over and above statements such as: "research infrastructure continues to be strengthened", "The support to private sector has

contributed to market development” and “Research and research training has been strengthened at Makerere University”.

It is acknowledged that Sida’s support to the human rights sector “is composed of a number of comparatively small, but strategic projects and programmes (Embassy of Sweden: Sweden’s development cooperation with Uganda 2010). This brings in another perspective on results: There is not necessarily a proportional relation between volume of support and effects. It is the catalytic power of a few strategic projects that could make a difference, but the argument is not developed further in the report. At the end, such an assumption about catalytic interventions and results would need to be carefully tested and documented.

As such, we don’t know much about the achievements of Swedish long-term strategic objectives from the annual reports. On the other hand, we have a lot of information about individual projects and a majority seems to achieve their immediate objectives (based on findings from reviews and evaluations). However, the question “Does Swedish aid to Uganda work” cannot be answered simply by trying to find out if a collection of projects has achieved their immediate objectives. This is necessary, but by no means sufficient. Deeper and more complex questions have to be asked. The key question is whether aid contributes to the achievement of wider development objectives. It not only requires data and information about the projects, but also linking the outputs of the projects to the underlying purpose of the project and the ability to judge how the immediate benefits of the project influence wider outcomes and strategic objectives.

To what extent is this feasible? Many evaluators have been unwilling to comment on the wider sectoral impact of the aid provided – what difference a donor’s education or health projects have made to the education or health sector overall. Many have been reluctant to link directly the overall contribution of a particular aid programme to the country’s aggregate growth performance, or to its poverty reduction achievements (Riddell 2007). Reasons are obvious: The causal pathways are too long, the confounding factors too many and the projects too small or isolated.

The final evaluation of the Diakonia programme: Making Human Rights (Holmberg 2015) provides an example of how and what an evaluation evaluates. The evaluation adopted a participatory approach including a desk study, individual and group interviews using the “Most Significant Change” approach. The programme was found to be relevant both to the local and national context and to the Swedish cooperation strategy with Uganda. The partners show “interesting results particularly at local level for specific right-holders and duty bearers.... The programme has been able to introduce several important changes at local level. Some of the most interesting outcomes are related to empowerment of women and girls and changed attitudes towards gender equality. However, the possibility to assess results at impact level has been limited”.

# CHAPTER 5: LESSONS LEARNED AND EMERGING CHALLENGES

This chapter presents first lessons learned pertaining to the first objective of the study – building a model for evaluating country level donor performance followed by emerging challenges from the explorative study of Swedish support to Uganda.

## 5.1. Lessons from the model building exercise

Donors such as Sida do not handle development problems directly, but allocate funds to partner organisations. They are intermediaries, they depend on allocation from above and must pass on the money to other levels of implementing organisations. As such, Sweden as a donor country can only indirectly influence achievement of results. It is the quality and effectiveness of implementing partners that matter most. The partners are also operating in an environment with a broad range of external factors promoting and hindering results to be achieved.

It matters how the donor provides aid – was the basic premise and is also the main message in this report. This is particularly true when results are created through partners. There is a complex causality chain linking external aid to final development outcomes, but donor behaviour is a key variable (See chart on page 2). Aid effectiveness rests also on the nature and quality of recipient – donor relationships. The challenge in this report has been to identify and analyse the most relevant internal factors in view of limitations in empirical data and information.

What are the lessons learned from the model building exercise and its explorative application to Swedish support in Uganda?

- The internal factors – factors shaped to a large extent by Sweden as a donor - have influenced aid effectiveness. Those factors represent aspects of aid management. They are managed and can consequently be changed and improved by Sweden.
- A set of internal factors linked to three processes was identified: Policy and programme development, aid management and implementation and learning and feedback loops. The number of internal factors is not exhaustive, but all the factors were discussed and found relevant – based on available evidence.
- The internal factors are contributory – not immediate causal factors determining aid effectiveness. They are part of a broader theory of change. In most cases, they play an indirect role in complex causal pathways. We have argued for their importance, but in most cases, it is not possible to prove and measure precisely their relative importance for aid effectiveness. The process of change is as mentioned complex and non-linear where even small factors may change the process and affect end results. What we have done is to build arguments why they play a role through an analysis of relevant literature and evidence from Uganda in line with principles of theory based evaluations.
- The internal factors are not only “internal”. They are also relational and will to a varying degree be shaped by country context and Ugandan counterparts. A donor can influence internal factors, but not control the results. The factors are formed in an interaction between two systems – the Swedish aid system and the Ugandan counterparts. What happens in these processes are the most interesting and in particular the balance between donor versus recipient influence of internal factors. Strategic planning and evaluations are for instance to a large extent managed and controlled by the donor, while programme and project planning are much more owned by the recipients. It seems that the Sweden has gradually taken more control of the donor - recipient interaction and hence the internal factors – for reasons discussed in the report.

- Some of the internal factors are also sensitive for a donor and difficult to assess due to limited data and conflicting perceptions, such as for instance of the quality and quantity of donor-partner interactions.
- The internal factors are not unique to Uganda, but are generic variables. As such, the same model and approach can be used in other countries as well even if the relative importance of each factor may vary. Future studies should broaden the perspective, include additional internal factors and cover the entire Swedish aid system – beyond the individual embassy and recipient country. In other words, to look at all systems and sub-systems between the Embassy and Sida/MFA. The division of responsibilities between MFA and Sida is for instance only mentioned briefly in this report. Future studies will also have to look carefully at interactions with implementing partners – since most of the internal factors are relational.
- A study of internal factors is necessary, but not sufficient for understanding and assessing performance. It does not cover and is not well suited to discuss and assess all OECD/DAC evaluation criteria such as cost-effectiveness and sustainability. When a country programme is evaluated other studies are also required including in depth assessment of achievements of results and the role and importance of external factors. Different types of studies should complement each other.
- This study fills a gap in the evaluation literature. There has been little attention on and analysis of internal factors as determinants of aid effectiveness in Swedish development cooperation with Uganda. Annual reports and other reports from the Embassy to Sida/MFA in Stockholm have mostly focused on external factors on the recipient side such as partner capacities and political and socio-economic contextual factors. There have been no strategic review or evaluation of the entire country programme – mechanisms to identify and assess such factors. Neither have programme and project evaluations discussed donor behaviour.
- The most critical internal factors can be found in the policy preparation and design phase – in the formulation and selection of policies, programmes, partners – and level of funding. Such factors are necessary, but not sufficient prerequisites for aid effectiveness.
- The aid management and modalities factors are also important – in particular the move towards more project support, the increased support channelled through civil society, the bureaucratization of aid relationships and level of focus/fragmentation.
- Finally, the learning and feedback loop factors play a more indirect role, but the understanding and methods for measurement and evaluation, determine what the results are – or more correctly – what results get measured and documented. The current results framework leads to underreporting of programme and project results due to its aggregate and high-level focus. It has not “crowded out” less tangible objectives and rights based approaches, but it has become more difficult to capture and report on their results.
- If similar studies should be carried out in the future, the approach ought to be broadened in level of participation, time and scope. To make the study more inductive and participatory, the Embassy should be more closely involved from the beginning in the identification of issues and hypotheses, collection of data and validation of findings. Data and information from interactive processes should also be collected over time as in formative research projects. Interactions “upwards” (to Sida HQ and MFA) and “downwards” (to partners and projects) should be included. We believe that external participation is necessary and useful to facilitate the process and ensure independent analysis and assessment.

## 5.2. Emerging challenges

OECD has summarized lessons from DAC peer reviews on donor behaviour and aid management (OECD: Effective Aid Management 2008). They argued that good donors should:

- Have a clear, top-level statement for the purpose of development cooperation that has a wide ownership and can remain relevant for a sufficient period.
- Avoid letting short-term pressures jeopardise the long-term common interest in effective development.
- Set a clear mandate and establish mechanisms to assure that policies are assessed for their impact on poor countries.
- Invest in delivering, measuring and communicating results of aid-financed activity.
- Task a sufficiently senior and publicly accountable figure with clear responsibility at the political level for the delivery of effective development cooperation.
- Rationalise bilateral aid structures to facilitate coherent action at country level.
- The decentralisation of responsibility to the field level can be beneficial, but it needs high-quality, lean supporting systems.
- Radical reforms in aid delivery will be vital as donors are forced to deliver more aid per head of agency staff, while increasing the effectiveness of this aid.
- Most DAC members should focus their assistance on fewer countries, fewer sectors and in particular, fewer activities.
- Develop a stronger culture of managing for results and align incentives accordingly, but in ways that promote, not weaken, local structures of accountability.
- Securing and developing well qualified, well-motivated local and expatriate staff essential for any agency to function effectively.

The findings from our study partly overlap and partly differ from the DAC lessons. The DAC lessons are all relevant, but very general. Insights from the research literature (chapter 2) and our analysis (chapter 4) question also the bureaucratic top-down logic implied in some of the findings. We believe it is necessary to go further into the internal organisational dynamics of the donor – recipient relationship looking at planning, management and evaluation processes.

Due to the explorative nature of this study, we limit ourselves at the end to present a number of emerging challenges and issues for Swedish aid authorities:

- **Strategy preparation and ownership:** There is a need to discuss the process of formulating the country strategy and what kind of strategy is required for what purpose. It is legitimate for a donor such as Sweden to define strategic “entry values” at the highest political level guiding the development cooperation with Uganda and as such go through an internal strategic clarification process. However, it is pertinent to discuss how the strategy development process could be more “bottom up” and country owned when it comes to the substance of a “results strategy” defining measurable objectives and targets. What does country ownership mean for a country strategy (process and product)? There seems to be a need for a more active involvement of and consultation with country partners and other donors. It would also be important to discuss what a “good” country strategy should look like and find an appropriate balance between clear direction and flexible adaptation.
- **Strategy formulation and evaluation:** The level and type of assessment preceding the preparation of the strategy should be reviewed. What is the right balance between too much and too little? There was no overall evaluation of the relevance of and results from the previous strategy period in



order to identify lessons learned and guide policy formulation. Such an evaluation could have covered internal factors. Most reviews and evaluations focus on individual projects and programmes – leaving out an assessment of relevance and results of strategic objectives. Important preparatory work was carried out, but systematic data and information for understanding and analysing the nature of poverty and identifying policy priorities for poverty reduction were missing.

- **Realism of the strategy:** The strategic objectives provide broad guidance, are complex, and ambitious given the modest level of resources available (average of 308 Mill SEK per year) and the limited selection of partners (mostly civil society and private sector entities). The relatively small contributions may have large catalytic effects, but such effects are so far not measured or well documented. The research cooperation programme with Makerere University is an example of successful long-term capacity building, while several other projects have a short time span (1-3 years). It should be discussed if the goals and strategies could be formulated differently – possibly with a brief introduction providing overall direction and more concrete sub-programmes. The current results strategy with indicators and targets at national and/or thematic levels is not optimal and lead to underreporting of actual results.
- **Coherence of country programme:** The nature of a country programme should be discussed. The results strategy is based on the assumption that all interventions contribute to the achievement of a few strategic objectives and that project data can be collected and used for measuring aggregate results at sector and national level. This is questionable for two reasons: The objectives for each project cover a broad spectrum of activities. It can also be argued that the country portfolio is more a collection of interventions clustered under a set of strategic objectives than a coherent country programme. The strategy has primarily served to legitimise rather than to reorient practice. The real planning has happened at project and programme level. This is not necessarily wrong. Programmes and project precede the strategy. The strategy should provide direction and be emerging, but it is problematic when all components are expected to be measured against national/thematic objectives and targets.
- **Report real results:** The Annual reports from the Embassy to Sida/MFA in Stockholm are based on the results strategy format and achievements are assessed against macro indicators and sector performance. As such, the results and achievements are modest – seen from a national and thematic/sector perspective. There is considerable evidence of significant short- and long-term results e.g. the research cooperation from evaluations of programmes and projects. The current results framework is guided and to some extent limited by a macro – national level format. The results framework is not in line with programme realities and how the Embassy works. An alternative more inductive approach – starting in the concrete interventions and trying to trace direct and indirect macro effects of Swedish contributions could provide more data and information on both micro- and macro results.
- **Compliance with Paris Declaration principles:** There is a need to define such principles consistently and explicitly discuss their limitations. The guidelines and strategy are based on Paris Declaration principles, but the Swedish Government has deliberately decided to avoid government partners and channels because of corruption and human rights violation. Civil society and private sector organisations are prioritised as contractual and implementing partners. This is justified as a short-term arrangement and is also in line with what most other donors do and the broader Busan principles including civil society and private sector in the concept of country ownership. The question is to what extent it is problematic for a bilateral donor as Sida – because it affects level of government ownership and the ability to achieve broader, long-term objectives – despite the value of strengthening ownership and participation of civil society and private sector. All the programmes and projects in the Swedish portfolio is currently managed and funded outside Government channels – as cash to the recipient country institutions. There is a need for a systematic assessment of current practice and discussion of future options for channelling Swedish aid.

- **The potential of civil society:** The share of funding to CSOs is expected to rise to 77% in 2018, while private sector will absorb 12%, multilaterals 8% and public sector only 3%. Civil society and private sector are significant actors in Uganda, but are expected to create sustainable and effective results on the ground and in areas of democratic governance and human rights. The questions are to what extent there are CSOs and private sector companies available with sufficient capacity and competence – acting as agents of change in society? Have studies been carried out to assess organisational capacities within those two sectors? Are there any negative effects in the massive increase of support to civil society from several donors? Is it realistic to reach the goals and objectives in the current strategy with no or minimal cooperation with the government?
- **Virtues of incremental, small step approaches:** It seems that the planning and implementation of programmes and projects can be described as incremental, contextually sensitive and careful. There is no evidence to suggest that there has been a push towards rapid up scaling and acceptance of large volumes of funding of particular Swedish priorities. There is considerable evidence of the Embassy practicing the virtues of “searchers” – looking for practical and implementable solutions.
- **Managing funds versus nurturing relationships:** The question is to what extent donor staff have to spend an increasing amount of time meeting internal bureaucratic requirements, as compared to creating and nurturing relationships up, down and across the aid chains. This is an important issue that will require further investigation. Even if donor staff are committed to downward accountability, networking, participation and empowerment, administrative and financial issues may increasingly absorb their time and capacity. Such developments are found in studies of modern bureaucracies reducing the quality and quantity of strategic and technical interaction with external partners. It would not be surprising if the same developments were found in donor agencies.
- **Discretionary power and experimentation:** The remit of Embassy decision-making and operational independence should be reviewed based on the question about the possible decreasing level of power restricting staff to administer policy flexibly and creatively – and avoiding risk. It could be argued that the volatile political situation in Uganda presents the Embassy with a high level of risk and requires acceptance of risk from all donors, but the consequences of widespread corruption, critical audits and other constraints are not well known. Future studies should assess donor behaviour in more detail and discuss how it is affected by experiences in the recipient country versus weaker structural autonomy for the “aid system” within Swedish development cooperation.
- **Predictability and fragmentation:** Long-term predictable and focused funding are important factors for achieving results. Evaluations commend Sweden for being a trustworthy and reliable donor country. Several interventions have been of long duration - the research cooperation with Makerere University being a prominent example. It is inherently difficult to count the number of interventions and get a true picture of level of fragmentation/concentration of the country programme portfolio. From one perspective, the average number of actual interventions has been high. Support to large donor led programmes reduces the number of Swedish contractual partners, but increases the number of implementing organisations and impacts on level of fragmentation. The preferable option would be to select a few priority programme areas providing predictable long-term funding and other smaller catalytic interventions in collaboration with other donors.
- **Responsiveness and adjustment:** The overall strategy and thematic priorities have remained remarkably constant, while it can be argued that Sweden has responded and adjusted its programmes and projects well to evolving contextual circumstances. The four strategic objectives/areas have with small variations been the same (despite the fact that e.g. water and sanitation and infrastructure have been phased out), but choice of partners and methods of implementation have changed considerably. The strategic areas have also been sufficiently broad to include a broad range of projects. There are systems and mechanisms in place for regular monitoring and internal consultations in particular for programmes and projects, but less for the strategic objectives.

- **Downward or upward accountability:** The Embassy is formally accountable to MFA/Sida HQ. Staff spend considerable time meeting upward accountability requirements, but the question is to what extent downward accountability to partners and projects has been weakened. This is an issue that requires further investigation. Attention should be paid to the balance between upward accountability and supporting and nurturing mechanisms for stronger downward accountability.
- **Log frames and complexity:** There is a continuous need to monitor the adequacy and implications of results-based management practices. There is no evidence that more complex interventions have been crowded out for tangible service delivery projects. The strategy has an explicit rights-orientation focusing on human rights, democratic governance and gender equality – all requiring an acknowledgement and understanding of complex multiple causes and effects and unpredictable solutions. This is better taken into account in the individual interventions than in the results strategy as such. The Embassy is placed in the tension between the rights- and the results agenda and tries to manage that tension. Right-based work as well as service provision create results, but the results are different and should be measured differently.

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## Annex 2: Total Swedish support to Uganda 1998 - 2014 (in Mill SEK)

	Total	Health	Rep.health	Democr	Priv sector	Educ	Peace	Trade pol	Agric	Multisector	Hum	Infrastruct	W&S	Energy	Bank ser	Bud sup
1998	78,9	21,5	16,3	1,5	3,6	5,6			1,6	2	3,5		10		0,2	
1999	167	26,2	16,3	15,9	3,1	2,9			0,7	1,2	8,3	4,6	43		0,1	50
2000	208	39,4	3,6	16,6	2,3	8,7	1	0,1	0,7	12,1	4,4	1,1	41,4	20,1	0,4	55
2001	304	52,8	7,7	13	3	10,7	1,1		0,1	10,2	7	0,2	61,5	66,4	0,5	55
2002	227	17,6	7,7	26,7	10,8	3,3			10,1	32	8,6	1,3	25	0,5	5	65
2003	266	61,6	9	19,8	16,4	3		1	5,1	13,5	61,1	0,3	11,1	1,2	6,2	65
2004	310	84,5	8,6	27,8	18				1,1	15	56,1	0,8	6	3,1	13,3	65
2005	358	88,4	11,9	53,1	25,8		0,4		6,8	21,8	140,7	0,9	9,4	4	8,3	
2006	462	85,9	12,5	54	34,4		5,1			24,8	86,6	0,8	56,7	54,8		33,5
2007	394	86,2	16,8	37,3	27,3		16,9			16,4	98,3	0,7	61,3	5	16,8	
2008	427	59,5	8,6	45,8	25,9		9,3	1,1		17,9	128	1,3	64,4	54,2	7,8	
2009	405	80,2	10,7	70,6	24,9		4	0,8		26,7	69,5	16,3	71,5	21,2		
2010	365	80,4	21,6	129	34,5		4,3	8,9		38,1	28,3	15,2	0,7	1,9		
2011	343	33,8	39	172	32,7		1	8,2		21,3	15,9	16,2		0,3		
2012	362	10,9	53,6	220	28,9		0,7	2,6		31,1	19,1	6		0,16		
2013	315	6,2	78,6	143	17,9	1,6	0,8	22,7		37,8	10,8			1,5		
2014	243	9,9	63,1	48,4	22,2	4	2,7	19,2	14,7	41,8	15,5	4,1		0,5		
Grand total	5234,9	845	385,6	1094,5	331,7	39,8	47,3	64,6	40,9	363,7	761,7	69,8	462	234,4	58,6	388,5

Total - including bi- and multilateral, humanitarian assistance and CSOs

Democracy= Public management, democracy, human rights and gender equality

Peace= conflict Resolution, peace and security

Health= Reproductive, HIV/AIDS

Multi sector: Research cooperation, frame agreements

Trade policy= Trade policy, trade related adjustment and tourism

Infrastructure= Social infrastructure and services

Private sector= Industry and business and other services

Source: openaid.se

## Annex 3: Country context and challenges

### Political trends

Following independence in 1962, the country experienced relative political and economic stability until a 1971 military coup by Idi Amin. Violence and mismanagement reduced the country to a failed state with a collapsed economy. Political and economic turmoil continued from 1979 to 1985, with successive coups and a disputed election in 1980 that led to armed rebellions across the country.

The National Resistance Movement (NRM) led by Yoweri Museveni took power in 1986, beginning a sustained period of economic and political renewal. The government advanced pro-market reforms and political liberalisation. Despite being landlocked, Uganda became one of the fastest growing countries in Africa.

Democratic development in Uganda gives a rather conflicting image. Uganda has not yet experienced a change in power through elections. Following the promulgation of the 1995 Constitution, non-party elections took place in 1996, providing President Museveni with his first elected term after ten years in office. He was re-elected first in 2001. Constitutional amendments approved by referendum in July 2005 introduced multi-partyism. At the same time, the Uganda Parliament voted to lift presidential term limits. Multi-party elections were held in 2006 and 2011, and President Museveni won both. The elections in 2006 and 2011 contributed to the establishment of preconditions for a political opposition, although that opposition is still weak. At the same time, the government has taken an increasingly strong grip over state power.<sup>20</sup>

Northern Uganda is now secure, but it missed out on two decades of growth. The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) waged a brutal war that displaced 1.86 Mill people and resulted in more than 10 000 deaths. Economic activity has now resumed and most internally displaced people (about 1.3 Mill) have returned to their villages.

Despite a strong anti-corruption legal framework, Uganda has struggled to translate its anti-corruption laws into practice. Transparency International assesses Uganda as "very corrupt" (2013). There have been several high-level corruption cases none of which have been resolved so far. Petty corruption is also widespread and pervasive "quite corruption" – the failure of public servants to deliver goods and services paid for by government. In 2012, an incident of corruption within the Ugandan state administration was revealed. Sweden suspended the payments to the Ugandan government and demanded repayment of the misused funds.

In 2014, Uganda decided on a legislation that could give life imprisonment for homosexuality. Due to this law and also the widespread corruption, Sweden currently avoids cooperation with the Ugandan government. This does not apply to research cooperation. Swedish support is largely channelled through civil society organisations and international organisations.

### Socio-economic developments

Uganda has experienced solid economic growth over the last decade, resulting in steady gains in per capita income, despite rapid population growth. Per capita GNI (World Bank Atlas method) has increased from USD 270 per person in 2004 to USD 600 in 2013. Over the last years, however, the economy grew at a slower pace, an average of 5.8 %, compared to 7 % over the past two decades and

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<sup>20</sup> The intricate political economy of Uganda is well explained in ODI. East African Prospects. 2014.

the GNI per capita grew at 2.5%<sup>21</sup>. While robust overall, Uganda's growth has lagged behind some of the regional comparators (e.g. Tanzania 7.1 %; Rwanda 7.4 %).<sup>22</sup>

Sectorally, the main drivers of economic growth are services, especially telecommunications, wholesale and retail trade and, to a lesser extent, public administration. By contrast, although the agriculture sector employs a large proportion of workers, growth in agriculture has been lower than expected. The share of agriculture as a proportion of GDP, which has historically hovered around 25 %, dropped to 13 % in 2013. The services sector has picked up the slack and increased its share of GDP from 45 to 53 in 2013, while the industry sector continues to make up about a quarter of total economic activity. The discovery of oil brings both development opportunities and challenges. Increased natural resource wealth in the context of poverty and weak institutions, could increase corruption, patronage, instability and conflict. On the other hand, it has also the potential to decrease dependence on international financing and support poverty eradication objectives (OECD International Drivers of Corruption, 2012).

The growth has been accompanied by significant poverty reduction, especially when growth in agriculture was strong. While the poverty incidence of people living under USD 1.25 per day was reduced from 51.5 to 38.0 % over the time period of 2006 to 2009, there are indications that the overall poverty reduction stalled since then, with 2013 poverty rate still at 37.8 % using the international poverty line (World Development Indicators). However, the national poverty line of USD 1 per day shows a further decline, from 39 % in the early 2000s to under 20 % in 2013. Taken together, these figures imply that, despite progress achieved, broader measures of income poverty suggest high persistence of poverty and vulnerability among large segments of the population. Geographically, progress has been unequal across regions with the Northern regions most notably lagging behind.

Uganda continues to experience very high rates of demographic growth and urbanisation. At 3.3 % per year, population growth in Uganda is among the highest in the world, and it has remained stable since 2004. Exceptionally high birth rates and overall population growth result in very unfavourable overall dependency ratio. Furthermore, urban population growth outpaces rural population growth with respective rates at 5.4 and 2.9 %, posing additional challenges to service delivery and poverty reduction in both urban and rural areas (World Bank. *The Growth Challenge: Can Ugandan Cities get to Work* 2015) . But, with low domestic revenue mobilization and reduced aid inflows, this has resulted in major pressures on the already overstretched urban services. At the same time, delivery of basic services in rural areas continues to lag behind, contributing to the massive rural-urban migration.

## National policy framework

In 1998, the Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) framework was introduced to enable the GoU to manage its resources more strategically in support of its long-term objective of poverty eradication. It acted as the overarching planning framework until 2010. The Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development collaborated closely with the Development Partners in the development of the first plan and its successor covering the period of 2004-2008, which was eventually extended to 2010. It covered five pillars: (1) economic management; (2) production, competitiveness, and incomes; (3) security, conflict-resolution, and disaster management; (4) governance; and (5) human development. The Government's priorities during this period were, by and large, focused on the expansion and quality of health care and primary education services along with programmes to support income generation through the commercialisation of agriculture.

In 2007, the National Planning Authority was established, which took stewardship of the national planning process and commissioned an independent evaluation of the PEAP. The National Planning

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<sup>21</sup> During FY 2013/14 the economy grew at an estimated rate of 4.7%, down from 5.1% in FY 2012/13 and well below the NFP target of 7.3% (Office of the Prime Minister 2014).

<sup>22</sup> Information taken from Joint Evaluation of Budget Support to Uganda (2015), World Bank, Country Assistance Strategy (2010), GOU, Office of the Prime Minister (2013) and others (see Annex 2: References).

Authority developed an ambitious new vision for the development of the country, aiming to achieve middle-income status within 30 years through the implementation of a series of five-year plans. The first of these plans (National Development Plan 2010-2015) incorporated the main recommendations from the evaluation of the PEAP. The new plan entails a significant shift in emphasis towards economic infrastructure, linked to the discovery of oil, gas and minerals. Social services sectors - which have been the long-standing focus of external donor support - including education, health, and water assume secondary priority.

The Government has adopted a new five-year plan, National Development Plan II (2015-2020). The national priorities for investments are clearly stated, namely infrastructure, agriculture, tourism, minerals, oil and gas, as well as human capital development. The plan represents a move forward in terms of promoting economic growth and development of the economy. It identifies a number of expensive infrastructure projects and in agriculture the government intends to enhance production and productivity through commercialisation, mechanisation and agro-processing. Education and training of youth has been identified as a priority, together with health services, nutrition and reduced teenage pregnancies. An increased share of public financing of social sector is not expected.

## Evolution of donor support to Uganda

Total donor assistance as a proportion of GDP fell from 8,5% in 2004/05 period to 5.3 % in 2008/09. Hence, the proportion of the budget funded with donor assistance declined from 44.5% in 2004/05 to 26.1% in 2007/08 before rising slightly to 30.4% in 2008/09. While noting the decreasing significance of foreign aid in financing Uganda's national budget, foreign aid still remains a major source of revenue to government with about 30% of the budget funded using aid resources. ODA finances over 70% of the development budget as most of the domestic revenue goes to financing the recurrent budget (Phase II Evaluation of the Implementation of the Paris Declaration, 2011).

According to Uganda data, over the period 2000/1 to 2008/9, 41 development partners disbursed aid to Uganda. This included 19 bilateral donors and 22 multilateral donors, of which six were UN agencies and two were Global Funds targeting specific themes such as prevention of HIV/AIDS. The relative monetary importance of development partners in Uganda is uneven. For that period financial flows were disbursed by just three donors (IDA, UK and EU), 75% by seven partners and 82% by the top 10. Thus, 31 development partners disbursed less than 20 % of ODA to Uganda.<sup>23</sup>

The 2004-2013 period saw an increase of more than 50 % in overall ODA (from USD 1 billion in 2003/04 to USD 1,69 billion in 2013/14). But it also saw a reverse trend in the absolute amounts of aid recorded on budget by the GoU, which declined from an initial USD 634 millions in 2003/4 to less than half that amount by 2013/14. In 2013/14, five new loans and twenty-one new grant agreements were signed, but the new resource envelope was entirely in the form of project support (OPM 2014). In particular, the relative share of on-budget aid vis-à-vis total ODA declined from 64 % at the start of the period to just 16 % at the end. The significant decrease in the shares of aid going to the government sector vis-à-vis off budget aid flowing directly to non-state actors, research institutes, foundations, private sector or project aid implemented directly by the development partners was clearly linked to 'governance challenges' and to the shifting and deteriorating partnership between donors and GoU over the period analysed.

Uganda had traditionally received large amounts of international donor funds in the form of budget support. Total budget support, including General Budget Support (GBS), Sector Budget Support

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<sup>23</sup> OECD/DAC reports different figures: 48 DPs disbursed aid to Uganda between 2003 and 2009, 29 on whom were bilateral and 19 multilaterals. The top three (IDA, USA and EU) disbursed 48% of the aid while the top seven disbursed 73% and the top 10 disbursed 85%. The difference between data from the two sources could be explained, at least in part, by the fact both sources do not collect data from a similar set of sources. Uganda's data does not capture recent (FY2007/8 and 2008/09) aid flows from the USA and from other DPs such as GAVI, UNAIDS, UNTA, UNHCR, Australia, Finland, Greece and Melinda and Bill Gates foundation while the OECD DAC does not have data on China and the regional development institutions.

(SBS) and Balance of Payment/Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) debt relief initiative support, decreased substantially from a high of almost USD 700 million in 2006/07 to well below USD 100 million as of 2012/2013. There is broad trend of decline in the last ten years and a sharp drop from 2012 to 2013, reflecting the aftermath of the episode of the diversion of donor funds.

It was in 2012 that the donors jointly decided to suspend all budget support disbursements in response to the publication of the special investigation into financial management at the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) released by the Auditor General showing that approximately USD 15 million of donor funding in support of recovery in Northern Uganda had been “misappropriated”

## Donor – government relationships

Although donor coordination had been growing since the late 1990s, it is in 2005 with the development of the Uganda Joint Assistance Strategy Paper (UJAS) that a harmonized approach of assistance by development partners centred on the PEAP was formalised. During this period, all budget support operations were designed jointly with a view to harmonise aid transfers modalities, reduce transaction costs for both GoU and donors, and increase the predictability of budget support. That said, most budget support operations also integrated additional conditions in more politically sensitive areas such as governance or human rights, and disbursement decisions were perceived as disjointed from the main evaluation and often inconsistent across donors. A review of the UJAS concluded that while increased coordination, in particular among development partners had been achieved, transaction costs had not been significantly reduced. GoU’s interest or buy-in to the UJAS was extremely limited and further reduced following the donors reduced disbursements over the events leading to the 2006 elections.

Partially, in response to these findings, budget support donors developed a Joint Budget Support Framework (JBSF), an approach which emphasized harmonization and alignment in line with the Paris Declaration, the Accra Agenda for Action and the Busan Partnership. However, clear weaknesses in the policy processes are evidenced by a number of politically driven decisions with important budgetary implications, which were neither analysed in terms of feasibility nor discussed with the development partners who supported the bulk of sectoral development expenditure.

The government performance in the areas of commitment, ownership, harmonization, alignment and coordination with donors was initially strong, but weakened later. The government was actively engaged and participated in the dialogue and the preparation of the agreements, but compliance with agreements in the achievement of objectives was relatively weak. Stakeholder consultation and involvement was generally strong in the early period and weakened later on.

The donor performance mirrors the government performance and the evolution of the partnership over time. In the earlier period of analysis, commitment, harmonisation, alignment and coordination was strong. Many donors provided important contributions to financing, dialogue, and results. But the scope of engagement, ambitions, and expectations of donors weakened in the latter period, reflecting diverging policy priorities, withdrawal of some development partners and reduced budget support volumes, and weakening policy dialogue.

## Paris Declaration: Harmonisation and alignment

As mentioned, Uganda has a long history of promoting donor coordination and alignment that predates the Paris Declaration. Uganda as early as the 1990s introduced specific measures such as joint sector working groups, Sector Wide Approach (SWAp) programmes, pooled funding mechanisms, joint missions, silent partnerships, and joint analytical work and advisory services to facilitate coordination of the development partners efforts. Uganda displayed also strong leadership by developing all its national development strategies, the PEAP and the NDP.

The Government's position on Official Development Assistance (ODA) has been set out in the "Partnership Principles between the Government of Uganda and its Development Partners" (2003). Further, Uganda and its main development partners are signatories to the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) and the Accra Agenda for Action (2008).

Notwithstanding the reports that Uganda's development partners align their assistance to Uganda to national development frameworks, Uganda's national development frameworks over the years have tended to be broad and all encompassing. One major criticism levelled against the PEAP and the current NDP is that the frameworks hardly gave priorities, which left a lot of room to development partners to choose and pick areas of their interest and not necessarily those of highest priority to Uganda's development needs. It has been argued that

lack of prioritization enabled Uganda's development partners to claim that all their activities were well aligned to the national development frameworks.

The evaluation of the Paris Declaration concluded that its impact on aid effectiveness in Uganda had been mixed. When the evaluators judged the performance of the Paris Declaration against each principle, the Declaration had been more of a success in areas that could be considered to be "softer turf" (that is, fostering of the principle of country leadership and ownership of the development agenda). The evaluation registered gains, but did not do so well in Uganda in more sensitive areas, such as alignment, harmonisation and mutual accountability.

The use of country systems by development partners, in particular, proved to be a complex undertaking and fraught with risks on both sides. On the recipient country side, the main risk that surfaced for development partners were related to perceptions about weaknesses in systems for public financial management and procurement, and the systems to fight high profile corruption in government.

In relation to development effectiveness, the evidence was not conclusive on whether the Paris Declaration has been successful and depends on the sector and whether or not it had a SWAp arrangement prior to and during Declaration.

## Public sector institutional and technical capacities

The review of the Budget Support to Uganda (Lister 2006) found that institutional and technical capacities in the health and education sectors have been seriously eroded over the past years, particularly at decentralised levels. In the education sector, the technical capacity of the MoES at central level was reported to be declining and capacity at local level has always been weak and its strengthening has not been systematically addressed by donors. Similarly, in the health sector, several sector experts and donors specifically involved in the sectoral support have testified to the gradual reduction in the analytical, technical and managerial capacities of the MoH. There is strong evidence to suggest that health sector institutional and technical capacities are particularly weak at the District and sub-district levels also as a result of the proliferation of districts, lack of robust local tax base, and lack of policy focus on local capacity building.

The water sector proves to be an exception. Here, the policy and facilitating role of the centre (MWE as line ministry) has become well established over the years. The improvements are still needed in the MWE internal quality control and reporting systems.

### • Education

Increased access to education has been the major achievement in the education sector, Achievements in increasing access are largely attributable to GoU investment in infrastructure, teachers and the abolition of fees at both primary and secondary level. However, there has also been a significant contribution to funding the education sector made by parents through financing additional teaching staff, teaching materials and infrastructure, as well as by donor projects.

The quality of education has experienced little improvement particularly in terms of results and learning achievements. This has been due to underfunding of the sector and weak capacity particularly at local level, combined with increases in enrolment and population growth. Gender equality has been achieved in rates of enrolment between boys and girls at primary level, although girls still lag behind boys in secondary school enrolment. Dropout rates for girls remain high and in some areas are also high for boys.

Uganda still faces geographic and socio-economic inequalities in education. There is significant variation between districts in access to education and learning achievements, with pupils in urban areas and those from wealthier families achieving better educational outcomes.

- **Water and sanitation**

GoU's strategy and deconcentrated implementation of piped water supplies has resulted in an increased access and functionality of rural and small towns' water supply. It also led to significant improvements in terms of equity. However, strong geographical disparities persist as a result of sub-optimal allocation of district funding, political interference, capacity gaps at district local government level and geographical attributes that, for instance, limit the use of affordable technologies, or cultural and educational aspects constraining gender mainstreaming. Moreover, funding for new water points is not sufficient to increase water coverage further in view of the high population growth, the costs of increasing numbers of district local governments, and the fact that options for affordable technologies have run out. The National Framework for Operation and Maintenance of Rural Water Supplies promoting community-based maintenance of water sources and availability of trained hand-pump mechanics has increased the functionality of water sources.

In Uganda, sanitation improvements are the responsibility of households. Overall, funding levels for promotion of sanitation are extremely low. Latrine coverage has gradually increased, but at a very low rate. Strong geographical disparities persist as a result of cultural aspects towards sanitation, enforcement disparities and differences in local capacity and awareness, and to a lesser extent challenges with latrine technologies in loose soils or in case of shallow water levels.

- **Health**

After the establishment of peace and stability in the country in the mid-1980s, the health sector, along with most other parts of the economy, saw rapid improvements in outcomes. In particular, along with just a handful of other countries, Uganda was able to turn the tide of the HIV/AIDS epidemic with a peak in HIV infection rate in the mid- to late-1990s at around 9% of the population. In the last decade, health coverage has also gradually improved.

However, while Uganda is on track to meet some of the MDG targets for health (e.g. MDG 4 on child mortality), the health sector faces several performance challenges, including financial, management, and overall policy leadership. By the mid-2000s, signs of a flattening out of the positive trends in sector outcomes became evident and the most recent years have seen a reversal or stagnation of health outcomes, including mortality rates for mothers and children, and HIV/AIDS prevalence rates.

The country will not meet MDG 6/Target 6.A on reversing the spread of HIV/AIDS. With respect to gender sensitive health sector outcomes, Uganda is not on track to achieve MDG 5 to improve maternal health, including reducing maternal mortality (MDG, Target 5.A), which is graded as 'Stagnant' in the most recent update. In addition, progress on Target 5.B, on universal access to reproductive health services, has been graded 'slow' in the same report. The proportion of deliveries in health facilities (health centres and hospitals) has increased over the evaluation period, but the increase has also been slow for this indicator and recent levels were stagnating below GoU policy targets. Contraceptive prevalence rate has shown a decline in recent years. The fourth Joint Assessment

Framework (based on 2012 data) indicates that none of the health sector results targets agreed upon in the context of the JBSF were met.

There is also relatively strong evidence of equity challenges in health care utilization in the past decade. The poor have generally lower access to most services and the overall system is generally pro-rich as allocations to central facilities that are mostly accessed by the better-offs dominate over lower-level allocations that are mostly accessed by the poor, near-poor, and households in remote areas.

In terms of human resources, while many managers in public institutions are highly competent, there is clearly a lack of capacity in health sector management and policy analysis. The current health system is far too fragmented into an excessive number of local/district units to be able to deliver effective and cost-effective services. Importantly, there are signs that, in general, the country's health system may not be fit for purpose with

several different types of service providers at various levels that fail to combine in an equitable, effective and efficient whole.

- **Gender**

Uganda has a substantial legal framework for greater equality of women, but its implementation has been limited and there are major gender gaps in many areas of society. Gender mainstreaming in the government has remained largely at the level of rhetoric. Moreover, many and deep gender gaps prevent women from taking advantage of economic opportunities, such as the rights to inheritance, treatment of married women, access to finance etc. In education, there were gains in the enrolment rates over time, but gender gaps in literacy, dropout rates, and attainment are striking. This is reinforced by cultural factors such as adolescent marriages and apparently no effective policy towards birth control resulting in the exceptionally high fertility rate. Maternal mortality has declined reflecting some improvements in basic health services, but it remains high. Finally, regarding access to economic opportunities in labour and finance markets, data suggest that women's labour force participation is high, but this reflects the prevalence of women workers in the informal, rural, subsistence economy.

Opportunities for women are far fewer in other sectors of the economy requiring specialized skills and higher education. Women are also clearly disadvantaged in the access to finance as reflected in access and gender gap statistics.



## Annex 4: Programme and project portfolio

The purpose of this Annex is to present the “contributions” from Sweden to the various sectors from 2009 to 2015. Information is generated from the Embassy database. In a few cases, we have noticed inconsistencies, e.g. projects are placed in different sectors. We are not sure if the list is comprehensive, e.g. covers all the interventions in the respective time period.

### HEALTH

The overall sector objective has been improved access by poor people to health services and a reduction in the spread of HIV/AIDS. Sweden has supported the development of the Ugandan health system since the mid-1990s and focused on balancing prevention and service in underserved regions and districts. The support has been used for the implementation of Uganda’s national strategic plan for the health sector, with special emphasis on capacity building, sexual and reproductive health and rights, and HIV/AIDS. Sida has and does also support non-state actors who complement government efforts in improving access to quality health services, and who act as watchdogs on the government and advocate for health rights. On-going and planned projects focus primarily on sexual and reproductive health, maternal health, and health rights. Sida has also supported organisations working to increase the access to HIV prevention services targeting the population that is most at risk, and addressing the risk factors and drivers of the HIV epidemic to prevent new HIV infections.

Contribution	Agr.Partner	Start	End	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	Totals
Health sector budget support	Ministry of Finance	2008	2011	70 328 203	70 509 000	20 180 000	0	0	0	0	161 017 203
HHR officer MoH WHO	World Health Organisation	2008	2011	0	268 000	0	0	0	0	0	268 000
TASO strategic plan 08-12	Misc	2009	2009	2 499 420	0	0	0	0	0	0	2 499 420
Naguru Teenage Ctr 08-11	Misc	2008	2011	3 994 360	3 997 000	3 142 000	-103 000	0	0	0	11 030 360
UNFPA SRHR support	UN Population Fund	2011	2013			15 000 000	0	0	0	0	15 000 000
Planning, mgmt, leadership programme	Belgian Technical Cooperation	2011	2015			7 000 000	6 500 000				13 500 000
Maternal Health Voucher programme	World Bank	2012	2015				25 000 000	25 000 000	20 000 000	20 000 000	90 000 000
Health guarantee	USAID	2012	2018				394 026	0	0	0	394 026
Naguru Teenage centre strategic plan 2011-2014	Misc	2011	2015				7 000 000	8 220 064	1 445 120	0	16 665 184
Health guarantee Ecobank	USAID	2013	2018					672 181	0	0	672 181
Maternal and newborn care in Karamoja/UNICEF	UNICEF Childrens Fund	2013	2015					5 000 000	5 000 000	0	10 000 000
UNFPA SRHR Phase II	Misc	2013	2015					20 000 000	25 000 000	0	45 000 000
Naguru Teenage Health & Info Centre 2015-2020	Naguru Teenage Info/Health	2015	2021							4 200 000	4 200 000
UNHCO Voices for Health Rights 2015-19	UNHCO Ugandan Nat HealthConOrg	2015	2020							10 000 000	10 000 000
Naguru Teenage Centre extension 2014-2015	Misc	2014	2015						2 554 880	4 000 000	6 554 880

VHR Maternal Health programme	UNHCO Ugandan Nat HealthConOrg	2010	2014		6 000 000	722 518	7 876 000	4 418 000	7 000 000		26 016 518
Civil Society Fund of the Uganda	Misc	2010	2013		9 997 700	15 143 000	10 000 000	14 500 000			49 640 700
UNICEF										10 500 000	10 500 000
UNFPA										20 000 000	20 000 000
Totals				76 821 984	90 771 700	61 187 518	56 667 026	77 810 245	61 000 000	58 700 000	492 958 472

## Short description of projects

**Naguru Teenage Information and Health Centre (NTIHC)** operates in the area of adolescent sexual reproductive health through provision of youth friendly services and information in central Kampala. The main activities at NTIHC are geared towards increasing awareness, motivation and adoption of safe adolescent sexual and reproductive health behaviour and practices, and to advocate for adolescent sexual and reproductive health rights. The services provided by NTIHC includes issues related to sexual transmitted diseases, counselling and testing for HIV, pregnancy related services, behaviour change communication, advocacy, and other health related issues. The centre is targeting the age groups 10-24 years. The main catchment area is Kampala district, but clients also come from other areas of Kampala as well as neighbouring districts of Wakiso, Mukono and Mpigi.

## Maternal Health Voucher Programme

The Uganda Reproductive Health Voucher Project (RHVP I) was officially launched in September 2009 as a pilot in four districts in the South-Western part of the country and originated as a voucher scheme to subsidise treatment of sexually transmitted diseases. The programme was subsequently expanded when it was rolled out to 20 districts and when the maternal voucher was added, called the *HealthyBaby voucher*, which provided subsidized motherhood services for economically disadvantaged women.

## Maternal and newborn care in Karamoja/UNICEF

The project was implemented between 2013 and 2014 and aimed at increasing the utilisation of maternal and new-born health services to reduce morbidity and mortality. It focused on provision of an integrated package of maternal and new-born health services along the continuum of care, and also addressed the various factors contributing to the three delays that lead to maternal mortality. The project was delivered through community structures, outreaches, and facility-based interventions.

## UNHCO Voices for Health Rights

Since 2011, a coalition of NGO partners (Voices for Health Rights) has been implementing a Maternal Health Project entitled “Improving Maternal, Sexual and Reproductive Health through the Rights-Based Approach among rural communities in Uganda.” The project implements a Rights-Based Approach contributing to the realisation of MDG 5 (Improve maternal health). The purpose of the project is to improve demand and utilisation of Maternal Sexual and Reproductive Health Rights at community level. The project seeks to empower communities to demand for quality MSRHR services, promoting access and utilisation of services, increasing the capacity of communities and groups to monitor and hold key duty bearers accountable for delivery of services, and strengthening the capacity of VHR.

## Others

**Budget support to the health sector** was provided by Sida with the aim to support the implementation of Uganda’s Health Sector Strategic Plan (HSSP). The sector is guided by a sector-wide approach (SWAp) to which development partners and the government have committed to harmonize all their support. The goal of HSSP is reduced morbidity and mortality from the major causes of ill-health and premature death, and reduced disparities therein. The Sida contribution is disbursed through direct sector budget support and through a joint development partners fund to

support established SWAp structures. The Swedish attention and dialogue focused on (1) sexual and reproductive health and rights and HIV/AIDS prevention, emphasizing the high population growth, maternal health, gender equality, and the situation for the population in conflict affected areas, (2) human resources for health, emphasizing capacity development to mitigate the strains on the health system due to the shortage of health workers, and (3) improved financial management and control in the health sector emphasizing overall planning and budgeting, transparency, accountability, and effective allocation and use of resources.

**Institutional capacity building in planning, leadership and management in the Ugandan health sector** was a new four year project in collaboration with Ministry of Health and the Belgian Development Agency (BTC). BTC took on the coordinating role through a delegated partnership agreement with Sida. The objective was to strengthen core institutional and organizational capacities at both central and district government levels in the field of planning, management and leadership. The target were staff responsible for the running of hospitals, health facilities and local health authorities as well as programme departments at central Ministry of Health.

**The Ministry of Health** was supported by Sida as a complement to the health sector budget support. This was carried out through funding of a Health and Human Rights Officer placed at the Ministry. The Officer was responsible for strengthening the capacities within the Ministry to effectively address, mainstream and institutionalize a human rights-based approach in all sector programmes and policies. The support was channelled through a donor agreement with World Health Organization (WHO). The Officer works under the supervision of the Ministry, but reports to WHO.

**Voices for Health Rights (VHR)** was a project called *Promoting maternal health through the Rights Based Approach*. The goal of the project was to bring together civil society organisations for the promotion of the right to health in Uganda, with a particular focus on maternal health. The objectives of the coalition was to (1) advocate for better access to quality health care through lobbying for better national health policies and monitoring the implementation of existing policies in Uganda, (2) carry out activities that promote an informed and empowered society that holds duty bearers in the government accountable, (3) carry out health research and policy analysis for purposes of informing and influencing policy, (4) initiate and continually oversee a redress system that will ensure accountability and proper management of the available health resources.

**The Aids Support Organization (TASO)** was established in 1987 with the aim to contribute to the process of restoring hope and improving the quality of life of persons and communities affected by HIV/AIDS in Uganda. TASO is one of Uganda's leading national NGOs with the mandate to provide HIV/AIDS prevention, treatment, care and support to a large number of adults and children in the country. Care and support services are offered at TASO centres, outreach clinics and through home visits. TASO activities are implemented through its headquarters based in Kampala and eleven TASO centres across the country.

**HIV/AIDS Civil Society Fund (CSF)** is a multi-donor funding initiative which provides grants to indigenous organisations in support of activities aimed at scaling up effective and comprehensive responses to HIV/AIDS, orphans and vulnerable children, tuberculosis and malaria. Five donor agencies and the Ugandan AIDS Commission (UAC) agreed on the set up and governance of CSF. Three general principles define the type of the projects CSF funds: (1) projects that are aligned with the national policy and strategic framework for HIV/AIDS as set by UAC, (2) projects that are short term but have essential activities that will contribute to the longer term objectives of the national response, and (3) projects that promise institutional partnership. More than 100 Ugandan NGOs have received support through the CSF.

## PUBLIC MANAGEMENT, DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND GENDER EQUALITY

The overall sector objectives were (1) improved democratic governance, with increased respect for and enjoyment of human rights and greater regard for the rule of law, and (2) peaceful and sustainable resolution of violent and armed conflicts. Both state and non-state actors are targeted. Sweden's support to human rights organisations and the justice sector has been composed of four large programmes and basket funds to reach a number of civil society organisations, core support to a couple of organisations, and sector budget support.

Contribution	Agr_Partner	Start	End	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	Totals
Deepening Dem Programme	Misc	2007	2010	3 696 211	5 500 000	0	0	0	0	0	9 196 211
JLOS SWAp Uganda	GoU	2009	2010	29 950 440	20 000 000	30 000 000	30 000 000	0	0	0	109 950 440
PFM - FINMAP	Ministry of Finance and Planni	2006	2010	6 000 000	5 999 997	0	0	0	0	0	11 999 997
PRDP North	Government of Uganda	2008	2011	14 977 800	15 000 000	15 000 000	-23 883 000	0	0	0	21 094 800
Diakonia civil society	Diakonia	2008	2011	10 000 000	10 000 000	0	0	0	0	0	20 000 000
Child rights Karamja ABEK	Misc	2009	2012	1 999 536	2 000 000	2 000 000	0	0	0	0	5 999 536
FHRI human rights	Misc	2009	2012	1 995 240	1 999 200	2 505 000	2 000 000	0	0	0	8 499 440
WomenRights & Empowerment	Misc	2009	2012	1 993 392	1 999 200	3 500 000	4 000 000	0	0	0	11 492 592
OHCHR Northern Ug Phase 2	OHCHR	2008	2010	5 000 000	0	0	0	0	0	0	5 000 000
KIC - support women & youth	Kristdem. råd, demokrati, utv.	2010	2013		1 226 000	1 285 000	1 439 000	-3 291			3 946 709
JBSF Trust Fund	World Bank	2010	2012		1 255 109	941 331	941 331				3 137 771
Progr Dev Fund 2010-11	Internal decision Letter of Co	2010	2012		839 952	737 172	979 000				2 556 124
HR Civil Society IDF II	Internal decision Letter of Co	2010	2013		5 500 000	2 500 000	2 500 000				10 500 000
OHCHR Uganda 2010-2011	OHCHR Human Rights	2010	2012		5 000 000	5 000 000					10 000 000
Elections Uganda	Internal decision Letter of Co	2010	2011		20 959	314 974					335 933
Public Financial Management	Ministry of Finance and Planni	2011	2014				0	12 000 000	0	0	12 000 000
Access to Justice	Misc	2006	2011				-106 206	5 000 000	0	0	4 893 794
Diakonia Civil Society	Diakonia	2011	2014				15 000 000	15 000 000	1 157 976	1 392 460	32 550 436
OHCHR	OHCHR UN High C Human Rights	2012	2016				5 000 000	5 000 000	0	0	10 000 000
Democratic gov. facility	Misc	2011	2014					20 000 000	0	0	20 000 000
JLOS SWAp Uganda 2013-14	Government of Uganda	2009	2014					31 000 000	0	0	31 000 000
Democratic Gov. Facility II	Misc	2014	2016						20 000 000	20 000 000	40 000 000

Support Women's Rights and Empowerment	IWCE,Womens cent.empowerment	2014	2015						6 500 000	0	6 500 000
Support to UN OHCHR	OHCHR UN High C Human Rights	2012	2015						7 000 000	0	7 000 000
Support to NOGAMU	Kisaka & Company	2014	2014						767 897	0	767 897
Stimulating incomes through Organic Trade Support	Nat Organic Agr. Movem.	2014	2017						5 000 000	0	5 000 000
Global Business Labs Uganda	Handelshögskolan, Stockholm	2012	2016						0	2 826 432	2 826 432
Strengthening Private Sector Engagement	International RescueCommittee	2014	2018						10 000 000	13 135 000	23 135 000
Sub totals				75 612 619	76 340 417	63 783 477	37 870 125	87 996 709	50 425 873	37 353 892	429 383 112



## **Short description of the projects**

**Financial Management and Accountability Program (FINMAP)** was under implementation since 2007 with the objective to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of central and local government public financial management and accountability processes, including an increase in transparency in the use of public funds and reduced opportunities for corruption. The key goal is to ensure efficient, effective and accountable use of public resources as a basis for poverty eradication and improved service delivery. Sida, together with the other development partners, were supporting FINMAP through a basket fund governed by a Memorandum of Understanding between the development partners and the GoU.

### **Deepening Democracy Programme**

The Deepening Democracy Programme (DDP) is a programme developed by donors under the Partners for Democracy and Governance (PDG) - donor coordination in Uganda. DDP has five components e.g. support to elections, parliament, political parties, civic engagement and media. Donors are DfID, Ireland, Norway, Denmark, Netherlands and Sweden.

### **Child Rights Karamoja - ABEK**

This project seeks to promote child rights in the pastoral Karamoja region through education. The Alternative Basic Education for Karamoja (ABEK) seeks to ensure access to education for Karamajong children who later transition to formal education.

### **Democratic Governance Facility**

The Democratic Governance facility is a fund under legal auspices of the Royal Danish Embassy in Kampala. DGF operates in the area of governance and human rights and is supported by eight donors. It supports non-state and state partners working within democracy, human rights/access to justice/peace & conflict/transitional justice, and voice and accountability.

### **Diakonia Uganda**

The Swedish support to Diakonia was an initiative of the Embassy to support CSOs in Uganda through a Swedish Organisation with strong competences and capacity in the area of Democracy and Human rights promotion. Diakonias focus in Uganda is Promotion of Human Rights and Democracy, Gender Equity, Social Economic Justice & Conflict management.

## **Other projects**

### **Women Rights and Empowerment**

International Women's Centre for Empowerment works to promote women's rights and empowerment. The support to IWCE addressed major challenges to Uganda's progress on gender equality. The project sought to tackle low levels of gender awareness and patriarchal attitudes among the public, the media and leaders, systemic weaknesses in the gender equality response.

### **Save the Children Northern Uganda**

This Save the Children in Uganda project seeks to promote child rights by improving care and protection of children and bridging the gap in service provision in post conflict Northern Uganda. The project targets war-affected and other vulnerable children who are at risk or have experienced abuse, neglect, exploitation and violence in Northern Uganda.

### **JBSF Trust Fund**

Sweden is one of ten partner countries that are members of the Joint Budget Support Framework (JBSF), and have agreed to pool resources to support the JBSF task force and provide technical and analytical research to inform policy design and dialogue. The instrument for this is the JBSF Trust Fund.

### **JLOS SWAp Uganda**

The Swedish support to Justice Law and Order Sector (JLOS), which consists of 15 institutions, was planned for three years, 2009-2012, with a total amount of 81 MSEK. Sweden shall contribute to the JLOS through a delegated partnership with the Netherlands. To alleviate this state of affairs the JLOS is geared towards improvements in relation to criminal, commercial, family and land justice. JLOS was born 1999 and began developing a reform programme. JLOS is comprised of 10 Ugandan authorities and ministries.

**Legal Aid Basket Fund (LABF)** is a joint donor basket fund, managed by the Danish development agency (Danida). The strategy of the LABF is to increase the access to justice by providing adequate and affordable legal aid, and to advocate for the government of Uganda to gradually take responsibility for legal aid, not least when it comes to poor and marginalized groups. The support to LABF is to contribute to a minimum standard nationwide, with specific intensive support to areas of special needs. The role of the LABF is to operate in the interim as a funding mechanism which aims to complement ongoing justice sector reforms and to pave the way for a sustainable provision of legal aid at the national level.

**The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)** specifically target Northern Uganda and Karamoja with linkages to overall country human rights promotion. The main objective is to strengthen national and local capacity to systematically monitor and effectively respond to conflict-related human rights violations as well as other human rights abuses in Uganda. More specifically, OHCHR's objective is to make human rights promotion and protection a nationally owned sustainable capacity by a strengthened national human rights protection and monitoring system. The current human rights monitoring and response capacity in Uganda is very weak, both in terms of technical and political capacities. The current mandate of the OHCHR in Uganda is to provide increased technical assistance to the national Uganda Human Rights Commission (UHRC), the national agency responsible for human rights monitoring and to a certain extent implementation.

**The Foundation for Human Rights Initiatives (FHRI)** works to improve the human rights situation by engaging both the state of Uganda and its citizens and for this aim lobbying is an important instrument. The overall objective for the Sida supported programme is to enhance citizen participation for democratic governance and sustainable development in Uganda. The strategic objectives are to (1) monitor and document human rights practices in order to promote dialogue and respect for human rights and democratic development, (2) promote sustainable access to justice for the poor and vulnerable groups, (3) advocate for best practices in the administration of justice, (4) build capacity of community based human rights associations to monitor, document and expose human rights violations, (5) build the civic competence of the media, local government and tertiary institutions to

effectively participate in democratic processes, (6) promote electoral democracy before, during and after the 2011 general elections, (7) promote leadership development among human rights defenders and to strengthen the institutional capacity and sustainability of FHRI.

**International Women's Centre for Empowerment (IWCE)** is supported by Sida through the programme *Promoting gender equality, women's rights and empowerment* which seeks to enhance the ability of women to engage effectively in pro-poor democratic governance. The support to IWCE will address the major challenges to Uganda's progress on gender equality. Specifically, the project will tackle low levels of gender awareness and patriarchal attitudes among the public, the media and leaders; systemic weaknesses in the gender equality response including lack of capacity, weaknesses in co-ordination and harmonisation, and lack of accountability mechanisms; and gaps in services and advice for women whose rights are violated and the gender-related barriers to accessing services. The project will also build systematic evidence on effective strategies to combat gender inequality.

**East and Horn of Africa Human Rights Defenders Project (EHAHRDP)** works to strengthen human rights defenders through capacity building, protection and advocacy on a regional level. The protection programme involves financial, technical and psycho-social support as each individual case requires. This can for example mean legal aid and help with evacuation. The capacity building involves activities such as workshops, trainings and production of education material. EHAHRDP also does a lot of research and advocacy to respond to regional and national issues like new legislation. Media linkages is used to raise the profile and visibility of human rights defenders in order to make their challenges known to activists, decision makers and other stakeholders within and outside the region. EHAHRDP also works on grass root level with community based activities.

## RESEARCH COOPERATION

The overall sector objective is greater autonomy for the research system and improved analytical capacity in areas of importance to poverty reduction, democratic governance and peaceful resolution of internal armed conflicts. This objective is in line with the Ugandan National Development Plan's emphasis on the importance of research and innovation to social and economic development.

The bilateral research cooperation with Uganda was initiated in 2000 and its main objective is to enhance research and research training capacity of public higher education institutions. This aim is to conduct and sustain strategic and quality research that can contribute to national development needs, through building a critical mass of independent thinking researchers. The purpose is to build capacity at the largest public university, Makerere University, in Uganda by supporting programs for Masters, PhD and post-doctoral training in relevant fields (e.g. basic science, technology, agriculture, health, veterinary medicine, social sciences and humanities) and to strengthen the institutional capacity for research management.

The support 2010-2014 focus on collaborative research and PhD research training at MU, as well as building an enabling environment for research which includes improvement of research management capacity, administrative and financial systems, library services, research funds, ICT, demographic surveillance site, laboratory infrastructure, and gender mainstreaming. In addition, support will target administrative reforms, quality assurance of postgraduate training, research communication and dissemination, the Innovation Systems and Cluster Program in Uganda, regional research collaboration, and PhD and Masters training at MU for staff from the four other public universities in Uganda. The programs are implemented in collaboration with Swedish universities and research training will be conducted both in Sweden and in Uganda.

Contri-bution	Modality	Start	End	DAA Total	Disbursed	Disbursed	Disbursed	Disbursed	Disbursed	Disbursed	Disbursed	Totals
					2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	
Bilateral Research Coop Uga P	Programme	2010	2014	180 000 000		51 087 384	30 549 374	35 477 595	40 465 845	42 419 802	10 550 000	210 550 000
Bilateral Res Coop. Uganda Ph	Programme	2005	2010	181 000 000	47 571 485	25 225	0	0	0	0	0	47 596 710
ISCP-UGA 2007-2009		2007	2010	2 991 570	501 570	0	0	0	0	0	0	501 570
Sub totals				363 991 570	48 073 055	51 112 609	30 549 374	35 477 595	40 465 845	42 419 802	10 550 000	258 648 280

## PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT

The overall sector objectives are (1) a better business and investment climate, and (2) increased trade. The aim is to increase the productivity and competition, especially within the agricultural sector which is still the main component of the Ugandan economy.

During the previous strategy period, greater focus was given to the trade sector through support to the Quality Infrastructure and Standards Programme (QUISP), and in the agribusiness sector through the U-Growth Programme. Other initiatives relates to economic development and peace, conflict and rights. In this area, Sida continues to work with International Alert in linking private sector development with post-conflict peace building and with International Rescue Committee (IRC) to re-establish agricultural livelihoods for farmers returning from IDP (internally displaced person) camps.

Contribution	Agr_Partner	Start	End	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	Totals
Programme Dev 07-09	Internal decision Letter of Co	2007	2010	3 193 103	231 321	0	0	0	0	0	3 424 424
IRC Livelihood programme	Misc	2007	2009	1 484 736	19 022	0	0	0	0	0	1 503 758
Interim support - organic	NGO Expert Group	2009	2011	2 000 000	1 150 000	0	0	0	0	0	3 150 000
EPOPA Phase III	Misc	2005	2009	58 140	0	0	0	0	0	0	58 140
A economy and peace	Misc	2007	2010	4 000 000	3 665 000	0	0	0	0	0	7 665 000
UGA Radio Media SME	International Labour Organisat	2003	2009	1 000 000	-22 000	0	0	0	0	0	978 000
UNCCI Phase II	Chamber of Comme Industry/Agri	2006	2010	913 131	0	0	0	0	0	0	913 131
FSD Phase II	Ministry of Finance	2006	2009	3 789 927	0	0	0	0	0	0	3 789 927
Trade QUISP Prog (MTTI)	Government of Uganda	2010	2015		8 896 995	8 227 000	2 640 000	1 580 000	1 439 000	9 715 000	32 497 995
Investment climate - CICS	Government of Uganda	2010	2013		1 635 804	2 200 000	2 200 000	87 105			6 122 909
U-Growth Agribusiness Initiat	Misc	2010	2014		15 000 000	18 000 000	10 000 000	2 000 000			45 000 000
PEEP/IRC postconflict PSD	Misc	2010	2013		7 295 644	3 947 000	6 066 000	4 129 000			21 437 644
A Economy and Peace II	International Alert	2011	2 014			4 100 000	4 499 000	4 000 000	2 279 000		14 878 000
Conservation Cotton TechnoServe	TechnoServe	2014	2 016						2 400 000	0	2 400 000
Sustainable Agriculture MercyCorps	Mercy Corps	2014	2 018						10 200 000	0	10 200 000
International Alert 2015-2018	International Alert	2015	2015							1800000	1 800 000
TradeMark East Africa Uganda Window	TMEA	2013	2016					12 000 000	12 000 000		24 000 000
Totals				16 439 037	37 871 786	36 474 000	25 405 000	23 796 105	28 318 000	11 515 000	179 818 928

## Selected contributions

**Competitive and Investment Climate Strategy (CICS).** The goal of CICS is to contribute to the enhancement of productivity, competitiveness and incomes by the identification of constraints that hinder private sector growth in Uganda. The CICS therefore places particular emphasis on recognizing and addressing competitiveness issues at sector/sub-sector levels by disaggregating these constraints and identification of measures to address them. It makes specific recommendations for further improving the business environment to support expanded domestic, regional, and international market competition through strengthened competitiveness of Uganda's productive sectors, an improved business environment and an improved competitiveness in the global market.

**U-Growth Programme** was initiated by the Danish development agency (Danida) as a response to requests from Uganda. U-Growth Programme is supported by Sida through funding of one of its components - the *Agribusiness Initiative (aBi)*. The aBi aims to support the government of Uganda and the private sector in achieving the main objectives of the government's Competitive and Investment Climate Strategy (CICS) which is to strengthen the competitiveness of Uganda's agricultural and agro-processing sectors. Other important aspires of the aBi is to improve production and productivity of the agricultural sector and to increase farmer incomes.

**International Alert** works to support peace building initiatives in the Great Lakes Region and is supported by Sida through funding of the project *Aligning the Economy with Peace*. The goal of the project is a shift in policy and decision-making among government officials, international development agencies and the private sector to align the economy with peace in Uganda. This by (1) promoting increased awareness of the links between economy-conflict and economy-peace among key stakeholders in Uganda, i.e. deepening the knowledge and understanding of ways in which the economy affects the prospects for peaceful development in Uganda, and (2) supporting proactive engagement on the part of some Ugandan business people in pursuing a peace building goal at both national and local levels, i.e. identifying and broadening a constituency which supports practical changes to align the economy more closely with peace.

**International Rescue Committee (IRC)** was supported by Sida since 2006 to implement the project Private Sector Promotion for Rural Economic Growth in Northern Uganda. Sida has recently signed a contract for a new three year phase to implement the project *Post-Conflict Recovery and Economic Empowerment of Returnees through Private Sector Development (PEEP)*. The project aims to assist former internally displaced persons (IDPs) returning to their homes after the conflicts in northern Uganda. This will be conducted through a market driven private sector led revitalisation of economic activities. The goal of the project is to improve the economic opportunities for returnees in the Lamwo and Lira districts through increased production of staple and marketable crops, increased collective marketing, and improvement in the local business environment. The main expected results are that households become food secure and earn a stable income to meet their needs, including social services.

**Quality and Standards Infrastructure Programme (QUISP)** is a five year government programme to which Sida is the largest donor. The overall goal of the programme is to promote the use of standards and quality infrastructure to improve the competitiveness of Ugandan products, processes and service delivery systems in domestic, regional and international markets. The implementing institution is the Ministry of Tourism, Trade and Industry (MTTI) together with the Uganda National Bureau of Standards (UNBS). QUISP seeks to develop a market driven, holistic and well coordinated institutional framework for the Ugandan standards and quality infrastructure which supports trade, industry health, safety, consumer protection and a sustainable environment. It also promotes the use of best practices in the production and service sectors which means dealing with trade markets, buyers and sellers, producers and consumers, service markets, and public and private service providers and their clients.



**National Organic Agricultural Movements of Uganda (NOGAMU)** is the umbrella body for organic producers and exporters in Uganda, established with the goal of uniting and leading the organic sector in Uganda. NOGAMU is supported by Sida through funding of the project *Organic Trade Strengthening (OTS)* with the intention to ensure that Uganda's position as the second largest producer of organic products in Africa is sustained. The goal of the project is to improve the livelihoods of farmers involved in organic agricultural production in Uganda. The project aims to increase the awareness of Ugandan organic products nationally and internationally, to increase the opportunity for small holder farmers to participate directly in certificate ownership and organic management, and to increase farmers and extension workers' support capacity for the organic sector.

## PEACE AND SECURITY

The objective is contributions aiming at achieving peaceful and sustainable resolution of violent and armed conflicts.

Contribution	Agr-Partner	Start	End	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	Totals
Peace-fund 2	Internal decision Letter of Co	2008	2009	3 179 994	0	0	0	0	0	0	3 179 994
SCiUG-Northern UGA II	Rädda Barnen	2009	2013	998 348	1 000 000	3 000 000	2 000 000	-127 000	0	0	6 871 348
RLP-Beyond Juba	Misc	2007	2010	0	4 000 000	0	0	0	0	0	4 000 000
Democratic governance facility	Misc	2011	2014			10 000 000	19 000 000	20 000 000			49 000 000
Sub totals				4 178 342	5 000 000	13 000 000	21 000 000	19 873 000	0	0	63 051 342

**Peace Recovery and Development Plan (PRDP)** is a government framework for peace, recovery and development of Northern Uganda. The overall goal of the PRDP is stabilisation in order to regain and consolidate peace and lay the foundation for recovery and development in Northern Uganda. The aim is that the districts in Northern Uganda is to achieve the average national level of social and economic status. In order to achieve this the strategic objectives of the PRDP is (1) consolidation of state authority, (2) rebuilding and empowering communities, (3) revitalisation of the economy, and (4) peace building and reconciliation.

The PRDP was supported by Sida through “notionally earmarked” budget support to the Government of Uganda (GoU). The agreement partner is the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development and the Office of the Prime Minister is responsible for coordination of the PRDP. Overall policy monitoring of the PRDP takes place in the PRDP Monitoring Committee in which the GoU, central and local government and development partners participates. Donors coordinate PRDP issues through the Northern Uganda Recovery Group (NURD).

**The Multi-Donor Trust Fund** is administered by the World Bank on behalf of the Government of Uganda. The Trust Fund is supported by a variety of bilateral donors and funds the *Uganda Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Program (UgDRP)*. This project assist the government in achieving the objectives of the Peace, Recovery and Development Plan (PRDP) for Northern Uganda by supporting the social and economic reintegration of former rebel combatants into the communities to which they return. Ex-combatant from multiple rebel groups are targeted by the project, with multiple expected results for their families and communities. The project consists of five components: (1) demobilization and repatriation, (2) reinsertion of “reporters” (former rebels combatants and collaborators), (3) support for socio-economic reintegration, (4) reconciliation promotion, and (5) program administration.

**Save the Children in Uganda (SCiU)** is active in Northern Uganda and Karamoja. Some of the issues that SCiU tries to address are reintegration of former LRA child soldiers and internally displaced persons (IDP’s), access to education, sexual abuses and child labour, access to land, children living in the streets, land disputes and trafficking in children. SCiU does not have a specific programme for disabled children but this issue is being addressed through efforts integrated in the ordinary work of SCiU.

**Civil Society Organisations for Peace in Northern Uganda (CSOPNU)** is a coalition of over 70 local, national and international non governmental organizations and networks advocating for just and lasting peace in northern Uganda. Sida is supporting the coalition to carry out the project *Confronting the transitional context of the conflict in northern Uganda*. The objectives of the project are to advocate for (1) local, regional and international institutions support for peaceful resolution of conflict, (2) improved security, protection, livelihood opportunities and services to enable successful return and resettlement of those displaced by the conflicts, (3) the establishment of functional justice and reconciliation mechanisms.

# Annex 5: Format for strategy review

## POLICY FORMULATION

1. How was the country strategy developed? Provide an account of the background and preparatory steps.
2. Was it based on any evaluation of the achievements and lessons learned from the previous strategy?
3. Evidence of any comprehensive risk, needs, capacity and context analysis?
4. Evidence of any demand from old and new partners in Uganda?
5. Evidence of any demands/interests/expectations from Swedish partners (commercial, CSOs, universities)?
6. Who led and participated in the development of the plan?
  - a. From the Embassy
  - b. From Stockholm
  - c. From Ugandan partners (CSOs, government, private sector, other donors)
  - d. Others (consultants, Swedish partners...)
7. Were any consultations carried out before, during and after the preparation of the plan?
  - a. With the government
  - b. Ugandan and Swedish CSOs
  - c. Other donors
  - d. Others
8. What is the level of knowledge and ownership of the plan among:
  - a. Government partners
  - b. Ugandan and Swedish CSOs
  - c. Private sector
  - d. Other donors

## POLICY DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION

9. To what extent are thematic and sectoral priorities well explained and justified?
10. Are the objectives clear and measurable (can performance be measured)?
11. Are the objectives realistic and achievable?
12. What are the complexity of the objectives and expected interventions?
13. Is there an articulation of an intervention logic (theory of change) – why and how the strategy will lead to the expected results?
14. To what extent does the strategy pursue an approach (log-frame) to change based on certainty, rationality, predictability and cause and effect linkages contrary to notions of complexity and ambiguity – multiple causes, multiple effects and multiple solutions.
15. Is the plan well/adequately resourced? (Does the budget correspond with the expected results?)
16. Is the plan well aligned with:
  - a. Political and socio-economic context
  - b. Government policies
  - c. Social and cultural factors
  - d. Institutional capacities
  - e. Partners planning/reporting/evaluation systems
17. Are there any guidance/plans for exit/phasing out?
18. To what extent is the strategy innovative – breaking new ground in Uganda?
19. Is the strategy highly profiled in Swedish development policies with a corresponding push to develop ambitious plans with high volumes of funding?
20. Is the strategy influenced by and linked to Swedish national economic interests?
21. Does the strategy reflect vested interests among Swedish partners and the need to maintain relationships?

22. Does the strategy primarily serve to legitimise rather than orient practice?

### **Learning and feedback**

23. To what extent does the Embassy have sufficient/adequate expertise/experience for translating, implementing, evaluating and adapting the strategy?

24. Is there a strong focus of results in the strategy?

25. What is the plan and practice for assessing results/effectiveness of the cooperation at strategic and programme level?

26. Was there any assessment of the previous strategy?

27. Was the strategy negatively perceived/received among any stakeholders (reluctance against a donor push to reform institutions, pessimism regarding the possibility of achieving results, scepticism to specific parts of the programme or its implementation, etc.)?

28. To what extent have any unanticipated/unplanned outcomes been reported and been acted on?

29. Is the strategy primarily driven by 'universal' aid policy and strategies, or was it specific and adapted to the country context?

# Annex 6: Format for project review

## Identification of the intervention

1. Name of the intervention
  
2. Name of contractual partner
  
3. Name of implementing partner (if different)
  
4. Type of institution (contractual partner)
  - a. Government
  - b. Parastatal
  - c. CSO
  - d. Private sector
  - e. Multi-/bilateral
  
5. Sector
  - a. Human rights
  - b. Peace/reconciliation
  - c. Research
  - d. Health
  - e. Others
  
6. Level of intervention
  - a. National
  - b. Regional
  - c. Local
  
7. Type of intervention (write the name of the invention and a short description)

8. Function of the intervention

- a. Service
- b. Policy development
- c. Advocacy/monitoring
- d. Capacity strengthening
- e. Other

9. Duration of the intervention:

- a. 0-1 year
- b. 1-3 years
- c. More than 3

10. Sources of funds:

- a. Multiple donors
- b. Single
- c. Basket

11. Modality

- a. Project
- b. Programme
- c. Sector programme

12. Level of harmonisation/coordination with other donors

- a. No
- b. Limited
- c. Strong
- d. No data

## Intervention history

13. Provide an account of the background and preparatory steps to the intervention (baseline, needs assessment, evaluations, etc.)?

Description:

- a. No steps
- b. Basic 1
- c. Good 7
- d. Strong 2
- e. No data

14. Evidence of comprehensive needs and context analysis (external constraints and opportunities)

- a. No analysis
- b. Basic analysis 1
- c. Good analysis 9
- d. Strong analysis
- e. No data

15. Evidence of an institutional assessment of partner capacities (internal constraints and opportunities)

- a. No analysis
- b. Basic analysis 2
- c. Good analysis 3
- d. Strong analysis 2
- e. No data 3

16. Leading the formulation of the plan

- a. Donor led 5
- b. Recipient led 1
- c. Co-led 4
- d. No data



17. Any champions/strong individuals in the partner organisation:

- a. Several 1
- b. One
- c. Weak
- d. No 9

18. Contribution of the donor:

- e. Strategic 6
- f. Technical 5
- g. Financial/administrative 7
- h. None

18. Evidence of demand from the partner institution

- a. No demand 2
- b. Limited demand 3
- c. Clear demand 4
- d. Strong demand
- e. No data 1

19. Level of ownership from the partner institution of the plan

- a. No ownership 1
- b. Limited ownership 5
- c. Strong ownership 3
- d. No data 1

20. Evidence of recipient institution participation in preparing the plan/proposal

- a. No involvement 2
- b. Limited Involvement 3
- c. Collaborative involvement 2
- d. Strong involvement 2
- e. No data 1

21. Summarise the main challenges affecting the implementation of the intervention:

Description:

- a. Major 6
- b. Moderate 3
- c. Few 1
- d. None

### **Intervention design**

22. Clear and realistic objectives

- a. No 2
- b. To some extent 3
- c. To a large extent 5
- d. No data/difficult to assess

23. Complexity of the intervention

- a. Very simple
- b. Simple 1
- c. Complex 5
- d. Very complex 4

24. Plan for exit of support:

- a. No 9
- b. Marginal 1
- c. Comprehensive

25. Articulation of intervention logic

- a. No intervention logic 1
- b. Basic intervention logic 7
- c. Good intervention logic 2
- d. Comprehensive intervention logic
- e. No data

26. The log-frame/theory of change is based on certainty, rationality, predictability and cause and effect linkages contrary to notions of complexity and ambiguity – multiple causes, multiple effects and multiple solutions).

Comment:

- a. No at all
- b. To some extent 6
- c. To a large extent 4
- d. No data

27. Level of innovation and complementarity

- a. Innovative and unique 7
- b. Complementary to other initiatives 2
- c. Parallel to other initiatives (donors, CSOs, government)
- d. No data 1

28. Level of alignment with policy and political context?

- a. No alignment 1
- b. Weak 2
- c. Medium 2
- d. Strong 5
- e. No /insufficient data

29. Level of alignment with social and cultural factors?

- a. No alignment
- b. Weak
- c. Medium 1
- d. Strong 8
- e. No /insufficient data 1

30. Level of alignment with internal institutional capacities?

- a. No alignment
- b. Weak 1
- c. Medium 7
- d. Strong
- e. No /insufficient data 2

31. Level of alignment with national/local/partner planning/reporting systems and procedures?

- a. No alignment
- b. Weak 3
- c. Medium 4
- d. Strong 2
- e. No /insufficient data 1

### **Management and implementation**

32. Key leadership and management roles (internal champions)

- a. Very weak
- b. Weak 1
- c. Strong 1
- d. Very strong
- e. No data 8

33. Level of involvement of Sida (Embassy/Sida HQ) in implementation?

- a. No
- b. Minimal 8
- c. Large 1
- d. Significant and continuous 1

34. Type of involvement

- a. Administrative (bureaucratic) 7
- b. Financial 7
- c. Technical 2
- d. Strategic 3

35. Is Sweden perceived as a trustworthy predictable donor?

- a. No
- b. To some extent
- c. To a large extent 10
- d. No data

36. Level of involvement of Swedish partners

- a. No
- b. Minimal 7
- c. Large 3
- d. Significant and continuous 1

**Results**

37. Articulation of results

- a. Non-specific 1
- b. Limited specificity 3
- c. Specific 6
- d. Highly specific
- e. No data

38. Results at what level

- a. Changes in individual skills and knowledge 9
- b. Development of new systems, processes and structures 4
- c. Strengthening external pressure for reform (e.g. through civil society) 3
- d. Strengthening incentives and systems for reform 1

39. Monitoring and evaluation system in place

- a. No M & E system
- b. Limited M & E system 3
- c. Clear M & E system 7
- d. Comprehensive M & E system

40. Reviews/evaluation carried out

- a. None
- b. One
- c. Several 10
- d. No data

41. Changes in the intervention as a result of evaluations/lessons learned

- a. No change
- b. Small adjustments 7
- c. Major changes 3
- d. No data

42. Clear and measureable indicators

- a. No 1
- b. Limited 3
- c. Satisfactory 6
- d. Comprehensive

43. Level of focus on results (outcomes and impact):

- a. Very high
- b. High
- c. Medium
- d. Low
- e. Very low
- f. None

44. Extent to which the intervention has achieved its planned outcomes

- a. Very high
- b. High 6
- c. Medium 4
- d. Low
- e. None
- f. No data

45. Have any unanticipated/unplanned outcomes of the intervention been reported?

- a. Yes 1
- b. No 1
- c. No data 8

32. Likely achievement of long-term objectives (impact)

- a. Very high
- b. High

- c. Medium 6
- d. Low 4
- e. None
- f. No data

## Annex 7: Annual strategic plans and reports

The following presents key findings from the annual strategic plans and reports prepared by the Embassy. The documents are more or less the same for all the years (2009-2015).

### 2009

The Embassy commends Uganda for its successes in economic development and poverty reduction, but points to the lack of democratic progress with the political power continuing to be centred around the ruling party and the president. This means that “the basis for cooperation cannot only be based on Uganda’s own priorities. Thus, the sector budget support and state to state cooperation will be decreased, while support to civil society and private sector will increase” (Context analysis).

The results reported in the democracy and human rights area are said to be rather limited. Supporting government structures for health service delivery has resulted in increased use of health facilities, but much remains to be done to decrease the high maternal mortality rates. Private sector development has led to increased organics support, strengthening of business organisations and better access to energy in rural areas. Research and research training at Makerere University has been strengthened.

A Results Matrix with core national and thematic indicators for measuring aggregate progress and achievement for the 2009 to 2013 strategy period is introduced, but it is not actively used later as far as we can see.

### 2010

In 2010, there is a brief summary of current and planned contributions, a strategic direction paper and two strategic reports – one in Swedish and another in English. “The Swedish development cooperation with Uganda is to contribute to the prevailing Swedish development cooperation goal, i.e. to create conditions that enable poor people to improve their lives. The Paris Declaration will also govern the cooperation”.

The thematic priorities are democracy and human rights, gender and the role of women in development, environment and climate. The first two should be incorporated in all contributions.

The strategic direction paper is short (4 pages) stating that there will be a change in the portfolio towards more focused cooperation by phasing out two sectors and starting up new and larger projects.

The progress reports follow a standard format. The English report is an assessment of to what extent “we are moving in the right direction and not of the results”. The progress report provides an overview of the portfolio and its interventions. Most of the results are at activity and output level. It is difficult to assess how and to what extent Swedish support has made a difference. It is stated that “Sweden has provided significant support”, but the intricate causal pathways to results and the specific Swedish contributions are not explained. The achievements are also described as modest: “The results in the area of democratic governance are weak, contradictory and difficult to measure”. The health sector faces major challenges and stagnation despite reduction in some health indicators. The results are deemed positive in the areas of peace and security, private sector development and research cooperation.

### 2011

The document “Sweden’s Development Cooperation with Uganda 2011” is almost identical with the one from 2010 except for some additional projects. However, there is an interesting new introduction – instead of basing the strategy in Swedish aid policies, the strategy “will help to implement Uganda’s poverty strategy”. The total country frame is reduced with 40 Mill SEK. The energy and water sectors are phased out. The aim is to reduce number of interventions and increase the proportion of programme-based assistance.

The Strategy Report follows the same format as for 2010, but the conclusions are slightly more critical to the situation in Uganda and achievements. The strategy is perceived as well tailored to the contradictory developments in Uganda. The cooperation with the State has been limited to areas



where there are opportunities to influence government policy. The cooperation with non-state actors and the private sector is expanding and issues of transparency receive greater focus. Progress in democratic governance is limited or absent. The results in peace and security, private sector development and research cooperation are more positive. It is also acknowledged that the framework for monitoring performance is not systematically used. Measurements of effects and results are scarce. It is difficult for Sweden to perform well on the aid effectiveness agenda – because a gradually smaller part of Swedish funds are channelled as sector/budget support.

There is a comprehensive two-years analysis of the implementation of the country strategy. It concludes that Uganda still fulfils the conditions for receiving sector support. However, the issue of budget support is seen as more than an issue of aid modality. It is rather about the extent to which Sweden should support the Ugandan State.

## 2012

The major risks for not achieving the strategic objectives are seen as the violation of human rights, weak democratic leadership and institutionalised corruption. The assessment of both internal and external risks will be intensified. The cooperation with the State will be further reduced and support through civil society increased. A dramatic cessation of all support to state institutions took place from November 2012 to July 2013 due to major fraud in the Office of the Prime Minister. Proposed sector budget support to health is stopped. The process for further concentration in the portfolio will be continued.

## 2013

The plan and report do not differ much from the previous year. State to state support has been radically cut and most of the funds are channelled through civil society. The health SWAp is put on hold. Most of the health portfolio will be implemented through project support to CSOs, UN and other bilateral organisations. The key activity in the year is to develop a new strategic plan for 2014 to 2017. Sweden is supposed to follow the Paris Declaration principles even if there is a conflict of interests between the Ugandan government and Swedish aid (Evaluation of Sweden's Implementation of the Paris Declaration 2010).

## 2014

The achievement of results is considered partial. The support to FINMAP – the programme for improved financial management was phased out in December 2014 in addition to the Justice, Law and Order project (JLOS). Continued support to such themes will be channelled through civil society and private sector. The Anti-Homosexuality Act was tabled in February 2014 and Sida together with other donors suspended disbursements to state projects. The new strategy stated that bilateral state-to-state cooperation should be avoided based on a Government decision March 2014. The implementation of the new country strategy was delayed to 2015. Both events affected and delayed the achievement of results in the health and governance sector. The space for civil society to operate was also constrained by the government through limitation in the freedom of speech and assembly.

## 2015

This is the first full year in implementing the new strategy. The strategy adopted a thematic rather than a sector focus. The previous year had been marked by the withholding of disbursements due to the Anti-Homosexuality Act and inability to enter into new agreements with state entities. A process of operationalizing the new strategy took place in the fall of 2014. The instruction from the Swedish Government is to focus on partnerships with civil society and private sector and cooperate with State actors only in areas where “this is deemed necessary to achieve the expected results and where Swedish knowledge and competence adds real value”.

The new strategy will continue supporting several projects from the previous period and prepare new proposals. In the governance area, four new contributions are planned in media strengthening, culture support, gender and rule of law). Six new interventions are planned in the economic growth area, five appraisals are planned in health and a new agreement is prepared for research cooperation (2015-2020).

Sida will in addition continue framework agreements with 18 Swedish CSOs, but they are decided by Sida HQ and not be in the Embassy's remit.

For making more effective use of the country allocation and space for innovative and catalytic initiatives, new contributions will be larger in volume and with longer agreements. Joint collaboration with other development partners will also be encouraged. Ways of collaboration will be found in order "to capture synergies across results areas". More active use of the Swedish resource base will be pursued, when applicable.

The Embassy did also prepare an "Operationalisation plan of the results strategy for Uganda 2014-2018". The Embassy organised a theory of change workshop in November 2014 addressing the question: "What has to change in order to deliver on the expected results of the strategy, and what role does the state, private sector, civil society and beneficiaries play in the change process?" The long term vision is: "To contribute to a prosperous Uganda, where young people, men and women are equal, healthy, safe and productive and able to express themselves and make informed decisions regarding their lives".

The rest of the document explains how Sweden will work and what will happen in the strategic result areas. The prospects for achieving the expected results through state actors are seen as limited except for technical assistance to individual institutions and twinning arrangements.

There is a need to set up a "qualitative framework for monitoring the progress at impact and outcome levels. The current performance matrix has quantitative indicators, but the Embassy will elaborate qualitative outcomes, using the outcome mapping technique and design additional monitoring systems". The share of funding to CSOs is expected to increase from 65% in 2015 to 77% in 2018. Private sector will change from 17% to 12%, multilaterals from 14% to 8% and public sector from 4% to 3%.

## Annex 8: Acronyms

BTC	Belgium Development Agency
CSF	Civil Society Fund
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DDP	Deepening Democracy Programme
DP	Development Partner
EBA	Expert Group for Aid Studies
EHAHRDP	Foundation for Human Rights Initiatives
FHRI	Foundation for Human Rights Initiatives
FINMAP	Financial Management and Accounting Programme
GBS	General Budget Support
GBV	Gender Based Violence
GoU	Government of Uganda
HIPC	Heavily Indebted Countries
IWCE	International Women´s Centre for Empowerment
JBSF	Joint Budget Support Framework
JLOS	Justice, Law and Order Project
LABF	Legal Aid Basket Fund
LGBTI	Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transsexual and Intersexual
LRA	Lords Resistance Army
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MHP	Maternal Health Project
MOES	Ministry of Education and Sports
MOH	Ministry of Health
NDP	National Development Plan
NRM	National Resistance Movement
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
OPM	Office of the Prime Minister
PAF	Poverty Action Fund
PD	Paris Declaration
PEAP	Poverty Eradication Action Plan
SBS	Sector Budget Support
SRHR	Sexual and Reproductive Health Rights
SWAp	Sector Wide Approach

TASO	Aids Support Organisation
ToC	Theory of Change
UBOS	Uganda Bureau of Statistics
UJAS	Uganda Joint Assistance Strategy Paper
VHR	Voices for Health Rights

Previous EBA-reports

2016:08, *Sustaining a development policy: results and responsibility for the Swedish policy for global development* Måns Fellesson, Lisa Román

2016:07, *Towards an Alternative Development Management Paradigm?* Cathy Shutt

2016:06, *Vem beslutar om svenska biståndsmedel? En översikt*, Expertgruppen för biståndsanalys

2016:05, *Pathways to change: Evaluating development interventions with Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA)*, Barbara Befani

2016:04, *Swedish responsibility and the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals*, Magdalena Bexell, Kristina Jönsson

2016:03, *Capturing complexity and context: evaluating aid to education* Joel Samoff, Jane Leer, Michelle Reddy

2016:02, *Education in developing countries what policies and programmes affect learning and time in school?* Amy Damon, Paul Glewwe, Suzanne Wisniewski, Bixuan Sun

2016:01, *Support to regional cooperation and integration in Africa – what works and why?* Fredrik Söderbaum, Therese Brolin

2015:09, *In search of double dividends from climate change interventions evidence from forest conservation and household energy transitions* G. Köhlin, S.K. Pattanayak, E. Sills, E. Mattsson, M. Ostwald, A. Salas, and D. Ternald

2015:08, *Business and human rights in development cooperation – has Sweden incorporated the UN guiding principles?* Rasmus Klocker Larsen, Sandra Adler

2015:07, *Making development work: the quality of government approach*, Bo Rothstein and Marcus Tannenber

2015:06, *Now open for business: joint development initiatives between the private and public sectors in development cooperation*, Sara Johansson de Silva, Ari Kokko and Hanna Norberg

2015:05, *Has Sweden injected realism into public financial management reforms in partner countries?* Matt Andrews

2015:04, *Youth, entrepreneurship and development*, Kjetil Bjorvatn

2015:03, *Concentration difficulties? An analysis of Swedish aid proliferation*, Rune Jansen Hagen

2015:02, *Utvärdering av svenskt bistånd – en kartläggning*, Expertgruppen för biståndsanalys

2015:01, *Rethinking Civil Society and Support for Democracy*, Richard Youngs

2014:05, *Svenskt statligt internationellt bistånd i Sverige: en översikt*, Expertgruppen för biståndsanalys

2014:04, *The African Development Bank: ready to face the challenges of a changing Africa?* Christopher Humphrey

2014:03, *International party assistance – what do we know about the effects?* Lars Svåsand

2014:02, *Sweden's development assistance for health – policy options to support the global health 2035 goals*, Gavin Yamey, Helen Saxenian, Robert Hecht, Jesper Sundewall and Dean Jamison

2014:01, *Randomized controlled trials: strengths, weaknesses and policy relevance*, Anders Olofsgård



