



Aid in local contexts

Panel 32, Devres, Aug 24, 2016

Expert Group for Aid Studies

www.eba.se



Presenters

+50 years of local research capacity building, Rebecca Andersson, Uppsala University

Electoral Rules and Leader Selection, Miri Stryjan, Stockholm University & Ben Gurion University

Aid & the Quality of Government, Arne Bigsten, University of Gothenburg

Rural Development and the Local-Universal Dilemma, Karl Bruno, Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences



UPPSALA
UNIVERSITET

INTERNATIONAL SCIENCE PROGRAMME ISP

+50 years of local
research capacity building

Rebecca Andersson

Rebecca.andersson@isp.uu.se

www.isp.uu.se

<https://www.facebook.com/isp.uu>



UPPSALA
UNIVERSITET



Outline

1. International Science Programme
 - Back then
 - Developments
 - Now
2. Experiences of local capacity building
 - What works
 - Improvements



ISP – Uppsala University 1961

- **Idea** – Provide research opportunities for young scientist from less developed countries
- **Vision** – continuation of research back home
- **Challenge** – Short term *individual* plan combined with poor/no research facilities for continuation at home institution





UPPSALA
UNIVERSITET

Developments

- Long term plan for capacity building 1967
- Group leaders
- Sandwich program – postgrad & research training
- Scientific collaborators
- Follow-up support
- Improving local conditions

Plan of action

Year	Africa	Int. Seminar in Uppsala	Actions
1968		Come to International Seminar	Prel. contacts Int. Sem.-resp. Physics Dept. "Project Manager", No. 1, appointed, also No. 2 in the project. E= research leader and future expert.
1969	Theoretical and administrative preparations	Research and planning	No. 1 joins the Seminar No. 2 starts preparations at home department
1970	Experimental preparations	Research and equipment construction	No. 2 joins the Seminar and the Africa equipment is set up. No. 1 trains No. 3 in the particular field, mainly literature studies.
1971		Research training	No. 3 joins the Seminar No. 1 and No. 2 receive the equipment and start to set it up.
1972			Swedish expert joins the group in Africa and research can start.
1973			Research and degree studies under way in Africa. No. 1 back to Uppsala for development studies



UPPSALA
UNIVERSITET

ISP today

- Followed the action plan in many ways
- Research group and network support developed - Physics, Chemistry and Mathematics
- Mainly Africa, also Asia and some support to Latin America
- Responsible group leader/network coordinator
- Funding – used for specific needs
- Sandwich program – postgrad & research training
- Host groups



UPPSALA
UNIVERSITET

Experiences – what works?

Long Term

Local
Ownership

Collaborative
Links

Improved
Conditions

Sandwich
Model



UPPSALA
UNIVERSITET

Experiences – what works?

- Key feature
- Takes time
- Support >20 >30 years
- Starting from scratch
- Funding *potential to develop*

Long Term

Local
Ownership

Collaborative
links

Improved
conditions

Sandwich



UPPSALA
UNIVERSITET

Experiences – what works?

Long Term

Local
Ownership

Collaborative
links

Improved
conditions

Sandwich

- Scientific and financial
- Leadership
- Efficient use of funds
- Flexible use of funds
- Accountability



UPPSALA
UNIVERSITET

Experiences – what works?

- GOAL - local capacity
- Scientific collaborators
- Establishment of postgraduate programs
- Research activities
- Personal and career development

Long Term

Local
Ownership

Collaborative
links

Improved
conditions

Sandwich



UPPSALA
UNIVERSITET

Experiences – what works?

Long Term

Local
Ownership

Collaborative
links

Improved
conditions

Sandwich

- Facilitates continuation of research
- Follow-up support
- Equipping laboratories



UPPSALA
UNIVERSITET

Experiences – what works?

Long Term

Local
Ownership

Collaborative
links

Improved
conditions

Sandwich
model



UPPSALA
UNIVERSITET

The Sandwich model

- Research training partly at home university and partly at scientific host abroad
- Applied when local training is not possible
- Efficient in many ways - noted early on
- Tracing ISP graduates 2008-2013 (92%)
- Sri Lanka, Thailand, Bangladesh (87, 88, 72%)



UPPSALA
UNIVERSITET

Partner experiences +

- Highly valued
- Start up and continue research at home
- Focus on local research problems
- Access to advanced facilities
- Sandwich model + Family allowance – enables women to go abroad
- Hosts – broadens research and cultural perspectives



UPPSALA
UNIVERSITET

Partner experiences -

- Time consuming
- Short periods abroad
- Low status of local PhD degrees
- Worked differently for women and for men



UPPSALA
UNIVERSITET

Improvements

- Take actions to improve gender equality in supported RG/NW
- Stress the importance of a successor
- Improve communication and mentoring in the eventual phase out of support to RG/NW
- Make better use of the competence in phased out RG/NW



UPPSALA
UNIVERSITET

Questions?



UPPSALA
UNIVERSITET

INTERNATIONAL
SCIENCE
PROGRAMME
ISP

Thank you!

Rebecca Andersson

Rebecca.andersson@isp.uu.se

www.isp.uu.se

<https://www.facebook.com/isp.uu>

Electoral Rules and Leader Selection: Experimental Evidence from Ugandan Community Groups

Miri Stryjan (IIES, Stockholm University & Ben Gurion University)
with Erika Deserranno (Kellogg) and Munshi Sulaiman (BRAC)

Development Research Conference 2016, Stockholm

August 24, 2016

Motivation

- In many developing countries, the public sector is failing to provide adequate levels of public services, and access to formal financial services is limited.
- Community-level organizations, often together with NGOs, provide both public and financial services.
- Effectiveness of these organizations depends on ensuring that the benefits of development are not captured by local elites.
(Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2006; Grossman, 2014)
- Who becomes **leader** crucially affects their success and outreach.

Research question

We study whether the **design of rules for electing leaders** determine the types of leaders that get elected and how this maps into policy.

- Electoral rules matter in all kinds of elections.
- Very difficult to obtain causal estimates of effect of electoral rules or leaders.
- Random assignment allows us to estimate causal effect of electoral rules.

Savings & loans groups

We study the effect of electoral rules during the formation of **new community groups in rural Uganda** that elect leaders for the first time.

- These groups supply basic financial services to vulnerable members in the community: savings and loans.
- **Group leaders** allocate loans and keep track of savings.

Electoral rules

92 community groups randomly assigned to selecting leaders with:

1. Open **Discussion** with consensus
2. **Vote** through secret ballot

Electoral rules

92 community groups randomly assigned to selecting leaders with:

1. Open **Discussion** with consensus
2. **Vote** through secret ballot

These two electoral rules:

- are the most common decision making rules in *direct democracy*.
- differ in openness of decision making.

⇒ Unclear which electoral rule leads to the most successful groups.

⇒ Unclear which rule has higher legitimacy.

Related literature

1. Literature on community driven development:

- ▶ Evaluations of local participation in development programs, promotion of local democratic procedures.
- ▶ Beath et al., 2012; Olken, 2010; Grossman, 2014
 - ▶ Do not distinguish types of participatory decision making.

2. Literature on electoral rules, leaders and policy:

- ▶ Extensive theoretical literature but limited empirical evidence
- ▶ Beath et al., 2014; Hinnerich & Petterson, 2014
 - ▶ Study district size, less relevant for community setting.

Research context and design

Geographical context: Karamoja



BRACs savings and loans groups

We partner with the NGO BRAC during creation of 92 **savings and loans groups** in Karamoja:

- Objective: savings and loan access to the most vulnerable.
- Groups of 15-35 young women who meet each week.
- Members save jointly and can take 4-month loans from the savings, repaid to group with interest.
- At the end of the year, the loan profits are shared out according to amount each member saved.

Role of group leaders

As a step towards local ownership:

Each group elected 5 committee members: “leaders”.

- Jointly responsible for:
 - ▶ Deciding how to allocate loans across members.
 - ▶ Setting weekly savings target.
- Extra individual roles.

⇒ Policy choices can affect who benefits the most from the group creation and who is pushed out of the group.

Selection process of group leaders

Groups elected leaders under supervision of BRAC staff in 2 ways:

- **Discussion** treatment: *Binding discussion (with possible threats & repercussions).*
 - ▶ Names suggested openly and openly supported or objected against. The position is given to the name on which an agreement is found.
- **Vote** treatment: *Discussion with cheap talk and secret ballot.*
 - ▶ Names discussed openly. Members then write name of preferred candidate on a piece of paper placed in a box. The person with most votes for a position gains it.

Treatments differ in openness of leader selection: secret ballot imposed in **Vote** but not in **Discussion**.

Selection process of group leaders

Open **Discussion** compared to secret **Vote** may yield:

- Less representative leaders: Richer but also potentially more competent.
- Due to intimidation:
 - ▶ elite prevails in the decision making by exercising their *de facto* power. (Hinnerich & Petterson-Lidbom, 2014)
- *or* Due to better coordination. (Fearon et al., 2001)

Ambiguous welfare implications. Differences in the preferences of the elite and other regular members may reflect:

- Differences in derived benefits (elite capture).
- Competence advantage of the elite in setting policies to make group function better. (Rao and Ibanez, 2005)

Data and Timeline

To estimate the effect of electoral rules on leader types and policy outcomes, we collected:

- Baseline characteristics for all 1816 members in 92 groups before elections (2011).
- Membership status 1 & 3.5 years after elections (2013 & 2015).
- Savings/income info from all stayers and a random 40% of leavers 3.5 years after elections (2015).



Summary Stats and Balance Checks

	Discussion		Vote		p-value
	Mean	St.dev.	Mean	St.dev.	Discussion = Vote
Group level variables (N=92)					
\# members in the group	20.000	5.631	20.022	5.632	0.985
Indiv. level variables (N=1816)					
Age	19.568	4.111	19.535	4.116	0.558
Married	0.777	0.416	0.835	0.371	0.18
Has children	0.768	0.422	0.813	0.39	0.24
Has some education	0.524	0.5	0.591	0.492	0.277
Completed primary school	0.153	0.36	0.178	0.383	0.388
Is a student	0.326	0.469	0.289	0.454	0.546
Is working	0.378	0.485	0.449	0.498	0.339
Has received business training	0.292	0.455	0.205	0.404	0.167
Wealth score (0-100)	20.582	13.586	17.995	12.916	0.103
Asset value (in Million)	1.872	2.507	1.732	2.362	0.66
Has savings	0.934	0.248	0.924	0.266	0.677
Has a loan	0.134	0.341	0.11	0.313	0.574

Note: p-values obtained by regressing each variable on vote dummy with robust st errors for group level outcomes and errors clustered at group level for individual level outcomes.



Results: Leader types

Leaders compared to regular members: Wealth



Differences in distributions: p-value in *Disc.*=.01; p-value in *Vote*=.8

Leaders compared to regular members: Assets



Differences in distributions: p-value in *Disc.*=.015 ; p-value in *Vote*=.9

Leader types

Leaders in **Vote**, compared to **Discussion** are

- More similar to regular members in their group regarding their assets and wealth score (inverse poverty score).
- They are also more similar to regular members in their group regarding their level of education, market activity, and exposure to business training.

Leaders in **Discussion** are positively selected on these characteristics, i.e. they are richer and more educated/experienced in market activities than non leaders. The differences between leaders and non leaders are statistically significant in the **Discussion** groups, not so in the **Vote** groups.

Results: Policy outcomes

Dropouts, Savings and Loans

Dropout

When comparing **Vote** groups to **Discussion** groups after 1 year we observe both size effects and composition effects of the electoral rule on dropout from the groups:

- Size effect: **Vote** groups lose substantially fewer members
- Composition effect: the initially poorest members drop out to lower extent in **Vote** groups than in **Discussion** groups

We observe the same patterns after 3.5 years but less stark difference.

Savings and loan allocation

When comparing **Vote** groups to **Discussion** groups after 3.5 year we observe small differences in the volume of savings and loans, with levels being slightly lower in **Vote** groups due to the poorer members remaining in these groups. There are, however, significant heterogeneities in loan access:

- Loan allocation: the members of a group that were the initially poorest at baseline are significantly less likely to gain access to a loan in **Discussion** groups.
- Loan size: Those among the initially poorest members who do get loans get smaller loan sizes in **Discussion** groups.

Potential mechanism: Elite capture

The findings of differential dropout and loan access show that a poor member randomly assigned to **Vote** group:

- More likely to gain access to financial services.
- More likely to capture the benefits of program.

⇒ Results are consistent with a **reduction in elite capture** when secret ballot is introduced.

Alternative mechanisms

1. Efficiency: leaders in **Discussion** may lend to richer people because it is more efficient to do so. However:
 - ▶ Richer members and members in **Discussion** are equally likely to default on loans as poorer members and members in **Vote**.
 - ▶ We also find no evidence that they have higher return to receiving a loan.
2. Legitimacy: poor members may perceive electoral rule with secret vote as more fair. However:
 - ▶ We observe difference in reported, perceived fairness.
 - ▶ No difference in dropout for shy/quiet members.

Conclusions

- We evaluate the effect of electoral rules on leader types and community group outcomes.
- We compare leader selection through secret ballot **Vote** or through open **Discussion**.
- We find evidence that electoral rules matter for types of leaders selected and for subsequent policy outcomes.
- A poor member is more likely to benefit from the community program when the secret **Vote** is imposed as this reduces elite capture.

Thank you!



Contact: miri.stryjan@iies.su.se

Web: miristryjan.com

Aid & the Quality of Government

**Arne Bigsten
University of Gothenburg**

**Stockholm
August 2016**


- **Purpose:** To review the area of aid impact analysis and to identify where research is needed.
- More work on the impact of aggregate aid inflows on per capita income is now low priority. These analysis have not investigated the aid processes.
- What is required is a better understanding of how state to state aid affects the quality of government. This includes both the processes by which policy makers are elected and formulate policy, and the functioning of the bureaucratic system implementing the policy.

- **Aid dimensions** to consider:
- Conditions associated with transfers.
- Coordination among donors.
- Types of aid sectors.
- Types of aid modalities (projects, budget support, technical assistance etc.).
- Type of donor (DAC-donors, new donors, bilateral, multilateral)

Five types of impact of aid on the quality of government

1. Incentive effects
2. Effects on transaction costs.
3. Direct effects of aid to institution building.
4. Effects of aid volatility on policy making capacity.
5. Effects on accountability (and democracy in general).

1. Incentive effects



- Does foreign aid reduce the incentive of the recipient government to use domestic resources to help its poor population?
- If the recipient does not have the same priorities as the donors, and if contracts cannot be used effectively to align their interests, then this is a problem.
- Torsvik (2005) shows that, if donors can use enforceable conditional aid contracts to influence the recipient's policy, the donors are always better off with coordination.

- Given that donors have the welfare of the recipient country at heart, is it then always desirable for them to coordinate?
- If the recipient shares the goals of the donors, cooperation is clearly beneficial.
- If the recipient government does not share the goals of the donors and if contracts cannot effectively be used to align the recipient with the donors, then coordination is not necessarily beneficial, though it might be.

2. Transaction costs

- Donors may undermine recipient government's policy making efforts by distorting incentives and overburdening government administrative structures.
- Knack and Rahman (2004) did an empirical cross-country analysis of the impact of donors on recipient administrative quality. The econometric results support their hypothesis that aid undermined the quality of government bureaucracy more severely in recipient countries, where aid was fragmented among many donors.
- See Bigsten-Tengstam (2015) on costs on the donor side.

3. Aid to institution building

- Baskaran and Bigsten (2013) explore the effect of fiscal capacity on the quality of government in present-day sub-Saharan Africa.
- Primarily relied on regressions with cross-section averages, using an instrumental variables approach.
- While the statistical significance of the estimates was sometimes questionable in the case of democracy, our results indicate that fiscal capacity leads to lower corruption and more democracy.

- Further analysis of the causal channels indicated that fiscal capacity enhances the quality of government because citizens demand more accountable administration when they have to bear a larger fiscal burden.
- These results suggest that the reason why fiscal capacity leads to higher-quality governments is that citizens begin to voice demands for more accountability.
- Donors interested in improving the Quality of Government in sub-Saharan Africa should therefore consider investments in fiscal capacity as an indirect but effective way to improve the quality of government.

4. The benefits of reducing the and volatility of aid

- Why volatility can be harmful?
(Bigsten et al., 2011)
 - Macro management of public finances much more difficult for the partner country
 - Aid is pro-cyclical: in recessions, partner countries' economic difficulties get magnified
 - Indirect effects on institutions:
 - In fragile democracies, large aid downfalls can increase the risk of coups
 - A sudden increase in aid can start off the spiral of rent-seeking

Main methodology

- Kharas (2008) on the basis of finance theory:
 - A partner country holds a ‘portfolio’ of aid, similar to the portfolio of risky assets held by an investor
 - Higher volatility is undesirable; the partner country would be willing to receive *lower* expected flows of aid in exchange for *lower* volatility of its aid portfolio
 - We can calculate the **certainty equivalent** of aid flows to any partner country:
 - The lowest amount of aid that the country would agree on receiving if this aid were given to the partner country with certainty
 - The difference between the aid flows to the partner country and the certainty equivalent is the **deadweight loss**:
 - The amount of financial loss to donor countries that *could have been avoided* if the aid flows to the partner country were certain.
- Advantages:
 - can be calculated for aid flows from any sub-set of donors
 - the quantification of DWL can be done either in total terms or in per-dollar (or per-euro) terms

Findings

- Construct the measures of CPA volatility, for each partner country and from each donor
- Taking all the partner countries together, and using the 2009 figures, this sums up to the following:
 - The annual benefit from eliminating the volatility of total CPA flows (from all donors) would be equal to **\$7 429 million**
 - The annual benefit from eliminating the volatility of CPA flows from all ***EU Member States*** would be equal to **\$1 678 million**
 - The annual benefit from eliminating the volatility of CPA flows from all ***EU Member States plus that from the EU Institutions*** would be equal to **\$2 342 million**.

- In per-dollar (or per-euro) terms:
 - About 10.2 cents per each dollar of total CPA is lost because of aid volatility
 - There is substantial variation: Liberia - over 30 cents per dollar, Nicaragua - slightly above 4 cents per dollar
 - Aid flows from the EU Member States: per euro of CPA, **14.9 cents** are lost because of volatility
 - In other words, the (monetary) effectiveness of the aid from the EU Member States could be increased by 1/6, even when keeping the same aid flows but by making them fully predictable
 - This loss is reduced a little bit when we add up the aid from the EU Institutions:
 - Per each euro of CPA from the EU Member States plus the EU Institutions, the loss is **14.2 cents**
 - EU Institutions can do much more by smoothing the European aid flows and thus increasing the (monetary) effectiveness of aid

Caveats

- These estimates are the **lower** bound of full figures, because:
 - Risk-return trade-off is probably sharper for the poorer countries
 - The indirect benefits of reducing aid volatility (e.g. operating through the effect on institutions) – are not included

5. Accountability (and democracy)

- Does aid promote democracy?
- Positive effect – aid gives education & growth, which leads to higher demand for democratic rights (normal goods), institutional development.
- Negative effect – by providing an alternative to tax collection it can make the government less accountable, may lead to corruption weakening institutions and promote clientelism.

- Mechanisms – (a) aid leads to development which leads to democratization, (b) builds institutions for democracy, (c) provides incentive to undertake democratic reforms.
- Kilby (2009) finds
- DAC aid small positive effect
- Autocratic aid negative effect
- US military aid negative effect
- Military aid has a stronger negative effect when recipient is strategically important.

Foreign Aid and Regime Change

- Aid is a non-tax revenue – less government accountability?
- Ross (2001) – increase in oil wealth reduces the likelihood of regime change – “political resource curse”
- What about the impact of aid?
- Unlike oil revenue – aid comes from an agent with his own objective function.
- Technical assistance, conditionalities associated.

- Bermeo (2011) looks at regime change and finds that
- ... aid from democratic donors is associated with increased likelihood of a movement in a democratic direction.
- Hard to determine causality. Either affecting transition or aid allocated to countries where donors expect transitions to happen.
- ... aid from authoritarian donors exhibits the opposite relationship with changes in the democratic score.

Chinese aid and local corruption

- SWOPEC paper (2016) by Ann-Sofie Isaksson and Andreas Kotsadam
- Investigates whether Chinese aid projects fuel local-level corruption in Africa.
- They geographically match a new geo-referenced dataset on the subnational allocation of Chinese development finance projects to Africa over the 2000-2012 period with 98,449 respondents from four Afrobarometer survey waves across 29 African countries.

- They compare the corruption experiences of individuals who live near a site where a Chinese project is being implemented at the time of the interview to those of individuals living close to a site where a Chinese project will be initiated but where implementation had not yet started at the time of the interview, we control for unobservable time-invariant characteristics that may influence the selection of project sites.

- The empirical results indicate more widespread local corruption around active Chinese project sites.
- The effect, which lingers after the project implementation period, is seemingly not driven by an increase in economic activity, but rather seems to signify that the Chinese presence impacts local institutions.

- China stands out from the World Bank and Western bilateral donors in this respect. In particular, whereas the results indicate that Chinese aid projects fuel local corruption but have no observable impact on local economic activity,
- World Bank aid projects stimulate local economic activity without fueling local corruption.
- <http://swopec.hhs.se/gunwpe/abs/gunwpe0667.htm>

Concluding remarks

- There is a need for aid research to seek to open the “black box” containing the political system and the government bureaucracy that links aid inflows to the ultimate development outcomes.
- We have noted that there are many gaps in the empirical literature in those areas.



Sveriges lantbruksuniversitet
Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences

Rural Development and the Local-Universal Dilemma

Some Findings from a Historical Study of the Swedish University of
Agricultural Sciences in Development Aid

Contributions to the session

1. General value of history for policy: new insights into the heritage of one's work; appreciation of how things have been and could again be different
2. Specific value of studying agriculture and forestry: by virtue of being tied to the land, they are always local activities and this makes them a good entryway into certain aspects of aid in local contexts

How do we understand the local?

- Local vs. national/central
 - As in, e.g., local government as opposed to national government
- Local vs. universal
 - As in, e.g., local knowledge (applicable in specific places) as opposed to universal knowledge (applicable everywhere)

Structure of the talk

- Conceptualizing the local in agricultural and forestry science
- Presentation of two case studies, with bearing on aid in local contexts, from my doctoral research
- Implications for rurally-oriented aid today


Centrifugality in agrarian science

- Agriculture and forestry are always local activities in the sense that they are tied to particular localities...
- ...yet science strives to transcend particulars to create universal knowledge
- Gives rise to a *centrifugal force* striving to create institutions and opportunities for local research
- This trend dates back to the origins of agricultural science in the nineteenth century, but also carried over into Swedish development aid at its start in the 1950s

Case I: The Chilalo Agricultural Development Unit (CADU), 1967-1974



Swedish experts obtaining the local perspective: Preparatory fieldwork for CADU, c. 1967.



Case I: The Chilalo Agricultural Development Unit (CADU)

- Technically CADU was a great success; stimulated a local green revolution in Chilalo and started an economic transformation
- Yet CADU—intended to help poor farmers—was also appropriated by more powerful local interests and its benefits were largely steered to those already better off
- At the same time, through *national* political connections (in Addis) CADU's core methods could be employed in other localities in Ethiopia

Case II: SLU support to academic forestry education in Ethiopia, 1986–2009



Teaching Ethiopian forestry in Sweden: Ethiopian BSc students acquiring local knowledge about the Adelsnäs estate, Åtvidaberg, Sweden

Case II: SLU support to academic forestry education in Ethiopia, 1986–2009

- In many ways a paradoxical project: Swedish experts articulated a strong commitment to local adaptations; yet considered it necessary to provide training in Sweden
- This hinged on another understanding of the *local*; academic forestry education had to take place (at least to a certain extent) in forests
- Sida later pushed for more explicit local, participatory work; this then conflicted with the nature of the project as academic and thus geared to (universal) science

The local-universal dilemma

True adaptation to local contexts is very difficult even for committed experts, if they are too rooted in their own professional paradigms. And yet at the same time, it is their rootedness—their professionalism—that makes them candidates for expert positions in the first place

More or less local context?

- This is an intrinsic dilemma (and related to more fundamental issues with development aid as such), but it does not mean that we need less focus on the local—quite the opposite!
- My findings suggest the extreme importance of local and practical perspectives for agrarian aid—but this requires acknowledging the difficulty in critically examining and adjusting the fundamentals of one's own professional identity and knowledge base, and to take this difficulty into account.

Academization and the local

- There is a certain tension here—especially relevant in projects that are university-driven and/or directly geared to research cooperation
- If academization becomes a matter of ideology it can also become a goal in itself, and then there is cause for concern about the possibilities of uniting a very strong academic focus with a practical, local, and utilitarian orientation, and this is something that should be kept in mind

Questions?





Aid in local contexts

Panel 32, Devres, Aug 24, 2016

Expert Group for Aid Studies

www.eba.se