Assessing Civil Society Outcomes

The case of Moldovan CSOs supported by Sida

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Preface

The Swedish Agency for Development Evaluation (SADEV) is a government-funded institute that conducts and disseminates evaluations of international development cooperation activities. SADEV's overriding objective is to contribute to the achievement of the goals of Swedish development cooperation.

Evaluation activities at SADEV are conducted along two major strands. The first of these involves the organisation of international development cooperation, and focuses on issues such as the management and monitoring of executive organisation, the choice of modalities, donor coordination and the internal efficiency of donor organisations. The second area is concerned with the short- and long-term impact of development assistance on global poverty. Results of SADEV's evaluations are published in series, which are available electronically, from SADEV's website, and in hard copy.

Civil society support is an area in which our knowledge about results needs to be improved, particularly in east European and post-communist contexts undergoing European integration. This evaluation identifies and assesses outcomes of civil society programmes supported by Sweden in Moldova - a country which is making efforts to deepen its integration with Europe and which has received increasing inflows of Swedish aid in recent years. The report also considers ideal monitoring procedures for Moldovan civil society organisations that receive funding from the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), in order to facilitate better follow-up of results. The evaluation is based primarily on a recent SADEV survey of Moldovan civil society organisations and in-depth interviews with relevant actors in Moldova. The evaluation offers recommendations about strengthening civil society and improving results-monitoring in a civil society organisation context.

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Executive summary

Strengthening civil society is an important democracy objective for Swedish and international development cooperation. Civil society constitutes a platform for citizen participation and influence, facilitating the promotion of democracy and human rights (D/HR). However donors and civil society organisations (CSOs) often face difficulties in measuring the contributions of civil society programmes. This evaluation, based on interviews with CSOs, public actors and donors, and on a recent CSO survey, identifies and assesses outcomes of CSO programmes supported by the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) in Moldova. The report makes recommendations for improving CSO results-monitoring in order to enhance knowledge about results, and suggests ways for improving CSO-support.

OUTCOMES AND RESULTS-MONITORING

Swedish support for civil society in Moldova should contribute to: a) increased respect for democratic principles, such as improved legislation which is in the interests of the population, increased levels of transparency and, correspondingly, reduced levels of corruption, strengthened state-civil society cooperation, and independent media; and b) increased respect for HR and non-discrimination. It is self-evident that civil society is but one of many factors contributing to these broad objectives. Furthermore, civil society outcomes cannot solely be attributed to Sida support. Nonetheless, the three civil society programmes assessed in this evaluation (one of which commenced in 2004 and the others in 2006) have received financial support from Sida to the extent of between 70 to 100 per cent. There are strong indications of civil society contributions to Moldovan public sector and social reforms during the same period; some examples identified in this evaluation follow.

Quantitative outcomes of Sida-supported CSO programmes in Moldova during 2005-2007

Contributions to democratic practices and principles

- Amendments to the 2004 election code, ensuring democratic voting procedures.

- Charter guaranteeing transparency and non-bias during election campaigns.

- Central and local election committees constituted according to international democratic norms.

- Memorandum enhancing Parliament/Government of Moldova (GoM)-civil society collaboration.

- Draft transparency law.

- New school subject promoting D/HR and knowledge about Moldovan legislation.

- Local and independent media networks expanded across the country.

- Anti-corruption examination incorporated into parliamentary legislative procedures.

Contributions to strengthened HR and non discrimination

- Legislation and programmes against violence in the family.

- Four homes for children in difficulty now financed by Chisinau City Hall.

- Secondary laws protecting prisoners' social, political and economic rights.

- Complaints committee concerned with prisoners' rights.

- Social reintegration programmes for former prisoners.

- Legislation and codes of conduct in prisons aligned to HR standards.

- 9 community centres providing assistance for vulnerable groups (such as former prisoners).

- Publicly financed public-CSO partnerships to assist people with mental, social and physical problems, for example, the partnership in Balti.

- Legislation protecting the rights of disabled people (elaborated jointly by 14 CSOs).

- Draft anti-discrimination law protecting a wider range of minorities, including Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender (LGBT)-persons.

- Establishment of the Ministry of Social Protection.

- Gender equality law ratified in 2006.

- Rural CSO coalition leading to public funding support being provided to small farms.

Qualitative outcomes of Sida-supported CSO programmes in Moldova during 2005-2007

Contributions to democratic practices and principles

- Understanding among public officials of the importance of integrating D/HR principles in reforms and new laws; public actors asking for CSO input.

- Attention brought to corruption cases and preferential rulings in court.

- Media at local and national levels disseminating non-biased information.

- Changed composition of the Central Electoral Commission (CEC) has increased citizens' trust in the electoral process and system.

- Media at national and local levels reflecting the interests of various sections of the population.

- The "civic coalition", consisting of a network of 200 CSOs active during the 2005 parliamentary elections, resulted in a strengthened, more confident and pluralistic civil society.

Contributions to strengthened HR and non-discrimination

- More open and constructive public servant attitudes towards vulnerable groups, such as prisoners and people living with HIV/Aids.

- Demand from public actors and the public, across the country, for HR activities.

Identifying outcomes, on a regular basis, is vital for all development cooperation. Understanding the effects of development cooperation helps in reorienting and improving strategies. Strengthening CSOs' abilities to measure results also enhances capacity development, enabling CSOs to more effectively conduct advocacy on the basis of evidence-based results. This in turn raises the credibility of CSOs. This report assesses results-monitoring mechanisms of the CSOs supported by Sida in Moldova, and identifies strengths and weaknesses in these mechanisms. Most CSOs are relatively effective at measuring how direct outputs (such as HR-debating) lead to specific outcomes (such as through input into new laws). Some organisations are working with several appropriate measures, by developing indicators jointly with local CSO partners. The use of an appropriate combination of qualitative and quantitative indicators is necessary to improve short- and medium-term results. The understanding of CSO results may be enhanced by:

- Developing overall indicators at the programme level jointly with the CSO partners and other relevant stakeholders to ensure the selected indicators are realistic.

- Encouraging CSO partners to report results on the basis of both qualitative and quantitative project indicators that may, in turn, be aggregated into overall programme indicators.

- Ensuring that data is collected regularly, using simple procedures and at minimum cost, within all projects.

- Combining qualitative and quantitative indicators: Quantitative measures indicate the scope of achievements; qualitative indicators reflect the quality of the results and the mechanisms used to achieve them.

- Enhancing evaluation capacities within CSOs, including competencies and resources.

HOW TO IMPROVE CIVIL SOCIETY SUPPORT

This report has identified both good practice and shortcomings in civil society support in Moldova. Some external factors that have enhanced civil society-influence have been donor support to CSO coalition building, advocacy and public-civil society partnerships. Positive internal factors include the growing networking abilities of CSOs, and their increasing specialisation around specific issues. These factors contribute both to capacity development and to focused, efficient advocacy. External factors that have impeded civil society-influence include limited media independence and restrictions on free access to information, and reductions in donor support to general CSO capacity development. Donor dependency is widespread, and CSOs need to develop their own income-generating activities to reduce this dependency. The following recommendations for improving CSO-support have been formulated

taking into consideration suggestions from CSOs, Moldovan public actors, and donors and international organisations consulted in this study:

Recommendations to CSOs for civil society-strengthening

- Promote the formation of coalitions, and include weaker CSOs or CSOs that are acting in difficult environments (such as Transnistria) to enhance the strength and influence of CSOs.

- Ensure regular data collection concerning results within all projects, using simple and clear procedures. Improved results-monitoring and the use of evidence-based outcomes will enhance the credibility and influence of CSOs in relation to decision-makers, the public and donors.

- Develop income-generating activities to decrease donor dependency.

- Improve internal and external communication strategies.

What to promote among public actors to support civil society-strengthening

- Create an enabling environment for the development and strengthening of civil society by providing both material resources and greater public space through freer access to information and a more independent media.

- Continue including civil society actors in dialogue. Ensure that relevant information is provided to participating CSOs well in advance of discussions, and provide meaningful feedback to CSOs that have contributed input.

- Develop, jointly with civil society, procedures for public-civil society partnerships that include accountability and transparency mechanisms.

Recommendations to donors for civil society-strengthening

- Encourage the formation of CSO coalitions, in order to enhance the transfer of competencies and capacities between CSOs and to strengthen civil society as a whole. Do not exclude weaker CSOs.

- Work with CSO partners in various domains (not only within D/HR) to strengthen a wider spectrum of CSOs and to, in turn, foster the pluralistic influence of civil society.

- Encourage public-civil society partnerships in the shaping, execution and monitoring of reforms, including the implementation stage. Do not limit civil society participation only to certain programming phases (such as law design).

- Continue to support capacity development within CSOs. Most CSOs require basic organisational training.

- Conduct risk analyses prior to implementing new development cooperation policies. New policies may have damaging unintended consequences that could be avoided through the development of plans for dealing with such consequences prior to implementation.

- Enhance the self-sufficiency of CSOs by promoting income-generating strategies that do not rely on donor funding.

- Promote transparency and accountability mechanisms in public-CSO partnerships.

It is problematic to isolate the specific impact of a particular donor's support. However, it is clear that Swedish assistance has played an important role in promoting CSO-development and influence in Moldova: Sida has maintained its CSO project support, while, as indicated by the interviews, a majority of donors have been reducing this kind of support. This evaluation is conducted within a former Soviet Union context that presents specific restrictions on civil society-strengthening, such as restricted access to information. Nonetheless, the Moldovan EU integration plan provides significant opportunities for the inclusion of civil society actors in reform processes. The lessons learnt from this evaluation are therefore particularly relevant for Swedish partner countries within post-communist contexts that are striving to move closer to Europe.

List of acronyms

Aids   Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
CBO   Community Based Organisation
CSO   Civil Society Organisation
DAC   Development Assistance Committee
DFID   Department For International Development
D/HR   Democracy and Human Rights
EU-COM   European Commission
EF   Eurasian Foundation
EGPRSP   Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
EUMAP   EU-Moldova Action Plan
GoM   Government of Moldova
HIV   Human Immunodeficiency Virus
HOM   Humanist Committee on Human Rights
IOM   International Organisation for Migration
LFA   Logical Framework Analysis
LGBT   Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender
MDGs   Millennium Development Goals
MFA   Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MFA and EI Moldovan Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration
NGO   Non-Governmental Organisation
ODI   Overseas Development Institute
OECD   Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OSCE   Organization for Economic Co-operation and Security in Europe
PRSP   Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
RBM   Results Based Management
SADEV   Swedish Agency for Development Evaluation
SEKA   Department for Cooperation with NGOs, Humanitarian Assistance and Conflict Management
SHC   Swedish Helsinki Committee
Sida   Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
Soros   Soros Foundation
TACIS   Technical Aid to the Commonwealth of Independent States
UNDP   United Nations Development Program
UNICEF   United Nations Children's Fund
USAID   U.S. Agency for International Development

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Contents

1   Introduction

Expectations on civil society actors in development cooperation are growing. Donors increasingly encourage civil society organisations (CSOs) to engage in advocacy, monitoring and watchdog activities to ensure that reforms are carried out (UNDP 2006). Donors expect governments of partner countries to collaborate with civil society, consistent with the Paris Agenda and with the trend towards increasing budget support. While the Paris Declaration emphasises national ownership it does not explicitly define the role of civil society. Civil society actors therefore often fear a reduced role (OECD 2005; Pratt 2006; Flores and Engelhardt 2006). However democracy assistance often fails if there is no mutual strengthening of democratic "supply" sides (that is, institutions protecting democratic rights) and "demand" sides, represented by citizens and civil society (Carothers 1999; Burnell 2004). The strengthening of civil society is therefore imperative for democratic development. Civil society is "the arena, outside the family, the state, and the market where people associate to advance common interests" (Heinrich 2004:13). CSO programmes often aim at facilitating popular participation in and influence over public policy-making processes.

Efficient CSO-assistance requires that donors tailor their support to recognise the role and function of civil society. Accordingly, it is necessary to consider the relationship of civil society with, and its specific impact upon, the environment within which it functions (Heinrich 2004:7). It is also essential to consider the roles and functions of CSOs within civil society. However few evaluations of development cooperation analyse results in terms of civil society strengthening and influence over developmental processes (Björk 2006; SEKA-Sida 2006a:27). Furthermore, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the Paris Declaration emphasise the demonstration of results (OECD-DAC 2005). The ability to generate and use evidence-based results is not only in the interests of donors, but it is also important in raising the credibility and influence of CSOs. Over the last decade the international community has increasingly called for improved evidence-based assessments in the domain of democratic governance, including advocacy[2] (see OECD-Metagora 2005; HOM 2007). It is frequently mentioned that civil society-influence is difficult to measure. However there is a plethora of evidence demonstrating the influence that CSOs have had over political developments (Carothers 2006). Institutional and quantitative results may be easier to grasp than less tangible CSO outcomes. But it is also necessary to follow up and evaluate results of CSO programmes. Here qualitative and contextual data are needed, in order to interpret formal results (OECD-Metagora 2005:4).

This report identifies and evaluates the outcomes of Swedish-supported CSO-programmes in Moldova that have had democracy and human rights (D/HR) objectives. Further, it assesses the capacities of these programmes to measure outcomes. Swedish civil society support is channelled through two main mechanisms: Swedish frame-

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[2] SADEV's project groups in the D/HR area actively participate in international networks that aim to improve data collection and evaluation in the D/HR domain and in which the OECD-Metagora and the UNDP Oslo Governance Centre (amongst others) are taking part. See for example HOM 2007.

work CSOs (through the co-financing CSO budget line), and from embassies directly to CSOs in partner countries (Gunnarson 2006). While the first mechanism aims at strengthening civil society at a general level, the second should contribute to goals that are defined in cooperation strategies. This evaluation focuses on support channelled through a Swedish embassy (in Moldova) on the basis of a cooperation strategy. It focuses on outcomes, and is based on a recent SADEV-CSO survey and a large number of in-depth interviews with CSOs, public actors and donors. The Republic of Moldova (hereafter referred to as Moldova) was selected as a case study because: Sweden is the largest European bilateral donor and has recently increased its support to Moldova[3]; Moldova is the poorest country in Europe[4]; and D/HR is prioritised within Swedish-Moldovan development cooperation (in 2006 44 per cent of Swedish support was directed towards good governance).

Improvements in the quality of life enjoyed by Moldavians are impeded by corruption, weak D/HR, poor social services and territorial conflict (Swedish MFA 2004, 2007). Consequently, democratic reform and a strengthened civil society have become pivotal objectives for Swedish development cooperation with Moldova, as well as pivotal means in achieving them. The overarching goal of Swedish development cooperation is "to contribute to an environment supportive of poor people's own efforts to improve their quality of life" (Swedish MFA 2005:5; SEKA 2006b). Civil society represents an important arena for such efforts. Furthermore, Swedish development policy builds upon "a rights perspective" and "the perspective of the poor" (Government of Sweden Gov. Bill 2002/03:122). A rights perspective means that D/HR should guide development cooperation. The perspective of the poor implies that groups and individuals who are poorer or less privileged than others in society should be empowered to influence and lead development processes. A strong civil society, in which people who are poor can organise themselves, promote their interests and influence outcomes is an important pillar of democracy (Sida 2007). CSOs include community based organisations (CBOs), and local, national, professional and international advocacy groups (SEKA-Sida 2006a:14). We also include non-governmental organisations (NGOs) within the meaning of CSO in this report.

Moldova came under the administration of various authoritarian communist regimes, from the Soviet period during and after World War II, until the early 1990s. These regimes allowed scant space for the development of civil society. More recently, the democratically elected Moldovan Government promised a number of reforms to facilitate Moldova's European integration, to promote D/HR and to reduce poverty. The participation and influence of civil society is vitally important to the realisation of these reforms. Furthermore, Moldova therefore represents a former Soviet Republic undergoing European integration - a context that has been subject to few evaluations of this kind. Swedish development cooperation in Eastern Europe is based upon European integration, and the Moldovan case provides lessons for the development of cooperation strategies with countries that have similar contexts.

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[3] With a population of around 4.2 million, in 2006 Moldova received about SEK92 million (Embassy of Sweden/Office for Cooperation, Moldova 2006b). For the period 2007-2010 Swedish aid to Moldova is budgeted to increase to about SEK110 million per year (Swedish MFA 2007).
[4] Approximately one-quarter of the population lives below the poverty line (Swedish MFA 2007).

1.1 Evaluation objectives

This evaluation aims to identify and assess outcomes of civil society support to, in turn, consider how this support may be administered more efficiently. Although this evaluation is based on the Moldovan case, the Sida-supported CSO programmes that are assessed here are similar to those of most other Swedish partner countries, and this study's conclusions are therefore of more general application for Swedish development cooperation. This evaluation also includes information of more specific interest; in particular regarding how civil society may be supported in post-communist contexts in which Sweden supports European integration efforts. Strengthening civil society is an important component of such integration efforts. This report also briefly assesses CSO results-monitoring and -reporting procedures, which were primarily used as background for the survey and interviews conducted for the evaluation. Good monitoring and reporting procedures are important prerequisites for monitoring outcomes. We present recommendations about improving CSO monitoring and reporting. This evaluation seeks to:

1   Identify and assess outcomes of Sweden's support for civil society in Moldova;

2   Provide recommendations about how CSO results-monitoring and -reporting can be improved to increase our knowledge about the impact of supporting civil society; and

3   Provide recommendations about how decision-makers, donors and partner countries may improve their support for civil society generally, and in particular, in post-communist contexts undergoing European integration reforms.

1.2 Method, delimitations and evaluation design

This evaluation assesses outcomes of Sida-supported CSO programmes against the objectives outlined in the Swedish-Moldovan cooperation strategy for 2004-2006. The civil society D/HR objectives of this cooperation strategy, and those of the CSOs, are consistent with the ownership principle outlined in the Paris Agenda since they were to a large extent developed by civil society itself. As mentioned earlier, this evaluation focuses solely on Swedish support for civil society under the Swedish-Moldovan cooperation strategy. This support is directed towards a total of 46 Moldovan CSOs, and is channelled through three intermediary CSOs: the Eurasian Foundation (EF), the Soros Foundation (Soros) and the Swedish Helsinki Committee (SHC). This evaluation does not aim to draw comparisons between the three intermediary CSOs, nor to assess the efficiency of channelling support through CSOs in cooperation countries compared with using CSOs based in Sweden. Rather the report's principal focus is on assessing the outcomes by aggregating results of Sida-supported CSO programmes in Moldova. Sida finances approximately 70 per cent of the Soros and EF programmes in Moldova, and it finances 100 per cent of the SHC programme.[5]

This evaluation focuses on both qualitative and quantitative outcomes. Results of Swedish CSO-support in Moldova have been traced by using a combination of methods. Firstly, Sida and CSO documentation concerning strategies and results were con-

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[5] Sida 2003c, 2006a, 2006b:11, 2006c:11. See also chapter two.

sulted. Good CSO monitoring is an important prerequisite to enhanced knowledge of results of civil society support (Chowdhury *et al*. 2006). Therefore, interviews focusing on monitoring and reporting procedures were conducted with Sida, and with CSOs active in Moldova that report results to Sida. Secondly, a questionnaire was sent to the 46 Moldovan CSOs that receive Sida support.[6] The survey questions concerned the role and influence of Moldovan CSOs in relation to donor support, and how, over the last several years, those CSOs, have contributed to Swedish-Moldovan D/HR goals (the questionnaire is reproduced in Annexe VI to this report). The CSOs were also asked to provide evidence concerning how they contributed to the outcomes that are enshrined both in their own objectives and in the Swedish-Moldovan cooperation strategy. Thirdly, the authors of this report conducted a field study in Moldova in May 2007. Over the course of two weeks, in-depth interviews were conducted with CSOs[7] supported by Sida-funded programmes and active across various D/HR domains (such as elections, justice reform, legal and social assistance, and so on) and in different regions (Chisinau, the north, the south, the separatist Transnistria area, and so on), with public officials (at Moldovan ministries and government agencies) that collaborate with civil society, and with various international organisations and donors. Eleven interviews were conducted with Moldovan CSOs, six were conducted with Moldovan public officials, and seven with international organisations and donors (the interview questions are outlined in Annexes III-IV to this report).

This evaluation contains five sections. Following this first section, chapter two discusses what results should be expected from CSO-support, and provides an overview of Swedish civil society policy and the objectives of CSO D/HR support in Moldova. Chapter three then presents guidelines for good results-monitoring, followed by an assessment of results-monitoring among the CSOs in Moldova that receive Sida support. A Moldovan civil society baseline is outlined, in relation to which change can be measured. Chapter four presents outcomes of Sida-supported CSO programmes in Moldova. The chapter discusses factors that enhance or impede the development and influence of civil society. Special attention is devoted to the role of Sida and other donors in this respect, in order to analyse ways in which civil society support may be improved. Chapter five summarises the key conclusions and suggests means of improving civil society support and results-monitoring, with particular applicability in post-communist contexts characterised by European integration efforts.

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[6] The 13 questions asked were qualitative; designed to elicit information concerning both concrete results and factors that may enhance or impede civil society-influence. The survey targeted all 46 Moldovan CSOs that receive Sida support. 46 questionnaires were despatched on 3 April 2007. 20 responses had been received by the closing date, 20 July 2007. This response rate was statistically acceptable given the qualitative character of the survey. The large number of in-depth interviews in the field with Moldovan public actors, CSOs, donors and international organisations also enabled the cross checking of survey data. Annexe V to this report lists the 46 Moldovan CSOs that were surveyed.
[7] Since Sida's CSO-support in Moldova is channelled through the three bodies - the Swedish Helsinki Committee, the Soros Foundation and the Eurasian Foundation - this study endeavoured to interview an equivalent number of Moldovan CSO partners of each of the SHC, Soros and EF. However, the ultimate selection of CSO-interviewees was of course dependent upon availability.

2 Results to expect: Sida CSO policy and objectives in Moldova

It is necessary to establish a clear view in relation to desired results of civil society support in order to assess the results actually achieved. At a general level it is useful to look at donors' experiences from a variety of countries. This chapter reviews general experiences of civil society support: What kinds of results may be expected? How can donors improve the CSO-support? Thereafter, the chapter gives an overview of the Swedish approach to civil society support, followed by an outline of the objectives of Swedish civil society assistance in Moldova.

2.1 Civil society support to reach D/HR objectives

Democratic governance is imperative in the fight against poverty: unequal resource distribution reflects unequal power relations (Sida 2003b:13). The democratic principles of participation, openness and transparency, accountability, access to justice, non-discrimination, equity and equality should enable people who are poor and less privileged to influence and improve societal developments (Sida 2003b). Civil society, as a platform for popular participation, can play a significant role in the introduction and development of democracy in a country (Sida 2004:12; Sida 2007:6). Development cooperation contributes in various ways to democratisation processes. Technical assistance can strengthen the judiciary in relation to oversight of executive powers. Improved socio-economic conditions may enable more people to influence politics. Support for financial management institutions may increase transparency and strengthen internal control and audit functions. Donors often condition their support upon democratic reforms. However, it is often difficult to identify an explicit (or a direct) correlation between aid and democratisation (Knack 2004).

Civil society participation in public policy making processes is one important component in democratisation processes (SEKA-Sida 2003:9). However civil society support must be undertaken with explicit awareness of the risks it harbours for inducing donor dependency and in eroding internal accountability; factors which endanger the very essence of civil society: its autonomy and active popular involvement (Hadenius and Uggla 1996). Not all CSOs are necessarily intrinsically democratic, but a society that imposes oppressive restrictions on individuals' rights to influence societal developments, to organise and to express opinions is certainly far from democratic. Engagement with civil society in efforts to promote human rights and reduce poverty is implicitly a political activity. Those engaging in such activity should thus be aware of possible political tensions arising from CSO-support (UNDP 2001:4). Some states, including Russia, China, Belarus and Zimbabwe, have recently questioned support for civil society, largely due to conflicts of interest that such support initiatives raise within these countries. The countries mentioned have imposed laws that hamper the ability of NGOs to receive aid and therefore to promote democracy (Carothers 2006).

CSO programmes often focus on specific human rights or particular marginalised groups (Sida 2003b:26). For example, CSOs may be oriented towards delivering services for the poor, improving popular participation in the political process, or reducing state control. During the last decade the role of CSOs has been shifting away from service delivery towards public policy influence (advocacy). However this shift has not been accompanied by a commensurate development of capacity among CSOs that would enable them to more effectively influence governments' development policies (Mendizabal 2006:23). Thus, there is a growing need to imbue civil society organisations with the capacity to engage in policy processes, in order to bring about sustained long-term change in that sphere (Chowdhury *et al.* 2006:6).

Results to expect

Research has shown that direct support to local communities can have a significant impact for a relatively small outlay of resources (see for example ODI 2006:6; UNDP 2003). Donor-CSO partnerships are often most effective when the leadership role is assumed by the CSOs. This approach is well demonstrated in the global fight against HIV/Aids. For instance, in Burkina Faso CSO-led partnerships have improved the country's efforts to combat the disease. In Southeast Asia CSOs broke the silence associated with HIV/Aids. In Mongolia, still a low-prevalence country, CSOs were able to focus the Government's attention on the HIV/Aids epidemic, which averted a threatening crisis (UNDP 2003:15-17).

The success of CSO engagement is dependent upon several factors. Firstly, the environment in which CSOs act is important (Methven 2006:4). Here it is necessary to identify possible conflicts of interests between the state, the market and civil society. This knowledge is vital for forming strategies for long-term CSO engagement and influence (Chowdhury et al. 2006:6). It is also necessary to balance civil society involvement in policy arenas with local accountability and civic mobilisation on the ground (UNDP 2001:4). Several sources highlight the importance of CSOs working together, forming a "united voice". This approach has a number of advantages: it enables CSOs to operate more cost effectively and to learn from the experiences of others, and also brings strength in numbers to empower CSOs in their engagement with the State. Successful networks - consisting of local communities, CSOs, researchers, international governments and donors - are, in general, more effective than individuals at producing, sharing and disseminating CSO results (Chowdhury et al. 2006:6). This, of course, assumes that there are no major conflicts of interests between the CSOs that are members of the networks. However, action at the individual CSO level may also have important impacts, such as facilitating the formation of strong CSO-policymaker bonds. This, in turn, may result in a more ready uptake of CSO research into policy processes and better media access for CSOs (Mendizabal 2006). Another factor that enhances CSO-influence is the use of evidence; systematic efforts to build CSO work upon knowledge and information. The evidence - or information - must be of practical use, relevant, contemporary, credible, accurate, and as objective as possible (Court et al. 2006:4, 33-4).

How donors may enable CSOs to reach high-standard goals

Other evaluations indicate a number of factors that enhance positive outcomes of civil society support (see for example Court et al. 2006; Methven 2006; ODI 2006;

OECD-Metagora 2005 and UNDP 2003). These factors are outlined briefly below:

- Obtain a clear picture of where civil society is at present, and use governments' and CSOs' joint visions of the role of civil society as a starting point for support.

- Work with a broad range of citizenry when determining thematic areas for CSO-support.

- Avoid aligning civil society with specific interests of donors, since this may undermine civil society's capacity to hold the State to account.

- Differentiate CSO-support: avoid disenfranchising small, effective civil society groups and grassroots organisations that may have limited absorptive capacity - go beyond NGO support.

- Be flexible - adapt to changing civil society conditions.

- Ensure funding is allocated for informed CSO-engagement in various domains, enabling civil society-influence through access to and use of information.

- Encourage CSO partnerships in order to enhance CSO influence and improve the coherence around policy objectives.

- Strengthen monitoring and evaluation procedures to enhance learning and improve strategies.

- Play a supportive role, through continuous provision of space, training and resources.

2.2   Swedish CSO-support

Sida defines civil society as "… an arena, separate from the state, the market and the individual household, in which people organise themselves and act together in their common interests" (Sida 2007:5). Strengthening civil society is a means employed to achieve a strengthened democracy, but it is also a D/HR goal in itself. According to Sida's newly-adopted overarching policy, "Sida's support to civil society", Sida shall, in all of its operations, "aspire to promote the development of a vibrant and democratic civil society that improves the possibilities for people who are poor to improve their living conditions" (Sida 2007:4). CSO-assistance is commonly pursued by donors to further democratic objectives. CSO promotion of HR is particularly important in Swedish democracy support. Sweden ratified an explicit human rights-based approach (HRBA) in 1997-1998 (Swedish MFA and Sida 2001). Accordingly, Swedish partnerships with developing countries are based on HR conventions to which all parties adhere. An important aspect of this policy is to understand poverty in terms of a lack of rights, rather than solely a lack of material needs. According to Sweden's "perspective of the poor" policy, development cooperation must be based on this multi-dimensional understanding of poverty (Sida 2002:7-8). Further, Sweden's Policy for Global Development emphasises both "a rights perspective" and "the perspective of the poor" (Government of Sweden Gov. Bill 2002/03:122; Committee Report 2003/2004:UU3; Parliamentary Communication 2003/2004:112). The rights perspective means that D/HR guide both the goals and the execution of Swedish develop-

ment cooperation. The perspective of the poor requires that development processes and policy be shaped and driven to a greater extent by the circumstances, experiences and priorities of people who are poor (Government of Sweden 2003). Civil society constitutes an important arena for such participation.

Sida uses four principal means to support civil society: three of these contribute directly to supporting civil society, while the other contributes indirectly. Sida provides support to (see Sida 2007):

- organisations selected on the basis of their competence as implementing agencies to carry out assignments of importance to Sida within the framework of cooperation strategies. Here, it is the activities that are in focus;

- organisations, with the aim of strengthening their capacities as democratic actors in civil society. Here, the focus is on the development of the organisations' decision-making structures and systems, internal and external communication, and actual performance;

- organisations and networks, in order to strengthen the role of civil society as an arena for citizens' engagement, and to promote transparency, cooperation and networking among organisations; and

- the development of an enabling social environment, in order to strengthen structures that create conditions for civil society to take action; and therefore an indirect form of support. Sida shall, in dialogue with the governments in partner countries, promote opportunities for civil society organisations to influence the design and implementation of poverty reduction measures.

In each of these cases, support shall be designed in such ways so that civil society is strengthened, without risking the undermining of legitimate state and democratic institutions. This caveat applies particularly when an organisation has assumed the role of implementer on behalf of, or as a complement to, the state and public authorities. One method of CSO-support flows to Swedish framework organisations through the co-financing budget line.[8] The aim is to promote the development of a vibrant and democratic civil society that increases the possibilities for people who are poor living in partner countries to improve their living conditions.[9] CSOs have often found it difficult to measure results on an aggregated level, due to the limiting design of old guidelines. This poses a significant challenge in highly complex development activities (Brundin, Sida 2007). This evaluation, however, focuses on the other principal category of CSO-support: organisations supported within the framework of cooperation strategies. These CSOs report to Sida against goals that are defined in adopted cooperation strategies. Such objectives often emphasise D/HR. The support may be channelled either through Sida in Stockholm, or through field offices or embassies. Assistance from field offices can pass directly to implementing organisations, or it may be channelled through intermediaries such as CSOs, UN bodies and other organisations (Gunnarsson 2006).

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[8] This is the called the "EO-anslag" (or EO-grant). In 2006 this grant was SEK 1.32 billion, and was divided between 14 Swedish organisations (ramorganisationer) that have framework agreements with Sida. The same amount for this grant appears in the 2007 budget (SEKA-EO/Sida 2006).
[9] Sida's policy for civil society 2007.

2.3   Swedish CSO-support in Moldova - Objectives

From the inception of Swedish support in the 1990s until 2004, Swedish-Moldovan cooperation was focused on public sector reforms. More recently the role of a strengthened civil society for sustainable democratic development has been empha-sised. Swedish-Moldovan development cooperation is today based on three main strategies, all of which necessitate cooperation between the Moldovan Government (GoM) and civil society (EF 2005:3-4; Sida 2006c:1):

- EU-MOLDOVA ACTION PLAN (EUMAP): Contains objectives for Moldovan-EU cooperation and a plan for bringing Moldovan legislation into conformity. It re-fers particularly to elections, European standards (including policy guidelines to promote economic growth), social cohesion for poverty reduction and environ-mental protection (signed in 2005);

- ECONOMIC GROWTH AND POVERTY REDUCTION STRATEGY PAPER (EGPRSP): A social, political and economic strategy for poverty reduction (ratified in 2004); and

- NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR PREVENTING AND FIGHTING CORRUPTION: According to this strategy CSOs shall act to prevent corruption by informing about causes and negative impacts of corruption (approved in 2004).

Sida's current CSO regranting partners in Moldova are the Swedish Helsinki Com-mittee (SHC), the Eurasian Foundation (EF) and the Soros Foundation Moldova (Soros). As mentioned in chapter one, Sida finances approximately 70 per cent of the Soros and EF CSO programmes in Moldova, and it finances 100 per cent of the SHC programme.[10] The SHC supported a series of local CSO HR projects in Moldova during the period from 2002 to 2006 (Sida 2003c; Embassy of Sweden-Office for cooperation, Moldova 2006:7-8). Sida's support to the Soros CSO programme com-menced for the period 2006 to 2008. The Soros programme includes, for example, non-discrimination measures, advocacy activities and developing independent media networks across the country. Sida commenced its funding for the EF programme during the same period. The EF programme focuses on CSO monitoring of public policy-making processes (overseeing the implementation of democratic reforms), free and fair elections and anti-corruption initiatives. Both programmes are scheduled to operate until at least 2008 (Nedera 2006). In addition, the SHC programme supported by Sida in Moldova emphasises anti-discrimination, independent media and strength-ening HR and the rule of law. The aims, objectives and emphases of the Soros, EF and SHC programmes are consonant with the objectives of Swedish-Moldovan de-velopment cooperation, as enshrined in the Swedish-Moldovan cooperation strategy for 2004-2006 (Swedish MFA 2004). The strategy prioritises democratic governance for support, and also stresses that civil society must be strengthened in order to im-prove Moldova's HR situation. Figure 2.1, below, correlates the objectives of the Sida-supported CSO programmes in Moldova to those of the Swedish-Moldovan cooperation strategy (for a full description of objectives, activities and expected out-puts and outcomes of the SHC, the Soros and the EF programmes supported by Sida in Moldova, see the log frames in Annexe I to this evaluation).

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[10] For the period 2006-2008, Swedish contributions to the EF are approximately SEK 7.5 million ($1m) (about 67 per cent of the total costs for the EF programme, according to Sida 2006a), and to Soros, approximately SEK 16 million ($2.3 million) (about 72 per cent of the costs for the Soros programme, according to Sida 2006b:11) (Sida 2006b:11; 2006c:11). Swedish support to the SHC for 2002-2006 was SEK 16,66 million ($2.4 million) (Sida 2006a). Of this, SEK 15 million was allocated to the SHC Moldovan programme for 2004-2006 (Sida 2003c).

Figure 2.1

D/HR Objectives of Swedish-Moldovan cooperation (Swedish MFA 2004:6)
▪ Increase respect for HR & democratic principles, for example, through civil society. ▪ Improved legislation reflecting the interests of the population. ▪ Promote transparency & impede corruption. ▪ Strengthen cooperation between ministries & civil society. ▪ Independent media. ▪ Non-discrimination.

D/HR objectives of Sida-supported CSO programmes in Moldova	
through the Swedish Helsinki Committee (Sida 2003):	
○ *Rule of law*	• Enhance awareness/recognition of HR, improve accountability/ compliance, facilitate legal counsel.
○ *Freedom of expression* *(The media component has largely been excluded from the programme.)*	• Decrease state control, improve professionalism in media, improve legislation, strengthen media support organisations, increase pluralism locally/regionally.
○ *Non discrimination*	• Improve monitoring/advocacy of minority rights, free expression of minorities/groups discriminated against.
through the Soros Foundation (Soros 2005):	
Promote the development of a civil society in which people act to improve their living conditions through:	
○ *Strengthened civil society*	• CSO networking impacting upon public policy development & implementation, improved public perception of CSOs.
○ *Integrated marginalised groups*	• Social reintegration of ex-prisoners.
○ *Good governance*	▪ Develop independent media.
through the Eurasian Foundation (EF 2005):	
○ *Promote & enhance public engagement on poverty reduction, democratic & free elections, European integration & fight against corruption;* ○ *Trust-building between civil society, the Government, media & the public;* ○ *Promote democratic development through implementation of the EU-Moldova Action Plan;* ○ *Implementation/monitoring of Economic Growth & Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (EGPRSP);* ○ *Free & fair elections;* ○ *Prevent setbacks in democratic development by working against corruption;* ○ *Strengthen CSO networks & make small & rural CSOs more effective.*	

3   Guidelines for results-monitoring: Assessing abilities within Sida-supported CSO programmes in Moldova

Establishing good procedures for the follow-up of development interventions are imperative in order to enable learning from past experiences and the consequent improvement of development programmes. This chapter assesses capacities for tracing results within the Sida-supported CSO programmes in Moldova, and provides guidelines for good results-monitoring and -reporting procedures. These guidelines reflect good practice in results based management (RBM). According to RBM it is vitally important to measure results against the situation that existed prior to the interventions, that is, against a baseline. Consequently, prior to assessing the results-monitoring procedures within the Sida-supported CSO programmes in Moldova we present a baseline of the Moldovan civil society situation prior to the implementation of these programmes. In particular we identify the main problems that needed to be tackled, and areas in which progress and limitations were identified. Thereafter follows our analysis of the results-monitoring and -reporting procedures, and of designated responsibilities, within the Sida-supported CSO programmes in Moldova. These procedures are assessed through the lens of good practice in RBM as outlined in this chapter. The analysis is based on: interviews with Sida programme officers and with NGOs that channel Sida support to Moldovan CSOs; the Swedish Helsinki Committee (SHC), the Soros Foundation (Soros) and the Eurasian Foundation (EF); reporting within each CSO programme; and the SADEV CSO survey (2007). The assessment both highlights problems and makes suggestions for improving monitoring procedures to increase the knowledge about results. Special emphasis is placed on ways of capturing outcomes (rather than simply monitoring the implementation of activities).

3.1   The importance of good monitoring procedures for capturing CSO results: Guidelines

Evaluations require results against which to measure the achievement of designated goals. All forms of organisation must track results on a regular basis if they are to effectively understand what works and what does not, to achieve the organisation's goals. All organisations therefore need some form of monitoring system. Monitoring should clarify links between interventions and results (Landman and Abraham 2004:7-8). Monitoring also serves, where required, to reorient interventions in order to achieve better results (UNDP 2002:31). But there is often a dearth of data upon which comparisons can be based, in order to assess interventions. A common problem is that programme goals and objectives are not formulated so as to enhance follow-up (Winai 2001:24; Landman and Abraham 2004:7-8). A "goal" has been described as: "how something should look and/or be like" (Eliasson 2006:12). A goal may be a "quality"; however, it cannot be an activity (Eliasson 2006:12). Hence, in

assessing progress we are interested in changes in appearances and behaviours of objects and actors.

CSO-reporting in Swedish development cooperation

Sida requires data-reporting from CSOs so that it can measure the extent to which it has achieved its development goals. CSOs themselves need to follow up their project implementation in order to learn what works and what does not. CSOs often monitor at the project level. Sida, however, expects aggregated results (Winai 2004:2). Sida's directives about results-reporting are not clear, however new guidelines have been developed for the co-financing budget line in order to facilitate the reporting of programme results by Swedish framework organisations at an aggregated level. Sida must report to the Swedish MFA against a number of objectives, including: the contribution towards overall goals made by Sweden's Politics for Global Development (including the rights perspective and the perspective of the poor); and about civil society in respect of the overall goals for civil society support within the country strategies, humanitarian aid and in the co-financing budget line - that is, the goal of promoting a vibrant and democratic civil society. It is important that Sida compares the efficiency of different cooperation instruments in its reporting (Söderlund and Rylander 2005:7-9; Sida 2007). In direct civil society support, Sida has tended to ask CSOs for results and impacts primarily for completed projects (Söderlund and Rylander 2005:10). However, this gives only a limited picture of CSO performance; it is important to capture results both during and after implementation, and over a short-, medium- and long-term timeline.

Good practice - Results Based Management, Logical Framework Analysis and Outcome Mapping

Several international declarations in development cooperation, such as those of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the Paris Agenda, require results based management (RBM). RBM means that goals guide development contributions at all levels (Winai 2004:5). RBM goes a step further than simply monitoring implementation, with its focus on outcomes (Kusek and Rist 2004:1). Outputs are direct - or specific - products of programmes. Outcomes, however, are the broader changes that these outputs contribute to (usually together with a number of contributing factors and mechanisms) (UNDP 2002:7). RBM incorporates the following aspects (SEKA-Sida 2006a:9):

- Clear identification of goals in a logical and hierarchical structure.

- Use of indicators to measure results against each objective in the goal hierarchy.

- Regular data collection and analysis according to defined indicators.

- Reflection upon, and analysis of, results at each level in the goal hierarchy.

- Use of evaluation as a complement to data collected through monitoring systems.

- Information from monitoring and evaluation used as input in reporting and decision-making.

RBM aims to: a) use resources correctly, and b) understand why interventions work or why they do not (SEKA-Sida 2006a:9). Good results-monitoring strengthens accountability and enhances informed decision-making (UNDP 2002:6). Logical Framework Analysis (LFA) is the most widely used tool for RBM in development cooperation (SEKA-Sida 2006a:15). LFA is an analytical model that helps to link interventions to objectives (see figures in Annexe I to this report). LFA incorporates the following steps: context analysis; identification of the actors affecting, and conversely affected by, the programme; problem analysis focusing on causes behind problems; goal formulation; activity and resource planning; selection of indicators; risk analysis; and assumptions about how to reach goals (Sida 2003a:5-14; EC 2004:57-94). LFA should be used in all programming phases (assessment, design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation). LFA requires a focus on how to reach objectives, not on what activities are preferred (Sida 2003a:3). Different assumptions about how to reach the goals may then be outlined together with objectives and means of verification in matrixes or "log frames" (logical frameworks).[11] Log frames structure goals and underlying objectives vertically, and outline activities and expected outputs and outcomes horizontally (European Commission 2004:59; Bakewell and Garbutt 2005:3). Using log frames assists planning, monitoring and evaluating programmes.

LFA has been a central planning and management instrument in global development cooperation since the 1980s (Bakewell and Garbutt 2005:1); USAID had already adopted LFA in the 1960s. The method is encouraged by OECD-DAC (NORAD 1999:1). Donors increasingly promote LFA among CSO partners. However, a problem arises from the fact that LFA is used mostly in planning - especially for the purpose of applying for funding - but not as part of regular monitoring. Since log frames need to be updated regularly to remain relevant as a useful tool, this often results in the selection of unrealistic and static goals and indicators (Bakewell and Garbutt 2005:6-11). LFA may be combined with other monitoring tools to enhance flexibility and improved monitoring. "Outcome mapping" is one such tool, considered relevant by some CSOs (Interview, SHC 2007).

Since CSO programmes are often small-scale it is often problematic to measure the contribution of civil society towards broader changes. Outcome mapping is a method that focuses on the extent to which, and in what ways, activities contribute to primarily behavioural and qualitative changes (Earl et al. 2001). Such changes may be small-scale but nonetheless important. Examples from the Balkans illustrate how CSOs improved their monitoring procedures using outcome mapping (Interview, SHC 2007). Listed below are ways for developing good monitoring procedures, based on ideas from LFA-RBM and outcome mapping (see for example Earl et al. 2001; NORAD 1999; UNDP 2002; Sida 2003a; EC 2004:57-94; Kusek and Rist 2004; Bakewell and Garbutt 2005; the World Bank 2006:16-18). Each of these steps should be considered, and revised, throughout various programming phases, along a short-, medium- and long-term timeline.

CONTEXT ANALYSIS - THE ROOTS OF THE PROBLEM A good understanding of the context in which a programme is implemented is imperative for goal-fulfilment: what

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[11] Annexe I to this report illustrates the use of log frames in CSO programmes.

are the main problems in a specific context? who is affected, and how? Interventions must be clearly linked to underlying causes of the identified problem. The causes are most likely multi-dimensional, and therefore strategies must also be multi-dimensional.

IDENTIFICATION OF ACTORS AFFECTING, AND/OR AFFECTED BY THE PROGRAMME All programmes need coordination with actors and organisations acting in the same environment. "Boundary partners" are groups and individuals that the programme expects to influence. If there are limitations in asserting direct influence, influence may be achieved through intermediate actors. As many of the relevant actors as possible should be identified and taken into consideration during planning, design, monitoring and follow-up activities.

SHARED VISIONS AND MISSIONS It is important that all stakeholders share the same vision about the broader change that is needed. The mission will often incorporate a number of activities attached to each goal. Each of these activities should be clearly linked to the overall goal. Stakeholders need to share a clear vision about how the programme contributes to the broader change sought.

REALISTIC GOALS The primary goal (the overall objective) is a benefit of general interest to which programmes contribute. Goals must be clear, since they guide the entire implementation chain.

RELEVANT INDICATORS It is important for stakeholders to agree about desired outcomes; what goals they will work towards. Indicators for follow-up must clearly reflect these goals, but must never be defined as targets. Such Indicators must be considered at the planning stage, and must be sensitive to qualitative and quantitative, and positive and negative, changes at different points in time. Quantitative measures usually indicate the scope of achievements; qualitative indicators reflect the quality of results, as well as mechanisms leading to them.

BASELINE DATA AGAINST WHICH TO MEASURE CHANGE Follow-up of programme implementation is not, of itself, sufficient in a results-based approach. Effective measurement of change requires obtaining baseline data about the conditions, as they exist at the time of programme launch. Such data may be reconstructed using:

- *Secondary data* about the characteristics of target populations at the time of programme launch;

- *Memory recall* among target individuals and groups, about earlier situations;

- *Participatory assessments,* in which communities reflect upon community conditions over time; and

- *Interviews* with key informants about the conditions that existed before programme launch.

RELEVANT ACTIVITIES It is important that programme activities explicitly target the causes behind the problems identified: how will different groups be affected? what benefits or detriments are there for different actors?

RISKS ANALYSIS All stakeholders must be able to identify different factors that impact upon a programme. Factors external to the programme may be difficult to influence, however parties may be able to either adapt to them or assert indirect influence.

ASSUMPTIONS AND PREREQUISITES At a general level it is necessary to analyse the pre-requisites for a programme to be successful: what factors may enhance implementation? what obstacles are there? how could or should these factors be dealt with?

ADEQUATE RESOURCES There must be sufficient resources, including those of expertise and time, to enable successful implementation.

MONITOR PROGRAMMES REGULARLY TO IDENTIFY:

• progress and setbacks in relation to objectives;

• factors enhancing or impeding progress, and ways of dealing with these factors; and

• ways of reorienting strategies, programmes or interventions to adapt to changed circumstances.

Behavioural outcomes Large-scale impacts are often the result of multiple interventions. These emerge only over a considerable period of time. However, even in this large-scale context, short-term and small-scale results are important. Such results are often qualitative or behavioural.

DON'T FORGET CAUSATION DATA Data indicating results is of little use without knowledge about what caused the results. It is therefore important to regularly collect data about how interventions contribute to change. Such data is frequently qualitative, for example indicating behavioural changes.

In summary, monitoring and evaluation serve two main purposes: control and learning (SEKA-Sida 2006:34). It is important to respect both of these purposes, throughout all programming phases, from planning to evaluation. Control and learning also require separate, specific attention. Programmes must be analysed to assess whether they were implemented according to plan. If interventions are to be improved, unsuccessful ones must be analysed to determine why they did not work. With these principles established, the following section analyses the reporting and monitoring procedures within the CSO programmes in Moldova that receive Swedish support. A baseline for the civil society situation prior to these interventions is provided as background to the review of results reporting.

3.2   Moldovan civil society baseline - a situation against which to measure change

A short discussion about baselines

As discussed above, targets and project performance goals cannot be made with respect to the future without first setting a baseline, which establishes the current conditions against which future change may be tracked. A performance baseline is information (qualitative or quantitative) that provides data at the beginning of, or just prior to, the monitoring period (Kusek and Rist 2004:80-1). It is the first step in developing an indicator. Baseline studies may be used to accumulate information, and to elicit,

organise and present information about the needs, resources and priorities of the intended counterpart. Baselines should be used at the planning, monitoring and evaluation programming stages (Freudenthal and Narrowe 1993:5-6). Sida's policy for civil society states: "When developing or implementing a cooperation strategy, there must be a sufficiently clear picture of the civil society's structure, values, impact and environment." (Sida 2007:9). The data presented below constitute baseline information concerning the Moldovan D/HR and civil society situation prior to the implementation of the Sida-supported CSO programmes. This is not an attempt to conduct a comprehensive baseline study, but is rather illustrative of a baseline construction, and also highlights areas of developmental need.

The Democracy and Human Rights situation in Moldova, 2003-2006

At the time that the Swedish-Moldovan cooperation strategy for 2004-2006 was settled, in January 2004, democratic development within Moldova exhibited serious shortcomings (Swedish MFA 2004). Since its independence in 1991, Moldova had not made the same kind of substantial progress towards a thriving, stable democracy as some of its other Eastern European neighbours. Although the new constitution included fundamental international HR principles, in practice the rule of law was still weak, citizens' access to public information was limited, and there were few mechanisms to ensure the protection and promotion of HR (Sida 2005:5). Elections that have been held since independence have undoubtedly exhibited pluralistic elements. Further, in the period to 2004 a large proportion of the legislation was revised, in order to align the legal framework with European standards. However, since the 2001 elections that delivered the Communist Party a mandate of approximately 70 per cent of seats in Parliament, certain centralist and undemocratic tendencies have returned to Moldova's governance. By 2004 legislation was still not uniformly applied, and there was evidence that political pressure was routinely exerted for personal gain (ADEPT and IFES 2004:3-6). However, following the 2005 elections, the centre-liberal opposition presented an ultimatum to the Communist Party to coerce their collaboration in Parliament. Consequently, the two factions agreed to work together to implement political and economic reforms to enhance Moldova's European integration (Dawidson 2006).

Analyses conducted prior to the Swedish-Moldovan strategy (for the period 2004-2006) identified corruption as among the main obstacles to development. In 2004 Moldova ranked 114 out of 146 countries surveyed in Transparency International's 2004 Corruption Perceptions Index; the following year Moldova ranked 88 out of 159 countries, indicating some limited improvement. Despite laws promoting governmental transparency, restrictions on access to information remained (Freedom House 2005-2006). A further problem was that the civil service was not considered politically independent, a legacy of old, bureaucratic (Soviet) state structures (Sida 2005:9). Additionally, several courts in Moldova were, and remain, inefficient, unprofessional and sometimes partisan. A large proportion of court rulings are never delivered, and there is evidence of prosecutors, judges and law enforcement officials accepting bribes or being under other pressure from or influence of government figures (Freedom House 2003-2006).

Corruption is a significant problem in Moldova. Despite laws that promote government transparency, access to information remains limited (Freedom House 2006).

Freedom of expression is guaranteed by the constitution, however other laws prohibit insults against the State and defamation of senior government officials. Prison sentences for such actions were abolished in 2004, but journalists are subject (still in 2007) to fines, and self-censorship is consequently widespread (Freedom House 2003, 2005). In 2004 Moldova's media, and news diffusion in general, was still heavily dependent upon state structures; the Government has habitually used these structures in favour of the dominant party (ADEPT and IFES 2004:9-14). In 2002 nearly 500 media workers at the State-owned "TeleRadio Moldova" held demonstrations to protest against alleged censorship and to demand greater media independence. In 2003 legislation was passed that transferred the State-controlled (and dominant) TeleRadio Moldova company to an ostensibly independent corporation. By June 2004 TeleRadio Moldova's coverage still demonstrated a heavy pro-government bias, and this continued in the lead-up to the 2005 parliamentary election. TeleRadio Moldova remains the only public service broadcaster with national reach (Freedom House 2003-2006).

The 2003 local elections were deemed by outside observers to have been conducted largely in line with international standards, but bias among the media, intimidation of opposition candidates and irregularities during the poll were also observed (Freedom House 2004, 2005). The most recently held parliamentary elections, in 2005, were considered free in terms of voters' choice (OSCE 2005). But monitoring groups did highlight flaws during the election campaign, such as police searches of opposition offices and harassment of opposition candidates. The Communist Party was also accused of manipulating State-controlled media and using state funds to bolster its electoral platform (Freedom House 2006). Further, the freedom and fairness of elections cannot be judged in isolation from the electoral campaign period. To exercise free choice, citizens need accurate and unbiased information about all political candidates. Prior to the 2005 elections there was concern amongst analysts that the limits on the circulation of information would favour the dominant political apparatus (ADEPT and IFES 2004). The OSCE (2005) confirms that, up to the 2005 elections, there was very limited public space for electoral campaigning, and the Communist Party (which won a large majority of votes in the 2001 elections) received more space than opposition candidates. And here again, the State television station, which is the only channel with national coverage, clearly favoured the incumbent party (OSCE 2005:1-2). Another concern was that, since the President and the Parliament appointed three members each of the Central Election Commission (CEC), six out of a total of nine members of that commission would, in effect, represent the incumbent party (OSCE 2005:1-2).

The situation in Transnistria (a separatist region in East Moldova, comprising over half a million inhabitants and with large Ukrainian- and Russian-speaking groups, administered under international - mainly Russian - peace keeping forces) is graver; a self-declared government severely limits the ability of voters in that region to participate in Moldova's national elections (ADEPT and IFES 2004; Freedom House 2003-2004). Voting could not take place in Transnistria in Moldova's 2003 local elections, or in the 2005 national elections. In 2005 only 8,200 residents from Transnistria were able to vote at polling stations that were located adjacent to the border, just outside Transnistria (OSCE 2005:3).

This overview of Moldova's D/HR situation over the last several years highlights the need to continuously promote and support governance reforms in Moldova. Sida considers the participation of civil society essential in order to enhance the implementation of democratic and economic reforms that are consistent with the Moldovan poverty reduction strategy (PRS) (Sida 2005:6). A background description of the Moldovan civil society situation in recent years follows.

The Moldovan CSO and civil society situation, 2003-2006

Civil society in Moldova is constituted mainly by NGOs. Today there are more than 4,000 NGOs registered with the Moldovan Ministry of Justice. These organisations are active at a national level. In addition there are several thousand CSOs registered with local authorities. The growth in the number of CSOs coincided with increased donor support in 2000, targeting social services and rural areas in particular (Transtec 2006:4-6). Since the first NGOs appeared in the 1990s, Moldovan civil society has evolved into three distinct categories: well-organised and advanced organisations based in the capital and urban centres, less developed CSOs that often are single person entities, and a third category in Transnistria, comprising CSOs that exist in a hostile and authoritarian regional political environment. The less developed CSOs often have limited organisational and financial management capacity, and are therefore often dependent on grants (the 2005 NGO Sustainability Index). The weaker and service-oriented CSOs are commonly found in rural areas. Although these organisations frequently are donor-driven, there is a great demand for their services among various vulnerable groups whose needs are not catered for by the State. Many CSOs tend to focus on more "socially acceptable" disadvantaged groups, such as children, the handicapped and the elderly; services for other large socially- and economically excluded categories, such as former prisoners and those infected with HIV/Aids, are poorly developed (Transtec 2006:8-9).

In contrast, CSOs that are well organised and based in urban centres are characterised by advanced organisational capacities, sound financial management systems, multiple sources of funding, strong memberships, positive public images and working relations with national and local government institutions (the 2005 NGO Sustainability Index). Prior to the cooperation strategy period, 2004-2006, Moldovan civil society was described by international observers as active but still weak, especially in the countryside. Meanwhile it was noted that civil society could come to play an important role in the struggle to raise the Government's respect for D/HR as well as the voices of the poor (Swedish MFA 2004). Moldova's citizens are ostensibly permitted to participate freely in CSOs, however, over the 2004-2006 strategy period, some CSOs have complained of government interference. In addition, unless CSOs receive support from outside the country, they are generally poorly funded, which limits their activities (Freedom House 2003-2006).

Moldovan CSOs increasingly work through networks - a significant change in CSO-behaviour since the 1990s. This enhances the capacity development and influence of these organisations. CSOs started to play an important role in electoral monitoring in 2003. Despite the weakness of civil society at the time, CSOs made a significant contribution to independent electoral monitoring (ADEPT and IFES 2004:15-16). During the election period of 2005, a coalition composed of 200 CSOs was established to

promote free and fair elections. The public was informed about democratic voting procedures, and independent electoral monitoring was carried out. This coalition was successful, and this success increased the recognition and credibility of Moldovan CSOs among the public. The work of the coalition also enhanced civil society engagement with government officials. The challenge for the CSO sector has thereafter been to consolidate and build upon this success. It remains unclear whether this growing role for CSOs on the public stage represents the initiation of lasting change in Moldova's political culture, or whether it is instead driven by the Government's desire to appease the international community (the 2005 NGO Sustainability Index).

With respect to the external civil society environment, Moldova's slow economic growth, and the absence of a culture of charitable giving and social responsibility, have hampered domestic philanthropy. Local authorities often lack the resources to support CSO initiatives, although at the national level grants are increasing (the 2005 NGO Sustainability Index; Transtec 2006:24). A survey of the CSO situation in the social domain has shown that, in 2005, few CSOs considered themselves as having an influence in public policy-making processes (Transtec 2006:25). The same survey indicates that CSOs had very limited contact with the media. Consequently, there was a low level of public awareness of CSO activities (Transtec 2006:26). The low visibility of civil society was closely associated with the restrictive formal environment. As mentioned above, the Government largely controlled the media that had national reach. In addition, media licences were distributed in a selective manner, and harassment of journalists and local radio stations was commonplace (ADEPT and IFES 2004:9-14).

After the 2005 elections the Moldovan Government appeared to become more open towards civil society, and it was noted that civil society increasingly participated in national policy processes (Embassy of Sweden/Office for cooperation, Moldova 2006a:3). Although Moldovan NGOs are becoming increasingly advocacy-oriented, there are significant obstacles to be overcome before CSOs are to meaningfully influence Moldovan politics. CSOs are challenged by a centralised political system, a historical absence of public participation and the public's lack of understanding of civil society. CSOs have therefore struggled to garner the credibility and political strength necessary for influencing policymakers. The Government has regarded CSOs as a threat rather than as a potential partner in development (the 2005 NGO Sustainability Index). Freedom House's 2006 annual country survey ranked Moldova and the (separatist) Transnistria region as "partly free" and "not free", respectively. Moldova received a score of 3 on a 1 to 7 scale concerning political rights, and a score of 4 concerning civil liberties (a score of 1 represents "free"), while the Transnistria region scored 6 in both categories.

3.3   Assessment of results-monitoring of Sida-supported CSO programmes in Moldova

This section is based on interviews with programme officers working with CSO programmes financed by Sida in Moldova, reporting from these programmes and the SADEV CSO survey (2007). The section aims to assess the capacities within these programmes to measure outcomes, and to investigate ways of improving results-monitoring. According to some programme officers at Sida, it is often difficult to

judge when civil society goals are fulfilled. It is therefore difficult to determine when a programme is completed. The problem is closely linked to obstacles in measuring aggregated results (Sida 2006). Sida is now encouraging its CSO partners in Moldova to use indicators in follow-up activities, in order to enhance knowledge about results (Nedera, Sida 2007). Sida has, for example, distributed the SADEV indicators guidelines (see Dawidson and Hulterström 2006) (Nedera, Sida 2007). The assessment below, based on RBM, focuses on the abilities of CSOs to measure outcomes and to use indicators. The following criteria are used for assessing monitoring and reporting procedures:

CRITERIA FOR ASSESSING RESULTS-MONITORING
• Abilities to measure contributions in terms of *outcomes.*
• Evidence of *how* activities or programmes contributed.
• Identification of factors enhancing progress.
• Identification of obstacles.
• Abilities develop strategies to tackle obstacles.
• Use of appropriate qualitative and quantitative indicators for short-term and intermediate results.

The Swedish Helsinki Committee in Moldova: Results-monitoring during 2004-2006

The SHC has the following objectives for its CSO programme in Moldova (see also the Figure 1.1 Log Frame in Annexe I):

Improved respect for human rights, strengthened media independence and enhanced rule of law through:[12]

• enhanced access of the population to justice;

• strengthened rights of persons or groups who may be subject to threats or acts of discrimination;

• strengthened rights to hold opinions and to receive and disseminate information; and

• enhanced access of the population to balanced and objective information.

The SHC suggests that, over the last few years, Sida has explicitly asked for evidence-based outcomes, but it has not specified how these evidence-based outcomes should be achieved. The SHC appeared unclear about what impacts Sida expects. Also, different programme officers often have different expectations and requirements. Sida holds LFA seminars with CSO partners in an effort to coordinate the monitoring procedures. The SHC has participated in such Sida seminars, and also in similar externally run seminars. Earlier, LFA was merely used in the writing of grant applica-

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[12] Sida 2003c, 2006a; SHC 2004; Embassy of Sweden/Office for cooperation, Moldova 2006:7-8. The media component has largely been excluded from the programme.

tions; now LFA is also increasingly being used in monitoring. The SHC finds it useful to link LFA to the more flexible tool of outcome mapping. As a large amount of the SHC's work revolves around changing attitudes and behaviours, alternative indicators are needed for aggregated results (SHC 2007).

SHC reporting for 2004-2006 indicates a tendency towards RBM.[13] The SHC introduced LFA among its Moldovan CSO partners in 2005. Among the outputs reported for 2004-2005 were increased numbers of police and trainers receiving HR training. This was followed by a demand for further police training from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, an outcome in the nature of a change in mentality among public officials. The expansion of HR seminars to local CSOs, public officials, journalists, teachers and students in areas outside the capital region - notably in Gagauzia (in the south) and Transnistria - and the significant media attention they attracted, further demonstrates the progress being made. Further, there was a joint CSO effort to draft and lobby for a new non-discrimination law. At the State University in Chisinau, an office for services for disabled students was opened and increasingly utilised by students in need. In 2006 a pilot programme for the provision of free legal counsel for underprivileged persons commenced. One of these services began in the sensitive Transnistria region. "Gay pride" activities, celebrating sexual diversity, were organised, which attracted high levels of attendance and media attention. A group working on the rights of sexual minorities was finally allowed to register as an NGO. Political resistance to these changes was a significant problem identified, and ways were found for dealing with it. For example, when the police in central Transnistria embarked on a strategy of interrogating CSO representatives giving seminars, the seminars were moved elsewhere. While Chisinau City Hall did not give permission for gay pride activities in the capital, small-scale activities were nonetheless carried out in defiance, with no significant official consequences.

While the SHC appears to have developed capacities to measure quantitative and qualitative outcomes, there are few signs of explicit indicators being used in monitoring and reporting for 2004-2006. The programme design suggests that little thought was given, at the time of the programme launch, about what indicators would be used in the follow-up stage. Figure 1.1 in Annexe I to this report outlines the objectives and expected results of the SHC programme in Moldova, as well as the assumptions about how the overall objectives of the programme will be manifested in practical change within society. The documentation exhibits relevant indicators for programme outputs, such as proposals elaborated for amendments to the legal framework. However, indicators are generally lacking.

The Soros Foundation in Moldova: Results-monitoring during 2006-2007

The Soros Foundation has the following objectives for its CSO programme in Moldova (see also the Figure 1.2 Log Frame in Annexe I):[14]

Develop a vibrant and democratic civil society through:

• improved channels for poor persons to influence policy making;

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[13] This section is based on SHC reporting documentation for the 2004-2006 period.
[14] Sida 2006b; Soros Foundation, Moldova.

- prevention of social exclusion; and

- improved access to media for poor persons.

According to the Soros Foundation, the lack of training about Sida reporting methodology was a problem at the commencement of the programme (Soros 2007b). Reporting tools offered by Sida included guidelines for planning, reporting and audit, procurement for non-governmental partners and the Sida audit guide. Later, Sida provided Soros with the SADEV study on the use of indicators (see Dawidson and Hulterström 2006). In addition to meeting Sida requirements, Soros programmes develop specific CSO-reporting and -monitoring tools. These tools include samples of progress, and they serve to guide the preparation of narrative and financial reports. Outcomes are generally difficult to measure due to the significant lead-time required for observable change to emerge. This issue could be tackled through long-term monitoring and the use of appropriate indicators. The incorporation of these indicators in the final reports requested from the beneficiaries will be a step forward on this front (Soros 2007b).

The Soros programme supported by Sida commenced in 2006, so large-scale outcomes will not emerge for some time yet.[15] Nonetheless, it is important to identify early contributions, since such assessments are imperative for identifying causal relationships at a later stage. The Soros projects within the Moldova CSO programme report on planned activities and those that have been carried out, target groups, project impact, lessons learnt, difficulties and opportunities, evaluation, qualitative and quantitative indicators, sustainability, and forthcoming activities. Hence, both qualitative and quantitative indicators are used routinely within each project. These reporting structures ensure CSOs focus their reporting on appropriate issues, and that they produce data on their results regularly. In practice there has been a substantial amount of reporting from the Moldovan CSOs to Soros for 2006-2007. A procedure exists for the making of assessments when planning activities. For example, a social reintegration plan for prisoners was developed jointly with relevant ministries. The plan has been piloted in a number of prisons. Progress is monitored using indicators (such as prison conditions, prisoners' access to information, health services, education, work conditions, and communication with and relations to external persons and communities). A handbook for prison staff, containing guiding norms, has been produced. Other activities aim to enhance young people's involvement in voluntary work. Networking was facilitated between public institutions and CSOs to exchange experiences. CSO input was taken (and documented) about legislation regulating voluntary activities. Other projects led to a cross-regional CSO network.

Even small-scale projects with short time frames consider outcomes within their frames of reference. For example, within one year of the programme's inception one CSO produced a school manual and a film informing school children about their human rights. Seminars were then held in different regions using this material, including in Transnistria. Important outcomes included an increasing acceptance of, and demand for, these kinds of seminars in Transnistria.

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[15] This section is based on Soros reporting documentation from Moldova for 2006-2007.

Within the media component of the Soros programme, a competition was held to select local radio and television stations to form an independent media network. The aim is for the network to improve access to information and to reflect the interests of different regions and groups. Consequently the media component has contributed to more frequent community radio broadcasts. These are conducted in Russian and Romanian. The radio programmes increasingly focus on everyday life in communities (instead of just official news). Radio programmes were established that targeted adolescents. Regular critical radio programmes began, some addressing issues concerning local public administrations. The reach of communications media has been improved. Local television programmes have become more regular. A media network has been established for the exchange of information, telecasts and competencies between television stations. Plans have particularly focused on how telecasts may reflect issues of local and community interest. Training has been carried out within both the radio and television projects. A procedure exists within the Soros programme to evaluate all training; media network participants gave evidence of this training impacting upon the way they carried out their work.

Obstacles reported in the Soros documentation for 2006-2007 relate to limited resources, especially technical equipment within the media network. Some radio projects were still in need of modern "non-Soviet style" training. Sound quality constitutes a major problem for some radio projects, which seriously impacts upon the reach of local radio programmes. Some problems are more fundamental, such as poor heating for staff working in studios. Organisational problems mentioned referred to the need for improved coordination between television stations. The Soros documentation emphasises that staff should be employed to work with coordination on an ongoing basis. Further, the documentation indicates that local stations need support from central television stations based in Chisinau with high capacity, in order to improve telecast reach.

A review of the Soros CSO-reporting from Moldova for 2006-2007 invites the conclusion that there is a great awareness within that programme of relationships between activities and outcomes. Soros has made great progress in the use of indicators. Hence, the monitoring procedures greatly enhance the knowledge about results. The programme design, seen in the Figure 1.2 Log Frame in Annexe I, suggests that great attention was devoted to the development of indicators at the planning stage. Some direct outputs mentioned are skill transfers between CSOs and assessments of reintegration systems for former prisoners. Defined outcomes relate to NGO coalitions contributing to systematic changes and the establishment of reintegration mechanisms in prisons and communities. However, both the outputs and the outcomes used focus primarily on quantitative results. Limiting indicators to quantitative outcomes may obscure important qualitative results that lead to broader impacts. Hence, the Soros results-monitoring would benefit from the inclusion of more qualitative measures; for example, qualitative outcomes in the area of anti-discrimination might relate to prison staff attitudes towards detainees.

The Eurasian Foundation in Moldova: Results-monitoring during 2006-2007

The EF has the following objectives for its CSO programme in Moldova (see the Figure 1.3 Log Frame in Annexe I):[16]

- Promoted and enhanced public engagement regarding poverty reduction, democratic elections, European integration and fighting corruption; and

- Increased civic participation and government accountability.

The EF reports annually according to a work plan agreed jointly with Sida (Mereacre, EF 2007b). This plan contains quantitative and qualitative outputs and outcomes. Initially, the EF realised that their aspired outcomes were too ambitious, a problem that might be mitigated by the use of more precise indicators. Based on the Sida work plan, the EF has also developed a monitoring and evaluation plan revolving around indicators. Outcomes are integrated components within EF project cycles. The EF asserts that their thorough procedures for awarding grants and contracts to CSOs minimise any problems in monitoring and follow-up (Mereacre, EF 2007b).[17]

The reporting documentation from the EF CSO programme in Moldova for 2006-2007 elicits that monitoring is characterised by clear structures and procedures. LFA is reflected, but there are also more evolved stipulated objectives.[18] Both qualitative and quantitative indicators are frequently used, both at the programme level and at the project level. Within the EF programme, CSO projects report on:

- overarching goals, and underlying objectives that these goals are expected to achieve;

- the demands and local needs that the projects address;

- external risks and how these might be handled;

- project activities;

- implementation plans, and comments on feasibility, cost effectiveness and possible synergy effects;

- organisational analysis;

- project key personnel;

- previous experience working with donor grants;

- a logic model showing connections between project activities; and

- intended outputs, outcomes and goals.

Further, the outputs and outcomes are to be specified with verifiable evidence of completion. Indicators of achieved results must be outlined. Clearly, these comprehensive procedures will enhance the knowledge about results. Reporting for 2006-

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[16] Eurasia Foundation 2005; Sida 2006c.
[17] These procedures include a "Grant Management Seminar", where EF personnel instruct the grantees how to use the donors' funds. The CSOs receive, at workshops, materials, report templates for narrative, financial and expense reports, donors' requirements and other information to assist their efficient project implementation. During the project cycle EF staff monitor and coach the grantee in order to ensure proper due diligence and use of resources.
[18] This section is based on Eurasian Foundation reporting documentation from Moldova for the period 2006-2007.

2007 shows that the EF's results-monitoring approach is successful in tracing both project outputs and programme outcomes. For example, journalists' training resulted in more balanced and professional media coverage, not only during the elections targeted by the project but also in the long-term. Moreover, raised levels of knowledge and awareness among the voting public will clearly empower voters to make ongoing informed choices in future elections. Media-monitoring projects in different regions resulted in increased awareness among media controllers about the need to have balanced media coverage and more equal access to media for all election candidates. Projects targeting youth led to a raised understanding of electoral rights and responsibilities.

The EF reports on the improvement in the ability of civil society to engage and have inputs in the Moldovan reform process, through the establishment of European interactive centres across the country. Activities include informing the public, training public officials and providing forums and public space for the debate of public issues for debate. Among significant important outcomes mentioned is the possibility for individuals to influence reforms that bring Moldova closer to EU standards. Further, the EF addresses the objective of preventing corruption through an alliance of over 20 NGOs acting to strengthen capacities in monitoring, advocacy and promoting the Government's ability to fight corruption. Activities include press conferences, regular meetings with public officials and enhancing awareness and knowledge among coalition members about tackling corruption. Results refer to the raised awareness of relevant parties about corruption issues.

Capacities to measure outcomes, to identify links between project activities and results and to use indicators are highly prioritised within the EF programme. However, risk analysis is dealt with mainly at the planning stage. The programme could benefit from devoting more attention to obstacles and possible negative impacts that may arise during and after implementation.

The EF CSO programme design (see the Figure 1.3 Log Frame in Annexe I) reveals several relevant indicators. Outputs frequently relate to training, campaigns and dissemination of information. The outcomes include: "electoral code adjusted", and "patterns for effective CSO-government cooperation". Some indicators may, however, be difficult to apply in practice, such as "public understanding of EU-MAP/EGPRSP". Here it might be useful to employ a proxy, such as the dissemination and reach of information about the EU-MAP/EGPRSP through the media. Nonetheless, a recent draft evaluation plan for the EF programme reflects great progress in the development of indicators. The indicators include important qualitative measures based on qualitative analysis of civil society-public collaboration and media content, as well as expert judgements of national plans for political and economic reforms. The indicators encapsulate a broad spectrum of issues relating to the scope and quality of civil society advocacy.

CSO contributions to programme goals: Perspectives from Moldovan CSOs
Several CSOs that took part in the SADEV CSO survey (2007)[19] emphasised that quantitative outputs, such as the numbers of court cases won or information seminars

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[19] This section of the evaluation builds upon information from the SADEV CSO Survey 2007.

held, are easy to attribute to a specific project, and to monitor and evaluate. They argued, however, that broader outcomes imply measurement of less tangible factors, which are often difficult to link to specific activities. Outcomes are frequently joint products of several organisations active in the same domain. Also, many activities of CSOs must evolve over a considerable period of time before their outputs are susceptible to meaningful measurement. Consequently it is often difficult to trace results over the short term; for example the effects of educating children about democracy and voter rights. Common obstacles to tracing results are high costs associated with opinion surveys or questionnaires, and weak evaluation capacities brought about through a lack of competence, resources and openness among CSO partners. To alleviate these problems more resources need to be allocated to monitoring, and towards conducting concrete, strategic evaluations according to the needs of the CSOs. The importance of careful results-monitoring should also be promoted directly to CSOs.

4   Evaluating Outcomes of Sida-supported CSO Programmes in Moldova: Progress, Obstacles and Opportunities

Most developments in civil society are non-linear. Some areas progress, while others lag. For example, CSO-influence on legislation protecting HR might move forward, while severe restrictions remain on access to information. This section of the evaluation assesses outcomes of Swedish civil society support in Moldova. A clear elaboration of the current role of civil society in Moldova, and of the environment in which it acts, is first necessary in order to facilitate an evaluation of these outcomes. The chapter commences with an outline of recent developments in Moldovan civil society (progress and setbacks), and an examination of opportunities for supporting CSOs and obstacles faced. This discussion constitutes an updated baseline, against which concrete outcomes are compared. This is followed by a discussion about how civil society support may be improved, from the perspective of Moldovan CSOs and decision-makers, donors and international organisations. The analysis is based on a qualitative survey (sent to the Moldovan CSOs that receive Sida support) and in-depth interviews with a selection of Moldovan CSOs (that collaborate either with the SHC, the Soros Foundation or the EF, and thus receive support from Sida), and with Moldovan official institutions and ministries, donors and international organisations based in Moldova. The analysis is divided into three main sections focusing on the following issues:

4.1 Current civil society baseline in Moldova

What is the role of civil society in Moldova today?

4.2 Outcomes of Sida-supported CSO programmes in Moldova

How have CSOs and civil society generally contributed to development goals in the field of democracy and HR?

What areas of Moldovan civil society have been strengthened or weakened during the period 2005-2007?

4.3 How to improve civil society support in Moldova

What opportunities are there for civil society to take part in and influence public decision-making?

What has been the role of donors (external support) in relation to civil society development during the period 2005-2007?

What could donors do to more efficiently support Moldovan CSOs?

4.1 Current civil society baseline in Moldova

From the CSO perspective

Moldovan CSOs report that civil society has only recently come to understand the key role of NGOs in facilitating social change. As recently as 1999 NGOs were widely considered to be for-profit organisations, like small businesses (Interview, PROMO-LEX 2007). Today the main tasks for NGOs are to increase the participatory spirit among the population, through information and consultation, and to serve as mediators between public institutions and the population (SADEV survey 2007). A further role is in providing services to citizens, such as legal assistance (Interview, Pro-Democracy 2007). CSOs are filling a gap where local authorities lack the capacity to fulfil their obligations (Interview, Independent Journalism Center, IJC 2007). This role was confirmed by a majority of the CSOs that took part in the SADEV Survey (2007). Indeed, CSOs are providing basic services to citizens that the State is ostensibly responsible for. Moreover, CSOs identify problems, assert pressure for reform, ensure that problems receive attention, transfer knowledge and good practice from other organisations and from abroad, and pilot and adapt projects in various contexts (Interview, Institute for Penal Reform, IPR 2007). Moldovan NGOs are not presently fulfilling a watchdog function - which, through civil society's surveillance of and commenting upon public reforms, is an important accountability mechanism in a vibrant and strong civil society. In Moldova, for example, promises during election periods are not monitored to ensure they are later honoured (Interview, IJC 2007). Civil society organisations are also guilty of a lack of transparency and accountability; NGOs tend not to communicate transparently with their members or with their beneficiaries (Interview, Soros Foundation 2007).

Civil society in Moldova can be seen as fragmented. There are approximately 7,000 registered CSOs in Moldova, however only a handful of these NGOs interact effectively with the State through activities such as monitoring and providing input into reform processes. Further, few NGOs are true grass-roots organisations, with real links in the society, and this in turn affects the image of civil society and the NGO sector; reportedly only around 30 per cent of the Moldovan population has confidence in the role and functioning of civil society (Interview, Association for Participatory Democracy, ADEPT 2007). Exacerbating this disjunction between civil society organisations and the population is that CSOs exist and act mainly through projects financed by foreign countries, and therefore they do not consider and pursue the local business community as a relevant source of funding (Interview, Soros Foundation 2007).

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Civil society organisations in Moldova

- Approximately 7,000 registered CSOs, but only a handful of these interact with the state through monitoring and by providing input to legislation.

- Few grass-roots organisations with real links in the society - only around 30 per cent of the population have confidence in civil society and CSOs.

- CSOs exist and act mainly through projects financed by foreign countries, and do not consider and utilise the local business community as a relevant source of funding.

(Interviews, 2007)

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The civil society situation outside of the capital is somewhat different. In rural areas the opportunities for CSOs to exist and operate effectively are limited, for a number of reasons. One is the limited access to information these CSOs have in outlying or remote regions; being geographically located near public institutions, where important meetings and public discussions take place is vitally important for most CSOs to effectively engage with civil dialogue. The domination of national public television (which is still very much controlled by the government) also hinders CSOs in non-urban areas. A lack of material resources, such as Internet access and office space, also hampers rural CSOs. More fundamentally and problematically for CSOs, people living in these areas are, through poverty, primarily concerned with earning a living, so in these conditions it is almost impossible for CSOs to achieve sustained engagement with the population about civil society issues (SADEV survey 2007).

The media sector illustrates the problem of isolation for regionally based activism; although the sector as a whole is receiving more and more donor support, this support is mainly channelled towards the most influential media organisations based in the capital. Meanwhile, journalists face increased restrictions, both within and outside of the capital. Active and independent media NGOs do exist outside Chisinau, but these are less critical towards the Government than their urban counterparts. Authorities in decentralised regions can also more easily monitor the activities of these NGOs (Interview, IJC 2007). A limited audience for media organisations outside the capital severely hampers media development and independence in the regions. Particularly in many of the poorer regions, such as in the north of the country, few people can afford to buy newspapers; nor do people living in these regions have sufficient disposable time or developed interest to read newspapers in any event. CSOs active in this region are increasingly networking across sectors such as media, social assistance and anti-discrimination to strengthen their influence. For example, dialogue with local authorities has led to the establishment of a local clinic that is financed by public means and provides assistance to people with mental and psychological problems (Interview, DECA Press 2007).

The situation in Transnistria remains the same as that which existed in other parts of Moldova in the 1990s; there are very few NGOs, which are only just beginning their

work, and they are faced with significant government restrictions (Interview, PROMO-LEX 2007; SADEV survey 2007). Government restrictions include local authorities restricting access to information and blocking NGOs' bank accounts. They also include constant threats and intimidation from authorities directed at NGOs and their members (SADEV survey 2007). The experience of an NGO that was formed for the purpose of decontaminating a fresh water spring illustrates this culture of official intimidation. During the work, local people began questioning and discussing the general situation in the region and particularly the state of local governance. This civil dialogue prompted the NGO to broaden its purpose, so as to act on these broader governance issues as well. The local authorities subsequently revoked the NGO's right of assembly and threatened its members with arrest if they did assemble. The fact that one-third of the adult males in Transnistria are involved in the military makes it easy for the authorities to exert this sort of control over the population (Interview, PROMO-LEX 2007).

As one informant in the SADEV survey put it, opportunities in Transnistria are different compared to the rest of Moldova since the level of respect for human rights is different (SADEV Survey 2007). However, for some NGOs working in very specific fields, the Transnistria region in fact provides a more conducive environment in which to work than in other parts of Moldova. An NGO that works promoting lesbian, gay, bisexual and transsexual rights and issues in Transnistria is offered protection from harassment by the local authorities, and the administration supports the work of this NGO. Two explanations have been put forward for this positive approach by the Transnistrian authorities: the first is that the Transnistrian leadership wants to demonstrate to the EU and the international community its respect for, assistance to and protection of this minority group; the second is that Transnistria's leadership wants to take the opposite standpoint of the Moldovan Government for political capital (Interview, Gender-Doc M 2007).

From the perspective of Moldovan public actors

The Moldovan Government is obligated, according to the EU-Moldova Action Plan (signed in 2005) to ensure that all legislation conforms to EU standards. These EU standards include respect for and protection of HR and democratic practices. The EU-Moldova Plan also emphasises that civil society should influence and monitor the Moldovan reforms. In this context, and since donors align their support and policies with the EU-Moldova Plan, it is necessary to consider the relations between Moldovan public actors and CSOs. The Moldovan Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration (MFA and EI) has a lead role in facilitating state-civil society dialogue. The Moldovan MFA considers the role of civil society as not only a watchdog role, but to add expertise to reforms and legislative processes (Interview, MFA and EI 2007). A representative from the Ministry of Justice added that civil society contributes knowledge, and conducts studies that the State itself neither has the resources, nor the capacity, to carry out (Interview, Ministry of Justice 2007). A Moldovan parliamentarian from the liberal opposition coalition perceived that civil society adds certain democratic values to the reforms (Interview, Parliament 2007). In the field of electoral reform, civil society (especially ADEPT, Ladom and the Helsinki Committee of Moldova) has played a critical (and ongoing) role in informing people and conducting training about voting rights, democratic election procedures and

electoral observation. CSOs are activating the electoral debate. This is increasing the public's confidence in the electoral system, and Moldova's Central Electoral Commission hopes that it will lead to a greater participation in elections, as absenteeism is a significant problem, particularly in local elections (Interview, CEC 2007).

Within the area of justice and probation authorities have realised that the police alone cannot solve the problem of increasing criminality. More effective measures have recently been developed through the police collaborating with CSOs, psychologists, the education sector and others. The role of civil society here is to identify problems and to suggest alternatives (Interview, Ministry of the Interior 2007). The Department for Penitentiary Institutions (DPI) (a government agency under the auspices of the Ministry of Justice) emphasises that, prior to 2005, there was very limited collaboration between justice officials and civil society. Before 2005, discussions were held with the Helsinki Committee of Moldova but today the Department is collaborating with a network of CSOs. The DPI acknowledges that CSOs present useful ideas about what types of reforms are needed, and how these ideas may be put into practice; civil society evaluates the system (Interviews, DPI 2007). CSOs are now, generally, more active, and their ideas receive a better reception, than was the case prior to 2005. Some CSOs are well organised and active in public debates, and their activities and views are often reflected in the media. However, legislative acts formulated in the ministries may always be revised by the Government at a later stage, without further consultation (Interview, Ministry of Justice 2007).

From the perspective of donors and international organisations

Donors and international organisations consulted in this study emphasise that the role of Moldovan civil society is gradually evolving. There is an increasing trend for civil society to be consulted, and on a wider range of topics. For example, draft laws are sometimes announced on the Parliament's website to facilitate civil society input. These announcements have, to some extent, resulted in an increase in the transparency of the legislative process. However, this procedure has not always been followed; only a limited number of legislative acts are available for public scrutiny, and in some instances critical draft laws - such as those concerning broadcasting and political parties - have not been published within the required time frames, thereby depriving civil society of the opportunity of making substantive input. Moreover, suggestions from NGOs are taken into account only selectively. Nonetheless, legislative procedures are more open now than they were even three years ago (Interviews, 2007).

Since the late 1990s, the number of CSOs in Moldova has grown, and the range of their activities has increased. This activity correlated with the allocation of project grants from several donors, such as the DFID, the UNDP and the Swiss Development Agency, amongst others (Interviews, 2007). Some CSOs have now evolved their technical capacities to enable them to comment upon policy and legislative drafts, and to monitor, provide concrete ideas towards, and to otherwise influence reforms - things that were not seen just a few years ago (Interviews, 2007). However, civil society depends greatly upon external donor support; the local business community has neither the will, nor the capacity, to support civil society. There are three main categories of CSOs in Moldova: a) think tanks that are well established and now often

consulted by the Government (such as ADEPT and Expert-Grup); b) weak NGOs with non-permanent or few staff; and c) CBOs (Interviews, 2007).

One donor does not consider that the civil society situation in Moldova has changed significantly since the 2005 parliamentary elections, notwithstanding that several re-forms to strengthen D/HR were promised by the incumbent Government (Inter-views, 2007). Within that donor's civil society component, emphasis is placed on NGO monitoring capacity and media, in particular improved monitoring, training and the development of an anti-corruption alliance. The donor is concerned that, al-though the Moldovan law on freedom of information is, on its face, of a high calibre, the administrative changes required under that law have not yet been implemented, resulting in substantial limitations on access to public information. Since CSOs must be informed in order to participate and exert influence, this administrative law se-verely hampers the strengthening of civil society. While there have been some im-provements in the legal field, the practical aspects of press freedom, freedom of ex-pression and freedom of assembly have not improved in the two years since the elec-tion. For example, the new broadcast legislation passed in 2006 has not led to any significant improvements in media independence. The national public broadcaster still heavily favours the Government. Instances of prosecutions against leading oppo-sition politicians, pressure on opposition candidates during election periods, the arrest of members of the press and the intimidation of journalists have in fact increased during this period, while the extent of pluralism represented on television and radio has diminished (Interviews, 2007).

Several interviews with donors and international organisations represented in Moldova indicated that CSOs play a number of important roles in Moldova. NGOs predominantly play the role of expert organisations, rather than watchdogs monitor-ing government transparency (Interviews, 2007). Also, as highlighted by the inter-views, civil society conducts many activities that are ostensibly the responsibility of government. For example, CSOs act to combat human trafficking, and to protect and support victims. Although much external funding is flowing into this area, the Gov-ernment does not evince a strong will to take greater responsibility in this area. There is a contradiction in this situation; at the same time as the Government is abrogating its responsibility in certain areas, it does not want to see civil society receiving large amounts of external funding. It appears to some that the Government's willingness to collaborate with civil society is largely superficial (Interviews, 2007).

There are few opportunities for CSOs to influence official decision making in Trans-nistria. Only a handful Transnistrian CSOs operate effectively as organisations work-ing for social change. The regional authorities limit civil society activities to less sensi-tive areas such as social issues or ecology. One donor has given direct grants to Transnistrian CSOs, providing basic support such as training in project- and financial management. In addition, this donor supported CSOs outside of Transnistria that in turn assisted Transnistrian CSOs (Interviews, 2007).

The media sector in Transnistria is more suppressed than in the rest of Moldova. There are very few NGOs in this region that act independently from the regional authorities. Moreover, media NGOs are pressured by some organisations that claim to be non-governmental but are in fact under the auspices of the regional secret ser-

vices. Against this background, supporting CSOs in the region is difficult. However, donors and international actors, as well as some Moldovan NGOs, run projects in the region that provide support to Transnistrian CSOs, such as through internships (Interviews, 2007).

Moldovan civil society is ascribed the following tasks by:

Civil society itself
- Identify problems, ensure that the problems receive attention, and assert pressure for reform.
- Monitor public reforms and suggest how to improve these reforms.
- Act as a watchdog in society.
- Transfer knowledge and good practice from other organisations and from abroad.
- Pilot and adapt projects in different contexts.
- Work with public opinion and spread information to tackle social problems, such as discrimination and stigmatisation of vulnerable groups.
- Provide services to citizens, such as legal and social assistance.

Moldovan official actors
- Identify problems and suggest alternatives, in particular in the social sector.
- Monitor reforms and act as watchdog.
- Add expertise to reforms and legislative processes.
- Add certain, democratic, values to the reforms.
- Support, add knowledge and conduct studies in areas in which the State does not have the capacity or resources.
- Conduct training and inform citizens about democratic rights, for example, in the area of democratic elections (leading to enhanced trust in the electoral system and thereby increased participation in elections).

Donors and international organisations
- Participate in, and add civil society expertise and opinion to, reforms.
- Monitor and suggest concrete ideas about how to improve reforms.
- Create public awareness of societal problems and reforms.
- Provide services to the public that the Government does not have the ability or willingness to provide.

4.2   Outcomes of Sida-supported CSO programmes in Moldova

Civil society contributions to democracy and HR development goals reported by CSOs

Since 2005, the Parliament has undertaken the formal responsibility to consult expert groups from civil society (SADEV Survey 2007). Regular meetings are held between NGOs and different sections of the Government, such as the Department for EU-Integration (Interview, National Youth Council Chisinau 2007). Procedures for collaboration are slowly being established. Some of the stronger NGOs have begun to collaborate with ministries at the draft legislation level to facilitate their influence over new laws before they reach their final stages. This has proved effective in achieving

greater influence; previously, NGO comments were rarely taken into account (Interview, Soros Foundation 2007). Transparency in the legislative process has improved since the adoption of a particular CSO initiative. An "anti-corruption" examination of laws adopted in Parliament now filters new laws, jettisoning the elements of draft laws that are deemed corruptive (SADEV survey 2007).

Another way that CSOs may exert influence at the state level is to provide expert knowledge in areas where the Government does not have sufficient resources, for example, when the Government invited ADEPT to draft amendments to the election code. These were adopted in Parliament in 2005 and 2006 (Interviews, 2007). However, a common attitude among CSOs is that the Government has "responsibilities", while civil society has "rights". Such attitudes may hinder a constructive dialogue between civil society and state officials. Also, the dearth of strong, credible and viable CSOs in Moldova may be leading to these few CSOs being "over-consulted" by public officials, diplomats and international organisations, thereby over-burdening these organisations in terms of capacity and resources. The solution must be the development of a large number of firmly rooted and influential Moldovan civil society organisations (Interview, ADEPT 2007). The Institute for Penal Reforms observes that, as CSOs improve their dialogue with public officials, they need to keep a certain distance to remain and be seen as objective, and so preserve their credibility in the eyes of both officials and the public (Interview, IPR 2007).

There is a growing trend for Moldovan CSOs to engage in partnerships with local authorities. However, CSO-influence remains limited at this level as well, since local officials control agendas for public-CSO partnerships. The most effective influence is exerted through individual contacts (Interviews, Pro-Democracy; Gender-Doc M 2007). There has been some progress in this domain. For example, the interaction between CSOs and the Balti City Hall is becoming increasingly formalised. As mentioned earlier, a new health and social support centre for mentally disabled people was recently established, and is now financed through the local public budget; still an uncommon initiative in Moldova. The willingness of the local public authorities to co-operate in this case was the result of social organisations and the media working together to raise the issues and to create awareness of the importance of finding a practical solution. The local public authorities and civil society have jointly developed a memorandum of cooperation that delineates a collaborative relationship (Interview, DECA Press 2007).

A further CSO initiative was the design, introduction and pilot study of a new school subject promoting democracy, human rights and knowledge of the law, which was introduced in secondary schools across Moldova and has been taught for the past five years. One synergy effect of this educational initiative involved CSOs working with local authorities to change policy, and thereby supporting over forty local initiative groups to address a community problem (SADEV survey 2007).

Concerning mechanisms for sharing information, some CSOs argue that information is readily available for civil society, but that people must take the responsibility to look for it; public information is disseminated through official web pages, and there is a relatively free and high calibre debate in the media. The problem, according to some CSOs, is one of a lack of communication between public authorities and civil society.

Several CSOs stress that there is limited access to public information, especially at the local level; local authorities are generally more closed and secretive, and do not disseminate information readily (Interview, PROMO-LEX 2007).

Often, as has been discussed above, CSOs have a very limited time in which to provide input to new reform projects (Interview, ADEPT 2007). This occurred, for example, when the new law on media broadcasting passed through the legislature. The legal framework states that a new law is to be published on the Government's website 15 days prior to its passing in Parliament. However this publishing schedule was not met when the new broadcasting law was to be passed, with the draft law placed on the website only five days before it was passed in Parliament. While the second reading of the law was sent to roundtable discussions with CSOs, their joint suggestions were not adopted in the final draft (Interview, IJC 2007).

The EU-Moldova Plan puts the onus on the Government to conduct reforms and to listen to civil society (Interview, ADEPT 2007). By acting together in coalitions, and coordinating activities, CSOs can increase their influence (SADEV Survey 2007).

"Civic Coalition" in Moldova

Prior to the Moldovan parliamentary elections in 2005, nearly 200 civil society groups organised campaigns and monitoring to promote free, fair and democratic elections. The Civic Coalition (partly financed by Sida and facilitated by the EF) resulted in:

- Increased public monitoring of election-related legislation and procedures.

- Over 2,000 extra civil society electoral observers covering 94 per cent of polling stations.

- Reporting on violations.

- Increased voter turnout.

- According to international observers: a more free, fair and transparent electoral process.

- Strengthened, more confident and more pluralistic civil society in Moldova.

(Sida, 2006:3, Embassy of Sweden/Office for cooperation, Moldova, 2006a:8; Interview EF 2007)

There are several examples of public-CSO partnerships. The Moldovan CSO, Gender-Doc M, is collaborating with five other NGOs active in the domain of HR, and, together with OSCE (as a neutral partner), this cluster is a partner to the Ministry of Justice in formulating a law on anti-discrimination. A law proposal was expected to be completed and delivered to Parliament in the summer of 2007, and to be approved and ratified by the end of year (Interview, Gender-Doc M 2007). A coalition of several NGOs was formed to draft a central code of conduct for the 2005 national elec-

tions, which included a guarantee of transparency and non-bias. The political parties were to sign this code prior to the commencement of the election campaigns, although few parties signed this in 2005. Nevertheless, this document has become a charter that political parties must sign one week prior to the commencement of election campaigns (Interviews, 2007).

The 2007 Coalition of NGOs working to make elections more democratic was very active in the lead-up to the 2007 local elections. The Coalition's activities involved both electoral education and monitoring. In a press release after the elections, the Coalition announced that, overall the elections fulfilled the criteria for free elections and at least partly conformed to democratic standards. However problems observed included the intimidation of national election observers and the distribution of multiple voting cards to individual voters in some locations. Serious impediments to free and fair elections were observed across the border in Transnistria, where citizens were hindered in voting by force (website http://www.e-democracy.md, accessed 6 July 2007). NGOs reported that the main radio and television stations continued to favour the ruling party across Moldova. Only very limited space was given to opposition candidates. In the written press, the majority of the private newspapers had a more pluralistic and critical stance (Press release, AIP and IJC 2007). (Despite the limited space given to the liberal opposition, the candidate of the Liberal Party was elected Mayor of Chisinau.[20])

A coalition involving the EF and other NGOs are starting to monitor Moldova's courts. Favourable treatment in the courts has been evident towards people with connections in the Communist Party; for example, in actions brought by dispossessed former owners of land that was privatised during communist rule, suing the Moldovan State to reclaim the land. The EF coalition has discussed this issue with the Government and some improvements have been made to address this partisan courts problem (Interviews, 2007). Another example of CSO-influence is the work of the NGO, the IRP, which regularly networks with other NGOs. Some of the main partners are Siedo, Lawyers for HR, LADOM and the Helsinki Committee. This NGO recognises that it is more effective for NGOs to engage with others to create an efficient network of coordinated organisations that are specialised in different fields. For example, the IPR cannot offer social services, such as housing, so it engages other NGOs in these fields where it has an interest. It has also been vitally important to involve local authorities to ensure that public resources are allocated to social services. There has been an improved understanding among public officials of the role of NGOs such as the IPR; they are not there just to "offer potatoes" (that is, to solely contribute material resources) (Interview, IPR 2007).

In the area of penal reform, the IRP has, through collaboration with other CSOs and public authorities, developed programmes for the reintegration of former prisoners - one of the most vulnerable groups in the country. These programmes are now piloted in various regions. Today the IPR is asked to comment on most new official projects in the field of penal reform. Thanks to input from the IPR and other CSOs, there are now secondary laws (since 2006) regulating, in detail, former prisoners' rights to education, social assistance, work, preparation for release, and so on. Assistants who

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[20] See ADEPT, http://www.e-democracy.md.

provide the services are paid by the State, but are trained by the IPR. Another important achievement is the Complaints Committee[21], to which prisoners may complain and claim rights. The IRP now works to promote the establishment of regional committees to enhance the capacity of the prisoner social reintegration programme. From November 2006 three community centres were established - in Chisinau, Balti and Cahul - providing social assistance to former prisoners and other citizens in need. In 2007 a further six such centres were established. There are also 12 NGO community justice centres (Interview, IPR 2007).

Examples of recent CSO-outcomes reported by CSOs

- Secondary laws giving former prisoners rights to education, work, salaries, etc. (since 2006).

- Social reintegration programmes developed and piloted for former prisoners.

- Establishment of a Complaints Committee seeing to prisoners' rights and complaints.

- 9 community centres providing social assistance for former prisoners and other citizens.

- Social health centre, providing assistance for people with mental and psychological problems, established through partnership in Balti (north), financed by public means.

- A possible law on anti-discrimination that protects all minorities; for example women, handicapped, unemployed, elderly people, LGBT-persons.

- A charter that guarantees transparency and non-bias during election campaigns.

- Amendments to the 2004 election code reflecting democratic standards.

- Attention brought to preferential rulings in courts.

- A new school subject promoting democracy, human rights and law knowledge has been introduced and taught for five years in Moldovan secondary schools.

- The legislative process in parliament has incorporated into their procedures a CSO initiative on anti-corruption examination, when finalising new laws.

- The "civic coalition", consisting of a network of 200 CSOs active during the 2005 parliamentary elections, resulted in a strengthened, more confident and pluralistic civil society

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[21] The Complaints Committee was established in 2006 and has five members: four from relevant ministries, and one NGO representative.

Trends in CSO-influence: strengthening and weakening mechanisms, according to CSOs

It is not possible to isolate one single, distinct change in Moldovan civil society. Civil society is developing, and with this development, more and more experience is gained. Some emerging trends identified in the SADEV survey (2007) are:

- an increasing number of stronger NGOs;

- the growth of new CSO coalitions and networks;

- NGO activities increasingly reflected in publications;

- NGOs increasingly engaged in policy making processes at all levels, although it is noted that NGO recommendations are rarely followed;

- NGOs becoming increasingly explicit and critical towards authorities; not hesitating to express opinions in media and at conferences; and

- NGOs becoming more involved in sensitive policy areas such as anti-trafficking.

The "expert community", consisting of between 10 and 15 CSOs that specialise in various domains, constitutes a strong element of Moldovan civil society. These organisations increasingly work and act together to create debate, and to follow up and influence reforms (Interview, ADEPT 2007). However, since a majority of CSOs are weak and have not yet developed high levels of professionalism, authorities and the public still do not attribute civil society with a high level of credibility, both at central and local levels (Interview, Pro-Democracy 2007). As mentioned above, a recent survey revealed that only 30 per cent of Moldavians trust NGOs (Interview, ADEPT 2007). A specific factor inhibiting the development of the NGO sector is that NGOs are still seen by many activists as a coveted employment opportunity. Consequently many of the NGO leadership are increasingly defensive of their positions, and thus are reluctant to employ new, especially younger, people for fear of ultimately losing their "employment" to these newcomers (Interviews, 2007).

The acceptance of NGOs working for the rights and issues of people who identify as lesbian, gay, bisexual or transsexual has increased over the last several years. An illustration of this is Gender-Doc M's attempts to organise events promoting gender rights issues. Their first attempt, in 2005, to arrange a "pride" festival, was blocked by the authorities. In 2006 the CSO planned to organise an "International day for human rights", but this too was thwarted by the local authorities, although the decision to refuse permission was not unanimous. In 2007 Gender-Doc M was permitted to engage in a silent action outside Chisinau City Hall, in support of the rights of LGBT-persons (Interview, Gender-Doc M 2007).

Several sources suggest that the media sector in Moldova has been weakened, rather than strengthened, over the last several years (SADEV Survey 2007 and Interviews 2007). Increasing pressure has been exerted on people working within the media sector, since the Communist Party returned to power in 2001. The authorities exert indirect pressure on the media organisations by sending the tax police to find "irregularities", during the last election campaign the authorities also arrested television staff on defamation-related accusations. At present, the number of prosecutions related to defamation cases are increasing (Interview, IJC 2007). However, CSOs

remain optimistic that the public understands that these investigations are based on false pretences, which remains a key factor in maintaining the momentum of civil society development (Interview, PROMO-LEX 2007). The Soros Foundation suggests that the independent media has become increasingly compliant towards the Government, moving away from its earlier period of critical revitalisation. This regression is also noted by Freedom House, which has, for the last two years, rated Moldova's media as "not free", compared to ratings of "partly free" in preceding years (Interview, Soros Foundation 2007). Media in the semi-autonomous Gaugazia region (in the south) appears far more free and independent than in the rest of Moldova, which appears to be directly attributable to the fact that the Communist Party is not in power in that region. The Governor of Gaugazia has indicated that he wants to build up a well-functioning media sector that is entirely free from political control and influence (Interview, IJC 2007).

Strengthening and weakening mechanisms in Moldovan civil society, according to Moldovan CSOs

Strengthening

•   Expert CSOs increasingly working together to monitor, debate and influence reforms.

•   The media sector's ability to act as watchdog in Moldova is fast improving, but state intervention and control is hampering this development.

Weakening

•   Low level of perceived credibility of CSOs, by authorities and the public, due to low levels of professionalism amongst a majority of CSOs.

•   NGO leadership commonly defensive about new recruits since NGOs seen as a coveted employment opportunity, which leads to personnel stagnation within NGOs.

Civil society contributions to democracy and HR development goals reported by Moldovan public actors

Access to information is critical to facilitate participation in the development of society. According to the Ministry of Justice, CSOs have access to new legislative projects, which are published on government websites (Interview, Ministry of Justice 2007). The Ministry of Justice estimates that approximately 50 per cent of new legislative projects are currently published online. Moreover, the Ministry publicises planned reforms through conferences, to which civil society is generally invited. However, only a small number (approximately 25) of Moldovan CSOs belong to the core group[22] whose members have the necessary expertise to participate in the monitoring and implementation of reforms (Interview, Moldovan MFA and EI 2007). Another problem hindering cooperation is a lack of experience among ministries in

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[22] For example, Adept, Expert Grup, Centre for Independent Journalism and Institute for Penal Reforms.

collaborating with civil society (Interview, Moldovan MFA and EI, Ministry of Justice 2007). Last year the Moldovan Ministry of Foreign Affairs organised roundtable discussions with high officials, representatives of the Government, the Supreme Court, the Parliament and CSOs, to encourage these actors to cooperate. Constructive discussions commenced, although they focused mainly on issues concerning justice and domestic affairs, and reportedly remained only at a general level. The Moldovan Ministry of Foreign Affairs argues that, in order to achieve real progress, there is a need to focus on more specific issues, with the participation of CSOs having special competencies in these areas (Interview, MFA and EI 2007). One Moldovan parliamentarian suggested that, since the authorities recognise the need for civil society expertise, the Government should take more responsibility for facilitating CSO participation by providing funding (Interview, Parliament 2007).

The Moldovan MFA has, in cooperation with key CSOs, released a memorandum that encourages ministerial-civil society cooperation, which emphasises the commitment of the State and all of the participating CSOs. The memorandum is an official document, published on the Government's website and updated regularly with CSO input (Interview, Moldovan MFA and EI 2007). CSOs have also provided input to a current project about transparency in legislative processes (including at the local level of government). The proposal was forwarded to the Government and Parliament in November 2006 (Interview, Ministry of Justice 2007).

The fact that the opposition has, since 2005, had representatives in the Central Electoral Commission (CEC) is evidence of explicit results being achieved through collaboration between the Government and civil society in the area of electoral reform. The number of seats held by the opposition on the CEC reflects the results of the last parliamentary elections. The president and members of the CEC do not belong to particular party factions (to ensure that the commission remains as neutral and apolitical as possible). The same reform - providing for opposition representation on electoral commissions - has been implemented in local electoral commissions. The composition of the CEC changed after the last elections as a direct result of lobbying and pressure from civil society; this has increased citizens' confidence in Moldova's electoral process and system. Moreover, transparency has increased as a result of civil society and CEC activities; CSOs and the CEC work together to inform citizens through electoral debates. The CEC, in cooperation with CSOs (including ADEPT and Eurasia Foundation), has produced and disseminated various brochures and guides about election procedures and the new electoral code. Such information is also available on the CEC's web page (Interview, CEC 2007).

The will and capacity to work with CSOs varies between ministries. The Ministry of the Interior is one of the ministries that is collaborating most closely with civil society. CSOs are represented in working groups that, over the last few years, have developed legislation and programmes against violence in the family, for preventive and social measures against criminality, and for social reintegration of former prisoners. The Institute for Penal Reforms is a key civil society partner (Interview, Ministry of the Interior 2007). There have been some recent concrete results from such collaboration: four homes for children in difficulty were established in Chisinau, with money provided by Chisinau City Hall; CSOs have established 12 further homes, providing assistance and shelter for children (Interview, Ministry of the Interior 2007). In the

area of health, cooperation with civil society in the legislative process is now the norm. All parliamentary commissions now consult civil society representatives, which add knowledge and ideas to the legislative process. A parliamentarian commented that this is of significant assistance, since the parliamentarians have very little time and resources at their disposal to engage in consultation to enhance the quality of the legislation. For example, 14 CSOs were involved in elaborating a new law for the protection of disabled people. The CSOs have provided critical and constructive comment, and the parliamentary committee has encouraged the Government to take these comments into account. However, many government officials retain the view that CSOs act self-interestedly (Interview, Parliament 2007).

A primary obstacle to state-civil society cooperation has been a lingering Soviet mentality among state officials. In the security sector this is manifested in a common view of detention as a purely punitive mechanism, rather than incorporating education and social reintegration. However, this mentality is gradually changing in parallel with new legislation and codes of conduct. As a result of recent reforms, prisoners - a highly marginalised group in Moldova - now have rights to education and social services that assist them to reintegrate into society. An example of progress in this area is the recent formation of a committee, financed publicly, to hear complaints from prisoners. Also, in 2005, eight educational programmes were introduced in various regions, focusing on criminal justice, prison treatment, social reintegration of prisoners and other important issues for this group. Prisoners now have explicit rights, during their imprisonment, to receive outside information, education, paid work and medical treatment, and to engage in correspondence with private contacts and their former communities, amongst other related rights. Prisoners are also informed about these rights, including their right to complain. Last year approximately 800 prison staff received training about the new code of conduct; the previous year only around 100 prison staff received this training (Interview, DPI 2007).

Although civil society-influence in Moldova is increasing, collaboration with the State is limited by a number of factors. On the one hand, the general population does not have sufficient information or knowledge about legislative projects or proposals. The oversight function of public opinion and pressure is therefore largely absent, enabling the Government to alter legislative proposals at the last moment, without consultation. In general, the authorities do not comply with the legislative requirement to publicly expose prospective legislation within designated time periods. In addition, there is still no law that protects the rights of interest groups to engage in lobbying activities. A further obstacle is a regression in media freedoms. The post-independence Government had initiated direct transmission of parliamentary debates, but more recently these have been discontinued. In the general media environment, as some television stations were privatised in 2007, the proprietors - who invariably had direct political links - correspondingly pulled some of the more outspoken and controversial programmes (Interview, Parliament 2007).

Examples of recent CSO-outcomes reported by public actors

- Input into the memorandum of government-civil society cooperation.

- Input into new legislative project on transparency.

- Central and local electoral committees constituted according to democratic rules.

- Legislation and programmes against violence in the family, for preventive and social measures against criminality, and for social reintegration of ex-prisoners.

- Four homes for children in difficulty in Chisinau, financed by the City Hall.

- Legislation and codes of conduct in prisons aligned to HR standards.

- A publicly financed Complaints Committee dealing with prisoners' complaints and rights.

- Legislation protecting the rights of disabled people drafted jointly by 14 CSOs.

- Changed composition of the Central Electoral Commission (CEC) has increased citizens' trust in the electoral system and process.

Trends in CSO-influence: strengthening and weakening mechanisms, according to Moldovan public actors

The very existence of dialogue between public institutions and CSOs in Moldova is in stark contrast with the situation that existed just a few years ago. There is also an increasing awareness within government that civil society expertise is imperative to ensure the appropriateness and quality of new legislation (Interviews, MFA and EI; Ministry of Justice of the RM 2007). There is evidence of civil society-influence in most reform areas. As mentioned, civil society contributed substantially to the new electoral code. Civil society collaboration with the CEC has continued. There have been numerous and varied consultations between government and civil society in relation to the 2007 local elections. The CEC and NGOs have engaged in roundtable discussions to identify the main problems that need to be addressed, and NGOs have conducted opinion surveys to identify problems. In particular, they have identified factors causing absenteeism (which is a significant problem in the larger cities such as Chisinau and Balti), and the lack of motivation among young people to vote due to apathy and disillusionment brought on by lack of real choice of political candidates (Interview, CEC 2007). To deal with problems such as absenteeism, the CEC and NGOs have been active in talking to youth to assure them that their vote makes an important contribution. The CEC has also provided education about the electoral process in schools (Interview, CEC 2007).

There is still a great need to develop communication tools, both within government ministries and among CSOs. Basic communication facilities, such as Internet access, are still not widely accessible within most private organisations and even in many government offices. The lack of resources hinders communication. (Interview, Ministry of the Interior of the RM 2007). Also, CSOs have not developed strong communication links among themselves. This is partly attributable to funding differen-

tials; according to a Moldovan parliamentarian, those CSOs that are the best organ-ised, and that network effectively with other organisations, tend to receive the most funding and therefore assert most influence, implying that other CSOs are left behind (Interview, Parliament 2007).

Strengthening and weakening mechanisms in Moldovan civil society, according to Moldovan public actors

Strengthening

• Key CSOs add expertise to new legislation.

• Awareness within ministries of the need of civil society input to reforms.

• Retained state-civil society partnerships, e.g. in the fields of democratic elections and penal reforms.

Weakening

• Few CSOs possess the expertise to influence. The majority specialise in D/HR.

• A widespread lack of communication tools.

• Lack of cooperation and communication between CSOs.

Civil society contributions to democracy and HR development goals reported by donors and inter-national organisations

The donors interviewed explained that state-civil society interaction in Moldova really began with the Participation Council, when civil society representatives were invited to provide input to the economic growth and poverty reduction strategy paper (EGPRSP), which is subject to ongoing review stages. However, the CSOs that have participated in this process have been only a small representative minority, and CSO input has in practice been very limited (Interviews 2007). The new poverty reduction strategy was discussed in a participatory council in 2006. The council consisted of delegates from the Government, representatives of many NGOs (all NGOs were invited) and donors (for example, USAID, Sida and The World Bank). The council suffered from two principal problems: firstly, not all parts of the poverty reduction strategy were open for discussion; and secondly, the NGOs that participated did not have sufficient expertise to form strong ideas and to lobby for these effectively in the council (Interviews, 2007). The lack of publicly available information constitutes a further obstacle to effective CSO participation that, together with the increasing re-strictions on media freedom, limits the influence of civil society (Interviews, 2007).

There has, however, been some improvement in the official environment. As men-tioned by CSOs and public officials, the Parliament last year created a concept for civil society collaboration, encouraging CSOs to be represented in parliamentary committees to comment upon new law projects. Also, public committees have been formed - in which ministries and CSOs are represented - across various domains, such as gender equality and anti-trafficking. These committees are responsible for

following up and evaluating developments in their jurisdictional areas. However, these committees have very limited resources, and administrative procedures are very weak. For example, there are no mechanisms for coordination, no agendas and no minutes taken at meetings. These committees must report to the Government each year, however they are often given very little time to produce their reports (Interviews, 2007). One donor observed that public officials want to demonstrate to donors that they are cooperating with civil society, but it saw this as somewhat superficial; while CSOs provide comments when parliamentary committees ask for input, the Parliament does not provide reciprocal feedback. Consequently, CSOs have no knowledge about the extent to which their input has been considered until after the legislation is ratified (Interviews, 2007). Further, as mentioned earlier, the Government often fails to comply with the legal mechanism requiring fifteen days' public exposure of new laws, compromising the opportunity for civil society input (Interviews, 2007). Nonetheless, there are numerous examples of civil society influencing new legislation. For example, the gender equality law, ratified in 2006 (although not yet implemented), was a direct result of civil society activism. The law on domestic violence, also approved in 2006, was also influenced by civil society and its donor partners (Interviews, 2007).

A further example of effective CSO participation in Moldovan reforms relates to monitoring. Last year one donor supported two CSOs and the NGO, Expert Grup, to follow up progress of the EU-Republic of Moldova (EU-RM) Action Plan, in cooperation with the Moldovan Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration. The monitoring material produced by that coalition has been used and discussed within various ministries and presented in Parliament (Interviews, 2007). In general, CSOs that work in coalitions achieve the most efficient outcomes. "Coalition 2005" is often held up as a success case. This coalition continues to work for free and fair elections. As the coalition has gained experience from successes and failures, it has determined that it is more effective for it to focus on qualitative work. A further coalition of 25 CSOs, coordinated through the Eurasian Foundation, has been formed to carry out anti-corruption activities, such as informing citizens through the press, and improving investigative journalism (Interviews, 2007). It remains a problem that journalists are still not properly protected; they are routinely victimised by public authorities when investigating sensitive issues, through methods such as the imposition of fines, costly processes in courts and the loss of journalistic accreditation (Interviews, 2007).

In the field of anti-trafficking, some organisations (such as la Strada) have taken on a watchdog role. CSOs have conducted good monitoring reports in this domain. Pressure from civil society, donors, international organisations and other actors has greatly influenced the Moldovan Government's decision to establish a Ministry of Social Protection, which works, amongst other things, for the protection of families in difficulties and against human trafficking; it supports five regional homes for victims of human trafficking. The Ministry is well led, and collaborates with the IOM and several CSOs.

There remains a legacy of official lethargy in taking responsibility for social and other problems. Often the Government appears to "dump" problems on civil society, leaving the problems for this sector to provide services and solutions (Interviews,

2007). Nonetheless, public-CSO partnerships are beginning to have an impact at the local level. For example, a rural advocacy campaign is strengthening the dialogue between NGO alliances (so-called second level cooperation), the Government and actors such as The World Bank, to enhance rural development. This dialogue has resulted in far greater access to public benefits for small farmers, whereas previously farmers with landholdings larger than 5 hectares received the majority of support. Through the coalition, the dialogue between rural CSOs and the authorities has become more efficient (Interviews, 2007).

Examples of recent CSO outcomes reported by donors and international organisations

- Regular CSO monitoring of the progress of the EU-RM Plan, with reports presented in parliament and debated among ministries.

- The 2005 and 2007 civil society election coalitions, previously giving input to the Election Code and continuing to improve the conduct of elections.

- Establishment of the Ministry of Social Protection.

- Gender equality law, ratified in 2006.

- Law on domestic violence, ratified in 2006.

- Rural CSO coalition resulting in equitable access to public support for small farms.

Trends in CSO-influence: Strengthening and weakening mechanisms according to donors and international organisations

Today, more than at any time in Moldova's recent history, CSOs have developed the capacity to influence public decision-making. Some influential coalitions have developed. For example, the NGO, Expert Grup, is working with approximately 20 NGOs, in coordination with the Eurasian Foundation, to develop a national development report, which aims to present civil society's development vision for Moldova. CSO work is increasingly characterised through quality rather than quantity (Interviews, 2007). One donor agrees with this assessment, citing the election and anti-corruption coalitions as examples (Interviews, 2007). In Transnistria, CSOs are now more informed and increasingly networking, in a difficult environment. There is some dialogue with local authorities, and the understanding of the role of CSOs has improved. However, civil society activities and influence here are limited to social and youth activities (Interviews, 2007).

It remains a significant problem that the majority of CSOs were created primarily to attract funding; some CSOs are considered more as small commercial enterprises than as agencies promoting democratic development (Interviews, 2007). There has been a steady increase in the number of registered NGOs (3096 NGOs are registered with the Ministry of Justice at present), but the number of active NGOs is far less. A study recently commissioned by the UNDP shows that over 50 per cent of registered NGOs were not even traceable. Of the remaining 50 per cent that were traceable,

between 70 to 80 per cent were found to be "active". This significant incidence of inactive NGOs can be partly explained through the fact that NGOs are often conceived as a means to income; some NGOs are formed with the sole purpose of earning a living for their founders (Interviews, 2007). In rural areas many CSOs were established by local mayors to improve incomes and to implement local projects. This widespread ulterior use of NGOs has precipitated a negative perception of CSOs among the public (Interviews, 2007).

At the organisational level, most Moldovan CSOs are still in need of basic training. Even the most professional CSOs require better management skills, reporting procedures and economic management (Interviews, 2007).

Strengthening and weakening mechanisms in Moldovan civil society, according to donors and international organisations

Strengthening

• Some CSOs have well-developed advocacy capacities.

• Professional CSOs are increasingly working in coalitions.

• A shift from quantity to quality in the activities of key CSOs.

• CSOs in Transnistria are more informed, and more active in social domains.

Weakening

• A majority of CSOs have very low capacities regarding administrative procedures, leadership norms, financial viability and advocacy.

• CSOs have attracted a negative reputation since, particularly in rural areas, many CSOs were formed (often by local mayors) to generate incomes, to attract funding for local public projects or to function as private employment vehicles.

4.3   The role of donors: How to improve civil society support in Moldova

From the perspective of CSOs

To become truly independent, professional and sustainable, civil society requires financial support from the Moldovan Government, which does not currently support CSOs (Interviews, Pro-Democracy 2007; SADEV Survey 2007). Meanwhile, donors tend to channel their support to government ministries, rather than to CSOs, exacerbating the CSO funding dilemma. Public authorities tend invite civil society as a "guest", rather than as an equal partner. Therefore it is common that NGOs are invited to provide input according to agendas that are fixed, merely to provide expertise, rather than being given opportunities to influence the agendas themselves (Interview, IPR 2007). This concern was reiterated by several NGOs that took part in the SADEV Survey (2007).

Scarce resources also restrict pluralistic civil society advocacy. Competition for funding among local CSOs is fierce. Meanwhile donors tend to gravitate to supporting only a limited range of NGOs, specifically in the field of policy advocacy. This may lead to agendas and priorities for civil society activities being determined by only a limited number of CSOs (Interview, Pro-Democracy 2007). CSOs must specialise in specific domains to become effective. However, many CSOs attempt to act on a very broad front, and to align their purposes with donors' agendas, in order to attract donor funding; instead of making CSOs effective, this in fact weakens them (Interview, IPR 2007). NGOs that are active in the same sector, working together towards common goals, are achieving a greater influence with the Government, which is indicated through numerous positive examples across Moldova. Donors should therefore encourage NGOs to work in coalitions and networks (Interviews, 2007).

While there is a large number of NGOs in Moldova today, the difficulty lies in transforming these NGOs into highly effective organisations. They need training; a recent evaluation of NGO training needs showed that NGOs need advocacy training, education about how to run a proper board that is responsible for the work of the NGO, basic financial management training and experience in writing narrative and financial reports (Interviews, 2007).

Moldovan CSOs encourage international donors to put pressure on the Government to implement laws that are ratified, and to support NGOs that focus on the implementation of laws. CSOs are heavily dependent upon laws to assist them in their work; for example, in the absence of a general anti-discrimination law, NGOs working in the human rights area are restricted in their scope for claiming that violations have occurred, because there is no specific legislative prescription establishing norms for how the Government shall treat citizens. The problem is not so much a lack of laws but in the implementation of laws that in fact exist. During communist rule, the legal framework was ostensibly "all-inclusive" - that is, intended to protect the social, political and economic rights of all citizens - and purported to guarantee all human needs, while in practice it achieved nothing close to this. This has had a residual effect in Moldova today, in that the written word is not respected (Interview, Soros Foundation 2007).

According to Moldovan CSOs, Moldovan civil society may exert influence through:

- Participating in parliamentary committees (official concept since 2005).

- Implementing the EU-Moldova Plan (which officially stresses civil society-influence).

- Local CSO-public partnerships, although still in very limited ways.

- Working in coalitions and coordinating CSO activities.

- Offering services where the government has limited capacity to fulfil responsibilities.

Moldovan civil society-influence is restricted by:

- Limited number of CSOs having the competence to collaborate with authorities; the key (competent) CSOs being over-consulted.

- Weak communication skills: in ministries and CSOs.

- Limited amount of time given to civil society to comment on public reforms.

- Frequently the authorities set the agenda and ask for professional CSO input, giving little opportunity for CSOs to influence either the agenda or final documents.

From the perspective of Moldovan public actors

A member of the Moldovan Parliament expressed the view that foreign support to Moldovan civil society has led to a spread of democratic ideas and norms in the country. The exchange of ideas and experiences with democratic and economically developed countries has enabled Moldovan CSOs to provide Moldovan decision-makers with input. Such possibilities did not exist prior to the provision of foreign donor support to Moldovan CSOs (Interview, Parliament 2007). But it is also argued that the competence of Moldovan CSOs reflects the concentration of donor support to certain specific areas, in particular D/HR. Other areas of civil society, such as the environment, are much weaker as a direct consequence (Interview, Moldovan MFA and EI 2007).

As mentioned earlier, a problem with CSO-state collaboration is that CSOs are most active and competent in fields in which donors have focused their support, such as D/HR (Interview, Moldovan MFA and EI 2007). Meanwhile, there is a great need to strengthen civil society in other domains, such as transport and the environment. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration CSOs need to be more specialised, and rather then repetitively criticising public reforms, CSOs should engage in constructive discussions in order to achieve results. Communication training is needed for weaker CSOs. The MFA also emphasises that capacities within ministries to collaborate with civil society need to be developed. Further, donors may improve state-civil society relations by encouraging partnerships. Long-term donor support would enable civil society to expand its role beyond just commenting on law projects to participating in implementation (Interview, Moldovan MFA and EI 2007).

According to Moldovan public actors, Moldovan civil society may exert influence through:

- Updating the official memorandum of government-civil society cooperation.

- Commenting on legislative drafts and reform projects.

- Suggesting policy alternatives and reform programmes, particularly in the social sector.

Moldovan civil society-influence is restricted by:

• Unclear transparency mechanisms within government.

• Not all legislative projects are published on the Government website.

• Funding that would facilitate CSO participation is not forthcoming from the authorities.

• General lack of public information to citizens about reforms and legislative projects.

• Government provides too little time for civil society to comment on reform drafts.

• Absence of a law proscribing lobbyism; induces public actor conflation of idea of civil society input with acting in self-interest.

From the perspective of donors and international organisations

As mentioned earlier, the expansion of CSOs in Moldova throughout the 1990s was attributable to the allocation of project grants from several donors. But since donors increasingly work directly with the Government, while still encouraging state-civil society collaboration, it is CSOs with special expertise and advocacy skills that grow stronger. Many CSOs that did not develop these capacities are no longer active (Interviews, 2007). Donor support to civil society in Moldova today tends to focus increasingly on formal governance issues and efficiency. Few programmes have a strong civil society component (a programme administered by USAID is an exception, with allocations of between $3-4 million for civil society). After the 2005 parliamentary elections, donors began supporting Moldova's pro-European strategy. However, the EC's support for civil society in Moldova still remains relatively small in comparison with the extent to which it supports, for example, Romanian civil society. Nonetheless, the Moldovan Government's and the donors' expectations for civil society participation in the EU integration process are high (Interviews, 2007). A donors' coordination network based in Norway, comprising USAID, DFID, Soros, the EF and Sida indirectly (represented by its partners the EF and Soros) shares experiences and coordinates activities regarding civil society support (Interviews, 2007).

One donor reported that, although it no longer provides direct support to CSOs (this has been superseded by the mainstreaming of civil society support directly to ministries), basic CSO-support for capacity development is still needed. Sida recently commenced its EF and Soros CSO-support programmes for 2006-2008, which, the donor argues, fills the funding gap left by other in-country donors that has otherwise left many CSOs with limited opportunities to grow and pursue their activism. Sida's support to civil society is, according to the donor, highly visible. Earlier Swedish support was mainly channelled through Swedish organisations, which the donor argued was not sufficient. The two channels (that is, support channelled through CSOs based in the country and those abroad), must complement each other. Sida engages in its CSO support in the field of D/HR in the East European region with both the EF and Soros - which organisations both enjoy high reputations through their respective

histories of high quality work, qualified personnel and good procedures for project proposals and management. They also have good knowledge of the local civil society context and are able to reorient strategies to improve their efficiency. Meanwhile, regranting CSOs and intermediaries based outside Moldova contribute institutional competencies (for example, in the field of democracy and human rights) and enhance exchanges of knowledge about good practice (Interviews, 2007).

Sida's support to civil society differs to a degree from that of other donors. Its support to civil society in Moldova expanded relatively recently, with the SHC programme in 2004 and the EF and Soros programmes in 2006. Further, Sida's 3-year CSO-support budget can be characterised as a longer-term approach than many common approaches in NGO support. Sida's programme also incorporates an inherent flexibility; strategies are developed on a one-year basis, jointly with NGOs, think tanks, donors, CBOs, and other relevant groups. Sida also supports a wide spectrum of CSOs - from influential think tanks, to local organisations that are less well established. Support goes both to equipment and training. Also, working with local regranting CSO partners and intermediaries (such as the EF and Soros) is viewed as an efficient method of support, since these organisations possess local knowledge and the ability to shape programmes through dialogue with local CSOs (Interviews, 2007).

CSO-support should be complemented with partnerships (Interviews, 2007). One donor has, during one programme period, focused on working with partnerships, and the donor intends to continue this strategy, as partnerships have proven to work successfully. It is important for CSOs to form partnerships with CSOs in other countries, so that these CSOs gain experience of the conditions in other countries and learn from each other. This form is preferred over one-off events, where representatives of CSOs meet only for the duration of the event (perhaps only a couple of days). The donor argues that partnerships whereby organisations work side-by-side, in close cooperation - visiting one another, working in a particular country for a period of 12 months or more - generate positive change and give impetus to further development (Interviews, 2007).

One donor encourages other donors to engage with the Moldovan Government in a manner that will encourage it to develop respect for civil society. This donor has conditioned Moldova's entitlement to increased aid upon demonstrating progress in reducing corruption and implementing certain governance and civil society benchmarks identified by the donor. The development of Moldova's civil society, particularly media freedoms, will be determinative of increased funding from this donor (Interviews, 2007). Another donor referred to the privatisation of formerly publicly owned media companies to illustrate issues in the media sector: Since the formerly publicly owned television stations, AntenaC and EuroTV, were privatised, they have become fully controlled by individuals that have direct political links. This has resulted in substantially diluted pluralism in the television debate. Similarly, a radio station in Balti, in northern Moldova, that aired content that was often critical of officials, was shut down; the closure was dubiously attributed to "technical problems". Furthermore, Moldova1, the public television company, has devoted more airtime to the communist candidate than to opposition candidates in the 2007 local elections (Interviews, 2007). In May 2007, just prior to the local elections, Freedom House announced its new press freedom ratings, which saw Moldova's press downgraded to a "not free"

rating (Freedom House 2007). In the same pre-election period, a majority of international donors and embassies with presences in Moldova presented a joint statement to the Moldovan Government, emphasising the need for a free and pluralistic media in Moldova in order for the country to achieve democratic development, and to fulfil its international obligations (Embassy of the USA *et al.* 2007).

Much basic training is still needed in the area of civil society support, but this training must focus on specific issues, since training that is too general has little impact. Training related to economic management, good leadership norms, writing project proposals and income-generating activities is needed by most CSOs (Interviews, 2007).

Most Moldovan CSOs need basic training
Training support for civil society should focus on specific issues, such as: • Economic management   • Internal and external communication   • Good leadership norms   • Writing project proposals   • Income-generating activities   (Interviews, 2007.)

Donors should be wary of some of the adverse implications of emerging trends in development cooperation policy. In the last few years, donors have increasingly focused on working in partnerships directly with the Moldovan Government. Key organisations involved in Moldovan development have also aligned themselves with this policy. One problem associated with this trend stems from the hasty implementation of this policy without sufficient control and follow-up. Consequently, scant evidence is available to determine whether this support is leading to the desired effects; the Government working with civil society as a real and equal partner. A further example demonstrates the risk that donors face - through channelling support directly to the Government - of indirectly endorsing the Government's poor support for civil society. One donor organisation supported a CSO centre for child victims of abuse, however after the donor's funding ended, the Government did not take over, leaving the centre without support (Interviews, 2007). Policy trends can also have severe impacts for entire regions. For example, from the 1990s, all donors supported D/HR on a national level. By 1999 this had resulted in a large number of NGOs active within that specific area in Chisinau, but left a dearth of CSOs working for D/HR in rural areas. Consequently, at the beginning of 2000, most donors reoriented their programmes towards supporting D/HR at the local level, which then had the converse debilitating effect on CSOs in Chisinau. There is a need to consider balancing policy effects between areas, and for donors to coordinate their programmes to avoid negative unintended impacts (Interviews, 2007).

Sustainability is a problematic factor when supporting NGOs. Donors' work with NGOs should be premised on the continuity of the NGOs; the NGOs should continue to be active after the donors' funding ends. This complex issue is being discussed within the EU organisation. One approach places the responsibility on NGOs; the European Commission asks NGOs to explain, in their project proposals, how the project will continue after funding has ended. The EC also welcomes the involvement of local authorities, to boost continuity (Interviews, 2007). Interviewees repeatedly referred to the dependence of NGOs on donor financing as a major problem. One reason for this dependence is that the local business community does not yet have the capacity to support civil society. One donor argues that the legal environment must change to facilitate the business community's support of NGOs. Capacity within NGOs must also be developed to provide NGOs with the skills and knowledge to raise money from the local business community, and also to raise money through the provision of various kinds of paid services. The donor is working with the creation of community foundations, which forms one part of the donor's support programme for NGO capacity building. Over the course of two years, NGOs are eligible for financial support from the donor. The amount of money allocated to an NGO is directly linked to the money raised by the NGO itself, on a one-for-one basis: if the NGO raises $2,000 it will receive the equivalent amount from the donor (Interviews, 2007).

According to donors and international organisations, Moldovan civil society may exert influence through:

- Monitoring reforms and presenting reports to public authorities.

- Representation in parliamentary committees (arising from a new official concept from 2006).

- Acting in CSO coalitions.

Moldovan civil society-influence is restricted by:

- Limited access to public information.

- Severe restrictions on media freedom.

- Limited (if any) feedback from parliamentary committees after CSOs have provided input into new legislation.

What could donors do to support Moldovan civil society more efficiently?
According to CSOs:

- Encourage the government to facilitate civil society participation, through dialogue, and financial and material support.

- Support a wider spectrum of CSOs. There is a tendency to concentrate support for a limited type of CSO, resulting in these CSOs controlling the agenda for other civil society organisations.

- Avoid focusing solely on direct support to ministries, since this is not an efficient way to support civil society. NGOs are mainly invited to participate as "guests", rather than as real partners.

- Avoid setting agendas for CSOs that are overly strict, or conversely too general, since CSOs must specialise on specific issues according to the context in which they act to become efficient.

- Give support to basic training needs such as report writing, accounting and advocacy.

- Monitor and support the actual implementation of laws.

- Encourage NGOs to work in coalitions and networks.

According to Moldovan public actors:
- Help increase capacity within the ministries to collaborate with civil society, focusing on specific, concrete issues to enable constructive collaboration.

- Improving coordination; most donors tend to support the same CSOs and similar themes such as D/HR.

- Support not only key CSOs, but also a wider spectrum of CSOs, and provide tools for developing expertise and communicating and with public actors.

- Civil society needs advocacy tools; instruments for communicating and promoting their ideas in order to be heard.

- Finding the tools for *how* to facilitate cooperation between civil society and authorities; the will to cooperate is already there.

- Focus on sustainability; assistance often has a short-term horizon. There is a need to improve implementation, not just to draft documents.

- Encourage civil society-public partnerships.

According to donors and international organisations:
- Allocate separate funds for different kinds of CSOs (strong/weak, advocacy/social).

- Develop CSO support in a participatory manner to suit local needs and the local context.

- Work with local regranting partners to facilitate more efficiency and flexibility.

- Encourage partnerships between strong and weak CSOs, particularly in rural areas.

- Encourage long-term partnerships between NGOs in different countries.

- Consider material needs of the CSOs; this is a prerequisite for participation.

- Enhance exchanges of good practice, for example reporting procedures.

- Support CSO training with a focus on improving constituencies, good leadership and project management. Training must be focused.

- Encourage the forming of CSO networks and coalitions.

- Condition support to the Moldovan government on promoting an enabling environment for civil society, including access to public information and media freedom.

- NGOs' weakest aspect is financial viability and sustainability - about 90 per cent depend on donor funding. Training in income-generating activities is urgently needed.

- There should be a more a long-term agenda for civil society support. Short-term plans make it difficult for NGOs to plan sustainably.

- Donors must consider possible negative consequences of implementing new development cooperation policies too hastily, in particular, channelling all aid through the Government: Firstly, with weak control and follow-up, the risk that this approach facilitates corruption; secondly the risk for indirectly endorsing the Government's poor civil society support; and thirdly the fact that policy trends can have severe impacts for entire regions.

- Prevent donor dependence, by encouraging NGO responsibility in funding issues and local involvement in projects.

4.4   Summary: CSO contributions to development goals

CSOs, and donors and international organisations, indicate relatively converging views about the civil society situation in Moldova. The area in which public actors reflect these other two broad groups' views most closely is regarding the role of Moldovan civil society. These three categories of interviewees consider that the main tasks for CSOs are to identify problems in society, promote public awareness of these problems, assert pressure for reform, contribute civil society expertise to, and monitor, reforms, and perform the role of watchdog in society. The CSOs and the donors also mentioned civil society's role as a provider of services that the State has neither the ability nor willingness to provide.

The three interviewee groups agree that civil society can exert the most influence at the state level through participation in parliamentary committees, through work in coalitions and by coordinating CSO activities. However, the extent of CSOs' influence is impinged mostly by factors that are external to the CSOs themselves, such as the general lack of access to public information and the restricted time afforded to CSOs to comment on public reforms. International organisations and donors highlight the severe restrictions on the media as a primary external limiting factor, while public officials identify state transparency issues within government and the withholding of funding for CSO participation by authorities as more significant limitations.

All interviewee groups highlighted expert CSOs working together and the existence of CSOs with developed advocacy capacities as strengths in civil society. The donors and the CSOs also highlighted the shift from quantity to quality in the activities of

CSOs, and the emergence of more informed CSOs in Transnistria, as further strengths in civil society. Public actors consider the increasing awareness within government ministries of the need for CSO input into reforms as a factor that is empowering civil society. Both CSOs and donors mention the stigmatisation of CSOs as income-providing vehicles as a weakness for civil society. Donors and international organisations identify the following internal limiting factors: the low level of administrative capacity within CSOs, limited cooperation and communication with CSOs exhibited by public actors, and a general lack of communication skills within CSOs and government alike.

The most divergent views centre on how donors may improve the effectiveness of their support to Moldovan civil society. However, all groups agree that support must include a wider spectrum of CSOs, for example including the full spectrum between strong and weak organisations, and those CSOs working on themes beyond democracy and human rights. CSOs encourage donors to focus on the Government, in particular to monitor and support the implementation of new laws. They also emphasise that direct CSO-support is still needed, since relying on the State to include CSOs can result in CSOs not being included as real partners. CSOs also request donor support for basic administrative training and continued encouragement to work in coalitions. In contrast, public actors demand support directed to ministries to increase the capacity for collaboration with civil society, and an elaboration of tools for collaboration. Public actors also emphasise the need for CSOs to develop advocacy tools. Donors and international organisations, and Moldovan public actors, emphasise the need for a longer-term agenda for civil society support. A focus on local needs and contexts and working with local regranting partners would be a more efficient use of donor support. Partnerships between urban and rural, and domestic and foreign, CSOs are encouraged, in order to facilitate the exchange of good practice experiences. The interviewees also agree that CSO work conducted in coalitions has proven to be the most efficient method of CSO activity. Further, the international organisations and donors consulted indicated that donors and international organisations could condition their support to the Moldovan Government on indicators linked to the strengthening of civil society, such as media freedom and access to public information.

5   Conclusions and Recommendations: Outcomes of Sida's CSO-support in Moldova and how to improve CSO results-monitoring and support

This evaluation has endeavoured to identify and assess outcomes of CSO programmes in Moldova that have received support from Sida during the period 2005-2007. A secondary objective has been to analyse how results-monitoring may be improved in order to enhance knowledge about such results. Thirdly, this report has discussed suggestions for making civil society support more efficient, based on the outcomes of civil society support in Moldova, and on suggestions from Moldovan CSOs, Moldovan official actors, and donors and international organisations. Sida's civil society support in Moldova is coordinated by three organisations: the Soros Foundation (Soros) and the Eurasian Foundation (EF) - both represented in Chisinau and with long experience in the promotion of democracy in the region - and the Swedish Helsinki Committee (SHC), based in Stockholm. The intermediation of Soros and the EF allows Sida the flexibility to reorient support strategies in the face of changing needs; the SHC contributes institutional competencies in the field of D/HR and experience of good practice. The CSO programmes that were evaluated in this study were each conceived to contribute to the following Swedish-Moldovan D/HR objectives (according to the Swedish-Moldovan cooperation strategy for the period 2004-2006):

- Increased respect for HR and democratic principles;

- Improved legislation in the interests of the population;

- Promotion of transparency and impeding corruption;

- Strengthened state-civil society cooperation; and

- Promotion of independent media and tackling discrimination.

In pursuit of these objectives, Moldovan CSO projects supported by the SHC aim to strengthen the rule of law (by creating awareness of HR and facilitating legal counsel), promote freedom of expression (by strengthening media independence) and tackle discrimination (by improving monitoring advocacy and the respect for the rights of minorities and other marginalised groups). Moldovan CSO projects that are supported by Soros focus on strengthening civil society and its influence in public reforms. The Soros projects emphasise media independence across the country, and CSO networking and advocacy in order to strengthen the rights of vulnerable groups (such as former prisoners). The EF civil society programme in Moldova focuses strongly on anti-corruption, democratic elections and promoting public participation and influence.

The SHC, Soros and EF programmes supported by Sida in Moldova: a) are consistent with Swedish-Moldovan D/HR objectives, and b) have achieved a high level of coordination to avoid overlapping efforts. The results of these programmes cannot be assessed in isolation from the contexts in which they are implemented. An understanding of what results to expect requires, on the one hand, a clear understanding of the Moldovan environment, and on the other, the context of international civil society support. With respect to the latter, consistent with the Paris Agenda, donors aim to work more directly with governments rather than with small-scale projects. While the Paris Declaration emphasises the importance of civil society participation, traditional small-grant CSO-support has been reduced in Moldova. Rather, donors increasingly encourage the Government to invite civil society to dialogue. Indeed, international experience shows that encouraging public-civil society partnerships (and CSO coalitions) is one effective way of strengthening civil society. However, in the Moldovan context, where civil society still faces restrictions on access to public information and in media freedoms, there is arguably still a great need to provide resources to facilitate civil society participation. Hence, assistance must both facilitate CSO participation and strengthen the capacity of CSOs to fulfil that role. Experience has shown that promoting public-civil society dialogue results in the strengthening of a small number of already active and established CSOs. The donor community tends to ignore the broader spectrum of CSOs in Moldova. If civil society participates in the public sphere merely through dialogue with ministries, there is a risk that governments will maintain a monopoly control over the civil society agenda.

In Moldova, Sida has, in contrast to most other donors, continued to support both CSO capacity development and advocacy. In particular, through the SHC, Soros and EF programmes, Sida supports well-established advocacy organisations, and coalitions of strong and weak CSOs alike. Sida has two aims in this approach: to facilitate civil society's influence over public reforms and participation in the reform process, and to strengthen a pluralistic civil society. This reflects both the Swedish-Moldovan cooperation strategy and Sida's own policy for civil society support. According to the Sida policy, civil society-strengthening is both an instrument for enabling the participation and influence of people who are poor, and a democracy objective in itself.

This evaluation has identified a large number of concrete outcomes of the Sida-financed CSO programmes in Moldova. In terms of formal results, it is striking that a majority of the CSOs supported by Sida have been involved in, and have explicitly influenced, several legislative projects during the period 2005-2007. However, public-civil society dialogue in Moldova does retain problematic elements. While ministries invite CSOs to comment upon new legislation, they do not provide sufficient time for CSOs to assess the drafts, or give feedback to the CSOs about how their input has been taken into consideration. Conversely, as a result of a growing dependency of some ministries upon expertise possessed by certain CSO coalitions (and through donors demanding CSO participation), during the period of our assessment there have been increasing opportunities for civil society to exert influence over policy and reform. Further, the evaluation also identified the widespread donor-dependency of many CSOs as an ongoing problem. Many CSOs still have weak capacities for generating incomes, collecting information, and monitoring and identifying contributions.

This evaluation has also identified significant qualitative outcomes of the contributions of CSOs, such as changes in public officials' perceptions of and relations with civil society. The increasing trend for public officials to seek civil society input into public reforms is a strong indicator of the strengthening of civil society. The principal outcomes of the Sida-supported CSO programmes in Moldova during the period 2005-2007 are listed below. This study has established - by cross-referencing interviews with Moldovan public officials, various donors and international organisations and a large number of CSOs - that CSOs have contributed to these outcomes. Further, there is substantial documentation, both official and in the media, verifying the contribution of CSOs to these outcomes.

Quantitative outcomes of Sida-supported CSO programmes in Moldova during 2005-2007
Contributions to democratic practices and principles

• Amendments to the 2004 election code, ensuring democratic voting procedures.

• Charter guaranteeing transparency and non-bias during election campaigns.

• Central and local election committees constituted according to democratic norms.

• Memorandum enhancing Parliament/Government of Moldova (GoM)-civil society collaboration.

• Draft transparency law.

• New secondary school subject promoting D/HR and knowledge about Moldovan legislation.

• Local and independent media networks expanded across the country.

• Anti-corruption examination incorporated into parliamentary legislative procedures.

Contributions to strengthened HR and non-discrimination

• Legislation and programmes against violence in the family.

• Four homes for children in difficulty now financed by Chisinau City Hall.

• Secondary laws protecting prisoners' social, political and economic rights (2006).

• Complaints committee concerned with prisoners' rights.

• Social reintegration programmes for former prisoners.

• Legislation and codes of conduct in prisons aligned to HR standards.

• 9 community centres providing assistance for vulnerable groups (such as former prisoners).

• Publicly financed public-CSO partnerships to assist people with mental, social and physical problems (for example, in Balti).

• Legislation protecting rights of disabled (drafted jointly by 14 CSOs).

- Draft anti-discrimination law protecting a wider range of minorities, including Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender (LGBT)-persons.

- Establishment of the Ministry of Social Protection.

- Gender equality law ratified in 2006.

- Rural CSO coalition, leading to public support for small farms.

Qualitative outcomes of Sida-supported CSO programmes in Moldova during 2005-2007

Contributions to democratic practices and principles

- Understanding among public officials of the importance of integrating D/HR principles into reforms and new laws; public actors asking for CSO input.

- Attention brought to corruption cases and preferential court judgments.

- Media at local and national levels disseminating non-biased information.

- Changed composition of the Central Electoral Commission (CEC) has increased citizens' trust in the electoral process and system.

- Media at national and local levels reflecting the interests of various sections of the population.

- The "civic coalition", consisting of a network of 200 CSOs active during the 2005 parliamentary elections, resulted in a strengthened, more confident and pluralistic, civil society.

Contributions to strengthened HR and non-discrimination

- Public servants' attitudes towards vulnerable groups, such as prisoners and people living with HIV/Aids more open and constructive.

- Demand from public actors and the public, across the country, for HR activities.

Of course, the progress identified in the work of these CSOs cannot solely be attributed to Sida support. The activities of various CSOs, donors and other actors jointly contribute to D/HR objectives and processes. For example, in the areas of anti-discrimination and the rule of law, one important result is the joint CSO-Government efforts in drafting an anti-discrimination law in 2006. The offering of small grants[23] by the UNDP, DFID, UNICEF and other donors some years ago also greatly contributed to the growth in the number of CSOs and civil society activities. It is evident that CSOs that formed coalitions, specialised in certain fields and remained involved in advocacy have strengthened their organisations and influence over the period 2005-2007, with the assistance of support provided to CSO coalitions, networks and advocacy by Sida and USAID in their CSO programmes.

A significant qualitative outcome that can be attributed equally to Sida's partners in CSO-support (the SHC, Soros and the EF, together with their Moldovan CSO part-

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[23] There may not be a definitive definition of the term "small grants", however common features of small grants programmes include: targeting CBOs; seeking to affect social change at the local level; focusing on capacity building and institutional support; and encouragement of greater dialogue between grant-givers and beneficiaries. The purpose of small grants is to strengthen the voices of diverse groups and to promote the inclusion of a broad array of citizens' initiatives into development policies. Source:
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTSMALLGRANTS/ResourcesorLinks/20711144/SgpWorkshop.pdf, pages 1-5.

ners) is the awareness their work has raised, and the action it has spurred, for D/HR issues, such as corruption and preferential court judgments. This work is imperative for stimulating debate around D/HR issues and for developing a democratic culture. The increasing visibility of the activities of each of the three CSO programmes supported by Sida in Moldova is another significant qualitative result of these programmes. This, amongst other factors, has led to a realisation among Moldovan decision-makers, and also increasingly among citizens, that CSO work is more than just a vehicle for generating incomes for CSO staff. Credibility is an ongoing struggle for many CSOs, since many were established with the sole purpose of attracting funding from donors as an income-generating exercise, rather than as an enterprise in the pursuit of public good.

Effective monitoring of CSO results is essential to allow an understanding of how civil society contributes to development cooperation objectives. This evaluation has assessed the respective capacities of the CSO programmes supported by Sida in Moldova to measure results. Effective monitoring procedures are as beneficial for CSOs - to strengthen their standing in relation to the public, official actors and donors, and for learning about the positive and negative effects of their strategies - as they are for donors. Our conclusions and recommendations regarding results-monitoring among Sida's CSO partners in Moldova follow.

Capacities of CSOs to measure outcomes, and recommendations for improving monitoring

Effective monitoring of results requires sustained and regular measurement of both qualitative and quantitative results. It is also important to identify possible risks and negative impacts of a programme. Such monitoring must be sensitive to the length of time that might be expected for certain types of results to develop. Sida has supported the SHC programme in Moldova since 2004, and the Soros and EF programmes since 2006; these programmes have each surpassed their initial output stages (that is, they have moved beyond the implementation of activities). Meanwhile, the programmes are too young, and budgets too small, to have, as yet, produced long-term impacts (such as the comprehensive protection of the human rights of all Moldavians throughout the country). Hence, the appropriate level of aggregation for following up the results of these programmes is the outcomes (that is, the results that the direct outputs of CSO projects contribute to) level.

The reporting of the SHC, Soros and the EF indicates that these organisations have endeavoured to improve their use of the logical framework approach (LFA) and their measuring of results. Parallel with quantitative results, all three organisations consider qualitative measures, such as behavioural change among government officials. Such results may be short-term and small-scale, but still contribute to significant impacts. It is therefore critical to follow up short-term (or intermediate) and qualitative results. The organisations evaluated here have demonstrated competency in measuring short-term outcomes. Within the Soros and EF structures this appears attributable to clear guidelines for CSO-reporting. The type of information to be reported on a regular basis from each Moldovan CSO project is clearly defined (for example, target groups, impact, lessons learnt, difficulties and opportunities, qualitative and quantitative indicators, sustainability, and so on). These procedures contribute to a rich and useful documentation of results.

Consistent with a results-based approach and LFA, it is important to use indicators to follow up results. These indicators must clearly reflect the objectives. They must also target qualitative and quantitative, and positive and negative, outcomes. The SHC, Soros and the EF all work to improve their use of indicators. For example, Soros's social reintegration projects use indicators to follow up a wide spectrum of changes: prison conditions, detainees' access to information, and so on. It also has procedures for evaluating the projects, thus generating qualitative indicators. The SHC's reporting reflects a clear understanding of measuring outcomes, but there are fewer references to indicators than in Soros's reporting. The EF employs indicators within all projects, and aggregates them to the programme level, as does Soros. The EF reporting documentation reflects a clear understanding of relations between outputs and outcomes. Media reports about public-civil society consultative meetings, and the minutes of those meeting, are examples of appropriate evidence-based outputs. Among the outcomes mentioned in the EF reporting documentation are mechanisms created for civil society-government cooperation. However, there is a tendency to identify outputs quantitatively, while identifying outcomes qualitatively. It is important to identify both qualitative and quantitative results, at both output and outcome levels. Qualitative and quantitative indicators need to be combined to enhance knowledge about the spread and the quality of, and mechanisms producing, the results. For example, quantitative indicators, such as the number of new laws, provide information about the scope of results, whereas qualitative indicators reveal more about the meaning of these results; for example, has new legislation led to vulnerable groups being less discriminated against? is the public aware of and claiming their rights? and so on. Based on the assessment of the results-measurement of the SHC, Soros and the EF, we provide the following recommendations:

- Develop overall indicators for the programme level jointly with the CSO partners and other relevant stakeholders to ensure the indicators selected are realistic.

- Encourage CSO partners to report results on the basis of both qualitative and quantitative project indicators that may, in turn, be aggregated into overall programme indicators.

- Combine qualitative and quantitative indicators: Quantitative measures indicate the scope of achievements; qualitative indicators reflect the quality of, and mechanisms producing, the results.

- Ensure data is collected regularly through simple procedures and at low cost within all projects.

- Enhance evaluation capacities within CSOs, including competence and resources.

Effective results-monitoring, based on qualitative and quantitative indicators, is essential for capturing the results of civil society support. The use of a wide spectrum of indicators, reflecting both short- and long-term achievements, is an important tool for improving civil society support.

The role of donors in the case of Moldova - Recommendations for improving CSO-support

This evaluation provides a number of suggestions regarding our third objective; how civil society support may be improved. We have canvassed a large number of Moldovan CSOs and various donors and international organisations, as well as Moldovan public actors. The Moldovan CSOs argue that increased coordination between donors, and an increase in the concentration of support aimed at certain specific sectors, would help develop CSO-capacities across various domains. This would enable CSO coalitions, to specialise in certain fields, and to more effectively collaborate, both with donors and Moldovan public actors, on a long-term basis. This approach would also enhance general capacity development within CSOs. In the 1990s, most donors had similar, broad, civil society agendas that embraced a large number of D/HR issues. This led to extensive CSO agendas, covering a broad range of D/HR issues, and a great deal of overlap in CSO activities. Today, CSOs that work in specialised coalitions have the greatest capacity and influence. Further, as Moldovan officials have themselves emphasised, civil society input is needed in most reforms, not only for those related to D/HR. Since civil society participation is imperative to enable a democratic and pluralistic society to fully develop, this participation should not be restricted to certain, specific areas. Hence, to strengthen civil society's capacity and influence, donors should continue encouraging public-civil society partnerships, but should avoid limiting CSO-support to advocacy and D/HR issues. This evaluation has demonstrated that there remains an urgent need for training within most Moldovan CSOs. General capacity development is imperative for civil society to remain independent, and to be empowered to set its own agenda. Building the independence of civil society is also critical in order to build in the citizenry a sense of trust in, and representation by, civil society. We make the following recommendations for strengthening civil society:

Recommendations to CSOs for civil society-strengthening

• Promote the forming of coalitions, and include CSOs that are weaker or acting in difficult environments (such as Transnistria) to enhance the influence and capacities of CSOs.

• Ensure regular data collection on results within all projects by using simple, clear procedures. Improved results-monitoring and use of evidence-based outcomes would strengthen CSOs' credibility and influence, in relation to decision-makers, the public and donors.

• Develop income-generating activities to decrease donor dependency.

• Enhance internal and external communications strategies.

What to promote among public actors for civil society-strengthening

• Create an enabling environment for civil society to develop and strengthen, by providing material resources and public space through free access to information and a more independent media.

• Continue inviting civil society to dialogue, but ensure that information is provided well in advance, and provide meaningful feedback to CSOs that have contributed input.

- Develop, jointly with civil society, procedures for public-civil society partnerships that include accountability and transparency mechanisms.

Recommendations to donors for civil society-strengthening

- Encourage CSO coalitions to enhance transfer of competencies and capacities between CSOs and strengthen civil society as a whole. Do not exclude weaker CSOs.

- Work with CSO partners in various domains (not only in the field of D/HR) to strengthen a wider spectrum of CSOs and to ensure a pluralistic civil society-influence in broader society.

- Encourage public-civil society partnerships in the shaping, carrying out and monitoring of reforms, including the implementation stage. Do not limit civil society participation to certain programming phases (such as law design).

- Continue to support capacity-development within CSOs. Most CSOs still need basic organisational training in order to function highly effectively.

- Conduct risk analysis prior to implementing new development cooperation policies. Effects of new policies may have severe consequences that could be avoided are plans for dealing with such consequences developed beforehand. New policy trends may have damaging unintended consequences that could be avoided; develop plans for dealing with such consequences beforehand.

- Enhance sustained CSO strategies by promoting income-generating activities other than donor funding.

- Promote transparency and accountability mechanisms in public-CSO partnerships.

Civil society in a post-communist and EU-integration context

These recommendations can be extrapolated and applied to other civil society contexts similar to Moldova's; post-communist structures, with residual limits on media freedom and on public access to information, represent barriers that need to be overcome to enable the strengthening of civil society. The former Soviet regime in Moldova ultimately contributed to a decimation of civil society activity in a democratic and pluralistic sense. Hence, CSOs have developed, and found their role in society, only gradually. It is therefore critical to continue working for an environment conducive to the flourishing of a pluralistic civil society. The other defining environmental context of Moldovan civil society is the ongoing European integration process. The EU integration plan has opened opportunities for civil society participation in national reform processes. Indeed, donors and CSOs have been relatively efficient in seizing opportunities, at the right moments, for roles for civil society throughout the European integration processes. It is important for civil society to seize these opportunities to claim a voice for civil society in European integration reforms, not only as a watchdog, but also as an instrument for participation and influence for Moldovan citizens.

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Appendix I

Log Frames for CSO programmes of the Swedish Helsinki Committee, the Soros Foundation and the Eurasian Foundation supported by Sida in Moldova

Figure 1.1 Log Frame for the Swedish Helsinki Committee Programme in Moldova 2004-2006

Overall Objective (what to contribute to)		Assumption
Improved respect for human rights in the Republic of Moldova: *"Enhanced access of the population to justice" (1)* *"Strengthen the rights of persons or groups who may be subject to threats or acts of discrimination" (2)* *"Strengthen the right to hold opinions and to receive and impart information, and to enhance people's access to balanced and objective information" (3)*		*Enhanced awareness and recognition of HR and the rule of law, improved accountability and compliance of duty-holders, and facilitated legal counsel and assistance will enhance people's access to justice.* *Improved professionalism in journalism, media legislation, new technologies and media management, strengthened media support organisations, and media pluralism, will strengthen freedom of expression.* *Improved monitoring and advocacy on minority rights and improved expression of minorities and discriminated groups will strengthen the rights of discriminated groups.*
Programme Purpose (what to achieve)	**Outputs (what to deliver)**	**Outcomes/Indicators (measures of contributions)**
1.1 Rule-of-Law	Regional HR awareness campaigns; HR training with police, civil servants, journalists etc; Elaboration of proposals for changes of/amendments to the legal framework on prevention of torture of detainees & access to fair treatment & a correct judicial procedure in connection with detention (during 2002-2006); Monitoring of civil/political rights; Support NGO working with legal advice/advocacy for free counsel;	
1.2 Non-Discrimination	Info campaigns; Support/advocacy activities for discriminated groups;	
1.3 Freedom of Expression (the media component has largely been excluded from the programme.)	Support to: journalistic education projects, new technologies, media (local in particular) management; journalist assoc., media centra, professional organisations; individual media outlets/networks;	

(Sources: Sida, 2003c, 2006a; SHC, 2004; Embassy of Sweden-Office for cooperation, Moldova, 2006: 7-8).

Figure 1.2 Log Frame for the Soros Foundation programme in Moldova 2006-2008

Overall Objective (what to contribute to)		Assumption
"Further develop a vibrant and democratic civil society in Moldova" *"Improved channels for poor people to influence policy making (component 1), prevention of social exclusion (component 2), improved access to media for poor persons (component 3)"*		*Civil society will be strengthened via NGO involvement in policy-making, support to local media and development of new services to marginalised groups.*
Programme Purpose (what to achieve)	**Outputs (what to deliver)**	**Outcomes/Indicators (measures of contributions)**
1. Strengthening the non-governmental sector (improve influence & impact of Moldovan civil society actors in promotion of democratic changes at community, institutional, social & policy level)	20 NGOs get capacity & skills to advocate affectively for new or amended public policies/laws & regulations; Creation of 5 advocacy coalitions; Knowledge & skill transfer from experienced national NGOs to 50 local NGOs; NGO-led campaigns on 5 D/HR-, Rule of law-, quality of life-issues; Civil society info. flow & activities include Transnistrian NGOs;	NGO coalitions contribute to systemic changes that benefit different society groups; Improved functioning of democratic institutions;
2. Social reintegration of marginalised groups/ex-detainees (improve quality of assistance for social re-integration of ex-detainees as a marginalised group)	Preparation for release program developed & enforced through regulatory penitentiary framework & social reintegration program; 30 prison staff at 6 prisons trained on preparation for release; 30 community members trained on enforcement of post-penitentiary probation as probation officers; Up to 500 ex-detainees (including Bender/Transnistria) assisted to re-integrate; Assessment of current re-integration system; 500 ex of guide for release preparation publ. & disseminated to prisons; 7 post penitentiary probation councillors learnt about Romanian experience; 500 guide-books to social re-integration officers; 1000 ex-detainee guide-leaflets spread in all prisons, including in Transnistria;	Replicable model of interaction of penitentiary & community based services, based on collaboration & partnership among several actors; Post-penitentiary probation services located in prisons & communities; Mechanisms for re-establishing offender/victim relations; Greater cooperation & coordination of civil society & government efforts; A community more tolerant, participative & aware of the needs of the vulnerable; Greater public awareness;
3. Strengthening good governance (improve professional capacity of independent local & national media in providing un-biased information, fostering social dialogue & active citizen involvement in decision-making processes affecting life quality)	Journalistic training & support to networking & experience sharing; Support to independent media; At least 10 community radio- & 10 TV stations (about 250 people) acquire data gathering & processing skills & apply professional program production techniques;	70% of the country territory covered with local broadcasting/programs of community interest;

(Sources: Sida, 2006b; Soros Foundation - Moldova)

Figure 1.3 Log Frame for the Eurasian Foundation Programme in Moldova 2006-2008

Overall Objective (what to contribute to)		Assumption
"Promote & enhance public engagement on poverty reduction, democratic elections, European integration & fighting corruption. Increase civic participation & government accountability."		*Trust building between government, CSOs, mass media & the public, & civil society-government cooperation to enhance implementation of poverty-reducing, democratic reforms.*
Programme Purpose (what to achieve)	**Outputs (what to deliver)**	**Outcomes/Indicators (measures of contributions)**
1.1 Strengthen the National Commission for Implementation of the EU-Moldova Action Plan.	Civil society participation methods learnt in Romania, Poland & Ukraine; Cooperation between National Commission & civil society; Civil society involvement reflected in GoM's legal norms;	Increase in successful initiatives of the National Commission; Clearer role of civil society in promotion & implementation; Improved quality of the National Commission's surveys, research & reports;
1.2 Strengthen the EGPRS Participation Council's capacity & enhance quality of NGO participation, including advocacy organisations representing the rural & urban poor, women & minorities.	Grants to NGOs working with the Participation Council; Quality monitoring reports produced & widely spread; Improved dialogue with government agencies; Support to NGOs representing poor & minorities; Collection of baseline & Citizen Confidence (Index) data;	More transparent EGPRSP reporting process with CSOs engaged; CSOs participating in decision-making through monitoring; Patterns created for effective CSO-government cooperation; Pro-poor-, women- & minority-CSOs participate & influence; Baseline data & Citizen Confidence Index show public opinion & progress;
1.3 Improve citizen buy-in for reform policies through public education & support to local initiatives.	Training for journalists; Public campaigns; Publications; Public debates & discussions; Development services delivered to identified advocacy NGOs;	Public understanding of EU-MAP/EGPRSP & the role of the public for implementation; Increased no. of local initiatives; Improved media understanding & reporting on EU-MAP/EGPRS;
2.1 Improved legal framework for elections (election code etc) & the enforcements of electoral laws.	Amendments to election-related legislation developed by CSOs; Study tours to Ukraine; Advocacy campaigns change voting procedures;	
2.2 Improve civic activism & voter participation.	Monitoring of implementation of electoral platforms; Pre- and post-2007 voter education campaigns;	
2.3 CSO coordination in ensuring free & fair election process.	Joint monitoring of implementation of electoral platforms;	Electoral code adjusted; More info on electoral promise fulfilment; More info on election & candidates; Democratic election standards; Increased voter turnout, abroad & in remote areas;
3.1 Improve skills & capacity of NGO monitoring of corruption.	Training for working group members; Study tours to Ukraine & Romania;	
3.2 Improved media capacity in corruption reporting.	Journalistic investigation projects; Results of journalistic investigations widely disseminated;	
3.3 Local anti-corruption initiatives.	Anti-corruption hotlines; Free legal services; CSO training; CSO net-working; Grants to local projects;	Functioning of effective CSO anti-corruption net-work; Enhanced local anti-corruption efforts; Improved public service & media;

(Sources: Eurasia Foundation, 2005; Sida, 2006c)

Appendix II

Interview Guide I.

Questions to Programme Officers (Sida) and CSOs Channelling Swedish CSO-Support in Moldova (Eurasian Foundation, Soros Foundation, the Swedish Helsinki Committee)

Monitoring Routines

1   What responsibilities do CSOs have to report on results to Sida?

2   What reporting tools are offered from Sida?

3   What are the main problems encountered in results monitoring? How can such problems be tackled?

Appendix III

Interview Guide II.

Questions to Moldovan public officials (at ministries and governmental agencies) that collaborate with Moldovan CSOs which receive Swedish support, and to international organisations and donors based in Moldova

Outcomes of CSO activities and programmes supported by Sida in Moldova during the last few years

1   What is the role of CSOs/civil society today?

2   Has this role changed during the last few years – if so, how? What has been the role of donors in this regard?

3   What opportunities are there for civil society actors to influence public institutions and public policy-making processes?

4   What mechanisms exist for sharing public information with civil society/CSOs? How is transparency assured?

5   How have CSOs influenced official institutions, public practices and/or decision-making over the last few years? (please give examples of such results)

6   What has been the role of donors in relation to civil society development during the last few years? How do approaches of different donors differ?

7   How may donors support civil society development (in a sustainable way)? What kinds of support are needed?

Appendix IV

Interview Guide III.

Questions to Moldovan CSOs that receive funding from Sida (through SHC/Soros/EF)

Influence and outcomes of civil society activities in Moldova

The role of civil society and State-civil society dialogue

1   What is the role of CSOs today in Moldova?

2   Has this role changed over the last few years - if so, how? What has been the role of donors in this regard?

3   What possibilities are there for CSOs to influence public institutions and their practices and political decision-making processes in Moldova?

4   Have these possibilities changed during the last few years - if so, how?

5   What mechanisms exist for sharing public information with civil society/CSOs? How is transparency assured?

6   Mention a few factors that enhance the influence of CSOs upon practices and decision-making of public institutions in Moldova.

7   Mention a few factors that impede the influence of CSOs upon practices and decision-making of public institutions in Moldova.

Outcomes and donor support

1   How have the activities of your organisation, during the last years, affected democratic practices, the human rights situation and/or the situation of people who are poor and/or discriminated against in Moldova?

2   What has been the role of donors in relation to such results? How do approaches of different donors differ?

3   How may donors support civil society development (in a sustainable way)? What kinds of support are needed?

Appendix V

CSOs in Moldova that receive Swedish Support, through the SHC, Soros and the EF, and included in the SADEV 2007 CSO Survey of Outcomes of Swedish-Supported Civil Society Contributions to Democracy and Human Rights in Moldova

Moldovan partners to the Swedish Helsinki Committee

1. Centre for Promotion of Freedom of Expression and Access to Information "Acces-info"
2. League for Defence of Human Rights of Moldova (LADOM)
3. Law Centre of Advocates
4. Public Association "Lawyers for human rights"
5. Pro-Democracy Association
6. Promo-Lex Association
7. The Independent Society for Education and Human Rights (SIEDO)
8. Association of Students with Disabilities "GAUDEAMUS" from Moldova
9. Information Centre GenderDoc-M

Moldovan partners to the Soros

1. Youth for the Right to Live Association, Chişinău
2. AGROinform National Federation of Agricultures from Moldova
3. Young and Free Resource Centre
4. INTECO Civic Association
5. Caroma-Nord NGO
6. National Youth Resource Centre
7. Motivation Association
8. New Generation Association
9. Credinţa (Faith) Association
10. Regional Human Rights Association from Transnistria, Dubasări
11. CREDO Resource Center for Human Rights
12. National Center for Prevention of Child Abuse
13. CAPTES Center for Information, Training and Social Analysis in Moldova
14. Prietenii Copiilor Association
15. Youth for the Right to Live Association, Bălţi
16. Boscana XXI NGO
17. Media Center for Communication and Democracy

Moldovan partners to the Eurasian Foundation

The EF's local CSO partners in Moldova are
1. CONTACT Center, Bălţi
2. LADOM
3. DIALOG Association for Communication and Democratic Cooperation
4. API
5. IDIS Viitorul
6. Expert Grup
7. National Youth Council
8. ADEPT
9. Habitat
10. DECA-Press
11. Femeia Moderna Association of Women
12. Institute for Democracy, Comrat
13. National Center for Transparency and Human Rights NGO
14. Ex-Lege NGO
15. Center for Analysis and Prevention of Corruption NGO

16. Union of Jurists of Moldova NGO
17. Transparency International Moldova
18. PRO Marshall Center of Moldova NGO
19. Contact Center, Cahul
20. Monitor Media Agency, Bălţi

Appendix VI SADEV 2007 CSO SURVEY

SADEV
SWEDISH
AGENCY FOR
DEVELOPMENT
EVALUATION

Agenţia Suedeză de Evaluare a Cooperării Internaţionale

2007-04-03

Dear Sir/Madame,

This letter is sent to NGOs that cooperate with the Eurasian Foundation (EF), the Soros Foundation, or the Swedish Helsinki Committee (SHC) in Moldova. These NGOs receive funding from the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida). The Swedish Agency for Development Evaluation (SADEV) conducts a study of Sida's support to NGOs/civil society. *The aim is to see how Sida may improve this support since Swedish support to NGOs, civil society, democracy and human rights is increasing.* We kindly ask each organisation receiving this letter to answer to the 13 questions below (by writing directly in this word document). You may answer either in English or in Romanian language. Please use as much space as you want and send your answers to SADEV at: karin.dawidson@sadev.se; inger.wikstrom@sadev.se

All answers will be dealt with confidentially. The anonymity of all respondents will be respected. Your participation is very valuable for us. Thank you very much for your contribution!

> *Sincerely,*
> *Karin Dawidson & Inger Wikström, SADEV*

Stimată Doamnă/Stimate Domn,

Această scrisoare este trimisă ONG-urilor ce colaborează cu Fundaţia Eurasia Moldova (EF), Fundaţia Soros-Moldova, sau Comitetul Helsinki pentru Drepturile Omului din Suedia (SHC) în Republica Moldova. Aceste ONG-uri primesc sprijin financiar de la Agenţia Suedeză pentru Dezvoltare şi Cooperare Internaţională (Asdi). Agenţia Suedeză de Evaluare a Cooperării Internaţionale (SADEV) face un studiu privind sprijinul Asdi pentru societatea civilă/ONG-uri. *Scopul este de a vedea cum Asdi ar putea îmbunătăţi acest sprijin, într-un context în care sprijinul suedez pentru ONG-uri, societatea civilă, democraţie şi drepturile omului este în creştere.* Rugăm acele organizaţii care primesc scrisoarea aceasta să răspundă la cele 13 întrebări de mai jos, scriind direct în acest document Word. Puteţi să răspundeţi în limba engleză sau în limba română. Vă rog să folosiţi cât spaţiu aveţi nevoie în document şi să trimiteţi răspunsurile la SADEV la: karin.dawidson@sadev.se ; inger.wikstrom@sadev.se .

Toată informația originală din acest formar va fi tratată confidențial. Celor care sunt intervievați li se va păstră anonimatul. Participarea dumneavoastră este foarte importantă pentru noi. Vă mulțumim mult pentru colaborare!

Cu stimă,
Karin Dawidson & Inger Wikström, SADEV

Questions to NGOs cooperating with the EF, the SHC or Soros in Moldova
Intrebări pentru ONG:uri colaborând cu SHC, Soros sau EF în Republica Moldova

The role of civil society
Rolul societății civile

1   What is the role of NGOs today in Moldova?
     În prezent, care este rolul ONG-urilor în Republica Moldova?

2   Has this role changed over the last few years - if so, how?
     S-a schimbat rolul acestora în ultimii ani? - Dacă da, cum s-a schimbat?

3   What possibilities are there for NGOs to influence public institutions and their practices, and political decision-making processes in Moldova? What factors may enable/disable this NGO interaction?
     Care sunt șansele pentru ONG-uri să aibă o influență asupra instituțiilor publice și asupra activității lor, și asupra deciziilor politice în Republica Moldova? Care sunt factorii care ar putea îmbunătăți interacțiunea aceasta dintre instituțiile publice și ONG-uri?

4   Have these possibilities changed during the last few years - if so, how?
     Aceste posibilități s-au schimbat în ultimul timp? - Dacă da, cum s-au schimbat?

5   Mention a few factors or circumstances that enhance the influence of NGOs upon practices and decision-making of public institutions in Moldova.
     Vă rog să dați câteva exemple de factori sau circumstanțe care întăresc influența ONG-urilor asupra activităților și deciziilor instituțiilor publice în Republica Moldova.

6   Mention a few factors that impede the influence of CSOs upon practices and decision-making of public institutions in Moldova.
     Vă rog să dați câteva exemple de factori sau circumstanțe care reduc influența ONG-urilor asupra funcțiilor și deciziilor instituțiilor publice în Republica Moldova.

Outcomes
Rezultate

7   How have the activities of your organisation, during the last years, affected
     democratic practices, the human rights situation and/or the situation of people
     who are poor and/or discriminated against in Moldova?
     Cum au influenţat activităţile organizaţiilor dumneavoastră, în ultimi ani, democratizarea, re-
     spectarea drepturilor omului şi/sau situaţia persoanelor sărace sau discriminate în Republica
     Moldova?

8   How can one be sure that these effects were due to your activities?
     Cum se poate evalua dacă acestea sunt rezultate ale activităţilor dumneavoastră?

9   What are the main problems in measuring your organisation's contributions to
     programme goals? How can one deal with such problems?
     Care sunt problemele cele mai importante cu privire la măsurarea rezultatelor organizaţiilor
     dumneavoastră în relaţia cu scopurile programelor dumneavoastră? Cum se pot reduce aceste
     probleme?

10   Have the activities that you refer to been carried out in the Transnistria region?
     (please indicate if and how opportunities for success differ from the rest of
     Moldova)
     Aţi pus în practică activităţile menţionate şi în Transnistria? (Vă rog să spuneţi dacă, şi cum,
     posibilităţile pentru succes sunt diferite în Transnistria în comparaţie cu restul Republicii
     Moldova)

11   What are the opportunities for NGOs to influence and be active in Transnistria,
     compared to the rest of Moldova?
     Care sunt posibilităţile ONG-urilor pentru a fi active şi pentru să avea o influenţă în Trans-
     nistria, în comparaţie cu restul Republicii Moldova?

12   Please indicate if your organisation is based in an urban or a rural area, and how
     the location impacts upon opportunities for being successful.
     Vă rog să indicaţi dacă organizaţia dumneavoastră este localizată într-o zonă urbană sau
     într-o zonă rurală, şi cum localizarea poate să aibă o influenţă pentru proiecte de succes.

13   Please indicate if you cooperate with the EF, Soros or the SHC.
     Vă rog să indicaţi dacă sunteţi partener al EF, al Soros sau al SHC.